The Development of British Amphibious Theory and

Doctrine during the Interwar Period.

Thomas Metcalfe

2016

Supervisor: Professor Alaric Searle

A dissertation presented in the University of Salford in partial fulfilment of the requirements

for the degree of:
Contemporary Military and International History BA (Hons).

Contents

Introduction:

I. British Amphibious Theory and Doctrine before the First World War:

II. The Utility of Amphibious Operations:

17

III. The Conduct of Amphibious Operations:

28

Conclusion:

43

Bibliography:

46

Introduction.

The ability to project power from the sea through the landing of a military force onto a hostile
or potentially hostile shore is among the oldest and perhaps most essential capability for any
maritime power to possess in times of war, excepting perhaps the ability to prevent a landing
on ones own shores. Described by Admiral Ernest J. King, USN, as the most difficult of all
operations in modern warfare,1 amphibious operations are complex and require considerable
skill to succeed, yet their potential to achieve decisive results and the flexibility that they grant
has meant that they have been of use throughout the history of warfare.2 Amphibious
operations are commonly defined as a subset of maritime power projection that involves the
insertion of a sea-based military force into a hostile, or potentially hostile, territory, subdivided
into four categories: assaults; raids; withdrawals and feints/demonstrations.3 Although
helicopter carriers now enable sea-based forces to disembark further inland,4 amphibious
operations have largely been characterised throughout history by the direct landing of a
military force at the shoreline.
In the decade prior to the start of the First World War, the concept of both combined
strategy and joint army-naval operations had grown firm roots within British military thought
with major advocates such as Sir Julian Corbett, Colonel C.E. Callwell and Sir George Aston
to name just a few of the more well-known examples. Although certainly not the sole
constituent of joint-operations between the army and navy, amphibious operations were
largely seen as the most important for Britains armed forces to master, with the 1911 and

Ernest J. King, Third Report to the Secretary of the Navy (1945), p.171, at
www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/USNatWar/USN-King-3.html, [accessed 16 October 2015].
2 Ian Speller and Christopher Tuck, Amphibious Warfare: Strategy and Tactics from Gallipoli to Iraq (London, 2nd
Edition, 2014), pp. 7-12.
3 Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-first Century (London, 2nd Edition, 2009), pp. 184-190.
4 Speller and Tuck, Amphibious Warfare, pp. 28-29.

1913 editions of the Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations focusing solely on
amphibious operations.5
With the exception of the Gallipoli campaign, no major opposed amphibious operations
were conducted by the British during the First World War, and the failure of Gallipoli has often
been seen as heralding the end of any serious approach to examining amphibious warfare in
Britain until shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War.6 As a consequence of both
this and the habit of comparing British amphibious development during the interwar period to
that occurring in both Japan and the United States, it has predominantly been viewed as
lacking in merit and appreciation until recently.7 Among the most cited works taking a more
positive outlook on the development of British amphibious capability during the interwar period
is David Massams 1995 D.Phil. thesis, British Maritime Strategy and Amphibious Capability
1900-1940. This work argued that instead of abandoning amphibious operations after the
Gallipoli debacle the army and navy learnt many important lessons from the experience, as is
evidenced by the preparations made for the aborted landings in Belgium in 1917, and that
Britain continued to develop its amphibious capability throughout the interwar period. In his
view although costly, the landings themselves succeeded even if the campaign had not and
the losses inflicted at Gallipoli, as well as the failure of the campaign as a whole, led to
improved communications between the army and navy for future amphibious operations.8 A
similar view is given by Richard Harding, whose studies give a detailed overview of the
development of multiple aspects of British amphibious capability throughout this period, such

The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew (hereafter, TNA), WO 33/569, Manual of Combined Naval
and Military Operations (1911), p. 7; WO 33/644, Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations (1913),
pp. 6-7. During this period and until the end of the Second World War, amphibious operations in Britain were
more commonly referred to as combined operations. See Richard Harding, Amphibious Warfare, 1930-1939 in
Richard Harding (ed.) The Royal Navy, 1930-2000: Innovation and Defence (2005), pp. 44-45.
6 For a detailed overview of how analysis of the Gallipoli campaign has largely been attributed to interwar
amphibious developments, see Ian Speller, In the Shadow of Gallipoli? Amphibious Warfare in the Inter-War
Period, in Jenny MacLeod (ed.) Gallipoli: Making History (London, 2004), pp. 136-149.
7 Works that have given a negative impression of British amphibious theory and doctrine during the interwar
period include B. Fergusson, The Watery Maze: The Story of Combined Operations (London, 1961); Arthur J.
Marder, The Influence of History on Sea Power: The Royal Navy and the Lessons of 1914-1918, Pacific
Historical Review, 41/4 (1972), pp. 413-443; David MacGregor, The Use, Misuse and Non-Use of History: The
Royal Navy and the Operational Lessons of the First World War, The Journal of Military History, 56/4 (1992), pp.
603-616.
8 Speller, In the Shadow of Gallipoli?, pp. 138-139.
5

as the often neglected impact of air power, and mention several theoretical developments,
although not in great detail.9
Among the most notable aspects of previous studies is the lack of focus on such
theoretical developments in the use and conduct of amphibious operations, barring a few
general references to the work conducted at the staff colleges, and little in the way of analysing
doctrinal development. Although the organisational and materiel aspects that have been the
focus of most previous studies do highlight the causes of many of the difficulties that Britain
would face when confronted with the prospect of amphibious warfare during the Second World
War, they are limited in that they alone cannot ascribe a reason for the way in which the British
armed forces would approach them. Based on this slant to the current historical wisdom, the
question which then arises is: What advances were made in British amphibious theory and
doctrine during the interwar period?
Theory, either naval or military, can be categorised as a formulated collection of ideas
that provide a conceptual foundation for understanding the nature, purpose and/or conduct of
war in their respective environment.10 It can be written by both professional servicemen and
civilians and is usually published in books and journals, although theoretical views and
debates on them can also be examined through other sources such as correspondence and
staff college lectures.11 During the interwar period Britain was a country whose armed forces,
as with those throughout Europe who had fought through the First World War, were concerned
with the development of new or refined ways of waging war. In addition to the purely military
experience of the First World War driving theoretical development, there were both social and
political factors such as: the birth of the first communist state, the Soviet Union; the growth of

Richard Harding, Learning from the War: The Development of British Amphibious Capability, 191929,
Mariners Mirror, 86/2 (May 2000), pp. 173-185; Harding, Amphibious Warfare, 1930-1939.
10 Thomas G. Mahnken, Strategic Theory in John Baylis, James J. Wirtz and Colin S. Gray (eds.), Strategy in
the Contemporary World (Oxford, 3rd Edition, 2010), p. 68.
11 Alaric Searle, Inter-service Debate and the Origins of Strategic Culture: The Principles of War in the British
Armed Forces, 19191939, War in History, 21/1 (2013), p.5.
9

fascism; economic constraints; and the bounds of international law, the Washington and
London naval treaties being those of most concern to Britain. 12
Although certainly influenced by the works and ideas of military theorists, naval theory
had largely developed both separately and under different circumstances to that of warfare on
land and in many ways remained largely disconnected from it.13 Whilst the two figures who
dominated military theory at the time, Antoine-Henri Baron de Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz,
were both veterans of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars and began writing either
during or shortly after the wars themselves, naval theory only began to develop in any real
sense towards the end of the nineteenth century and focussed much of its analysis on the
experiences of predominantly maritime nations as opposed to the continentalist land powers
in whose armies Jomini and Clausewitz had fought.14 Imperial rivalries, the emergence of new
threats and rapid developments in naval technology were the driving force behind the growth
of naval theory at this time, rather than the recent experience of major conflicts.15 Although
the role of sea power had been touched on by Jomini and efforts to place naval theory within
a broader theory of war as a whole had been taken by writers such as Corbett and Aston, the
overarching themes which influenced naval strategy were still largely disassociated from those
of strategy on land. Even though Corbetts ideas became more widely accepted within the
navy after the First World War (although not without controversy),16 the overarching view that
the naval blockade against Germany was the decisive factor in winning the First World War

