Page 1

Mr Garry McIntosh, Associate to His Honour Mullaly J.

judgemullaly.chambers@countycourt.vic.gov.au
Cc:

30-1-2016

Mr Peter Kidd CJ County Court of Victoria, feedback@countycourt.vic.gov.au

Buloke Shire Council buloke@buloke.vic.gov.au
Daniel Andrews Premier Victoria daniel.andrews@parliament.vic.gov.au
Mr Martin Pakula, martin.pakula@parliament.vic.gov.au & attorney-general@justice.vic.gov.au
Elliott Stafford and Associated
lawyers@elliottstafford.com.au
County Court of Victoria crim.reg@countycourt.vic.gov.au
Re: 20160130-Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Associate Mr Garry McIntosh to His Honour Mullaly J CCV-Re APPEAL-15-2502
-Re Location Ballarat Venue-unsworn statement abolished-etc

Sir,

after 3 months having passed since the pre appeal hearing held before His Honour Mullaly J
ON 30 October 2015 the court still has not to my knowledge managed to perform a basic legal
requirement and that is to advise me the location of the Ballarat venue. It is not uncommon that a
court/tribunal hold a hearing other than its ordinary physical court venue location and this may
even eventuate upon a short notice, such as due to certain water damage or otherwise. It is for
this important that the courts has the not just decency and courtesy but the competence to advise
a party, without this party having to request this, what the physical location address will be where
the hearing or any further hearing is to eventuate, and this including the time, etc. In my view
that the county court of Victoria has been unable to manage this in 13 weeks (3 months) I view
underline its gross incompetence to deal with basic legal requirements.
When will the court manage such simple basic task and provide me with the relevant
details?
Failure of due process.
QUOTE Merritt v. Hunter, C.A. Kansas 170 F2d 739.
Where a court failed to observe safeguards, it amounts to denial of due process of law, court is deprived of
juris.
END QUOTE

From onset there was a total failure of due process. While Buloke Shire Council and its legal
representatives were alerted to the fact that due to ill held I couldnt travel, nevertheless despite
legal requirements no full brief was served upon me and this is the modus oprandi that has so
far persisted throughout. Despite that a full request was made for a copy of the brief on 27
October 2015 as after all with the pre-appeal hearing it was important for me to know what was
at the time on 20 August 2015 and subsequently on 17 September 2015 placed before the
Magistrates Court of Victoria at the St Arnaud venue, to date no attempt was made to serve such
a brief. This also in violation of the orders of His Honour Mullaly J on 30 October 2015 that
the brief was to be posted to me by no later than 9 November 2015 via Australian Post.
In fact neither did Buloke Shire Council legal representatives file any Notice of Appearance as
required by the rules of the court and this may underline the disrespect/disregard by Buloke Shire
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Page 2
council legal representatives as to compliance with the rules of the court as well as with the
rights of myself as a defendant/objector.
This has been aggravated by the courts themselves, as while it was known that there was an
objection to jurisdiction submitted in writings in my ADDRESS TO THE COURT including
my written submissions OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION for the 20 August 2015 hearing
and again in regard of the 17 September 2015 hearing the court at no time dealt with the
OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION and as such never invoked jurisdiction.

I below quote part of the 2 September 2015 correspondence received from ES&a Lawyers acting
allegedly for Buloke Shire Council, I have however at the end of this ADDRESS TO THE
COURT included a scanned copy of the correspondence in full.
QUOTE (Alison J May LEGAL Practitioner ES&a 2-9-2015 correspondence)
We act on behalf of the Buloke shire Council in the above prosecution.
The above matter was listed for before the Magistrates Court at St Arnaud on 20 August 2015 and we
acknowledge your numerous items of correspondence. We do not propose to respond to a majority of the
matters raised therein.
The purpose of this letter is to confirm that as you did not appear the matter has been adjourned for hearing at
the St Arnaud Magistrates Court on 17 September 2015 at 8.30am In the event you do not appear on that
date the matter will proceed in your absence.
We confirm that the St Arnaud Magistrates Court is the appropriate venue for this matter as the offence took
place in Berriwillock. The only Court which is closer to the location of the offence is the Magistrates Court
ar Swan Hill which is a greater distance from your residence. Council will not consent to any change of
venue and we note that the Collingwood Magistrates Court is not the appropriate venue for your matter in
any event as it deals with matters only where the offence has taken place within the strict boundary of a small
proportion of the City of Yarra or where the accused resides within that same boundary.
We note your purported objection to jurisdiction contained in your letter dated 17 August 2015 and strongly
suggest that you take legal advice with respect to same.
END QUOTE (Alison J May LEGAL Practitioner ES&a 2-9-2015 correspondence)

It is therefore absolutely clear that ES&a lawyers were fully aware about my OBJECTION TO
JURISDICTION. The fact they desired not to respond to them also must be taken into account
as a failure to prove jurisdiction, this as the court cannot assume jurisdiction but the prosecutor
had to prove jurisdiction by evidence. A refusal to do so is no legal excuse and therefore the
Court on 20 August 2015 had an uncontested OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION. See also set
outs further below under different headings.
Actore non probante reus absolvitur. When the plaintiff does not prove his case, the
defendant is absolved.
Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat. The burden of the proof lies upon him who
affirms, not he who denies.
The same eventuated on 30 October 2015 before His Honour Mullaly J on the pre-appeal hearing
where His Honour Mullaly J without a shred of evidence being before the court to justify this
outburst/tirade His Honour Mullaly J commenced to attack my person, also refusing to follow
Due Process such as to consider the written submission stated in the ADDRESS TO THE
COURT that was already on court file as well as submitted from the Bar table, and by this
totally ignored the written submission OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION regarding the
appeal.
It may be in legal terms extra ordinary that an Appellant objects to the jurisdiction of the court to
hear and determine an appeal, but to the court what should be relevant is what the correct process
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Page 3
is in law. If I can achieve the same end result desired with an OBJECTION TO
JURISDICTION then so be it. In the end when I submitted that I would seek a judicial review
His Honour Mullaly J then announced to adjourn matters so His Honour Mullaly J could read the
11 page written submission being the ADDRESS TO THE COURT, however upon return
totally failed to deal with the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION albeit did raise the issue of
the full brief. It also should be understood that Buloke Shire Council legal representatives
purportedly served a brief regarding a 18 March 2013 court hearing which was long before the
17 November 2014 Infringement Notice was issued. As such it appears that Buloke Shire
Council legal representatives had purportedly a hearing listed long before the alleged offence had
been committed. Then it purported to amend the brief to a 22 February 2016 date but this
doesnt in any way then provide the full brief I was all along entitled upon that was before the
court, if at all, on 20 August 2015 and/or 17 September 2015. More over in the purported brief
the only witness listed is Mr Wayne Wall and one then has to ask if the legal representatives of
Buloke Shire Council are not listed as witnesses how can they then purport to give evidence from
the bar table by making unsworn statements from the bar table (Itself a violation of the sanctity
of the bar table) by producing a stack of papers claiming to be my writings.
In my view it is a serious matter to file and/or serve a false brief with a hearing date that is a
fabrication of the person signing the document. Yet, even in that regard the court has so far failed
to address this issue also.
County Civil Court: CIVIL PROCEDUREDismissal. It is not apparent from the face of the complaint that the
issues raised involve the same parties and facts previously litigated and ruled on, and that dismissal was warranted
based on the affirmative defense of res judicata. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Joseph John
Libertino v. Mario Vavoulis and Rock Bottom Auto Sales, Inc., No. 13-AP-0017-WS (Fla. 6th Cir. App. Ct. June 15,
2015).

