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Volume VII.
Number4.

July, 1898.

Whole
Number4o.

THE

PHILOSOPHICAL

REVIEW.

THE METAPHYSIC OF ARISTOTLE.

IV

SO

Potentialand Actual Reality.

farAristotle has considered the real mainlyfroma statical point of view,though he has been incidentallyled to
point out that all definiterealityinvolvesa dynamicalprocess.
It is this last aspect of things to which he now draws special
and indeed what is most distinctive
attention,
of his doctrineis his
conception of the world as a process. Reality,as he has contended,is neithera mere series of changes, nor is it fixed and
unchanging. The formerview makes realitythe perpetual rise
and disappearanceof theparticular,thelattertransforms
the living
'
realityof thingsintothe dead unchanging being' of the Eleatics,
or the equally dead 'ideas' of the Piatonists. There is change
and thereis permanence,but change takes place in fixedand unalterableways, so that each thing contains within itselfand is
constitutedby the universal nature whichit realizes underparticular conditions. This universal nature, however,as he now
goes on to maintain, is in finitethings not somethingwhich
they possess, but somethingwhich theyare in process of realizing, and thereforewe are compelledto distinguishbetweenwhat
') and what they are 'potentially'
they are 'actually' (Yvepre
(8ocv&s). The clear comprehensionof the relationof the 'potential' to the ' actual' is thereforeindispensable to a true
knowledgeof the real.

338

HE

PHILOSOPHICAL

REVIEW

[VOL. VII.

Now, the distinctionbetweenthe ' potential' and the ' actual,'

betweenwhat a thingis capable of being, and what it actuallyis,
was in Aristotle's day, as in ours, ignored or denied. The
Megarians held that nothing can be said to be whichis not in
activity. A man is a builderwhen he is actually building,but it
is absurd to speak of a man as havinga facultywhichis not in
actual exercise. To this view Aristotleanswersthatit ignores
the process by whichthe art of buildingis acquired,confusingan
originalendowmentwiththe resultof a process by whichthe individualattainsa power which he did not at firstpossess. If we
generalize the doctrineof the Megarians,we shall be forcedto
conclude that realityconsists in an evanescentseries of particulars, since nothingis real except in the actual moment of its
existence. Accordingly,a sensible object must be supposed to
exist only at the timewhen it is apprehended,and this apprehension itselfmust be held to be a momentarysensation. Thus the
doctrineof the Megariansis at bottomidenticalwiththat of Proof which has already been shown. All
tagoras,the imperfection
such doctrinesdestroythe possibilityof real change,substituting
forit a discontinuousseries of particulars,and thus makingboth
realityand knowledge impossible. We cannot, then,deny the
distinctionof ' potential' and ' actual' realitywithoutmakingthe
factsof experienceinexplicable.'
What, then,is the relationof the ' potential' to the ' actual'?
The answeris to be found in the distinctionbetween the 'possible ' and the ' impossible.' The ' potential' must not be confused with mere'possibility,'i.e., with the 'possibility' of anythingwhatever. The only ' possibility'that we can admitis the
' possibility'of the ' actual.' We cannot say, to take Aristotle's
own instance, that it is 'possible' that the diagonal of the
square should be measured,and yet neverwill be measured,or,
to take a moderninstance,withwhich Mill has made us familiar,
thatit is possible that2 + 3 may be = 6. What cannotbe actually realizedis 'impossible,' and therefore'possibility' is determinedby ' actuality.' Nothingis ' possible' which,by the nature
of things,cannotbecome ' actual;' so thatthe ' possible' or ' poI

Met. 0, io46b

29-I047a

2.

No. 4.]

THE METAPHYSIC

OF ARIS[O TLE.

