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Projective Identification: A Neuro-psychoanalytic

Perspective
Klaus Roeckerath
Published online: 09 Jan 2014.

To cite this article: Klaus Roeckerath (2002) Projective Identification: A Neuro-psychoanalytic Perspective,
Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal for Psychoanalysis and the Neurosciences, 4:2, 173-181, DOI:
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173

Projective Identification: A Neuro-psychoanalytic Perspective

Klaus Roeckerath

There is no doubt that all psychic processes have

a somatic substrate. Starting from that viewpoint,
I would like to investigate a psychoanalytic
concept of unconscious perception in regard to
its compatibility with neuroscientic models of
psychic functioning. I will do so in order to
scrutinize in which way a well established psychoanalytic term could be looked at from a
neuroscientic point of view.1
The term in question is ``Projective identication'' (PI). It has become a well dened term in
psychoanalysis since it was rst introduced by
Melanie Klein in 1946. For the non-psychoanalytic reader its content will be described briey
in the following sections of this paper. The reason
I chose this term for trying to bridge a gap
between psychoanalysis and the neurosciences is
because it deals with perception. Cognitive
science primarily explores the way the brain
handles information processing. Although it
covers attempts to provide models of unconscious
processes, it nevertheless lacks theories and/or
descriptions of how unconscious information
gathering takes place in intersubjective encounters. As psychoanalytic concepts deal with exactly
these processes, a combination of both models
might give further insight. What I want to address
here is the interdependence of two sciences that
have in focus the most precious development of
evolution: the human mind. In so far it is
reasonable that the two should exchange their
ndings.
PI represents a model of an intersubjective

exchange via unconscious pathways. While

psychoanalysis is well aware of the ongoing
subjective processes during this exchange, there
is no scientically based model of how this
exchange may take place. Therefore, it remained
a somewhat mystic phenomenon, often referred
to as a ``telepathic'' encounter. Nevertheless, it is
a well established and usable concept in psychoanalytic treatment.
Neuroscientic research has produced a
wealth of insight in brain functions involved in
information processing. The models of the working mind developed on this basis dier of course
from the psychoanalytic models in some respects,
but there is a convergence in other aspects (Solms,
1998a). Freud himself refrained from following
the neuroscientic approach because he clearly
realized that the methods available at his time
could not provide substantial data in exploring
the eld of the neuroses (Solms, 1998a). The
neurosciences typically conceive of the brain as an
organ which constructs an image of the world,
i.e., inner and outer reality, rather than copying it
isomorphically.2
If individual construction of reality and
drawing appropriate conclusions from it is its
main task, how do we gain sucient knowledge
about what is going on in order to survive? The
need to understand what a member of one's own
species ``has in mind'' (Simon Baron-Cohen,
1995) surely belongs to this task. Psychoanalysis
has developed its special approach to the detection of unconscious psychic material.
As a mode of unconscious communication
between two individuals, PI has not been
subjected to systematic investigation in the
neurosciences as a mode of perception on a
neurobiological basis. Nevertheless, some of their
models contain certain aspects of it.

1
I am well aware of the fact that there exist several models for
several phenomena of the human mind. I am referring here to the
overall assumption that the brain and its functions ``produce'' the
human mind in general.

2
I follow the view of Llinas and Ribary (1994) here, who state
that the brain operates in a constructivistic mode, i.e., it constructs
its reality by processing the information it perceives. The outer or
inner stimuli don't act directly on the brain (Freeman, 1995).

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The truth of the matter is that what we call the

unconscious is really unconscious to us but is itself
never unconscious of us [J. Grotstein].

Introduction

174

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Based on a psychoanalytic case study in

