The Paradox of Progress

Ari Allen

How wonderful that we have met with a paradox!

Now we have some hope of making progress! Niels Bohr

Table of Contents
Preface: An Introduction on Method
The Cycle of Impermanence
Chapter 01 An Introduction
The Systemic Cycle
Chapter 02 - On Self-Love through Primal Fear
Chapter 03 - On Timidity, Paranoia and Aggression
Chapter 04 - On Conflict and Hatred through Diffidence and Competition
Chapter 05 - On Glory, Systemic Cycles and Mechanical Dominance
Chapter 06 - On Peace, Asymmetrical Hierarchy and Impermanence
The Metasystemic Transition
Chapter 07 - On Asymmetrical Anarchy
Chapter 08 - On Isolation, Competition and Specialization
Chapter 09 - On Communication and Love, Amour-De-Soi and Amour-Propre
Chapter 10 - On Self-Sacrifice through Enlightened Desire
Chapter 11 - On Cooperation, Metasystemic Transitions and Organic Interdependence
Chapter 12 - On Peace, Metasystemic Anarchy and Impermanence
The Paradoxical Non-Ends of Evolution
Chapter 13 - From Liberal Disorder to Egalitarian Uniformity
Chapter 14 - On Static Equilibrium: Nihilism, Uniformity and Passivity
Chapter 15 - On Individuality and Creativity
Chapter 16 - On Moral Relativism and Order of Rank
Chapter 17 - On Eternal Return as Both Dispiriting and Empowering
Chapter 18 - On Extremism, the Lowest and Highest Types
Chapter 19 - On Dynamic Equilibrium: The Infinite Meaning of Impermanence
Conclusions through the Synthesis of Paradoxical Dialectics
Chapter 20 Introduction to Dialectics
Chapter 21 Entity and Identity
Chapter 22 Motion and Ration
Chapter 23 Inclination and Duty
Chapter 24 Truth and Creativity
Chapter 25 Stability and Change
Chapter 26 Defining Progress

Preface:
An Introduction on Method
Man is the only animal for whom his own existence is a problem which he has to solve.
Erich Fromme

Perhaps the most inspiring aspect of being alive is the internalization of

experience to consciously experience reality, and ask rhetorically (as we know we can
never truly arrive at a complete answer):
What is this? How did it get here? What am I? How did I get here? Where is
this? When is this? What is where? What is when? What is what? What is? What is not?
What? Silence. Speechlessness -- an awe-inspiring inability to understand the miracle
of nature, our Universe and ourselves.
Some may see this as frightening, an insecure uncertainty. I admit, I have seen it
in the same way at the lowest of times, however, when embracing the full knowledge of
what I will expound in this treatise, I am able to see life itself as, instead, a miraculous
opportunity to discover nature and create my own reality.
Steeper and steeper becomes the climb of gaining knowledge, and my method of
thought revolves around this fact. I constantly ponder these same fundamental questions,
and now that I have thought about them so much, I more and more often come back to
the same responses but when I do discover new ones, I am able to synthesize new ideas
into the old framework. As such, my table of contents constantly expands, but not
necessarily in any particular direction. It grows "not in one direction but equally upward
and outward and inward and downward.1 However, there is an asymptote of truth that I
1

Friedrich Nietzsche, (1882) 1974. The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix

will never completely reach, and this is what drives me there is always more to
discover. My methodology mirrors that of the ancient Greeks notion of consilience2
(more recently resurrected by E O Wilson), and also, those modern general systems
theorists a unification, a generalization, an abstraction of knowledge, rather than a
branching, a narrowing, a specialization of knowledge. We shift our balance toward
becoming more like Renaissance Men, polymaths, with extensive breadth, rather than
solely specialized modern scientists with blindingly over-extensive depth.
My quest for knowledge attempts to return to the unification of human
knowledge, rather than to create a further fragmented version of current schools of human
knowledge. The answers are already out there, and as such I will choose to stand on the
shoulders of giants, while also keeping in mind Nietzsches connection between
perspectival tolerance and objectivism: ...there is only a perspective seeing, only a
perspective knowing; and the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more
eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our
concept of this thing, our objectivity, be.

of Songs, Walter Kaufmann (ed.). New York: Vintage: 332-333.

William Whewell may have best described the methodology of consilience: The Consilience of
Inductions takes place when an Induction, obtained from one class of facts, coincides with an Induction
obtained from another different class. Thus Consilience is a test of the truth of the Theory in which it
occurs." The same generally applies for deductions between classes. This logical method has close
correlations with the Planes of Correspondence doctrine of Hermetic philosophy.

The Cycle of Impermanence

Introduction
Every aspect of our Universe is interdependent and impermanent an endless
chain of cause and effect. However, this chain is not without pattern and in general,
history tends to repeat itself. No equilibrium is final, no hierarchy is perpetual in our
Universe, the only constant is the cycle itself, which this author prefers to call, the cycle
of impermanence. This cycle consists of two important subcomponents: the systemic
cycle (which allows a system to self-organize, develop and solidify) and the metasystemic
transition3 (which raises the system to new levels of complexity a conglomeration of
many systems into a larger interdependent metasystem).
The systemic cycle is the component more commonly noticed by those who study
history. This cycle begins in a state of nature an asymmetrical anarchy. Different units
(or in the political sense individual men or sovereign states) have different capabilities
with no laws, rules or norms to interact by. This anarchy fosters the unit-level
development of fearful self-love that first exhibits itself as timidity a sort of isolated
development of unique self. In this stage, the unit prefers to flee danger, rather than
confront it. However, as this unit (and other individual units of the system) grows in
developmental isolation, the systems subunits become increasingly varied. Eventually,
the independent units begin to come into conflict with other units for rival resources.
This systemic environment then spurs the growth of diffidence, paranoia and
competition, which then exhibits itself as aggression. Finally, inevitable conflict results

It is important to note that the term metasystemic transition does not originate from my application to
political philosophy. Rather, it finds its originations in cybernetics (coined by Valentin Turchin in his 1977
book, The Phenomenon of Science) and was developed in the studies of biology and evolution (by John
Maynard Smith and Eors Szathmary in their 1995 book, The Major Transitions in Evolution).

from the interaction of multiple aggressive units. Upon the end of conflict, the prevailing
units (those most fit to survive in essence, natural selection) absorb the defeated units,
hence strengthening the victor with glory. At this point, the systemic cycle reaches its
impermanent end a peaceful eye at the center of a cyclical storm of conflict, established
through the creation of a mechanical hierarchy of dominance. However, eventually this
stabilizing hierarchy dissolves back into the initial state of anarchy a consequence of
the hierarchys internal instabilities, asymmetries and dependencies.
What then, drives the ought of political philosophy? If stable hierarchies are
doomed to dissolve, how should we live our lives? What should be the goals of humanity
as a whole? Is there a way to escape the cycle? The answer to these questions lies in the
nature of the metasystemic transition.
After many revolutions of the systemic cycle, a point comes when the intensity of
conflict is no longer feasible conflict has reached a point of mutually assured
destruction, or, in some cases, a greater metasystemic danger threatens the units of the
system itself. At this point, competition must temporarily be placed on the sidelines and
cooperation becomes more ideal (the evolutionary concept of group selection).
John Maynard Smith and Ers Szathmry provided much important insight into
the understanding of these metasystemic transitions. By examining eight metasystemic
leaps in the history of evolution, Smith and Szathmry recognized five underlying
properties common to all of these leaps: (1) conglomeration, (2) specialization, (3)
metasystemic threats resulting from interdependence, (4) internal threats of rebellion
resulting from interdependence, and (5) new methods of transmitting information. Of
course, in their research, they examine metasystemic transitions primarily in relation to

biology the advancement of molecules to DNA, of unicellular organisms to

multicellular organisms, asexual clones to sexual populations and so on. However, when
abstracted, these common properties can be applied to nearly any field in which there is a
temporal, developmental dimension.4
It is important to realize however, that this result is not necessarily inevitable
according to evolutionary theory, it is just as possible (maybe even more likely) that the
units will fail to cooperate, and thus disappear altogether. However, miraculously, all of
our predecessors have led us to where we are today atoms learned to work together to
form organic molecules, our cells learned to cooperate to make our body function as
beautifully as it does, the Earth and the Moon maintain the stability of our oceans
cooperation can indeed be found in an infinite number of places in our Universe.
So then, what happens when units do successfully begin to cooperate? Firstly,
competition evolves into specialization - this begins the escape from the systemic cycle.
Eventually, the full benefits of specialization are realized and thus, our eternal
interdependence is also realized. Thus, our self-love becomes enlightened, and our
amour-propre (in the words of Rousseau) is expanded. Hence, the metasystemic
transition involves the evolution of the systemic cycle itself, from a state of destructive
self-love to enlightened self-sacrifice.
Here, the metasystemic cycle also reaches an impermanent end a peace
established through the creation of a dynamic equilibrium, the organic hierarchy of
interdependence an evolved version of the systemic cycles static equilibrium, the

John Maynard Smith and Ers Szathmry, The Major Transitions in Evolution, (Oxford University Press,
1995).

mechanical hierarchy of dominance.5 However, as this new organic superstructure grows

and expands, it is sure to run into new competition, and thus, begins to compete again, on
the playing field of a newly established metasystemic anarchy (for example, from the
political view, the creation of the state has merely moved the locus of conflict to the
international level).
Thus, I have outlined the systemic cycle and the metasystemic transition an
underlying process of the cosmos that can be explored through the lens of nearly any
academic field or thinker. For the sake of this inquiry however, and due to its beneficial
applications, this discussion will explore the transition primarily in the context of
political philosophy and through the lens of Hobbes, Kant and Rousseau.

The Systemic Cycle

Self-Love through Primal Fear
According to Thomas Hobbes, fear and I were born twins together.6 However,
Hobbes does not imply that he is alone in this rather, he believes that fear is an intrinsic
aspect of human nature in general. This fear is one major component of self that, in
effect, influences our every decision, desire and passion. Nor is this concept unique to
Hobbes (or philosophy for that matter) in Darwinian terminology, the same idea holds
true in that those that are most fit to survive, will in fact, survive a seemingly logical
tautology coined by philosopher Herbert Spencer as survival of the fittest.7 From

John Barkdull, Waltz Durkheim, and International Relations, The American Political Science Review,
Vol. 89, No. 3 (Sep., 1995): 671.
6
Hugh Trevor-Roper, Historical Essays (London: Macmillan, 1957), 233.
7
Doyne Dawson, The Origins of War: Biological and Anthropological Theories, History and Theory,
Vol. 35, No. 1 (Feb., 1996): 16.

Hobbes viewpoint, fear is the human manifestation of this innate drive to survive we
avert what causes us pain (which warns us of immediate dangers).
Hobbes goes further however, by suggesting that in the state of nature, mans
sense of fear develops into a continual state of paranoia a sort of offensive realism (in
international relations terminology). Man constantly improves himself by competing with
others in a struggle to maintain a favorable balance-of-power all of this for the sake of
his own security (of which, complete security is an eternal impossibility). Hobbes
believes that fear itself evolves into aggression a struggle for power, control which, at
its root is a struggle to avoid violent death.
Hobbes explains: There is no way for any man to secure himselfe, except
through force, till he sees no other power great enough to endanger him, and as such,
man in the state of nature remains in that condition called Warre of every man against
every man, who live in a, continual feare and danger of violent death. And the life of
man, solitary, nasty, brutish and short.8 Kenneth Waltz describes this concept even more
succinctly in his description of the security dilemma: wherein measures that enhance
one states security typically diminish that of others.9 Further complicating matters, the
submissive subordinate can always use other strategies deception, guile, appeasement,
bartering, alliance formation or friendship to survive, and to outwit the powerful.10 In
essence, we become what Richard Dawkins calls survival machines,11 in accord with

James Glass, Hobbes and Narcissism, Political Theory, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Aug., 1980): 341.
Kenneth Waltz, The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18,
No. 4 (Spring, 1988): 619.
10
Bradley Thayer, Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics,
International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Autumn, 2000): 135.
11
Ibid., 132.
9

what Sigmund Freud concludes in a letter to Albert Einstein - that there is a naturally
biological basis for aggression.12

Timidity, Paranoia and Aggression

Jean-Jacques Rousseau takes a slightly different perspective on the development
of fear in the state of nature. The crux of his perspective lies in his definition of the state
of nature a state of isolation. This is an important redefinition that creates a more sound
metaphysical foundation for the nature of man (even if it is not completely practical). In
this sense, Rousseau takes a man as an individual, and places him in a pure state of nature
the individual alone within his surrounding environment. As a result, Rousseau
concludes that while the Hobbesian state of nature consists of men who are naturally
intrepid and [seek] only to attack and fight, in reality, nothing is so timid as man in the
state of nature.13 In other words, Rousseau and Hobbes agree that fear is a fundamental
human emotion governing the subconscious root of our every decision - however, they
disagree as to how this fear manifests itself and thus, as to the fundamental nature of
man as good or evil. Hobbes suggests that fear, in the state of nature, results in
continual paranoia, while Rousseau suggests that it results in restless timidity - a
tendency to flee danger and seek isolation from it.
However, Rousseau does not deny that the current condition of man rests on an
inescapably dangerous paranoia. Rather, he suggests that this paranoid diffidence arises
from man-in-society, rather than man-in-nature in other words, human nurture rather
than human nature. In Rousseaus words, conflict arises from uncertainty because
12

Dawson, 14.
John Scott, The Theodicy of the Second Discourse, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 86,
No. 3 (Sep., 1992): 702.