339

tential' is not abstractor unlimited' possibility,'but determinate

' possibility,'i.e., the possibilityof realizationin a certaindefinite
way. The 'impossible' is thereforethatwhich is incompatible
withthe ' actual;' the ' possible' thatwhichis compatiblewiththe
actual. The 'possible' may or may not become 'actual,' but
nothingis ' possible' which underappropriateconditionswill not
become ' actual.' What Aristotle,then,is contendingfor,is that
the transitionfrom'possibility' to 'actuality' must take place
in certain fixedand unchangingways, in which the true nature
of the real is manifested. Thus we get, as the meaningof the
'potential,' the persistenttendencytowards the ' actual.' 1 The
world is not a chaos but a cosmos, and there can be no cosmos,
if realityis conceived as the infinitepossibilityof any actuality
whatever. The acorn is the possibilityof the oak, but not of
the fir; the child is the possibility of the man, but not of
the horse or dog; and so in all cases. We can thus understand why,in the case of ' natural' things,'moving principle,'
'form,'and ' end' become identical. The principlewhichdeter' to ' actuality' is the ' end'
minesthe transitionfrom'potentiality
or determinatemode of 'actuality' which a thingis capable of
involvedin the
becoming,i.e.,its 'form;' and the ' end ' is therefore
' potentiality.' The distinctionand the correlationof ' potentiality' and ' actuality' is thereforea fundamental
principlein the
Aristotelianphilosophy.
In every' potentiality,'
then,there is a tendencyto pass into
'actuality.' This tendency,however,is not always realized,because it can be realizedonly when the externalconditionspermit
of its realization; in otherwords,when the ' matter' is capable of
being acted upon. Thus, the seed tends to develop into the
plant, but it cannot do so withoutfavorablesoil, moisture,air,
and sunlight,which are its ' material' conditions. But, provided
the ' matter' permitsof it, the ' potentiality'will pass over into
'actuality.' We have thereforeto observe that the 'potential'
is thatwhichis in a conditionto become ' actual.' Nothingcan in
thepropersense be called ' potential'whichwill not become ' actual ' underappropriateconditions,and thatwithoutfirstundergo1Met. 0,

1047b

3-31I

340

THE PHILOSOPHICAL

REVIEW

[VOL. VII.

ing an internalchange. It followsthatthereare variousstages or

degrees of the ' potential' and ' actual.' Earth is the ' potentiality' of which wood is the actuality; but wood again, is the
' potentiality'of which a box is the ' actuality.' And it will
be observed that, however far we carryback the process, we
never reach an unformed' matter,'but only that which is ' matter' relativelyto the ' form' whichis expressedas 'actuality.' In
findthat nothingoriginates
the process of the world we therefore
from mere 'matter,'but always from something determinate,
whichis the 'matter' relativelyto thatwhichis moredeterminate.
We may suppose a primarysubstance, as the matteror substrateunderlyingthe whole complex organismof the world,but
we cannot conceive of a primitiveor unformedmatteras the
nucleus of all determinatereality. This will become obvious if
we ask whetherthe ' potential' is prior to the ' actual,' or the
'actual' to the 'potential.' 1
Now, thatwhich is 'prior' mustbe so either(I) in knowledge,
or (2) in time,or (3) in ' substance;' and it may be shown that
in all these senses the 'actual' is prior to the ' potential.' For
(i) we cannot know in any case what is 'potential' withouta
knowledge of the 'actual.' The 'potential,'as we have seen, is
not a bare ' possibility,'but the ' possibility'of somethingdeterexcept thatwhichis in
minate,and there is nothingdeterminate
' actuality.' We could not tell thatan object is capable of being
seen ifno one had ever seen it; thatan animal has thefacultyof
seeing, did we not findthat animals actuallydo see; nor thata
man is capableof building,who does not ' actually' possess the art
of building. Thus, our knowledgeof the ' potential' always presupposes a knowledgeof the 'actual.' (2) It may seem as ifthe
'potential' were 'prior' in timeto the 'actual,' because in the
case of any given individualit is so. Bricks must be in existence beforethey can be made into a house; the 'seed-corn'
must precede in existence the corn; a man must have the
facultyof sight before he sees. And no doubt this is true,
but we forgetthat the individualin question presupposes the
' actual' existenceof that which in each case is ' potential.' The
'Met. 0, i048b 38-1049b3.

No. 4.]

THE METAPHYSIC

OF ARISTOTLE.

341

house must exist as an ' actual' conceptionin the mind of the

builder beforeit is built; the seed-corn has come from actual
corn, and the man from another man. It must, further,be
observedthatin all the ' rational' faculties,the ' actual' is always
prior to the 'potential.' Every 'art' is a faculty,which is acquired only by actual exercise,and in factthe Sophistical argumentthat nothingcan be learned is based upon this veryfact,
that 'learning' consistsin the 'actual' doing of a thing,as the
condition of the ' capacity' to do it well. (3) It may also be
shown that the 'actual' is prior in 'substance' to the 'potential.' The ' substance,''essential nature,'or 'form' of anything
is thatwhichit is as actualized,and the 'potential' is merelythat
phase of the ' actual' in whichas yet the thingcannotbe said to
have existence (o&aza). For, as the 'potential' is that which,
under appropriateconditions,must become 'actual,' each thing
has a certain' end,' withoutthe realizationof which it cannotbe
said to exist. As it is this 'end' (rAo;) whichdeterminesthe
'actual' existenceof thething,the end is also the ' beginning' or
nothingcan be called 'po'principle' (dpxy).Since,therefore,
tential' except thatwhich is capable of realizingits ' end,' it is
obvious that the 'end' must be the active principledetermining the characterof the ' faculty.'1
We have now reached the point where Aristotle enters upon
the finalstage of his enquiry,seeking to determinethe ultimate
natureof the universefromthe vantage ground reached by these
investigations. In what follows an attemptwill be
preliminary
made to give as full an account as seems necessaryof the con1tentsof the twelfthbook (A) of the Metaphysic,as viewed in the
lightthrownupon it by what he says elsewhere.
IV.

