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Topic 1.
Ashish Nair

ATS3873
Essay 2:

ATS3873 PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN APPLIED ETHICS 2015

Second Essay
Required length:

2250 words

Assessment:

50% of total assessment

Due date:

5pm, Sunday 14 June

Word count:
> In-text references: 109
> Subtitles: X
> Total word count (minus both above):
1.

Neil Levy and Mianna Lotz argue that having a close genetic link with ones
children is morally insignificant. Critically evaluate their argument for this claim.

In Reproductive cloning and a (kind of) genetic fallacy, Levy and Lotzs (2005:232)
purpose was to evaluate whether we should welcome or reject human reproductive
cloning as a means for those otherwise infertile to have genetically related children of
their own. The authors posit that the strongest argument in favour of human
reproductive cloning for infertile couples is the genetic argument, which essentially
emphasizes the moral significance of having a close genetic relation to ones children.
Levy and Lotz however deem this relation morally insignificant, and thus claim that the
'genetic argument' is unsound due to the moral insignificance of having a close genetic
relation to ones children. In this paper, I will focus on summarising and evaluating their
objections to the claim of the moral significance of having a close genetic relation to
ones children. My contention is that Levy and Lotz do not account for an evolutionarily
significant factor that is in fact largely genetically inherited, and that many of their
insufficiently substantiated objections do not stand up to current empirical evidence.
Why would a close genetic relation to one's child be important and morally significant?
The reasons are varied, but are broadly about the increased love, happiness, and
contentment that can (presumably) result from such a relation, e.g. from better
relationships with partner and child, and with better care and prospects for the childs
future, compared to if a child was not as closely related or even at all (as in most cases of
adoption). Additionally, Levy and Lotz (2005:234) note that many of us have a
(supposedly) natural desire to bring forth into existence children of our own (i.e. those
closely genetically-related to us), and thus can there can be significant distress in
couples who cannot fulfill their desire due to various reasons, primarily infertility. Of the
potentially numerous reasons that people may have when legitimately interested in
having biological children, nine reasons were listed; six from Strong (2000), and three
from Almond (1999) (Levy and Lotz 2005:236):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

It involves participation in the creation of a person;

It can be an affirmation of a couples mutual love and acceptance of each other;
It can contribute to sexual intimacy;
It provides a link to future persons;
It involves experiences of pregnancy and childbirth;
It leads to experiences associated with child rearing;
Genetic parents will provide better care for children than will non-genetic parents;

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8. Genetic relatedness is more natural than other means of assuming responsibility