13

matters of doubt [are] always biased towards personal considerations, and as such,
men are crazy and because to be sane in the midst of madmen is a kind of madness,
therefore, war would still be inevitable, even when everyone wished to be just.14 Thus,
the discovery and exercising of freedom by mankind has led to its own enslavement in
conflict man was born free, and everywhere he is in chains.15 As a result, it would
seem that Rousseaus view is both unique, while also encompassing concepts from the
Hobbesian view. Hobbes on the other hand, ignores timidity and clings to paranoia.
Further complicating paranoid uncertainty is the fact that men simultaneously
make predictions and decisions on the strategic battlefield. Thus, the battlefield itself
constantly changes, creating even more uncertainty. As political philosopher Ernst Haas
states, the actors perceptions of reality result in policies that shape events; these effects
create a new reality whose impact will then be perceived all over again, ad infinitum,16
and thus, man-the-knower is the victim of his methods of acquiring knowledge and is
therefore condemned to settle for successive approximations of reality.17 Or, as Henshel
writes, prediction in the social sciences finds its inevitable limitation in the fact that
knowing the predicted course of events, man can alter that course, thereby nullifying the
prediction itself.18
However, if the paranoia of uncertainty is so important, what part does timidity
then play in establishing a framework for understanding conflict? Rousseau refers to this

14

Elizabeth York, Leagues of Nations. Swarthmore Press: London, 1919: 233.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, Penguin Classics: London, 1968: 49.
16
Ernst Haas, Words Can Hurt You, International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring, 1982): 241.
17
Ibid., 209.
18
Richard Henshel, The Boundary of the Self-Fulfilling Prophecy and the Dilemma of Social Prediction,
The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Dec., 1982): 511.
15

timidity as amour de soi a sort of initial self-containment.19 However, it is important

to note that this amour de soi is only a theoretical concept, not a practical one - the sort
of pure state of nature that Rousseaus timid man requires, has never actually existed.
As Rousseau suggests, it is purely a hypothetical concept. Rather, mans phylogenic
relatives (such as primates, mammals and even social insects) have also been observed
conducting their own warfare. In a sense, society was not invented by man, but rather, by
some prior evolutionary ancestor. Therefore, man has never existed in the pure state of
nature that Rousseau defines.
Although man did not invent society and thus, did not invent warfare, this is not
the point Rousseau is trying to make. Rather, Rousseaus primary metaphysical
conclusion does not rest in the nature of man, but in the nature of society, and thus
remains fundamentally correct society created warfare. In other words, living beings
have always lived in close quarters with other living beings the only transformation
over time has been in the size, density and complexity of these communities bringing us
from a cold and lifeless Universe to the current state of societal volatility and complexity.
Hence, it would be most useful to view the ideas of timidity and paranoia not as two
different outcomes of fear, but rather, as a spectrum that increasingly moves toward
paranoia as the static volume and the dynamic density of communities grows.20 This
concept gains importance as Rousseau attempts to resolve the conflict that arises from the
Hobbesian paranoia by advising the individual to submit his own will (a return to
timidity) to that of the general will (through social contract).

19

Nannerl Keohane, The Masterpiece of Policy in Our Century, Political Theory, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Nov.,
1978): 459.
20
John Barkdull, Waltz Durkheim, and International Relations, The American Political Science Review,
Vol. 89, No. 3 (Sep., 1995): 671.

10

However, the paranoia of Hobbes, or as Rousseau calls it, amour-propre (a sort of

narcissistic egoism that will be explored later), is not completely negative it is a sort of
necessary evil, and has its own evolutionary benefits. It allows the development of
desirable skills and traits within a species, and allows these desirables to be passed down
through the generations (through selection/drift). From the viewpoint of Herbert Spencer
and sociologist Emile Durkheim, it allows a specialization of function (or a division of
labor) in which a species improves itself through a sort of evolutionary arms race a
competitive practice that allows us to sharpen our survivability as a species by
scrimmaging amongst ourselves. This contrasts against the stagnant avoidance of testing
our individual fitness that is exhibited by timidity.21 Hence, this paradox (a theme wellappreciated by Rousseau) allows paranoia, competition and conflict to be viewed as both
destructive and constructive while holding timidity in a sort of perpetual, fearful, and
meaningless peace.
The dilemma of this paradox then, is that as our nature grows more complex, both
the constructive and destructive consequences of amour-propre seem to grow in intensity
the evolutionary arms race produces greater creations, but also greater destructions. In
essence, the marginal efficiency of this division of labor quickly decreases and thus, this
paranoid distrust both begins the division of labor, while also preventing the completion
of its specialization into a constructive and cooperative interdependence. Each
independent individual fears dependence on other individuals, and thus irrationally fears
a harmonious interdependence this is what Thucydides calls, the antagonism of

21

Ibid., 670.

11

independence and as such, explains the essence of competition.22 In a sense, progress

conflicts with stability (which, in essence, is a logically-sound conclusion - stability is
defined by its static nature and progress by its dynamicity).
Hence, we have reached the central question of political thought - how do we
prevent the negative consequences of paranoia from ultimately destroying us and thus,
from overwhelming its positive consequences? For this, we must analyze the causes of
conflict, war and violence by building on the strong foundation of amour-propre and
paranoia.

Conflict and Hatred through Diffidence and Competition

In Leviathan, Hobbes states, in the nature of man, we find three principal
causes of quarrel. First, competition; second, diffidence; thirdly, glory. The first maketh
men invade for gain, the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation.23 From
Hobbes standpoint, it would make sense for competition to be the root cause of conflict.
In other words, it is human natures innate and evil greed that fosters conflict, a sort of
human psychological explanation for warfare. Hobbes would say that anarchy is
permissive, as it allows the innate brutish nature of man to grow and thrive. From
Rousseaus viewpoint however (and as explored above), it would make more sense for
diffidence to be the root cause of conflict in other words, it is human nurture, or the
presence of society and anarchy that results in conflict a sort of systemic/structural
explanation for warfare. Rousseau would say that anarchy is not permissive, but that
society and anarchy combine to corrupt human nature with malevolent ideas such as
22

Arend Lijphart, The Structure of the Theoretical Revolution in International Relations, International
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Mar., 1974): 44.
23
Dawson, 3.

12

private property and greed or better stated in Rousseaus words, those who have
nothing have limited desires, those who do not rule have limited ambitions the more
one has the more one wants.24 Thus, below it will be shown that it makes more logical
sense to conclude that competition and glory stem from diffidence, rather than diffidence
and glory from competition (even though diffidence without competition or in essence,
timidity - has never truly existed in practicality). In addition, it will be shown that both
Hobbes and Rousseau are in fact, making similar conclusions only Rousseau is saying
it more completely. In a sense, Hobbes ignores some seemingly useless and impractical
concepts to the expense of the completeness of his view, and as such, the correctness of
his pessimistic conclusions.
It may be most beneficial to examine the above causes of war through the various
schools of international relations. For example, the concept of diffidence holds an
important presence in neo-realist thought and manifests itself as the infamous security
dilemma. This security dilemma results in a sort of quest for security, and as a result, a
struggle for power (and control) so that one can autonomously guarantee ones own
security. Thus, a lack of security (or anarchy) is the source of our quest for power and
as a result, seeking power results in the classical realist (specifically, offensive realist)
explanations for conflict. From this we can conclude that man would prefer to engage in
certain conflict, rather than remain in a limbo of continuous uncertain insecurity. At root,
man quests to control the security dilemma, subordinate others to his own free will, and
as a result, recognize others intentions while hiding his own all of which, increase the

24

Torbjorn Knutsen, Re-Reading Rousseau in the Post-Cold War World, Journal of Peace Research,
Vol. 31, No. 3 (Aug., 1994): 249.

13

intensity of the naturally arising security dilemma.25 Hence, we can understand the nature
of anarchy and uncertainty, and also recognize the benefits of human evolution and
interdependent alliances. Furthermore, we can notice that this cycle is self-perpetuating.
In other words, conflict creates greater distrust, which, as a result, creates a greater
likelihood of conflict.
In this sense, the academic field of international relations itself, has developed as
a reverse deconstruction of the causes of war a sort of stripping of the layered causes of
war from direct and obvious resultant causes such as the power struggles seen in
classical realism to the independent and ultimate cause of conflict the lack of security
described by neorealism. In other words, IR constantly seeks to understand and fix one
cause of war, only to learn that there is yet one further deeply seated within the system.

Glory, Systemic Cycles and Mechanical Dominance

But then what of glory? Glory is less of an implicit cause of war because it is also
the cause that allows conflict to stabilize into peace. Men seek glory so that they can
communicate their dominance to others so as to avoid constant conflict and maintain the
status-quo hierarchical dominance. An example of this is among animals the alphamale generally holds his tail high as to assert his dominance in the hierarchy and thus, to
maintain social order and his own dominance of it.26 Therefore, glory is the selfregulating mechanism of conflict that ensures that the other two causes of conflict do not
spiral into inevitable destruction. In other words, the quest for security is in fact the quest
for autonomous and independent survival, the quest for power is in fact the quest for
25

This very concept lies at the heart of many negative human conditions such as conflict, xenophobia and
ethnocentrism.
26
Thayer, 133.

14

hegemony, while the quest for glory is in fact the quest for hegemonic stability all
result from the innate equilibrium-seeking nature of the balance-of-power.27
Hence, we have a framework in which we can connect man, his environment and
the nature of conflict. The nature of mans fear (amour de soi) develops into paranoia
(amour-propre) and thus causes diffidence, which then develops into a power-seeking
nature to secure oneself from the uncertainty of anarchy. This aggression then finally
develops into the quest for glory or a stable equilibrium a status quo in which the
hegemon dominates. In this way, the fear of uncertainty self-organizes itself into a selfregulating (though not necessarily smooth) mechanism that stabilizes the conflict that
anarchy creates a sort of autopoietic process within anarchic relations. In essence,
competition is the means through which the anarchic causes of conflict establish the
hierarchic ends of conflict. Thus, I have connected the philosophies of Hobbes and
Rousseau with the more theoretical balance-of-power, and the natural causes of conflict
(anarchy) with the natural (but temporary) causes of peace (hierarchy).
However, the condition of man remains problematic. How can we avoid the
possibility of competitive destruction and the pain that this competition creates? In other
words, is there a way to avoid the pains caused by establishing stability, or are we bound
to a continuously painful cycle of war and peace? Will this cycle only end in complete
systemic destruction? Rousseaus answer to this is an unsatisfying maybe. Rather, he
would say it is possible, but not definite (not even necessarily likely).
What then would Rousseau suggest to foster peace and progress while avoiding
pain and conflict? How can we disconnect the link between progress and conflict, pain

27

It is interesting to note Adam Fergusons observation that while conflict externally stabilizes the balanceof-power, it also internally solidifies solidarity: (Dawson, 6).

15

and peace and create a more optimistic future? Rousseau suggests drawing on the rational
nature of amour-propre. Rather than expecting men to love someone other than self,
Rousseau would suggest extending self to include others.
Rousseau recognized David Humes idea that reason is, and ought only to be the
slave of the passions, and thus, rather than trying to overcome the paradoxical nature of
self-love as self-defeating by relying on the slave of reason to transform the master of
passion, Rousseau, attempts to resolve his beloved paradox by extending self to include
others, and thus to halt its self-defeating nature.28 As a result, Rousseau suggests that the
opposite of self-love (self-sacrifice) is a way to transcend this paradox and create a new
more virtuous and harmonious all-encompassing self-love of mankind. In essence, we
would best serve our personal interest through the indirect route of serving others. As
Rousseau states, virtue is self-love utterly transformed, and as such, Rousseau
maintains the primacy of self-love as mans contribution to the creation of conflict.29
Hobbes however, claimed that this type of love would be impossible. Rather,
Hobbes says that even social virtues stem from an inherent self-love for example, the
idea that affability is in fact a sort of self-interested charm.30 Thus, again, a seemingly
positive aspect of a universal condition (like hegemonic stability) is in fact, created to
assist the self-interested quest for equilibrium through glory and reputation. Rousseau
acknowledged this fact. Rather than being the pessimist or optimist that some describe
him as, Rousseau would be more properly defined as a pure and true realist realizing
what would be necessary to attain an ideal harmony, while also recognizing that it would

28

Neta Crawford, Passion of World Politics, International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Spring, 2000): 126.
Keohane, 470.
30
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan. Penguin Classics: London, 1985: 476-477.
29

16

require a great transformation within mankind to achieve it.31 As a result, Rousseau tries
to find a more temporary solution to this dilemma.
Finally we have reached a point in which Rousseau and Hobbes would probably
agree completely the only likely mechanism of escape from the grasps of anarchy, is
establishing a stable hierarchy. Thus, it would be better to design this hierarchy through
the lens of reason, than depend on it emerging through the natural and passionate causes
of the balance-of-power. Hence, we can begin to see the foundations of liberalism as a
solution to the surface causes of war set out by realism (the struggle for power). In this
sense, liberalism suggests the establishment of hierarchy that aims to deter independent
transgressions that impede on individual freedoms, reform individuals who commit these
transgressions and to impose retribution against those transgressors. Through establishing
this sort of order, liberalism seeks to ensure maximum freedom and maximum equality
a very difficult balancing act indeed, which can only be carried out through the selfsacrifice of some freedoms of the individual will to that of the general will.32 This is the
concept that Hobbes called leviathan, and Rousseau (more liberal in the terminological
sense), called the social contract.
The social contract draws on the self-sacrifice of autonomous independence to
create an interdependent society. This contract helps fully develop a specialized division
of labor and a division of interests, and as such, a certainty of interdependence among
these divisions. Thus, the social contract is the creation of a man-made certain hierarchy
from an uncertain anarchy replacing the end of the dominating nature of hegemonic
31

Rousseau also outlines the means that would be needed to achieve this transformation (if it is possible at
all) in his discourse on education Emile. Rousseau suggests that an uncorrupted and well-developed
amour-de-soi (through proper education) is the key to a healthy amour-propre and, thus, a virtuous society.
32
R.E. Gahringer, Punishment and Responsibility, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 66, No. 10 (May
1969): 291.