which projective identication played a major
role over a certain period of time, I would like to
discuss some potential theoretical connections
between the psychoanalytic concept of PI and a
newly introduced model of the generation of
consciousness by neuroscientist Antonio Damasio
(1999). After a short discussion of the psychoanalytic theory of PI and related phenomena, I
will present the case and then try to formulate
some considerations which may shed a new light
on PI. It will be found that the language in which
this is accomplished diers from ``pure'' psychoanalytical presentations. If this is an improvement
will be left to the audience's judgment.
Projective Identification (PI)
Since the work of Melanie Klein (1946) the
phenomenon of PI has drawn the attention of
numerous psychoanalytic authors (Bott-Spillius
(ed.), 1988; Ogden, 1982; Sandler, 1987; Schar,
1992, to name only a few). It has been discussed
as an early psychic defense mechanism by which
unwanted, unbearable inner objects or feelings
are projected into an outer object. The object, in
turn, now seems to possess the attributes of the
projected inner object, and may eventually be
identied as ``bad'' by the projecting subject. In
this way, its view of reality is distorted according
to its needs. But the object also actually changes
according to the projected attributes. It must be
added that M. Klein did not limit PI to ``objects'',
but rather spoke of ``object relations'' being
projected. This takes into account the fact that
psychic subjects deal with the environment by
relating to it, i.e., they build psychic representations of themselves in connection with the object.
Bion (1989) enriched the concept by introducing the model of ``container/contained''. He
pointed out the enormous importance this process
has for the normal psychic development of
infants. Only if the early caregiver (``container'')
is capable of taking in the (to be ``contained'')
projections of the baby and change them into less
aggressive and ``good'' objects by inner processes,
it is possible for the infant to take back its
projections in a feasible way and deal with them.
By identifying with the modied projections it
gradually develops a mental apparatus (mentalization, Fonagy, 1991). In this sense, the ``container/contained'' system is kind of a mental
``digestive system''. Similar processes take place
in every analysis.
It is characteristic for this process that it
happens unconsciously. The receptor of the

Klaus Roeckerath
projections experiences the feelings generated by
them as alien to him; but he does not do so before
a certain time has passed: most often he is not
aware when the projection actually ``enters'' him.
If one asks how it should be possible to transport
inner feelings, mental or physical states, all of
them highly subjective and therefore unique, into
another human being, even without speaking
about them,3 the process becomes a complicated
matter. How comes the mother actually ``knows''
what the baby experiences, when telepathic
processes are not an option for possible explanations? Bion's term for this was ``reverie'', a state
of subconscious empathy with the child. The same
phenomenon can be seen in daily life and
especially in every analytic hour: ``somehow'' we
(analysts) ``know'' from within about the patient's
intentions. But ``reverie'' does not provide a
model how this transaction is achieved. As brains
construct reality, the receptor must contribute to
this process. I want to focus on the activity taking
place primarily on the object's side of PI.
PI and Theory of Mind
The term ``Theory of Mind'' (Premack and
Woodru, 1978) addresses a cognate problem:
how can we deferby only looking at a person or
a scenewhat this person's state of mind is or
what is happening in a special scenario? BaronCohen's (1995) concept describes especially three
functional units of the psychic apparatus which
seem to be involved in this: the eye-directiondetector (EDD), the shared-attention mechanism
(SAM), and the intentionality detector (ID). The
three modules work together and nally compose
a ``theory'' about how the actual perception of the
outer world, may it be a person or a scene, should
be interpreted. This process, in opposition to PI,
is nearer to consciousness. Nevertheless it seems
reasonable to submit PI under the many processes
with which we gain an ``impression'' of the other's
state of mind. The consequences of an absence of
this ability can be seen in the autistic or
Asperger's syndrome. People with autism cannot
interpret the state of another person's mind, and
thus will behave strange in social situations.4
Now let me present the case material.
3
Even when language is involved it is hardly possible to
convey exactly how one feels. These things belong to the ``qualia'',
the subjective perception of oneself and of the world.
4
Recent research with autists seems to indicate, though, that
the basic capability to decipher another human being's mental state
is not diminished, but that the autist lacks the ability to
operationalize this understanding ``into a functional tool that
would allow him to adjust better to the demands of real-time, reallife social situations . . .'' (Klin et al., 1993).

