Jurisdiction

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI) vs. BOARD OF COMMUNICATIONS and
DIEGO MORALES G.R. No. L-43653 November 29, 1977
FACTS: These are two cases involving complaints of inconvenience or injuries brought about by the failure of
the RCPI to transmit telegrams informing complainants of the deaths of close relatives which according to them
constitute breach of contractual obligation through negligence under the Civil Code.
In one case, Diego Morales claims that while he was in Manila his daughter sent him a telegram on October
15, 1974 from Santiago, Isabela, informing him of the death of his wife, Mrs. Diego T. Morales. The telegram
sent thru the petitioner RCPI however never reached him. He had to be informed personally about the death of
his wife and so to catch up with the burial of his wife, he had to take the trip by airplane to Isabela. In its
answer petitioner RCPI claims that the telegram sent by respondent was transmitted from Santiago, lsabela to
its Message Center at Cubao, Quezon City but when it was relayed from Cubao, the radio signal became
intermittent making the copy received at Sta. Cruz, Manila unreadable and unintelligible. Because of the failure
of the RCPI to transmit said telegram to him, respondent allegedly suffered inconvenience and additional
expenses and prays for damages.
Meanwhile in another case, Pacifico Innocencio claim that on July 13, 1975 Lourdes Innocencio sent a
telegram from Paniqui, Tarlac, thru the facilities of the petitioner RCPI to him at Barrio Lomot, Cavinti, Laguna
for the Purpose of informing him about the death of their father. The telegram was never received by Pacifico
Innocencio. Inspite of the non-receipt and/or non-delivery of the message sent to said address, the sender
(Lourdes Innocencio has not been notified about its nondelivery, As a consequence Pacifica Innocencio was
not able to attend the internment of their father at Moncada, Tarlac. Because of the failure of RCPI to deliver to
him said telegram he allegedly was "shocked when he learned about the death of their father when he visited
his hometown Moncada Tarlac on August 14, 1975," and thus suffered mental anguish and personal
inconveniences. Likewise, he prays for damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Board of Communications has jurisdiction to entertain and take cognizance of
complaints for injury caused by breach of contractual obligation arising from negligence covered by Article
1170 of the Civil Code and injury caused by quasi delict or tort liability under Article 2176 of
the Civil Code which according to it should be ventilated in the proper courts of justice and not in the Board of
Communications.
HELD: No. The Board of Communications, "being a creature of the legislature and not a court, can exercise
only such jurisdiction and powers as are expressly or by necessary implication,. conferred upon it by statute".
The functions of the Public Service Commission, now Board of Communications, are limited and administrative
in nature and it has only jurisdiction and power as are expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it
by statute. As successor in interest of the Public Service Commission, the Board of Communications exercises
the same powers jurisdiction and functions as that provided for in the Public Service Act for the Public Service
Commission.
One of these powers as provided under Section 129 of the Public Service Act governing the organization of the
Specialized Regulatory Board, is to issue certificate of public convenience. But this power to issue certificate of
public convenience does not carry with it the power of supervision and control over matters not related to the
issuance of certificate of public convenience or in the performance therewith in a manner suitable to promote
public interest.
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There can be no justification then for the Public Service Commission (now the Board of Communications as
successor in interest) imposing the fines in these two petitions. The law cannot be any clearer . The only power
it possessed over radio companies as noted was to fix rates It could not take to task a radio company for an
negligence or misfeasance. It was not vested with such authority. That it did then in these two petitions lacked
the impress of validity.
In the face of the provision itself, it is rather apparent that the Public Service Commission lacked the required
power to proceed against petitioner. There is nothing in Section 21 thereof which empowers it to impose a fine
that calls for a different conclusion.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL ROBERTO LASTIMOSO, ACTING CHIEF PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
(PNP), DIRECTORATE FOR PERSONNEL AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT (DPRM), INSPECTOR
GENERAL, P/CHIEF SUPT. RAMSEY OCAMPO and P/SUPT. ELMER REJANO vs. P/SENIOR INSPECTOR
JOSE J. ASAYO G.R. No. 154243
December 22, 2007
FACTS: Sometime in 1997, a certain Delia Buo (Buo) filed with the Office of the Inspector General of the
PNP an administrative complaint for abuse of authority/harassment against P/Senior Inspector Jose J. Asayo.
The latter allegedly obstructed police officers from arresting his brother Lamberto Asayo, one of the suspects in
the shooting of Buo's son.
The complaint was referred to the Inspector General for pre-charge investigation. When summoned, Asayo did
not appear but filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that it was the People's Law Enforcement Board (PLEB)
which had jurisdiction over the case.
On September 23, 1998, the Inspector General submitted a report to the PNP Chief recommending the
commencement of summary dismissal proceedings against Asayo. Upon approval of said recommendation,
the administrative complaint was referred to the PNP Legal Service for summary hearing. Asayo was asked by
the hearing officer if he wanted to cross-examine Buo and her witnesses but he declined and instead agreed
to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings.
On December 28, 1998, the hearing officer recommended that Asayo be dismissed from police service for
grave misconduct. On January 22, 1999, the PNP Chief, then Deputy Director General Roberto Lastimoso,
rendered a decision dismissing respondent from police service. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