THE

DIVINE

REASON.

In seekingto determinethe ultimaterealitywhichis the prius

of all other reality,Aristotlefollows, as usual, the regressive
methodof startingwithwhat is ' best knownto us,' and asking
what is ' best knownin itself,'i.e., what mustbe presupposed as
I

Met. 0,

1049b 4-IO50a 5S

342

THE PHILOSOPHICAL

REVIEW

[VOL.

VII.

essentialto its existence. Now, we are all familiarwith sensible

reality,in the formof particularthingswhich arise and perish,
such as plants and animals; and, therefore,
we shall startwith
this sensibleand perishablereality.
Every sensible thing is an instanceof a specificclass, and by
its verynatureis subject to change. As belongingto a class, it
necessarilyconformsto the law of its class; and, therefore,
whatever be the mode in whichit manifestsits changeable or perishable nature,it cannottranscendthe limitsof its class. Herein
we see the finitecharacterof all sensiblethings. Change necessarilyinvolves transition,
but in sensible things the transitionis
fromone contraryinto another,i.e., it takes place, not between
all opposites, but only between opposites of the same genus.
Moreover,it is characteristic
of changeable things,thatthe contrariesare mutuallyexclusive,so thatwhen the one exists the
otherceases, or the change fromone to the otherconsistsin the
substitutionof the one for the other. If, therefore,
realityconsisted in nothingbut change, we should have no individualsubstance whatever,but merelya succession of particulars. Change,
therefore,
implies thatthereis some underlyingbasis, whichpersists in the change, or which is capable of existing in contrary
states,though not at the same time. This underlyingbasis or
'matter' is, therefore,the ' permanentpossibility' of contrary
states. We can thus see that sensible things are necessarily
finiteor transitory,
just because the mode in whichtheyexist at
any giventimedoes notexpress all that is impliedin them. The
plant passes througha succession of states,but in no one of them
is its whole naturerealized; in each phase, onlypart of its reality
is 'actual,' and, therefore,
its 'matter' and its 'form,'what it is
'potentially' and what it is ' actually,' do not coincide.'
This separationbetweenwhat a thingis ' potentially'and what
it is 'actually' maybe shown to obtainin all the ways in whicha
sensible thing may change. There may be change (i) of the
' what' (xara tb ti), (2) in quality(wrotvd),
(3) in quantity(woa0)6,
(4) in place (7ro): in other words,this particularsensible thing
(t-80) may either 'originate' (Ovsetc) or ' perish ' (sOopd); it may
1 Met. A, io69a i8_ b34.

No. 4.1

THE METAPHYSIC

OF ARISTOTLE.

343

undergo' alteration' (d2Aoiewct)or change in its accidentalproperties (xara o 7rdt9o3); it may ' increase' (av$?tc) or ' decrease'
or it may ' move' (xara'-r0rovuszapo2). In none of
((peae;);
these modes of change is there any absolute originationout of
nothing,nor is thereany absolute destruction. (a) When a particularthingcomes into being or goes out of being,thereis a
transitionfrom 'potentiality'to 'actuality,' or from ' actuality'
to 'potentiality,'but thereis no creation out of nothing. The
energyis a genericprocess existing prior and subsequentto the
particularthing. (b) Aftercomingintobeingthe particularthing
may alterin quality,passing fromone contraryto another,but it
can only exist in the particularstate which its naturepermitsit
to assume. (c) It may increaseor decrease; but only because it
is capable of quantitativechange. (d) It may change in place,
but only because it is in its naturecapable of motion. It is thus
evidentthat sensible changes are in all cases the realizationof
what is 'potential,'i.e., that thereis a certain determinatenature
which confinesthe changes of each thingwithinimpassablelimits.
The realityof each thing is determinedby the generic energy
which is immanentin it. And not only is there no absolute
origination,but the changes which finiterealityundergoes are
always of a fixedcharacter. This truthwas very imperfectly
apprehended by the earlier thinkers,who rather imagined that
'matter' is the abstract possibilityof any and every change.
Were this the case, it would be impossibleto explain how there
should be such infinitevarietyin sensible things,or how certain
things are capable of change only in place, while others also
arise and perish,and undergo changes of quality and quantity.
in fact,arises the fundamentaldifference
From this distinction,
between the celestial bodies, which never arise or perish,but
change only in the way of motion,and terrestrialthings which
are perishable,and change in qualityand quantityas well as in
place. Anaxagoras,Empedocles,Anaximander,and Democritus
saw that we must presuppose ' matter' in order to account for
change, but they did not see that ' matter' is not the universal
possibilityof change, but the possibilityof certain fixed and
definitechanges which occur in accordance withthe special na-