12

For works that give a detailed overview of the factors that affected British military thought in this period, see
Brian Bond, British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars (Oxford, 1980); Christopher Bell, The Royal
Navy, Seapower and Strategy Between the Wars (Stanford, 2000).
13 J.J. Widen, Theorist of Maritime Strategy: Sir Julian Corbett and his Contribution to Military and Naval Thought
(Farnham, 2012), p. 155.
14 Peter Gretton, Maritime Strategy: A Study of British Defence Problems (London, 1965), pp. 4-5; John Shy,
Jomini in Peter Paret (ed.), The Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, 1986), pp.143-185; Peter Paret,
Clausewitz in Peter Paret (ed.), The Makers of Modern Strategy, pp. 186-213.
15 John Gooch, Maritime Command: Mahan and Corbett, in Colin S. Gray and Roger W. Barnett (eds.),
Seapower and Strategy (Annapolis, 1989), pp. 27-31.
16 Widen, Theorist of Maritime Strategy, pp. 20-21.

reinforced the views of those of the blue-water school who viewed naval warfare as being
fundamentally separate from the waging of war on land.17
Whilst military or naval theory does not necessarily have any official recognition within
the armed forces, military and naval doctrine does. The most recent edition of BR 1806, or
British Maritime Doctrine, describes doctrine as a framework of principles, practices and
procedures, the understanding of which provides a basis for action,18 whilst the newest edition
of UK Defence Doctrine includes the caveat that Doctrine is a guide to commanders and
subordinates on how to think, not what to think.19 Usually published in official manuals and
actively taught to those within the service in question, doctrine draws on both historical and
recent experience, tradition and theoretical developments in an attempt to create a common
approach to planning and conducting operations that is likely to meet the circumstances of
future conflict.20 It has been described as providing a bridge between theory and practice,
[Interpreting] ideas about war, and how they affect its conduct and its character, by combining
strategic theories and operational plans into functional guidelines for action.21 Between 1919
and 1939 there were in total four editions of the Manual of Combined Operations published,
increasing from the 47 pages of the earlier 1913 edition to 230 pages in the 1923 edition.22
In order to answer the question already posed, we will first need to examine the
development of British amphibious theory and doctrine prior to the First World War, making
use of published theoretical works, both from books and articles, as well as the first two
editions of the Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations. Secondly, views on the

17

For a contemporary naval view on the impact of the blockade on the outcome of the war, see R. G. O. Tupper,
The Blockade of Germany by the Tenth Cruiser Squadron in the Atlantic, Journal of the Royal United Services
Institution, 68/469 (February 1923), pp.1-22.
18 British Maritime Doctrine (BR 1806), (London: Ministry of Defence, 3 rd edition, 2004), p. 4.
19 UK Defence Doctrine (JDP 0-01), (London: Ministry of Defence, 5 th edition, 2014), p. iii.
20 Simon Hollington, The Royal Navy needs Doctrine, Naval Review, 83/1 (1995), pp. 12-15.
21 Geoffrey Sloan, Military Doctrine, Command Philosophy and the Generation of Fighting Power: Genesis and
Theory, International Affairs, 88/2 (March 2012), p. 244.
22 Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations (1911); Manual of Combined Naval and Military
Operations (1913); TNA AIR 2/1059, Manual of Combined Naval, Military and Air Operations (1923). During the
period covered in this work, the name of the publication was altered twice, with the 1911 and 1913 editions being
titled the Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations, the 1923 and 1925 editions being titled the Manual
of Combined Naval, Military and Air Operations, and the 1931 and 1938 editions being titled the Manual of
Combined Operations. For the purposes of brevity, when not referring to a specific edition these publications will
be referred to as the Manual of Combined Operations, or simply Manual.

utility of amphibious operations that developed during the interwar period will be examined,
analysing how important amphibious operations were perceived to have been to the
implementation of British strategy and in which circumstances were they seen to have likely
been of use. In order to do this contemporary books and journal articles, Admiralty and War
Office reports, correspondence, and staff college lectures and assignments will be used in
addition to the interwar editions of the Manual of Combined Operations. Finally, views on the
conduct of amphibious operations, by which we mean what were seen as the operational and
tactical requirements for the successful execution of an amphibious operation, will be
examined, again making use of staff college lectures and assignments, correspondence,
reports, contemporary books and journal articles, and published doctrine.

. . .

British Amphibious Theory and Doctrine before the First World War

The emergence of dedicated naval theory towards the end of the nineteenth century appears
to have been the main catalyst for deeper theories on amphibious operations to develop. As
stated before, significant discussions on the nature, purpose or conduct of naval warfare
developed later than those concerning the waging of war on land and were the product of a
number of different factors.23 Perhaps the most prominent theorist of naval warfare in Britain
prior to the start of the First World War was Sir Julian Corbett. Originally educated as a lawyer
before turning to the study of naval history, Corbett became not only a respected historian
(although not without critics), but eventually became lecturer of naval history at the Royal
Naval College in Greenwich and through close association with the First Sea Lord, Admiral
Sir John Fisher, became somewhat of an unofficial strategist for the Admiralty.24 His two most
important books to consider the importance of amphibious operations were England in the
Seven Years War (1907) and Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (1911).
Pre-eminent in Corbetts understanding of naval warfare was its relation to the conduct
and outcome of war on land as, in Corbetts mind, naval power was largely impotent when
used in isolation.25 He described amphibious operations, particularly in the context of their
use during the long eighteenth century, as being the form of war in which Great Britain most
successfully demonstrated the potentiality for direct continental interference of a small army
acting in conjunction with a dominant fleet.26 Corbett considered amphibious operations to
fall under two categories based on their strategic purpose: those to facilitate the conquest of
territory, usually overseas and colonial in nature; and operations directly against an enemys

23For

an overview of the factors that led to an increased interest in naval history, theory and strategy in Britain
towards the end of the nineteenth century, see D. M. Schurman, The Education of a Navy (Chicago, 1965), pp. 115. For an overview of naval theory and strategy in this period, see Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought: From
the Enlightenment to the Cold War (Oxford, 2001), pp. 441-493.
24 J. J. Widen, Theorist of Maritime Strategy: Sir Julian Corbett and His Contribution to Military and Naval
Thought (Farnham, 2012), pp. 15-28.
25 Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (London, 1911), pp. 8, 11-12; Julian Corbett, England in
the Seven Years War (London, 1907), p. 5.
26 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 51.

