COMMENTARY

with three or less than three members in

the House. The crucial issue is whether
with three or five members a party would
be in a position to force a certain policy
or programme unless the party is necessary for government formation and is also
willing to participate in the ruling coalition.
From the high reformist and moral
language the AAP speaks, it is difficult to
think of the party getting involved in
government formation even if we assume that it wins a couple of seats to the
Lok Sabha or a few seats to a state legislature. Thus, crossing the threshold
(even at the state level) might be tough
and having crossed it, becoming relevant
to policymaking and/or government formation is even more unlikely.
Against this backdrop, the main asset
of the AAP will be its image as a party that
is ready to take on the establishment. In
more or less stable biparty/bipolar competition, third or minor parties serve as
vehicles channelling political discontent
(Belanger 2004: 1055) because the third/
minor parties tend to represent and capitalise upon prevailing anti-partyism.
Existing literature suggests that those

citizens who are fed up with parties in

general tend to abstain from voting
whereas those who are angry/upset with
major parties tend to turn to new/third
parties (ibid: 1068-72). With its specific
targeting of the main opposition and the
ruling party, the AAP in its short life so far
seems to have sharpened a sense of specific anti-partyism (sentiments against
the main parties), it is also possible that it
has converted some general anti-partyism (an overall anti-party sentiment) into
the specific version of anti-partyism. The
crucial question for AAP is twofold what
space would it have in non-bipolar situations? And, does it have the capacity to
place itself in a position to exploit the
specific anti-partyism against the Congress and BJP beyond a few cities? But
more than these questions of realpolitik,
the question would be what kind of democracy it wants to build and what kind
of political sensibilities it wants to tap.
Notes
1 As per Order the Election Commission of India,
available at http://www.lokniti.org/pdfs_dataunit/NES%20Series/nes-2004-post-poll-surveyfinding.pdf, accessed on 13 February 2013.

The Shahbag Uprising

War Crimes and Forgiveness
Nadine S Murshid

The uprising at Shahbag in Dhaka

is perhaps a sign that the conflict of
1971 will finally see a resolution,
and that Bangladeshis, as
individuals, will be able to come
to terms with their violent history.

Nadine S Murshid (smurshid@ssw.rutgers.edu)

is a PhD Candidate at the School of Social
Work, Rutgers University, the US.
Economic & Political Weekly

EPW

march 9, 2013

n 5 February, in a spontaneous
move, thousands of young people
gathered at Shahbag Mor (intersection), Dhaka, at the behest of activistbloggers of the Bangladesh Online Activist Network (BOAN) to protest against
war criminals. So intense have been the
demonstrations that the Shahbag intersection has been renamed Projonmo
Chottor (New Generation Roundabout),
where demands are being made for justice
for war crimes committed by rajakars,
allies of the state of Pakistan and its army,
against Bengalis during the Bangladesh
War of Liberation in 1971.
It all began when the International
War Crimes Tribunal found Abdul Quader
Mollah current secretary general of

vol xlviII no 10

2 State of Nation Survey, August 2011 done by Lokniti; available at its website http://www.lokniti.org/pdfs_dataunit/Questionairs/sonsaugust2011-survey-findings.pdf, accessed on 13
February 2013.
3 National Election Study 2009: http://www.lokniti.org/nes2009-finding_of_the_survey.pdf,
accessed on 13 February 2013.
4 Source: for 2009 available at the Lokniti website
cited above and for 2004: http://www.lokniti.org/
pdfs_dataunit/NES%20Series/nes-2004-postpoll-survey-finding.pdf, accessed on 13 February 2013.

References
Belanger, Eric (2004): Antipartyism and Third
Party Vote Choice: A Comparison of Canada,
Britain and Australia, Comparative Political
Studies, 37 (9), 1054-78.
Kumar, Anand (2013): A Constructive Challenge
to the Political Class, Economic & Political
Weekly, XLVIII (7), 11-15.
Kumar, Sanjay (2009): Patterns of Political Participation, Economic & Political Weekly, XLIV (39),
47-51.
Mazzoleni, Gianpietro and Winfried Schulz (1999):
Mediatisation of Politics: A Challenge for
Democracy?, Political Communication, 16(3);
247-61.
Palshikar, Suhas and Sanjay Kumar (2004): Participatory Norm: How Broad-based Is It?, Economic & Political Weekly, XXXIX (50), 5412-17.
Schedler, Andreas (1996): Anti-political Establishment Parties, Party Politics, 2(3), 291-312.
Shukla, S P (2013): Myopia, Distortions and Blind
Spots in the Vision Document of AAP, Economic
& Political Weekly, XLVIII (7), 16-18.
Ware, Alan (1996): Political Parties and Party
Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Jamaat-e-Islami, Bangladesh guilty of