Projective Identification: A Neuro-psychoanalytic Perspective

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Mrs. A
Mrs. A is the third of four siblings (sisters +3,
+5, brother 2), and she came to analysis at the
age of 34. She is a lawyer and in a leading position
at a government agency. At the time to be
discussed here she is in treatment for nearly 4
years (4 hrs. per week). When I saw her for the
rst time she complained about various anxieties,
especially to step up in public (which actually was
part of her job); she used to blush easily, and
tended to mistrust people. The relationship with
her now 52 years old friend B, a successful lawyer
himself, bore the sign of suspicion and unjustied
jealousy. At the same time she wished to have a
child with him. The perspective to grow older
without having fullled this wish threatened her.
In this conict she asked for help.
Two perceptions in the rst encounter left a
strong impression on me: her clumsy, kind of
wooden movements, enforced by her height (she's
nearly 1, 90 mtrs) made me feel uncomfortable;
the narrative about her inner states invoked a
similar feeling of clumsiness in me. On the other
hand her sincerity and her readiness to focus
attention on her problems moved me. I understood my hesitance therefore as a mirror of her
ambivalence towards analysis. At the same time
something more seemed to be hidden which could
not become more visible at this moment. We
agreed on an analysis with 4 sessions per week.
As could be expected due to the symptoms
described above, she developed a negative transference, prevailed by mistrust. Working through
these aspects brought forth a highly ambivalent
relationship with her parents. She felt very poorly
acknowledged by them, especially by her mother;
from early times on she had the strong impression
that her siblings found an easier access to her. The
mother pursued her own goals in the rst place,
instead of listening to her children's needs. She
did not refrain from manipulative maneuvers to
dominate the children.
The father had to give up his academic study
due to WW II; he worked hard as a farmer, and
nally advanced to a high position in a ministry.
He suspiciously watched his daughters, especially
during their puberty, when he tended to be violent
at times. So he lurked for them at night on their
way home to see if they were ``alone'' as they had
to promise. In general, he was a reserved man
who seldom spoke.
Mrs. A. was aware of her strong rage and
fantasies of revenge; behind lay a deep sorrow
about an unfullled relationship and a pronounced feeling of being worthless.
Beside this, seemingly out of the blue sky, she

175

suered from feelings of desperation, the contents

of which she could hardly describe. Each time it
seemed as if she lost the ground under her feet.
Now and then, we could attribute these states to
dicult situations in the analysis, sometimes to
the absence of her partner. But I could not come
up with any really substantial interpretation for
that. In the sessions now to be discussed this
problem reached a new dimension and came
nearer to an understanding.
Over time I could adjust better to Mrs. A. I
also had the feeling that I got more used to her
``woodenness''. A certain ``jolting'' in our communication, though, persisted.
Gradually she was able to perceive her
environment less fearful. She even advanced in
her oce and fullled her wish for a child.5
The two sessions I want to describe are from
this period of the analysis.
The Antecedents of the Sessions
Mrs. A interrupted the analysis for six week only,
and had delivered her child through an emergency
Caesarean section only three weeks before resuming analysis: her daughter C had the umbilical
cord wound around her neck two times and was
in great distress. I was somewhat surprised by the
soon return. We had agreed on a later date for
resuming analysis. I felt a little bit overwhelmed;
almost, as if she intruded me by force. On the
other hand, I could understand her wish to
continue with analysis very well, as she only
gradually recovered from the horror of the
delivery, and also had to attune to her child.
Nevertheless, it had come to some turbulence
between us in the rst sessions, which I understood mostly as resulting from my diculty to reestablish my inner representation of Mrs. A quick
enough.
Discussions with B about the adequate care
for C reected her insecurity in this regard. It also
manifested in a (helpless) intervention of mine
about the actual state of C, whom she brought
with her into one of the sessionsas if I knew
much better what was good for C. Mrs. A was
especially afraid something harmful could happen
to C. One of her frightful fantasies was that, while
sleeping, she could roll on top of C, who slept
next to her in bed, and smother her.
A central scene in her associations was an
episode with her father, who could not open the
5
I refrain form describing the transference implications for
reason of space.

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176
central lock of his car. In the trunk were fresh
owers, which were about to rot due to the
summery heat. The father was rather desperate.
Only through complicated maneuvers the car
could nally be opened after hours. In this
context the topic of being secluded, inaccessible
and locked in, appeared in numerous variations in
analysis. Nevertheless I did not gain a deeper
understanding of the situation. There was no
image building up inside me about the inner
situation of the patient. I considered this as an
expression of the actual diculty to re-activate
the self-patient-object (Bollas, 1995) inside me.
Obviously I felt more disturbed through her
sudden return than I could become aware of.
Therefore I had an uneasy feeling during the
sessions, as if I remained in her debt for something. A feeling of fear crept on me if I could reestablish contact with her. My counter-transference in this time reectedas I see it todayher
own embarrassment about C: what was going on
inside her; what was going on between us? The
following two sessions took place three weeks
after her return. They were preceded by a
cancellation of an appointment on my behalf in
the week before.

