THE UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS

Noncompliance with
Justice:
An analysis of the ICC indictments of
the Sudanese leaders and Sudan’s
defiance of the Court

Maureen E. Didde
December 2008
POLS 689
Dr. Mariya Omelicheva
 Didde 2

In July of 2008, the front page of many international papers announced that the
International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor had applied for an indictment of President
Al Bashir of Sudan on charges of genocide and other crimes against humanity. After
years of violent conflict in Sudan and continued bloodshed in the Western region of
Darfur, the world breathed a sigh of relief that justice would finally be served. But the
leaders of Sudan had different plans in mind.
Just three years earlier, two of Sudan’s political leaders were indicted by the ICC
on similar counts, yet one of them still remains a prominent member of the government.
Sudan’s government has made it clear that if Bashir were to be indicted, he would
continue to hold the presidency because Sudan has not recognized the ICC as a plausible
international institution. In effect, Sudan is ignoring the international community that
backs the ICC on counts that its sovereignty is at risk. Therefore, I pose the following
question: Is the International Criminal Court’s indictment of political leaders in Sudan a
violation of state sovereignty? In this paper, I put forth and defend a negative answer to
this question and explore why Sudan disobeys the ICC’s rulings?
I begin by describing the International Criminal Court and its indictment of
Sudanese political leaders. I will then define state sovereignty and review its historical
roots and connections to human rights. Next, I will argue that the ICC’s indictments are
not violations of state sovereignty, and briefly explore the actions of Sudan in response to
the ICC’s rulings. Finally, I will propose a few challenges both to Sudan and to the
international community to end this metaphorical stand-off.

The International Criminal Court and the Sudanese Cases

The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established in 2002 upon the
ratification of the Rome Statute by 108 countries (not including Sudan). Presently, the
States Parties include 30 African states, 14 Asian states, 16 Eastern European states, 23
Latin American/Caribbean states, and 25 Western European and other states (ICC,
2008(a)). The purpose of the ICC is to “exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most
serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in the Statute, and shall be
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions (ICC, 1998).” The ICC itself refers to
these actions as those of “last resort,” only trying those accused of “the gravest crimes.”
The ICC acts only in cases where national judicial systems do not. Also, the UN Security
Council has the ability to “trigger the provisions under the Statute that enables it to refer
situations in non-State parties to the world court if it deems that it is a threat to
international peace and security (Sudan Tribune, 2008).” That is the only case in which
the ICC can act within a nation that has not ratified the Rome Statute, and will be
discussed in further detail later.
Before an explanation of the Sudanese indictments, it is pertinent to understand a
brief summary of the situation in Sudan that has led to the cases. The nation of Sudan
endured a twenty-year long civil war that ended with a peace treaty known as the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. However, since 2003 the war has
continued to rage in a Western region of Sudan known as Darfur. The conflict is known
to be primarily ethnic and tribal, yet involves many factors beyond this—such as
environmental issues, control of oilfields, and political motives. In 2003, several rebel
groups rose up against the Sudanese government with accusations of being oppressed as
non-Arabs. The government lashed back with a state-supported militia known as the
 Didde 3

