Torts Cases Batch-3

1) Bermudez v. Judge Amuerfina Melencio

Herrera
(**casedigestph)
BERMUDEZ V MELENCIO-HERRERA
G.R. No. L-32055 February 26, 1988
Facts: A cargo truck, driven by Domingo Pontino
and owned by Cordova Ng Sun Kwan, bumped a
jeep on which Rogelio, a six-year old son of
plaintiffs-appellants, was riding. The boy sustained
injuries which caused his death. As a result,
Criminal Case No. 92944 for Homicide through
Reckless Imprudence was filed against Domingo
Pontino. Plaintiffs-appellants filed on July 27, 1969
in the said criminal case A Reservation to File
Separate
Civil
Action.
On July 28, 1969, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a
civil case for damages against Domingo Pontino y
Tacorda and Cordova Ng Sun Kwan. Finding that
the plaintiffs instituted the action on the
assumption that defendant Pontinos negligence in
the accident of May 10, 1969 constituted aquasidelict, the trial court stated that plaintiffs had
already elected to treat the accident as a crime by
reserving in the criminal case their right to file a
separate civil action. That being so, the trial court
decided to order the dismissal of the complaint
against defendant Cordova Ng Sun Kwan and to
suspend the hearing of the case against Domingo
Pontino until after the criminal case for Homicide
Through Reckless Imprudence is finally terminated.
Issue: Whether or not the present action is based
on quasi-delict under the Civil Code and therefore
could proceed independently of the criminal case
for homicide thru reckless imprudence.
Ruling: In cases of negligence, the injured party or
his heirs has the choice between an action to
enforce the civil liability arising from crime under
Article100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action
for quasi-delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil
Code. If a party chooses the latter, he may hold the
employer solidarily liable for the negligent act of his
employee, subject to the employers defense of
exercise of the diligence of a good father of the

family. In the case at bar, the action filed by

appellant was an action for damages based on
quasi-delict. The fact that appellants reserved their
right in the criminal case to file an independent civil
action did not preclude them from choosing to file a
civil action for quasidelict. The appellant precisely
made a reservation to file an independent civil
action. In fact, even without such a reservation, the
Court allowed the injured party in the criminal case
which resulted in the acquittal of the accused to
recover damages based on quasi-delict. It does not
follow that a person who is not criminally liable is
also free from civil liability. While the guilt of the
accused in a criminal prosecution must be
established beyond reasonable doubt, only a
preponderance of evidence is required in a civil
action for damages (Article 29, Civil Code). The
judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability
of the accused only when it includes a declaration
that the facts from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist.
-----------------------------------------------------------------(**full-text)
G.R. No. L-32055 February 26, 1988
REYNALDO BERMUDEZ, SR., and, ADONITA
YABUT BERMUDEZ petitioners-appellants,
vs.
HON. JUDGE A. MELENCIO-HERRERA,
DOMINGO PONTINO y TACORDA and
CORDOVA NG SUN KWAN,respondentsappellees.
YAP, J.:
This is a direct appeal on pure questions of law
from the Order of March 10, 1970 of the Honorable
Judge (now Supreme Court Justice) Ameurfina
Melencio-Herrera of the defunct Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch XVII, dismissing
plaintiffs-appellants' complaint in Civil Case No.
77188 entitled "Reynaldo Bermudez, Sr. and
Adonita Yabut Bermudez, plaintiffs, versus
Domingo Pontino y Tacorda and Cordova Ng Sun
Kwan, defendants," and from the Order of May 7,
1970 denying plaintiffs-appellants' Motion for
Reconsideration.
The background facts of the case are as follows:

A cargo truck, driven by Domingo Pontino and

owned by Cordova Ng Sun Kwan, bumped a jeep
on which Rogelio, a six-year old son of plaintiffsappellants, was riding. The boy sustained injuries
which caused his death. As a result, Criminal Case
No.92944 for Homicide Through Reckless
Imprudence was filed against Domingo Pontino by
the Manila City Fiscal's Office. Plaintiffs-appellants
filed on July 27,1969 in the said criminal case "A
Reservation to File Separate Civil Action."
On July 28,1969, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a
civil case for damages with the Court of First
Instance of Manila docketed as Civil Case No.
77188, entitled "Reynaldo Bermudez, Sr. et al.,
Plaintiffs vs. Domingo Pontino y Tacorda and
Cordova Ng Sun Kwan, Defendants." Finding that
the plaintiffs instituted the action "on the
assumption that defendant Pontino's negligence in
the accident of May 10, 1969 constituted a quasidelict," the trial court stated that plaintiffs had
already elected to treat the accident as a "crime" by
reserving in the criminal case their right to file a
separate civil action. That being so, the trial court
decided to order the dismissal of the complaint
against defendant Cordova Ng Sun Kwan and to
suspend the hearing of the case against Domingo
Pontino until after the criminal case for Homicide
Through Reckless Imprudence is finally terminated.
From said order, plaintiffs filed the present appeal,
stating as their main reasons the following:
I. The main issue brought before this Honorable
Court is whether the present action is based on
quasi-delict under the Civil Code and therefore
could proceed independently of the criminal case
for homicide thru reckless imprudence.
II. The second question of law is whether the lower
court could properly suspend the hearing of the civil
action against Domingo Pontino and dismiss the
civil case against his employer Cordova Ng Sun
Kwan by reason of the fact that a criminal case for
homicide thru reckless imprudence is pending in
the lower court against Domingo Pontino
III. The last question of law is whether the
suspension of the civil action against Domingo
Pontino and the dismissal of the civil case against
his employer Cordova Ng Sun Kwan by reason of
the pending criminal case against Domingo Pontino