17

stability with that of a mutually symbiotic and interdependent stability. Hence, the
continuous and inescapable systemic transitions of the hegemonic cycle are replaced with
a metasystemic transition to create a form of a hierarchical domestic government that
controls the anarchy of individuals in the state of nature. As Rousseau suggests, the
means for accomplishing this is through the interdependence of the social contract.

Peace, Asymmetrical Hierarchy and Impermanence

It must be noted however, that this social contract is only a temporary solution.
The nature of self-sacrifice through social contract creates a paradoxical cyclicality as
many different isolated social contracts are established into separate domestic
sovereignties, these newly established social contracts become the fuel for a new type of
self-love: nationalism. Furthermore, this new type of self-love is placed into a newly
emergent international anarchy. Thus, this cyclical nature results in the continuous need
to redefine self and to expand amour-propre.33
In essence, continuous short-term self-interested calculations by the hegemon
(and other actors) begin to degrade the hegemonic stability (by increasing internal
asymmetries and dependencies)34 and thus, these acts work on the contrary to the longterm general-interest. Hence, peace remains impermanent and systemic transitions into
new hegemonic cycles continue to be persistent. In addition, even when the costs of
hegemonic stability become too high and we advance to a new metasystemic phase in
33

There is still reason to remain optimistic however. While our destructions may be great in an absolute
scale, they are not so great in relativity to our capabilities. We have evolved a sense of innate morality
exemplified by the hegemonic restraint on the use of nuclear weapons in the modern age. In fact Erich
Fromm argued that, an unbiased Martian observer might conclude that Homo sapiens are rather peaceful
when compared to other species, (Thayer, 140).
34
Rousseaus focus on asymmetries is evidenced and outlined in the Discourse on Inequality. In addition,
John Rawls discusses the same concept in his discussion on distributive justice in the Theory of Justice.

18

which we create more complex hierarchies, we are still only creating temporary solutions
that will eventually be dissolved by an even greater metasystemic anarchy. At core, this
concept in its whole describes the primary characteristic of the Universe
impermanence.35 Thus we return to our original hypothesis complete security is an
eternal impossibility, and hence, so is complete permanence. As a result, we can see that
an evolutionary perspective leads to a range of conceivable future orders, not to a single
utopia.36 That is the essence of Rousseaus paradoxical reality, the error of Hobbes
pessimistic realism and the impracticality of Kants idealistic liberalism. Rather, my
response to the likes of Kant mirrors Rousseaus response to that of Saint-Pierre:
perpetual peace is worth seeking, but remains a practical impossibility, as it is
contradictory to the fundamental principle of impermanence. We live in a causal
Universe in which every cause is also an effect, and vice-versa. As such, nothing remains
in perpetuity and certainly peace is not exempt from this universal theme. We are
bound to this cyclical reality, which Charles Tilly presented most succinctly when he
stated, in classical political terminology: War made the state, and the state made war.37
Indeed, our Universe unfolds as a paradoxical, self-fulfilling, self-defeating and
cyclically impermanent recursion.

The Metasystemic Transition

Asymmetrical Anarchy

35

It is important to note that this is not a concept unique to this political philosophy. Rather, it is found as
the essential doctrine of anicca within the three marks of existence provided by Buddhist philosophy.
Thus, through this analysis we have also established a link between Western and Eastern philosophies.
36
Haas, 240.
37
Thayer, 146.

19

In the words of Immanuel Kant: Nations may be considered like individual men
which hurt each other in the state of nature, and therefore, for states in their relation to
each other there cannot, according to reason, be any other way to get away from the
lawless state which contains nothing but war than to give up (just like individual men)
their valid and lawless freedom. Thus, Kant concludes: unless all is to be lost, the
positive idea of world republic must be replaced by the negative substitute of a union of
nations38 In this simplicity, Kant reveals the recurring dilemma of asymmetrical
anarchy. He mentions asymmetrical anarchy on the individual level, its less-than-perfect
solution the state and the newly created dilemma of metasystemic anarchy. In other
words, individuals give up their rights to the sovereign state only to transfer the problem
of conflict to a greater metasystemic level in this case, international anarchy. Thus,
Kant concludes that the only way to overcome this new problem is to apply the same
solution, on an international scale: a social contract, or in Kants words: a union of
nations. This brings us to our core questions: What allows the social contract to succeed
on a domestic level, and how can we replicate and adapt it to an international scope? If
competition is inevitable on any level of analyses, is there a way to control the outcome
of competition? For this, we turn to an in-depth discussion about the positive externalities
of competition (in contrast to its negative resultant conflict).

Isolation, Competition and Specialization

While realist and neorealist thinkers such as Morgenthau and Waltz (respectively)
constantly reference the dangers of mans competitiveness, they seem to overlook the

38

Arend Lijphart, The Structure of the Theoretical Revolution in International Relations, International
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Mar., 1974): 49.

20

positive aspects that competition contributes to stability. Rather, sociologist Emile

Durkheim seems to hold a more complete perspective on the effects of competition:
population growth, the advance of the division of labor the development of improved
technology of communication and transportation, and the response to such variables in
the moral basis of society.39
In this statement, Durkheim does not pass judgment on the nature of competition
and its effects on an anarchic system rather, he suggests that its intricacies are far more
complex than understood by most, and that instead of judging competition as positive or
negative, to understand change in and of the international system requires attention to
[these] important variables that press societies toward new forms of social
relationships.40 Thus, by understanding the true and complete nature of competition, we
can tame Adam Smiths invisible hand. In this way, the invisible hand is all-powerful,
but also lacking morality our job is to use our reason to provide it with such beneficial
values.
Durkheim concludes that on the one hand, both the increases in societys
productive power and the individuals capacity fully to develop his or her talents and
skills seems to depend on a deepening division of labor. On the other hand, this
specialization seems to exacerbate competitive instincts, emphasize the differences
between people, and destroy traditional social relations that provide social cohesion
Hence industrial society seemed caught in an acute dilemma between progress and social
solidarity.41 Here, Durkheim reveals the paradoxical nature of competition. Thus, we
proceed in our investigation by focusing on how to weaken competitions negative effects
39

Barkdull, 670.
Ibid.
41
Barkdull, 670.
40

21

(declined social solidarity) while strengthening its positive effects (increased rate of
progress).
Philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes and Jean Bodin focused strongly on how to
weaken the negative effects of competition and avert civil conflict. Both suggested
sovereignty in the form of a hierarchical and mechanical structure of dominance. There
was an inescapable dualism society and sovereign, people and state. Society needed the
state for its protection, while the state needed a society to protect and a people to bestow
it with sovereignty. Interestingly, both Hobbes and Bodin lived in times of civil war
(English and French respectively), and thus are placed into the same contextual
atmosphere, with the same desired goals to obtain order, stability and legitimacy of the
state. The obvious and easiest way to provide order is by legitimizing the natural and
Darwinian creation of dominance hierarchies. Hence, we have the earliest definition of
the leviathan and the sovereign state - a conception of the state that would evolve
drastically over the following centuries. Ironically, this conception of the early modern
state is also the reality of our current stabilizing mechanism of international politics - the
balance-of-power and its equilibrium in the dominance of hegemonic stability. This
mechanical dominance must surely evolve on an international level as well.
The creation of a mechanical system of dominance holds the seeds for its own
destruction. While eliminating anarchy and controlling some of the negative
consequences of competition, it retains the festering infection of asymmetry - a flaw that
will eventually cause the fragile hierarchy to shatter into a segmented, asymmetrical
chaos of dependencies and eventually rise into a new, more evolved dominance hierarchy
slowly approaching the ideal of an organic interdependence.

22

The creation of this organic superstructure has an evolutionary and progressive

significance that is far greater than the mechanical stability provided by hierarchical
dominance. In other words, the systemic cycle provides steps in evolution, while the
metasystemic transition provides a leap. The current metasystemic transition (in terms of
international politics) began with the creation of the modern state (in Westphalia). It
began with the cold dominance of hegemonic stability and is gradually evolving through
repeated iterations of the systemic cycle to reach the eventual goal of the metasystem
organic interdependence. Unfortunately however, even metasystemic transitions
eventually dissolve into the cycle of impermanence. However, metasystems are more
vulnerable to a greater metasystemic anarchy, rather than its own internal deficiencies.
Thus, the unfolding of the Universe faces its next step the international anarchy of
evolved domestic dominance hierarchies (or sovereign states). Completing the
metasystemic goal of evolving from mechanical states into organic states involves
making an initial leap on the metasystemic level. Only once we move to the next
metasystemic transition will the former transition be completed (systemic organic
interdependence of domestic states) and the new transition begin (the beginnings of a
mechanical stabilization of metasystemic anarchy). Indeed, the next step is in fact a leap,
and the leap has already begun with the formation of entities such as the EU.
Certainly there has been progress since Westphalia. While Westphalia marked
the birth of the modern state, the state itself has matured over the course of the
Westphalian era. In other words, the modern state and its legitimacy were solidified in
Westphalia and, only after this solidification, could the state evolve into its current and
more organic form. In this way, human thought has shifted from the Hobbesian

23

leviathan conception of sovereignty to Rousseaus conception of the social contract.

Order was established through dominance, and only through this order, was it then
possible to begin exercising true freedom and ensuring true equality. Rousseau
recognized the nature of this metasystemic transition and attempted to resolve the
dilemma of mechanical dominance (order versus freedom and equality). Rousseau states:
Man is born free, yet everywhere he is in chains.42 Rousseau attempts to evolve these
chains so that they can coexist with a more natural and human freedom. Indeed, the
chains created by Hobbes and Bodin were a necessary precursor to the freedoms desired
by Rousseau. In a world with limitless freedom and anarchy, we seem to desire order.
Meanwhile, in a world with overwhelming dominance and dependence we tend to desire
freedom and equality. Thus, order is a necessary precursor to freedom in the systemic
cycle, while the opposite holds true for the metasystemic transition.
Hence, we have the transition from mechanical dominance to organic
interdependence. Dominance solidifies the many independent entities of the systemic
cycle into a stable but statically asymmetrical equilibrium. This metasystem then evolves
on a metasystemic level (the metasystemic transition) to become again, an organic
interdependent superstructure of specialized substructures.
Emile Durkheim states eloquently, Just as ancient people needed, above all, a
common faith to live by, so we need justice.43 Here, Durkheim illuminates the nature of
this cycle faith and obedience to something great establishes a common identity,
hierarchy and order. Meanwhile, justice provides the goal of transforming this cold
mechanical hierarchy into a beautiful organic interdependence. This is the dynamic

42
43

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, Penguin Classics: London, 1968: 49.
Barkdull, 680.

24

equilibrium in which order, freedom and equality can peacefully coexist (even if it is only
for a fleeting moment).
How then do we minimize inequality, maximize justice and complete our current
phase of systemic cycles? How can we move to a new metasystemic transition? Rousseau
addresses the relevance of justice and inequality in his Discourses on Inequality. He
suggests the importance of the general will and the creation of the social contract,
which has allowed us to evolve to our current archetype - free domestic society.
However, Rousseaus ideas are sometimes too abstract for complete practical application
the general will is too incalculable and the social contract too imaginary.
Emile Durkheim helps resolve this vagueness. Durkheim suggests, in concrete
form, the importance of interdependence, and the difficulties in attaining it. Firstly,
Durkheim notes that most naturally, organisms fear dependence and strive to be selfsufficient. Dependence is a primal fear, and thus, interdependence is also feared. At this
stage, benefits from trade and communication are achievable - however, they are not
completely efficient (nor organic). Some specialization occurs, however, the units
maintain the autonomous capacity to retreat to self-sufficiency. Thus, social solidarity is
gained through similarities the universal drive to survive and the universal agreement to
do not that to another, which thou wouldest not have done to thy selfe.44 However, the
passions of men are susceptible to violating agreements, and hence, this type of solidarity
is especially weak. It is the same type of solidarity that Durkheim referred to as faithbased. Like units with little differentiation form a sort of mechanical segmented society

44

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan. Penguin Classics: London, 1985: 214.

25

that work together, but at a less than optimal efficiency due to the fear of what would
occur if interconnections were severed.45
The benefits of specialization, interdependence and overcoming the fear of
dependency are present throughout Adam Smiths discussion of the invisible hand. As
competition increases, units begin to adapt and cooperate due to mutual benefits. As this
repeats through much iteration, reputations build and thus, some of the fear of
specialization is subsided. As this process continues, the units move along a spectrum
toward complete specialization (which is the point of optimal utility and efficiency). Only
at the point of complete specialization do the individual units join through individuality
and love, rather than conformity and fear. This is a social solidarity that is paradoxically,
yet beautifully, based on difference rather than similarity. This is the nature of organic
solidarity. Only at this time, when organic solidarity is completely realized, can we move
to a new metasystemic level. Thus repeated iterations of a fear-stricken systemic cycle
lead us through the metasystemic transition in which we become helplessly intertwined in
interdependence this inescapable entanglement of dependence leads us to an
enlightened amour-propre. Only at this crossroad can we passionately and rationally
extend our self-love to others. Hence, love is the long forgotten reality of the
interdependence that permeates the cosmos the idea that opposites can attract.
What however is our largest obstacle to overcoming this fear of dependency? The
answer to this lies in the concept of asymmetry (inequality), while its solution lies in a
proper conception of justice. In attempt to solve this dilemma, we turn to a discussion of
love and communication, amour-de-soi and amour-propre.

45

Leon Duguit, The Law and the State, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Nov., 1917): 178.