As on 19 July 2006 (about 10 years earlier) I then already had successfully objected to the
jurisdiction of the County Court of Victoria involving the Commonwealth as well as
State/Territorial Attorney-Generals and the Attorney-General for the State of Victoria then made
known to abide by the courts decision, then clearly where Buloke Shire Council is seeking to
purportedly enforce State legislative provisions it cannot now on behalf of the State of Victoria
violates this undertaking. This also because it was a constitutional issue and the same parties
cannot re-litigate a constitutional issue.
His Honour Mullaly J clearly disregarding the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION by this
violated cardinal critical legal requirements and the moment His Honour Mullaly J did so His
Honour Mullaly J no longer continued as an judicial officer but as a private person, basically as I
view it conducting a STAR CHAMBER COURT/KANGAROO COURT. This I view is a
criminal matter in itself.
The following Authority while dealing with the U.S.A likewise is applicable to the judiciary in
then commonwealth of Australia.
Note: Any judge who does not comply with his oath to the Constitution of the
United States wars against that Constitution and engages in acts in violation
of the supreme law of the land. The judge is engaged in acts of treason.
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "no state legislator or executive or
judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking
to support it". See also In Re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (188); U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S.
200, 216, 101 S. Ct. 471, 66 L. Ed. 2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia,
QUOTE:..However, the judiciary has no power to amend or modernize the Constitution to give effect to what
Judges think is in the best public interest. The function of the judiciary, including the function of this
Court, is to give effect to the intention of the makers of the Constitution as evinced by the terms in which
they expressed that intention. That necessarily means that decisions, taken almost a century ago by
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Page 4
people long dead, bind the people of Australia today even in cases where most people agree that those
decisions are out of touch with the present needs of Australian society.
":.. The starting point for a principled interpretation of the Constitution is the search for the intention of its
makers"
Gaudron J (Wakim, HCA27\99)
"... But in the interpretation of the Constitution the connotation or connotations of its words should
remain constant. We are not to give words a meaning different from any meaning which they could have
borne in 1900. Law is to be accommodated to changing facts. It is not to be changed as language changes.
"
Windeyer J (Ex parte Professional Engineers' Association)

Causing me to attend to the Ballarat venue in my view is a form of extortion to force me unduly
to travel to an inappropriate court venue and face further denial of justice and incur cost which
His Honour Mullaly J ought to have avoided.
Essentially His Honour Mullaly J grossly denied me JUSTICE, because as I had set out from
onset having OBJECTED TO THE JURISDICTION of the courts then the court shouldnt
manipulate its powers as to cause me to engage in protracted litigation where it should have
addressed the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION in the first place.
Extract from the Nuremberg Judgment within the International Military Tribunal 1st October
1946 bottom of page 100
QUOTE
Many of these men have made a mockery of the soldier's oath of obedience to military orders. When it suits
their defence they say they had to obey; when confronted with Hitler's brutal crimes, which are shown to
have been within their general knowledge, they say they disobeyed.
The truth is they actively participated in all these crimes, or sat silent and acquiescent, witnessing the
commission of crimes on a scale larger and more shocking than the world has ever had the misfortune to
know. This must be said: Where the facts warrant it, these men should be brought to trial
so that those among them who are guilty of these crimes should not escape punishment.
END QUOTE

The same applies to judicial officers/OFFICER OF THE COURT who knowingly ignore the
Rule of law and persist in enforcing invalid court orders. Despite my elaborate writings nothing
was done to address these invalid orders.
.

Uniform Tax \case, 1942 (65CLR 373 at 408) 23-7-1942

QUOTE
Common expressions such as: 'The Courts have declared a statute invalid'," says Chief Justice Latham,
"sometimes lead to misunderstanding. A pretended law made in excess of power is not and never has been a
law at all. Anybody in the country is entitled to disregard it. Naturally, he will feel safer if he has a
decision of a court in his favor, but such a decision is not an element, which produces invalidity in any law.
The law is not valid until a court pronounces against it - and thereafter invalid. If it is beyond power it is
invalid ab initio.
END QUOTE
Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally; Re Wakim; Ex parte Darvall; Re Brown; Ex parte Amann; Spi [1999] HCA 27
(17 June 1999)
QUOTE
For constitutional purposes, they are a nullity. No doctrine of res judicata or issue estoppel can prevail
against the Constitution. Mr Gould is entitled to disregard the orders made in Gould v Brown. No doubt, as
Latham CJ said of invalid legislation, "he will feel safer if he has a decision of a court in his favour".
That is because those relying on the earlier decision may seek to enforce it against Mr Gould.
END QUOTE
.