for homicide thru reckless imprudence in the lower

court could be validly done considering that the civil
case against said defendants-appellees also
sought to recover actual damages to the jeep of
plaintiffs-appellants."
We find the appeal meritorious.
The heart of the issue involved in the present case
is whether the civil action filed by the plaintiffsappellants is founded on crime or on quasi-delict.
The trial court treated the case as an action based
on a crime in view of the reservation made by the
offended party in the criminal case (Criminal Case
No. 92944), also pending before the court, to file a
separate civil action. Said the trial court:
It would appear that plaintiffs instituted this action
on the assumption that defendant Pontino's
negligence in the accident of May 10, l969
constituted a quasi-delict. The Court cannot accept
the validity of that assumption. In Criminal Case
No. 92944 of this Court, plaintiffs had already
appeared as complainants. While that case was
pending, the offended parties reserved the right to
institute a separate civil action. If, in a criminal
case, the right to file a separate civil action for
damages is reserved, such civil action is to be
based on crime and not on tort. That was the ruling
in Joaquin vs. Aniceto, L-18719, Oct. 31, 1964."
We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by
the trial court is inapplicable to the instant case. In
Joaquin vs. Aniceto, the Court held:
The issue in this case is: May an employee's
primary civil liability for crime and his employer's
subsidiary liability therefor be proved in a separate
civil action even while the criminal case against the
employee is still pending?
To begin with, obligations arise from law, contract,
quasi-contract, crime and quasi-delict. According to
appellant, her action is one to enforce the civil
liability arising from crime. With respect to
obligations arising from crimes, Article 1161 of the
New Civil Code provides:
Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall
be governed by the penal laws, subject to the
provisions of article 21 77, and of the pertinent

provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary, Title, on

Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this book,
regulating damages.
xxx xxx xxx
It is now settled that for an employer to be
subsidiarily liable, the following requisites must be
present: (1) that an employee has committed a
crime in the discharge of his duties; (2) that said
employee is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil
liability; (3) that the employer is engaged in some
kind of industry. (1 Padilla, Criminal Law, Revised
Penal Code 794 [1964])
Without the conviction of the employee, the
employer cannot be subsidiarily liable.
In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs
has the choice between an action to enforce the
civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasidelict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a
party chooses the latter, he may hold the employer
solidarity liable for the negligent act of his
employee, subject to the employer's defense of
exercise of the diligence of a good father of the
family.
In the case at bar, the action filed b appellant was
an action for damages based on quasi-delict. 1 The
fact that appellants reserved their right in the
criminal case to file an independent civil action did
not preclude them from choosing to file a civil
action for quasi-delict.
The appellants invoke the provisions of Sections 1
and 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which
provide:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil action.
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended party expressly
waives the civil action or reserves his right to
institute it separately.
Section 2. Independent civil action.-In the cases
provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent
civil action entirely separate and distinct from the

criminal action, may be brought by the injured party

during the pendency of the criminal case,provided
the right is reserved as required in the preceding
section. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.
Article 2177 of the Civil Code, cited in Section 2, of
Rule 111, provides that
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence
under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
The appellant precisely made a reservation to file
an independent civil action in accordance with the
provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111, Rules of Court.
In fact, even without such a reservation, we have
allowed the injured party in the criminal 1 case
which resulted in the acquittal of the accused to
recover damages based on quasi-delict. In People
vs. Ligon, G.R. No. 74041, we held:
However, it does not follow that a person who is not
criminally liable is also free from civil liability. While
the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution
must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only
a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil
action for damages (Article 29, Civil Code). The
judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability
of the accused only when it includes a declaration
that the facts from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist (Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 129
SCRA 559).
WHEREFORE, we grant the petition and annul and
set aside the appealed orders of the trial court,
dated March 10, 1970 and May 7, 1970, and
remand the case for further proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., took no part.
----------------------------------------------------------------2) Reyes v. Sempio-Dy

G.R. No. L-71914 January 29, 1986

ZENAIDA CRUZ REYES, petitioner,
vs.HON. JUDGE ALICIA SEMPIODIY, 'Vacation' Judge of RTC,
BRANCH 170, Malabon, Metro
Manila,
and
SPS.
CRISTINA
MALICSI and DANILO MALICSI,
respondents
FACTS:

In Criminal Case No. 23633 of the Metropolitan

Trial Court of Navotas, Metro Manila, Cristina
Malicsi was charged with the crime of intriguing
against honor. The aggrieved party therein was
Zenaida Cruz Reyes, the herein petitioner. In said
case Zenaida Cruz Reyes was represented by a
private prosecutor, Atty. Barayang. The accused
pleaded guilty to the information and was
sentenced by the Court to a fine of P50.00.
Because of her plea of guilty, the aggrieved party
was unable to present evidence to prove damages
against the accused. Neither was she able to make
a reservation of her right to file a separate civil
action for damages. Instead, she filed a new action
against Cristina Malicsi and her husband with the
Regional Trial Court for damages arising from the
defamatory words uttered against her by Cristina
Malicsi which was the subject of the information
filed against the latter for intriguing against honor.
Said case is Civil Case No. 357-MN.
At the pre-trial plaintiff admitted that she was
represented by a private prosecutor in the criminal
case against defendant Cristina Malicsi and in said

case she did not reserve the right to file a separate

action for damages. She further admitted that the
appearance of said private prosecutor was for the
purpose of proving damages against the accused.
After said admission made by plaintiff, the parties
agreed to have the Court rule on the question of
whether or not plaintiff by her being represented by
a private prosecutor in the criminal case and her
failing to make a reservation in said case to file a
separate action was barred from filing a separate
civil action for damages against the accused
Cristina Malicsi. On said issue, the Court a quo
ruled in favor of the defendants, relying principally
upon Roa vs. dela Cruz, 107 Phil. 8, and dismissed
the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the rule laid down in the
Roa case should govern this one

down in Roa vs. De la Cruz, supra, does not govern

this case. The ends of justice will be better served if
plaintiffs are given their day in court. (pp. 457-458)
Upon authority, therefore, of Meneses vs. Luat We
find and so hold that the mere appearance of a
private prosecutor in the criminal case against the
herein private respondents did not necessarily
constitute such intervention on the part of the
aggrieved party as could only import an intention on
her part to press her claim for damages in said
criminal case and a waiver of her right to file a
separate civil action for damages. Because the
accused had pleaded guilty upon arraignment and
was immediately sentenced, there was no chance
for the aggrieved party to present evidence in
support of her claim for damages and to enter a
reservation in the record to file a separate civil
action.
------------------------------------------------------------------

HELD:
NO. In the instant case the criminal action against
defendant Luat did not proceed to trial, as he
pleaded guilty upon arraignment. The mere
appearance of private counsel in representation of
the offended party did not constitute such active
intervention as could only import an intention to
press a claim for damages in the same action. It is
as reasonable to indulge the possibility that the
private prosecutors appeared precisely to be able
to make a seasonable reservation of the right to file
a separate civil action which, even if unnecessary
at the time would nevertheless have been the
prudent and practical thing to do for the purpose of
better protecting the interest of their clients. But as
matters turned out, the accused pleaded guilty
upon arraignment and was immediately sentenced.
Thereafter there was no chance to enter such a
reservation in the record.
We do not believe that plaintiffs' substantive right to
claim damages should necessarily be foreclosed by
the fact at best equivocal as to its purpose that
private prosecutors entered their appearance at the
very inception of the proceeding, which was then
cut short at that stage. It cannot be said with any
reasonable certainty that plaintiffs had thereby
committed themselves to the submission of their
action for damages in that action. The rule laid

3) Castillo v. CA
(**J.C.Sangco)
In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, this
Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a
separate legal institution under the Civil Code with
a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is
entirely apart and independent from a delict or
crime a distinction exists between the civil
liability arising from a crime and the responsibility
for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The
same negligence causing damages may produce
civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal
Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa
extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore,
the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is
entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of
course, in the event of an acquittal where the court
has declared that the fact from which the civil
action arose did not exist, in which case the
extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it
the extinction of the civil liability.
Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari
where petitioners seek for the renewal of the Court

of Appeals decision affirming the dismissal of the

Court of First Instance of the complaint for
damages filed by petitioners against the
respondents Juanito Rosario and Cresencia
Rosario.
On May 2, 1965, petitioner Bernabe Castillo (in his
own behalf, and in behalf of Serapion Castillo who
has since then become deceased, and Eulogio
Castillo, his minor child) and Generosa Galang
Castillo figured in a vehicular accident with private
respondents Juanito Rosario and Cresencia
Rosario at Bagac, Villasis, Pangasinan causing
injuries to their persons and damages to their
respective
vehicles.

Ruling: Yes. The Court of Appeals' findings that the

collision was not due to the negligence of Juanito
Rosario but Bernabe Castillo's own act of driving
was actually the proximate cause of the collision.
With such findings and citing the cases Corpus vs
Paje, 28 SCRA 1062, 1064, 1067; Faraon vs Priela,
24 SCRA 582, 583; De Soriano vs Albornoz, 98
Phil. 785, 787788; Tan vs Standard Vacuum Oil
Co., 91 Phil. 672, 675, the Court of Appeals
exonerated Rosario from the civil liability on the
ground that the alleged negligence did not exist.

The parties have their own version of what actually

happened on that fateful day. Each party is pointing
to the negligence by the other as the proximate
cause
of
the
accident.
While the case was pending in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, the Provincial Fiscal of
Pangasinan file an information dated September
29. 1965 against Juanito Rosario for double
physical injuries, double less serious physical
injuries, and damage to property thru reckless
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of
Urdaneta. Rosario was prosecuted and convicted in
the criminal case. Castillo then appealed to the
Court of Appeals which rendered a decision
acquitting him from the crime charged on the
ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt. On the other hand, the Court of
First Instance of Manila rendered a decision on the
basis of the testimonies and evidence submitted by
the petitioners as well as the records of the case,
dismissing the complain of the petitioners against
private respondents as well as the counterclaim of
private respondents against the petitioners. On
January 24, 1973, petitioners appealed to the Court
of Appeals which then affirmed the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Manila as it found no
negligence committed by Juanito Rosario to
warrant an award of damages to the petitioners.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.