344

THE PHILOSOPHICAL

REVIEW

[VOL. VII.

ture of that which changes, and that each kind of change has
its own law.1
In the case of finitesensiblethings,then,we find a perpetual
process of coming to be and ceasing to be, and a process of
change accordingto a fixed law or principle. It may therefore
seem that thereis no eternaland immutable' substance.' If the
changes of the world are possible only under presuppositionof
the existence of particularsubstances,while these only endure
fora limitedtimeand thenpass away, why should not all finite
substancesperish,and withthemthe whole universe? It is obvious that if there is no realityexcept thatwhich is sensibleand
perishable,thereis nothingto hinder us fromsupposingthat all
realitymay disappearin absolute non-entity. We cannot,therefore,admit that sensiblerealityis self-sustaining
or completein
itself,unless we are preparedto maintainthat thereis no distinction between being and non-being. Let us, therefore,
enquire
whetherthe process of sensible realitydoes not presupposea
realitywhichis supersensible.
If finitethingsare the only reality,theremustbe an absolute
beginningand cessationof reality,foreach finitething as such
begins to be and ceases to be. Now, we have seen that no finite
thing is self-originating,
but, on the contrary,is a manifestation
of the activitywhichis immanentin all membersof the class to
whichit belongs. It followsthat nothingfinitecan come intobeing except underthepresupposition
of somethingelse which concan be realizedonly
tainsit potentially,and thatthispotentiality
throughthe generativeactivityof the species. Now, if no finite
thingoriginatesor destroysitself,the process of the world must
be eternal. Process impliestime,and we cannotconceive of time
as beginning,because, in orderto explain itsbeginning,we should
have to suppose somethingfromwhich it proceeded,and which
was therefore' prior' to it; in other words, time would be
'prior' to itself. But this is simplyanotherway of saying that
time neverbegan to be, but is eternal. As therecan be no process withouttime,and no time withoutprocess,the process of
the world is eternal. It is also continuous,since any break in
I Met. A, xo69b 3-26.

2P/zys.

VIII,

I, 25lb

IO.

No. 4.]

THE METAPHYSIC

345

OF ARISTOTLE.

the process would mean thattherewas an absolute beginningor

end.' We have,therefore,
to ask what is the necessarycondition
of an eternalprocess. The answerto this question leads to the
highestpointreached by Aristotle. It will be well to quote his
own words: " To suppose thatthereis somethingwhichis capable of producingchange (xtvrTrtx0)or is originative(roartxodv),
but thatit does not actuallyproduce or originatechange (dveprovp),does not account forchange; forthatwhich has the power
(86vapct) to originate change may not actually originate it.
Hence it is no explanationof change whatever,to say thatthere
are eternalsubstances,as is done by the advocates of ' ideas,' so
long as these are not conceived to contain a principlecapable of
originatingchange. And even if we did hold that ' ideas' contain such a principle,or, that thereis besides themanothersubstance capable of originatingchange,we should not account for
change inasmuchas neitheris conceivedto be actuallyproductive
even iftherewere a principlewhichwas
of change. But, further,
actually productiveof change, we should not account for the
change being eternal,if we held that therewas any potentiality
in its innernature(ovoia), forthat whichis potentialmay not be.
be a principlewhichis by its verynature
There must,therefore,
actuality(pvePreoa). And such substances must be free from
' matter;' for if there is anythingat all eternal,these must be
in 'actuality.'"2 In this pregnantpaseternal,and, therefore,
sage Aristotleargues thatthe process of the world is inexplicable
unless we suppose an originativeor self-activeprinciple. All
process implies that somethingcomes to be which beforewas
not, and nothing can account for such originationexcept that
which not only has the capacityof origination,but actually is
originative;while again nothing can actually originatesomethingelse,whichis not in itsverynatureoriginativeor self-active.
the process of the world is eternal,theremustbe an
If, therefore,
eternallyoriginativereality,i.e., a realitywhich is free fromall
'matter' or limitation.
The conclusion to whichwe have been led is that thereis an
eternallycomplete or self-activeenergy,which is manifestedin
I Phvs.

VIII, 6,

259a i6.

2 Met. A, 107lb

12-22.