Klaus Roeckerath
I am moved by her emotional outburst.
Suddenly I have the uneasy feeling again to have
failed. I discover myself considering how ``justiable'' her claims are after all. Her approach seems
to upset me. Then I think that she is a lawyer: as if
she wanted to prosecute her demands. I understand my reaction as the result of an attempt to
escape the pressure Mrs. A put on me, because I
feel helpless myself right now. I think it is she who
is upset about the fact that I wasn't accessible in a
situation where she urgently needed to see me.
I say: ``You felt abandoned by me in a
situation which seemed to overwhelm you, and
this upset you.''
Mrs. A does not pick up on this directly but
calms down a bit, and then goes on about B's
plans to expand his enterprise and take up new
activities. This, again, will implicate longer
separations. She understands fully it is inevitable,
but she can't stay relaxed with it. She cannot set
her mind at ease, does not seem to nd an anchor.
At the end of the session an impression of
emptiness, perplexity and loss of perspective
arises in me. It expresses itself in numbness, a
feeling of being cut o from any emotion.
Considerations on the First Session

The Sessions
First Session

She is early and rings me out of the current

session. She looks excited: the ride was very
stressing, a trac jam obstructed her way, but she
hurried up and made it even before time. Again, I
am confused, partly about the unusual event itself
(normally, she is rather discrete and punctual),
partly about her excited state.
The following session deals mostly about her
anger concerning a lecture-tour of B, implicating
his absence for some time, and her worries about
C, who has fallen ill. She had to consult a
pediatrician a friend recommended. She did not
know him and was unsure about his competence.
I can follow her worries about C very well, as she
had to search for medical help the rst time
outside the routine screenings. I interpret her fear
of being overwhelmed, and connect it to my
absence in the preceding week: obviously she felt
overwhelmed and had the urgent need to consult
me. Instead, she had to cope with it alone. She
agrees, but emphasizes appealingly my overall
reliability. Neverthelessshe just can not get the
feeling that something is suciently reliable, and
this despite the fact ``that I come here for such a
long time.'' She is rather desperate and nally
starts to cry.

While I was taking notes on the session later, it

came to my mind that most of the last sessions
were characterized by this special irritation. What
Mrs. A conveyed to me (or the picture of Mrs. A I
tried to establish inside me) reected an inability
and lack of inner pictures on her side. She
desperately was seeking for orientation, and by
this generated a massive confusion in me. This
had probably led me to actually express a
concrete conjecture about C's state some sessions
ago, i.e., to act out my counter-transference,
rather than to take her basic irritation more into
focus. Mrs. A was overwhelmed by anxieties to
lose control and by aggressive fantasies that C
could suer harm. The picture of the umbilical
cord that strangulates rather than nourishes
might have been a metaphor for the current
situation between us.
Her associations of the ``trac-jam'', the
complaints about the absence of B, and the
consultation of the pediatrician ``beyond routine''
seemed all to indicate that she felt abandoned by
me, being left alone with her fears. Although I
could emphatically feel her anxiety concerning C,
her distress and complaining about B's absence,
and even could convey this to her by means of a
transference interpretation, it nevertheless did not
bring about any relief. Her state of mind
obviously resulted from deeper turmoils of her

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Projective Identification: A Neuro-psychoanalytic Perspective

