1

STONEHILL VS DIAKO
Facts: Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners
personally, and/or corporations for which they are officers directing peace officers to
search the persons of petitioners and premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences to search for personal properties:
books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents showing all business transactions
including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins(cigarettes) as the subject of the offense for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner Alleged, that the search warrants are null as it contradicts the constitution:
(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation
cases filed against them
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner
(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the
warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law
The petitioner maintained that the search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and that
accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void.
The constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
2 major groups(writ of preliminary injunction was partially lifted or dissolved)
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations
(b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
1. As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to
assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance
thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities,
separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners,
Documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to
above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations
A question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have been invaded.
2.With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners.
The court lifted the preliminary injunction. , restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from
using them in evidence against petitioners herein.
iSSUE: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the
authority thereof, are valid or not
(2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative,

HELD: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the
manner set forth in said provision
(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were
issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a
"violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence,
it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of
probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the
party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of
fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein
petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," as
alleged in the aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate provision of said
laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and
the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of
peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above
quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in
times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even
though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by
providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue
but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification,
the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one
specific offense."
NO GENERAL SEARCH WARRANT CAN BE ISSUED. =because they place the sanctity of the
domicile and the privacy of the communication and correspondence at the mercy of the
whims, caprice or passion of peace officers.
No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense
Illegally seized documents are inadmissible evidence to the court
The corporation being considered as a person exist only in contemplation of the law

TORRES VS GONZALES
FACTS: petitioner was convicted of the crime of estafa (2counts).a conditional pardon was granted to
the petitioner by the President of the Philippines on condition that petitioner would "not again violate
any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against
in the manner prescribed by law.
The pardon was cancelled on the ground that the petitioner had been charged with twenty counts of
estafa and had been convicted of the crime of sedition.
The respondent Minister of Justice issued "by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and
Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa
to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence.
The petitioner now question the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment. He claims that he
did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment
Petitioner also contends that he was not given an opportunity to be heard before he was arrested and
recommitted to prison, and accordingly claims he has been deprived of his rights under the due
process clause of the Constitution.
ISSUE: whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the
petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional
pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.
HELD: no. to grant to convicted prisoners reprieves or pardons, either plenary or partial, conditional or
unconditional; to suspend sentences without parole, remit fines, and order the discharge of any
convicted person upon parole, subject to such conditions as he may impose; and to authorize the
arrest and recommitment of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the
condition or conditions, of his pardon, paroleor suspension of sentence

4
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are
purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper
consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny
under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for
and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where
the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final
judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional
pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et unique judicial process, and because the conditionally
pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the
offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is
not afflicted with a constitutional vice.
Who determines if violated? The PRESIDENT. When the person was conditionally pardoned it was a
generous exercise by the Chief Executive of his constitutional prerogative. The acceptance thereof by
the convict or prisoner carrie[d] with it the authority or power of the Executive to determine whether a
condition or conditions of the pardon has or have been violated. To no other department of the
Government [has] such power been intrusted.

US vs VALLEJO
FACTS: A complaint of a public disturbance lodged by the Januario Duran with the police authorities of
Polangui, in the province of Albay, the city hall sent to municipal policemen, named Saravillo and Sabio
to the place of the disturbance, (the house of Salvador Vallejo).
NARRATION OF SABIO(of what occurred):
The guard said to us, "Go to San Diego and get the people who are making a scandal there." I
immediately went following Tranquilino, to the house of Salvador Vallejo. While we were still on the
ground we heard the shouts of Vallejo. He was running from one side to the other of his house. When I
approach the house of Vallejo I heard the words in a loud voice, Matza, turco, tesorero municipal
secretaryo de . . . (using obscenity which it is unnecessary to quote). We were about five rods distant.
When he spoke those words he was upstairs in his house at the window. Tranquilino and I and a great
many other people were near the house. We were in front of the house looking and listening. There are
other house there, but none immediately opposite. We immediately went up the steps to arrest the
accused Vallejo. On arriving on the top of the stairs I knocked on the door, we heard Vallejo asked,
"Who is it?," and I said, "municipal police." Thereupon Vallejo immediately came to the door to meet
us, and as he approached us he said ". . . (another obscene expression), policias municipales." He
stopped inside the doorway and asked us, "Have you any warrant to come in?" I replied that we had
none, and then he immediately struck Tranquilino Saravillo with his fist, and immediately afterwards he