346

THE PHILOSOPHICAL

REVIEW

[VOL. VII.

the eternal process of the world. But this gives rise to a difficult problem. It is usually assumed that,while nothingcan be
'actual ' which is not 'possible,' all that is 'possible ' is not
' actual.' Must we not,therefore,
say thatthe 'possible' is prior
to the ' actual ?' Must we not,in otherwords,hold thatthe universe as a whole develops from the 'possible' to the ' actual'?
From what has alreadybeen said as to thepriority
of the 'actual '
as comparedwith the ' potential,'we can readilyanticipateAristotle's answer. It is true thatin finitethings the 'potential' is
prior to the 'actual,' and indeed this constitutestheir finitude;
but in realityas a whole therecan be no separationof 'potentiality' and 'actuality.' For, if all ' actual' realitywere referred
back to 'potential' reality,therewould be no possibilityof transition fromthe ' potential' to the ' actual.' That which is not
cannotoriginatethat which is, and thereforethe ' actual ' would
remainfor ever 'potential.' This assumptionof the priorityof
the 'potential ' to the 'actual' is the fundamentalmistakeof the
early poets and philosophers,who suppose the cosmos to have
developed out of a primitivechaos or unformed'matter.' But,
ifrealityas a whole is thus reduced to inactive'matter,'whence
is the active principleto come which is to develop this ' matter' into' actuality' ? We do not findbricksformingthemselves
into a house withoutthe self-activeprincipleof intelligence,or
earthbecominga plant apart fromthe self-activity
presentin the
seed; and similarly,the eternal process of the world demands
an eternaland self-activeprincipleto account for it. Leucippus
and Plato, rightlyholding that the process of the world is eternal, ought to have seen that an eternalprocess implies an eternal originativeenergy. A glimpse of this truthwas obtained
by Anaxagoras, when he made reason (vova) the principleof
'
the world,forreason is a pure energyor self-activity.
It is of fundamentalimportanceforthe understanding
of Aristotle that his argumentforthe existenceof an eternaloriginative
energyshould be properlyunderstood; and it may thereforebe
well to restateit in a freerway. There are three main points
which he seeks to establish. In the firstplace, his aimis to show
'AMet.A,

1071

b22-1072a

7,

No. 4.]

THE METAPHYSIC

OF ARISTOTLE.

347

that,while withinthe sphere of the sensible or transitory

there
is a continualprocess, the process is not self-explaining. Looking at the perpetual alternationof finitethings,it seems as if we
must say that realityis continuallyoriginatingand ceasing, or,
what is the same thing,thatthingscome into being withoutany
cause. But such a view owes its plausibilityto the assumption
thatsomethingcan originateout of nothing. The earlierthinkers
were unaware of the difficulty,
because they simply accepted
change as a fact which did not requireany principleto explain
it, and hence theysaw nothingabsurd in the doctrineof an absolute originationof reality. But change necessarilydemands
some cause, and this cause cannot be itselforiginated,because,
if it were,we should ultimatelybe forced upon an infinite
series
of causes, i.e., we should never reach a true cause at all. It is
thus evidentthat,so long as we confineourselvesto the alternation of finitethings,we have not reacheda real explanationof the
process of the world. A true ' cause' or ultimate principleis,
in Aristotle,necessarilyunproduced; it cannot have an
therefore,
originbecause then realitywould arise fromnon-entity;in short,
it is self-determining.We may speak of one finitething as the
' cause' of another; but what we here call ' cause' is merely a
particularphase in the process of the world,the true ' cause' of
whichis separatefromor independentof everyparticularphase.
Aristotle,then,maintainsthat the true 'cause' of anythingis
uncausedor self-caused. But,in the second place, a true ' cause'
cannot be merelythatwhich existsas self-dependent,
but it must
expressitself,or must be actuallyoriginative. A 'cause' must
be, as we may say, self-separative;it cannot be a dead, inactive
being,doing nothingand enjoyingmere otiumcum dignitate. If
self-dependent
realitydoes not pass over into ' actuality,'or utter
is
itself,it 'as good as nothing.' The process of the world is not
in the least explainedby the suppositionof a self-existent
reality
whichin no way affects,or expressesitselfin, that process; and
hence the Platonists,while theysee that the changes in finite
to thatwhichdoes not change,do not see
thingsmustbe referred
that true realitycannot be dead and inert,but must be actually
causative or originative. Hence the self-dependentrealitymust

348

THE PHILOSOPHICAL

REVIEW.