of the PNP Chief's Decision but withdrew the same and instead filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition,
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila (RTC). The RTC granted his petition but the CA nullified such decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Asayo failed to exhaust all administrative remedies prior to the filing of case in court.
HELD: No. Asayo rightfully invoked the jurisdiction of the courts without first going through all the administrative
remedies because the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies admits of exceptions, such as when
the issue involved is a purely legal question. The only issue presented by respondent in his petition for
certiorari and prohibition before the RTC was whether or not the PNP Chief had jurisdiction to take cognizance
of the complaint filed by a private citizen against him. Said
issue being a purely legal one, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies did not apply to the case.
NOTE: However, as to the question of whether the PNP Chief had jurisdiction to act on a private citizen's
complaint against respondent, the Court finds merit in petitioners' position. The PNP Chief and regional
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directors are vested with the power to summarily dismiss erring PNP members if any of the causes for
summary dismissal enumerated in Section 42 is attendant. Thus, the power to dismiss PNP members is not
only the prerogative of PLEB but concurrently exercised by the PNP Chief and regional directors.
B. Scope of Judicial Review
REPUBLIC vs. MANILA ELECTRIC CO. G.R. No. 141314. November 15, 2002
FACTS: On December 23, 1993, MERALCO filed with the ERB an application for the revision of its rate
schedules. The application reflected an average increase of 21 centavos per kilowatthour (kwh) in its
distribution charge. The application also included a prayer for provisional approval of the increase pursuant to
Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act and Section 8 of Executive Order No. 172.
On January 28, 1994, the ERB issued an Order granting a provisional increase of P0.184 per kwh, subject to
the following condition:
In the event, however, that the Board finds, after hearing and submission by the Commission on Audit of an
audit report on the books and records of the applicant that the latter is entitled to a lesser increase in rates, all
excess amounts collected from the applicants customers as a result of this Order shall either be refunded to
them or correspondingly credited in their favor for application to electric bills covering future consumptions.
In the same Order, the ERB requested the Commission on Audit (COA) to conduct an audit and examination of
the books and other records of account of the applicant for such period of time, which in no case shall be less
than 12 consecutive months, as it may deem appropriate and to submit a copy thereof to the ERB immediately
upon completion.
On February 11, 1997, the COA submitted its Audit Report SAO No. 95-07 (the COA Report) which contained,
among others, the recommendation not to include income taxes paid by MERALCO as part of its operating
expenses for purposes of rate determination and the use of the net average investment method for the
computation of the proportionate value of the properties used by MERALCO during the test year for the
determination of the rate base.3
Subsequently, the ERB rendered its decision adopting the above recommendations and authorized MERALCO
to implement a rate adjustment in the average amount of P0.017 per kwh, effective with respect to MERALCOs
billing cycles beginning February 1994. The ERB further ordered that the provisional relief in the amount of
P0.184 per kilowatthour granted under the Boards Order dated
January 28, 1994 is hereby superseded and modified and the excess average amount of P0.167 per
kilowatthour starting with [MERALCOs] billing cycles beginning February 1994 until its billing cycles beginning
February 1998, be refunded to [MERALCOs] customers or correspondingly credited in their favor for future
consumption.
The ERB held that income tax should not be treated as operating expense as this should be borne by the
stockholders who are recipients of the income or profits realized from the operation of their business hence,
should not be passed on to the consumers. Further, in applying the net average investment method, the ERB
adopted the recommendation of COA that in computing the rate base, only the proportionate value of the
property should be included, determined in accordance with the number of months the same was actually used
in service during the test year.
ISSUE: Whether or not findings and conclusions of the ERB on the rate that can be charged by MERALCO to
the public should be respected.
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HELD: Yes. Settled jurisprudence holds that factual findings of administrative bodies on technical matters
within their area of expertise should be accorded not only respect but even finality if they are supported by
substantial evidence even if not overwhelming or preponderant.
Courts should "refrain from substituting their discretion on the weight of the evidence for the discretion of
administrative agency on questions of fact and will only reverse or modify such orders of the Public Service
Commission when it really appears that the evidence is insufficient to support their conclusions."
In the cases at bar, findings and conclusions of the ERB on the rate that can be charged by MERALCO to the
public should be respected. The function of the court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is to determine
whether under the facts and circumstances, the final order entered by the administrative agency is unlawful or
unreasonable.20 Thus, to the extent that the administrative agency has not been arbitrary or capricious in the
exercise of its power, the timehonored principle is that courts should not interfere. The principle of separation of
powers dictates that courts should hesitate to review the acts of administrative officers except in clear cases of
grave abuse of discretion.
Question Subject to Judicial Review
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST Co. vs. ASB HOLDINGS, INC. G.R. No. 166197