5
struck me also. When I felt him strike me here in the cheek and I dodged and stuck him with my club.
When he attempted to strike me again of his fist I caught his right hand. I said to Salvador Vallejo, "You
are arrested". We arrested because he did not come with us but resisted. Then Blas Ausina came out
and threw his arms around Vallejo's body and dragged him away from us, and immediately drew him
inside and close the door.
Both policemen were at the time in uniform.
CFI: guilty of an attempt against an agent of authority giving Vallejo the benefit of drunkenness as an
exteriorating circumstance. (3yrs6mo to 4yrs2mo bilibid prison)
In his defense(Vallejo)
That within his own house a man's person in sacred and he may conduct himself as
he pleases.( It is clear from the testimony that in this case the behavior of the defendant amounted
to more than private misconduct and constituted a public annoyance and a breach of the peace of the
neighborhood.)
That the policemen had no right to arrest without a warrant and that in doing so
they acted without authority, so that resistance to them was lawful. (The law for
municipalities in general gives the municipal council power to establish, regulate, and maintain a
police department to promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and
convenience of the township and inhabitants thereof, and to enforce obedience thereto with such
lawful fines and penalties as the council may prescribed.) (policeman was held empowered to arrest
without warrant for breach of municipal ordinances committed in his presence.)
the law looks to is the character of the duty to be discharged by the officer, rather
than the name under which he acts, and that all officers having the general attributes of
constables may be inferred to be clothed with their ordinary powers of arrest.
in the absence of the expressed legislative definition of the faculties of police officers, they
must be assumed to possess those powers necessary to the convenient exercise of the duties for
which their offices were created.
The accused Vallejo, set us a further defense double jeopardy, alleging a former
conviction under the Penal code. (the act of resistance to the policeman, which characterizes the
offense under the Penal Code did not necessarily enter into the disorderly conduct of the defendants,
which indeed preceded the appearance of the policeman, and was not therefore to be considered as
part of the same act.)
Guilty: resistance to public officers while executing their duty having been intoxicated without
being an habitual drunkard, he is entitled to that as one extenuating circumstance.
PEOPLE VS AMADO HERNANDEZ (99 PHIL 515)
1. What happened:
About March 15, 1945, Amado Hernandez and other appellants were accused of conspiring,
confederating and cooperating with each other, as well as with the thirty-one(31) defendants charged in the
criminal cases of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Theywere accused of being members of PKP Community
Party of the Philippines which wasactively engaged in an armed rebellion against the government of the Philippines.
With the party of HUKBALAHAP (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa mga Hapon), they committed thecrime of
rebellion causing murder, pillage, looting plunder, etc., enumerated in 13 attackson government forces or
civilians by HUKS.
2. Crime Committed:
Rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies
3. Contention of the State:

6
The government, headed by the Solicitor General, argued that the gravity of thecrime committed
required the denial of bail. Moreover, the complex crime charged by
theg o v e r n m e n t a g a i n s t H e r n a n d e z h a s b e e n s u c c e s s f u l l y i m p o s e d w i t h o t h e r a r
r e s t e d communist leaders and was sentenced to life imprisonment.
4. Contention of the Accused:
An appeal prosecuted by the defendants regarding the judgment rendered by theCFI in Manila that
rebellion cannot be a complex crime with murder, arson or robbery.
5. Ruling:
The court ruled that murder, arson, and robbery are mere ingredient of the crime of rebellion as means necessary for
the perpetration of the offense. Such common offense isabsorbed or inherent of the crime of rebellion. Inasmuch as the
acts specified in Article 135constitutes, one single crime it follows that said acts offer no occasion for the application
of Article 48 which requires therefore the commission of at least two crimes.***
HERNANDEZ DOCTRINE
: Rebellion cannot be complexed with common crimes such as killings, destruction of property, etc.,
committed on the occasion and infurtherance thereof. The thinking is not anymore correct more so that there is no
legal basisfor such rule now. Rebellion constitutes ONLY ONE CRIME. *
ENRILE VS SALAZAR
Senator Enrile, his co-accused(the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio
Honasan) was charged of the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup.(attempt from November 29
to December 10, 1990.) Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI
headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the
information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he
was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the
custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula
Torres.
Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpusherein (which was
followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was deprived
of his constitutional rights in being, or having been:
a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;
(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was
initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due
process;
(c) denied his right to bail; and
(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who
issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause.
They alleged that they cannot be liable for murder and multiple frustrated murder as it is absorbed in
the crime of rebellion
ISSUE: whether or not it is a simple rebellion only?
HELD: yes, it is a simple rebellion;In accordance with HERNANDEZ DOCTRINE: Rebellion absorbed the
crime of murder and frustrated murder.
the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned
information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio
must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final
conviction, as a matter of right.