[VOL. VII.

reality; it must be a real

be a self-activeor self-manifesting
'cause,' not a mereinactivebeing. But, thirdly,while it is selfthe truecause mustnotlose its identity
dependentand self-active,
withitselfin exercising its causal activity;it must express itself
and yet remain equal to itselfin its expression; in other words,
and yet self-identical. Thus
it mustbe eternallyself-manifesting
we reach the necessaryconclusionthat theremustbe an eternal
or uncreatedreality,which must eternallyexpress itselforiginatively,and yet eternallypreserveits self-identity.
From the pointof view now reached we can understandhow
Aristotleis led to maintainthatthe process of the world must be
eternal. If therewere a cessationof thatprocess,we should have
to suppose thatan eternal self-activeprincipleceased to be selfactive; whichis the same as sayingthatit would cease to exist,
since an inactiveprincipleis a mere 'potentiality,'and indeed the
'potentiality'of nothing. This is the fundamentalidea which
underliesAristotle's contentionthat a self-activeprinciplemust
manifestitselfin the eternal circular movementof the heavens.
The imperfect
astronomicalknowledge of his day was no doubt
partlyresponsibleforthe doctrinethat the spheres of the stars
revolvein an absolutelyuniformway,but it should be observed
that he regardsthe argumentforthe eternalprocess of the world
as independentof actual observation,though,as he thinks,confirmedby it.1 Admittingthe astronomicalerror,the contention
thatthe process of the world cannotbe a creationor exhaustion
of the eternalenergyof the whole remainsintact. The essential
point is that a self-activecause must express itselfin the productionof change, and must yet returninto itself,or retainits
in this expression.2
self-identity,
Grantingthatthereis an eternalenergy,absolutelyinexhaustible in its originationof change, thereremainsthe supremelyimportantquestionas to its ultimatenature. Aristotlehas, in various passages, intimatedthatthe ultimateprincipleof the universe
must be Reason (vos), and he now seeks to show that an eternal
to
self-activereality,as alreadyproved to exist,must be referred
culmiReason. To understandthis
an absolute, self-originative
1Met. A, 1072a 21.

2Met. A, 6,

1072a 25.

No. 4.]

THE METAPHYSIC

OF ARISTOTLE.

349

it will be well to preparethe way

nationof his whole metaphysic,
by a referenceto the discussion of the nature of reason,as set
forthin the thirdbook of the De Anima.
Reason, as we find it in ourselves, is essentiallyself-active.
"Reason (ro voscvj)," says Aristotle, "cannot be passive, but
must be receptiveof 'form,'and ' potentially,'though not ' actually,'identicalwith 'form.' The relationof reason (vobc)to its
object(ra' voucd)will thus be similarto that of the facultyof sense
(To ai'Oizrexov) to the sensible (rZ alord0^q)." 1 Reason, in other
words,cannot exist at all except in so far as it is capable of
graspingthe ' form,'' essence,' or permanent' nature' of reality,
and this it cannot do, if it is merely passive, or acted upon in a
purelyexternalor mechanicalway. Just as sensibleperception
is not the transference
of the sensible thing into the sensible
being,but the active apprehensionby that being of the sensible
'form,' so reason is capable of grasping the intelligible' form,'
in virtueof its own self-activity. In man reason at firstexists
only 'potentially,' and it cannot be said to exist untilit is exercised; but it is, nevertheless,implicitin the lower phase of sensible perception. Thus the transitionfromsensibleperceptionto
reason is a developmentfrom' potentiality'to ' actuality,'so that
the formeris relatedto the latteras ' matter' to ' form.' Sensible
perception,viewed in itself,is not mere 'matter' or 'potentiality,'
but has its own 'form' or 'actuality;' relativelyto the more developed stage of reason, however,ithas to be viewedas the ' matter' to which reason gives 'form.'2 "Since reason thinks all
things,"proceeds Aristotle,"it mustbe unmixed,as Anaxagoras
says,in orderthatitmaymasterthings,i.e.,knowthem;foritchecks
and excludes whateveris foreignto its own nature. Hence reason has no ' nature' but this,thatit is capable (Juvazdv)."3 Here
Aristotleexplicitlyrejects the idea of an absolute limitto intelligence. To suppose thatintelligencehas a peculiar naturewhich
preventsit fromgraspingthe real natureof things,is to deny the
'De An. III, 4, 429a I5-I8.
2 The development
ofsensibleperception
intoactivereason(voiC7ro1o7rtK6g)
involves
the intermediatestages of memory(av' v), imagination(Oavraaia) and reflection
The wholeoftheseconstitute
the ' passivereason' (voiw7raO7rr7K6C).
(taivota).

3,bid., 429a i8-22.