26

Love and Communication, Amour-De-Soi and Amour-Propre

Overcoming such a natural human fear seems nearly impossible. It would require
a miraculous transformation within mankind and a revolutionary re-thinking of such
static concepts as education and family. Rousseau attempts to suggest how to create such
a transformation in Emile, but his suggestions, as of yet, are too radical for practical
adoption. Rousseau properly bases the causes of conflict and the obstacles to
interdependence within the nature of uncertainty and fear. Thus, in attempt to solve this
fear, Rousseau explores the most primal manifestation of fear timidity or amour-desoi. Rousseau explains that in order to develop a truly virtuous amour-propre (self-love)
that is expandable to loving others, one must first develop a healthy amour-de-soi. In this
way, through proper education, Rousseau hopes to transform fearful timidity into loving
self-confidence. Only once a man can be confident in his own ability to provide for
himself, can he be confident and trusting of other men. Only then can man release his
tight clutch on his amour-propre and allow it to naturally expand to others. In this way,
Rousseau also suggests the importance of driving these inspired and self-confident men
toward specialization so they can contribute a maximum utility to the rest of society.
Again, Rousseau states succinctly: Virtue is self-love utterly transformed.46
However, Rousseau was quite aware of the impossible nature of such a task, and
thus created a temporary solution a rest stop on the road from mechanical dominance to
organic interdependence the social contract. As political theorist Nannerl Keohane
states: In Emile, the stress is laid on virtue, an individual achievement made possible by
independence from society; in the Social Contract, the language shifts to that of morality

46

Nannerl Keohane, The Masterpiece of Policy in Our Century, Political Theory, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Nov.,
1978): 470.

27

instead, shared patterns of action that rest on healthy integration of individuals within a
society.47 In this way, the social contract relies on the creation of payoff structures that
reward trustworthy behavior and punish those that breach the contract.48 Thus, men give
up their complete autonomy for a safer level of individual freedom. Although men have
not been transformed at core, as Rousseau wishes in Emile, the paranoid amour-propre of
man is transformed into at least, what seems like, a compassionate empathy (although it
is different than the truly virtuous and saintly compassion that arises from a healthy
educated amour-de-soi).49

Self-Sacrifice and Enlightened Desire

What then would be the result of an enlightened desire, or complete self-sacrifice
as suggested in Emile? This would involve shifting the golden rule from being a negative
obligation to a positive duty. Rather than Do not that to another, which thou wouldest
not have done to thy selfe50 as Hobbes negatively suggests in his rule of natural law, it
becomes act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should
become a universal law,51 as Kant positively suggests in his categorical imperative.
There is an inherent problem however with this positive conception of the golden rule
men have different desires and different conceptions of pleasure. Thus, this problem
could only be resolved through Rousseaus prescription in Emile the elimination of
differences in our moral bases, while also developing our differentiation and
47

Keohane, 471.
Nicholas Rengger, The Ethics of Trust in World Politics, International Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 3 (Jul.,
1997): 484.
49
Keohane, 480.
50
Hobbes, 214.
51
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge,
1998: 31.
48

28

specialization of function for the efficiency of the greater good. Only then would we fully
invert self-love into self-sacrifice and thus evolve into a greater, metasystemic organic
superstructure.
Interestingly enough, peoples from across the world, at different times in human
history have stated the concept similarly. Confucius: What you yourself do not want, do
not do to another person. Rabbi Himel: Do not do to other what you would not want
them do to you. Jesus: What you want people to do to you, do also to them. Islam:
None of you is a believer as long as he does not wish his brother what he wishes
himself. Jainism: Human beings should be indifferent to worldly things and treat all
creatures in the world as they would want to be treated themselves. Buddhism: A state
which is not pleasant or enjoyable for you will also not be so for him; and how can I
impose on another a state which is not pleasant or enjoyable for me?52 While some
differences arise based on pessimism or optimism (negative obligation and positive duty),
the underlying message is clear: while fear was the key to the evolution within the
systemic cycle, extending our love is the key to taking a metasystemic leap.

Cooperation, Metasystemic Transitions and Organic Interdependence

As explored above, people only act for the public good if it is in accord with their
own interest hence, the social contract and the expansion of amour-propre. Thus, the
important question at this point is - how we can apply this on an international scale? Who
must extend their amour-propre? Is it possible? If so, how can we ensure its completion?

52

Dale Snauwaert, International Ethics, Community, and Civic Education, Peabody Journal of
Education, Vol. 70, No. 4 (Summer., 1995): 133.

29

The answer to these questions lie appropriately in Keohane and Nyes exploration of
complex interdependence theory.
Keohane and Nye recognize the relevance and importance of the systemic cycle
and its natural equilibrium hegemonic stability. However, rather than ending their
exploration at hegemonic stability, they inquire as to whether hegemonic stability can be
transformed into something greater. Can we move from hegemonic stability to a peaceful
complex interdependence? Can we move from mechanical dominance to organic
interdependence? Keohane and Nye suggest it is very possible.
In relation to amour-propre, Keohane and Nye suggest that it is the responsibility
of the hegemon to extend its amour-propre. Every other sovereign state is already, to an
extent, dependent on the hegemon in one way or another thus, it requires an enlightened
desire, an enlightened self-love of the hegemon to willingly accept its own dependencies
and to act with justice and compassion toward less-powerful states.53 While such a
strategy seems against Morgenthaus conception of the national interest and against
most rational cost/benefit calculations, it actually provides a larger scope an
enlightened sense of what will best serve the hegemon, and the rest of the international
system in the long run. In other words, the hegemon, the provider of hegemonic stability,
must sacrifice some of its own hegemony for the sake of a continued increase in its
complementary stability. Only in this way can we move from mechanical to organic,
dominance to interdependence, asymmetrical hierarchy to metasystemic anarchy.
Unfortunately, hegemons continuously seem to overstretch themselves, a constant
repetition of Eve reaching for the apple original sin has become our eternal demise.

53

Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1977: 231.

30

Thus, this strategy by a hegemon seems unlikely. How do metasystemic

transitions usually occur then? What kinds of variables are required to enlighten a
hegemon into making such a long-term decision? Keohane and Nye suggest the injection
of an external/internal threat. Interestingly enough, this is one point in which realist
Morgenthau agrees with liberal Wilson and neorealist Kenneth Waltz agrees with
neoliberals Keohane and Nye the only way to attain true organic cooperation is through
the injection of a metasystemic threat. In addition, Morgenthau suggests that our current
age may in fact be the era that requires cooperation the environment, pollution, energy,
global warming, mutually assured destruction and other international issues. Only once
we recognize the innate interrelatedness (unperceived interdependence) of mankind, will
we finally be able to cooperate and solve these metasystemic issues. Once we realize that
our current amour-propre is highly inefficient, highly costly, and highly uncertain will we
be able to enlighten our own self-love into realizing that it is also highly irrational.54

Peace, Metasystemic Anarchy and Impermanence

Once we face a metasystemic threat however, how can we decide on a framework
in which to cooperate? Keohane and Nye suggest the importance of regimes on an
international scale. Domestic regimes helped solidify cooperation on the state-level,
helped ensure an efficient division-of-labor, and a proper system of justice thus
international regimes should assist the same progress on an international scale. Keohane
and Nye suggest that regimes should be utilized to provide information and transparency
to lower the level of international uncertainty. In addition, regimes should be used to

54

Ernst Haas, Is there a Hole in the Whole?, International Organization, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Summer, 1975):
861.

31

generate payoff structures that impose understanding of the costs of conflict in an

interdependent world (similarly to the social contract).55 While on a domestic level, the
privacy of individuals is an important aspect of government, such opacity is irrelevant on
the international level the opacity of states is unnecessary, as the state is an artificial
organ of society. Thus, while the privacy of the individual remains important, the privacy
of the state is not, and to repeat the words of Kant: unless all is to be lost, the positive
idea of world republic must be replaced by the negative substitute of a union of
nations56 In other words, a republic was the ideal form of domestic governance due to
the level of justice, freedom and equality it provides its citizens. On the other hand, a
federalist and restrictive negative form of governance is preferable on the international
scale (a control mechanism for the non-human uncompassionate state) after all, the
positive idea of a republic becomes less efficient as its size grows. Hence, Kant
recognizes the importance of centralized power, while also recognizing the importance of
states rights to some level of autonomy and the individuals inalienable human rights
this was the ultimate balance that was needed to move to our present metasystemic level,
and is also the balance that must be created in order to move to a new metasystemic level.
This concept began to take root in our international system upon the institution of
the Nuremberg Obligation the idea that international law supercedes domestic law, and
thus, no state, nor individual can claim that they were just following orders.57 In this
way, international law should establish the broadest level of human rights and wrongs so
that the state can establish more specific laws, but also so that certain rights are
inalienable universally.
55

Snauwaert, 125.
Lijphart, 49.
57
Snauwaert, 120.
56

32

There are multiple strands of thought on how international law should be

legislated however. The purposive view deals more with external threats, and counters
such threats utilizing common interests among units. On the other hand, the rule-based
view deals more with internal threats of collapse and keeps all encompassed units in a
harmonic interdependence. Thus, a combination of these two strands would be the
optimal route for any international regime.58 Only then can we begin to fully obtain the
true stuff of virtue true order, true freedom and true equality.59
Rousseau states that the purest pleasures are those enjoyed in common.60 If this
statement is held as true, then the ultimate ideal of mankind would be to continue to
interconnect while also stepping back and ensuring that we grow together, as a
harmonious interdependent superstructure. Without this, we are prone to collapse due to
our own internal dependencies and asymmetries. Although nature is permissive and it
is possible to attain purpose without slavery and freedom without anarchy, we must
avoid excessive optimism, because, in reality, an evolutionary perspective leads to a
range of conceivable future orders, not to a single utopia.61 Indeed, the purpose of
evolution is to learn to live in harmony with all life forms and all global resources, and,
regimes are needed to promote cooperation. In addition, while this sounds like a moral
dictum or an ethical insight, ecologists will argue that our positive knowledge supports
their view of evolution; moral progress and purpose are considered implicit in science.
In this way, evolution is not merely a scientific theory: it is the principle that underlies

58

Snauwaert, 127.
Keohane, 481.
60
Ibid., 479.
61
Ernst Haas, Words Can Hurt You, International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring, 1982): 240.
59

33

the cosmos62 Thus, in conclusion and summary, I say: man's belief that he is the
highest possible form of interdependent organicity is an ignorant and arrogant selffulfilling deception.

The Paradoxical Non-Ends of Evolution63

Liberal Disorder to Egalitarian Uniformity
The thinkers of liberalism had one goal in mind - break from blind faith in
traditional, religious ideals and utilize reason to form a new order of values and
governance that could be recognized as universal, and thus, could set the framework
within which, the natural competition of man could play out, without their often
destructive consequences. However, while succeeding in some respects, liberalism
failed in that it was unable to completely revaluate the old ideals of Platonic JudaeoChristian thinking which had dominated Western thought for the previous millenia.
Instead, liberalism tried to tame conflict and destruction in the same way Platonic
thought did -- by dulling competition itself.
Liberalism appealed to the masses by preaching its claimed main tenet: liberty.
However, on the flip side, these thinkers recognized liberty as the root cause of chaos and
conflict (anarchy refers to liberty at its extreme). As a result, liberalism attempted to quell
the disorder by appealing to another value; the same value to which Platonic JudaeoChristian thinking appealed -- equality. While liberalism recognized the incompatibilities
62

Ibid., 219-222.
It is clear through Nietzsches work that he is staunchly anti-Darwinism. However, I would prefer to say
that he sees the inherent workings of evolution, but that it does not necessarily lead us to where we want it
to. This paradox leads Nietzsche to believe that we need to will nature, or will evolution, into
revolution or, in Nietzsches terminology revaluation. Thus, Nietzsche believes teleology and Western
morality is, by definition, leading to the teleological ends of man. However, why do we want man to
end? Nietzsche finds this paradoxical flaw in Western morality and its disovery leads him to seek new
values that will promote individuality and creativity.

63

34

between liberty and equality, its mission became a quest to define liberty and equality in
ways that would make them more compatible, and provide society with order. However,
by creating its own definitions (for freedom especially), it in fact degraded the very value
which it derives its name from -- liberty.
By placing emphasis on equality, man no longer had the same freedoms to exert
his full capabilities on the world -- his full will to power. In the end, the enlightenment,
while extremely utilitarian in setting up a new order for the governance of states and the
world, in fact used reason and science to try to justify the previously unjustifiable ideals
of the blind faith in Christianity. In short, the enlightenment tamed conflict and
destruction indirectly -- by taming competition through the ideal of equality.
Consequently, this new order, the state, repressed its inherent antagonist -- culture.64
Friedrich Nietzsche recognized this error, and in his time as a poet-philosopherthinker, he tried to rectify the damage that liberalism inflicted on the world. Liberalism
led us down a path to nihilism - to the last man - and by using reason, it became rather
convincing. Nietzsche however, refused to be fooled -- he recognized their word games,
their ability to define and redefine, and thus, realized that there was no truth, only the
prejudices of philosophers. Nietzsche thus sought the revaluation of all values. In short,
he turned the goals of Platonic Judaeo-Christian-Liberalism on its head.65 Rather than
seeking a way to tame conflict and destruction by dulling competition, Nietzsche
sought a way to refuel it. He wrote, Must the ancient fire not some day flare up much

64

Robert Antonio, Nietzsches Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History, The
American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 101, No. 1 (July 1995): 9.
65
This ancient strand of morality was characterized by escaping the cave, the apparent world -- to have the
real come to the indifferent spectator. For this reason, Nietzsche admired thinkers such as Copernicus
who questioned the very foundations of our assumptions, and rather than trying to escape the apparent
world, tried to understand what drives the apparent world.