I have sought to cooperate to follow legal procedures regardless that I view the orders are and
remain to be invalid and without legal force.
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Page 5
Uniform Tax \case, 1942 (65CLR 373 at 408) 23-7-1942
QUOTE
Common expressions such as: 'The Courts have declared a statute invalid'," says Chief Justice Latham,
"sometimes lead to misunderstanding. A pretended law made in excess of power is not and never has been a
law at all. Anybody in the country is entitled to disregard it. Naturally, he will feel safer if he has a decision
of a court in his favor, but such a decision is not an element, which produces invalidity in any law. The law is
not valid until a court pronounces against it - and thereafter invalid. If it is beyond power it is invalid ab
initio.
END QUOTE
Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally; Re Wakim; Ex parte Darvall; Re Brown; Ex parte Amann; Spi [1999] HCA 27 (17
June 1999)
QUOTE
For constitutional purposes, they are a nullity. No doctrine of res judicata or issue estoppel can prevail against
the Constitution. Mr Gould is entitled to disregard the orders made in Gould v Brown. No doubt, as Latham
CJ said of invalid legislation, "he will feel safer if he has a decision of a court in his favour". That is because
those relying on the earlier decision may seek to enforce it against Mr Gould.
END QUOTE

The judiciary however has shown to be blatantly ignorant of what is Due process of law and that
should be of grave concern to anyone.
While the Infringement Notice was to have been withdrawn prior to any summons having been
issued it now is that the summons relies upon the Infringement Notice. As such it appears to me
that Buloke Shire Council legal representatives so to say are a bunch of amateurs not knowing
how to properly litigate and by this inflict undue harm upon me. Surely I should be entitled to
have competent litigation being conducted against me and not be subjected to this kind of utter
rubbish, and then they dare to pursue cost for their utter disgraceful rubbish?
They have consistently violated Due process and aided so by the judiciary, hence it is
reasonable to suspect for a FAIR MINDED PERSON that because the courts share the same
ABN number as to State of Victoria it no longer provides due process but rather are so to say
in my view participant and so aiding and abetting in the perverting of justice.
Federal jurisdiction versus State jurisdiction, etc.
While the matter that was instituted for hearing before the Magistrates Court of Victoria at St
Arnaud was one as to State of Victoria legislation the fact that as the objector and
CONSTITUTIONALIST relies upon the legal principles embedded in the Commonwealth of
Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) then this means the matter became a federal jurisdictional
matter, albeit past litigation on constitutional issues which on 19 July 2006 were decided in my
favour are beyond re-litigation and as such Buloke Shire Council acting for the State of Victoria
is bound by this.
.

The High Court of Australia held that where a party pleads the non-application of a State Act
because of Commonwealth legislation then the State Court is exercising Federal jurisdiction.
(However only if the State Court can invoke jurisdiction, which VCAT cannot and neither is a
court!) Troy v Wrigglesworth (1919) 26 C.L.R. 305; 25 (1926) 38 C.L.R. 441; 33 A.L.R. 66.
.

Held that a State Court exercising federal jurisdiction when it erroneously applies
Commonwealth Act to subject matter before the Court. Commonwealth v Cole, (1923) 32 C.L.R.
602 and Commonwealth v Dalton, (1924) 33 C.L.R.. 452; 30 A.L.R. 85
QUOTE Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F 2d 906, 910.
Jurisdiction can be challenged at any time." and "Jurisdiction, once challenged, cannot be assumed
and must be decided.
END QUOTE

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Page 6
QUOTE Stuck v. Medical Examiners, 94 Ca 2d 751. 211 P2d 389.
Once challenged, jurisdiction cannot be assumed, it must be proved to exist.
END QUOTE
QUOTE Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 2nd 906 at 910,
Jurisdiction can be challenged at any time, even on final determination.
END QUOTE
QUOTE Dillon v. Dillon, 187 P 27
Thus, where a judicial tribunal has no jurisdiction of the subject matter on which it assumes to act, its
proceedings are absolutely void in the fullest sense of the term. .
END QUOTE
QUOTE Hagens v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 533,
Once jurisdiction is challenged, it must be proven
END QUOTE
QUOTE HALSBURYS LAWS OF AUSTRALIA says under (130-13460):
Consent to summary jurisdiction The consent to be tried summarily must be clear and unequivocal and a
failure to carry out the procedures for obtaining the consent will deprive the court of jurisdiction to determine
the matters summarily.
END QUOTE
QUOTE Hill Top Developers v. Holiday Pines Service Corp., 478 So. 2d. 368 (Fla 2nd DCA 1985)
Defense of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any time, even on appeal.
END QUOTE
QUOTE In Re Application of Wyatt, 300 P. 132; Re Cavitt, 118 P2d 846.
Jurisdiction is fundamental and a judgment rendered by a court that does not have jurisdiction to hear
is void, ab initio.
END QUOTE
QUOTE (Jagens v. Lavine, 415 S.Ct.768).
Once jurisdiction is challenged, it must be proven.
END QUOTE
QUOTE Joyce v. US, 474 F2d 215.
There is no discretion to ignore that lack of jurisdiction.
END QUOTE
QUOTE Latana v. Hopper, 102 F. 2d 188; Chicago v. New York, 37 F Supp. 150.
Court must prove on the record, all jurisdiction facts related to the jurisdiction asserted.
END QUOTE
QUOTE Main v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980).
The law provides that once State and Federal jurisdiction has been challenged, it must be proven.
END QUOTE
QUOTE Melo v. US, 505 F2d 1026.
Once jurisdiction is challenged, the court cannot proceed when it clearly appears that the court lacks
jurisdiction, the court has no authority to reach merits, but, rather, should dismiss the action.
END QUOTE
QUOTE Norwood v. Renfield, 34 C 329; Ex parte Giambonini, 49 P. 732.
A universal principle as old as the law is that a proceedings of a court without jurisdiction are a nullity
and its judgment therein without effect either on person or property.
END QUOTE
QUOTE Rosemond v. Lambert, 469 F2d 416.
The burden shifts to the court to prove jurisdiction."
END QUOTE
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Page 7
QUOTE Standard v. Olsen, 74 S. Ct. 768,
No sanctions can be imposed absent proof of jurisdiction.
END QUOTE
QUOTE Thompson v. Tolmie, 2 Pet. 157, 7 L.Ed. 381; Griffith v. Frazier, 8 Cr. 9, 3L. Ed. 471.
Where there is absence of jurisdiction, all administrative and judicial proceedings are a nullity and
confer no right, offer no protection, and afford no justification, and may be rejected upon direct
collateral attack.
END QUOTE

Legal Position of Buloke Shire Council to sue.

