Sustainability: Science, Practice, & Policy

http://ejournal.nbii.org

ARTICLE

Uncertainty, innovation, and dynamic

sustainable development
Lenore Newman
School of Environment and Sustainability, Royal Roads University, 2005 Sooke Road, Victoria, B.C., Canada V9B 5Y2
(email: lenore.newman@royalroads.ca)

Sustainable development is a rich concept that has helped shape the discussion of human societys
interaction with the biosphere. However, the term sustainable development is contentious, and some
dismiss it outright as an oxymoron. The seemingly contradictory sustainable and development can be
reconciled by accepting that due to two factors, the inherent complexity and uncertainty of human and natural
systems, and the ability of human society to innovate, sustainable development must be dynamic. It must be
an ongoing process, not a goal. A sustainable society must constantly evaluate its relationship with nature as
it adopts new innovations and encounters unexpected events. The role of feedback and suitable application of
the precautionary principle are key elements of a dynamic sustainable development process. The example of
nuclear waste management in Canada demonstrates the beginning of such a process.
KEYWORDS: sustainable development, human-environment relationship, human impact, innovations, appropriate technology, human
ecology, waste management, radioactive wastes

systems theory, human societies are dynamic, open systems far

from equilibrium and must evolve and adapt to survive.
Development does not need to refer to mindless growth; it can
also manifest itself as adaptation. Such adaptation can be
sustainable over very long time scales, as is demonstrated by the
biosphere, which has grown more diverse, extensive, and
complex over the last several billion years.
Embracing dynamic sustainable development comes at
a price, as the concept of a stable equilibrium state for human
society disappears. This occurs for two reasons: complex
adaptive systems are inherently unpredictable, and innovation
constantly changes our impact upon the biosphere (Newman &
Dale, 2005). Innovation and uncertainty ensure that a
dynamically sustainable society must prepare for the
unexpected.

Introduction
Since being defined by the Brundtland Commission as
behavior that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs (Brundtland, 1987), the concept of sustainable
development has continued to evolve. There are now hundreds
of definitions for sustainable development (Dale, 2001), a
term that several observers contend is problematic. Certainly
some of these definitions are no longer mutually compatible, yet
this ongoing debate can be seen as an evolution rather than an
argument.
William Rees, co-developer of ecological footprint
analysis, argues that a prerequisite to formulating sustainable
policies is to develop a satisfactory working definition of the
concept (Rees, 1989). However when dealing with complex
systems such as human societies and ecological regimes,
meaningful global definitions are not always possible or useful.
The Brundtland Commissions definition was left purposefully
vague to allow various shareholders to work toward common
ground. The resulting controversy, according to some observers,
has created a constructive dialogue (see, e.g., Dale, 2001).
Though some protagonists argue that the very term is
an oxymoron (Livingston, 1994), another possibility is that the
perceived incompatibility in the terms sustainable and
development is an artifact of a worldview based on
equilibrium. However, from the perspective of complex adaptive

From Goal to Process

Numerous recent publications support the shift from a
goal-oriented to a process-oriented sustainable development. As
C. S. Holling (2001) argues,
Sustainability is the capacity to create, test, and
maintain adaptive capability. Development is the
process of creating, testing, and maintaining
opportunity. The phrase that combines the two,
sustainable development thus refers to the goal of

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fostering adaptive capabilities and creating

opportunities. It is therefore not an oxymoron but a
term that describes a logical partnership.