35

more terribly, after much longer preparation? More: must one not desire it with all ones
might? even will it? Even promote it?.66
Nietzsche took the most fundamental nature of society, interaction (and its
counterpart, competition), and tried to find and fuel the creative force within it, rather
than focusing on dimming its destructive, pain-causing forces (as thinkers had done for
thousands of years). In fact, Nietzsche would say that the beauty of this creative force is
its overcoming of the destructive force, the overcoming of the suffering -- mans ability to
create beyond himself!
Thus, because mans nature is immutable by morality, morality should be molded
to fit the individual. Nietzsche would write his most prided work, Thus Spoke
Zarathustra, in direct reference to Zoroaster -- the founder of opposite ideals (good and
evil) and linear temporality (beginning and end -- the afterlife), and, as a result, Western
morality in general. Nietzsche wrote: Zarathustra created this most calamitous error,
morality; consequently, he must also be the first to recognize it.67
Nietzsche would not say that Platonic Judaeo-Christian-Liberal thinking was
necessarily wrong - it was necessary to civilize man when man was just an animal.
However, he thinks it has gone on for too long. Man has been civilized to a point where
he is denatured, separate from nature, which is ultimately counterproductive. We are
part of nature, and by separating ourselves from it, we are separating ourselves from the
very beauty of life, along with what pertains to it: nature, world, the whole sphere of
becoming and transitoriness.68 These things depend on interaction, competition and

66

Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, 54.

Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, Walter Kaufmann, ed., (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 328.
68
Friedrich Nietzsche, On The Genealogy of Morals, Walter Kaufmann, ed., (New York: Vintage Books,
1989), 117.
67

36

tension. We needed to be civilized, but the process of domestication will lead us

down the nihilistic path to the last man. We will have given up the one characteristic
that makes men superior to beasts -- being interesting!

Static Equilibrium : Nihilism, Uniformity and Passivity

Daniel Pinchbeck and others describe the path to the last man as, the end of
history.69 But who is this last man? And why does Nietzsche despise him as such?
E.T. Mitchell writes: The problem which [Nietzsche] had on his mind was how
to save Europe from the mediocrity and decline which he saw setting in.70 To Nietzche,
the greatest flaw of the old thinking was its reliance on a faith in truth, which
depended on the ideal of asceticism. In this way, science extended the ascetic ideal of
Christian thinking to define objectivity itself as contemplation without interest.71 In
Nietzsches words, science is not the opposite of the ascetic ideal but rather the latest
and noblest form of it.72
However, Nietzsche rejected the idea that truth, if it exists at all, would be some
sort of reducible or deducible concept. Rather:
...there is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective
knowing; and the more affects we allow to speak about one
thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one
thing, the more complete will our concept of this thing, our
objectivity, be. But to eliminate will altogether, to suspect each
and every affect, supposing we were capable of this -- what
would that mean but to castrate the intellect?73

In other words, science promotes an objective person as:

69

Daniel Pinchbeck, Breaking Open the Head: A Psychedelic Journey into the Heart of Contemporary
Shamanism, Broadway Books, 2002: 17.
70
E.T. Mitchell, Nietzsche on Ideals, International Journal of Ethics, Vol. 38, No. 3 (April 1928): 19.
71
Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, 119.
72
Ibid., 147.
73
Ibid., 119.

37

...only an instrument; let us say, he is a mirror -- he is no end

in himself... no conclusion and sunrise, no complementary man
in whom the rest of existence is justified... for the most part, a
man without substance and content, a selfless man.
Consequently, also nothing for women.74

As we know from a careful reading of Nietzsches works, his reference to

women is in fact a reference to life, wisdom and truth. Resultantly, as there is nothing
left of the selfless man for these women, we move toward the last man, the
dispassionate passive man who would rather will nothingness than not will.75
This disinterested rationality (facetiously named immaculate perception by
Nietzsche -- a reference to the ascetic purity sought by the entire history of Western
religion, philosophy and morality) provided a recipe for inaction and indifference, and
thus, these last men are those who live a comfortable but mediocre life of convenience,
apathy, and passivity. In its current form, it is characterized by the industrious ants, and
the flies of the marketplace who fuel our capitalist society which produces allencompassing haste, superficiality, and life-denying specialized labor.76 It is also
characterized by modern science -- the product of the enlightenment, of which
Zarathustra remarks in On The Scholars, Too long did my soul sit hungry at their
table; I am not, as they are, trained to pursue understanding as a kind of nut-cracking.
Freedom I love and the air over fresh earth.77 Robert Antonio writes of mediocrity, ...a

74

Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Walter Kaufmann, ed., (New York: Vintage Books, 1989),
126-128.
75
Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, 163.
76
Antonio, 10.
77
Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Graham Parkes, ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005), 108.

38

thirst arises for novelties: unfamiliar pleasures, nameless sensations, all of which lose
their savor once known.78
On the other hand, in its archetypical form, this mediocrity is characterized by the
uniform, stagnant, static equilibrium of Marxist communism, which one could posit we
are moving toward. Its values no longer promote creativity and innovation; rather, they
impede them - for the sake of the greater good, for the community - as if it were
some sort of superior truth, greater than the importance of individuality. These last
men declare equality as greater than liberty. As Zarathustra continues in his diatribe
On the Scholars, he says, For human beings are not equal: thus speaks justice. And
what I want, they would have no right to want!79
Antonio writes:
Against social Darwinist claims that capitalist competition
produces the fittest individuals, Nietzsche held that it gives rise
to smaller... more governable types. Capitalisms formal
equality, relativistic interdependence, and instrumentalism level
status and value hierarchies, reduce tastes to the lowest common
denominator, and destroy cultural constraints on ressentiment.80

81

In other words, the current path of morality is leading us toward, what gametheorists or economists would call the minimax -- the lowest maximum, as to avoid
conflict. It is also worth noting the similarity of this minimax with the resulting justice

78

C.A. Bowers, Culture against Itself: Nihilism as an Element in Recent Educational Thought, American
Journal of Education, Vol. 93, No. 4 (Aug 1985): 9.
79
Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 109.
80
Antonio, 11.
81
This is the inherent paradox of will to power versus self-preservation. Nietzsche wrote: so does
even the greatest yield and risks for the sake of power -- life itself... And this secret did Life herself tell to
me. Behold, she said, I am that which must always overcome itself, (Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra,
99). Thus, will-to-power and self-preservation are inherently intertwined and interdependent. As interesting
creatures however, our evolutionary bias toward self-preservation has itself evolved into a bias toward
will to power -- the self-preservation of ourselves, our creations, our legacy into eternity (Dawkins and
Dennett may propose that memes have become the new, prioritized, self-propagating survival
machines).

39

as fairness doctrine of John Rawls veil of ignorance. In this doctrine, it is only fair
that we desire equality, because behind a veil of ignorance, we do not know our
place in the world.
However, this minimax of equality also leads to indifference, stagnation, and
passivity. Nietzsche wrote: ...imagine indifference itself as a power -- how could you
live according to this indifference? Living - is that not precisely wanting to be other than
this nature?82 As a result, ...we also have to learn caution... and put a halt to the
exaggerated manner in which the unselfing and depersonalization of the spirit is being
celebrated nowadays as if it were the goal itself.83 Nietzsche sought to avoid this
unselfing -- the mass regimentation and socialization envisioned by Karl Marx.
Nietzsche would say that Marx may have been correct; this is the direction in which
Western thought is evolving. However, this does not necessarily make it the right or, even
a, good direction. Nietzsche, seeking the revaluation of all values, tries to will the
future and attempts to redirect us away from Marxist communalism and toward a
vision of renewed individualism. He would prefer great, creative, innovative
individuals to boring, uniform, regimented communities. As Antonio writes: ...he
spoke of the highest men living beyond all rulers and social bonds and of the possible
case of a single individual justifying a whole millennia.84 This was apparent by
Nietzsches praise of specific individuals such as the unfathomables.
This is not to say that Nietzsche disliked communities -- but great peoples are
made up of great individuals, and rely on great, independent founders. In On Old and
New Tables, Zarathustra said of peoples: Oh blissful time far off, when a people
82

Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 15.

Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 126.
84
Antonio, 21.
83

40

would say to itself: Over other peoples will I -- be lord!85 And of these peoples great
founders: Behold here a well for many that are thirsty, one heart for many that are
yearning, one will for many instruments: around him a people will gather, that is: many
experimenters... Human society: this is an experiment... the search is for commanders!86
Great individuals are what make the communities worthwhile. The great individual is the
womb of creativity -- the womb of peoples.

Individuality and Creativity

In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche writes, ...nothing has been exercised and
cultivated better and longer among men so far than obedience... The strange limits of
human development... is due to the fact that the herd instinct of obedience is inherited
best, and at the expense of the art of the commanding.87
According to Nietzsche, the key to refueling individual creativity is to slay the
thou shalt mindset of mass ressentiment and slave morality (which is characterized
by cruelty directed inward, sin, and pity). While Nietzsche recognizes that thou
shalt was useful in civilizing the destructive aspects of competition, he proclaims that
the imperative thus it shall be, will assist in promoting its creative effects.
Nietzsche suggests that the path to nihilism will result in the complete lack of
those who command and are independent.88 He continues by noting that the
progression down this path has already begun:
This state is actually encountered in Europe today: I call it the
moral hypocrisy of those commanding. They know no other way
85

Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 183.

Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 185.
87
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 110.
88
Ibid., 110-111.
86

41

to protect themselves against their bad conscience than to pose as

the executors of more ancient or higher commands (of ancestors,
the constitution, of right, the laws, or even of God). Or they even
borrow herd maxims from the herds way of thinking, such as
first servants of their people or instruments of the common
weal.89

In other words, commanders are no longer creators, rather, commanders also obey by
enforcing the herds preconceived moral framework -- commanders became
philologists. All of this is only for the sake of being useful to the herd, -- for the sake
of security and stability.90 The herd mentality of equality has led to the labeling of high
and independent spirituality, and the will to stand alone, as evil.91
So what would Nietzsche prescribe as a cure for the poison (cruelty directed
inward)? How can commanders command as innovative creators rather than as
servants of their people? Nietzsche would suggest, a real mastery and subtlety in
waging war against oneself, so that, then those magical, incomprehensible, and
unfathomable ones arise... found in Alcibiades and Caesar... and among artists perhaps
Leonardo da Vinci.92 93 Nietzsche would like us to move toward new philosophers;
there is no choice; toward spirits strong and original enough to provide the stimuli for
opposite valuations to revalue and invert eternal values... To teach man the future of
man as his will, as dependent on a human will.94 As such, the great commander must

89

Ibid., 111.
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 111.
91
Ibid., 113-114.
92
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 112.
93
Our current equivalent of the unfathomable ones could be seen in artists who consistently reinvent
themselves and end up gathering peoples or defining generations, rather than justifying millenia (one
could think of Bob Dylan or Bob Marley). However, to be considered unfathomable like Leonardo da
Vinci or Caesar would require such breadth of accomplishments, and such consistent self-overcoming,
that one would have to understand the perspectives on a multitude of different disciplines and fields of
inquiry and creativity. It would also require a more spiritual, value-centered exhibition.
94
Ibid., 117.
90

42

both be free enough to be innovative, but disciplined enough to be the master of his
own wills so that he can channel his will to power into a creative willing of nature.
To Nietzsche, man is only a vessel for his creations: one does best to separate an
artist from his work, not taking him as seriously as his work. He is after all, only the
precondition of his work, the womb, the soil, sometimes the dung and manure on which,
out of which, it grows.95 In On Old and Young Little Women, Zarathustra alludes to
women and pregnancy as an analogy for men and creativity. The procreative woman
(truth is a woman) is merely a vessel that needs to be filled with content, meaning.
For this reason, truth is not static -- like a woman, it is a vessel for new possibilities,
new creations -- new meanings. Zarathustra says, the man is for the woman a means:
the end is always the child.
However, Zarathustra takes us one step further by asking, but what is the woman
for the man? Zarathustra answers: the most dangerous plaything. In other words, to
Nietzsche, the most important thing for a genuine man is to seek danger and play and
thus, to be interesting.96 In this way, man and woman (human and truth) interact to cause
the self-perpetuating creation of a new creator: a higher body shall you create, a first
movement, a self-propelling wheel -- a creator shall you create.97 98
Nietzsches emphasis on creativity is extremely important to a greater
understanding of Nietzsches thought in general, and especially his underlying one than
controls the many: will to power. Nietzsche writes, like trees we grow... not in one
95

Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, 100.

Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 57.
97
Ibid., 61.
98
It is interesting to note at this point the difference between creativity and productivity (and, on
another level, procreativity and reproductivity). Creativity and procreativity refers to the dynamic
organic process that Nietzsche seeks, while productivity and reproductivity refers to the static mechanical
process that Marx envisioned.
96

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place only but everywhere, not in one direction but equally upward and outward and
inward and downward; our energy is at work simultaneously in the trunk, branches, and
roots.99 In this way, the only constant characteristic of nature (which we are part of) is
the will to power. Rather than the categorical imperative of Kant, or universal truths of
other previous philosophers, Nietzsche describes genuine philosophers as
commanders and legislators... With a creative hand they reach for the future, and all that
is and has been becomes a means for them, an instrument, a hammer. Their knowing is
creating, their creating is a legislation, their will to truth is - will to power.100 In other
words, the only truth of the genuine philosopher is to create truth, will nature, and
influence the future using the one universal constant - will to power.
Unlike the Enlightenments moral obligations, Nietzsche suggests that life
ought to be an experiment... not a contract.101 This is the renewed individualism that
Nietzsche sought - life as a journey, an experiment, a continuous act of self-overcoming rather than a duty or a means to a continually-evasive afterlife.
Humanity, in Nietzsches view, needed an all exuberant, floating, dancing,
mocking, childish and blissful art lest we lose our freedom above things that our ideal
demands of us... We should be able also to stand above morality... to float above it and
play!102 In this way, the complete revaluation of the ascetic ideal lies in overturning
the will to truth and replacing it with arts will to deception with a good conscience
(a byproduct of the earlier will to ignorance upon which, the will to truth was built).
Art never attempts to present itself as the truth , the empty vessel, the abyss itself,
99

Friedrich Nietzsche, (1882) 1974. The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix
of Songs, Walter Kaufmann (ed.). New York: Vintage: 332-333.
100
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 136.
101
Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 185.
102
Nietzsche, Gay Science, 107.