February 27, 2007

FACTS: Metrobank is a creditor bank of respondent corporations, collectively known as the ASB Group of
Companies, owner and developer of condominium and real estate projects. The loans were secured by real
estate mortgages. ASB Group of Companies filed with the SEC a Petition For Rehabilitation With Prayer For
Suspension Of Actions And Proceedings Against Petitioners, pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 902A, as amended. ASB Group of Companies submitted to the SEC for its approval a Rehabilitation Plan, to which
Metrobank objected, specifically as to the arrangement concerning the mode of payment by respondents ASB
Realty Corporation and ASB Development Corporation of their loan obligations.
Under the plan, ASB will dacion the bank's equity in St. Francis Square and apply the excess dacion value on
its BSA Twin Tower loan. Further, Makati Hope, Buendia cor. Malugay, 21 Annapolis (which is expected to be
released by PNB) and # 28 & 23 Eisenhower St., will be dacioned to Metrobank, the excess of which will also
be applied to Metrobank's exposure on BSA Twin Towers. In return, State Condominium will be freed up and
placed in the ASB creditors' asset pool. Further, Metrobank shall also undertake the completion of BSA Twin
Towers. The SEC Hearing Panel, finding petitioner banks objections unreasonable, approved the
Rehabilitation Plan. Metrobank then filed with the SEC En Banc a Petition for Certiorari, alleging that the SEC
Hearing Panel, in approving the Rehabilitation Plan, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin its implementation. Subsequently, the ASB Group of Companies filed their Opposition to the
petition, to which petitioner bank filed its Reply. SEC En Banc denied petitioner banks Petition for Certiorari
and affirmed the SEC Hearing Panels approval of the plan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the SEC En Banc absent any showing of arbitrariness can still be
disturbed by a judicial review.
HELD: No. The SEC En Banc found that the SEC Hearing Panel "acted within its legal authority in resolving
this case. Neither it overstepped its lawful authority nor acted whimsically in approving the Rehabilitation Plan.
Hence, it cannot be faulted of grave abuse of discretion. The Court said that it found no reason to disturb such
finding, it being a fundamental rule that factual findings of quasijudicial agencies, like the SEC, which have
acquired expertise as their jurisdiction is confined to special matters such as the subject of this case, are
generally accorded great respect and even finality, absent any showing that they arbitrarily disregarded
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evidence or misapprehended evidence to such an extent as to compel a contrary conclusion if such evidence
had been properly appreciated.
Appeal to the Office of the President
LAND CAR vs. BACHELOR EXPRESS, INC. G.R. No. 154377 : December 8, 2003
FACTS: On 21 May 1999, Land Car filed with the Regional Office of the Land Transportation Franchising and
Regulatory Board (LTFRB), Region XII, a verified application to operate a public utility bus service from Davao
City to Cagayan de Oro City via Butuan City.
Bachelor Express and Vallacar Transit, themselves grantees of certificates of public convenience, opposed
petitioners application alleging that the route applied for was sufficiently being served by them, and that
cutthroat competition would only result if petitioners application were to be favorably acted upon.
On 29 October 1999, the LTFRB rendered its decision granting petitioners application and directing the
issuance of the corresponding Certificate of Public Convenience. Bachelor and Vallacar then appealed to the
Office of the Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC), where in the DOTC
Secretary reversed the decision of the LTFRB. After denial of MR, the respondents thereupon moved for the
immediate implementation by the LTFRB of the decision of the DOTC Secretary. On 03 October 2000, the
LTFRB granted respondents motion and directed petitioner to cease and desist from operating its buses along
the contested route.
On 07 October 2000, Land Car filed a letter-appeal to the Office of the President seeking to set aside the
resolution and order of the DOTC Secretary. It then likewise filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari questioning the same resolution and order of the DOTC Secretary subject of the letter-appeal
addressed to the Office of the President. Upon advice of its new counsel, however, petitioner filed a notice of
withdrawal of its petition for certiorari pending with the appellate court. The CA dismissed the said petition.
On 20 October 2000, the Office of the President issued a memorandum directing that the execution of the
resolution and order of the DOTC Secretary, be meanwhile stayed.
On 15 January 2001, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed C.A.-G.R. SP No. 62619, assailing the Memorandum Order of the
Office of the President. Respondents argued that the Office of the President had no jurisdiction to issue the
assailed order in the absence of any law providing for an appeal from the DOTC to the Office of the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the President has the power to review the final determination of matters of
the DOTC.
HELD: Yes. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies empowers the Office of the President to
review any determination or disposition of a department head. The doctrine allows, indeed requires, an
administrative decision to first be appealed to the administrative superiors up to the highest level before it may
be elevated to a court of justice for review. Thus, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be had by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to
decide on the matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be priorly exhausted before
the courts judicial power is invoked.

