Lotus Case (Summary)

Name of the Case: The Lotus Case (France vs Turkey); Year of the decision: 1927; and Court: PCIJ.
Overview: A collision occurred on the high seas between a French vessel and a Turkish vessel.
Victims were Turkish nationals and the alleged offender was French. Could Turkey exercise its
jurisdiction over the French national under international law?
Facts of the Case:
A collision occurred on the high seas between a French vessel Lotus and a Turkish vessel BozKourt. The Boz-Kourt sank and killed eight Turkish nationals on board the Turkish vessel. The 10
survivors of the Boz-Kourt (including its captain) were taken to Turkey on board the Lotus. In
Turkey, the officer on watch of the Lotus (Demons), and the captain of the Turkish ship were
charged with manslaughter. Demons, a French national, was sentenced to 80 days of imprisonment
and a fine. The French government protested, demanding the release of Demons or the transfer of
his case to the French Courts. Turkey and France agreed to refer this dispute on the jurisdiction to
the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ).
Questions before the Court:
Did Turkey violate international law when Turkish courts exercised jurisdiction over a crime
committed by a French national, outside Turkey? If yes, should Turkey pay compensation to France?
The Courts Decision:
Turkey, by instituting criminal proceedings against Demons, did not violate international law.
Relevant Findings of the Court:
Establishing Jurisdiction: Does Turkey need to support its assertion of jurisdiction using an existing
rule of international law or is the mere absence of a prohibition preventing the exercise of
jurisdiction enough?
The first principle of the Lotus case said that jurisdiction is territorial: A State cannot exercise its
jurisdiction outside its territory unless it an international treaty or customary law permits it to do
so. This is what we called the first Lotus Principle.
Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that failing
the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary it may not exercise its power in any form in the
territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by
a State outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom
or from a convention. (para 45)

The second principle of the Lotus case: Within its territory, a State may exercise its jurisdiction,
on any matter, even if there is no specific rule of international law permitting it to do so. In these
instances, States have a wide measure of discretion, which is only limited by the prohibitive rules of
international law.
It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a State from exercising jurisdiction in
its own territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken place abroad, and
in which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of international law. Such a view would only be
tenable if international law contained a general prohibition to States to extend the application
of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside their
territory, and if, as an exception to this general prohibition, it allowed States to do so in certain
specific cases. But this is certainly not the case under international law as it stands at present. Far
from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that States may not extend the application
of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside their
territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion, which is only limited in
certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the
principles which it regards as best and most suitable. This discretion left to States by international
law explains the great variety of rules which they have been able to adopt without objections or
complaints on the part of other States In these circumstances all that can be required of a State is
that it should not overstep the limits which international law places upon its jurisdiction; within
these limits, its title to exercise jurisdiction rests in its sovereignty. (paras 46 and 47)
This applied to civil and criminal cases. If the existance of a specific rule was a pre-requisite
to exercise jurisdiction, PCIJ argued, then it wouldin many cases result in paralysing the action
of the courts, owing to the impossibility of citing a universally accepted rule on which to support
the exercise of their [States]jurisdiction. (para 48).
The PCIJ based this finding on the sovereign will of States.
International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law binding upon
States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages
generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the
relations between these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the achievement
of common aims. Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed
[NB: This was one of the most debated aspects of the judgement. Some argued that the Court placed
too much emphasis on sovereignty and consent of States (i.e. took a strong positivists view)].
Criminal Jurisdiction: Territorial Jurisdiction