44

because paradoxically, truth is created from fiction, from non-truth!103 Nietzsche

wrote: To recognize untruth as a condition of life -- that certainly means resisting
accustomed value feelings in a dangerous way; and a philosophy that risks this would by
that token alone place itself beyond good and evil.104 Thus, art is the expression of
creativity, which we need to regain in order to create new truths and new values.
Interestingly, Nietzsche gives an especially large amount of credit to music as an
authentic art form: speaking rather the language of the will itself, directly out of the
abyss as its most authentic, elemental, nonderivative revelation.105
Most importantly however, Nietzsche views individuality as something good in
itself. This freedom is not a means to an end but part of the end.106 Thus, as such, the
paradoxical ends of man is to have no end - to float above it - to ceaselessly become
and overcome, so that we shall remain interesting107. After all, the end of man would
have to be, nobody other than, the last man. Instead, man should not see himself as an
end, but only as a means, a vessel, an impregnable woman. Only by being these
paradoxical non-ends, these means, can man continue to be an interesting creature,
constantly overcoming himself through his creations, through his will to power.

Moral Relativism and Order of Rank

103

Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 9-10.

Ibid., 12.
105
Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, 103.
106
Kwame Anthony Appiah, Liberalism, Individuality, and Identity, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 27, No. 2,
(Winter 2001): 312.
107
Zarathustra finds redemption, in On Redemption, in that there is none. Rather, the only redemption is
living a life of affirmation rather than regret, because the only purpose of regret, is to avoid it -backwards the will is unable to will... this, yes this alone, is what revenge itself is: the wills ill-will
toward time and its It was. Nietzsche prefers Thus I willed it! -- that alone should I call redemption,
(Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 121).
104

45

Nietzsches prioritization of the individual can be troubling to some, especially

when put in context of his perspectival strain of moral relativism. How can an
individual-centric philosophy be tolerant enough to see multiple moral perspectives
without degrading the authenticity and meaning of an individual perspective -- without
falling into a meaningless nihilism where there is no truth? How can anything be
meaningful while : language... cannot get over its crassness and keeps talking about
opposites where there are only degrees and multiple subtle shades of gradation,?108 The
answer to this lies in Nietzsches conception of the ordering of rank.
Firstly, it is important to analyze Nietzsches Genealogy of Morals in order to
understand the development of morality, and as a result, the nature of moral relativism.
While the ancients (especially polytheists) had many battling Gods and value systems,
eventually these collapsed with the creation of monotheism and the spread of Christianity
-- into a faith in one universal truth. The worst part of this oneness was that once
Christianity began to decline (with the Enlightenment) and once the one God was
declared dead, there was nothing left to stand upon. In other words, because the
multiplicity of ancient values was flattened into the unity of Judaeo-Christian thinking,
the destruction of this one system would lead to the destruction of meaning in general -the path of nihilism, the caged bird paradox of the horizon of the infinite. In short,
we flattened the infinite possibilities of uncertainty into one universal certainty, which,
upon destruction, left us with both nothing and uncertainty.
Nietzsche sees this as the clear, and disturbing end to the current track of
morality, the human quest for truth:

108

Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 35.

46

...[that some] may participate and ultimately prefer even a

handful of certainty to a whole carload of beautiful
possibilities; there may actually be puritanical fanatics of
conscience who prefer even a certain nothing to an uncertain
something to lie down on -- and die. But this is nihilism and the
sign of a despairing mortally weary soul.109

As such, it is interesting to note that the will to truth is inherently in

contradiction with the will to power, or the ever-sought free will of Western morality
-- if everything were certain, how would there be any room left for the freedom of the
will? 110 Nietzsche wrote, God is dead; but given the way of men, there may be caves for
thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown. And we still have to vanquish his
shadow, too.111 In other words, we will not regain uncertaintys accompanying beauty of
infinite possibilities until the forgetful, or, the child is born, and the shadow of the
lion-slain dragon, thou shalt is forgotten.112 Only then can the journey of creating
meaning begin anew on a blank canvas of uncertainty. Only then will the true
nothingness be forgotten as irrelevant, and uncertainty re-recognized as, instead, an
opportunity to create -- a blank slate!
Thus, it seems that the misinterpretation of the difference between perspectival
moral relativism and stagnant nihilism is in fact mans inability to differentiate the
infinite from the nothing. In other words, if everything is equally true, then how is
anything meaningful? The key to this distinction lies in the word equally -- all values
are not equally true because values should not be measured according to validity, rather,

109

Ibid., 16.
For this reason, Nietzsche prefers referring to strong and weak wills rather than free wills. It is
also interesting to note the distinction between a free will and a free wont -- man was born with a
freedom of will that stems from what he does not know (the will to ignorance), meanwhile man gains
freedom of wont over things he knows. Would we not prefer the infinite freedom of will to the limited
freedom of wont?
111
Nietzsche, Gay Science, 167.
112
Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 24.
110

47

they should be measured according to the value of values. To Nietzsche, meanings and
values are not a priori truths but rather, the human being first put values into things, in
order to preserve itself -- it created a meaning for things, a humans meaning! Therefore
it calls itself human -- that is: the valuator.113 As such, Nietzsche suggests an ordering
of rank, not... an individualistic morality.114
Thus, while Platonic-Judaeo-Christian morality encountered the linguistic
problem of opposite ideals, nihilism makes the fatal egalitarian error of declaring all
values as equal. Meanwhile, the beauty of moral relativism depends on competition and
the resulting ordering of rank of these values. Antonio writes, since all serious cultural
achievement demands stretching, striving, and struggling, the only way out of the crisis
[of nihilism] is to restore the matrix for creative individuality and cultural vitality -strong opponents, resistances, and genuine differences.115 This is the paradoxical,
perspectival relativism that Nietzsche represents and seeks - not nothing but
everything -- the infinite!

Eternal Return as Both Dispiriting and Empowering

On the basis of these two strands of Nietzsche: the individualism of the will to
power (the one-to-drive-the-many) and the perspectival moral relativism (the value
of values), Nietzsche finally attempts his third and final task: the revaluation of all
values. However, as Nietzsche shows in Thus Spoke Zarathsutra -- this is no easy task.
Even if one successfully were to complete revaluate old ideals, there is a large
possibility of being misunderstood and misinterpreted -- a multiplicity of masks that a
113

Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 52.

Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 71.
115
Antonio, 19.
114

48

philosophy can become. Thus, the revaluation of all values must not only get to the
root of asceticism, but also present itself in a way so that different types will have
different interpretations (according to the ordering of rank) -- so that the lowest types
will be dispirited and tamed while the highest types are empowered to create. Nietzsche
wrote: What serves the higher type of men as nourishment or delectation must almost be
poison for a very different and inferior type. The virtues of the common man might
perhaps signify vices and weaknesses in a philosopher.116 Man is too complex, too
diverse, to be ruled by one overarching morality -- rather, the morality should embody the
paradoxical nature of man, the Universe, and nature itself. Morality should mold itself to
the needs of each individual -- a (currently) politically incorrect double standard in a
sense, which may both contradict with itself, and promote contradiction,
competition and creation in both society, and the individual himself. Nietzsche wrote:
Morality in Europe today is herd animal morality -- in other
words, as we understand it, merely one type of human morality
beside which, before which, and after which many other types,
above all higher moralities, are, or ought to be, possible. But this
morality resists such a possibility, such an ought with all its
power: it says stubbornly and inexorably, I am morality itself,
and nothing besides is morality.117

As such, in order to will the future, Nietzsche must present his philosophy as a
riddle, something that may not be understood or even relevant until after his death,
possibly centuries later -- which is why Zarathustra decides to spread his riddle among
sailors (the courageous explorers who do not fear the uncertainty of new seas and new
lands). As Nietzsche wrote in Beyond Good and Evil: Higher than love to your
neighbour is love to the furthest and future ones.118 Thus, Nietzsches task is to recreate
116

Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 42.

Ibid., 115-116.
118
Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 53.
117

49

tension, and in doing so, create the ultimate tension - the polarization of opposites - the
believers of nothing versus the believers in the infinite, the passive versus the
creative, the rabble versus the noble -- the nihilist versus the unfathomable.
In his search for the revaluation of all values, Nietzsche finds the root of
Western morality in the calamitous error made by the prophet whom he bases his main
character on (Zoroaster/Zarathustra). Zoroaster conceived of the duality of nature, the
separation of good and evil, and most importantly, at the root of it all, the idea that time
is linear -- that there is a beginning and an end. However, as expounded earlier,
there ought not be an end to man, and thus, Nietzsche finds the root of Western
morality which must be revaluated in order to recreate tension, to will nature and to
will the future -- to avoid the end and return to a new beginning. Nietzsche
revaluates the conception of linear time, as instead, crooked or cyclical -- or to the
lower types: circular. Thus was the birth of Nietzsches infamous eternal return, or as
some scholars suggest (as an alternative translation): perpetual return.
However, how can we explain the two possible interpretations of eternal return?
Zarathustra hid eternal return in a riddle so that lower types and higher types will
have dual interpretations. Lower types will interpret eternal return as eternal
recurrence: circular in the way of repetition -- a hopeless predestined fate. Higher
types, on the other hand, would interpret eternal return as perpetual return: cyclical
(or in Zarathustras words -- crooked), in that it continuously reunites opposites in a
perpetual struggle -- an infinitely blank canvas for a perpetual spiritual arms race of the
many wills to power.119

119

For this reason, I prefer the phrase perpetual return to emphasize the high interpretation of eternal
return and the phrase eternal recurrence to emphasize its low interpretation.

50

Zarathustra recognizes that the past cannot be overcome, and thus, he must
establish a bridge between the past and the future. This bridge is found in the
riddle of eternal return -- a thought that will create a bridge, rather than a truth
that will overcome all prior truths.
As such, it becomes clear that Nietzsche does not necessarily believe that eternal
return is some sort of a priori, cosmological truth (although he does question its
possibility) -- rather, it is the value of eternal return that matters -- the thought, or
guessing of eternal return (similarly to the deterrent value of the Christian thought of
hell). It kills two birds with one stone -- it dispirits the rabble while empowering
potential unfathomables. Zarathustra alludes to this polarization in On the Vision and
the Riddle when he states to the spirit of heaviness, my Devil and arch-enemy...
Dwarf! You! Or I! Zarathustra then encodes the high interpretation within the riddle
by overcoming the dwarf, the spirit of heaviness.120 Zarathustra states to the dwarf:
Behold this gateway, dwarf! I continued. It has two faces. Two ways
come together here: nobody has ever taken them to the end. This long
lane back here: it goes on for an eternity. And that long lane out there -that is another eternity. They contradict themselves, these ways; they
confront one another head on, and here, at this gateway, is where they
come together. The name of the gateway is inscribed above it:
Moment. But whoever should wake farther on one of them -- on and
on, farther and farther: do you believe, dwarf, that these ways contradict
themselves eternally?--121

The dwarf interprets this to mean: All that is straight lies... All truth is crooked;
time itself is a circle.122 The dwarf states this contemptuously, and after further
convincing by Zarathustra, disappears into the darkness. Similarly, Zarathustras
animals in The Convalescent respond to the thought of eternal return with
120

Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 134-135.

Ibid., 136.
122
Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 136.
121

51

passivity. Zarathustra says, in reference to his abysmal thought (that tension cannot be
rebuilt): But now I lie here, still weary from this biting and spitting out, still sick from
my own redemption. And you simply watched all this?123 Zarathustras animals did
not understand that the thought of eternal return is not supposed to be a comfortable
redemption, rather, it requires action, not passive celebration and hurdy-gurdy
songs.
In less metaphorical words, this guessing of eternal return promotes a
comfortable and secure future for the rabble, who so fiercely fear suffering, and so
desperately seek truth and meaning to justify their pains -- We want that some day
there should be nothing any more to be afraid of!... the will and way to this day is now
called progress.124 125
Meanwhile this guessing also promotes a love of eternity (amor fati) by the
greats who can attain the ultimate affirmation of all eternity: to desire all of life and
eternity, all of the suffering, and all of the joy -- to desire the journey itself -- eternalism.
All of this is in recognition of the fact that all of these natural aspects of life are in fact,
interdependent. It is all-or-nothing in this intertwined temporality -- the nihilists will
naturally choose nothing.

123

Ibid., 190.
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 114.
125
In this context, it is interesting to note Nietzsches sentiments on Buddhism, echoed in The Antichrist:
Buddhism, I repeat, is a hundred times more austere, more honest, more objective. It no longer has to
justify its pains, its susceptibility to suffering, by interpreting these things in terms of sin -- it simply says,
as it simply thinks, I suffer. To the barbarian, however, suffering in itself is scarcely understandable: what
he needs, first of all, is an explanation as to why he suffers... Here the word devil was a blessing: man had
to have an omnipotent and terrible enemy -- there was no need to be ashamed of suffering at the hands of
such an enemy.-- (Friedrich Nietzsche, (1888) 1968a. Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-Christ, translated
by R. J.
Hollingdale. London: Penguin: Section 21).
124

52

Thus, the ancient ascetic ideal (the paradoxical life against life) that has
plagued humanity for so long, can only be forgotten through this ultimate affirmation of
life -- eternal return. Thus, it may be better to say that this yea-saying song does not
kill two birds with one stone, but rather, it allows the birds to fly while securing the
lambs with a shepherd.