for children;
9. A genetic connection will best ensure that the child shares the significant interests
and outlook of her parents, thus making for more satisfying parenting and
allowing greater intimacy between parents and child.
From these, it is clear that some are irrelevant/apply regardless of adopted or genetic
children: (3) is irrelevant since that can be, and more often than not is, separate from the
desire to conceive; (5) is irrelevant, because the woman can have the fertilized egg
implanted in her and thus experience pregnancy and childbirth if they so wanted (Levy
and Lotz 2005:241); finally, (6) is irrelevant as well, since adopted children can also
provide child rearing experiences. As in the paper, I will go through the objections Levy
and Lotz give for each of the remaining reasons from bottom to top.
Reason 9 essentially states that the positive results in the parent-child relationship and
parenting increase as a childs similarities to their parents increase. This seems
understandable, however the objection lies in the reliance on the notion that the parents
genetics are a more significant force than the social factors of upbringing in a childs
similarity to their parent/s, with regards to interests, skills, life outlook, etc. (Levy and
Lotz 2005:237). Genetic inheritance is, at most, as important as social upbringing, and
there is a lack of evidence for the strength of claims of reason (9), i.e. there is evidence
against the genetic inheritance of: religious and political ideologies; intelligence; skills
such as perfect pitch (Levy and Lotz 2005:237-8). Thus, they suggest that our most
important individual characteristics are acquired, not innate, especially for traits of
world-view and life outlook (Levy and Lotz 2005:238).
Reason 8 is initially dismissed in the paper as appealing to nature and thus fallacious
(Levy and Lotz 2005:238), i.e. that just because genetic relatedness is more natural than
other means of assuming responsibility for children, it does not means that it is optimal
or worth striving for. They consider, however, another interpretation which ties into
reason 7: due to a (supposedly) inherent desire to have biological children, parents are
more likely to provide better care to their biological children compared to an adopted one
(Levy and Lotz 2005:238). The evidence they give is that children of purely social
upbringing (e.g. adoption) tend to be at a higher risk of being mistreated/abused by their
guardians/stepparents than children biologically related to their parents. However, the
authors disagree with this latter claim, arguing that from a evolutionary biology
standpoint, it is too simplistic to assume that the drive to care for genetically-close
children will have been selected for automatically (Levy and Lotz 2005:239). It seems at
least equally likely that evolutionary pressures favoured the "...tendency to care for those
physically proximate," (Levy and Lotz 2005:240). They also disagree with the claim that
children with no biological link are at a greater risk of experiencing poor parenting, citing
Rome and Japan as cultures where social ties are valued at least equally as blood ties, if
not excluding them altogether (Levy and Lotz 2005:240). Further evidence is cited for
the historical changes in the treatment of children during the Middle Ages till the 18th
and 19th centuries, claiming that the wealthy and poor alike had an indifference to their
children, and thus from this Levy and Lotz (2005:241) state that a biological connection is
"...neither necessary nor sufficient for good childcare". Any disparity that does occur in
the treatment of biological versus adopted children may be sufficiently explained by and
thus likely due to prevailing social norms that place the importance of genetic
relatedness over and above the social factors (Levy and Lotz 2005:241).
Regarding reason 4, Levy and Lotz (2005:242) claim that the biological mother or parent
has just as much a link to the child as would to a couple who adopts, or to its surrogate
mother (even if the embryo is not theirs). Interesting to note is that despite any
differences in the link to the child the adoptee couple or surrogate mother has compared
to a biological link, they cannot come up with an argument that does not first assume the
importance of the biological link. Arguing that the biological link is important insofar as it
is a continuation of one's genes past one's own life is also rejected by Levy and Lotz

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Ashish Nair

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(2005:242) for two main reasons: firstly, emphasising genetic continuity over the more
relevant identity signifier, psychological continuity, seems to be a poor choice; secondly,
our percentage contribution within each subsequent generation's child is halved
(biological child having 50% of each parent), and thus within just a few generations will
eventually be insignificant. One can continue via social means, i.e. passing on one's life
outlook, ideologies, etc. onto our children and so on, making it unclear how genetic
continuation could be considered superior without first assuming its importance (Levy
and Lotz 2005:242).
Finally, regarding reasons 1 and 2, Levy and Lotz (2005:242-3) consider them, at face
value, as the most morally important of the nine reasons. With reason 1, defining what
creating a person means is key, and determines whether this reason in favour of a close
genetic relation to one's child stands: either it is interpreted as conception, in which case
it is unclear how conception counts as the creation of a person (since Levy and Lotz
consider personhood as something one grows into after birth), or interpreted as
developing into personhood (since many aspects of personhood begin long after birth), in
which case both biological and adoptee parents are involved in a child's development
into personhood (Levy and Lotz 2005:243). Reason 1 fails on both interpretations.
Regarding reason 2, Levy and Lotz consider a case of a baby swap as a counter example:
the swap occurred shortly after birth at the hospital, with no knowledge from either of the
couples, lasting for about nine years before the child of one of the couples died of a heart
defect, from which they found that it was not their biological child (Levy and Lotz
2005:244). As Levy and Lotz point out, it seems wrong to think that given nine years of
raising their unknowingly adopted child from birth that the couple did not consider the
child their own, a living symbol of their love to each other. The couple's perception and
beliefs about their child are what matter over any actual biological connection (Levy and
Lotz 2005:244-5). To bolster this, they consider a though-experiment (Levy and Lotz
2005:245): a baby-making machine exists that allows its operator to construct a viable
embryo with full control over genotype selection, implant it into a uterus (natural or
artificial), and bring it to term. Unlike the common view on conception, this lends equal
weight to children created genetically similar or different to the creator/s. Levy and Lotz
(2005:245) claim that this also shows that the only reason for an individual to want to
meet their creator is out of curiosity, even in the case of an identical genotype to the
creator, and thus this explains away supposed inherent nature of the desire of adopted
children to want to meet their parents. This concludes all the objections Levy and Lotz
give against the moral significance of having a close genetic relation to one's child.
I think this paper has some major underlying issues. Firstly, it is important to note that
Strong (2008:132-4) responds to the objections made by Levy and Lotz against some of
his six reasons, particularly reasons 1 and 2, which Strong shows are misinterpreted
and/or mischaracterised in their paper and thus outlines the various flaws that result.
Taking Levy and Lotz's paper as it stands however, I have found a genetic factor not
considered by them that may potentially overturn the objections they have to many of
the nine reasons. I must note however that my objection relies on this idea: that despite
how little the differences may be between a genetic connection versus a purely social
connection, the genetic connection could always be considered as having whatever
factors the social connection has, plus any factors due to the genetic aspects of the
parent-child relationship. And regardless of the size of these additional factors, that they
can confer a distinct and significant potential for increased interest, love, contentment,
etc. in a parent for their child means that the factor is morally significant.
The single most significant factor I believe that was not considered by Levy and Lotz was
of the role of visual similarity, i.e. the similarities of facial features (and likely
expressions) between the child and the parent/s, and/or close relatives. We have good
reason to believe that genetic inheritance from our parents does contribute significantly
to our facial features and that recognition and differentiation of these features in an
individual from another confers important evolutionary advantages, such as identifying