It should be understood that Buloke Shire Council c is standing in the legal position of the state
of Victoria when it sues regarding alleged enforcement of state legislation such as the Country
Fire Authority Act 1958. See also Sydney City council v Commonwealth 1904 where the court
held that council by delegated legislative powers was exercising within s114 of the constitution
taxation powers. As such councils alleged incurred legal cost is self-inflicted and should not be
reclaimable against me. As I had informed Buloke Shire Council long before it commenced to
institute legal proceedings that I would challenge the jurisdiction of the courts, etc, then it cannot
use the extensive writings as a burden as it owns conduct (so that of its legal representatives) was
the cause of it all. See also http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSC/2011/140.html
Hobsons Bay City Council v Viking Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 386 (27 August
2010)
It should be of concern that what I consider is fraudulent conduct that Buloke Shire Council
required by Infringement Notice to make a payment to itself rather than to the State of Victoria
Consolidated Revenue Funds, as is constitutionally applicable.

Administrative versus judicial hearing.

QUOTE ASIS v. US, 568 F2d 284.
A judge ceases to sit as a judicial officer because the governing principle of administrative law provides
that courts are prohibited from substituting their evidence, testimony, record, arguments, and
rationale for that of the agency. Additionally, courts are prohibited from substituting their judgment
for that of the agency. Courts in administrative issues are prohibited from even listening to or hearing
arguments, presentation, or rational.
END QUOTE
QUOTE Burns v. Sup. Ct., SF, 140 Cal. 1.
Ministerial officers are incompetent to receive grants of judicial power from the legislature, their acts
in attempting to exercise such powers are necessarily nullities.
END QUOTE
QUOTE Thompson v. Smith, 154 SE 583.
When acting to enforce a statute and its subsequent amendments to the present date, the judge of the
municipal court is acting as an administrative officer and not in a judicial capacity; courts in
administering or enforcing statutes do not act judicially, but merely ministerially.
END QUOTE

In this case the courts sharing the same ABN (Australian business Number) with that of the
government, allowing the government to access its computers and having the courts listed as
Business Unit 19, etc, (see my recent extensive writings about this) cannot adjudicate merely
because a summons was issued with a charge as if the Municipal Fire Prevention Officer Mr
Wayne Wall for the court divided my guilt, this despite that the Fire Prevention Notice itself was
in violation of the legal provisions of the Country Fire Authority Act 1958! The mere fact that
no evidence was filed nor orally presented to the court on 17 September 2015 at the Magistrates
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Page 8
Court of Victoria at St Arnaud underlines that the legal principle embedded in the constitution
that a judicial determination can only be made after hearing both sides has been violated.

Magistrates order versus Judicial Registrar order

http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgibin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/HCA/1991/9.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query="otherwise%20fell%20outside%20its%2
0jurisdiction%20"
Harris v Caladine [1991] HCA 9; (1991) 172 CLR 84 (17 April 1991)
QUOTE
The Full Court on appeal from Maxwell J. held that the review of the Deputy Registrar's decision was
confined to an inquiry whether the parties did in fact consent to the terms of the order and whether the terms
agreed upon were in a form appropriate to the type of order sought and were enforceable. But the order made
by the Deputy Registrar must have been made pursuant to s.79 - the section which confers power upon the
Court to order a settlement of or an alteration in the property interests of the parties. The Court could not
make an order which otherwise fell outside its jurisdiction merely because the parties consented to it
and it follows, a fortiori, that a Registrar, exercising a delegated power, could not do so. Thus, for instance,
under s.80(1)(j) of the Act the Court may make an order by consent, but only in exercising its powers under
Pt VIII. Section 37A(1)(g) allows the delegation to the Registrar of the power to make an order by consent,
but only where it is a power of the Court. And O.36A, r.2(1)(n) delegates to the Registrar the power referred
to in s.37A(1)(g).
END QUOTE

While an appeal lies to the County Court of Victoria regarding a judicial determination of a
Magistrate in my view where it relates to a Judicial Registrar then not an appeal but a review of
the Judicial Registrars decision is the appropriate way. Whereas on appeal an appellate court
may uphold the decision of a magistrate it cannot do so in regard of a Judicial Registrar, because
the moment the court commences a review the Judicial Registrars decision is to so say wiped
from the face of the earth. (See also http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/HCA/1991/9.htm
Harris v Caladine [1991] HCA 9; (1991) 172 CLR 84 (17 April 1991))

Yet, despite this by this day I have still not received formal orders of the purported 20 August
2015 and purported 17 September 2015 hearings and reasons of judgments. As such, the court
has operated as to what I view is a STAR CHAMBER COURT and a KANGAROO COURT
in secrecy without that I am allowed what precisely went on and neither so the general
community.
.

QUOTE In the Marriage of Tennant (1980) 5 FLR 777 at 780

As no grounds for appeal are required to be specified in the notice of Appeal, which, on filing institutes the
appeal (reg 122), there is no limitations of the scope of the appeal and all findings of fact and law made in the
lower court in relation to the decree appealed are in challenge and cannot be relied on by the appellant or the
respondent. All the issues (unless by consent) must be reheard. This of course brings me to the point of the
absence of reason for the magistrates decision in this case. Perhaps reasons were given orally but not recorded
for the record. Apart from the requirement of such reason for the purpose of the appeal process, there is the
basic ground of criticism that litigants who go to court, put their witnesses up, argue their case and attempt to
controvert the opposing case are entitled to know, if they lose, why they lost. If they are given no reason they
may be entitled to feel the decision against them was conceived in prejudice, bias, or caprice. In such a case
not only the litigant, but justice itself, is the loser.
Magistrates should realise, even more than they seem to do, that this class of business is not mere ordinary
trivial work, and they should deal with these cases with a due sense of responsibility which administrations of
the summary jurisdiction Act and the far reaching consequences of the orders that they make thereafter entail.
[Baker v Baker (1906) 95 LT 549; In Robinson v Robinson (1898) p135; and again in Cobb v Cobb (1900)
p145] it was stated that when making orders of this kind, from which lies an appeal to other courts, it is the duty
of the magistrate not only to cause a note to be made of the evidence, and of his decision, but to give the reasons
for his decision and to cause a note to be made of his reasons... Elaborate judgements are not required, but the
reasons which lead the magistrate to make his order must be explicitly stated.
END QUOTE
.