experience, which mirrored itself in the outer
events, but which themselves were nevertheless
not causative in the rst place.
These considerations made it clear to me that
I had, by looking at her ``reality'', drawn my
attention from her inner world. ``Reality'' became
a metaphor for Mrs. A's inner reality, according
to which she tried to shape it. This constellation
already had developed after her return to analysis
and persisted since then. I had not succeeded to
master my own confusion in a suciently fast
enough time to transform it into a helpful
intervention.
Mrs. A, so it seemed to me, had been aicted
by the delivery of her child twofold. First, she had
experienced giving birth as a loss, while she had
felt safe and strong during pregnancy; this had led
to an inner turmoil. Second, C suddenly appeared
to her as an object about which she had developed
fantasies and imaginations during pregnancy, but
which now ``disturbed'' these conceptualizations
and asked for a new adaptation. Mrs. A was
unable to achieve this in a sucient way. I did not
see a third level then: her physiology had changed
during pregnancy and delivery due to hormonal
alterations. At that time, I understood my
irritation basically as a mirror of Mrs. A's
irritation, which seemed to encompass her whole
personality. The major concern of the past
sessions did not lie in the daily aairs and
obstacles, but rather in the loss of herself, the
loss of her ``feeling'' for herself. Paradoxically it
seemed as if she had experienced the separation
from her child through birth as a separation from
herself as well. Her ``premature'' entry into the
session now appeared to me as a projective
identication with her own being overwhelmed
by the delivery of C. I may add my assumption
that probably the hormone-change played a
major role in this: the expression of a physiological ``thunderstorm''. I was not aware of it at
that time, except that her behavior ``puzzled'' me
for the time being. Nevertheless, I felt I had
regained some ``analytic power'' after these
considerations.
The Second Session

In the following hour Mrs. A is very much

obsessed with C, who has caught a cold. She has
diculties to ``suck in air'', and needs constant
attendance. B is still absent. Mrs. A feels tired and
exhausted, because she can hardly sleep at all
during the nights. I myself feel much more
relaxed, compared with the previous sessions. I
``hear'' much better her eorts to keep up her
ability to act in a state she has no words for yet.

177

Her excitement does not infect me this time in the

sense that I also get confused. Instead, I see a
mother trying with much eort to help her child,
although she herself feels very insecure if she is
doing right and furthermore experiences feelings
she cannot categorize.
I say: It is an enormous eort for you to keep
up your circumspection to treat C adequately,
despite your actual inner needs. This is especially
dicult as you apparently cannot conceive what
these needs are.
At rst she keeps silent. Then she moves on
the couch to bring herself into a dierent,
obviously more convenient position. She seems
to calm down a little bit. For the rst time since
we resumed analysis I have the impression to have
found a more stable approach to her. Then she
talks about her feelings of last night, her fear to
overhear C and not being there when she needs
her.
I say: You also want to convey to me how
much you depend on me, and how insecure you
feel when left alone or not understood by me.
She briey mentions B, who frequently calls
and tries to soothe her, but most of the time this
doesn't carry her far. She also had tried in vain to
reach her mother on the phone. After a while she
can speak about her impression that over the last
sessions I also was unable to push things further,
that I looked resigned and without perspectives to
her.
I say: Obviously you had the impression I
overhear you in the same way you fear to
overhear C when she cries; this also reminds
you how you felt when you have been overheard
by your mother when you needed her.
She becomes livelier and says she hadn't seen
it this way, but the situations may be comparable
indeed. It would be sheer horror to think that I
was not the listener anymore who really listens.
``In the early times of analysis I was anxious what
you might think about me, and wanted to know
everything. But I realized that it is of much more
importance that you understand what I am
talking about. I have the feeling this is what I
need.''
I say: You want to be sure that I know about
your inner life in case you don't know what's
going on. Only when you can be sure of that, so is
your hope, you can calm down and approach
yourself again.
Mrs. A keeps silent after that interpretation
for a while. Then she recalls that she read about
mothers being able to instinctually know what
their children need. Only that she has the feeling
that was not so easy with her. She falls silent
again, and then tells a story from the times when