actively participating and abetting the
murder and rape of unarmed civilians
and was given life-imprisonment when
the expectation was a death penalty.
In Shahbag the common goal of justice
has brought together thousands of people,
who now have put forward a six-point
demand, that was delivered on 21 February, coinciding with the International
Mother Language Day that recognises
those who fought for their right to speak
in Bangla in 1952: (1) Within seven days,
the killers of martyrs killed at the hands
of Jamaat-Shibir will have to be arrested;
(2) By 26 March legal processes have to
be initiated to ban Jamaat-Shibir as a war
criminal organisation, which opposed the
freedom of Bangladesh and led mass
genocides; (3) With no further delay, an
independent investigative committee should
be established to identify Jamaat-Shibirs
funding organisations and bring them
under legal process; (4) The international
war crimes tribunal has to be given a
permanent set-up to ensure continued
13

COMMENTARY

momentum of the judiciary process; (5) To

ensure safety of the common masses,
enforcers of law and order should immediately mobilise to arrest terrorists and
root out their hideouts, and facts about
their reign of terror have to be published
in national and international media;
(6) Steps have to be taken against media
outlets protecting the war criminals and
instigating fundamentalism.
In response, the Jamaat-e-Islami and
their student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir,
have issued death threats against the
protesters, and even warned that they
will use suicide bombers to uproot the
atheists at Shahbag if the protesters
there were not disbanded; they then
proceeded to act upon the threat by
turning the streets of Dhaka into a battleground on 22 February and then with
support from the Bangladesh Nationalist
Party (BNP) called a nationwide strike
on the 24th. This violence, vandalism,
and strike follow the gruesome murder
of Rajib Haider, who was a core member
of BOAN, on the 15th (BDNews24 2013).
Crimes and Forgiveness
The word forgiveness insults me. It makes
me a victim again. I have never been in [a]
fight with anybody hence there is no need to
forgive the other. Nobody has the right to
demand from the victim to forgive or to reconcile with the offender. We want neither forgiveness nor reconciliation. All we want is that
each perpetrator gets its name and surname,
hence to be punished. It is a shame to talk
about forgiveness while the main perpetrators
who have killed our children and husbands
still have not faced legal prosecutions.
M Subasic, president of the Association of
Citizens Mothers of Srebrenica and
Zepa Enclaves, 2005.

These words by a Bosnian Muslim

leader resonate with those of many in
Bangladesh; the atrocities that were
committed against Bengalis during the
War of Liberation by Pakistanis and the
rajakars have not been forgotten, or forgiven. The forgiveness literature suggests
that forgiveness is associated with facing
the perpetrators, rather than avoiding them
(McCullough, Worthington and Rachal
1997). Where do Bangladeshis stand on
that? In my estimation, Bangladeshis have
not had the opportunity to face the enemy
in the post-liberation era. The Pakistani
prisoners of war in India were sent back
14

to Pakistan as part of a 1973 tripartite

treaty signed in New Delhi, none of
them were tried for war crimes. Their
local collaborators enjoyed immunity
because of political interference. As Rao
and Murshid (2013) point out:
Mujib succeeded in banning the Jamaat and
four other groups that had collaborated with
the Pakistani forces, and passed ordinances
such as the Collaborators Order and the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act to bring them
to trial. However, he was unable to paper
over the factionalism within the newlyformed Bangladeshi armed forces. In 1975, a
military coup overthrew Mujibs government,
assassinated him, scrapped the Collaborators
Order, allowed the hitherto banned groups to
resurface, and permitted leading perpetrators
of war crimes to return to the country.

In 1975, the rajakars were allowed to

form a political party, Jamaat-e-Islami
and they have been contesting elections
since 1986 and won two seats in Parliament in the last election. The acceptance
of Jamaat-e-Islami as part of the democratic process, perhaps, created a form of
mass amnesia surrounding the 1971 war
crimes, and it took four decades to set up
another tribunal to try the war criminals,
the known rajakars (while an international tribunal is yet to be set up to try
Pakistani war criminals). Some argue that
the democratic process should have disallowed their entry into Bangladesh in
the first place for their involvement in
atrocities committed during the Liberation
War, and more importantly, they should
have been debarred from forming a
political party, as suggested by Veena Sikri,
former Indian high commissioner in
Bangladesh, because their party constitution is directly in defiance of the constitution of Bangladesh (Tehelka 2013). As
such, the people of Bangladesh did not
get a chance to face the enemy, ask for
redemption, or get an apology in the way
that McCullough and colleagues would
have wanted; instead, they had to accept
them as political leaders.
A study by Wohl and Branscombe
(2005) found that when Jews thought of
the atrocities committed during the holocaust as atrocities against humanity it
allowed Jews to forgive Germans and
assign them less guilt for the holocaust;
when they were induced to think of the
atrocities as those committed against Jews,
they had a harder time forgiving Germans.
march 9, 2013

