Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Facts:
Respondents, spouses Royeca executed and delivered to Toyota Shaw, Inc. a
Promissory Note which is payable in equal monthly installments with notice of
its maturity date, it also provides for a penalty for every month that an
installment remains unpaid.
Toyota, with notice to respondents, executed a Deed of Assignment 5 transferring
all its rights, title, and interest in the Chattel Mortgage to Far East Bank and
Trust Company (FEBTC), where the latter (FEBTC) sent a formal demand to
respondents, asking for the payment thereof, plus penalty, claiming that the
respondents failed to pay four (4) monthly amortizations. The complaint was
later amended to substitute BPI as plaintiff when it merged with and absorbed
FEBTC.
The respondents refused to pay on the ground that they had already paid their
obligation to FEBTC, alleged that they already delivered to the Auto Financing
Department of FEBTC eight (8) postdated checks in different amounts as
manifested in the Acknowledgment Receipt that petitioner bank received the
said checks which is attached to their answer.
Issue:
WON the Acknowledgment Receipt was sufficient proof of payment.
Held:
The Acknowledgement Receipt is only a proof that respondents delivered eight
checks in payment of the amount due. Apparently, this will not suffice to
establish actual payment. Settled is the rule that payment must be made in
legal tender. A check is not legal tender and, therefore, cannot constitute a valid
tender of payment. Since a negotiable instrument is only a substitute for money
and not money, the delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself, operate
as payment. Mere delivery of checks does not discharge the obligation under a
judgment. The obligation is not extinguished and remains suspended until the
payment by commercial document is actually realized. To establish their
defense, the respondents therefore had to present proof, not only that they
delivered the checks to the petitioner, but also that the checks were encashed.
Facts:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals, affirming the nullity of the transfer of Central Bank Certificate of
Indebtedness (CBCI) No. D891, with a face value of P500, 000.00, from the
Philippine Underwriters Finance Corporation (Philfinance) to the petitioner Trader's
Royal Bank (TRB), under a Repurchase Agreement, and a Detached Assignment.
The action was originally filed as a Petition for Mandamus in the Regional Trial Court,
to compel the Central Bank of the Philippines to register the transfer of the subject
CBCI to petitioner Traders Royal Bank (TRB). In the said petition, TRB stated partially
that:
Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation (Filriters) executed a "Detached
Assignment" . . ., whereby Filriters, as registered owner, sold, transferred, assigned
and delivered unto Philippine Underwriters Finance Corporation (Philfinance) all its
rights and title to Central Bank Certificates of Indebtedness of PESOS: FIVE
HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00).
Issue:
WON the subject CBCI D891 is a negotiable instrument
Held:
Admittedly, the subject CBCI is not a negotiable instrument in the absence of words
of negotiability within the meaning of the negotiable instruments law (Act 2031). As
held in Caltex (Philippines), Inc. v. Court of Appeals:
The accepted rule is that the negotiability or non-negotiability of an instrument is
determined from the writing, that is, from the face of the instrument itself. In the
construction of a bill or note, the intention of the parties is to control, if it can be
legally ascertained. While the writing may be read in the light of surrounding
circumstance in order to more perfectly understand the intent and meaning of the
parties, yet as they have constituted the writing to be the only outward and visible
Held:
Contrary to the respondent court, the CTDs are negotiable instruments. The
documents provide that the amounts deposited shall be repayable to the depositor.
And who, according to the document, is the depositor? It is the "bearer." The
documents do not say that the depositor is Angel de la Cruz and that the amounts
deposited are repayable specifically to him. Rather, the amounts are to be
repayable to the bearer of the documents or, for that matter, whosoever may be the
bearer at the time of presentment. If it was really the intention of respondent bank
to pay the amount to Angel de la Cruz only, it could have with facility so expressed
that fact in clear and categorical terms in the documents, instead of having the
word "BEARER" stamped on the space provided for the name of the depositor in
each CTD.
5.
Facts:
The respondent, Auditor General refused to authorize the payment of Treasury
warrant which was originally issued in favor of Placido S. Urbanes, a government
employee, in his capacity as disbursing officer of the Food Administration for
"additional cash advance for Food Production Campaign but is now in the hands of
herein petitioner Benjamin Abubakar, who argues that he is a holder in good faith
and for value of a negotiable instrument and is entitled to the rights and
privileges of a holder in due course, free from defenses.