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178
the family moved away from the farm where she
grew up to the city. She was seven years then.
Weeks ahead she felt uncomfortable and had
diculties to sleep. Nothing was said about the
forthcoming removal, neither if it was dicult for
the children to lose the environs they loved, nor if
they had anxieties about what they would be up
to coming to the city. She didn't know at these
times what was the matter with her, but later
thought she might have been sad. Only her
younger brother cried out loud when the day
had nally come. ``But that's how it was most of
the time. Mother didn't understand somehow
when one suered from grief. ``Don't make such a
fuss!'', she used to say. I think I am worried I
could be like her. That's why I'm always looking
so cautiously not to overlook anything.''
During her narrative I see pictures in my
head how she strolled around the farm as a child,
wavering what she should feel and think. This
reminds me of my state of perplexity at the end of
the last session. Because she recalls a whole timespan I think it has been similar to her since the
delivery, maybe even during the whole pregnancy:
An incisive change of life had to be integrated. All
her life she had lacked eective support with this,
and similarly dicult it had been for us in the past
two weeks. Probably also because she feared her
aggression against C and her demands, an
aggression she has to avoid at all costs.
I say: I think the past time has brought up a
lot in you concerning similarly dicult changes in
your life. I suppose there is a lot more to
understand for us, especially as far as your
diculties are concerned to get a clearer picture
about yourself and your intentions.
Mrs. A is completely calm now. C is not
mentioned in the following sessions explicitly.
Instead, numerous memories of her life come up,
which all seem to show basically the same pattern:
an emotional confusion, the frantic search for a
solution, followed by a resigned giving in to the
circumstances, or the counter-movement into
mistrusting and aggressive pseudo-autonomy.
As can be seen from this description it took
me some time until I nally understood Mrs. A on
a more conscious level, and could use this insight
to give an interpretation which opened up again
her inner space to associate freely. How did this
insight came about? Who told me which words to
use in order to convey to her what I thought about
the situation? How did I became conscious of what
was going on at all, i.e., how did I come up with a
concept for interpreting what was the matter?
I am not going to discuss the psychoanalytic
aspects of the case, as it leads in a direction which
is not the purpose of this paper. Rather, I would

Klaus Roeckerath
like to discuss how the interactions between Mrs.
A and me could be seen from a neuroscientic
model of becoming conscious.
Antonio Damasio's Model of the Generation of
Consciousness
Let me introduce here the theory of consciousness
that has recently been proposed by neuroscientist
Antonio Damasio. I will do this as brief as
possible and then focus on a special part of it. I
will have to leave out many important aspects of
his model. In his book ``The feeling of what
happens'' (1999) he describes the role of emotions
as changes of body states in the generation of
consciousness. In a nutshell, he proposes three
stages in the process of generating consciousness.
The rst is the state of the ``proto-self''. It
consists of neural patterns, connected and coherent in time, which continually monitor the actual
state of the body in so called rst order maps. The
proto-self is not conscious.6
Emotions, in Damasio's denition, are basic
bodily changes, inaugurated by stimuli, and
gaining physiological meaning while being processed. They will show in behavior, but don't need
consciousness necessarily. The function of the
proto-self reects, simply spoken, ``being''; it is
not yet sucient for ``being conscious''.
Once this network encounters an objectin
Damasio's terminology an outer object as well as
an inner perceptiontwo things happen at the
same time. First, the object is mapped in the
relevant centers as neural activity, which in turn
alters the activity patterns that map the body state
(the proto-self); second, both events will be
mapped as activity patterns in second order
maps. These maps represent the causal connection between an object and an organism in the
process of change through the interaction with
this object. Mapping this process can become
conscious as a ``feeling'', the subjective notion of
an ongoing emotion. Emotions, in this classication, are not subject of consciousness itself; they
become conscious through generating a feeling.7
6
Nevertheless, the organism on this level is capable to react
adequately to outer or inner stimuli. Comatose patients, for
instance, show reactions to painful stimuli. The fact that they show
mimic patterns on their face that correspond to certain emotions
shows that theydespite being unconsciousare subject to
emotional processes.
7
According to Damasio not all feelings are conscious. As an
example he points out to feelings the origin of which we cannot
determine, but which nevertheless inuence our behaviour. As we
also can become conscious of our feelings, there seems to exist a
third level, namely the level of ``consciousness of feeling''. It is an
open question in psychoanalysis if aects, as a synonym for feeling,
can be unconscious (Shevrin, 2000).

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This brings forth the ``core-self''. As long as

we encounter objects in the outer or inner
environment it is nearly impossible to evade
``real'' or ``thought'' objects. In other words, as
long as we don't manipulate our brain, we will
have core-consciousness.8
A rst consequence of this process is the
feeling of ``knowing'', a rst realization of
ourselves in an environment. A second consequence is that the image of the object is drawn
into attention, and discerns itself from its background. It becomes more visible, it becomes a
factreality. In short, what Damasio claims here
is that we become conscious through establishing
a relationship.
Core consciousness occurs when the brain's
representation devices generate an imaged, nonverbal account of how the organism's own state
is aected by the organism's processing of an
object, and when this process enhances the image
of the causative object, thus placing it saliently in
a spatial and temporal context [Damasio, 1999,
p. 169].