France alleged that the flag State of a vessel would have exclusive jurisdiction over offences
committed on board the ship in high seas. The PCIJ disagreed. It held that France, as the flag State,
did not enjoy exclusive territorial jurisdiction in the high seas in respect of a collision with a vessel
carrying the flag of another State (paras 71 84). The Court held that Turkey and France both have
jurisdiction in respect of the whole incident: i.e. there is concurrent jurisdiction.
The PCIJ held that a ship in the high seas is assimilated to the territory of the flag State. This State
may exercise its jurisdiction over the ship, in the same way as it exercises its jurisdiction over its
land, to the exclusion of all other States. In this case, the Court equated the Turkish vessel to Turkish
territory. In this case, the PCIJ held that the offence produced its effects on the Turkish vessel
and consequently in a place assimilated to Turkish territory in which the application of Turkish
criminal law cannot be challenged, even in regard to offences committed there by foreigners. Turkey
had jurisdiction over this case.
If, therefore, a guilty act committed on the high seas produces its effects on a vessel flying another
flag or in foreign territory, the same principles must be applied as if the territories of two different
States were concerned, and the conclusion must therefore be drawn that there is no rule of
international law prohibiting the State to which the ship on which the effects of the offence have
taken place belongs, from regarding the offence as having been committed in its territory and
prosecuting, accordingly, the delinquent.
The Lotus Case was also significant in that the PCIJ said that a State would have territorial
jurisdiction, even if the crime was committed outside its territory, so long as a constitutive element of
the crime was committed in that State. Today, we call this subjective territorial jurisdiction. In order
for subjective territorial jurisdiction to be established, one must prove that the element of the crime
and the actual crime are entirely inseparable; i.e., if the constituent element was absent the crime
would not have happened.
The offence for which Lieutenant Demons appears to have been prosecuted was an act of
negligence or imprudence having its origin on board the Lotus, whilst its effects made themselves
felt on board the Boz-Kourt. These two elements are, legally, entirely inseparable, so much so that
their separation renders the offence non-existent It is only natural that each should be able to
exercise jurisdiction and to do so in respect of the incident as a whole. It is therefore a case of
concurrent jurisdiction.
Customary International Law
The Lotus case gives an important dictum on creating customary international law. France alleged
that jurisdictional questions on collision cases are rarely heard in criminal cases because States tend

to prosecute only before the flag State. France argued that this absence of prosecutions points to a
positive rule in customary law on collisions.The Court held that this would merely show that
States had often, in practice, abstained from instituting criminal proceedings, and not that they
recognized themselves as being obliged to do so; for only if such abstention were based on their
being conscious of having a duty to abstain would it be possible to speak of an international
custom. The alleged fact does not allow one to infer that States have been conscious of having such
a duty; on the other hand, as will presently be seen, there are other circumstances calculated to
show that the contrary is true. In other words, opinio juris is reflected in acts of States (Nicaragua
Case) or in omissions (Lotus case) in so far as those acts or omissions are done following a belief that
the said State is obligated by law to act or refrain from acting in a particular way

Pinochet Case (Extracts)

A former head of state only has immunity with regard to his acts as a head of state but not with
regard to acts which fall outside his role as head of state. A head of state may be treated as the state
itself and entitled to the same immunities.
A former head of state cannot have immunity for acts of murder committed outside his own territory.
International law recognizes crimes against humanity and the Torture Convention says that no
circumstances can be invoked as justification for torture. Therefore it cannot be a part of the function
of a head of state under international law to commit those crimes.
.
There is general agreement between the parties as to the rules of statutory immunity and the
rationale which underlies them. The issue is whether international law grants state immunity in
relation to the international crime of torture and, if so, whether the Republic of Chile is entitled to
claim such immunity even though Chile, Spain and the United Kingdom are all parties to the Torture
Convention and therefore contractually bound to give effect to its provisions from 8 December
1988 at the latest.
CURRENT HEAD OF STATE
It is a basic principle of international law that one sovereign state (the forum state) does not
adjudicate on the conduct of a foreign state. The foreign state is entitled to procedural immunity
from the processes of the forum state. This immunity extends to both criminal and civil liability.
State immunity probably grew from the historical immunity of the person of the monarch. In any
event, such personal immunity of the head of state persists to the present day: the head of state is
entitled to the same immunity as the state itself. The diplomatic representative of the foreign state in
the forum state is also afforded the same immunity in recognition of the dignity of the state which he
represents. This immunity enjoyed by a head of state in power and an ambassador in post is a
complete immunity attaching to the person of the head of state or ambassador and rendering him
immune from all actions or prosecutions whether or not they relate to matters done for the benefit of
the state. Such immunity is said to be granted ratione personae.
FORMER HEAD OF STATE
What then when the ambassador leaves his post or the head of state is deposed? The position of the
ambassador is covered by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961). After providing for
immunity from arrest (article 29) and from criminal and civil jurisdiction (article 31), article 39(1)
provides that the ambassadors privileges shall be enjoyed from the moment he takes up post; and
paragraph (2) provides:

When the functions of a person enjoying privileges and immunities have come to an end, such
privileges and immunities shall normally cease at the moment when he leaves the country, or on
expiry of a reasonable period in which to do so, but shall subsist until that time, even in case of
armed conflict. However, with respect to acts performed by such a person in the exercise of his
functions as a member of the mission, immunity shall continue to subsist.
The continuing partial immunity of the ambassador after leaving post is of a different kind from that
enjoyed ratione personae while he was in post. Since he is no longer the representative of the foreign
state he merits no particular privileges or immunities as a person. However in order to preserve the
integrity of the activities of the foreign state during the period when he was ambassador, it is
necessary to provide that immunity is afforded to his official acts during his tenure in post. If this
were not done the sovereign immunity of the state could be evaded by calling in question acts done
during the previous ambassadors time. Accordingly under article 39(2) the ambassador, like any
other official of the state, enjoys immunity in relation to his official acts done while he was an official.
This limited immunity, ratione materiae, is to be contrasted with the former immunity ratione
personae which gave complete immunity to all activities whether public or private.
In my judgment at common law a former head of state enjoys similar immunities, ratione materiae,
once he ceases to be head of state. He too loses immunity ratione personae on ceasing to be head of
state: see Sir Arthur Watts Q.C., Hague Lectures, The Legal Position in International Law of Heads
of States, Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers 1994-III 247 Recueil des cours, p. 88 and the
cases there cited. He can be sued on his private obligations: Ex-King Farouk of Egypt v. Christian
Dior (1957) 24 I.L.R. 228; Jimenez v. Aristeguieta (1962) 311 F.2d 547. As ex-head of state he cannot
be sued in respect of acts performed whilst head of state in his public capacity: Hatch v. Baez (1876)
7 Hun 596. Thus, at common law, the position of the former ambassador and the former head of
state appears to be much the same: both enjoy immunity for acts done in performance of their
respective functions whilst in office.
The question then which has to be answered is whether the alleged organisation of state torture by
Senator Pinochet (if proved) would constitute an act committed by Senator Pinochet as part of his
official functions as head of state. It is not enough to say that it cannot be part of the functions of the
head of state to commit a crime. Actions which are criminal under the local law can still have been
done officially and therefore give rise to immunity ratione materiae. The case needs to be analysed
more closely.
Can it be said that the commission of a crime which is an international crime against humanity and
jus cogens is an act done in an official capacity on behalf of the state? I believe there to be strong

ground for saying that the implementation of torture as defined by the Torture Convention cannot be
a state function. This is the view taken by Sir Arthur Watts Q.C. in his Hague Lecture who said, at p.
82: [*204]
While generally international law does not directly involve obligations on individuals personally,
that is not always appropriate, particularly for acts of such seriousness that they constitute not
merely international wrongs (in the broad sense of a civil wrong) but rather international crimes
which offend against the public order of the international community. States are artificial legal
persons: they can only act through the institutions and agencies of the state, which means,
ultimately, through its officials and other individuals acting on behalf of the state. For international
conduct which is so serious as to be tainted with criminality to be regarded as attributable only to the
impersonal state and not to the individuals who ordered or perpetrated it is both unrealistic and
offensive to common notions of justice. The idea that individuals who commit international crimes
are internationally accountable for them has now become an accepted part of international law.
Problems in this area such as the non-existence of any standing international tribunal to have
jurisdiction over such crimes, and the lack of agreement as to what acts are internationally criminal
for this purpose have not affected the general acceptance of the principle of individual
responsibility for international criminal conduct.
Later he said, at p. 84: It can no longer be doubted that as a matter of general customary
international law a head of state will personally be liable to be called to account if there is sufficient
evidence that he authorised or perpetrated such serious international crimes.
It can be objected that Sir Arthur was looking at those cases where the international community has
established an international tribunal in relation to which the regulating document expressly makes
the head of state subject to the tribunals jurisdiction: see, for example, the Nuremberg Charter,
article 7; the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia; the Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Statute of the International Criminal Court. It is
true that in these cases it is expressly said that the head of state or former head of state is subject to
the courts jurisdiction. But those are cases in which a new court with no existing jurisdiction is being
established. The jurisdiction being established by the Torture Convention and the Hostages
Convention is one where existing domestic courts of all the countries are being authorised and
required to take jurisdiction internationally. The question is whether, in this new type of jurisdiction,
the only possible view is that those made subject to the jurisdiction of each of the state courts of the
world in relation to torture are not entitled to claim immunity.