G.R. No. 48541 August 21, 1989

Issue: Whether or not the judgement of acquittal

extinguishes civil liability based on the same
incident.

Petitioners and private respondents figured in a

vehicular accident on May 2, 1965 at Bagac,
Villasis, Pangasinan, which caused injuries to their
persons and damage to their respective vehicles.

-----------------------------------------------------------------(**full-text)

BERNABE CASTILLO (In his own behalf, and in

behalf of SERAPION CASTILLO, who has since
then become deceased, and EULOGIO
CASTILLO, his minor child) and GENEROSA
GALANG
CASTILLO,petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
JUANITO
ROSARIO
and
CRESENCIA
ROSARIO, respondents-appellees.
Lino R. Eugenio for petitioners.
Eduardo G. Rosario for private respondents.

FERNAN, C.J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners
seek the reversal of the February 13, 1978 decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 52567-R,
entitled "Bernabe Castillo, et al. v. Juanita Rosario,
et al," affirming the dismissal by the Court of First
Instance of Manila of the complaint for damages
filed by petitioners against private respondents.
Said dismissal was decreed on the basis of the
evidence before the trial court as well as the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
07684-CR, entitled "People v. Juanito Rosario."

The parties have conflicting versions as to what

actually transpired on that fateful day; each party
pointing to the negligence of the other as the
proximate cause of the accident. Thus, as expected
in cases like this, the main issue is: Who was at
fault? According to the petitioners, the accident
happened as follows: 1

windshield, was nearly beheaded, while the other

two passengers suffered multiple slight and less
serious injuries.

On May 2, 1985, at about 2:00 o'clock in the

afternoon, petitioner Bernabe Castillo was driving
his jeep with Plate No. J-4649 '64 Manila on the
right lane of the McArthur Highway with Generosa
Castillo, his wife, father Serapion Castillo, seated in
front and Eulogio Castillo, then a minor child, as
passengers, bound and northward for Binmaley,
Pangasinan at the rate of 25 kilometers per hour.
Just past San Nicolas bridge, Villasis, he noticed,
from a distance of 120 meters more or less, a
speeding oncoming car with Plate No. L-27045 '64
Cavite, along the same lane (facing north) he was
driving, overtaking a cargo truck ahead of it. He
switched on his headlights to signal the car to
return to its own right lane as the way was not clear
for it to overtake the truck.

Sometime in the early afternoon of May 2, 1965,

the private respondents, together with their small
daughter, were on their way from San Carlos City
(Pangasinan) to Olongapo City where they resided
at the time and where Juanito Rosario, a member
of the US Navy, had been temporarily stationed.
They rode in the family car. (TSN, C. Rosario, p.
35; J. Rosario, pp. 2, 12 Annex "D", "Request for
Admission")

The car turned out to be driven by the private

respondent, Juanito Rosario, with his wife,
Cresencia Rosario. The signal was disregarded, as
the car proceeded on its direction southward on the
right lane (facing north).lwph1.t In order to
evade the impending collision, petitioner Bernabe
Castillo swerved his jeep to the right towards the
shoulder and applied on the brakes, and leaving his
feet on it, even, immediately after the impact. The
car rested on the shoulder of the right lane. The
jeep's rear left wheel was on the road, leaving short
tiremarks behind it; while the car left long tiremarks, specially its left rear wheel. The jeep
suffered a shattered windshield, pushed-in radiator.
The left mid-portion of its bumper badly dented.
The car had a flat tire on its right front wheel; its
right fender badly dented as the headlamp on top of
it. The bumber stooped downward, because it went
thru under the bumper of the jeep.
The driver of the jeep, including his passengers
suffered physical injuries. Bernabe Castillo, with the
patella of his right knee, fractured, suffered serious
physical injuries, in other parts of his body.
Serapion Castillo whose head crushed through the

Private respondents, on the other hand, have their

own version of the accident and thus asseverate as
follows: 2

At or about 2:30 p.m. of the same date, as Juanito

Rosario who was driving the car, and his two
passengers, were along MacArthur Highway in
Barrio Bacag, Villasis, Pangasinan, going towards
the south, they saw ahead of them a big heavily
loaded cargo truck. (TSN, B. Castillo, p. 532, Annex
"B", "Request for Admission") The truck was
moving very slowly because of its heavy load so
that Juanito Rosario decided to overtake it. But
before doing so, he first saw to it that the road was
clear and as additional precautionary measure, he
blew his horn several times at the time he was
overtaking the truck. (TSN, Juanito Rosario, pp. 4,
11; C. Rosario, pp. 31-41, Annex "B", "Request for
Admission")
Then as the car was about to overtake the slow
moving cargo truck, the car's front left tire suddenly
burst due to pressure causing the car to swerve to
the left and naturally making steering and control
difficult. Because of the tendency of the car to veer
towards the left due to the blown out tire, the driver
steered the car towards the direction where he
could find a safe place to park and fix the tire. He
finally brought the car to a halt at the left shoulder
of the road (facing south). (TSN, C. Rosario, p. 31;
J. Rosario, pp. 4, 17, Annex "D", "Request for
Admission")
But barely had the said defendant parked his car on
the left shoulder of the road and just as he was
about to get off to fix the flat tire, the car was
suddenly bumped by the jeep driven by Bernabe

Castillo which came from the opposite direction.