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Page 9
In fact I filed my appeal without having any proper records as to what was if at all ordered by the
court on 20 August 2015 and/or on 17 September 2015. This to me underling the gross abuse of
the legal processes and one may wonder if the Judicial registrar could so to say manage to run a
kindergarten?

The State of Victoria abolished the right to make an unsworn statement.

See also Justification as to orders for cost. regarding confirming under oath a statement
made at the Bar table as to become evidence.
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) Act No. 2 of 1995 as amended
QUOTE
25 Rights to make unsworn statements unaffected
This Act does not affect any right that a defendant in a criminal proceeding has under a law of a State
or a Territory to make an unsworn statement.
Note:
END QUOTE

The NSW Act has no equivalent provision for section 25.

Azzopardi v The Queen [2001] HCA 25 (3 May 2001)

QUOTE
9.

When, in the late nineteenth century, legislatures decreed that people accused of crime should have the
capacity to testify in their own defence, it was well understood that this would bring some consequences
that were potentially unfavourable to some accused persons. This understanding is reflected in the
reasoning of the various judges in R v Kops[12], a case decided soon after the 189 New South Wales
legislation. There was a well-founded apprehension that, when juries became aware that an accused person
was entitled to testify, there would, in some cases, be a practical compulsion to do so. A practical
compulsion to testify frequently arises from circumstances that have nothing to do with the problem now
under consideration. It may arise from the facts of a particular case, or the nature of an accused person's
defence. It may arise because of the accidental unavailability of a witness who could give evidence of some
fact important to the defence case. The existence of a practical compulsion to testify is not inconsistent with
the immunities which together make up the right of silence. Giving an accused the choice of making an
unsworn statement, and prohibiting judicial comment on the exercise of such a choice, was not a
satisfactory solution. Unsworn statements were sometimes abused, especially in sexual cases, where
complainants might be publicly vilified and humiliated by statements that could not be challenged or tested
in cross-examination. Juries came to know that an accused could give evidence on oath, if he or she wished
to do so. Judicial silence on the topic could leave an accused person exposed to unguided reasoning that
might be far more dangerous than the reasoning legitimately available.
10. The problem that arose, when accused persons were given the capacity to testify, concerned the onus of
proof. The onus remained on the prosecution; and the standard remained proof beyond reasonable doubt.
But there was a change in the forensic context. Lord Mansfield's maxim that "all evidence is to be weighed
according to the proof which it was in the power of one side to have produced, and in the power of the other
to have contradicted"[13] always applied to criminal as well as civil trials. It is exemplified by R v
Burdett[14], a case decided in 1820. However, it took on an altered significance when the power to
contradict extended to the power to contradict by sworn testimony of the accused.
11. To express the question as one concerning the probative significance of silence may be misleading. The
question concerns the significance of an accused's silence, either generally or on a particular subject, when
evaluating either the whole or part of the evidence. In the context of a jury trial, the question only arises if
the prosecution has established a case fit to go to the jury; that is to say, if there is evidence which, if
accepted by the jury, is capable of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. If that
condition is satisfied, then it is the task of the jury to evaluate the evidence for the purpose of deciding
whether it proves the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. A corresponding process of evaluation
must be undertaken by a magistrate dealing with a summary offence, or by a judge trying a case without a
jury. The silence of the accused cannot add to the evidence. Nor can it be treated as an implied admission of
guilt. But there are circumstances in which it can legitimately be used in the evaluation of evidence.
12. Between 1993 and 2000, trial judges, and intermediate appellate courts, bound by decisions of this Court,
looked to Weissensteiner for guidance as to the principles according to which, at a criminal trial, the silence
of an accused legitimately may be considered in evaluating some or all of the evidence in the case. In both
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Page 10
of the cases presently before the Court, the trial judges gave directions which were obviously based upon
the majority judgments in Weissensteiner. Courts of Criminal Appeal, bound by Weissensteiner, referred to
that decision in considering instructions to juries, and decisions of trial judges sitting without juries, and in
their own reasoning[15].
13. In the reasons of the majority in Weissensteiner, the focus of attention was the failure of an accused to
explain or contradict evidence. That expression, "explain or contradict", has been used repeatedly in this
context, at least since 1820, when it was used by Abbott CJ in R v Burdett[16].
14. In Weissensteiner, Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ said[17]:
"We have quoted rather more extensively from the cases than would otherwise be necessary in order to
show that it has never really been doubted that when a party to litigation fails to accept an opportunity to
place before the court evidence of facts within his or her knowledge which, if they exist at all, would
explain or contradict the evidence against that party, the court may more readily accept that evidence. It is
not just because uncontradicted evidence is easier or safer to accept than contradicted evidence. That is
almost a truism. It is because doubts about the reliability of witnesses or about the inferences to be drawn
from the evidence may be more readily discounted in the absence of contradictory evidence from a party
who might be expected to give or call it. In particular, in a criminal trial, hypotheses consistent with
innocence may cease to be rational or reasonable in the absence of evidence to support them when that
evidence, if it exists at all, must be within the knowledge of the accused." (emphasis added)
15. It seems unlikely that, in the hypothetical case concerning the tattoo earlier considered, their Honours
would have rejected the proposition that the failure of the accused to deny that he had a tattoo on his left
arm could make it easier or safer to accept the evidence of the witness who testified to that effect. If they
would have done so, the language of the above passage is, to say the least, unguarded.
16. Brennan and Toohey JJ[18], after referring to the need for a jury to be properly instructed as to the onus of
proof, said:
"But the jury may draw inferences adverse to the accused more readily by considering that the accused,
being in a position to deny, explain or answer the evidence against him, has failed to do so." (emphasis
added)
17. In 2000, this Court decided RPS v The Queen[19]. The trial judge had directed the jury in terms which
evidently attempted to follow the majority judgments in Weissensteiner. There was an added feature in that
case. Section 20 of the Evidence Act applied. The applicant was given leave to raise, in this Court, a new
ground of appeal, concerning instructions given by the trial judge as to the significance which the jury
might properly attach to the appellant's failure to give evidence. This Court held that the instructions were
erroneous, and ordered a new trial. The criticisms went well beyond a conclusion that the instructions were
in some respects inconsistent with s 20. Those criticisms had potential application to trials before
magistrates, and before judges sitting without juries. They are, in my view, and with respect to those of a
contrary opinion, in some respects impossible to reconcile with the majority judgments in Weissensteiner.
18. The issue concerns the evaluation of evidence. The evidence against an accused may be direct, or
circumstantial, or partly direct and partly circumstantial. The problems of evaluating the evidence might
concern the reliability of particular witnesses, on the safety of drawing inferences from established facts, or
the reasonableness of competing hypotheses. In relation to such problems, the maxim stated by Lord
Mansfield in Blatch v Archer might be of significance. As the judgments in Weissensteiner recognised, that
significance could be diminished, and might sometimes be eliminated, by considerations which flow from
the circumstance that, at a criminal trial, there are reasons why it may be dangerous to treat an accused's
silence in the same way as one would treat the silence of a party to civil litigation. Those considerations
were taken into account in the majority judgments, and allowance was made for them. But they do not turn
upon the difference between direct and circumstantial evidence, or between facts already the subject of
evidence and additional facts, or between facts known only to the accused and other facts.
19. As a matter of logic, a rigid distinction between failure to contradict and a failure to explain, (a distinction
which is inconsistent with almost 200 years of authority), is difficult to sustain. Nor is it logical to
distinguish between commenting upon an accused's failure to give evidence and commenting on an
accused's failure to give an innocent explanation of some apparently incriminating fact or circumstance.
The lack of logic is even more evident if the occasion to make a comment of the second kind only arises
when the accused is the only person who would be likely to know of the innocent explanation, if it existed.
If that is the case, then the difference between failing to explain and failing to give evidence is purely
semantic.
20. There is, in my view, no justification for distinguishing between a failure to give or call evidence about
some additional fact and a failure to give or call evidence about some fact already the subject of evidence.
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Page 11
And there is no justification for limiting the occasion for comment to facts known only to the accused. How
does a trial judge, or a jury, know whether some fact is known only to the accused? There is a large
difference between saying that, if a certain fact existed, the accused would know of it, and saying that the
accused is the only person who knows the fact.
END QUOTE
Azzopardi v The Queen [2001] HCA 25 (3 May 2001)
QUOTE
71. In the course of his charge to the jury, the trial judge (Nield DCJ) told the jury, in unexceptionable terms,
that an accused may give evidence on his or her trial, but is not under any obligation to do so because the
prosecution bears the onus of proving beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused of the offence or
offences with which the accused is charged. The judge went on, again in unexceptionable terms, to remind
the jury that because the appellant had decided not to give evidence, the jury
"must not think that he decided not to give evidence because he is, or believes himself to be, guilty of the
offence with which he stands charged. It would be completely wrong of you to think that. His decision not
to give evidence must not be thought by you to be an admission of guilt on his part. There may be many
reasons why an accused person may decide not to give evidence. I tell you, members of the jury, that you
must not speculate as to why the accused decided not to give evidence."
He went on to say, in the passage of his charge which now is impugned, that:
"However, members of the jury, when assessing the value of the evidence presented by the Crown, you are
entitled to take into account the fact that the accused did not deny or contradict evidence about matters
which were within his personal knowledge and of which he could have given direct evidence from his
personal knowledge. This is because, members of the jury, you may think that it is logic and common-sense
that, where only two persons are involved in some particular thing - the complainant and/or a witness and
the accused - so that there are only two persons able to give evidence about the particular thing, and where
the complainant's evidence or the witness's evidence is left undenied or uncontradicted by the accused, any
doubt which may have been cast upon that witness's evidence may be more readily discounted and that
witness's evidence may be more readily accepted as the truth."
72. The impugned passage of the judge's charge gave the jury instructions which cannot be reconciled with the
earlier instructions given to them. The jury were told, correctly, that the appellant bore no burden, onus or
obligation to prove anything. Yet, at the same time, by the impugned passage, the jury were invited to
conclude, from the fact that the appellant did not give evidence, that "any doubt which may have been cast
upon [the prosecution evidence] may be more readily discounted and [that evidence] may be more readily
accepted as the truth". That would be so if, and only if, the circumstances were such as to require response
by the appellant. Yet the judge had correctly told the jury that the law required no response from him.
END QUOTE