Janjaweed. The Janjaweed is known to have committed massive crimes against humanity
and genocide, which continues today (Reuters, 2005).
Therefore, the ICC has indicted two Sudanese leaders, Ahmad Muhammad Harun
(Ahmad Harun) and Ali Muhammad Al Abd-al-Rahman (Ali Kushayb). Currently, the
ICC’s prosecutor is in the process of requesting an arrest warrant for the President of
Sudan, Omar Al Bashir on accounts of war crimes against humanity and genocide. The
prosecutor, Luis Moreno, has presented his case for this indictment to the judges, and
their decision is pending. The rest of this section will go into some detail regarding these
indictments.
Ahmad Harun served from 2003-2005 as the Minister of State for the Interior of
Sudan and managed the Darfur Security Desk. Presently, he is the Minister of State for
Humanitarian Affairs in Sudan. Harun’s position involved coordinating all of the entities
involved in the counter-insurgency against the rebel fighters, which included the
Janjaweed militia. Ali Kushayb is known to be a key leader of the Janjaweed militia, the
group held responsible for extensive crimes and violence in Darfur. According to the
ICC, he was known as the “mediator” between the leaders of Janjaweed and the Sudanese
Government (The Hague, 2007). The warrants of arrest for both Harun and Kushayb are
separate, yet include many similar accusations, including over twenty counts of crimes
against humanity each. These crimes include murder, persecution, forcible transfer of
population, rape, imprisonment or severe deprivation of liberty, pillaging, torture, and
other “inhumane acts”. Each count also involves over twenty war crimes, including
violence, degrading treatment towards individuals, intentional attacks against civilians,
pillaging, rape, and destruction of property (The Hague, 2007).
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir is currently under pending indictment for
masterminding many of the above crimes against humanity and war crimes, as well as the
crime of genocide under Article 6 of the Rome Statute. The application for his arrest by
Luis Moreno states: “The Prosecution does not allege that Al Bashir physically or
directly carried out any of the crimes. He committed the crimes through members of the
state apparatus, the army and the Militia/Janjaweed in accordance with Article 25 of the
Statue (indirect perpetration or perpetration by means) (ICC, 2008(b)).” At present,
Moreno’s application for this arrest warrant is in the hands of the court awaiting judge
ruling. Many sources predicted that the indictment will go through by the end of 2008,
however the ICC is silent on the issue at the time of this research (November 2008).
Overall, the initial creation of the ICC through the implementation of the Rome
Statute has led to these international actions towards Harun, Kushayb, and Bashir. Never
before has an international court existed that brings individual criminals to justice at this
level (the ICC is unlike the UN’s International Court of Justice in that the latter deals
with states, not individuals). Therefore, the actions of the ICC and the indictments of
these Sudanese leaders are anomalies in world history. The rulings against these three (as
well as ten other individuals) deserve particular attention as to the reasons for their
indictments and the validity of their reactions, which will be discussed in the following
pages.
 Didde 4

State Sovereignty
Sovereignty was initially created for the purpose of granting power to royal
authorities during the era of feudal states, and as the modern state came into play. At this
time, it had been recognized that without stability and order among various populations
and territories, chaos would ensue. In spite of the form of government that any given
region practiced—monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, etc.—members of society believed
that the governments must maintain order and authority over their own territories, which
led to the idea of sovereignty.
Over time, this new concept became a part of international relations theory.
Likewise, it developed and grew as the prominent authority of the church in Europe
began to disseminate. In 1648, history was made when the Westphalia Treaty was
signed. The treaty ended the Thirty Years’ War, a European war fueled by various
religious and dynastic motivations. This settlement, though, not only ended a major
series of wars but also “opened the quest—which goes on to this day—to find a way for
independent states, each enjoying sovereignty over a given territory, to pursue their own
interests without destroying each other or the international system of which each is a part
(Lyons, 1995: 4).”
The implementation of sovereignty came with several assumptions—that states
would maintain order within their own borders and deal effectively and fairly in their
international relations with other states. Beyond these assumptions, a set of institutions
developed in order to oversee the balance between states with unequal power distribution.
The institutions include:

“…a balance of power to prevent the rise of a preponderant state and to

contain unlimited aggression; the codification of rules and behavior
through international law; the convening of international conferences to
settle major differences; and the growth of diplomatic practices through
which states would maintain continuing contact and be encouraged to
negotiate differences among themselves (Lyons, 1995: 6).”