Extremism, the Lowest and Highest Types

So where does the often-associated fascist or extremist strand of Nietzsche
appear? Primarily, and paradoxically, it is associated with his conception of moral
relativism, discussed earlier. Nietzsches order of rank, and references to superior
and inferior types could appear to be some sort of diction on Nazi eugenics. However,
these fascist interpretations of Nietzsche abandon his other strands, resulting in an
incomplete misinterpretation.
Rather, Nietzsches order of rank refers rather to the fact that the nature of man
is unchangeable, not even by morality itself -- a bird of prey will be a bird of prey.126
Will to power can never disappear, it can only be weakened or strengthened -- man
would rather will nothingness than not will.127 128 We are only changeable, as long as
our soul of plurality exercises upon its battleground of competing drives, -- and even

126

Furthermore, it is interesting to note the many inherent contradictions of morality. For example, imagine
a selfless man and a selfish man stranded on a desert island. One must eat the other to survive. The selfless
man would seem to be the obvious meal, however, from a greater societal perspective, the selfless man
would be a better citizen, and thus, being selfless, should give up his own selflessness in order to survive
and spare society of the other castaways selfishness. This is just one example of the problematic and often
contradictory nature of morality.
127
Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, 163.
128
It is also interesting to note that Zarathustra feels that cripples will be cripples as well -- in fact, their
disability is generally their driving force, and thus we should not pity them.

53

that, is not changing our actual nature, because those drives are part of our nature.129
Zarathustra says in On the Despisers of the Body:
Always the Self listens and seeks: it compares, compels,
conquers, destroys. It rules and is also the Is ruler... My brother,
are war and battle evil? But necessary is this evil, necessary are
envy and mistrust... among your virtues... Each virtue is jealous
of every other, and a terrible thing is jealousy. Virtues too can
perish through their jealousy... The human is something that
must be overcome and therefore shall you love your virtues.130

At very best, morality merely acts as a utilitarian way to redirect the cruelty of the
low types, inward. However, this morality has poisoned mankind as a whole, so that
now, even high types succumb to this self-directed cruelty -- that we are all born into
sin, or, even more so, the guilt that comes with a God who died for our sins. As a
result, Nietzsche desired the re-recognition of the immutable nature of man, and thus, a
re-liberation of the high types, so that the unfathomables can again be born, and can
again create.
Nietzsche wrote:
To demand of strength that it should not express itself as
strength, that it should not be a desire to overcome, a desire to
throw down, a desire to become master, a thirst for enemies and
resistances and triumphs, is just as absurd as to demand of
weakness that it should express itself as strength, that the doer
is merely a fiction added to the deedthe deed is everything,
and that it is not possible that the strong man is free to be weak
and the bird of prey to be a lamb.131

However, Nietzsche cautions against extremism as a potential repetition of

tyrannical intolerance against the promotion of further creativity and innovation. Quoting
Nietzsche again:

129

Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 32.

Ibid., 30-33.
131
Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, 45.
130

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But this is an ancient, eternal story: what formerly happened

with the Stoics still happens today, too, as soon as any
philosophy begins to believe in itself. It always creates the world
in its own image; it cannot do otherwise. Philosophy is the
tyrannical drive itself, the most spiritual will to power to the
132
creation of the world, to the causa prima.

Dynamic Equilibrium: The Infinite Meaning of Impermanence

Thus, we come to our conclusion. Here we find not the static equilbrium of the
ends of man, of the tame and mediocre last man, but rather, the dynamic equilibrium
of eternal return -- the dynamic order of the Universe paradoxically dependent upon
its constant flux. One could say, the only fundamental, unchangeable, permanent truth
of the Universe, of nature, is its very impermanence. Additionally, this impermanence is
maintained by the constantly competing energies of the Universe -- the wills to power.
One can see here, that impermanence (flux) is paradoxically, the fundamental
underlying mortar that holds together Nietzsches three strands of thought: will to
power, moral relativism, and eternal return. Will to power drives impermanence
and allows nature to continually self-overcome (and avoid a boring stagnation);
moral relativism allows man to deal with and perceive this perpetual impermanence
(through a gradated order of rank); and eternal return is the thought, the value,
that will allow impermanence to continue to fluctuate wildly, and, as a result, will
hopefully perpetuate man and nature as eternally interesting.
The competing drives of nature are no longer naturally occurring, and thus
through eternal return, Nietzsche hopes to will nature. This was Zarathustras
abysmal thought: have we all become too equal to create tension -- Nietzsche wrote:
Was that the end of it? Had the greatest of all conflicts of ideals been placed ad acta

132

Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 16.

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[disposed of] for all time? Or only adjourned, indefinitely adjourned?133 This abysmal
thought is represented as a strangling snake -- I myself strangled the strangler that is
called sin.134 In this way, it seems Nietzsche is alluding to the fact that Christianity has
equalized us all through the concept of original sin -- high and low types became
God, and men, respectively. Had the tarantulas, the weak and vengeful preachers of
equality, succeeded in poisoning us?135
This brings us to Nietzsches question -- can we overcome the last man? In
order to do so, Nietzsche would suggest the transformation of evolution into continual
revolution (revaluation, overcoming). As Lewis Hinchman writes: nevertheless,
to pass from one system of interpretation to another means, at least temporarily, ceasing
to be someone and becoming no one or anyone... passing through a kind of no mans
land between past and future.136 Better, in Nietzsches words: all great things bring
about their own destruction through an act of self-overcoming.137 This perspective,
however, begs an even more important question: can we overcome the last man without
destroying ourselves in the process? Will the philosophers fiddle as the West burns?138

133

Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, 54.

Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 194.
135
Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 86.
136
Lewis Hinchman, The Idea of Individuality: Origins, Means and Political Significance, The Journal of
Politics, Vol. 52, No. 3, (Aug 1990): 772.
137
Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, 161.
138
It is interesting to note Arthur Clarkes interpretation of this issue in his 2001: A Space Odyssey. In this
book (adapted into the famed Stanley Kubrick film), the hopeful future and evolution of mankind is
temporarily threatened by HAL, the uninteresting dispassionate machine - nihilism - created by man
himself. However, the film progresses and man overcomes the machine. The final lines of the book allude
to this Nietzschean vision of the future: Then he waited, marshalling his thoughts and brooding over his
still untested powers. For though he was master of the world, he was not quite sure what to do next. But he
would think of something. As such, it may be no coincidence that the opening chords of the film are none
other than Richard Strauss tonal poem: Also Sprach Zarathustra, as the sun rises above the moon, the
moon above the sun -- the constant overcoming of nature, by nature. In the end, after the long struggle,
Nietzsches star child is born into outer space, innocent, forgetful, and creative.
134

56

Isabelle Grunberg writes: As has frequently occurred, the combatants may

exhaust themselves, and the victorious power may be unable to reorder the international
system. The destruction of Rome by barbarian hordes led to the Chaos of the Dark
Ages.139 Being a Nietzschean immoralist, a new philosopher, a new founder,
requires floating above morality, the ability to command independently. However,
we must remember that commanding is harder than obeying.140
Thus, we see that evolution and revolution have no certain ends, rather, it is
time which is eternally beginning, eternally becoming, always devouring itself and
always giving birth to itself again. The antithesis eternally begets itself in order to be
consumed again and again by the unity, and the antithesis is eternally consumed by the
unity in order to revive itself ever anew. Or, more simply stated: O my brothers, is
everything now not in flux?141 Thus Revolted Zarathustra.

Conclusions through the Consilience of Paradoxical Dialectics

Introduction to Dialectics
Here it seems we have met a paradox. First I spoke of the inevitability of the
cycle of impermanence and then of the importance of creativity and revolting against
the cycle. However, this paradox can be resolved through an exploration of paradoxes in
general.
Hegel presented the possibility of reconciling paradoxes through his dialectical
triad. The triad is made up of a thesis, which is then opposed by an antithesis, and then

139

Isabelle Grunberg, Exploring the Myth of Hegemonic Stability, International Organization, Vol. 44,
No. 4, (Autumn 1990): 448.
140
Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 99.
141
Ibid., 175.

57

resolved through a synthesis. Part of the beauty of this triad lies in the fact that it can
rotate to allow the thesis to take on the role of antithesis or even synthesis, in different
relative configurations again, the dangers of a one-perspective objectivism, and the
beauties of perspectival possibilities are revealed.
One example of such dialectic can be seen through the Adam Smith Problem. At
its deepest abstraction, it is one of the fundamental problems of political thought,
morality, and philosophy in general. While it is often limited in its characterization as a
mere contradiction between self-interest and sympathy, it is important to note that
this dichotomy can be abstracted onto many levels of thought. One of the earliest, and
most detailed proposed solutions to this problem was given by Jean-Jacques Rousseaus
treatise: Emile: On Education. Rousseau states in the early sections of this treatise that
every society must choose between making a man or a citizen. This dichotomy is
inherently the same as the one between self-interest and sympathy.
Being a man requires being self-interested, looking after ones own survival and
self-sufficiency to be without dependence, to be independent and autonomous.
However, as we know, interaction (often described as matter in motion) is a
fundamental aspect of nature, and our Universe. Meanwhile, we can define human
interaction as family or society, at different metasystemic levels. On a human level, a
citizen requires sympathy so that it can be reciprocated into a mass empathetic
understanding in which our apparent self-interest, independence and autonomy can be
preserved in a reality defined by interaction, society and interdependence (which implies
both independence, and total dependence at the same time).

58

In short, in the private sphere (mans interaction with himself), self-interest is

required to preserve a man as himself an independent, autonomous, self-sufficient
individual. Meanwhile, in the public sphere (mans interaction with others), sympathy (so
it may be reciprocated) is required to allow a man to be himself independent and free
from the security dilemma, power struggles, and the inevitable conflict that results from
interaction and society. This is the only way that the individuals freedom, societys
equality and the naturally occurring order of nature can all be simultaneously maintained.
This can be abstracted to mans relation to one, and to the infinite which, after all is
implicitly one and the same. As Heraclitus wrote long ago, All things come out of the
one, and the one out of all things.
The key to reconciling these paradoxes into the unity of nature is to realize that
one and infinity, as the most mathematically abstracted example, are in fact different
sides of the same coin they come to the same truth the unity of the infinite from
different perspectives.
This section will explore the different levels and perspectives of these
dichotomies and will show how all of these paradoxes in fact resolve each other as
necessary complements. In utilizing such a correlative logic, this author prescribes to the
ancient Hermetic logic of consilience. As the Emerald Tablet said over 5000 years ago,
As above, so below.

Entity and Identity

The struggle between entity and identity is a fundamental byproduct of human
consciousness. While identity does exist (because we have conceived of it, and thereby

59

have created it), it is not some sort of a priori, or external, natural law or concept. It is
merely the way we perceive reality because our reason inclines us to do so to
rationalize the world, literally to divide the infinite universe into conceivable, finite
and reducible units -- identities.
The byproduct of this struggle between entity and identity becomes more
commonly conceived as the struggle between natures implicit interdependence and our
reasons fundamental need to perceive reality in terms of independent units, and thereby
to be an independent unit after all, only an independent unit can perceive and conceive
of a whole (as a part can never see the entirety of its encompassing whole). Thus, to be
objective, reason requires independence. The only problem is that nature itself is
interdependent.
However, this seeming contradiction is not a contradiction at all
interdependence is defined by independence it is the complete interdependence of many
independent units. In reality, the reference to the independence of a unit and the
interdependence of the units are referring to two different aspects of the same reality
one to the unit, in and of itself, and the other to the relationship between units. As Peter
Kakol writes:
The common mistake of confusing the absolute with the
inclusive or even the all-inclusive is most likely based on the
assumption that the independent includes the dependent.
However, it is really the dependent that includes the
independent, just as the whole is dependent on its independent
parts. It is a basic insight of process thought that dependent on
is not that same as included in rather, the dependent is
inclusive and the independent included This is especially the
case when the community of intrinsic values is dependent for its
very existence on the instrumentally valuable such as

60

humanitys dependence on the Earths ecosystem, or a cells

dependence on the existence of molecules.142

In fact, Kakol goes as far to create an analogy about the divine from this
viewpoint:
rather than being a view from nowhere Gods relation to
the universe would be analogous to the relation between mind
and body (which is itself a relation between an event and an
organized grouping of events). Nevertheless, as the divine
perspective is nonlocal and all-inclusive, it can be considered to
be an objective view of things despite the fact that it is itself
subjective.143

Another way of viewing this concept is through David Hume. In Humes

terminology, we are bundles of bundles, and thus, there is no objective way of identifying
a bundle, other than that it encompasses other bundles and is encompassed by even
others. As Ken Wilber suggests: there are no parts that are not also wholes and no
wholes that are not also parts.144 Thus, independent units are as independent as we
define them to be, and their rules of interdependence are also as we define them we are
the perceivers, the conceivers -- the meaning-creators. Thus, like there is no
contradiction between the one and the infinite, there is also no contradiction between
entity and identity, nor between interdependence and independence only what
Nietzsche would describe as word games. As Nietzsche writes, if you gaze for long
into an abyss, the abyss gazes also into you."

Motion and Ration

142

Peter Kakol, A General Theory of Worldviews Based on Madhyamika and Process Philosophies
Philosophy East and West, Vol. 52, No. 2, (April 2002): 209.
143
Ibid., 210.
144
Ibid., 209.

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It has long been known that man is a parallel processor we process our reality
through two types of memory emotional and rational. One induces experience, while
the other deduces from experience, one is about believing and perceiving and the other
about inquiring and conceiving. The communication between these parallel processes
provides us with our free will by allowing us to act as a cohesive perceiver and
conceiver, at the same time. However, from these two different processes, the Universe is
seen in two different ways.
On one hand, the motion perspective of the Universe perceives matter in
motion as an interdependent substance. On the other hand, the rational perspective
conceives of matter as the interaction of many independent units (atoms). One view is
exoteric, the other esoteric one is the forest, the other the trees. However, they are one
and the same. One views the Universe as one. The other views the Universe as
infinite. However, views are merely that views. Truth on the other hand, is not an
objective, reducible perspective, but rather, the act of recognizing all of the views, and
realizing that they are one and the same synthesizing the views into a state of
consilience! Alfred North Whitehead writes:
All worldviews are at the same time wholes that include but
transcend antecedent worldviews, and parts that are (or will be)
transcended but included within subsequent worldviews. Rival
contemporary worldviews can be understood as being mutually
compatible from the point of view of a subsequent worldview
that inclusively transcends both. So, although refutation has its
legitimate place in philosophic discussion [worldviews]
advance by the introduction of new ideas, widening vision and
adjusting clashes.145

Thus we can make a further correlation while the one interdependent motional
substance implies the unity of nature, the potential configurations and interactions of the
145

Kakol, 209.