7
ENRILE VS AMIN
An information was charged against Senator Juan Ponce Enrile for having committed rebellion
complexed with murder with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Another information was
subsequently filed with the Regional Trial Court 9of Makati, charging the former with a violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1829 for willfully and knowingly obstructing or delaying the apprehension of
Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio Gringo Honasan.
Allegedly, Senator Enrile entertained and accommodated Col. Gringo Honasan by giving him food and
comfort on December 1, 1989 in his house and not doing anything to have Honasan arrested or
apprehended. It was the prosecutions contention that harboring or concealing a fugitive is punishable
under a special law while rebellion is based on Revised Penal Code; thus, the two crimes can be
separately punished.
Issue: Can a separate crime of a violation of PD 1829 be charged against the petitioner?
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court used the doctrine that if a person cannot be charged with the complex crime
of rebellion, he can neither be charged separately for two different offenses, where one is a
constitutive or component element or committed in furtherance of rebellion.
It was also noted that petitioner was already facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with Honasan.
Being in conspiracy thereof, the act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere
component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of rebellion. It cannot be made the
basis of a separate charge.
Also, the High Court reiterated that in cases of rebellion, all crimes committed in furtherance thereof
shall be absolved. Hence, the other charge of rebellion complexed with murder cannot prosper. All
crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere components or
ingredients, or committed in furtherance of rebellion, become absorbed and it cannot be charged as
separate crimes.

URAL VS RAMOS
To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his
crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest,
the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances.
(RATIONALE BEHIND: lawful arrest without warrant)
The petitioners (8) were arrested without warrant of arrest. The petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus.
They contended that their detention is unlawful as their arrests were made without warrant and,
that no preliminary investigation was first conducted, so that the information filed against them are
null and void.
The court said that:
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.

FACTS: The record of the instant cases would show that the persons in whose behalf these petitions
for habeas corpus have been filed, had freshly committed or were actually committing an offense,
when apprehended, so that their arrests without a warrant were clearly justified, and that they are,
further, detained by virtue of valid information filed against them in court.
They were arrested in connection with the killing of 2 capcom soldiers
Dural was captured and identified 1 day after the incident because he needed medical care
FEB 6, 1988 petition for habeas corpus was filed with the court on behalf of Umil, Dural and
Villanueva

FEB 26, 1988 Umil and Villanueva posted bail before RTC Pasay where charges for violation of the
Anti-Subversion Act they were released HC of Umil and Villanueva = moot and academic

Dural was not arrested DURING the shooting nor was he arrested JUST AFTER arrested a DAY AFTER
= seemingly unjustified

BUT court said the Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA an outlawed subversive
organization
The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or
offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against
the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes
Subversion is a continuing offense = arrest without warrant is justified
Furthermore evidence shows that the case against Dural was tried in court wherein they were found
GUILTY = now serving sentence = HC no longer available

.
.

PRIMICIAS VS FUGOSO
Primicias applied for a permit for the holding of apeaceful public meeting at Plaza Mirandaon Sunday
afternoon, November 16, 1947, for the purpose of petitioning the government forredress togrievances.
Fugoso REFUSED to issue the permit.

The right of freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress
of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the
Constitutions of democratic countries. But it a casettled principle growing out of the nature of wellordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that
it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, not injurious to the
rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other
constitutional rights is termed the sovereign "police power" which is the power to prescribe
regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general
welfare of the people.
The Philippine legislature has delegated the exercise of the police power to the Municipal Board of
the City of Manila, which according to section 2439 of the Administrative Code is the legislative body
of the City.