These ideas led to a formalized version of international society, the members of which
were expected to uphold these values of sovereignty, both within and without their
borders.
While these ideas may have seemed fairly straightforward in the 17th century, the
world today continues to redefine and question what sovereignty really means for the
nations of the world. In regards to human rights, the question of sovereignty lies in the
definition of international intervention. Lyons notes, “Intervention involves the physical
crossing of borders with a clear-cut purpose (10).” He cites examples such as delivering
humanitarian assistance into another country or the more extreme examples of bombing a
nuclear facility. Lyons points out that the use of isolation (e.g. imposing economic
sanctions) and influence (e.g. negotiations or threats of isolation) are other means of
involving one’s nation in the actions of another, and are independent of intervention.
During the 20th century, though, the ideas of intervention, isolation, and influence became
muddled as investigations into human rights violations and the intentions to stop them
became more prominent in the West. The most important thing to note here is expressed
succinctly by Lyons: “What to one state looks like unobtrusive and even benign attempts
 Didde 5

at influence may appear to another to be blatant intervention and an infringement on

sovereignty (11).”
That being said, the definition of sovereignty continues to evolve into the 21st
century. In the early 1990s, a new concept was coined by Francis M. Deng, the newly-
appointed UN Representative on Internally Displaced Persons. Deng refered to this
changing idea as “sovereignty as responsibility.” Cohen describes Deng’s idea in stating,
“Sovereignty must mean accountability to one’s population and also to the international
community in the form of compliance with international human rights and humanitarian
agreements (Cohen, 2008).” Deng put forth that sovereignty is a nations responsibility
for the protection and well-being of its people. In this, he helped to redefine the concept
in a way that would be more conducive to international intervention in light of severe
human rights violations.

Sudan’s Perspective on the Indictments

In the midst of the ICC indictments, how have the leaders of Sudan responded to
the ICC and the international community? To put it simply, they haven’t. Or, they have
responded with a short, simple message of their unwillingness to recognize the ICC, and
have gone about their business. It is difficult to obtain an objective analysis of the
Sudanese perspective on this issue, but this section will attempt to shed light on their
approach to the current situation.
First, Sudan has not signed on to the Rome Statute, which means they are not
required by law to accept the rulings of the ICC. According to the statute:

“If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is required
under paragraph 2, that state may, by declaration lodged with the
Registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to
the crime in question. The accepting State shall cooperate with the Court
without any delay or exception in accordance with Part 9 (ICC, 1998: 8).”

In the context of the articles of the Statue, the above paragraph basically states that if a
country that is not party to the Statue accepts the ruling, then they must cooperate with
the Court. This is a roundabout way of saying that if a state has not signed on to the
statute, they have no obligation to the ICC. Therefore, one can clearly see that since
Sudan has chosen not to sign on to the Rome Statute, by law they are free to continue to
exercise autonomy from the ICC.
Underlying the Sudanese government’s unwillingness to ratify the Statute is the
issue of sovereignty. Sudan has heavily resisted international intervention in Darfur,
specifically peacekeeping troops and humanitarian aid. In 2007, Bashir agreed to allow
only African Union peacekeeping troops, who made little positive impact on the
situation. The UN has been forced to abide by this decision in order to avoid any
sovereignty violations. Nevertheless, UN members believe that the reasons for not
allowing non-African troops are two fold, according to the Africa Research Bulletin: that
the government “suspects that [non-African forces] will be better at their job than troops
from neighbouring countries (Africa Research Bulletin, 2008: 17398)” and are more
“easily manipulated by the government.” Also, their government’s resistance to
peacekeeping may also be due to the ICC indictments, for fear that “the hybrid force
 Didde 6