I have doubts whether, before the coming into force of the Torture Convention, the existence of the
international crime of torture as jus cogens was enough to justify the conclusion that the
organisation of state torture could not rank for immunity purposes as performance of an official
function. At that stage there was no international tribunal to punish torture and no general
jurisdiction to permit or require its punishment in domestic courts. Not until there was some form of
universal jurisdiction for the punishment of the crime of torture could it really be talked about as a
fully constituted international crime. But in my judgment [*205] the Torture Convention did provide
what was missing: a worldwide universal jurisdiction. Further, it required all member states to ban
and outlaw torture: article 2. How can it be for international law purposes an official function to do
something which international law itself prohibits and criminalises? Thirdly, an essential feature of
the international crime of torture is that it must be committed by or with the acquiesence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity. As a result all defendants in torture cases will
be state officials. Yet, if the former head of state has immunity, the man most responsible will escape
liability while his inferiors (the chiefs of police, junior army officers) who carried out his orders will
be liable. I find it impossible to accept that this was the intention.
Finally, and to my mind decisively, if the implementation of a torture regime is a public function
giving rise to immunity ratione materiae, this produces bizarre results. Immunity ratione materiae
applies not only to ex-heads of state and ex-ambassadors but to all state officials who have been
involved in carrying out the functions of the state. Such immunity is necessary in order to prevent
state immunity being circumvented by prosecuting or suing the official who, for example, actually
carried out the torture when a claim against the head of state would be precluded by the doctrine of
immunity. If that applied to the present case, and if the implementation of the torture regime is to be
treated as official business sufficient to found an immunity for the former head of state, it must also
be official business sufficient to justify immunity for his inferiors who actually did the torturing.
Under the Convention the international crime of torture can only be committed by an official or
someone in an official capacity. They would all be entitled to immunity. It would follow that there
can be no case outside Chile in which a successful prosecution for torture can be brought unless the
State of Chile is prepared to waive its right to its officials immunity. Therefore the whole elaborate
structure of universal jurisdiction over torture committed by officials is rendered abortive and one of
the main objectives of the Torture Convention to provide a system under which there is no safe
haven for torturers will have been frustrated. In my judgment all these factors together
demonstrate that the notion of continued immunity for ex-heads of state is inconsistent with the
provisions of the Torture Convention.
For these reasons in my judgment if, as alleged, Senator Pinochet organised and authorised torture
after 8 December 1988, he was not acting in any capacity which gives rise to immunity ratione

materiae because such actions were contrary to international law, Chile had agreed to outlaw such
conduct and Chile had agreed with the other parties to the Torture Convention that all signatory
states should have jurisdiction to try official torture (as defined in the Convention) even if such
torture were committed in Chile.
As to the charges of murder and conspiracy to murder, no one has advanced any reason why the
ordinary rules of immunity should not apply and Senator Pinochet is entitled to such immunity.
For these reasons, I would allow the appeal so as to permit the extradition proceedings to proceed on
the allegation that torture in pursuance of a conspiracy to commit torture, including the single act of
[*206] torture which is alleged in charge 30, was being committed by Senator Pinochet after 8
December 1988 when he lost his immunity