10

JUSTO VS CA
Petitioner Severino P. Justo guilty of the crime of assault upon a person in authority.
The offended party Nemesio B. de la Cuesta is a duly appointed district supervisor of the Bureau of
Public Schools, with station at Sarrat, Ilocos Norte.
Between 9:c00 and 10:00 a.m. on October 16, 1950, he went to the division office in Laoag, Ilocos
Norte, in answer to a call from said office, in order to revise the plantilla of his district comprising the
towns of Sarrat and Piddig.
At about 11:25 a.m., De la Cuesta was leaving the office in order to take his meal when he saw the
Appellant conversing with Severino Caridad, academic supervisor.
Appellant requested De la Cuesta to go with him and Caridad to the office of the latter. They did and in
the office of Caridad, the Appellant asked about the possibility of accommodating Miss Racela as a
teacher in the district of De la Cuesta. Caridad said that there was no vacancy, except that of the
position of shop teacher.
Upon hearing Caridads answer, the Appellant sharply addressed the complainant thus:c Shet, you
are a double crosser. One who cannot keep his promise. The Appellant then grabbed a lead paper
weight from the table of Caridad and challenged the offended party to go out.
The Appellant left Caridads office, followed by De la Cuesta. When they were in front of the table of
one Carlos Bueno, a clerk in the division office, De la Cuesta asked the Appellant to put down the
paper weight but instead the Appellant grabbed the neck and collar of the polo shirt of the
complainant which was torn. Carlos Bueno separated the protagonists, but not before the complainant
had boxed the Appellant several times.
PETITIONER ARGUED:
(1) that when the complainant accepted his challenge to fight outside and followed him out of the
room of Mr. Caridad where they had a verbal clash, he (complainant) disrobed himself of the mantle of
authority and waived the privilege of protection as a person in authority; chan
(2) that the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that there was no unlawful aggression onPetitioners
part because there was a mutual agreement to fight.
ISSUE: whether or not the accused is liable of the crime of assault upon a person in authority.
HELD: Yes, he is guilty of the crime of assault upon a person in authority.
The character of person in authority is not assumed or laid off at will, but attaches to a public official
until he ceases to be in office. Assuming that the complainant was not actually performing the duties
of his office when assaulted, this fact does not bar the existence of the crime of assault upon a person
in authority; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryso long as the impelling motive of the attack is the
performance of official duty. This is apparent from the phraseology of Article 148 of our Revised Penal
Code, in penalizing attacks upon person in authority while engaged in the performance of official
duties or on occasion of such performance, the words on occasion signifying because or by
reason of the past performance of official duty, even if at the very time of the assault no official duty
was being discharged
The argument that the offended party, De la Cuesta, cannot claim to have been unlawfully attacked
because he had accepted the accuseds challenge to fight, overlooks the circumstance that as found

11
by the Court of Appeals, the challenge was to go out, i.e., to fight outside the building, it not being
logical that the fight should be held inside the office building in the plain view of subordinate
employees. Even applying the rules in duelling cases, it is manifest that an aggression ahead of the
stipulated time and place for the encounter would be unlawful; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryto hold
otherwise would be to sanction unexpected assaults contrary to all sense of loyalty and fair play. In the
present case, assuming that De la Cuesta accepted the challenge of the accused, the facts clearly
indicate that he was merely on his way out to fight the accused when the latter violently lay hands
upon him. The acceptance of the challenge did not place on the offended party the burden of
preparing to meet an assault at any time even before reaching the appointed place for the agreed
encounter, and any such aggression was patently illegal.

PEOPLE VS ACIERTO
Leon Acierto is convicted of the crime of assault in public authority. He alleged that
1. The lower court erred in not finding that the accused-appellant Leon Acierto acted in selfdefense in preventing or repelling with his fists, the unlawful attack begun by the alleged offended
party, Hipolito Velasco.
2. The lower court also erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of assault
upon a public officer, defined and punished in article 251 of the Penal code in connection with the
last paragraph of article 250 hereof.
3. Lastly, the lower court erred in not acquitting the accused-appellant, Leon Acierto, of all
criminal liability for the crime with which he was charged.
At about 10 o'clock on the morning of March 2, 1931, while the offended party, Hipolito Velasco, duly
appointed postmaster for the municipality of Bacarra, Province of Ilocos Norte, was in his office
situated in the municipal building, counting two rolls of twenty-peso bills amounting in all to P4,000,
the accused, Leon Acierto, entered the office without the postmaster's noticing it, and stood behind
him. Without saying a word, the accused took one of the rolls, but the postmaster caught hold of his
hand and took away the money, saying: "Get out of here, Lawyer, because we have plenty of work".
The defendant moved away towards the north, and the postmaster, believing he had gone, began to
count the money again; but the accused came back to his side, and as he did not want to be disturbed,
he put the money in the safe, took the key to the office, and as he was going towards the door, said to
the accused: "Be so good as to leave now, Lawyer". The other answered: "I don't want to. You may
close it". He said this with his hands in his trouser's pockets, and was walking about the room. When
he came to the door of the office, the postmaster again told the accused: "Be so good as to leave now,
Lawyer". The accused gave the same answer. For the third time the offended party said to the
defendant: "Go away now," and the latter answered: "I don't want to leave." Displeased with this
answer, the offended party approached the defendant quietly, and took hold of his left hand to conduct
him outside. Whereupon the lawyer hit him in the right eye with his fist, leaving him stunned, and
making him lose his balance. When he recovered, the accused again hit him, first in the right frontal
region, and then below the left eye. The offended party shouted for help, and a member of the
municipal police, as well as his office companions, came up. As a result of the blows he had sustained,
the offended party suffered an ecchymosis in the orbit of the left eye, and another in the frontal region,
which took seven days to heal completely.
Testifying in his own behalf, the accused said that on the morning of March 2, 1931, he had gone to the
post office of Bacarra to collect his correspondence, and approached the postmaster, the offended
party herein, Hipolito Velasco, who was counting bank bills on his table, and being close friend, he
gave him one or two little slaps on the back; that as the man paid no attention, he slapped the table;
that the postmaster then got up angrily and said: "Don't you come around with your jokes; I may stick