would be mandated to track down and arrest suspects on behalf of the ICC.”
All of these factors have led Bashir and other Sudanese leaders to claim that many
of these actions are violations of sovereignty. As early as 2006, according to the
Sudanese news agency Suna, “President Al-Bashir described the incentives presented by
the Western countries to the government to accept entry of international troops to Sudan
as an insult to the national sovereignty (Suna News Agency, 2006).” More recently,
other governmental leaders in Sudan have accused the actions of the UN and the ICC of
this violation. For example, in July of 2008, National Congress Party (NCP) leader Dr.
Rabi Abd-al-Ati stated, “I believe that any charges leveled by the ICC prosecutor general
against President Al-Bashir are leveled against the entire Sudanese people because
President Al-Bashir does not represent himself only as much as he represents the
Sudanese sovereignty and the Sudanese people. Hence, I believe that this is a serious
issue. [The Prosecutor] and others are not allowed to harm the sovereignty of the entire
Sudanese people (Al-Arabiya TV, 2008).” These statements beg the question—who is
right? Is Sudan’s sovereignty being violated? The answer to that question will be
explored in the next section.
In spite of their non-recognition of the ICC, Sudan has still taken some level of
action after the indictments of Harun and Kushayb occurred. In one case, they moved
Harun to a new job within the government, in the other, they let Kushayb out of jail even
though he was already in custody at the time of the indictments.
The arrest warrants for Harun and Kushayb were issued in April 2007. In spite of
strong messages sent from the United Nations Security Council to the Government of
Sudan over the next several months, Sudan still chose not to cooperate. Instead, in
November 2007, Ahmad Harun was transferred from his post as Minister of the Interior
to Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs and was also appointed to the United
Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) Committee. Both of these roles
grant Harun responsibility to oversee the deployment of peacekeeping troops and
humanitarian aid, as well as managing internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees
in Sudan (ICC, 5 Dec 2007).
According to the Sudan Tribune, Ali Kushayb had already been in and out of
custody, held by the Sudanese Government, at the time the ICC’s arrest warrants were
released in April 2007. However, after delayed trials and appeals from the defendant,
Kushayb was released in March 2007 due to insufficient evidence to hold him, just prior
to the ICC’s indictment. Kushayb was free from March 2007 until October 2008, at
which time he was arrested once again. The Sudanese government has committed to
putting Kushayb on trial for war crimes committed in Darfur. The international
community has assumed that the timely action against Kushayb occurred in order to
prevent the ICC’s indictment of President Al-Bashir (Sudan Tribune, 2008).
If Sudan prosecutes Harun and Kushayb in the federal court, then by law the ICC
loses jurisdiction. While Harun remains in power, the recent detainment of Kushayb is a
good move on the part of Bashir’s administration. The waiting period between the
Prosecutor’s application for a warrant and the pending decision of the judges allows
Bashir to show the world why he should not be indicted. On November 12, 2008,
international news sources across the globe featured information like the following:

“Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, facing a possible

 Didde 7

indictment by the International Criminal Court for alleged war crimes in

Darfur, announced a ceasefire in the region on Wednesday. But an
important Darfur rebel group, the Justice and Equality Movement, called
the announcement a "PR exercise" and vowed to fight on until a proper
ceasefire deal was reached.
The move by Bashir, who was accused in July by the ICC chief
prosecutor of masterminding a campaign of genocide in Darfur, marks the
latest push by the Sudanese government to persuade the United Nations
Security Council to suspend any ICC warrant. "I hereby announce our
immediate unconditional ceasefire between the armed forces and the
warring factions, provided that an effective monitoring mechanism is put
into action and observed by all involved parties," Bashir said in a speech
(Reuters, 2008).”

Violence continues in Darfur since this announcement was made as the rebel groups
reject Bashir’s actions on the grounds that it is for the sole purpose of avoiding
indictment, and not a true cease-fire. Other implications of a potential indictment of
Sudan’s president include further violence in reaction to the indictment as well as various
political and economic implications if he remains the President but is unable to leave the
country (if Sudan chooses not to cooperate with the indictment).

Are the ICC’s Indictments in Violation of Sudan’s Sovereignty?

