A D DR E S S TO

R A D IO C A B C O.
B OA R D O F D I R E C TO RS

RADIO CAB 98D

Christopher Harley
ChristopherHarley@gmail.com

F O R IM M ED IATE R E L EA S E TO S HA RE H OLDE RS

Tuesday, Februar y 2, 2016

T H E N E E D F O R G R E AT E R S O P H I S T I C AT I O N A N D P R E C I S I O N I N L E A S I N G
At Radio Cab Company (RCC) there is no distinctly transparent and easily referenced methodology
to inform the day-to-day operations of the office of superintendent. Without a daily evaluation of
applicable market metrics, the superintendent relies only upon his discretion, imperceptible to
oversight, when assigning contract drivers to the idle cabs of shareholders who are unable or
unwilling to drive these cabs and therein derive revenue from such activity.
Without a model of logistical calculus, the superintendent appears to rely solely upon the number of
shares owned when determining the frequency with which shareholder-idled cabs are leased. Under
this system inequities abound and the goal of reaching a state of parity, where lease revenue is
distributed equally across all shareholders, is impossible to negotiate.
Since the superintendent is the sole intermediary between the shareholder and the contract driver,
it is my argument that there appears the tacit understanding of collusion between the
superintendent and the select shareholders. Although this cursory examination of the functions of
the superintendents office is not done to assess culpability, it does attempt to illustrate the degree
to which the superintendents actions may be construed as collusive when viewed from the
standpoint of a prospective investor.
Since the superintendent is not empowered to enter into any contracts with shareholders, this
office is thereby unable to ensure any given frequency with which an investor could hope to
determine the projected profits obtained from lease revenue. To a third-party observer, this system
would suggest an unseen force that directs the superintendents actions. As an employee of RCC,
the superintendent may feel as though he is compelled into collusion where his sole inducement
may be the fear of losing his job if he doesnt comply with the wishes of multi-shareholders. As an
employer, RCC is assuming a potential liability if the superintendent were to sue for redress under
any current whistleblower protections afforded employees who feel they are being compelled,
against their better judgment, to engage in illicit activity in the workplace.
As a remedy to this seemingly collusive arrangement and its attendant liability, it is incumbent upon
RCC to formulate a clearly discernible and accurately quantifiable procedure for determining the
frequency with which shareholder-idled cabs are leased. Short of a mathematical model that strives
for unbiased distribution by taking into account historical data based on market factors such as
customer demand weighed against contract driver availability, RCCs only foreseeable choice may be
the introduction of a multi-tiered payment system governing the contributions made to the
companys general fund. It may be advantageous to implement such a system wherein the losses
incurred by lower-tier shareholders are absorbed by higher-tier shareholders when a greater
frequency of lease revenue is provided to the latter over that of the former.
Without any changes made to the duties of the superintendent, this office will remain unable to
guarantee that there are safeguards in place to protect against the accusation of collusion, either
tacit, in this form; fear of retribution, or explicit wherein the potential for inducement is present in
the form of kickbacks or bribes paid to those employed as superintendents.