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infinite rationalized independent atoms provides the infinite possibilities of creativity

thus, creativity has a prerequisite for a rationalizing mind.
One problem with this perspective, as of late, is that reason (ration) has been
seen as the sole instrument of discovering truth. However, this is merely apparent
because ration created the concept of truth. However, in actuality, ration, which lives in
the apparent, created truth as a way to define the real, which, by definition, is separate
from it (a part cannot view its encompassing whole). However, it is important to note
that the truth cannot ever be seen in entirety, because, by definition of the unity of the
infinite real, the apparent must be encompassed within the real, because there cannot be
another substance outside of it.
Thus, in conclusion, the key to harmoniously utilizing the infinite possibilities of
creativity is to keep in mind its implicit connection with, and derivation from, the unity of
nature. While the rationalists, those Platonic disinterested philosophers always denied the
subjective view as irrelevant to truth; the new philosophers see Platonic philosophy as a
smaller subset of its greater world-view not separate from it. To rejoin together many
philosophies and branches of learning, to create new, cohesive, comprehensive, and
unifed ones is the act of consilience - interdependent creativity applied to knowledge (the
unity of knowledge). I recognize however, that even this, is subject to the greater law of
impermanence. Hans-Georg Gadamer recognized this inseparable consilienceimpermanence dynamic when he suggested that,
there is no more an isolated horizon of the present in itself
than there are historical horizons Rather, understanding is
always the fusion of these horizons supposedly existing by
themselves In a tradition this process of fusion is continually

63

going on Even Jacques Derrida agrees that worldviews

develop by nested inclusion.146

Thus, here it has been shown that motion and ration are the also different sides of
the same coin an important dialectic to synthesize to understand the difference between
constructive creativity and reductive rationality or as we will explore later, truth and
creativity.

Inclination and Duty

In order to preserve some sense of unification within our own internal
dividedness, man has created separate spheres the public and the private in order to
harmonize and channel his different motional and rational drives into different
environments. Our private sphere is characterized by our inclination, our deepest
passions running without restriction, a concept necessary to a mechanical solidarity based
on shared suffering. Our interactions with the public sphere however is characterized by
duty, a concept necessary to organic solidarity based on specialized interdependence and
therefore, rationally, to an independent individuals security. As a people, historically, we
move through cycles, with increasing amplitudes, however, in the general direction of
greater and greater organic solidarity and interdependence. In addition, as individuals, our
lives tend to move from private to public.
Put into context of the prior section, motion and ration, we can see that inclination
and duty also fits nicely into our pattern of dialectics. Thus, paradoxically, our duty is to
incorporate our inclination into our duty, and vice-versa to bring our passion into the
public sphere -- to interact with the infinite, the others of society, in a way that one is

146

Kakol, 209.

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passionate about (while also remembering the unity of the infinite, and that, in fact, the
other is only as other as one defines him).
Thus, the synthesis of inclination and duty is in fact a resolution to the Adam
Smith Problem itself bring ones passions into the public sphere (into ones work) while
also being sympathetic towards others work, self-interest and passions! This is the true
life of an enlightened self-loving man -- to balance partiality with tolerance and passion
with compassion. This is the key to balancing the tension between inclination and duty,
and also to feeling a yearning, and a love for all of eternity!

Truth and Creativity

Ration has had many symbols and terms over the ages reason, rationale, the
tree of knowledge. However, its place in our world is clear throughout our most ancient
legends. Upon gaining more ration, or upon eating from the tree of knowledge, we
were expelled from the ignorant, but blissful Garden of Eden and were slowly cast into
Nietzsches horizon of the infinite (a process, of original sin, which is only concluding
now, with the reductionism of modern science!). We tried to discover truth by
rationalizing, by dividing into smaller and smaller, more reducible units however, as
we did this, we also created a larger and larger quantity of separate atoms the horizon of
the infinite! We killed God, the truth of the unity of nature, in search of a more
reducible, easy-to-grasp truth. However, what we resist persists -- we have found no
truth, we have only drifted further from it (which is also back toward it!). We were
seduced by a never-ending game of hide-and-seek, in which the truth continuously
remains hidden. We have become the paradoxical caged bird in the horizon of the

65

infinite. Thus, creativity is as rare as it is because there is security in excelling in the

customary but danger in challenging old truth, we prefer the limits of old lands to the
exploration of open seas!
This infinite substance of reducible units, identical atoms, can be terrifying with
such monotony and uniformity, this objective perspective on truth provides us with no
direction, no markers only this vast horizon of the infinite in which left is right,
forward is backward, and right is wrong. Even freedom and equality are empty vessels
with no substantive moral content of its own. Without moral standards, [they] remain
meaningless147
The only way to resolve the conflict between fact and fiction, truth and
creativity is to realize that creativity lies within truth what we create is real! This
empowering statement alone can allow us to re-harness our self, and our passions, and
direct our interested mind toward creating new legends, new truths, and new meanings to
life! This is The Secret. Adam Smith writes: Man was made for action, and to promote
by the exertion of his faculties such changes in the external circumstances both of himself
and others. 148 In our self-perpetuating and self-defeating Universe (both are forms of
self-alteration), it seems almost tautological that every thought starts in the apparent, and
then slowly begins to manifest itself in the real.149
Henshel writes of this phenomenon in his description of reflexive prediction:
that predictions may themselves become a part of the interacting set of social conditions
147

Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality Harvard Law Review, Vol. 95, No. 3, (Jan 1982): 547.
Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, (Oxford University Press, 1976), Part 2, Section 3,
Chapter 3.
149
It is interesting to note the concept of mental gender at this point. The creative I (sometimes
classified according to gender as the male hemisphere) commands and creates through the passive Me
the mental womb. The world interacts with me, while I interact with the world however, most
importantly I command me and thus, I have free will to create through this I/Me duality of mental
gender.
148

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that result in future social states is an important attribute of social life.150 Thus, Merton
defines the consequences of this reflexive prediction as a self-altering prediction
which can manifest itself as either a self-fulfilling prophecy or a self-defeating prophecy.
It is important to note however, that the dynamics of these two consequences of selfaltering predictions are the same; their ends however, are different. One moderates while
the other perpetuates and intensifies.
We see this phenomenon, more broadly named the self-fulfilling prophecy, in
nearly every aspect of nature, society and thought. One common modern-day example of
this is seen through one of the most important effects of biology the placebo effect.
Not surprisingly, modern science has focused less time on studying such a prevalent and
important mental effect, and more time trying to figure out how to minimize its impact on
our reductionist physical world. The placebo effect is just one piece of evidence that
shows that the self-fulfilling prophecy is always in effect, and its potential benefits
often ignored.
However, the self-fulfilling prophecy is everywhere the placebo effect,
stereotyping, confirmation bias, paranoia, electoral exit polls, conflict escalation and
resolution, millenarianism, mysticism and much more.151 Thus, possibly the most
intriguing aspect of the self-fulfilling prophecy is its breadth of prevalence.
Hence, a further beauty of this dialectic resolution is that it also resolves the
conflict between the many schools of thought or religions the consilience of
knowledge! Every school of thought, religion, profession of faith is implicitly correct
through this view. All of these modes of faith are indirect routes to the same destination
150
151

Henshel, 511.
Ibid.

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faith itself! Faith allows one to believe that they have received truth from the Universe,
and thus, they have! Truth is our prime mover, and thus any faith that we believe in, can
act as our individual truth, our own self-fulfilling prophecy our call to action! Of
course, some truths have called to action, the willing of nothing. This passivity
however, is a truth of its own (although it may rank less on a spectrum of contribution).
Similarly, forces such as malevolence and violence are also truths (as many know all
too well), although through this philosophy, in which we create truth, it would seem
against any concept of empathy, or even self-interest, to create such a destructive truth.
This type of truth does not resonate with any emotional, rational, or human (and
thus, humane) perspectives of a desired reality. Thus, the truth is in our hands, as is the
future of truth why not create the most of it?
If, in Hegelian logic, the thesis is a faith in the unity of nature, and the antithesis
is the scientific pursuit of a reducible truth, then one could say that the synthesis is art.
We must reduce our truth so we have units in which we can artfully create new truths,
new unities. Only from the vast horizon of the infinite, could new, undiscovered lands be
found -- and it is only these undiscovered (uncreated) lands that keep mankind from
reaching some sort of teleological end. After all, who wants the end of mankind? Why not
a continual new beginning?

Stability and Change

And thus we reach our fundamental and transcendental truth once again is
everything now not in flux? 152 The permanence of the impermanence of our Universe

152

Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 175.

68

allows for some of the most beautiful aspects of our Universe, but also some of the most
destructive. For example, Charles Gray writes:
Culture is like the molecules in a gas The movements and
collisions of individual molecules are random, and one cannot
heat up the gas by increasing the speed of the molecules without
at the same time increasing the randomness and chance of their
movements, and to date the same has been true of increasing the
intensity of artistic creativity.153

Music for example, is a most artful exhibition of this paradox a dynamic

equilibrium in which there is a constant rhythm, but also constant change and constant
rebirths. The song is the artful expression of the act of continually becoming and
overcoming, remaining familiar, while constantly innovating, playing off of old
expectations, and setting new ones to dance rhythmically above morality, and remain
interesting! Other arts perform in the same way (such as humor, oration etc.)
Similarly, one could utilize mathematics to visualize this concept. A cycle can be
seen in any sort of sinusoidal representation while every point changes, the cycle itself
stays the same. This is the nature of a dynamic equilibrium a synthesized balance of
change and stability.
This also occurs in two primary mechanisms of evolution: selection and variation.
While selection provides stability through the function of survival of the fittest,
variation provides the change necessary to adapt to future situations and the dynamicity
of nature itself. Too much variation and a species will not be able to survive as itself. Too
much selection and a species will not be able to adapt to interactions and new situations.
We can also discover the connection between this and our original discussion of the

153

Charles Edward Gray, Paradoxes in Western Creativity, American Anthropologist, Vol. 74, No. 3
(Jun., 1972): 687.

69

necessary balance between independence as self (selection) and the interdependence of

interaction (variation).

Defining Progress
Finally, we come to the ultimate question that initiates the transition from physics
and philosophy to metaphysics and theosophy -- To what from this? To where from here?
To when from now?
More properly phrased: does dynamic equilibrium imply progress? This question
however, ponders an even greater question: What is progress? Progress (like truth) is
something that is defined by us the meaning-creators -- and thus, many brilliant
scholars have taken different angles on this question, without conflicting with their
underlying philosophies. Unfortunately for some, it meant living a self-created life of
pessimism, even though they had learned and created so much. For others, it led to selfcreated lives of optimistic idealism, of greatness, of wealth, fortune and happiness and
very often, of a lasting legacy for being blessed with these joyous ornaments.
Thus, it could be concluded that the content of our life is derived primarily from
our outlook on it. As Niels Bohr wrote: How wonderful that we have met with a
paradox! Now we have some hope of making progress! Paradoxes allow us to create our
own reality because if there were some certain reducible truth (devoid of paradox), how
could there exist a multitude of creative possibilities for the free will to experiment with?
Nietzsche writes, Human society: this is an experiment... the search is for
commanders!154

154

Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 185.

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Hence, to conclude our discussion on these great paradoxes, I will leave you, the
reader, with the ultimate judgment a man can make for himself: his view on progress.
Clifford Geertz says that, worldviews are models both of reality and for reality
(ethos).155 Thus, for this purpose, I leave you with a spectrum of outlooks from some of
historys most famous and infamous people. I invite, you, the reader, to align yourself
along this spectrum (progressing from the ultra-paranoid Joseph Stalin to the ultraaffirming Buddha), or, preferably, to synthesize156 a view of your own:

To slacken the tempo...would mean falling behind. And those who fall behind get
beaten...
Joseph Stalin

The production of too many useful things results in too many useless people.
Karl Marx
Mans "progress" is but a gradual discovery that his questions have no meaning.
Antoine de Saint-Exupry
It is the business of future to be dangerous.... The major advances in civilization are
processes that all but wreck the societies in which they occur.
Alfred North Whitehead
Civilization is a progress from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity toward a definite,
coherent heterogeneity.
Herbert Spencer

The art of progress is to preserve order amid change and to preserve change amid
order.
Alfred North Whitehead
155

Kakol, 209.
With this in mind, let us recall Nietzsches view on consilience, in contradistinction to reductionism:
...there is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective knowing; and the more affects we allow to speak
about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our
concept of this thing, our objectivity, be.

156

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History shows that the human mind, fed by constant accessions of knowledge,
periodically grows too large for its theoretical coverings, and bursts them asunder to
appear in new habiliments, as the feeding and growing grub, at intervals, casts its too
narrow skin and assumes another.
Charles Darwin
The history of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of
freedom.
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

Every day you may make progress. Every step may be fruitful. Yet there will stretch out
before you an ever-lengthening, ever-ascending, ever-improving path. You know you
will never get to the end of the journey. But this, so far from discouraging, only adds to
the joy and glory of the climb.
Winston Churchill
Imagination is more important than knowledge. For knowledge is limited, whereas
imagination embraces the entire world, stimulating progress, giving birth to evolution.
Albert Einstein
All that we are is a result of what we have thought.
Buddha

TO NEW BEGINNINGS...

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