Based on the evidence presented this far, this section will explore the answer to
this question, concluding that it is a negative one—the indictments alone do not violate
sovereignty. However, one must consider the provision of further intervention if Sudan
does not cooperate and consequently the conflict becomes a threat of international peace
and security. In that case, will the ICC and/or UN be justified in intervening without
Sudan’s cooperation? This section will explore these questions based on a further
exploration of the Statute and provisions as well as other cases of interventionism and
state sovereignty.
First, when the UN Security Council referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC,
they did so under Resolution 1593, which states “that the Government of Sudan and all
other parties to the conflict in Darfur shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary
assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution and, while
recognizing that States not party to the Rome Statute have no obligation under the
Statute, urges all States and concerned regional and other international organizations to
cooperate fully (UNSC, 2005).” So, while this resolution recognizes that Sudan is not
party to the Rome Statute, it still makes a formal call for cooperation. Then, within the
Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, lies an article calling for further intervention
on the case of a non-cooperative state. Article 42 states, “Should the Security Council
consider that measures provided in Article 41 [Economic and diplomatic measures]
would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea,
or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security
(UN, 1945: Art. 42).”
These resolutions and articles reveal that if the UN Member States deemed
physical intervention necessary to take place, then it would be a legitimate, legal action.
 Didde 8

What one cannot say is that it is not a violation of sovereignty, which leads to the tension
in this issue: violations of national sovereignty may be acceptable and legitimate in the
most severe cases. The UN’s referral to the ICC on the issue of Darfur shows that it is a
severe case and must be dealt with internationally. Therefore, the indictments in and of
themselves are not a violation of sovereignty. Further enforcement, which is yet to take
place, may be so, but will be justified for the sake of international peace and security.
The case of Sudan is unique among the cases of the ICC in that Sudan is the first
country the ICC has dealt with that is not party to the Rome Statute. All the other cases
dealing with criminals in Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Central
African Republic (CAR) are far more clear-cut because those nations have ratified the
Statute. In Uganda in 2003, President Yoweri Museveni took action, referring five
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) leaders to the Court for war crimes. Presently, three of
the members are still at large and the ICC has recently renewed efforts to arrest them (the
other two indictees are now deceased). In 2004, the situation in DRC was also referred to
the Court by the nation’s President. Presently, the three Congolese men indicted have all
been arrested. Finally, the former Vice President of DRC was arrested within 24 hours of
his warrant being released and is currently under trial. Overall, the ICC has shown itself
to be fairly successful in regards to those it pursues, having arrested the majority of living
suspects. The difficult of arresting Harun and Kushayb is clearly impacted by Sudan’s
role as a non-State party to the Rome Statute (ICC, 2008(c)).
Finally, one must simply consider the necessity of human rights and the
legitimacy of international perspectives when presented with this question of violation of
sovereignty. The aforementioned article of the UN Charter lays the framework for
international action and intervention for the sake of peace and security, not only for the
world, but for the individuals enduring the violations. At the very root of the crimes
committed by the ICC indictees is the violation of the most basic, universal human rights:
the right to life, liberty, and security of person; the freedom from being held in slavery of
any kind; the freedom from being tortured or enduring cruel, inhumane, or degrading
treatment or punishment (UN, 1948: Art. 3-5). It is the violations of these rights that lead
the International Criminal Court to act. These rights have been widely accepted and
deemed universal, inalienable, and non-derogatory, which means that they are not rights
given to an individual, but rather they exist simply by fact of being human. Consequently,
the act of taking them away is a dire crime.

Sovereignty and Human Rights in Light of the Situation in Sudan

There is no question about whether the atrocities that have occurred in Sudan, not
only in Darfur but throughout the rest of the nation during previous civil war, have
violated the human rights set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR). The heads of government themselves acknowledge this reality. Yet the status
quo remains—thousands of people are brutalized and killed while the world speculates
about who is behind it and what can be done. Yet, while holding sovereignty in place,
what power does the international community have to act?
Perhaps a way to understand what underlies the different perspectives of Sudan
and those states that have willingly ratified the Rome Statute and abided by it lies in the
varying models of the international community’s role in international human rights, as
expressed by Donnelly. He advances three models that can describe the tension between
 Didde 9