In the State of Victoria unsworn statement was abolished.

While His Honour Mullaly may have the view that despite of In the Marriage of Tennant
(1980) 5 FLR 777 at 780
the court is not required to provide any reason of judgment I hold
that nevertheless where it issue orders against me (apart of being without jurisdiction) then I am
entitled to know on what legal consideration!
QUOTE In the Marriage of Tennant (1980) 5 FLR 777 at 780
As no grounds for appeal are required to be specified in the notice of Appeal, which, on filing institutes the
appeal (reg 122), there is no limitations of the scope of the appeal and all findings of fact and law made in the
lower court in relation to the decree appealed are in challenge and cannot be relied on by the appellant or the
respondent. All the issues (unless by consent) must be reheard. This of course brings me to the point of the
absence of reason for the magistrates decision in this case. Perhaps reasons were given orally but not recorded
for the record. Apart from the requirement of such reason for the purpose of the appeal process, there is the
basic ground of criticism that litigants who go to court, put their witnesses up, argue their case and attempt to
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Page 12
controvert the opposing case are entitled to know, if they lose, why they lost. If they are given no reason they
may be entitled to feel the decision against them was conceived in prejudice, bias, or caprice. In such a case
not only the litigant, but justice itself, is the loser.
Magistrates should realise, even more than they seem to do, that this class of business is not mere ordinary
trivial work, and they should deal with these cases with a due sense of responsibility which administrations of
the summary jurisdiction Act and the far reaching consequences of the orders that they make thereafter entail.
[Baker v Baker (1906) 95 LT 549; In Robinson v Robinson (1898) p135; and again in Cobb v Cobb (1900)
p145] it was stated that when making orders of this kind, from which lies an appeal to other courts, it is the duty
of the magistrate not only to cause a note to be made of the evidence, and of his decision, but to give the reasons
for his decision and to cause a note to be made of his reasons... Elaborate judgements are not required, but the
reasons which lead the magistrate to make his order must be explicitly stated.
END QUOTE