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Topic 1.
Ashish Nair

ATS3873
Essay 2:

our relatives and biological children, genetic relations between others, and consequently
decisions regarding trust, altruistic actions, recognising strangers and enemies, and
social interactions in general (DeBruine 2002; Maloney et al. 2006; DeBruine et al. 2008;
Klimentidis and Shriver 2009; Alvergne et al. 2010), and additionally there is evidence to
suggest that there is a considerable inheritable genetic component to our facial
expressions too (Peleg et al. 2006).
The first area of contention is on reason 7, where there is evidence of facial resemblance
playing an important role in assessing the certainty to which we would consider a child to
be our biological offspring (evolutionarily more important to men, but the effect occurs in
women via their male relations), and consequently the depth of care depending on how
certain we are, e.g. patrilateral grandmothers and aunts providing less care compared to
their matrilateral counterparts (DeBruine 2004); fathers increasing emotional investment
in the child and the subsequent link to improved outcomes for their child (Alvergne 2007;
2009; 2010). Similarly, Leohlin et al. (2010) found that adopted children felt less close to
their adoptee parents compared to biological children, and that this closeness predicted
with moderate accuracy life outcomes like maturity, educational level, and a sense of
responsibility. Therefore, genetic relation expressed as facial similarities are indeed an
important factor in the likelihood of a child receiving optimal care, and additionally, this
evidence provides a stronger, more plausible account for why there may be a disparity in
care/abuse between stepparents and biological parents to their children, as opposed to
Levy and Lotz's (unsubstantiated) idea that the emphasised importance of genetic
relations (due to the prevailing social norms) were to blame.
Since this evidence claims an evolutionary basis for recognising and identifying our
relatives and biological children based on facial features, it definitely does not seem that
far a stretch to think that these facial features would play an important role in conferring
additional strength to the affirmation of a couple's mutual love and acceptance of each
other, i.e. that the affirmation would be stronger given a biological child compared to an
adopted child due to the clear resemblance and increased certainty of genetic relation
for the former (reason 2). Obviously, increased certainty due to similarities is not
absolute proof a genetic link, as is evidenced by the example of babies switched at birth
and raised by the 'wrong' family, however that genetic inheritance can confer a definite
increase in facial similarity is still important to note. Additionally, Levy and Lotz's claim
against a genetic connection as a driver of adopted children to seek their biological
parents does not seem to stand up to the evidence either, e.g. a study of 300 adopted
families finding that the vast majority of adopted children (from birth) resembled their
biological mothers more than their adoptee parents, and additionally genetic variation
did explain differences in the childrens' intelligence (Horn 1983). A more recent analysis
of this data suggest further correlation with genetic inheritance: with substance abuse,
educational level, marital stability (Loehlin and Horn 2012).
Finally, regarding reason 4, if before we considered that both biological and adopted
children equally count as a link to future persons, the addition of facial features as an
important factor, being unique to the biological child, makes it clear that there is an
increased sense in which the biological child is a link to future persons i.e. it has the
social aspects transmitted as well as important facial features that identify the child as
being much more likely related to its parents and relatives (even if the effect would be
diluted with passing generations, as discussed by Levy and Lotz (2005:242)).
The vast majority of the evidence I've given in opposition of Levy and Lotz's (in many
cases unsubstantiated) claims are quite recent, and thus it is unclear they would respond
with empirical evidence against mine. That facial features are an important part of our
evolutionary history and still influence our behaviour towards children (amongst others)
in morally significant ways to this day seems clear and difficult to dispute. The only way
in which Levy and Lotz's claims (those that I have objected to) could hold water is if
genetic inheritance is not a factor anymore i.e. if we all 'procreated' via the baby-making
machine. This way, genetic inheritance has no meaning, no link other than the event of