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of reason is thatits
possibilityof knowledge. What is distinctive
capacityis not limitedto the apprehensionof some particular
mode of reality,but it is the capacityof grasping the essential
natureof all reality. It is 'potentially,'i.e., beforeit is actually
exercised,by its verynature identicalwith reality,and when it
becomes whatin essence it is, what it thinksand what is are absolutelyidentical. This identityof thoughtand reality,it will be
observed,is not incompatiblewith theirdistinction;but the disand actuality,and when the transitinctionis that of potentiality
tion is made fromthe formerto the latterthe distinctiondisappears. Reason, therefore,is free from ' matter,'i.e., there is
nothingwhichit cannot make an object,and therebybringwithin
we speak of it as 'potential,' this does
itself. When, therefore,
not mean that it is infectedwith a limitwhich it cannottranscend, but merelythat,in the individualman, it is not yet realdeveloped into actuized, or has not by its inherentself-activity
from perception is manifest.
ality. "That reason is different
Sense cannot perceive when the sensible is too strong; e.g.,
we cannothear aftera veryloud noise, nor see or smell aftertoo
vivid colors or too pungent odors. Reason, on the otherhand,
when it thinksthat whichis in the highest degree intelligible,is
not therebyincapacitatedforthinkingthatwhichis less intelligible,
but it thinksthe latter better. For sense is not independentof
fromit."1 In
the body,whereas reason is separable (xwpeazc6)
but
sensible perception,Aristotleargues, the mindis self-active,
is limitedby the condition of the bodily organ,
its self-activity
and thereforeit is self-dewhereas reason is pure self-activity,
reason is not in unionwithits object
veloping. While,therefore,
is the potenexcept when it is actually developed,its potentiality
of
or
Hence
we are told
self-activity.
independent
pure
tiality
that " reasonis ' potentially'all thatis thought,though' actually'
it is nothingbefore it thinks."' In other words,reason cannot
be said to have any existence except as self-active;it is incapable of beingacted upon fromwithout,and its ' actuality' is thereforeidenticalwiththe thinkingof its own activity. Reason is
therefore' potential' onlyin the sense that its capacityforthink1 Ibid., 429a 29-Jb5

2 Ibid., 429a 22-24.

No. 4.]

THE METAPHYSIC

OF ARISTOTLE.

35 1

ing the real may not be developed into the explicitcomprehension of the real. It is in this sense that it is compared to a
tabula rasa, not in the sense of Locke, forwhom the mind was
the mere recipientof ideas produced in it by external things.
There is forAristotleno contentof reason apart fromits selfactivity,and when reason comes to an explicit knowledge of
itselfor is ' active,'what it knows are the ' forms'of itself,or the
modes of its own self-activity.Thus man, when he reaches the
stage of activereason (vov rotprx6) grasps the self-activeprinciple which is operativein himselfand which is the source of
the eternalprocess of the world.'
We are now in a betterpositionto understandthe finaldiscussion in the Metaphysic,in whichAristotleseeks to determinethe
nature of the Supreme Reality upon which the whole universe
depends.
Turningto the world of finitethings,Aristotlepointsout that
thereis in each being an effortor desireor strivingtowards an
end, and.that this end is not changeable but is involvedin the
verynatureof the being in which the desireis operative. In rational beings,thereis also an end, and the whole of the rational
life is directedtowards it. Now, here we have a fixed or unchangeable principle,whichis yet the moving principlein the
whole lifeof the beings in whichit is operative. It is not possible to account forthe persistenttendencytowardsa certainend
by sayingthat an object seems ' good' because it is desired,for
end; the onlypossible
thiswould mean that desirehas no definite
it
seems 'good,' ie.,
is
it
is
desired
because
that
explanation
because reason grasps the principlewhich satisfiesits tendency
towardstherational-that whichwill afforda completesatisfaction
to desire. Every being is thereforestrivingaftercompleteselfrealization,and the whole process of its lifeis a meansto thisend.
Now, whateveris in process is of necessityincomplete,and,therefore,the originalsource of all the process of finitethingsmustbe
the unchangeable or self-completeReality,which admits of no
process of developmentfromthe less to themore complete. The
Absolute Reality is eternallycomplete,and in its freeand inde1 De An., 4, 429a 3I_430a

2.