(TSN, C. Rosario, p. 32; J. Rosario, p. 6, "Request
for Admission") Both vehicles were damaged, the
car suffering the heavier damage. (Please see
Annex "C", "Request for Admission") Passengers of
the jeep sustained injuries while those of the car
were badly shaken.
On June 30, 1965, a civil case for the recovery of
damages for the injuries sustained by petitioners
and for the damage to their vehicle as a result of
the collision, was instituted by the petitioners in the
Court of First Instance of Manila. While this case
was pending, the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan
filed an information dated September 29, 1965
against Juanito Rosario, private respondent herein,
for double physical injuries; double less serious
physical injuries; and damage to property thru
reckless imprudence, in the Court of First Instance
of Urdaneta. Respondent Juanito Rosario was
prosecuted and convicted by the trial court in the
criminal case. He appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which rendered a decision 3 acquitting him from the
crime charged on the ground that his guilt has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
In the meantime, private respondents thru counsel,
filed a "Request for Admission" 4 on April 3, 1972 in
the civil case, requesting petitioners to admit the
truthfulness of the facts set forth therein as well as
the correctness and genuineness of the documents
attached thereto. On May 5,1972, petitioners filled
a "Manifestation", 5 admitting the allegations in the
"Request for Admission" with some qualifications.
Later, both parties submitted their respective
memoranda.
On the basis of the testimonies and evidence
submitted by the petitioners, as well as the records
of the criminal case attached in the "Request for
Admission" of the private respondents, the Court of
First Instance of Manila rendered a decision 6 on
December 28, 1972, dismissing the complaint of
the petitioners against private respondents as well
as the counterclaim of private respondents against
the petitioners. On January 24, 1973, petitioners
appealed to the Court of Appeals. On February 13,
1978, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision 7 of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

Hence,
the
present
petition
for
review
8
on certiorari. The petitioners-appellants raise in
issue before Us the following questions, to wit:
1) Is the decision of the Court of Appeals, where its
dispositive part, or "fallo", states that the guilt of the
(appellant) accused was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt final and conclusive, on an action
for damages based on quasi-delict?;
2) Are the testimonies given in a criminal case,
without strict compliance with Section 41 Rule 130
and without opportunity to cross examine the
witnesses who made these testimonies, admissible
evidence in a subsequent case and can be the
basis of a valid decision?;
3) Is an action for damages based on quasi-delict
barred by a decision of the appellate court
acquitting the accused, the body of which lays the
blame on the plaintiff but in its dispositive part,
declares the guilt of the accused not proved beyond
reasonable doubt ? 9
The main thrust of this petition for review which
stems from a cause of action based on quasi-delict
or culpa aquiliana (being a recovery for damages
arising from the vehicular accident), is that
petitioners were deprived of due process because
their civil action was decided on the basis of private
respondent Juanita Rosario's acquittal in the
criminal case for reckless imprudence.
There is no dispute that the subject action for
damages, being civil in nature, is separate and
distinct from the criminal aspect, necessitating only
a preponderance of evidence. According to a
number of cases, 10 a quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the
Civil Code, with a substantively all its own, and
individuality that is entirely apart and independent
from a delict or crime. A distinction exists between
the civil liability arising from a crime and the
responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extracontractual. The same negligence causing
damages may produce civil liability arising from a
crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for
quasidelictos or culpa extra-contractual under the
Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in
the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil
case. 11

In the case of Azucena v. Potenciano, L-14028,

June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 468, 470-471, this Court
held:
... in the criminal case for reckless imprudence
resulting in serious physical injuries ..., the
judgment of acquittal does not operate to extinguish
the civil liability of the defendant based on the same
incident. The civil action is entirely independent of
the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177
of the Civil Code. There can be no logical
conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil
action contemplated in the said articles to the result
of the criminal prosecution whether it be
conviction or acquittal would render meaningless
the independent character of the civil action and the
clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter.
But this rule is not without exception. Thus, Section
2 (c) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides:
Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration from a final judgment
that the fact from which the civil action might arise
did not exist.
In a previous case, CA-G.R. No. 07684-CR, People
v. Rosario, the Court of Appeals after a painstaking
analysis of. (a) the testimonial evidence; (b) the
relative positions of the two vehicles as depicted in
the sketches; (c) the distance of each of the two
vehicles from the cemented edge of the road; (d)
the point of impact; (e) the visible tire marks, and (f)
the extent of the damage caused upon each of the
two vehicles, ruled that it was the driver of the jeep
and not the accused driver of the car who was
negligent and accordingly acquitted the latter. 12
Negligence, being the source and foundation of
actions of quasi-delict, is the basis for the recovery
of damages. In the case at bar, the Court of
Appeals found that no negligence was committed
by Juanito Rosario to warrant an award of damages
to the petitioners.
Respondent Appellate Court states:

In acquitting defendant-appellee Juanito Rosario in

CA-G.R. No. 07684-CR on October 28, 1968, this
Court held that the collision was not due to the
negligence of Juanito Rosario but it was Castillo's
own act of driving the jeep to the shoulder [of the
road] where the car was that was actually the
proximate cause of the collision.' (Ibid., p. 183) With
this finding, this Court actually exonerated appellee
Juanito Rosario from civil liability. Since plaintiffsappellants' civil action is predicated upon Juanito
Rosario's alleged negligence which does not exist,
it follows that his acquittal in the criminal action,
which is already final, carried with it the extinction
of civil responsibility arising therefrom. (Corpus vs.
Paje, 28 SCRA 1062, 1064, 1067; Faraon vs.
Priela, 24 SCRA 582, 583; De Soriano vs.
Albornoz, 98 Phil. 785, 787788; Tan vs. Standard
Vacuum Oil Co., 91 Phil. 672, 675). 13
It was the Court of Appeals findings that the
collision was not due to the negligence of Juanita
Rosario but rather it was Castillo's own act of
driving the jeep to the shoulder of the road where
the car was, which was actually the proximate
cause of the collision. With this findings, the Court
of Appeals exonerated Juanito Rosario from civil
liability on the ground that the alleged negligence
did not exist.
As earlier stated, the questioned decision of the
Court of Appeals was an affirmation of the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Manila. During the
trial of the case before the Court of First Instance,
the private respondents were not present, in view of
the fact that they were out of the country at that
time. Their counsel introduced as part of their
evidence, the records in the criminal case, in
accordance with Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court.14 These records were attached to their
"Request for Admission" and were substantially
admitted by petitioners. The said records were
mostly composed of transcripts of the hearing in the
criminal case. Petitioners raised, as one of their
objections, the propriety and correctness of
admitting and adopting these transcripts as part of
the record in the civil case. According to them, this
is a violation of Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, on the ground that petitioners were not given
the opportunity to cross-examine. We have to
disagree. A careful reading of the transcripts would

reveal that then counsel for petitioners, Atty.

Nicodemo Ferrer, actively participated during the
proceedings of the criminal case. He raised various
objections, 15 in the course of the trial. Petitioners,
therefore, thru counsel had the opportunity to
cross-examine the witnesses.
Thus, the admission of the said testimonies cannot
be set aside.
Finally, in a long line of decisions, this Court has
held time and again that the findings of facts by the
Court of Appeals are conclusive and not reviewable
by the Supreme Court. 16
In Macadangdang v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA
73 and Tolentino v. De Jesus, 56 SCRA 167, it was
held that:
Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
conclusive on the parties and on the Supreme
Court, unless (1) the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and
conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly
mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4)
the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts;
(5) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of
the case and its findings are contrary to the
admission of both appellant and appellee; (6) the
findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (7) said findings
of facts are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (8) the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; and (9) when the finding of facts of the
Court of Appeals is premised on the absence of
evidence and is contradicted by evidence on
record.
Finding that the questioned decision does not fall
under any of the exceptions cited above, we find no
cogent reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions of the Court of Appeals.

4) Azucena v. Potenciano
(**J. Cesar Sangco)
In Azucena vs. Potenciano, the Court declared that
in quasi-delicts, (t)he civil action is entirely
independent of the criminal case according to
Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can
be no logical conclusion than this, for to
subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said
articles to the result of the criminal prosecution
whether it be conviction or acquittal would
render meaningless the independent character of
the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31,
that his action may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of
the latter.
If the civil action for damages based on quasi-delict
is entirely independent of the criminal case and
may proceed regardless of the result of the latter,
what justification is there for the provision in Sec 1,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
mandating the implied institution of such civil action
with the criminal case and requiring that the right to
institute it separately be reserved in violation of that
provision of law? The Court may thus ignore
substantive provisions of law, but such violation
does not become lawful because it did so for that
would be vesting in itself legistlative power to
repeal or modify existing laws.
-----------------------------------------------------------------(**full-text)
G.R. No. L-14028

June 30, 1962

NEMESIO
AZUCENA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
SEVERINO
POTENCIANO
AND
LAGUNA
TRANSPORTATION CO., defendants-appellees.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition

is hereby denied. No pronouncement as to costs.

Jose A. Lozada and Alvero, Brion and Associates

for
plaintiff-appellant.
Yatco and Yatco and A. R. Narvasa for defendantsappellees.

SO ORDERED.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ.,

concur.