It may be added that the limbic structures

and several others, all responsible for the processing of emotions, are involved in this process. The
structures needed for establishing the third level,
the ``autobiographical-self'', are far more numerous. At this level nearly the whole brain is active.
Damasio introduces the concept of the
``convergence zones'' to provide for the autobiographical self: a ``third element'', located in the
frontal cortex, which also maps events from many
dierent modules of the brain. They are not
represented directly, but stay there ready on call if
needed for further information. They especially
serve the mapping of elements concerning our
identity, the near past or near future. The
coordinated activity of these neural networks,
rhythmically triggered by the thalamic nuclei, is
the basis of the autobiographical self. It generates
images of autobiographical relevance and displays them in working memory, thus making us
conscious of ourselves. It reminds us of ourselves.
From here it is but one step to the ``extended
consciousness''. But I will stop here and turn to a
small, but relevant, element of the theory.
The As-If-Body-Loop (AIBL)
Beside the feelings generated through physiological changes of the body state, Damasio proposes
8
This view is in coherence with the theory of Llinas and
Ribary who regard the entry of objects into the brain via
perception as a disturbance of the otherwise ``sleeping'' or
``dreaming'' brain.

179

a second model how the organism can generate

feelings without interacting with the environment:
the ``as-if-body-loop''; a mechanism which leads
to activity in the sensory-motor cortex regardless
of the fact that no interaction has taken place.
Such processes may eventually start in the
prefrontal cortex. Obviously, inner stimuli lead
to the notion that the body state has actually
changed, although this is not the case. The loop
circumvents the body totally or partially, and
maybe part of activity cascades which generate
feelings via fantasies. It is obvious that this model
provides an understanding of how the organism
can generate feelings, i.e., become conscious, by
imagination only. We can identify a thought
through the feeling that arises in us with the same
``reality'' as it is created by physiological changes
of the body states. I think it is not too far
reaching to link this model with the concept of PI.
Projective Identification:
A Neuro-psychoanalytic Perspective
I would like to look at the case material now from
two sides: the psychoanalytical model of PI, and
the neuroscientic interpretation of the ongoing
processes. Although both models stem from
dierent scientic elds, and therefore cannot be
exchanged, I nevertheless would like to pick up on
elements from both perspectives at the same time,
in order to point out how their combination could
shed some new light on the ongoing psychic
processes.
The case report shows how the interaction
between Mrs. A and me led to changes in myself
that I could not clarify at rst. The turbulence of
the sessions acted upon me in a way that made me
incapable of ``containing'' Mrs. A suciently.
From the defense aspect of PI, the ongoing
interaction was the expression of Mrs. A's
attempt to ``project'' her worries and anxieties,
her distress and her insecurity into me. She did so
because she hoped to nd a stable object in me
which would take care of her, an assumption that
had grown by numerous successful encounters
with me during analysis. On a more rudimentary
level she simply tried to externalize her feelings, a
basic reaction to distress. The need to adjust
herself to C inaugurated erratic attempts to
stabilize herself by trying to gain access to me.
On the surface, the main topic, as it were, was
that of coping with the daily needs of child care.
When taking into account a physiological
aspect, her distress most probably rooted in the
physiological changes of the hormonal milieu
during pregnancy and delivery; she didn't recognize