In essence, highly identified Jews were less

likely to forgive Germans for the holocaust.
Would it then follow that in Bangladesh, people are highly identified Bangladeshis? Is that why Pakistan and the
rajakars have not been forgiven? The
answer is a complicated one.
The events at Shahbag today would
lead one to think: yes, that is why they
have been unable to forgive the atrocities
committed against them. But if that were
the case, Shahbag would have happened
a long time ago. Why is it that they have
only now arrived at Shahbag? The instigation was perhaps the infamous flashing
of the victory sign by Quader Mollah when
he was sentenced to life-imprisonment for
his role in mass murder and rape during
1971. But what is at the root? Others have
cited: the culture of impunity, the years of
inciting violence in the name of Islam, the
rise of political power by Jamaat. But I
believe the issue at hand is the unresolved
trauma of the violence that Bangladesh
was willingly or unwillingly a part of. The
victory sign was a trigger that recreated
that trauma. And, in a way, Shahbag is a
response to that trauma, as well as the
third-party (un)forgiveness effect, which
is the tendency to be more forgiving for
transgressions committed against the
self than a close other. On behalf of parents and grandparents, the Bangladeshi
youth have been unable to forgive Quader
Mollah and his ilk, and the reactions we
see on the streets are a response to that
(un)forgiveness. All of these emotional
processes intersect with the notions that
the narrative of the war is primarily
about being victimised, and the history
of Bangladesh has not been accurately
documented amidst politically co-opted,
and conflicted narratives, including constant revisions in textbooks by the party
in power. These notions lead to angst
associated with not having an accurate
sense of ones history. Ergo, the trauma
of war remains (with the angst), and has
been intergenerationally transmitted,
along with its unresolved component.
International War Crimes Tribunal
The formation of the International War
Crimes Tribunal allowed Bangladeshis an
opportunity for redemption and closure,
one can argue. It was finally time for
vol xlviII no 10

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Economic & Political Weekly

COMMENTARY

justice, and an opportunity to perhaps

assuage the deep-seated collective trauma. As scholars such as Cehajic, Brown,
and Castano (2008) point out: legal accountability may well be essential for
the restoration of moral equality between victims and perpetrators and
for the creation of a just society. However, as they also suggest, that is only
the first step towards closure; for deeprooted conflicts, forgiveness by those
who were victimised is important for
psychological and political reconciliation (Lederach 1997; Staub 2006; Tutu
1999). In Bangladesh, there has been no
climate for forgiveness to occur because of the institutionalised support
that the perpetrators received, and the
complete disregard of the heinous acts
as evinced by the carte blanche freedom
that they have enjoyed till the present
day, and accordingly, there has been no
psychological or political reconciliation
in the absence of which three generations of Bangladeshis are still victims.
Scholars studying trauma suggest
that in the short run it works to ascribe
meaning such as they were awful people to deal with the trauma; but in the
long run unless those experiencing the
trauma make meaning of it in a way that
allows them to deal with it (for example,
believing that those who suffered did
not suffer in vain), they will remain in
trauma. The successful completion of the
International War Crimes Tribunal is,
conceivably, a step towards forgiveness.
However, forgiveness will not come
easily, not even in the event of an apology.
Scholars such as Wohl, Hornsey and
Bennett (2012) suggest that the outgroup
is more likely to be seen as people who are
not able to experience complex, uniquely
human emotions such as remorse, and
in the absence of remorse, they are not
likely to be forgiven. And in the case of
Bangladesh, there are two sets of outgroups: Pakistan and the rajakars. The
chances of getting an apology from
the latter group are perhaps too much
to ask for, even though the present-day
Jamaat-e-Islami party would benefit
from delinking itself from the known
war criminals on trial, while Pakistan
may still have the impetus to make an
apology, especially if their connection
Economic & Political Weekly