Before us on appeal is the order of the Court of

First Instance of Laguna, San Pablo branch, dated

January 10, 1950, dismissing the complaint on

motion of defendants-appellees. The action is for
recovery of damages allegedly sustained, as a
result of a collision between plaintiff-appellant's
scooter and a bus of appellee Laguna
Transportation Company, then driven by its coappellee Severino Potenciano. Negligence is
imputed to the driver, and to the company itself with
respect to the choice and supervision of its
employees. The allegations send to make out a
case of quasi-delict, or culpa aquiliana, under
Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
The complaint was filed September 3, 1957.
Defendants answered September 9, with a
counterclaim also for damages. On December 10
they filed a supplemental pleading with a prayer for
dismissal of the complaint on the ground that in the
criminal action against Severino Potenciano for
serious physical injuries with damage to property
through reckless imprudence, involving the same
accident which gave rise to the civil action, the
accused was acquitted in the decision rendered the
previous November 6 by the Court of First Instance
of Laguna, Bian branch. The San Pablo court then
issued the order now under review, holding that
since the acquittal of the accused was based on a
finding that he did not act recklessly or negligently
the judgment in the criminal case is a bar to the civil
action. Reliance is placed squarely on Rule 107,
which provides, inter alia, that when a criminal
action is instituted the civil action for recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged is
impliedly instituted with it, and that the extinction of
the penal action does not carry with it extinction of
the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact front
which the civil might arise did not exist.
The issue here presented is not a novel one in this
jurisdiction. Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. vs. Santiago
D. Gamboa, G.R. No. L-10296, May 21,
1957; Leoncio Dyogi, et al. vs. Nicasio Yatco, et al.,
G.R. No. L-9623, Jan. 22, 1957;Maria C. Roa vs.
Segunda de la Cruz, G.R. No. L-13134, Feb. 13,
1960; Standard-Vacuum Oil Co. vs. Anita Tan, et
al., G.R. No. L-13048, Feb. 27, 1960; Quirino
Pacheco vs. Agripina Tumanpay, et al., G.R. No. L14500, May 25, 1960; Hermenegildo Calo, et al. vs.
Luis Peggy, G.R. No. L-10756, March 29, 1958. It

involves a determination of which law should

govern: Rule 107, which states a general rule, or
the more specific provisions of Articles 31, 33 and
2177 of the Civil Code, which read as follows:
ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an
obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter.
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may
be brought by the injured party. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution,
and
shall
require
only
a
preponderance of evidence.1wph1.t
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence
under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff can not
recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
This Court in Dyogi vs. Yatco, supra, stated that
Article 33 constitutes a partial amendment of Rule
107. In Calo vs. Peggy, supra, substantially the
same situation as the one now before us was
passed upon by this Court. A minor son of the
defendant there, while driving a jeep belonging to
the father, bumped and injured plaintiff Romeo
Calo. A criminal action for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence was instituted. While
it was pending a civil action to recover damages on
the theory of quasi-delict was filed against the
father of the accused. After a judgment of acquittal
was rendered, where it was intimated that the
victim of the accident was the one at fault, the
defendant in the civil action moved for its dismissal,
alleging that since in the criminal case there was no
reservation of the right to file a separate civil action
for damages the judgment of acquittal operated to
extinguish the civil liability of the defendant based
on the same incident. The trial Court granted the
motion to dismiss, but on appeal this Court
reversed the ruling on the ground that the civil
action was entirely independent of the criminal case
according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code.
There can indeed be no other logical conclusion

than this, for to subordinate the civil action

contemplated in the said articles to the result of the
criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or
acquittal would render meaningless the
independent character of the civil action and the
clear injunction in Article 31 that this action "may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter." To be
sure, an exception to this principle of separation
and independence of the two classes of actions
from each other has been recognized, namely,
when the offended party not only fails to reserve
the right to file a separate civil action but intervenes
actually in the criminal suit by appearing through a
private prosecutor for the purpose of recovering
indemnity for damages therein, in which case a
judgment of acquittal bars a subsequent civil
action. Maria Roa vs. Segunda de la Cruz, et al.,
supra. The case at bar, however, does not fall
under the exception, for the plaintiff here did not so
intervene in the criminal action against defendant
Potenciano.
Appellees contend that the civil action referred to in
Article 33 of the Civil Code is that which arises ex
delicto, or from the commission of the offense
involving defamation, fraud or physical injuries, and
consequently, pursuant to Rule 107, section 1 (a),
the right to file it must be expressly reserved in the
criminal action if it is to prosper at all. The
contention is erroneous. Bachrach Motor Co., Inc.
vs. Gamboa. It presupposes that there must first be
a conviction for the crime, for without conviction
there can be no offense to speak of from which civil
liability could arise. Article 33 contemplates a civil
action for the recovery of damages that is entirely
unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of the case.
This is the reason why only a preponderance of
evidence and not proof beyond reasonable doubt is
deemed sufficient.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is set
aside and the case is remanded to the Court of
origin for further proceedings, with costs against
defendants-appellees.
------------------------------------------------------------------

5) People v. Ligon

(**Beda Alabang digests)

People vs. Ligon
152 SCRA 39 (July 29, 1987)
Facts: Accused Fernando Gabat was riding a 1978
Volkswagen Kombi owned by his father and driven
by the other accused, Rogelio Ligon. While waiting
for the traffic light to change, Fernando called a
cigarette vendor, Jose Rosales to buy some
cigarettes. While the transaction was occurring, the
traffic light changed to green, and the car suddenly
moved forward. While the car was moving, Rosales
was clinging to the window but lost his grip and fell
down on the pavement. The bystanders rushed
Rosales to PGH where he was treated for multiple
physical injuries until his death. Since Ligon did not
stop the car, Castillo, a taxi-driver chased him and
sought the assistance of two police officers in an
owner-type jeepney. At an intersection, Castillo was
able to overtake the car and blocked it, while the
jeep pulled up right behind. The police officers drew
their guns and told them to alight from the car. They
were brought to the police station. Ligon was then
charged with Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence.
A charge of robbery with homicide was likewise
charged to Ligon and Gabat, since there was an
allegation that Gabat forcibly took the cigarette box
of the victim. Ligon however was never
apprehended after the police released him, so only
Gabat was convicted by the RTC. An appeal was
then brought to the SC, which ruled that the guilt of
the accused was not established beyond
reasonable doubt.
Issue: Whether or not accused may be held civilly
liable despite the finding of the Court of Appeals
that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
Held: Yes. When a person was acquitted of a
crime, it does not follow that he is free from civil
liability, since only preponderance of evidence is
required in a civil action for damages. The
judgment of acquittal can extinguish the civil
liability of the accused only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist. In the instant
case, a preponderance of evidence exists sufficient