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180
herself anymore. On the psychic level the experience of ``falling apart'' brought up the ``basic
fault'', as she herself had not found a sucient
containing function in her own mother as a child.
These elements were triggered in her memory
structure through the encounter with C. Unconsciously she re-enacted her own struggle to be
contained, and thus was blocked in containing her
child. We can assume here that indeed her
individual neural network, her organism, was
shaped through her early experiences. The view of
the historical dimension of an organism, embodied in the shape of its neural networks, is covered
by the work of Gerald M. Edelman (1987, 1988,
1989, 1992). Mrs. A reacted to her child according
to her own psychic history, laid down in neural
circuitry. Analysis provided the space for a reenactment of her early experiences by means of
PI, as then she experienced me exactly as
inaccessible as her mother.
How come she could ``manipulate'' me into
an inaccessible mother? We are two separate
individuals with our distinct personal history.
Nevertheless, I ``became'' her mother in a certain
aspect of my reaction to her. From my point of
view, this is the moment where AIBL comes into
play. It is the analyst's task to listen to the
associations of his patient in the rst place. These
associations don't act directly on the analyst's
brain, but are processed according to the very
individuality of the analyst's brain. It invokes
neural modules to ``identify'', in the double sense
of the word, the meaning of what he experiences
with the patient. To experience, in this context,
means an alteration of the proto-self, and in the
ongoing cascade to generate a feeling about what
is encountered. This will be connected with
memories, autobiographical memories, theoretical concepts etc., and thus change the ``ego''
transiently in the process of identication. In
other words, the analyst partly ``becomes'' what
he encounters. In an elegant way Damasio
explains in his model how the generation of
identicatory processes in the autobiographical
self leads itself to a re-enforcement of the coreself: the arising images are by themselves objects
which will be used for another change of the
proto-self, and by this will generate core-consciousness. This circle seems to be the basis on
which we can transiently become someone else,
but are by the very process itself led back to be
ourselves again.
It is an interesting but open question if this
outcome is acquired automatically. The process
of identifying with a projection (PI seen from the
object's side) happens unconsciously. Thus, I
became as insecure and anxious as Mrs. A. In

Klaus Roeckerath
order to ``clarify'' my feelings, i.e., defend myself
against them unconsciously I externalized them at
rst, i.e., I attributed them to the unjustied
demands of Mrs. A, and also tried to get rid of
them by giving her a good advice how to handle
C. Only by realizing that I ``somehow'' acted not
in the usual analytical way I noticed the ``change''
I had undergone. In other words, I no longer
experienced the arising feelings as ``me''. The
``alien'' feelings, although generated by myself via
identicatory processes, discerned themselves
from ``my'' autobiographical background
through reinforcing my core-identity. This led to
a re-establishment of my analytical ``identity'',
acquired through my training, and in the consequence to resume analytic work.
Concluding Remarks
I want to emphasize the point that PI seems to be:
an innate mode of cognition (individual
perspective)
a mode of creating a representation by
identication (intersubjective perspective)
a mode of unconsciously processing certain
feelings (or ``states'') between conspecics
(social perspective).
From the individual's point of view, PI, like
any other sense organ, scans the world with
innate or acquired patterns. The former may be
addressed in psychoanalysis as ``preconceptions''
(Bion, 1989); the latter encompass all unwanted
aspects of the self. It enables the subject to get rid
of them momentarily by attributing (``projecting'') them to an object. Regardless if the object
reacts to the projection in an adequate way (like a
good mother) or inadequately (as I in the case of
Mrs. A), the projecting subject will be altered by
perceiving the object's reaction. The object unto
which is projected will change automatically, i.e.,
unconsciously by identifying with the projections
and thus get to ``know'' something about the
otheralthough this knowledge may remain
completely unconscious.
This leads to a communicative circle by
which feelings, relevant in object relations, are
processed between individuals or groups. In
regard to the topic of ``theory of mind'', PI seems
to be one of the early mechanisms by which an
organism learns something about a conspecic's
state of mind. I think it is underestimated in
psychoanalysis in regard to this normal function
as an unconscious communicative agent in its
individual, intersubjective, and social aspects.
Eventually, by invoking higher functions of

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cognition and information processing, and by

evolving new patterns the circular process will
nally generate a pattern that ``ts'' the situation
in questionit will produce an ``insight''. This
allows for an encounter with the object that leads
to fruitful results for the subject. What I want to
emphasize here is that both partners, from their
very own sources (constitution, experience, memories, knowledge etc.), create theories about the
other and thus shape the picture they will nally
identify as the object, may it be adequate or
inadequate. As long as the ``theory'' is correct,
i.e., leads to fruitful behavior while being with the
object, the object is ``adequately'' treated in
relation to the subject. It is at this level, where
considerations about the evolutionary aspects of
PI could be explored further.
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