seaboard, designed to frustrate or divert their plans, potentially open up a new front, and to
strengthen the position of both the nation conducting the operation and its allies.27 In a war
in which Britain had a major continental ally, such as the Seven Years War or the French
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the threat of potential seaborne operations also led to
the containment of troops along the coast out of proportion to those which threatened them,
and as such drawing them away from the more decisive fronts.28
Corbetts view was that an amphibious expedition should consist of four elements: the
landing force itself; the transports and landing flotilla; the squadron in charge of transports,
which would provide both the close protection of the transports in transit and support the
landing operation; and the covering squadron to deter or if necessary engage enemy naval
forces to prevent interference with the expedition en route.29 Thus, although he considered
local sea control to be essential to successful large-scale amphibious operations, he also
considered the possibilities of operations being carried out in disputed seas.30 As his focus
was primarily naval, he did not pay considerable attention to the question of how to
successfully conduct the actual landing, with the notable exception of his consideration of the
debate over the effectiveness of naval artillery for covering opposed landings.31
Whilst Corbett had examined amphibious operation from a largely naval perspective,
Colonel (later Major General) C. E. Callwell, now widely known for his 1896 book Small Wars:
Their Principles and Practice, self-admittedly approached the subject from the point of view
of his own profession,32 producing two books which cover the subject of amphibious
operations: The Effect of Maritime Command on Land Campaigns since Waterloo (1897);
and Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance: Their Relations and Interdependence
(1905). The first book was little more than an overview of a number of campaigns from across

27

Ibid., p. 51.
Ibid., p.57.
29 Ibid., p. 259.
30 Ibid., pp. 258-259.
31 Ibid., pp. 264-265.
32 C. E. Callwell, Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance: Their Relations and Interdependence
(Edinburgh and London, 1905), p. 5.
28

10

the world in which superior sea power had had an effect, directly or indirectly, on the outcome
of military operations on land during the past eighty-two years with some added commentary,
whilst the latter has been described as [possibly] the best study of joint warfare that has ever
been written.33 Certainly the depth in which he examines joint army-naval operations,
including amphibious operations, eclipses the writings of the other figures mentioned here.
Callwell considers the role that amphibious operations could play in in a variety of situations,
from the destruction of enemy fleets in harbour to the capture of territory either for permanent
occupation or as a means of bargaining during peace negotiations, to the capture of harbours
suitable for naval purposes.34 Like Corbett, he also discusses the ability of amphibious raids
to induce an enemy to concentrate their land forces on defending their coasts rather than
committing them to the main theatres of battle.35 He also considers the problems of that often
neglected form of amphibious operation, the withdrawal, 36 as well as operations in which
marines and bluejackets could carry out minor, ad hoc landings.37
Callwell largely drew from historical examples to construct his theory whilst also
examining the ways in which new technology and other changes could have altered the way
in which wars were conducted and how that in turn affected the ability to successfully conduct
an amphibious operation. Whilst the discussion on whether opposed landings were possible
or not was largely avoided by Corbett, Callwell dedicated an entire chapter to their
consideration,38 arguing that they had become far more difficult than those which had
occurred in the past for a variety of reasons. The increased range of modern small arms and
artillery fire is the first development he brings up, arguing that the landing force would be
under fire for a considerably longer period of time during the ship-to-shore stage of the
operation, the stage in which they would have been most vulnerable, than in the past.39 With

Colin S. Gray Introduction in C. E. Callwell, Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance: Their Relations
and Interdependence (Annapolis, 1996), p. xv.
34 Callwell, Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance, pp. 94-95, 110-113, 129, 180-182.
35 Ibid., pp. 323-324.
36 Ibid., pp. 362-368.
37 Ibid., p. 361.
38 Ibid., pp. 243-368.
39 Ibid., pp. 358-353.
33

11

some prescience, he stated that The evolution in tactical conditions works entirely in favour
of the troops repelling an attempted landing, as against the troops making the attempt. . . . If
the attacking army is prepared to accept heavy loss, it may succeed. But the operation is not
one to be ventured on with a light heart, or one to be undertaken without counting the cost
and without accepting the risk of disaster.40 To remedy these new difficulties, he was an
advocate of utilising feints and deception to lure enemy forces away from the intended landing
sites in order to land with at least depleted opposition.41 His view on night landings was that
they were best avoided and that the advantages gained from being less susceptible to enemy
fire would be offset by the difficulties of navigation, orientation and the likelihood of causing
unneeded confusion in both the landing force and the naval forces.42
Callwell concludes his study by bringing up areas of improvement that he believes are
essential if Britain were to successfully conduct amphibious operations in the near future. He
suggests the development of specialised ships of shallow draft with large guns, not dissimilar
from the monitors the Royal Navy would later develop, to provide naval gunfire support
nearer to the landing sight, enabling for better communication with the forces ashore and that
consideration should be made for equipping these ships to fire shrapnel as opposed to the
standard high-explosive ammunition used within the navy.43 Himself an artillery officer, he
also advocated the early deployment of mountain guns or pack-howitzers after the beach
itself was free from direct fire in order to provide artillery support for any troops moving further
inland.44 Most importantly to him, however, was the need for the army and navy to consider
methods of co-operation and co-ordination before the outbreak of any future conflict.45
The final theorist for consideration shared Callwells concern for increasing cooperation between the services and was one of the main driving forces behind such attempts

40

Ibid., pp. 359-360. For another contemporary opinion questioning feasibility of opposed landings being
conducted under modern conditions, see I. S. Bloch, Is War Now Impossible? (London, 1899), pp. 117-120.
41 Ibid., pp. 345-347.
42 Ibid., pp. 361-362.
43 Ibid., pp. 431-435.
44 Ibid., pp. 438-439.
45 Ibid., pp. 443-444.

12

before 1914. Sir George Aston was an officer in the Royal Marine Artillery who, in spite of the
pitfalls that usually befell marine officers regarding promotion at this time, came to a position
of both respect and influence within both services.46 Such were his efforts at fostering such
ties that Colin S. Gray has argued that Aston had the greatest impact on the army of any preFirst World War amphibious theorist.47 His first major venture into amphibious theory was a
lecture delivered at the Royal United Services Institution in 1907, in which he outlined what
he considered to be the major strategic principles of joint army and naval strategy, the primary
ones being concentration of effort, the importance of maintaining lines of communication, and
the need for command of the sea to be achieved beforehand.48 He also considered the use
of amphibious operations for a variety of purposes including the capture of advanced bases
for naval forces, the containment of a disproportionate number of enemy troops along their
coast through threatened landings, the severing of an enemy armys communications if they
are situated near the coast, and the occupation of territory to influence the terms of peace.49
Aston used this lecture as the basis of a more detailed work focusing on the conduct of what
he referred to as amphibious wars within the last few decades, such as the Chilean Civil
War of 1891, the Spanish-American War and the Sino- and Russo-Japanese Wars.50 This
contemporary focus was in part a measure to assuage criticism from some circles as to the
practicability of successful amphibious operations, many of whom objected to the examples
used by theorists such as Corbett as they tended to predate more recent innovations in
weaponry and transport.51 Perhaps his most important work, Sea, Land and Air Strategy, was
published in 1914, and unlike his previous book, which added little to the thoughts he had
first articulated in his 1907 lecture, Sea, Land and Air Strategy examined the role of

For a full and comprehensive account of Sir George Astons efforts at stimulating inter-service co-operation in
Britain before the First World War, see Jim Beach, The British Army, the Royal Navy, and the Big Work of Sir
George Aston, 19041914, Journal of Strategic Studies, 29/1 (February 2006), pp. 145-168.
47 Gray, Introduction, p. xli.
48 George Aston, Combined Strategy for Fleets and Armies; Or Amphibious Strategy, Journal of the Royal
United Services Institution, 51/345, (July 1907), pp. 984-1004.
49 Ibid., pp. 994-996.
50 George Aston, Letters on Amphibious Wars (London, 1907).
51 Beach, The Big Work of Sir George Aston, pp. 153, 156, 163.
46