system, damping out change; this process, however, does not

always lead to stability. Too much negative feedback can cause
a system to become stagnant and unable to adapt to suddenly
changing situations. A system composed only of negative
feedbacks will become out of step with its surrounding
environment and perish.
In order to thrive, systems must also contain positive
feedback, defined as feedback which reinforces a change or
trend. As environmentalists we tend to shrink from positive
feedback, as it evokes thoughts of runaway growth. However,
positive feedback is what allows our societies to respond quickly
enough to adapt to changing conditions. Sadly, positive
feedback introduces an insurmountable uncertainty into our
system that is best described as a sensitive dependence on initial
conditions. This phenomenon is also called the butterfly
effect, a term coined by Lorentz in a 1972 talk titled,
Predictability: Does the Flap of a Butterfly's Wings in Brazil Set
Off a Tornado in Texas? (Lorentz, 1993). Positive feedback can
reinforce a small event again and again until it becomes a
system-wide phenomenon.
Positive feedback loops allow accidents of history to
get magnified in outcome (Waldrop, 1992). If negative feedback
loops hold a system stable, positive feedback loops allow
systems to explore their environment and follow new
development paths. As they magnify random small variations,
positive feedback loops add an element of surprise to the
systems behavior. This leads to the results of many small
actions being unintended and unpredictable from the initial
conditions (Jervis, 1997).
The existence of positive feedback and sensitive
dependence on initial conditions within society has profound
consequences for sustainable development. As we can never
trust our predictions of the future entirely, there can be no
perfect model of a permanent sustainable society. Instead, we
must monitor feedback loops carefully and continually adjust
our models and our actions accordingly. Systems theorists
sometimes refer to this inherent unpredictability as strong
uncertainty, in the sense that not only are we unable to predict
the consequences of events, we are unable to determine which
events will lead to future change (Spash, 2002).
The effects of feedback are well illustrated by the
collapse of the cod fishery in Newfoundland. Once the largest
cod stock in the world, the Newfoundland stock supported a
viable commercial fishery for over three hundred years.
However, the stock was destroyed in only two decades and has
yet to recover (EEA, 2001). During the 1970s and 1980s, the
Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans ignored negative
feedback from two important sources: its own research scientists
and the inshore fishers who were directly observing the cods
decline (EEA, 2001). The fishers, for instance, noticed that the
fish were becoming fewer and smaller and tried to communicate
this information to the scientists at the DFO. They were ignored
and dismissed. This is negative feedback, as in a perfect world
their knowledge would have led to a change in fish catch limits,
stabilizing the stock. At the same time, a positive feedback
mechanism was in play. The large offshore fishing fleet was
upgrading its technology, and this contributed to the pattern of
stock depletion. As fish become scarcer, fishers were
encouraged to invest still larger sums to ensure that the quota
was being caught. In effect, the fleet was working harder to
achieve the same result, but the catches were remaining
constant, presenting the illusion of a stable stock. This cycle of

Such an approach is a shift from a command-andcontrol model to a self-organizational model of dynamic

sustainable development. This type of model is more likely to
succeed if it can emerge organically from unsustainable
behavior in manageable steps. Norms cannot be imposed in
advance (Robinson, 2003), but emerge as part of an adaptation
process. Instead of being a final objective, sustainable
development has to be understood as a continuous process of
change (Jokinen et al., 1998); a potentially fruitful approach is to
treat it as an evolution (Rammel & Van den Bergh, 2003).
Treating sustainable development as a process creates
the need for an indefinite program of monitoring and
adjustment, with every successful adaptation only a temporary
solution to changing selective conditions (Rammel & Van den
Bergh, 2003). In short, sustainable development is a moving
target (Salwasser, 1993). In some cases, the time spans involved
are long to the point of being indefinite. The two factors earlier
mentioned - the inherent unpredictability of complex adaptive
systems, and the changes brought about by human innovation necessitate certain requirements of what I call dynamic
sustainable development.