As elsewhere set out in this writing lawyers cannot misuse/abuse the sanctity of the Bar table to
make statements without being confirmed as evidence in the witness box as being unsworn
statements from the Bar table. Even an self-represented accused party must vacate the sanctity
of the bar table (stand aside) to be charges, be served with documents and/or and make any
unsworn statement (if the court were to permit any unsworn statement to be made) and yet we
have a party that engages a legal practitioner then to have benefits not provided to the selfrepresented litigant, in clear violation to the rule that every party is equal before the court.
Regretfully to my knowledge the judiciary has been bias to allow this gross abuse/misuse by
legal practitioners from the Bar table for decades and I view THIS MUST STOP!
As I have set out below as to the issue of cost, it violated the criminal burden of prove without
reasonable doubt where a lawyer merely claims a certain amount of documentation where the
court then issue orders as if the documentation was part of evidence beyond reasonable doubt
an in violation to the Hobsons Bay City Council v Viking Group Holdings Pty Ltd principle
also. It would be absurd in fact idiotic to hold that a Judicial Registrar in mere seconds could
have peruse the 200 odd pages the lawyers claimed to seek cost for as to judicially determine if
the writings did or didnt legally justify orders for cost in spite of the Hobsons Bay City Council
v Viking Group Holdings Pty Ltd principle. In my view the Judicial registrar involved should be
suspended from adjudicating and be retrained to learn/understand/comprehend the basic legal
requirements involving legal processes/procedures and in particular regarding criminal litigation.
Fraud by prosecutor nullifies prosecution case.
I understand that in the case of MORIATY v LONDON, CHATMAM & DOVER RY Queens
Bench 1870 L.R. 5 Q.B. 314;39 L.T.Q.B. 109;22 L.T. 163;34 J.P. 692;18 W.R. 625 in which the
plaintiff sued a railway company for personal injuries sustained and this plaintiff has gone about
suborning false evidence and it was held by the Court that even so the plaintiff would have had a
genuine and justify to case to sue normally, by the plaintiff conduct to suborn false evidence
this was seen by the Court that this conduct amounted to an admission that he had no case.
Corrsepondence file versus court file & WITHOUT PREJUDICE & Justification as to
orders for cost.
Hansard 20-4-1897 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National
Australasian Convention)
QUOTE Mr. HIGGINS:
I think it is advisable that private people should not be put to the expense of having important
questions of constitutional law decided out of their own pockets.
END QUOTE

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Page 13
While according to an audio recording for which I scandalously was required to pay for to obtain
some information as to what transpired on 17 September 2015 at the Magistrates Court of
Victoria at St Arnaud that the legal representatives for Buloke Shire Council submitted for cost
regarding my writings, the Judicial registrar appeared to immediately respond with ordering cost
submitted for this. This without that any evidence was filed to prove such writings neither for the
Judicial Registrar to consider the validity of the writings the legal representatives claimed I had
written. For what it might be worth they may have simply placed empty pages of a ream of paper
before them with placing some page on top claiming the lot was written documentation by me,
and the judicial Registrar simply couldnt bother to check if indeed this claim from the Bar table
was justified. In my view the Judicial Registrar ought to have indicated that as no evidence can
be provided from the Bar table if therefore the lawyer representing Buloke Shire Council was to
give evidence under oath from the witness box.
SCHOREL v. SCHOREL (1982) C 66117 of 1982 Unreported Transcript 11-3-82 and 12-3-82 before Emery SJ.

(In regard of the former husbands statements from the bar table earlier during the proceedings
about matters on the lists)
QUOTE Page 115: (Emery SJ examine-in-chief Mr Schorel in the witness box)
You made or gave me some information while you were standing at the bar table just a little while ago
about the two lists of furniture that your wife produced this morning, exhibits A and B. What you said
from the bar table is true, is that right?- - - That is correct, your Honour.
Yes. Well, that makes it all evidence that you have given instead of just a statement.
END QUOTE
.

The Judicial Registrar couldnt have had a clue if this correspondence was written WITHOUT
PREJUDICE or not and if so if the Defendant consented to it being used in court as evidence.
No list of the alleged documents were filed either which prevents the accused therefore to check
if indeed the documentation referred claimed to have been written by him were in fact so.
Where documentation refers to constitutional issues then even if they were to be admitted as
evidence with consent or otherwise then the aforementioned legal principle embedded in the
constitution that a party shouldnt be out of pocket regarding constitution issues is relevant.
.

Because of the total failure from onset of Buloke Shire Council to itself comply with the legal
requirements of the Country Fire Authority Act 1958 then the court had to consider if the
content of each writings were justified or not and cannot order cost regarding writings which
points out, even if extensive, the breaches of law by Buloke Shire Council and/or its legal
representatives.
Maugham v. Hubbard Kings Bench: 1828 6 L.J (o.s.) K.B. 229
QUOTE
While a witness memory can be refreshed as to use a document written by him it must be realized that unless
the document so used is actually filed as an exhibit it (the document) itself is not part of evidence.
However a party that calls for inspection a document in the possession of another party is required then to use
it as evidence (See Wharam v. RoutledgeNisi Prius: 1805 5 Esp. 235:170 E.R. 797
END QUOTE

Because correspondence to the court doesnt form part of the court file but becomes part of the
correspondence file, then only if each particular the correspondence is filed as an exhibit can the
court consider it and again subject to the afore stated. It is totally irrelevant for criminal
proceedings if a party wrote hundreds of books and/or miles of reams of paper if they do not
form part of the case and have not been submitted as exhibits.
Qui inique non erit aequi - He who has committed iniquity, shall not have equity. Francis' Max., Max. 2.
Semper necessitas probandi incumbit qui agit. The claimant is always bound to prove: the burden of
proof lies on him.
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Page 14
And, if the legal representatives were to claim cost as to the writings then the court had to
consider the relevant and so the content of all the writings and the legal representatives therefore
were bound to submit to the court all Authorities relevant to the case. This is what they appeared
to conceal and as such the orders for cost were I view obtained by fraud/deception/concealment
and failing due process of law.