The CA correctly ruled that the action of a department head bears only the implied approval of the President,
and the latter is not precluded from exercising the power to review the decision of the former pursuant to the
Presidents power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices.
The Office of the President validly acquired jurisdiction over the case upon the filing therewith of the appeal by
herein petitioner, and said jurisdiction is not lost by the subsequent recourse by the petitioner of the certiorari
proceedings before the Court of Appeals. Jurisdiction which has attached in the first instance continues until
the final resolution of the case. Incongruently, the appellate court, while recognizing to be valid the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Office of the President, ordered the dismissal of the appeal pending with the said office
based on forum shopping.
BIRAOGO VS PTC
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010
LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO
vs.
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

x -x
G.R. No. 193036
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP.
ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD

FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate
reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative
body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in
disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption
6

and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt,
much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable
cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions.
They argued that:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office
and appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O.
No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to
achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office
which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the Truth Commission with
quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the
1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution
officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it
excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the Presidents executive power and power
of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as
amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies.
7

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but
a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ,
because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or
erode the latters jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for
laudable purposes.

ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to
create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question
the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question
of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as
members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since
his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action
which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
8

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and
direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.

Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits, standing is
governed by the real-parties-in interest rule. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest. Real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in
assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to show
that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the
public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Court, however, finds reason in
Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court
in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents

The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the
President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the
President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees.
This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The
purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President
is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to
the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated.
There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no
need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the
Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission.
9

The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so
there is no impropriety in the funding.

3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative
function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable
cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the
Ombudsman. PTCs power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the
President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent
transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a
states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of
a statue or by its improper execution through the states duly constituted authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness.
The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of
the same class.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to
rights conferred and obligations imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of
truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption
10

during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and
manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of
its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal
protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the
commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a
valid classification.

The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to
investigate all past administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and
in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not
conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations[38] that due process in administrative proceedings requires
compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1) the respondents right to a hearing, which includes the
right to present ones case and submit supporting evidence, must be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider
the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to support itself; (4) there must be substantial
evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have acted on its
own consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and must not have simply accepted the views of
a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents would know the
reasons for it and the various issues involved.[39]

11