13

amphibious operations within a wider theory of war which appears to largely draw from the
ideas of both Corbett and Sir Edward Hamley.52
In it he offers little in the way of new thoughts on the utility of amphibious operations
than had already been put forward by himself and others, apart from discussing the potential
of small-scale raids, something that both Corbett and Callwell dealt little with.53 His main
contributions to the discussion lie in his views on the conduct of amphibious operations, and
some of Astons most interesting and prescient thoughts in this work relate to the potential
effects of air power on the conduct of war as a whole and amphibious operations in particular.
He notes the increased danger to ships approaching an enemys coast posed by bombdropping aircraft, and mentions the possibility of using aircraft to sink ships in harbour.54 He
also noted their potential to act as spotters for naval guns firing at onshore targets beyond
their visible range, providing the landing forces with a far greater chance of securing a
sufficiently large beachhead.55 But perhaps Astons greatest contribution was not in
theoretical developments, but in encouraging the British armed forces to consider amphibious
operations as potential actions of a future war, actions which in turn would contribute to
Britains first doctrinal efforts on the matter.
Moving on from the development of theory, the development of British amphibious
doctrine during this period must now be considered. Although given the prevalence of
amphibious theory being developed in Britain during this period it might seem that the
development of amphibious doctrine was directly influenced by it, this does not appear to be
the case. The first official field manual on operations published by the British Army, the 1909
Field Service Regulations: Part I, included a brief mention of amphibious operations in the
sub-chapter entitled Movements by Sea.56 On the utility of amphibious operations it lists
three potential aims:

52

George Aston, Sea, Land and Air Strategy (London, 1914), passim.
Ibid., 291-301.
54 Ibid., pp. 103, 215.
55 Ibid., pp. 217-218, 263-264.
56 War Office, Field Service Regulations, Part I: Operations, 1909 (London, 1909), pp. 64-67.
53

14

i. The establishment of a base for military operations either against

the enemys field armies or against a coast fortress.
ii. The establishment of a flying naval base.
iii. Raids against shipping, communications, &c.57
Apart from being adamant on the need to attain and preserve command of the sea, 58 there
is nothing written on the conditions appropriate for the landing of troops or how to conduct
the landings themselves, with most of what little was written within these few pages focusing
on the embarkation process and the division of duties between the army and the navy.59
Following this publication, the War Office published a number of other manuals
detailing more specific areas, such as individual manuals for the infantry, cavalry, engineers
and field artillery,60 and it is in this context that we must place the publication of the first
Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations. Published in 1911, the first few pages
were identical to the sub-chapter in the Field Service Regulations in discussing the utility of
amphibious operations, although the publication as a whole was considerably longer.61 There
were two main sources from which the new manual drew. The first was a report on a joint
amphibious exercise carried out in 1904 which attempted to replicate the conditions of an
unopposed landing near Colchester. This report mostly concentrated on the division of duties
between the services, and large sections were copied verbatim from the report into the
manual.62 The second major source was the result of a number of annual inter-service staff
tours, organised by Aston, from 1905 onwards to stimulate a dialogue between the two
services, often involving visits to the coastal areas of southern England in which members of
the staff colleges from both services would discuss how best a landing could be effected in
the area from the point of view of each service.63

57

Ibid., p. 64.
Ibid.
59 Ibid., pp. 64-67.
60 Christopher Pugsley, We Have Been Here Before: The Evolution of the Doctrine of Decentralised Command in
the British Army 1905-1989, Sandhurst Occasional Papers, 9 (2011), p. 11, at
www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/rmas_occ_paper_09.pdf.
61 TNA, WO 33/569, Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations (1911).
62 Beach, The Big Work of Sir George Aston, pp.149-150.
63 Ibid., pp. 150-152.
58

15

The 1911 manual, and its revised 1913 edition, lay out a clear organisation for the
planning and conduct of amphibious operations. On the issue of choosing a suitable landing
site, the views of the navy are given priority over those of the army.64 The troops which were
to be landed would be organised into two groups: the covering force, who would land in the
first wave and secure a suitable beachhead;65 and the main body, who would later
disembark along with the armys supplies and equipment under the protection of the covering
force.66 The manual emphasises the need for the covering force to be landed at night,
especially if the landings are opposed.67 The revised 1913 edition strays little from the 1911
edition, largely just clarifying a number of the statements made in the original with a small
number of new thoughts added, such as the statement that ships would likely be unable to
provide indirect fire support to the landing troops.68 All three publications are largely
organisational in content and methodical in nature, tending to proscribe action for best-case
scenarios rather than in trying to consider guidelines for action under less favourable
circumstances, and there appears to have been little to no influence from the ideas of preFirst World War theorists, excepting perhaps the imperative to publish on the subject. All
these problems would begin to be rectified once the decision to revise the Manual was agreed
on following the end of the First World War.

. . .

TNA, WO 33/569 Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations (1911), pp. 23-24.
Ibid., 24-25.
66 Ibid., 24, 26-27.
67 Ibid., p. 24.
68 TNA, WO 33/644, Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations (1913), p. 44.
64
65

16

The Utility of Amphibious Operations

The need to redress the problems of the existing Manual of Combined Naval and Military
Operations was acted upon soon after the end of the war. Following the results of a 1919
paper exercise involving officers from both the naval and army staff colleges held at
Camberley, a joint report was issued to both the War Office and the Admiralty. 69 Describing
the 1913 manual as obviously out of date,70 this report laid the foundations, and brought up
many of the conflicting schools of thought which would surround the debates over amphibious
operations for the next twenty years as well as leading to the establishment of the
Interdepartmental Committee on Combined Operations in 1920 to organise the publication of
a new version of the manual.71 The immediacy of the decision to re-examine amphibious
operations so soon after the conclusion of the First World War challenges the idea that
amphibious operations were immediately discredited by Britains armed forces following the
debacle at Gallipoli,72 as does the decision to hold joint paper exercises on them at the Staff
College, Camberley twice a year from 1919 onwards.73 There was clearly then a belief within
at least a sizeable proportion of the armed forces that amphibious operations were not only
practicable, but were also an important element of Britains ability to wage war. As the Director
of the Naval Staff College in 1919 described them, These operations had a large share in
building up the British Empire, and there seems little doubt that they will be constantly needed
to maintain it.74

TNA, ADM 116/2086, Report on Combined Naval and Military Exercise, 1919, W.H. Anderson, n.d.
Ibid., p. 4.
71 Harding, Learning from the War, p. 176.
72 For one such view, and the one from which the term discredited was specifically used, see Marder, The
Influence of History on Sea Power, pp. 432-433.
73 TNA, ADM 116/2086, Major Gen. Sir W. E. Ironside, K.C.B., etc., proposed guest of C in C, Atlantic Fleet
during Spring Cruise request for information re, investigations relative to combined operations, 5 January 1922,
Minute Sheet no. 1.
74 TNA, ADM 116/2086, Drax to Director of Training and Staff Duties Division, Admiralty, 8 December 1919, p. 2.
69
70

17

Nor was this view a lone one at the time. In one of his first lectures delivered to the
students at the Senior Officers Course at Greenwich, Sir Herbert Richmond echoed both
Callwell and Corbett in advocating in the case of another major continental conflict:
Using our army in an auxiliary sense to support the continental armies and adjust the
military balance. In such a purpose a small, very efficient force would be effective;
and we could use it wherever it might most usefully be employed, our sea-power
enabling us to place it in any part of the world we desired. Such an army is strongly
out of proportion to its numbers. It can be a professional army, and man for man better
than a short service army, while the power of transferring it to any theatre at will adds
an additional strength to its quality and mobility.75