As in criminal matters the prosecutor must prove beyond reasonable doubt matters it cannot
be argued that somehow this doesnt apply to seeking orders for cost. In particular not where the
cost sought by far outstrip the cost of the fine.
Marriage of Baines (No. 2) (1981) 7 Fam LR 232 at 237;QUOTE
We recognise that each party is entitled to a Fair and Proper trial and to an adequate opportunity to adduce
relevant evidence and to test the quality and veracity of the evidence adduced by the other party.
END QUOTE
.

Legal practitioners and indeed so the judiciary must understand that to order cost in a criminal
matter merely upon the say so of a lawyer at the Bar table without that this lawyer takes the
witness box and can be duly cross-examine as to the cost claim and any material relied upon is
in itself a gross denial of justice. It denied equal accountability before the courts. It basically
allows a lawyer to misuse and abuse the sanctity of the Bar table to commit fraud and pervert the
course of justice.
OMYCHUND v BARKER (1744) Chancery 1 Atk, 21; Willes 538; 1 Wils K>B> 84; 26 E. R. 15
QUOTE LORD Hardwickle L.C.
Suppose a Heathen, not an alien enemy, should bring an action at common law, and the defendant should
bring for an injunction, would anybody say that the plaintiff at law should not be admitted to put in an answer
according to his own form of an oath? If otherwise, the injunction must be perpetual, and this would manifest
denial of justice
This falls in exactly with what Lord Strair, Puffendorf, etc say, that it has been the wisdom of all nations to
administer such oaths, as are agreeable to the notion of the person taking, and does not at all effect the
conscience of the person administering, nor does it in any respect adopt such religion: it is not near so much a
breaking in upon the rule of law, as admitting a person to be an evidence in his own cause
Upon the special circumstances of this case, I concur in opinion with my Lords the Judges, that the
depositions of those witnesses ought to be read as evidence in this cause, and do not therefore order that the
objection be overruled, and the depositions read.
END QUOTE
See also; Phipson 482, 483; Nokes 392 as to various modes to administer oaths to non-Christians.
R. v. Moore (1892) 61 L.J.M.C. 80 (C.C.R.), Nash v Ali Khan (1892) 8 T.L.R. 444 (C.A.), R.
v.Clark[1962] 1 W.L.R. 180 (C.C.A.)
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSC/2011/140.html
QUOTE Hobsons Bay City Council v Viking Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 386 (27 August 2010)
6 After the Magistrate awarded costs in the sum of $180.80[1] he was asked to give reasons for his order. He then
stated:
The application for legal costs is refused on the basis that I think that theyre disproportionate to the
criminality of the defendants conduct. I believe weve had this discussion in the past Mr Prosecutor, but the
same reasons apply. It seems to me to be unfair to award costs based on the defendants bad luck in being
prosecuted by a council rather than by the police as a matter of principle, it cannot be or should not be the
defendant that incurs the additional liability of substantial costs based on who prosecutes. It strikes me as
unfair that an award of costs against the defendant when thieves, drug traffickers and other wrongdoers who
do far more harm than the defendant has, are not asked to pay costs. Additionally, citizens pay rates and taxes
for services, including the cost of prosecuting, supervising and imprisoning wrongdoers. It seems to me that
principle ought to apply to this prosecution as well and as I also say that the costs are disproportionate to the
criminality of the defendants conduct (sic). In the exercise of my discretion, the application for costs is
refused.[2]
END QUOTE Hobsons Bay City Council v Viking Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 386 (27 August 2010)

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Page 15
My attendance to any court hearings or purported court hearings is not intended and neither must
be perceived that I waive my objections. I rather am aware that what I view corrupt conduct by
the judiciary if I were not to attend, well within my legal rights, then the judicial officer more
than likely will use this against me no matter that in view of the OBJECTION TO
JURISDICTION I cannot be compelled to attend where it undermines some of the essence of
my OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION, which I continue to maintain throughout.

VACATING 22 February 2016 hearing at Ballarat venue.

In my view the court cannot proceed with any De Novo hearing on 22 February 2016 (as
directed by His Honour Mullaly J) for that I am not ready to proceed as I am still denied a copy
of the full brief of the proceedings that eventuated in the magistrates court of Victoria at st
Arnaud and still denied copies of sealed orders setting out the precise orders issued on 20 august
2015 and on 17 September 2015.
Also in view of the failure by Buloke Shire Council and its legal representatives to comply with
the order to serve the full brief by sending it by Australian Post by no later than 9 November
2015 then I view the matter should be returned to the Court for any further directions/orders.
It also would be an absurdity for the Court to pursue a De Novo hearing in violation of the
OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION as well as that the Court would be in no position to enforce
(not that I seek to concede this may be legally justifiable) the orders of the Magistrates Court of
Victoria at St Arnaud where I am still denied to even prepare my case (not that I concede the
OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION might fail)
As I also have refused to accept the NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Buloke Shire Council
legal representatives which was filed out of time and without having applied for and obtained
any leaved to file and serve out of time a NOTICE OF APPEARNACE then I maintain that
Buloke Shire Council legal representatives had NO LEGAL STANDING to appear before His
Honour Mullaly J on 30 October 2015 and still has no business to appear before the court to
represent Buloke Shire Council. As I view counsel for Buloke Shire Council misled His Honour
Mullaly J on 30 October 2o015 as to claim from the Barf table yesterday and so conceal the
true date when the written request was received regarding the full brief/brief then this may
have constituted contempt in the face of the court and perverting the course of justice, and as
such should be dealt with before the court could deal with any other matters. The same should
apply with the failure to comply with the orders to server via Australian Post by no later than 9
November 2015 the full brief and also with the deceptive full brief date of 18 March 2013.
It should be understood that the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION doesnt contain all legal
issues, this because even if the court were to dismiss my OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION
(Not that I seek to imply or concede this to eventuate) then the alleged evidence of Mr Wayne
Wall also will be subjected to a rigorous legal challenge. I have in the past during cross
examination of so called EXPERT WITNESSES proven that what they had stated in their
Affidavits and what actually turned out to be evidence before the court were distinctly different
circumstances.
I request that the 22 February 2016 ordered hearing at Ballarat is vacated.
Again any appearance by me to attend to any ordered hearing is not intended and neither
must be perceived I relinquish my objections.
This correspondence is not intended and neither must be perceived to state all issues/details.

Awaiting your response,

G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. (Gerrit)

MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL

(Our name is our motto!)
p15
30-1-2016
G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.
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