EPW

march 9, 2013

with Jamaat-e-Islami is loosened as a

result of a [hypothetical] ban of religionbased politics, and conviction of the
Jamaat-e-Islami leaders who were involved in war crimes and are awaiting trial.
Towards Celebrating
Independence
It is in the Bangladeshis best interests to
move on from the tragedy of war and
celebrate the independence that they
have attained but have been unable to
enjoy. It is in the peoples best interests
to find it within themselves to accept the
violence committed against them and
learn the value of peace, by resolving it
first through due process, and second, by
making a concerted effort to accurately
document the history of Bangladesh.
The uprising at Shahbag is perhaps a sign
that the conflict of 1971 will finally see a
resolution, and that Bangladeshis, as individuals, will come to terms with their
violent history. Eventually, Bangladesh
may even forgive Pakistan and the rajakars
for their crimes during the Liberation
War, but it is unlikely that any of this
will ever be forgotten.
Today, in Shahbag, there is hope for a
new Bangladesh, a Bangladesh that has
taken charge of dealing with the trauma
of war. The people have spoken and they
have been heard; public opinion has
swayed public policy and new legislation
allows government to charge institutions
with war crimes, and appeal verdicts
during the Tribunal (The Daily Star 2013).
They have found ways to be inclusive of
indigenous people, have conversations
about Islam and atheism, about humanity.
Some, such as David Lewis from the
London School of Economics, have even
wondered if they are the third force.
But most importantly, the silent majority,
as they have been termed, is no longer
silent; finally, democracy has been democratised. As Dan Mozena, the United
States Ambassador to Bangladesh said
in a comment to the author: Shahbag is
a manifestation of a democratic right
to peacefully express your views. As
such, calls for capital punishment at
Shahbag, for many, are a data-reductionist
term that encompasses the demand for
justice, freedom, democracy, and conflict resolution.
vol xlviII no 10

Ultimately, Shahbag is important because it gives Bangladesh a chance to

resolve its harrowing past by ensuring
the successful conclusion of the ongoing
trials under the International War Crime
Tribunal with attention to due process.
Moreover, it gives Bangladesh a chance
to demand a Nuremberg-like trial for the
war criminals in Pakistan. And therein
lies a chance of a resolution of the conflict
of 1971. This is important not only for
Bangladeshis but also for the conscience
of a fair and just world.
References
Bangash, Y K (2013): Shahbag Will Haunt Us, The
Express Tribune, retrieved 25 February 2013
from: http://tribune.com.pk/story/509095/shahbag-square-will-haunt-us
BDNews24 (2013): Killers Hacked Rajib First,
Then Slit His Throat: Police, retrieved 22 February from: http://bdnews24.com/ bangladesh
/2013/02/16/brutal-murder-of-rajib-haider
Cehajic, S, R Brown and E Castano (2008): Forgive
and Forget? Antecedents and Consequences of
Intergroup Forgiveness in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Political Psychology, Vol 29, No 3.
Lederach, J P (1997): Building Peace: Sustainable
Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington:
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Lewis, David (2013): What Future for NGOs?
Creativity and Contradiction in Bangladeshs
Third Sector, Bangladesh Development Initiative Conference, Berkley.
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(1997): Interpersonal Forgiving in Close Relationships, Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, Vol 73, 321-36.
Rao, N and N Murshid (2013): Lessons from Delhi
and Dhaka: Nagesh Rao and Navine Murshid,
retrieved 22 February 2013 from: http://kafila.
org/2013/02/14/lessons-from-delhi-and-dhakanagesh-rao-and-navine-murshid
Staub, E (2006): Reconciliation after Genocide,
Mass Killing, or Intractable Conflict: Understanding the Roots of Violence, Psychological
Recovery and Steps toward a General Theory,
Political Psychology, Vol 27, 867-94.
Subasic, M (2005): Pathways to Reconciliation
and Global Human Rights, National Conference in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo.
Tehelka (2013): In Conversation with Veena Sikri:
Decoding the Shahbag Movement in Bangladesh, retrieved on 22 February 2013 from:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I-OdQKLL52g
The Daily Star (2013): Jamaat-Shibir Mayhem in
City, Retrieved on 22 February 2013 from:
http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/latest_
news.php?nid=44940.
Tutu, D (1999): No Future without Forgiveness
(London: Rider).
Wohl, M J A and N R Branscombe (2005): Forgiveness and Collective Guilt Assignment to Historical Perpetrator Groups Depend on Level
of Social Category Inclusiveness, Journal
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288-303.
Wohl, M J A, M J Hornsey and Shannon H Bennett
(2012): Why Group Apologies Succeed and
Fail: Intergroup Forgiveness and the Role of
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No 2, 306-22.

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