Considering amphibious operations to be essential to the projection of naval power, Richmond

also claimed that, The maritime offensive, to be used with effect, must be a combined
offensive. Troops are always needed, but troops embarked are a very real and useful addition
to the powers of the fleet.76
Continuing throughout the interwar period, the views of the major proponents of a
maritime or amphibious strategy against a continental enemy appear to have held sway in
certain circles. In a lecture delivered at the Royal United Services Institution in 1934,
Lieutenant-Commander G.B.H. Fawkes examined the merits of the three pre-First World War
schools of strategic thought and the prospects they held for British strategy in a future major
war. After dismissing the views of the blue-water school (which he himself termed the insular
school) and being highly critical of the continental school, he claims that, despite possessing
some inherent faults, a maritime strategy, wherein our Army should have conferred upon it
the benefits which sea power can bestow would be the best course of action, and that the
skilful use of combined naval, military, and air power may well be the means of restoring
offensive action to the high plane it has always held in the history of the British Empire.77

75

Caird Library, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich (hereafter, NMM), Admiral Sir H.W. Richmond papers,
RIC/10/1, Lectures at R. N. War College, Greenwich: Spring Session, 1920, Volume I, Policy and Strategy, n.d.
p. 12.
76 Ibid., pp. 19-20. Underlining in the original.
77 G. B. H. Fawkes, British Strategy, RUSI Journal, 79/515 (1934), pp. 590-594.

18

Neither were these opinions held solely by naval officers. Similar views were put forward
in Major General Sir Fredrick Maurices British Strategy: A Study of the Application of the
Principles of War (1929), where he claimed that Both we and our forbears [sic] have been
accustomed to think of our military power as amphibious, . . . the chief criticism which our
descendants will have to make of our conduct of the Great War will be that we did not make
the best use of our amphibious power.78 He believed that, in the army at least, British military
thought prior to the First World War had been dominated by the ideas of continental theorists
and that, rather than approaching strategy from the view of Britains unique (from a European
standpoint) geostrategic position, they had instead attempted to transform Britain into a land
power, something in which she would be at a great disadvantage when compared to the great
continental land powers of Europe.79 He also argued that the ability to land unexpectedly and
anywhere on an enemys coast had in the past given the British army an advantage in winning
the initiative over numerically superior foes.80 Given that this was an officially endorsed work,
Maurice being given an advance copy of the new Field Service Regulations (1929) whose list
of the principles of war he used as the basis of his work and an introduction being provided by
Field Marshal Sir George Milne,81 it demonstrates that there was still a clear belief within the
British Army during the interwar period of the need to consider the utility of amphibious
warfare. But, although the traditional pre-war concepts of amphibious utility against a
continental enemy espoused by Richmond, Maurice and others would later become
popularised by writers such as Sir Basil Liddell Hart later on in the interwar period,82 in the
immediate post-war years there was no longer a major European threat to Britain in which
amphibious operations could be used in this way. Instead, amphibious operations began to

78

F. Maurice, British Strategy: A Study of the Applications of the Principles of War (London, 1929), pp. 54-55.
Ibid., pp. 49-50, 54.
80 Ibid., p. 150.
81 Searle, Inter-service Debate and the Origins of Strategic Culture, pp. 18-19.
82 For a criticism on both the originality and strength of Liddell Harts argument that there had always been a
British way in warfare, see Hew Strachan, The British Way in Warfare in David Chandler and Ian Becket (eds.),
The Oxford Illustrated History of the British Army (Oxford, 1994), pp. 417-434.
79

19

be incorporated into new roles in British strategic thinking, most importantly that of imperial
defence and policing the Empire.
Although imperial defence had long been the main role of Britains armed forces,83 the
interwar period had thrown up a number of new challenges. In the first instance, between 1914
and 1919 the British Empire had grown by some 1.8 million square miles and incorporated
approximately 13 million new inhabitants at the expense of both the German and Ottoman
Empires.84 Despite this tremendous increase in responsibilities, Britains armed forces were
being reduced and one of the greatest benefits to British imperial defence planning since 1902,
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, was to be discontinued.85 As Colonel J.F.C. Fuller, perhaps the
most important British military theorist of the interwar period, put it: Our army is smaller than
it was in 1914, and yet costs twice as much; our Empire is larger than it was in 1914, and is in
a very unsettled and nervous condition. How, then, are we to protect it?.86
Fuller himself divided the problems of imperial defence into three categories: imperial
defence during great wars, imperial defence during small wars, and imperial defence to
maintain domestic tranquillity.87 He argues that in the first category there is little difference to
the waging of conventional wars, other than logistics, and instead focuses, as most writers of
the time did, on the latter two, and given his view that in these conflicts rapidity of movement
is the predominant factor, it is understandable that amphibious operations came to be seen
as an essential part of British plans on maintaining the Empire.88 Fuller argued that a fleet of
warships and transports which possessed both an amphibious capability, aircraft carriers and
sufficient troops could become a completely self-contained fighting force capable of operating
on and in the three elements of water, earth, or air. The possibilities of such a force, for the

83

For works on this subject, see Greg Kennedy (ed.), Imperial Defence: The Old World Order, 1856-1956
(Oxford, 2008), passim; D. M. Schurman, Imperial Defence, 1868-1887 (London, 1999).
84 Niall Ferguson, Empire (London, 2003), p. 315.
85 For a work examining both the causes for and the effects of the termination of the alliance, see Phillips Payson
OBrien, Britain and the end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, in Phillips Payson OBrien (ed.), The AngloJapanese Alliance, 1902-1922 (London, 2004), pp. 264-284.
86 J.F.C. Fuller, The Reformation of War (1923), p. 192.
87 Ibid., p. 190.
88 Ibid., pp. 190-191.

20

major police work of the Empire, need no accentuation, for they must be visible to all.89 He
also advocated for the development of small amphibious tanks for use by the fleet in such
conditions:
Suppose that a rebellion threatening the lives of British citizens broke out at HongKong and there were no troops there, the crew of our present-day cruiser could render
small assistance on land, but, equipped with four tanks, it could make its presence
felt, and felt in such a manner that the rebellion might well be quashed in a few hours.90
Similar views on the employment of ship-based tanks for colonial policing were held by an
anonymous contributor to the Naval Review in 1931.91

Ideas promoting self-contained naval response forces to combat imperial unrest appear
to have been common around this time.92 One report on the future role of the Royal Marines
points to their ability to provide a fast and flexible response in savage warfare, providing a
landing force to preserve order, or to deal promptly with trouble in out of [the] way places.93
Another report on the same subject also advocated this role of colonial peace enforcement,
stressing the need for the Corps of Royal Marines to carry out its peace mission of policing
the outer portions of the Empire, by landing detachments specially trained in shore operations,
for the preservation of British lives and interests during disturbances on shore, or for carrying
out small punitive expeditions.94 Even in the late 1930s by which time the threats posed by
both Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy had become apparent, imperial defence remained a
major concern in British military thought. Imperial police work carried out by ships landing
parties were featured in lectures at the Royal Naval Staff College as late as 1936,95 whilst
books such as Major General H. Rowan-Robinsons Imperial Defence: A Problem in Four

89

Ibid., p. 200.
Ibid., p. 209.
91 Anon., Naval Landing Parties, Naval Review, XIX/4 (November 1931), p. 696.
92 For examples, see Anon., Naval Landing Parties, Naval Review, XIX/4 (November 1931), 694-698; Anon.,
The Bluejacket Landing Party, Naval Review, XX/1 (February 1932), pp. 58-66;
93 TNA, ADM 1/8664/134, Memorandum B, 28 September 1923, pp. 6-7.
94 TNA, ADM 1/8664/134, Committee on the Corps of Royal Marines. Report, 6 August 1924, p. 10.
95 NMM, Captain Richard Oliver-Bellasis papers, BEL/151, Aids to the Civil Power, Precis of Lecture, Lt. Colonel
K. M. Loch, 9 November 1936.
90