The Nuremberg Judgment

Oct 5th 1946

ON September 30, 1946, seven years and a month after the Second World War began with the
onset of the German armies across the western frontiers of Poland, the International Military Tribunal
at Nuremberg pronounced a mainly unanimous judgment in a document of 50,000 words on the
German personalities and organisations charged before it. This judgment has certainly been an
epoch-making event. Nothing at all comparable has ever taken place before. For the first time a
court representing the principal nations of the world emerging victorious from a great war has
formally tried the political leaders of a sovereign state for responsibility for waging aggressive war
defined as a crime. The defendants at Nuremberg have also, of course, been tried for all manner of
atrocities committed in connection with German aggressions, and this has not involved any new
principle of jurisprudence, for it has long been recognised that the victor in war has the right to try by
court-martial officers and others of the defeated nation who have committed atrocities contrary to the
accepted laws of war against the victor's nationals. Although this right has not hitherto been invoked
in application to the rulers and highest military authorities of an enemy country, it could have been so
applied to the Nazi leaders and it provided grounds for the punishment of most of themall those
who have been convicted at Nuremberg on charges of "War Crimes" in the narrow sense and
"Crimes against Humanity"even without any accusation of "Crimes against Peace." But
responsibility for the war itself has been the central charge in the Nuremberg indictment, and the
Tribunal has declared in its judgment: "To initiate a war of aggression is not only an international
crime; it is the supreme international crime, differing only from other war crimes in that it contains
within itself the accumulated evil of the whole."
It is of interest to recall that when in 1918 the question of trying the Kaiser came up before the British
War Cabinet, the Attorney-General (who was later to become Lord Birkenhead) reported in favour of
trying him for having committed offences against international law by the violation of the guaranteed
neutrality of Belgium and by authorising unrestricted submarine warfare, but advised against
prosecution for "the crime against humanity of having caused the war," not on the ground that such a
charge was legally inadmissible, but because "we do not wish to be confronted by a meticulous
examination of the history of European politics for the past twenty years." Lord Birkenhead indeed
saw clearly that a charge of war guilt involves a record of national policies, and that such a record
may not leave unscathed the reputations of the prosecuting governments. In the Nuremberg case
such a historical record has actually been written; the judgment clearly claimsor at any rate will be
claimedto stand as an adequate history of the great events with which it deals as well as being a
legal verdict on the accused. This aspect of the trial cannot be overlooked in any estimate of what
has been achieved by the judicial process.

It has in fact been easy on the evidence to obtain a conviction of the Nazi leadership on the charge
of planning and initiating aggressive wars. The prosecution has had at its disposal, not only the
record of German acts which was available to the Allied Governments before the end of the war, but
also a great mass of documentary material captured in Germany, including minutes of secret
conferences in which Hitler expounded his plans to a select circle of his colleagues. These
documents, the authenticity of which was not seriously challenged by the defence, provided the most
striking proof of the deliberateness and premeditation of Hitler's aggressions and revealed the
hollowness of the various excuses made for them at the time by Nazi propaganda.

Related topics
USSR

International law

Crime and law

Law

Germany

In the minutes of a secret conference held in the Reich chancellery on November 5, 1937, Hitler is
recorded as saying to his Foreign Minister (then Freiherr von Neurath), his War Minister and the
commanders-in-chief of the three fighting services: "The question for Germany is where the greatest
possible conquest could be made at the lowest cost." This declaration was preceded by an allocution
on economic theory and racial biology justifying a policy of acquiring fresh "living space" for the
German nation. Hitler maintained that neither autarky nor international trade could provide Germany
with satisfactory economic life and scope for its capacities. He went on:
The only way out, and one which may appear imaginary, is the securing of greater living space, an
endeavour which at all times has been the cause of formations of States and movements of nations.
It is explicable that this tendency finds no interest in Geneva and in satisfied States . . . every space
expansion can only be effected by breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are
unavoidable; neither formerly nor today has space been found without an owner; the attacker always
comes up against the proprietor.
There is nothing here about any external threat to Germany which might justify extraordinary war
preparations; the purpose is quite frankly territorial conquest. Hitler admits, however, that Germany
"must reckon with its two hateful enemies, England and France, to whom a strong German colossus
in the centre of Europe would be intolerable," and speculates on the when and how of "the decision
to apply force." He concludes that action must in any case be taken not later than the period 1943-45
(because, for reasons which he gives, he expects Germany's relative position to deteriorate after
that date), but that war against Czechoslovakia should be launched earlier if France is either
paralysed by internal political crisis or diverted by a war with Italy.
This document of the autumn of 1937 reveals the long-term plan with the utmost lucidity, but the
stages in its accomplishment were liable to adjustment according to circumstances, and the minutes