sovereignty and intervention over time. First, he presents the traditional statist model,
which places all power in the hand of the states, and little emphasis on the existence of an
international community. Donnelly states, “For statists, there is no significant,
independent international community, especially when questions of human rights are at
issue. International intervention on behalf of human rights is not to be expected (Lyons,
1995: 121).” The second model is the cosmopolitan model which focuses on individuals
who are first and foremost members of a global society rather than citizens of states. For
the cosmopolitanists, international intervention for human rights is “relatively
unproblematic (121).” Finally, Donnelly presents the median between the two, which is
the internationalist model. Internationalists take bits from both of the previous models,
and in essence “accept the centrality of states and of sovereignty in international
relations, but stress international social practices that regulate interstate relations…
Intervention on behalf of human rights is permissible to the extent that it is authorized by
the society of states (121).” This model fits most closely with the perspective of the UN
and the ICC, although Donnelly believes it to be weak in practice. Based on what has
been seen about Sudan’s perspective on the ICC indictments and their responses to it, one
could assume that the country still acts within the traditional statist model, which
Donnelly believes to have become outdated post-World War II. Nevertheless, the
nation’s unwillingness to cooperate with the international community amidst blatant and
widespread human rights violations reveal their traditional, out-dated views of
sovereignty.
However, one cannot spend too much time considering the situation in Sudan
without acknowledging the economic issues that preside over many of the political
decisions made in the country. Sudan is rich with oil fields and has significant investors,
the most well known of which is China. This wealth of natural resources influences both
the international community’s interest in stabilizing Sudan as well as Sudan’s attempts to
appear in control (e.g. Bashir’s attempts to show the world that Sudan is doing all it can
to cease the conflict). Consider the implications for Sudan in this scenario: If Bashir is
indicted, will China maintain their tight relations with Sudan? And if China pulls out,
then what will become of the economy? Could the humanitarian situation in the nation
grow even worse if they lose such tremendous investment? On the other hand, imagine
what the rest of the world may see: If Sudan was to be stabilized, then would Western
nations (who impose conditions on trade relations) choose to invest in their oil? Is it
possible that entities like the UN or countries like the United States continue to feel the
ramifications of their lack of intervention in Rwanda in 1994? Would taking care of the
situation in Sudan help to lighten the guilty image that they assumed after the genocide
there? It is crucial to consider the more far-reaching implications when analyzing the
situation in Sudan. For both Sudan and all other institutions involved, it is more than just
human rights, although many wish that were truly the priority.
So, keeping all this in mind in light of the situation in Sudan, one must attempt to
observe the complimentary affects of sovereignty and human rights instead of posing
them against one another. As Francis Deng advanced, state sovereignty is a principle
meant for a state to protect its own citizens from outside harm. Likewise, DeLaet
suggests an example of sovereignty and human rights working together: “…a state’s
resources may be crucial in meeting the basic economic rights of human beings, and a
state may play an important role in preventing private actors from violating the basic
 Didde 10

rights of individuals (DeLaet, 2006: 4).” Therefore, when assessing Sudan’s accusations
of the violation of sovereignty, one must consider if they are putting their sovereignty to
its intended use.

What should be done?

