UY vs BIR

* UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION (hereinafter referred to as UNIFISH)

* UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION ( UCP)
In Sept 1993, Rodrigo Abos, a former employee of UPC reported to the BIR that Uy Chin Ho
aka Frank Uy, manager of UPC, was selling thousands of cartons of canned cartons without
issuing a report. This is a violation of Sec 253 & 263 of the Internal Revenue Code. In Oct
1993, the BIR requested before RTC Cebu to issue a search warrant. Judge Gozo-Dadole
issued a warrant on the same day. A second warrant was issued which contains the same
substance but has only one page, the same was dated Oct 1 st 2003. These warrants were
issued for the alleged violation by Uy of Sec 253. A third warrant was issued on the same
day for the alleged violation of Uy of Sec 238 in relation to sec 263. On the strength of these
warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by members of the PNP, on 2 Oct 1993,
searched the premises of the UPC. They seized, among other things, the records and
documents of UPC. A return of said search was duly made by Labaria with the RTC of
Cebu. UPC filed a motion to quash the warrants which was denied by the RTC. They
appealed before the CA via certiorari. The CA dismissed the appeal for a certiorari is not the
proper remedy.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search warrant issued.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of UPC and Uy in a way for it ordered the return of the seized
items but sustained the validity of the warrant. The SC ruled that the search warrant issued
has not met some basic requisites of validity. A search warrant must conform strictly to the
requirements of the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions. These requirements,
in outline form, are:
(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;
(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or
any other person;
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and
(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or
things to be seized.

The SC noted that there has been inconsistencies in the description of the place to be
searched as indicated in the said warrants. Also the thing to be seized was not clearly
defined by the judge. He used generic itineraries. The warrants were also inconsistent as to
who should be searched. One warrant was directed only against Uy and the other was
against Uy and UPC. The SC however noted that the inconsistencies wered cured by the
issuance of the latter warrant as it has revoked the two others.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right of the people against
unreasonable searches and seizures:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
NOTES
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized.
SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under
oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them
and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.

PEOPLE vs COURT OF APPEALS

In December 1995, Quezon City PNP applied for a search warrant before the QC RTC
against Azfar Hussain who had allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at
Abigail Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose del

Monte, Bulacan. A warrant was issued the next day by J Bacalla not at AVS but at AVS, Apt.
1 Area F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan Apt 1 is
immediately adjacent to AVS. The PNP then proceeded to search the said apartment where
they seized money, some clothings, 4 Pakistani nationals including Hussain and some
explosives. The Pakistanis petitioned before J Casanova that the search warrant is invalid
for there is a discrepancy in the place described and place indicated in the warrant. AVS is
not in any way the same as Apt 1 for Apt 1 is totally separate. J Casanova quashed the
search warrant and ordered the return of the things seized and at the same time ordered
the seized things to be inadmissible as evidence. Prosecutor Chiong moved that the
decision be reversed. The CA affirmed the decision of J Casanova. Chiong averred that the
policemen who did the search has acted on their knowledge. The PNP actually knew that
the Pakistanis are indeed residing in Apt 1 and not in the AVS.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search warrant issued.
HELD: The SC affirmed the decision of the CA. The place to be searched, as set out in the
warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers own personal knowledge of the
premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such
a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to
particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized.
It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it
not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search
process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the
Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of the
place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself;
it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.

People vs. Aruta

In the morning of 13 Dec 1988, the law enforcement officers received information from an
informant named Benjie that a certain Aling Rosa would be leaving for Baguio City on 14
Dec 1988 and would be back in the afternoon of the same day carrying with her a large
volume of marijuana; At 6:30 in the evening of 14 Dec 1988, Aruta alighted from a Victory
Liner Bus carrying a travelling bag even as the informant pointed her out to the law
enforcement officers; NARCOM officers approached her and introduced themselves as
NARCOM agents; When asked by Lt. Abello about the contents of her travelling bag, she

gave the same to him; When they opened the same, they found dried marijuana leaves;
Aruta was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conducted search and seizure is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Aruta and has noted that some drug traffickers are being
freed due to technicalities. Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she
about to commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Aruta was merely crossing the
street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the
NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only
when the informant pointed to Aruta and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the
marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have
apprehended Aruta were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly
illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect
that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the
informant. The SC could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there any
semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and
warrantless arrests. Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to
effect a warrantless search of Arutas bag, there being no probable cause and the accusedappellant not having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently
illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not
incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure must perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized
could not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for these are fruits of a poisoned
tree and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.