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pendentliferealizes eternallythat which man only realizesin his

best moments. Being thus always completelyself-active,
it must
for felicityis proportionateto the
always enjoy absolute felicity,
realizationof self-activity,
and the Supreme Realityis the complete realization of self-activity,
and, therefore,
absolute felicity.
Now, the essentialnatureof thoughtis to grasp thatwhichis real,
and the supremethought is the thought of that which is absolutely real. Intelligence,in thinkingthe intelligible,therefore
thinksthat whichis the veryessence of intelligence. When intelligencethus grasps its own nature,it actually is intelligence,
whereas beforeit was only the potentialityof intelligence. The
highestreachof intelligenceis, therefore,
to graspitselfas a whole,
i.e., to become conscious of the formsof its own self-activity.
When fora fewbriefmomentsman reaches this stage, he enjoys
the greatest felicityof which he is capable. But God is always
what we are only at times; nay, He eternallyenjoys a felicity
still more complete. He is thus the self-active,living,eternal,
best. Nor has He any sensible nature,because he would then
be extendedand divisible; He is, therefore,
a purelysupersensible
or incorporeal Being'

Certaindropiat may be raised in connectionwiththisconception of God. (i) What is the object of the Divine Reason? It
will be admittedthat Reason (pour)is the highestfacultymanifestedby a finitebeing. The Supreme Reason must therefore
thinkthat which is in the highest sense real, thatwhichis most
divine. And this highest reality it must eternallythink, for
any change in thoughtwould be forthe worse, and would imply
incompleteness. (2) Is there any' potentiality'in the Divine
Reason ? Manifestlynot, for this would imply that it did
not think uninterruptedly,
since thatwhich is not continually
thinkingshows that it is fatiguedby the continuousactivityof
thinking. Moreover,(3) ifin the Divine Reason therewere any
'potentiality,'that which is thoughtwould be higher in nature
than the Divine Reason itself. For, since it would be dependent upon whateverwas presented,it would exist no matterwhat
was thought. If thereforethe Divine Reason must thinkthe
' Met. A, 7,

I072

a 26-I073

a 13.

No. 4.]

THE METAPHISIC

OF ARISTOTLE.

353

highestreality,it must think itself,and thus it consists in the

thinkingof thought(Voweqvofasrw). The mode of its activity
is not perception(ac'vaftO), opinion(80da) and externalreflection
(edvoea), in whichthe object of thoughtappears as distinctfrom
in whichthoughtis at
thought,but the total or concreteactivity,
once subject and object or thinks itself. Further, (4) if the
how could it be the
Divine Reason and its object were different,
can only be resolved
highest form of reality? This difficulty
when it is seen that even in human thinkingthe essence of
thingsis thoughtwithoutthe ' matter.' This holds good both in
the productiveand the theoreticalsciences,where thoughtand
its object are identical. In the Supreme Reason, however,the
object which is thought must be identical with Reason itself.
(5) Nor can the Divine Reason be composite. That which is
compositecan be thoughtonly by a transitionfrompart to part.
Now human reason only grasps the meaning of the universe
when it conceivesit as an indivisiblewhole. Hence the Divine
Reason, whichis its own object, must be an absolute whole or
individual,and this whole it must eternallycontemplate. God,
to sum up the result of the whole enquiry,is eternal,
therefore,
self-knowing,and
unchangeable, self-dependent,self-originative,
immaterial,the firstand finalcause of the whole process of the
universe.1
and self-knowing.
The Divine Reason is thus self-originative
It must,however,be added that,while it is the primarysource of
all energy,thereis communicatedto the universean energyof its
own. The highestformof this energyis exhibitedin the eternal
substancesof the stars; a less degree of energyis foundin those
beings which arise and perish,and whichare thereforesubject to
and thus
change and accident; but all thingswork harmoniously,
in
its
which
The
the universeis a cosmos.
perfection
principle
constitutesthe Divine Reason is immanentin each part,and maniaftercompleteness; so thatthereis a regufestsitselfas an effort
lar gradation of existence, beginning with lifeless things and
stages of vegetativeand senascendingthroughthe intermediate
sitivelife,to the rationallifeof man, the highestformof which is
1Met.A, 9, I074b I5-I075a IO0

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[VOL. VII.

speculativeinsightinto the firstprinciplesof all reality. Thus

of each part,while
Aristotleseeks to provideforthe self-activity
he maintainsthe independenceof the Divine Reason and its separationfromthe world. The Divine Reason, while it is the
originalsource of all the process of the world,does not act upon
it mechanically,but each being,through the self-activitycommunicatedto and immanentin it, strivesafter thatcompleteness
of naturewhichconstitutesthe movingprincipleof all its activity.
There is thus a complete circle of reality,the Divine Reason
being at once the beginningand the end ofall existence. Hence
Aristotle compares the universeas a whole to a well-ordered
armywitha general at the head, and to an organizedState, in
which each member discharges his own function,though the
functionis not in all the same. The inexhaustibleand rational
Divine Energycommunicatesitselfto the eternal substancesof
the stars,which communicatetheir energyto finiteand changeable things,and these ever strivetowardstheiroriginalsource in
virtueof the energyimmanentin them.'
QUEEN'S

JOHN WATSON.

UNIVERSITY.
I Met.lO, 1075

I I-25.