21

Dimensions (1938) continued to examine this aspect of British defence policy, including the
role of amphibious operations within it.96 Nevertheless, it is clear that during the interwar period
amphibious operations were viewed not only as having been a feature of the past for use in
the capture of new territories, but as also a vital part in maintaining them. As one anonymous
commentator in the Naval Review put it: The co-operation of the navy and army in combined
operations is mainly responsible for the vastness of the British Empire, and will be responsible
for its retention and defence in the future.97
Of all the many and varied colonies of the British Empire, the newly acquired Middle
Eastern territories were perhaps the most troublesome in the eyes of British defence planners.
In November 1924 Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond had expressed concern over the threat
which Persia and Iraqi nationalists, or the Soviet Union through subversive activities, posed to
both the newly acquired Mandate of Iraq and the Anglo-Iranian oilfields in the Persian Gulf. If
these oilfields, of vital importance to both the navy and the British Empire as a whole, were
taken, Richmond believed that they would have to be retaken by a major amphibious operation
involving all three services.98 Britains interests in the Middle and Near East stretched beyond
her colonies however. Neither the armistices of 1918 nor the subsequent peace treaties signed
by the Central Powers ended British active service against other nations, with Turkey being a
particular target of British aggression. During the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923)
the Royal Navy both assisted with the Greek landings at Smyrna in May 1919,99 and conducted
a number of their own minor landings, both opposed and unopposed, in June 1920 in order to
prevent Turkish Nationalist forces from threatening the sea-route through the Dardanelles, the
Sea of Marmara and the Bosporus.100 Although an armistice was signed in October 1922 and
the Treaty of Lausanne established peace in 1923, Turkey remained a potential hotbed for

96

H. Rowan-Robinson, Imperial Defence: A Problem in Four Dimensions (London, 1938), pp. 111-115.
Anon., Review of The Army and Sea Power, Naval Review, XVI/1 (February 1928), p. 163.
98 Richmond to Keyes, 14 November 1924, Volume 121 - The Keyes Papers Vol. II: 1919-1938, Publications of
the Navy Records Society (1980), pp. 105-106.
99 Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars, Vol. 1 (London, 1968), pp. 183-185.
100 For a first-hand account of a number of these operations from an unnamed British naval officer, see Anon.,
Some British Naval Operations against the Turkish Nationalists, Naval Review, XII/4 (November 1924), pp. 619633.
97

22

conflict with Britain; the 1924-1926 Mosul crisis prompting another reconsideration of
amphibious utility when discussions were undertaken over whether or not it would be possible
to conduct amphibious landings in either western Anatolia or European Turkey if the crisis
escalated into war.101
As much as colonial pacification and the protection of British interests in the Middle and
Near East were the major concerns of British defence planning for much of the early interwar
period, as far as the Royal Navy in the 1920s was concerned the most likely rival to Britain in
the foreseeable future would be Imperial Japan. Although Britain had been in a formal alliance
with Japan since 1902 and both nations had fought on the same side during the First World
War, from its conclusion Japan was increasingly regarded as the major naval threat to Britains
possessions and interests in Asia.102 The greatest challenge that Britain was likely to face in
this endeavour would be one of logistics. Neither Hong Kong nor the as of yet uncompleted
naval base at Singapore were near enough to Japanese home waters for a fleet to operate
there, most British war plans focussing on the defeat of the Japanese battle fleet followed by
the implementation of a blockade.103 The solution was to devise a method for rapidly
establishing a base nearer to the area of operations to provide suitable anchorages for fuelling,
minor repairs, and resupply.104
This led to the development of war plans which relied on the ability of the fleet to first
secure a suitable site for a temporary naval base and then to begin the construction of one,
known as Mobile Naval Bases.105 As there was no guarantee that the area in which they
wished to construct one would be in friendly territory, and the most likely territory being the
Japanese-controlled Ryukyu Islands,106 it was acknowledged that amphibious landings,

Paul Halpern, Volume 158 The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean, 1919-1929, Publications of the Navy
Records Society (2011), pp. 457-460.
102 Andrew Field, Royal Navy Strategy in the Far East 1919-1939: Planning for War against Japan (London,
2004), pp. 1-16.
103 Douglas Ford, A Statement of Hopes? The Effectiveness of US and British naval war plans against Japan,
1920-1941, Mariners Mirror, 101/1 (February 2015), p. 70.
104 Field, Royal Navy Strategy in the Far East, pp. 53-71.
105 Ibid., pp. 160-164.
106 Ibid., p. 65.
101

23

possibly in the face of hostile forces, would be necessary in order to construct and defend
such a base.

107

Those proposing the creation of an organisation to carry out this work

envisioned it as a distinct tactical unit of the fleet,108 composed mainly of Royal Marines and
a naval labour force, and as such these operations were viewed as entirely naval rather than
combined. Nevertheless, there was consideration over the potential need to work with the
army if the intended area was well defended.109 The other major scenario considered for a war
between Britain and Japan also featured an important amphibious element. In this scenario it
was supposed that the Japanese would strike first and capture either Hong Kong or Singapore,
and before the war could be taken to Japanese home waters, they would have to be
recaptured.110 Many of both the field and paper exercises on amphibious operations during
the interwar period were devised around this scenario.111
However, when viewing the wider, less specific debates about the utility of amphibious
operations during the interwar period, it is their use for the acquisition of advanced naval
bases, as in the first scenario for a war against Japan, which appear to have been the main
consideration. Writing in the Naval Review, Lieutenant C. H. Drage advocated the need for
advanced bases to facilitate continuous activity and to economise force and stated that they
will almost always have to be seized during war, often against opposition; and the progress
of the naval or of the general campaign may render their seizure absolutely essential to its
further prosecution.112 In their book The Army and Sea Power (1927), Majors R. B. Pargiter
and H.G. Eady largely examined the role of amphibious operations either to establish
advanced bases for ships or to attack enemy naval bases,113 although given that this works
intention was to argue that the army had an important role to play in the growth and

TNA, ADM 116/2335, Organisation of Mobile Naval Bases, n.d. [c.1920], p. 2.

Ibid., p. 10.
109 TNA, ADM 116/2335, Walker to multiple recipients, 14 July 1926.
110 Field, Royal Navy Strategy in the Far East, pp. 76-83.
111 Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars, Vol. 1, pp. 538-540. For specific paper exercises based on this
scenario, see NMM, Vice Admiral Thomas Hope Troubridge papers, TRO/401/5 (10), Combined Operations,
Camberley, 1925, n.d.; NMM, Vice Admiral Thomas Hope Troubridge papers, TRO/401/8 (6), Scheme 44, Far
Eastern Situation, 2 June 1925; NMM, Vice Admiral Thomas Hope Troubridge papers, TRO/401/8 (7),
Combined Operations, Appreciation of the Naval Situation, January 28 th MDCCCCXXV, 26 February 1925.
112 C.H. Drage, Land Operations in Maritime Warfare, Naval Review, XI/2 (May 1923), p. 218.
113 R. B. Partiger and H. G. Eady, The Army and Sea Power (London, 1927), pp. 193, 206-212.
107
108