When is a warrantless search allowed?

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court 8 and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where
they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.

People vs. Montilla

On 19 June 1994 at about 2pm, police officers Talingting and Clarin were informed by an
asset that a drug courier would be arriving from Baguio to Dasmarias carrying an
undetermined amount of marijuana. The next day, the informant pointed at Montilla as the
courier who was waiting in a waiting shed Brgy Salitran, Dasmarias. Montilla was then
apprehended and he was caught in possession of a bag and a carton worth 28 kilos of
marijuana. Montilla denied the allegation and he said he came to Cavite from Baguio for
work and he does not have any effects with him at that time except for some pocket money.
He was sentenced to death thereafter. He averred that the search and seizure conducted
was illegal for there was no warrant and that he should have been given the opportunity to
cross examine the informant. He said that if the informant has given the cops the
information about his arrival as early as the day before his apprehension, the cops should
have ample time to secure a search warrant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest conducted is legal.
HELD: The SC ruled that the warrantless arrest is legal and so was the warrantless search.
Sec 2 Art 3 of the Constitution has its exception when it comes to warrantless searches,
they are:

(1) customs searches;

(2) searches of moving vehicles,
(3) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(4) consented searches;
(5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest;
(6) stop and frisk measures have been invariably recognized as the traditional exceptions.
In the case at bar, it should be noted that the information relayed by informant to the cops
was that there would be delivery of marijuana at Barangay Salitran by a courier coming from
Baguio in the early morning of June 20, 1994. Even assuming that the policemen were not
pressed for time, this would be beside the point for, under these circumstances, the
information relayed was too sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of the
corresponding arrest or search warrant. While there is an indication that the informant knew
the courier, the records do not reveal that he knew him by name.
On such bare information, the police authorities could not have properly applied for a
warrant, assuming that they could readily have access to a judge or a court that was still
open by the time they could make preparations for applying therefor, and on which there is
no evidence presented by the defense. In determining the opportunity for obtaining
warrants, not only the intervening time is controlling but all the coincident and ambient
circumstances should be considered, especially in rural areas.
A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting
police officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offender
(1) dangerous weapons, and
(2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense.

People vs. Racho

626 SCRA 633, August 3, 2010
Facts:

On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through

cellular phone withappellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent reported
the transaction to the police authorities whoimmediately formed a team to
apprehend the appellant. The team members posted themselves along
thenational highway in Baler, Aurora, and at around 3:00 p.m. of the same
day, a Genesis bus arrived inBaler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the
confidential agent pointed to him as the person hetransacted with, and when
the latter was about to board a tricycle, the team approached him and
invitedhim to the police station as he was suspected of carrying shabu. When
he pulled out his hands from his
pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened
, yielded a small sachet containingthe suspected drug. The team then
brought appellant to the police station for investigation and theconfiscated
specimen was marked in the presence of appellant. The field test and
laboratory examinationson the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded
positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.Appellant was charged
in two separate informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165,
for transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law
for possessing, dangerous drugs.During the arraignment, appellant pleaded
"Not Guilty" to both charges.
On July 8, 2004, the RTCrendered a Joint Judgment convicting appellant of
Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 butacquitted him of the charge of
Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the CA affirmedthe
RTC decision. The appellant brought the case to SC assailing for the first time
he legality of his arrestand the validity of the subsequent warrantless search.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellant has a ground to assail the validity of his arrest.
Held:
The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone
is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition,
that the accused perform some overt act thatwould indicate that he has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
Wefind no cogent reason to depart from this well-established
doctrine.Appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the
police officers. Neither did thearresting officers have personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested hadcommitted, was
committing, or about to commit an offense. At the time of the arrest,
appellant had justalighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a
tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any suspiciousmanner that would
engender a reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude
that hewas committing or intending to commit a crime. Were it not for the
information given by the informant,appellant would not have been
apprehended and no search would have been made, and consequently,
thesachet of shabu would not have been confiscated. Neither was the
arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away

with therequisite warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a

member of the arresting team, their office received the "tipped information"
on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the informant not
only the appellants physical description but also his name. Although it was
not certain that appellant
would arrive on the same day (May 19), there was an assurance that he
would be there the following day(May 20). Clearly, the police had ample
opportunity to apply for a warrant.

People vs Claudio