Uncertainty and Dynamic Sustainable Development

Complexity is the defining feature of our highly
heterogeneous modern society. Human society is very nonergodic. Ergodicity is the tendency of a system to move towards
equilibrium, maximizing entropy and minimizing free energy.
Human societies do not settle down into stable patterns for long.
They constantly innovate, grow, and change, posing a challenge
for those trying to adjust our interactions with the biosphere.
Though we might wish to design a perfect and stable
society, history suggests such experiments end in failure.
Sustainable development models must therefore be flexible
enough to mitigate the ecological effects of a non-ergotic
society. Theories based upon a complex systems approach are
appropriate for the study of human society and its interaction
with the biosphere for several reasons. First, complexity deals
with the links between things. Second, it is neither reductionist
nor holistic, but combines elements of both, necessary for multiscale systems. Finally, the science of complexity deals with
systems composed of varied elements connected in non-linear
ways, a state that is certainly found within human societies.
Complex adaptive systems are far more than a
collection of elements; they are bound together by the flow of
energy, matter, and information. This flow is often two-way,
forming feedback loops within the complex system. Achieving a
sustainable society is fundamentally a question of observing and
responding to feedback. Feedback loops form the nervous
systems of complex adaptive systems, allowing the flow of
information among elements and between the system and the
environment. Feedback is a process in which a change in an
element alters other elements, which in turn affect the original
element (Jervis, 1997). Feedback is an iterative process, and is a
fundamental part of what makes a system both complex and
adaptive.
Complex systems generate both positive and negative
feedback. Negative feedback loops are those which moderate a

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increasing pressure upon the stock continued right until the

eventual collapse. Once it became clear the cod stocks were
declining, corrective action occurred only slowly due to another
set of negative feedbacks. The DFO feared the social and
political effects of drastically reducing the fishery, and
accordingly moderated their response (EEA, 2001). Positive
feedback drove the stocks destruction and negative feedback
inhibited the imposition of fishing curbsa worst-case scenario
for sustainable management.

Identify a series of paths leading to that goal, and then pick a

path.
The process of backcasting is one of the key
innovations of the Natural Step. Selecting a goal and imagining
how to get there works better than adapting to prediction when
the problem is complex, when the changes needed are major,
and when trends and externalities play a role in the problem
(Nattrass & Altomare, 1999). In the case of nuclear waste, this
process involves understanding the need to manage this waste,
evaluating the sustainability of current practices, determining
what the desirable goal of nuclear waste management might be,
and identifying the steps necessary to reach that goal.

Nuclear Waste Management and Complexity

The mismanagement of the Newfoundland cod stock
is a good example of the problems that can result from incorrect
actions. However, trouble can also arise when no action is taken
and problems are allowed to accumulate. The lack of long-term
management of nuclear waste is such a problem. This very
complex issue involves both ecological and social systems on an
unprecedented time frame.
In Canada, there are roughly 1.7 million used nuclear
fuel rods from power generating stations in three provinces. To
date, used fuel has been stored on-site, in cooling pools and in
concrete bunkers. This waste will remain dangerous to human
and ecosystem health for tens of thousands of years, posing a
managerial problem on an immense scale. Many complex
questions arise: Should waste be stored at reactor sites, or
undergo the difficult process of being moved to locations far
from population centers (where it might be neglected)? Should
we place the waste beyond the reach of future generations, or do
we include a level of accessibility in case a better method of
disposal is developed? How can we communicate to future
generations the danger this waste poses? These issues, combined
with strong public feelings, make nuclear waste management a
bellwether for dealing with complexity and uncertainty. Nuclear
waste disposal presents vague and poorly defined social and
ecological feedback loops.
Managing such a complex process successfully will
require the development of new tools. First, plans must be
ongoing and iterative, subject to adjustment. Ecological
footprint analysis can provide a starting point for this purpose as
it relies on quantitative data to provide a snapshot of how
sustainable a society is at a particular time (Wackernagel &
Rees, 1996). However, as this tool only provides an idea of
present conditions, more work must be done to extend this
process into the future. As an example of such a combination of
visioning and measurement, the Natural Step process, developed
by cancer researcher Karl-Henrick Robert to take advantage of
the power of iterative analysis, has been widely used by both
corporations and municipalities to map out a route to more
sustainable behavior (Nattrass & Altomare, 1999). The
application of the Natural Step involves four core processes that
build on each other to provide a course of action that leads
toward a state of higher sustainability. The procedure is
therefore a creature of feedbackit can be applied again and
again, taking the user group to higher and higher levels. The
steps are outlined below:

Innovation and Dynamic Sustainability

Humans must innovate to survive. The physical
human is strangely and woefully unequipped to survive in the
wild, and we rely extensively on technology to compensate for
our lack of physical preparedness (Debray, 1997). Innovation,
however, is not just technological; it can take several forms.
Technical ingenuity creates new technology, but social ingenuity
reforms old institutions and social arrangements into new ones
(Homer-Dixon, 2000).
Innovation within a complex society occurs on many
scales. At the smaller scale, we see incremental innovations,
small refinements that occur relatively continuously. At a larger
scale, there are radical innovations, very significant shifts in
existent technologies and social structures. These are not
predictable and may happen at any time. Lastly, there are
systematic innovations that create entire new fields (Pereira,
1994). They cannot be predicted, and their occurrence radically
reshapes society. These innovations can be thought of as
gateway events and they can lead to rapid change (Rihani,
2000). Such sudden shifts can provide new technologies to
protect ecosystems, can shift use from one resource base to
another, and can also increase our impact on ecosystems in new
and unexpected ways. We desperately need to sharpen our a
priori understanding of what effect an innovation might have.
Detecting gateway events is difficult, as it is hard to
identify signals of massive change early enough (Levin et al.,
1998). While there is no real way to predict gateway events, we
can increase the chance that we will be able to take advantage of
them when they occur. In the case of nuclear waste
management, we might consider making certain that the material
remains accessible in case better disposal technologies arise in
the future.
Incorporating innovation into a model of sustainable
development is difficult. Though technology can be seen as an
adaptive answer to problems (Rammel & Van den Bergh,
2003), there is a fundamental disconnect between the world of
the information society and the groundings of sustainable
development. These two systems of social organization are often
presented as mutually exclusive due to differing values held by
the actors involved (Jokinen et al., 1998). Even if we can
surmount this chasm, there is inherent uncertainty in the process
of innovation (Buenstorf, 2000). Innovations can give rise to
new needs, but they introduce variation and learning that is
essential to the exploration and development of new possibilities
(Vollenbroek, 2002). Some of our problems require systems
innovations that will enable the fulfillment of needs in an
entirely new manner, yet planning is difficult when resources

Understand the principles of sustainability.

Locate unsustainable processes and determine the gain in
changing them.
Form a vision of how to change them by backcasting from the
final goal.

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and concepts that are useful to us today might be of no use in the

future, and resources and concepts that we do not presently
value may be essential to humans living in the future (Gowdy,
1994).

Precaution in an Uncertain World

One method used to mitigate the uncertain effect of
new innovations is to evaluate them according to the
precautionary principle. However, the very complexity that
makes the precautionary principle desirable also makes it
contentious and hard to define. The origin of the precautionary
principle concept is often credited to the German notion of
Vorsorgeprinzip, or foresight planning, which began to receive
attention in the 1970s (Morris, 2000). The concept has evolved
over time, and what began as a measure shifted to an
approach and finally to a principle (Adams, 2002).
The Rio Declaration urges the use of the precautionary
principle. Principle 15 states that where there are threats of
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty
should not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective
measures to prevent environmental degradation (Morris, 2000).
A stronger definition, known as the Wingspread definition,
emerged from a 1998 conference. The Wingspread definition of
the precautionary principle states that when an activity raises
threats of harm to human health or the environment,
precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause-andeffect relationships are not fully established (Raffensperger,
2002).
Intuitively,
the
precautionary
principle
is
straightforward, (Adams, 2002; Saltelli & Funtowicz, 2005).
The general idea is to avoid serious and irreversible damage
(Som et al., 2004). As Raffensperger (2003) states, the
precautionary principle can be used to prevent, not just redress,
harm. What is simple to describe, however, is not necessarily
simple to put into use. Critics say the precautionary principle is
ill defined, unscientific, and ideological. Some commentators
argue that universal application of the precautionary principle
would rule out any action, including doing nothing (Sunstein,
2002). It is also argued that the precautionary principle inhibits
innovation and the creation of better substitutes (Goldstein &
Carruth, 2005). These concerns must be addressed before the
precautionary principle can be applied practically. Innovation is
critical to human health and welfare. The optimal balance
between precautionary principle proponents and their critics
would be to develop a method of screening inventive
adaptations that does not cripple innovation, but does limit
potential harm. Such an approach might proceed as follows:

We must accept that some breakthrough technologies will

have unpredictable effects, and develop our ability to cope
reactively with problems accordingly. As an example, the
development of chlorofluorocarbon-based refrigerants
allowed a revolution in cooling and food storage that saved
many lives and greatly improved human health. The
technology to understand the risk that these compounds
posed to the ozone layer did not exist until much later, and
thus what mattered was not our ability to apply a
precautionary principle, but our ability to react quickly and
effectively to an unforeseen problem.

It is necessary to begin by asking, to what sort of

hazards does the precautionary principle apply? What level of
evidence should be required for its use, and what kinds of
preventive measures should be invoked? In the first instance,
there must be some evidence that a hazard exists if the
precautionary principle is not to lead to efforts to rule out any
action (Sandin et al., 2002). If the precautionary principle is not
to stifle progress, it should be coherent, use known information
and theories, have explanatory power, and possess simplicity
(Resnik, 2003). Low complexity solutions should be preferred to
high complexity solutions, if the precautionary principle is to
avoid simply creating further problems (Som et al., 2004).
Tickner & Geiser (2004) point out that an important
proviso is needed if the precautionary principle is to be practical
and workable. Many framings of the precautionary principle call
for preventative action and reversing the burden of proof. These
measures need to be coupled with alternatives assessment in
order to be proactive. This recommendation leads to a focus on
solutions rather than problems and can stimulate innovation.
Alternatives assessment can also allow an avenue for public
participation, as we will see in the following discussion of
nuclear waste management. To summarize:

The strength of the precautionary principle applied should

reflect the scale of the innovation in question.
A discussion of alternatives should be a part of a
precautionary principle process.
The precautionary principle should focus on known risks,
with the understanding that unknown risks might exist.
It must be understood that no precautionary principle short
of disallowing any action will be 100% effective in
preventing problems, as our society and ecosystems are
inherently unpredictable. We must therefore develop our
ability to respond to such problems as they arise.

Uncertainty and Resilience

A brief application of the precautionary principle is needed

for trivial innovation similar to other innovations with only
local effect. As an example, imagine that someone develops
a slightly better corkscrew. It is unlikely such a refinement
will have serious consequences, and therefore the
precautionary principle might consist simply of testing to
ensure the product does not cause injury.
A much more thorough application of the precautionary
principle is needed when a clear risk can be imagined. For
example, genetically modified organisms that contain
genetic material from serious allergens such as peanuts and
shellfish should be carefully studied before being used in
food products.

Complex systems are filled with uncertainty, and no

amount of precaution will eliminate all risks. We therefore need
to build system resilience, which Holling (1976) defines as the
ability of a system to persist by absorbing change. Several
factors influence a systems resilience. These include its latitude,
or the maximum amount of stress that it can absorb without
changing to a new state, its ability to resist change, and its
precariousness or fragility (Walker et al., 2004). The more
resilient an ecosystem or society is, the better it will be at
responding and adapting to unpredictable changes.
There are several ways we can increase system
resilience. In the first instance, we can increase resilience by
ensuring that as we undertake a course of action we leave room