24

maintenance of British sea power rather than considering the impact of sea power on the
conduct of the army,114 this is understandable.
The other major role that appears to have been given to amphibious operations during
the interwar period was for the construction of air bases close enough to an enemys own
forces or vital regions for the conduct of an independent bombing campaign.115 The twice
yearly exercises held at Camberley were all tri-service affairs and, whilst the ways in which
amphibious operations could be of use to the implementation of either naval or military strategy
is immediately obvious, the extent to which they would benefit a predominantly aerial strategy
was less so. In part due to the need to justify its existence as an independent service, the RAF
in the interwar period came to regard strategic bombing as its main mission in the event of
war and although the air force could realistically carry out this function against enemy targets
within range of its existing bases, beyond this range such an aerial strategy would be
impracticable.116 As such, within the RAF the possibility of rapidly creating a new base nearer
to the area of operations, very similar in many respects to the navys plans for Mobile Naval
Bases, became a concern when examining joint warfare with the other services. As with
Mobile Naval Bases, there was a strong chance that in order to construct them there would
have to be an amphibious landing on a potentially hostile shore. Although this was considered
an impractical plan against an enemy who possessed a modern air force within range which
had not already been neutralised or in a territory with strong opposition on the ground, it was
seen as a possible measure against less industrialised or powerful enemies.117 On both a
number of the field exercises, and in many of the paper exercises carried out during the
interwar period, the main objective of the landing was to capture, secure and hold an area

114

Ibid., pp. 9-11.

Richard Harding, Amphibious Warfare, 1930-1939, pp. 52-53.
116 For an overview of the development of independent air strategies within the RAF, see Phillip S. Meilinger,
Trenchard and "Morale Bombing": The Evolution of Royal Air Force Doctrine Before World War II, Journal of
Military History, 60/2 (April 1996), pp. 243-270. For one more specifically related to the use of airpower for
policing and pacifying colonies, see James S. Corum, Colonial Air Control: The Europeans Develop New
Concepts of Air Warfare, in James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson (eds.), Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting
Insurgents and Terrorists (Lawrence, 2003), pp. 51-86.
117 TNA, ADM 116/2086, Report on Combined Naval and Military Exercise, 1919, W. H. Anderson, n.d.,
Annexure 1; NMM, Vice Admiral Thomas Hope Troubridge papers, TRO/401/5 (4), Combined Operations (Air
Aspect), n.d. [c1925].
115

25

large enough to construct and defend an air base to conduct an independent bombing
campaign.118
In spite of this new aerial consideration, discussions on the utility of amphibious
operations appear to have been dominated by the concerns of the navy over those of the other
two services, something that becomes apparent when examining the revised editions of the
Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations, which are now Admiralty publications
rather than War Office publications. In the first of these to be produced during the interwar
period, renamed the Manual of Combined Naval, Military and Air Operations (1923), we begin
to see considerably more thought given to the question of the utility of amphibious operations
than in the pre-war editions. It asserts that as an island nation, unless the army is to take a
purely defensive role in a future conflict, co-operation with the navy is essential and that if a
friendly port within the theatre of operations is not available for disembarkation, be it an ally or
colony, an amphibious operation would be the sole means of bringing the army to the
enemy.119 Equally it echos Corbetts views on the limitations of naval power alone and
emphasises the importance of amphibious capability to the maintenance of the Empire.120
Whilst there was little advancement on ideas concerning the utility of amphibious operations
in the following two editions of the Manual,121 the 1938 edition demonstrates a marked leap in
examining the utility of amphibious operations. Many of the concepts brought up in the interwar
period are mentioned, including the ability of amphibious operations to provide an attacking
force with increased mobility and surprise, the ability to police and defend the Empire, to
conduct minor raids against valuable targets, theatre entry landings, landings to acquire the

For examples, see TNA, ADM 116/3395, Report on Landing Operations 1934, n.d.; NMM, Vice Admiral
Thomas Hope Troubridge papers, TRO/401/5 (4), Combined Operations (Air Aspect), n.d. [c1925]; NMM, Vice
Admiral Thomas Hope Troubridge papers, TRO/401/5 (10), Combined Operations, Camberley, 1925, General
description of the operation, n.d., pp. 2-3.
119 TNA AIR 2/1059, Manual of Combined Naval, Military and Air Operations (1923), p. 12.
120 TNA AIR 2/1059, Manual of Combined Naval, Military and Air Operations (1923), pp. 13-14. It should be
noted, however, that from the 1923 edition onwards the manuals dealt with a wider number of joint operations
than just amphibious landings, unlike the previous editions.
121 TNA, AIR 10/1206, Manual of Combined Naval, Military and Air Operations (1925), pp. 13-16; TNA, DEFE
2/708, Manual of Combined Operations (1931), pp. 1-6.
118

26

ground on which to construct an air base, and the capture of harbours for advanced naval
bases.122
Yet, despite there being many roles for which amphibious operations were perceived to
have been of use, towards the end of the interwar period the question of whether or not
amphibious operations would be of any use against what were now clearly Britains most likely
foes, Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, had yet to be agreed on. Speaking of his experiences
at Greenwich in 1938, Rear Admiral L.E.H. Maund, later the first chairman of the Inter-Services
Training and Development Centre, recalled that:
On a number of occasions during the [Senior Officers] course, strong views about our
unpreparedness to undertake a landing attack of any kind had been voiced. . . . The
view, which was being widely accepted, that we should never need to land on enemy
held territory again was said to be ridiculous: our history told of a long sequence of
landing attacks to capture or recapture places of importance to our strategy.123

Britain certainly was unprepared to undertake amphibious operations at the time, possessing
only nine modern landing craft at the beginning of 1938 and with very little practical experience
among servicemen,124 and this would become apparent to everyone following the start of the
Second World War. However, despite a lack of specialist equipment and sufficient training,
the interwar period had seen considerable debate over the details, methods and practicalities
of actually conducting an amphibious operation. These debates would influence the
development of Britains amphibious doctrine during the interwar period, and, in turn, influence
the outcome of Britains amphibious operations during the Second World War.

. . .

TNA, ADM 186/117, Manual of Combined Operations (1938), pp. 17-19.

L.E.H. Maund, Assault from the Sea (London, 1949), p. 1.
124 Ibid., pp. 4-5; Fergusson, The Watery Maze: The Story of Combined Operations, pp. 35-45.
122
123

27

The Conduct of Amphibious Operations

As the Gallipoli landings were the largest amphibious operations of the First World War, the
experience of this campaign was the source of most of the interwar debate on the conduct of
amphibious operations, a debate which included those who had been strong advocates of
amphibious warfare before the start of the war.125 Two of the three major pre-war theorists of
amphibious warfare, Aston and Callwell, published their opinions of what the causes of failure
were at Gallipoli in 1919, whilst Corbett was responsible for covering them in the official history
of the Royal Navys role in the First World War. Corbetts contribution to the post-war debate
on the Gallipoli campaign, found in Volume II of Naval Operations (1920-1923),126 was
primarily focused on the naval aspect of the campaign and provided little in the way of outright
criticism of any of the parties involved in the endeavour.127 Although expressing concerns over
the high number of casualties which were inflicted upon the landing forces, he believed that
they now possessed an unparalleled feat to [their] credit a feat accomplished in the face of
every difficulty that delay, inadequate means and a well-prepared enemy could place in the
way of success.128 That feat was the ability to land and establish a beachhead under fire from
an enemy who had prepared for their arrival, something which many commentators before the
First World War had considered to be an impossibility in modern warfare.129
One such sceptic of the feasibility of successfully conducting an opposed landing before
the war was Callwell, whose analysis of the campaign, entitled The Dardanelles,130 was
published in 1919. In addition to being a major proponent of amphibious warfare before the
First World War, Callwell also served as the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence at

125

For an overview of the impact of the Gallipoli campaign on British amphibious development during the interwar
period, see Speller, In the Shadow of Gallipoli?, pp. 137-145.
126 Julian Corbett, Naval Operations, Vol. 2 (London, 1921).
127 Unlike his analysis of the Battle of Jutland in the following volume which was posthumously published with a
disclaimer from the navy disputing his conclusions. See J. J. Widen, Theorist of Maritime Strategy, pp. 20-21.
128 Corbett, Naval Operations, Vol. 2, p. 347.
129 Bloch, Is War Now Impossible?, pp. 117-120; Callwell, Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance, pp.
359-360.
130 C. E. Callwell, The Dardanelles (Boston and New York, 1919).