to establish the facts from which the civil liability of

Gabat arises. Gabat, by his act and omission with
fault and negligence caused damage to Rosales
and should answer civilly for the damage done.
Gabats willful act of calling the victim to the middle
of a busy street to buy two sticks of cigarettes set
the chain of events which led to the death of the
victim. Through fault and negligence, Gabat (1)
failed to prevent the driver from moving forward
while the purchase was completed; (2) failed to
help the victim while the latter clung precariously to
the moving vehicle, and (3) did not enforce his
order to the driver to stop. Finally, Gabat
acquiesced in the drivers act of speeding away,
instead of stopping and picking up the injured
victim.
-----------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLE vs. LIGON
152 SCRA 419
July 29, 1987
Facts:
Accused-appellant, Fernando Gabat was convicted
of the crime of Robbery with homicide and was
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Gabat allegedly
robbed Jose Rosales Ortiz, a 17 year old working
student, who was a cigarette vendor. According to
Prudencio Castillo, a taxi driver, who allegedly saw
the incident that transpired on the night Ortiz died.
According to Castillo, he was at a distance of about
3 meters travelling on the same lane and was
behind the Kombi driven by Rogelio Ligon together
with Gabat.
Castillo, in his testimony, said that Gabat grabbed
the box of cigarettes from Rosales. That while
waiting for the traffic light to change from red to
green, Castillo idly watched the Volkswagon Kombi
and saw Gabat signal to Ortiz. While Ortiz was
handling the cigarettes to Gabat, the traffic light
changed to green and as the Kombi moved
forward, Gabat grabbed the box from Ortiz. Ortiz
ran beside the Jombi and was able to hold on to the
windowsill with his right hand. Howeverm as the
Kombi continued to speed towards the C.M. Rector
underpass, Gabat forcibly remove the hand of

Rosales from the said windowsill and as a result fell

face down on the ground.
On the other hand, according to Gabat, after Ortiz
handed the two sticks cigarettes Gabat in turn paid
him a 5 peso bill. In order to change the said bill,
Ortiz placed his box between the arm of Gabat and
the window frame. When the traffic light changed to
green, Ligon moved the vehicle forward. That in
spite of Gabats order to stop the vehicle, Ligon
said that it could not be done due the the moving
vehicular traffic. When Ortiz fell down, Gabat
shouted at Ligon but the latter replied that they
should go on to Las Pinas and report the incident to
the parents of Gabat and that later they would
come back to the scene of the incident. At this
point, the Kombi was blocked by Castillos taxi and
the jeep driven by the policeman.
The trial court gave full credence to Castillos
testimony and dismissed Gabats testimony on the
ground that it is of common knowledge that
cigarette vendors do not let go of their cigarette.
Gabat was convicted by the trial court; Hence, this
appeal.
Issue:
Whether a person who is not criminally liable is also
free from civil liability.
Held:
According to the Court of Appeals, although Castillo
is a disinterested witness, his testimony even if not
tainted with bias is not entirely free from doubt
because his observation of the event could have
been faulty. Castillos taxi was driving a car lower in
height compared to the Kombi. The windshield of
the
Kombi
(1978
model)
is
occupying
approximately 1/3 of the rear end of the vehicle
making it visually difficult for Castillo to observe
what clearly transpired. Also, Castillos statement
given to the police on the evening of the incident
did not mention that he saw Gabat forcibly prying
off the hand of Rosales from the windowsill though
such appeared in the police report.
Given the circumstances, the Court is not
convinced with moral certainty that the guilt of
Gabat was established beyond reasonable doubt.

As such he is acquitted. However, such does not

necessarily exempt him from civil liability as such
only requires a preponderance of evidence and
such evidence is sufficient to establish Gabats
liability. The Court finds Gabats act and omission
with fault and negligence caused damage to Ortiz.
That he failed to prevent the driver from moving
forward while the purchase was completed; He
failed to help Ortiz while the latter clung to the
moving vehicle; e did not enforce his order to Ligon
to stop; and that he acquiesced in the drivers act of
speeding away instead of stopping and picking up
Ortiz.
His acquittal in the criminal prosecution does not
bar the heirs of Ortiz from recovering damages.

The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil

liability only when it includes a declaration that the
facts from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist.
Wherefore, Gabat is sentenced to indemnify the
heirs of Ortiz the amount of P15,000 for the latters
death, P1,733 for hospital and medical expenses,
4,100 for funeral expenses, and the alleged loss of
income amounting to P20,000.