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for alternatives. Preventative measures should allow for more

flexibility in the future (Gollier et al., 2000). Especially in cases
of irreversibility, options should be kept open (Arrow & Fisher,
1974). We can expand resilience by increasing a systems
buffering capacity, by managing for processes at multiple scales,
and by nurturing sources of renewal (Gunderson, 2000).
Allowing cross-scale communication can be particularly
important, as information presented by the inshore
Newfoundland fishers demonstrates (although it was ultimately
ignored by the government). Moving information across scales
is difficult, but it is critical to resilience (Peterson, 2000).
In his detailed study of historical social collapses, the
geographer Jared Diamond (2005) highlights several points of
failure: failure to anticipate problems, failure to perceive the
problems once they exist, failure to act on problems, and finally
failure of an action to solve a problem. The precautionary
principle can mitigate the earlier stages of this progression, but
how do we successfully manage the entire spectrum of proactive
and reactive responses? Diamond argues that important
components of resilience are a willingness to engage in longterm planning and an openness to reconsider core values.

The dialogues were held to engage the public in a

discussion of the NWMO Assessment Framework, of the
general risk and uncertainty of nuclear waste disposal and
management, and of the decision-making processes most
applicable under such conditions of risk and uncertainty. The
goal was to provide a neutral space where discussion of a
contentious and complicated public policy issue could take
place. The dialogues were also designed with an educational role
in mind, to further public engagement with sustainable
development issues in which the science is often uncertain, the
needed information is incomplete, and the time frames transcend
successive generations (Newman & Dale, 2005).
The process was similar for each of the three
dialogues. Before each session, we posted on the e-dialogue
website illustrative background material that was chosen to be
informative, fair, and balanced. All three dialogues are available
at www.e-researchagenda.ca, and a summary report was
prepared for the NWMO.
The three dialogues introduced several new points and
reiterated others for political decision makers. There was
widespread consensus among both the experts and the panelists
that the worst decision would be to take no decision, despite the
risk and uncertainty. In the spirit of alternatives assessment,
participants discussed the merits and detractions of several
proposed solutions. Many participants believed that adaptability
should be strengthened to include ongoing improvement,
innovation, and research and development, a result that
reinforces the above discussion on resilience. The public wanted
to ensure maintenance of capacity to adapt to and to benefit
from changing cognition. The framework should provide
flexibility to future generations to support improved
management options and changes in decisions, and not place
constraining burdens or obligations on future generations.
More importantly, although the federal government
mandated the NWMO to focus exclusively on the management
of used nuclear fuel, an ardent public desire emerged, especially
among younger Canadians, to see this issue linked to nuclear
waste production. From a systems perspective, it was viewed as
problematic to separate the human demand for, and use of,
energy from the management of spent fuel. This result mirrors
the previously discussed need to connect across scales.
We feel the issues raised during these discussions
represent a successful and diverse engagement with the audience
that has enriched the NWMO decision process. It was
particularly interesting to see how the dialogues encouraged
participants to challenge the assessment framework and to
suggest more holistic approaches for the management of used
nuclear fuel. The preliminary report from the NWMO to the
Canadian government reflects these concerns, and calls for the
waste to be buried but left accessible for at least several hundred
years (NWMO, 2005). The alternatives assessment undertaken
here resembles the Natural Step process. The problem was
acknowledged, a goal set, and a selection of paths considered. In
this case, the process will be ongoing for thousands of years, and
the progress to date is only the barest beginning of a very
complex management problem.
The NWMO process has precedent in the Berger
Inquiry into pipeline development in Canadas North.
Parliament established this inquiry early in 1974 to review plans
to build an oil and gas pipeline in the Mackenzie Valley. This
wide-ranging process evaluated social, environmental, and
economic impacts of the prospective facility. The inquiry had

Precaution, Uncertainty, Resilience, and Nuclear

Waste
Nuclear waste management presents a poignant
example of a case that mandates action despite extremely
uncertain information and future scenarios. Canada is currently
deciding how to manage its existing high-level nuclear waste.
During the fall of 2004 and the spring of 2005 I participated in
the organization of three electronic dialogues on nuclear waste
disposal with the goal of engaging the Canadian public.1 The
dialogues were conducted for the Nuclear Waste Management
Organization (NWMO) of Canada, an entity established under
the Nuclear Fuel Waste Act to study various options for
managing the countrys used nuclear fuel. Three provinces
(Ontario, Quebec, and New Brunswick) currently produce such
waste, which poses a very long-term hazard to both human
health and natural ecosystems. The organization has been
charged to:

Establish an Advisory Council that will make public its

comments on the study by the waste management
organization and other reports.
Submit to the Minister of Natural Resources, within three
years of the legislation coming into force, proposed
approaches for the management of used nuclear fuel, along
with Advisory Council comments and a recommended
approach (NWMO, 2005).

The NWMO focus on public involvement stems in

part from the failure of the earlier Canadian Nuclear Waste
Management Program (CNWMP) to finalize a waste
management process. Begun in 1978, the CNWMP concluded in
its final report, released in 1998, that broad public support for
the proposed disposal measures had not been demonstrated
(CEAP, 1998).

These electronic dialogues were created by Ann Dale of Royal Roads University
in British Columbia.

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great flexibility, with permission to gather testimony at hearings

throughout the country. Hearings were held in all communities
along the proposed route. The inquiry concluded that no
pipelines should be built in the Northern Yukon, and that the
building of a pipeline in the Mackenzie Valley should be
delayed. Key issues included the great risk to the fragile Arctic
environment, the smaller-than-promoted size of economic
benefits, and the opposition of the local population (OMalley,
1976).
The Berger Inquiry and the NWMO represent flexible,
open, and responsive approaches to complex issues. The
mismanagement of the Eastern Cod fishery, particularly the
exclusion of the views of local fishers, stands in stark contrast,
suggesting that inclusion of public knowledge is crucial to a
dynamic approach to sustainable development.

adapt to such surprises. As the concept of sustainable

development evolves, a combination of proactive and reactive
management should prove central to sustaining societies in the
face of change.

Acknowledgement
I would like to thank Dr. Ann Dale for her insight into these issues.

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Conclusion
One of the goals of any approach to pursuing
sustainable development is to ensure that future generations
have ample options (Tonn, 2004). A dynamic approach that
manages uncertainty as an ongoing process could maintain our
future options. Dynamic sustainable development is largely
about balance; embracing precaution will be most effective
when paired with alternatives assessment. Innovation needs to
be coupled with resilience building.
The NWMO has begun a process designed to address
a very complex, very long-term problem in a manner that
respects many of the issues addressed in this paper. The
organization recognized the problem and realized that the status
quo was not sustainable, even if the results of any recommended
action would be intrinsically uncertain. The NWMO embraced
the precautionary principle in their decision making process
(NWMO, 2005), but acknowledged the need for alternatives
assessment. As part of this process, the organization engaged the
public and this helped to bring together the issues social and
technical dimensions. In the subsequent report, the NWMO
responded to calls for resilience by recommending a course of
action that would leave room for future technical innovation and
allow for monitoring, thus providing important feedback.
However, it remains to be seen whether Canadian governments
will progress to a multi-scale conversation that connects waste
management with waste production, an important step in linking
feedback loops.
Throughout the public consultations, members of the
public have asked why Canadas nuclear waste exists in the first
place and whether the current dilemma could have been
prevented. If the founders of the Canadian civilian atomic power
program had applied the precautionary principle to the
development of nuclear energy, they might have determined that
the waste from these facilities posed serious, but poorly
understood, risks that were not technologically resolvable, and
that alternative sources of electricity were available at the time.
However, even the most diligent application of dynamic
sustainable development will never create an entirely proactive
society. The interaction between human societies and biological
ecosystems will occasionally generate surprising threats to
sustainability, and these situations must be managed reactively.
Inherent uncertainty always exists, and innovation can act as a
double-edged sword, both straining the biosphere and
simultaneously creating new ways to achieve sustainability. A
society with sufficient diversity and resilience will be able to

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