Issue:
WON a Treasury warrant originally issued to a government employee is a negotiable
instrument
Held:
Such being the case, the Auditor General can hardly be blamed for not authorizing
its redemption out of an appropriation specifically for "treasury warrants issued ... in
favor of and held in possession by private individuals." (Republic Act No. 80, Item FIV-8.) This warrant was not issued in favor of a private individual. It was issued in
favor of a government employee. Also, this treasury warrant is not within the
scope of the negotiable instruments law. For one thing, the document bearing on
its face the words "payable from the appropriation for food administration," is
actually an order for payment out of "a particular fund," and is not
unconditional, and does not fulfill one of the essential requirements of a
This is petition before the SC where the petitioner assigns twelve (12) errors
which focus on the alleged fraud, bad faith and misrepresentation of Violago
Motor Sales Corporation in the conduct of its business and which fraud, bad
faith and misrepresentation supposedly released petitioner from any liability to
private respondent who should instead proceed against VMS.
Records disclose that, Juanita Salas (hereinafter referred to as petitioner) bought a
motor vehicle from the Violago Motor Sales Corporation (VMS for brevity) as
evidenced by a promissory note. This note was subsequently endorsed to Filinvest
Finance & Leasing Corporation (hereinafter referred to as private respondent) which
financed the purchase.
Petitioner argues that in the light of the provision of the law on sales by
description which she alleges is applicable here, no contract ever existed
between her and VMS and therefore none had been assigned in favor of private
respondent.
Issue:
WON the promissory note in question is a negotiable instrument which will bar
completely all the available defenses of the petitioner against private
respondent.
Held:
A careful study of the questioned promissory note shows that it is a negotiable
instrument, having complied with the requisites under the law. It was negotiated by
indorsement in writing on the instrument itself payable to the Order of Filinvest
Finance and Leasing Corporation and it is an indorsement of the entire instrument.
Under the circumstances, there appears to be no question that Filinvest is a holder
in due course, having taken the instrument under the required conditions.
Accordingly, Respondent Corporation holds the instrument free from any defect of
title of prior parties, and free from defenses available to prior parties among
themselves, and may enforce payment of the instrument for the full amount
thereof. This being so, petitioner cannot set up against respondent the defense of
nullity of the contract of sale between her and VMS (Violago Motor Sales)
Corporation.
Answering the first contention of appellant, counsel for plaintiff-appellee argues that
in accordance with the best authority on the Negotiable Instruments Law, plaintiffappellee may be considered as a holder in due course, citing Brannan's Negotiable
Instruments Law, holds that a payee may be a holder in due course and says that to
this effect is the greater weight of authority.
Issue:
1. WON the plaintiff-appellee may be considered as a holder in due course.
Held:
Section 52, NIL, defines holder in due course, thus: A holder in due course is a
holder who has taken the instrument under the following conditions: (a) That it
is complete and regular upon its face; (b) That he became the holder of it before
it was overdue, and without notice that it had been previously dishonored, if
such was the fact; (c) That he took it in good faith and for value; (d) That at the
time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument
or defect in the title of the person negotiating it.
1.The stipulation of facts contains no statement of such good faith, hence we are
forced to the conclusion that plaintiff payee has not proved that it acquired the
check in good faith and may not be deemed a holder in due course thereof. As
holder's title was defective or suspicious, it cannot be stated that the payee
acquired the check without knowledge of said defect in holder's title, and for this
reason the presumption that it is a holder in due course or that it acquired the
instrument in good faith does not exist. And having presented no evidence that
it acquired the check in good faith, it (payee) cannot be considered as a holder
in due course.
dishonored in the hands of the Philippine National Bank. Later the bank indorsed the
draft in blank, without consideration, and delivered it to the plaintiff, who thereupon
instituted the present action on the instrument against the acceptor, defendant, and
the two individuals named in the complaint, in the character of members of said
partnership.
Issue:
WON the plaintiff Fossum is a holder of the questioned draft in due course
Held:
The plaintiff Fossum is far from being a holder of the draft in due course. He was
himself a party to the contract which supplied the consideration for the draft, albeit
he there acted in a representative capacity. In the second place, he procured the
instrument to be indorsed by the bank and delivered to himself without the
payment of value, after it was overdue, and with full notice that, as between the
original parties, the consideration had completely failed. Under these circumstances
recovery on this draft by the plaintiff by virtue of any merit in his own position is out
of the question.