of later conferences show Hitler making up his mind on his estimate of the current situation. In a very
important conference held on May 23, 1939, shortly after the giving of the British guarantee to
Poland, Hitler explains that the problem for solution is "to attack Poland at the first suitable
opportunity." He says he will try to isolate Poland diplomatically, but if this proves impossible, and "if
it is not certain that a German-Polish conflict will not lead to war in the West," then "it will be better to
attack in the West." The most interesting revelation of this document is that Hitler in the spring of
1939 was in favour of starting a war by direct attack on France and the Low Countries on the 1914
model; he was still assuming the hostility of Russia, but told the conference that "it is not impossible
that Russia will show herself to be disinterested in the destruction of Poland."
The Nuremberg judgment uses these documents to establish beyond challenge the calculated
aggressiveness of Nazi policy. It is indeed proved conclusively that Hitler and his responsible
ministers and military commanders undertook aggressive wars with the utmost premeditation
which is all that needed to be proved for the legal condemnation of those of them brought before the
Nuremberg Tribunal. However, at one point in the record of events included in the judgment a
curious oblivion seems to have affected the judges with regard not only to facts which have long
been known but also to important evidence given during the trial itself. As we approach the subject of
the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August, 1939, some inhibition appears to interrupt the
flow of narrative and the whole episode is passed over with the bald statement that "the defendant
Ribbentrop was sent to Moscow to negotiate a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union."
During the trial the defence lawyer Seidl produced witnesses, including Baron von Weizsaecker,
permanent Secretary of State in the German Foreign Office from 1938 to 1943, who testified about a
secret treaty attached to the Non-Aggression Pact and providing for territorial partition of six
European states between Germany and the Soviet Union.
The prosecution made no attempt to disprove this evidence; nevertheless, the judgment completely
ignores it. Such silence unfortunately shows that the Nuremberg Tribunal is only within certain limits
an independent judiciary. In ordinary criminal law it would certainly be a remarkable case if a judge,
summing up on a charge of murder, were to avoid mentioning evidence on the part played by an
accomplice in the murder because the evidence revealed that the judge himself had been that
accomplice. That nobody thinks such reticence extraordinary in the case of Nuremberg merely
demonstrates how far we still really are from anything that can be called a "reign of law" in
international affairs. Both Britain and France are on record as having concurred in the expulsion of
the Soviet Union from the League of Nations for its unprovoked attack on Finland in 1939; this
verdict still stands and is not modified by anything which has happened since. In 1939 Moscow
openly gloried in military cooperation with Germany for the destruction of Poland, "that ugly offspring
of the Versailles Treaty," and Ribbentrop in his last plea quoted a cable of congratulation from Stalin
as proof that the Soviet Union had not then regarded the war against Poland as an aggression. The
contrast between 1939 and 1946 is indeed fantastic, and it is too much to expect that either

historians in the future or Germans in the present will share in the current United Nations convention
of not seeing it.
Nor should the Western world console itself that the Russians alone stand condemned at the bar of
the Allies' own justice. Waging aggressive war is the chief count in the indictment, but it is not the
only one. Among crimes against humanity stands the offence of the indiscriminate bombing of
civilian populations. Can the Americans who dropped the atom bomb and the British who destroyed
the cities of Western Germany plead "not guilty" on this count? Crimes against humanity also include
the mass expulsion of populations. Can the Anglo-Saxon leaders who at Potsdam condoned the
expulsion of millions of Germans from their homes hold themselves completely innocent?
The result of the Nuremberg trial has been a well-deserved fate for a group of evil men whose
terrible guilt has been thoroughly demonstrated for all time; yet the force of the condemnation is not
unaffected by the fact that the nations sitting in judgment have so clearly proclaimed themselves
exempt from the law which they have administered