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Topic 1.
Ashish Nair

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Essay 2:

creation that exists between the child and its 'creator/s'. However given our evolutionary
tendencies, it seems likely that even in this case people or couples would still produce
children of a close genetic link to themselves, as the genetic similarities are meaningful
and engaging to us, and provide us with an extra layer of happiness and love with the
child and for each other, on top of the social similarities that will occur over time.
Therefore, for all the reasons and evidence given in this discussion, I think that having a
close genetic link with one's children is of moral significance, contrary to Levy and Lotz's
claim of insignificance.

References
Alvergne, A., Faurie, C. and Raymond, M. (2009). Fatheroffspring resemblance predicts paternal
investment in humans. Animal Behaviour, 78(1), pp.61-69.
Alvergne, A., Faurie, C. and Raymond, M. (2010). Are parents' perceptions of offspring facial
resemblance consistent with actual resemblance? Effects on parental investment. Evolution and
Human Behavior, 31(1), pp.7-15.
Alvergne, A., Faurie, C. and Raymond, M. (2007). Differential facial resemblance of young children
to their parents: who do children look like more?. Evolution and Human Behavior, 28(2),
pp.135-144.

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Topic 1.
Ashish Nair

ATS3873
Essay 2:

DeBruine, L. (2002). Facial resemblance enhances trust. Proceedings of the Royal Society B:
Biological Sciences, 269(1498), pp.1307-1312.
DeBruine, L. (2004). Resemblance to self increases the appeal of child faces to both men and women.
Evolution and Human Behavior, 25(3), pp.142-154.
DeBruine, L., Jones, B., Little, A. and Perrett, D. (2007). Social Perception of Facial Resemblance in
Humans. Arch Sex Behav, 37(1), pp.64-77.
Horn, J. (1983). The Texas Adoption Project: Adopted Children and Their Intellectual Resemblance to
Biological and Adoptive Parents. Child Development, 54(2), p.268.
Klimentidis, Y. and Shriver, M. (2009). Estimating Genetic Ancestry Proportions from Faces. PLoS
ONE, 4(2), p.e4460.
Levy, N. and Lotz, M. (2005). Reproductive cloning and a (kind of) genetic fallacy. Bioethics, 19(3),
pp.232-250.
Loehlin, J. and Horn, J. (2012). How general is the General Factor of Personality? Evidence from
the Texas Adoption Project. Journal of Research in Personality, 46(6), pp.655-663.
Loehlin, J., Horn, J. and Ernst, J. (2010). Parentchild closeness studied in adoptive families.
Personality and Individual Differences, 48(2), pp.149-154.
Maloney, L. and Dal Martello, M. (2006). Kin recognition and the perceived facial similarity of
children. Journal of Vision, 6(10), pp.4-4.
Peleg, G., Katzir, G., Peleg, O., Kamara, M., Brodsky, L., Hel-Or, H., Keren, D. and Nevo, E. (2006).
Hereditary family signature of facial expression. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, 103(43), pp.15921-15926.