As previously mentioned, if the ICC indicts President Al-Bashir of Sudan, there
are significant implications to follow. There are three primary areas where further action
must be taken in order for a stable transition from conflict to peace in Sudan to occur.
First, China must be willing to use their influence to pressure the Sudanese
government. Ever since the Prosecutor made the application for Bashir’s arrest, China
has opposed the move. Formally, the country’s leaders do so based on their opinion that
it would ruin the current negotiations occurring between the Sudanese government and
the rebel forces (although there is little evidence of said negotiations occurring). Many,
though, suggest that China’s motives are based on their massive oil investments. The
Interpress News Agency notes that “China is keen to retain its presence in Sudan as a key
investor and commodities buyer to secure its future supplies (Bezlova, 2008),”
insinuating that China’s opposition to the indictment is based on their natural resource
motivation. Therefore, as was seen prior to the Beijing Olympics of 2008, the world
must put pressure on China to use their investments and trade with Sudan to influence the
humanitarian situation there. Whether they do so by ceasing to provide weaponry to
Sudan, decreasing their oil investments (unlikely), or pressuring Bashir to not only hand
over Harun, but to abide by Resolution 1593 if Bashir himself is indicted. China has
more influence over Sudan than any other nation or institution in the world, and their role
in the situation is key to ending the stand-off between the Sudanese government and the
rebel forces.
Second, the United Nations must be prepared on multiple levels if Bashir is
indicted (regardless of whether he is arrested at the time); they must have peacekeeping
troops and massive humanitarian aid infrastructure in place, ready to move in to the entire
country, not just Darfur. If China does use their influence, then it could mean an
economic loss for Sudan that would have repercussions throughout the entire country,
including the South. Southern Sudan gains a small percentage of the oil revenues
extracted from within its borders, and consequently in the case that oil investments were
lost, the Southern and Central portion of the country would feel the aftershock.
Therefore, if the United Nations and the ICC choose to follow through with the
indictment, they must be prepared to help the citizens of Sudan, assisting them with the
mentality of a disaster-relief effort. Certainly this will be significant in Darfur, but the
international community must not forget that the entire nation will be affected
significantly.
Finally, the ICC must be thorough in their presentation to the world as to the
criminal activity of those indicted. Many nations who oppose the indictment claim that
the ICC overlooks one dictator and indicts another, accusing the international community
of acting based on their own interests as opposed to acting for the purpose of upholding
human rights. Therefore, the ICC must clearly express the clear-cut reasons for whom
they indict and why. Additionally, they must not focus on only one region (currently all
four open cases are in Africa), but they must show to the world that they are approaching
their duties in a fair and equal way.
 Didde 11

Conclusion
This paper has presented the situation in Sudan in regards to the International
Criminal Court and their indictment of Sudanese leaders. Sovereignty is an issue that has
been defined over time in many different ways, as well as what is a violation of
sovereignty. The International Criminal Court, which was created under the Rome Statue
of the United Nations in 2002, has presently indicted two leaders of the war-ridden nation
of Sudan and is in the process of indicting the nation’s president. This case is an anomaly
among the other cases of the ICC because Sudan has not ratified the Rome Statute, and is
additionally unwilling to comply with the ICC. Yet, the act of indicting the Sudanese
leaders is not a violation of sovereignty, for currently Sudan is exercising its power to
choose whether the nation will cooperate with the ICC. Nevertheless, many in the world
are calling on the UN and the ICC to take action and intervene in order to put a cease to
the conflict in Darfur. While that may be a possibility, harmful implications for that sort
of action have been proposed.
In conclusion, the ICC’s indictments of Sudanese leaders are not a violation of
sovereignty, but Sudan’s unwillingness to comply is still within the realms of
international law. Current events have shown that President Bashir is taking action in
ways to show that he is working for peace in Darfur, through arresting Ali Kushayb and
by declaring a cease-fire. It is yet to be seen what will become of Kushayb, but so far the
cease-fire has had little impact on the violence. Bashir must enter into true, open
negotiations with rebel forces in Darfur in order for a cease-fire to actually occur.
However, if he does there is no guarantee the indictment will not ultimately occur
anyway—and if it does, the world must be prepared for the implications this will have on
the ground, even amidst peace.
Sudan is the largest geographic nation in Sudan. Its people are diverse in culture,
religion, and ethnicity. They have endured civil war throughout the nation for 25 years.
If something is not done about the conflict in Darfur, then the entire nation will continue
to suffer. Sudan must cooperate with the ICC and the UN in order for the transition to
peace to occur. The nation must do this with the mindset that its own national
sovereignty and the global attempts to assist the nation’s citizens can work hand-in-hand
instead of in tension.

Bibliography
 Didde 12

Africa Research Bulletin. 2008. “Sudan: UNAMID Seeks Support.” Africa Research
Bulletin: Political, Social, and Cultural Series, Vol. 45: 1, pp. 17398-99.

Al-Arabiya TV. 12 July 2008. “Sudan ruling party official says major countries behind
ICC plan.” British Worldwide Monitoring: Middle East.

← Arsanjani, Mahnoush H. 1999. “The Rome Statue of the International Criminal

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