12
a knife into you." The accused was hurt by this taunt, and began to walk away. The postmaster then
got up, put the papers in the safe, and when the accused was already within two meters of the door,
passed by him and blocked his way, and said with a gesture of threat: "Get out, you, I say." That as the
accused would not budge, he rushed at him, caught his right arm, and pushed him forward, giving him
a blow on the right temple; that the accused then returned the blow, giving rise to a fist fight between
the two until a policeman came and separated them, and took them outside the hall; that the offended
party had not told him to leave his office or was he answered in the manner attributed to him.
The trial court, who saw and heard the witnesses testify, gave more credit to the testimony for the
prosecution than that for the defense. There is no doubt that in spite of his intimacy with the offended
party, the accused had no right to enter the latter's office and disturb him while in the performance of
his duty, counting money he had received from Manila. But taking into account the circumstances of
the case and the friendship between the two, it may be supposed that the defendant was joking, and
the offended party happened to be in irritable mood, on account of the work he had, and it
degenerated into a real fight, having been provoked by the herein accused.
The court a quo found the accused guilty of the crime of assault upon a public officer, defined and
punished in article 251, in connection with the last paragraph of article 250, of the old Penal Code. The
Attorney-General considers the act to constitute two crimes: assault upon an agent of authority,
defined in article 249, paragraph 2, and punished in the last paragraph of article 250 of the Penal
Code; and slight physical injuries, defined and punished in article 587 of the same code.
The first question to decide in the present appeal is whether one offended party, Hipolito Velasco, as
postmaster of Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, who was discharging his duties at the time of the assault, is
merely a public officer, or is an agent of authority besides.
In People vs. Ramos (p. 462, ante), by Justice Imperial, it was held:lawphil.net
From the above-quoted provisions of law we believe it may be deduced that the provincial
treasurer is a person in authority within the province where he exercises his jurisdiction, and
that the municipal treasurer, being his deputy ex officio, is an agent of authority, and not a
person in authority, as this word is employed in the Penal Code under which the information
against the appellant was filed.
The postmaster of a municipality is an agent of the Director of Posts, and as such is in charge of the
custody of the Government funds that come into his hands by virtue of the transactions with the public
in postal matters, telegrams, savings bank, and so forth, and like a municipal treasurer is an agent of a
person in authority in addition to being a public officer, inasmuch as the Director of Posts is a person in
authority who by law exercises jurisdiction of his own in postal and telegraphic matters.
Since the offended party, Hipolito Velasco was an agent of a person in authority when he was attacked,
the defendant herein having laid hands upon him, the crime of which the latter is guilty is assault upon
an agent of a person in authority, defined and punished in the last paragraph of article 250, in
connection with paragraph 2 of article 249 of the Penal Code, the penalty fixed by law being prision
correccional in the minimum and medium degrees, and a fine not less than 375 pesetas or more than
3,750 pesetas, and this penalty must be imposed in the medium degree because there is no modifying
circumstance present.
The same offense is punished in article 148 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty fixed being that
of prision correccional in the minimum degree, and a fine not exceeding P500 which is less severe than
the penalty prescribed by the old Penal Code for the same crime, and in accordance with article 22 of

13
the Revised Penal Code, and the accused not being an habitual criminal, the penalty provided by
article 148 above-mentioned must be imposed.
With regard to the physical injuries sustained by the offended party from the attack, they, being light
in character are to be considered as inherent in the, assault, for it cannot be supposed that in laying
hands upon a person, no harm or injury will be caused.lawphi1.net
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold: (1) That a postmaster is an
agent of a person in authority; and (2) that the slight physical injuries sustained by such an agent as a
result of the defendant's laying hands upon him, are inherent in the offense of assault upon an agent
of a person in authority.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is modified, and the accused-appellant is held to be guilty of
assault upon an agent of a person in authority, and sentenced to suffer one year, one month, and
eleven days of prision correccional, and to pay a fine of P100, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, plus costs. So ordered.