28

the War Office from August 1914 until January 1916,and as a result was himself involved in
part with planning the conduct of the campaign.131 Although the book is largely narrative, the
final chapter focuses on what he considered to have been the outstanding lessons of the
campaign.132
The first lesson which Callwell covers, and the one which he considered to be the most
essential, is the importance of planning and forethought, something which he also links to the
need to select objectives based on available means rather than potential results, and the role
of politicians in influencing or dictating strategy.133 The second lesson that Callwell points to is
the greater difficulty posed to the attacking force during an amphibious landing due to the
increased sizes of modern armies: in these days, when whole nations take to the field and
when armies consequently muster as vast multitudes, command of the sea cannot be turned
to account to such good purpose in connection with land operations as was formerly the
case.134 He argued that large scale amphibious operations were likely to fail in any future
conflict due to the likelihood of the defending armies being larger than those conducting the
landing and that even if there was no opposition on the beach, enemy troops could still be
concentrated in the area of operations with great speed, although he believed that smaller
scale raids were likely to still be practicable due to their limited nature.135 Similar concerns
were also expressed by Sir Herbert Richmond.136 The other major lessons which Callwell
claimed had been taught by the Gallipoli campaign, some of which will be covered in more
detail later, were the need for advanced bases near the intended landing site; the impact that
the submarine would now have on amphibious operations; the ineffectiveness of naval gunfire
during the campaign; the need to secure a large area immediately after landing; and the need
for immediate reserves to replace casualties.137

T. R. Moreman, Callwell, Sir Charles Edward (18591928), Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford,
2004), online edition, January 2008: www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/32251 [accessed 19 Dec 2015].
132 Callwell, The Dardanelles, pp. 332-347.
133 Ibid., p. 335.
134 Ibid., p. 335.
135 Ibid., p. 336.
136 Herbert Richmond, Sea Power in the Modern World (London, 1934), pp. 173-174.
137 Callwell, The Dardanelles, pp. 337-347.
131

29

Astons views on the causes of the failure at Gallipoli were published in 1919 as part of
his larger examination of the lessons of the First World War entitled War Lessons, New and
Old.138 As with Callwell, he considered political interference with military and naval strategy to
have been the greatest cause of failure, the entire campaign being in his view a distraction
from the most important task of the war, the defeat of the German army and the destruction of
the German fleet.139 On the landings themselves, he believed that many of the difficulties could
have been avoided through a greater use of deceptive measures such as feints,140 and greater
rapidity in both decision and action, considering speed to be the all-important factor in all
amphibious operations.141
Aston saw both the political nature of the decision to force the straits and lack of rapidity
of either decision or action as jointly responsible for the greatest blunder of the campaign:
attempting to force the straits by naval power alone without having an amphibious force held
in reserve to attempt a landing as soon as the first method had failed. It was the delay between
the initial attack on 18 March 1915, which Aston saw largely as the result of political
interference in strategy, which allowed for the defending forces to reinforce the areas around
the straits and prepare defences in the knowledge that this would be the area most likely to
be attacked.142 In Astons own words, as secrecy was impossible, rapidity of decision and of
action was of vital importance. Every day allowed to the enemy for perfecting his preparations
would add to the difficulties in landing the army in the face of opposition.143 On whether or not
the Gallipoli campaign had proved opposed landings to be impracticable, his views were
similar to those of Corbett, believing that the landings had in fact proven that it was possible
to land troops on and capture a defended beach, even if they had then failed to advance
further inland.144 Yet although the Gallipoli campaign was to remain the focus of British

138

George Aston, War Lessons, New and Old (London, 1919).

Ibid., pp.55-56. Further criticism on how political interference with strategy led to the failure of the Dardanelles
campaign can also be found in NMM, Admiral Sir Arthur Malcolm Peters papers, PET/7 (2), Precis of lecture on
Combined Operations The Army Point of View, Col. Mayer, 15 May 1930, p. 1.
140 Aston, War Lessons, New and Old, p. 76.
141 Ibid., p. 71.
142 Ibid., pp. 67-75.
143 Ibid., p. 69.
144 Ibid., pp. 76-78.
139

30

analysis on amphibious operations during the interwar period, there were many new
challenges to the successful execution of an amphibious landing that had not been present at
Gallipoli yet would be the subject of interwar debates on the issue, including recent
developments in naval and aerial warfare.
The first consideration for whether or not an amphibious operation is practicable is
whether or not it is possible to transport the landing force and supporting ships to the desired
landing site.145 Although the Royal Navy had managed to maintain almost complete sea
control outside of the Dardanelles Straits in 1915,146 two weapons which had appeared shortly
before the war would come to dramatically alter the conduct of naval warfare and the ability to
safely transport troops, namely the submarine and the aeroplane. As Callwell remarked on
the dangers posed by the former, It has always been recognised that the transport of troops
across the seas during hostilities is in principle only permissible if the state carrying out the
operation enjoys maritime command; but so long as opposing submarines are about, maritime
command is necessarily relative and cannot be complete.147 Although the Royal Navy had
managed to overcome the threat posed by the German unrestricted submarine campaign
against merchant shipping in 1917-1918,148 the danger posed to an amphibious expeditionary
force was still a major concern, for the loss of even a single troopship could jeopardise the
operation.149 The main assumption remained, as it had before the war,150 that the safest
measure was to sail the troopships in convoy with a suitably strong escort, something which
experience in protecting merchant ships from submarine attack had reinforced.151

145

Speller and Tuck, Amphibious Warfare: Strategy and Tactics, pp. 39-45.
Although there were a small number of isolated torpedo attacks on allied ships anchored off the Gallipoli
peninsular later on in the campaign, they were not sufficient enough to dramatically alter the navys ability to
assist the army onshore. See Lawrence Sondhaus, The Great War at Sea (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 181-182.
147 Callwell, The Dardanelles, p. 339.
148 For an overview of how the German submarine campaign of the First World War was overcome , see
Sondhaus, The Great War at Sea, pp. 241-278.
149 Speller and Tuck, Amphibious Warfare: Strategy and Tactics, p. 39.
150 Although he had been sceptical about the use of escorted convoys for protecting merchant shipping before
the First World War, Corbett had still advocated that they be used for protecting the troopships of an amphibious
expedition. See Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, pp. 259-260.
151 TNA, ADM 203/61, Military Sea Transport. General Principles, H. Stansbury, 1 October 1921, p. 11.
146

31

The submarine, along with the aeroplane, also contributed in part to greater Corbettian
influences in British amphibious theory and doctrine. Prior to the start of the First World War,
Corbett had argued that the conventional understanding of command of the sea as being
absolute was erroneous, that its only practical meaning was the control of the sea lines of
communication, and that this control was rarely absolute and could be either permanent or
temporary, local or general.152 When reading many of the interwar discussion on amphibious
operations, it becomes clear that Corbetts ideas are becoming far more accepted.153 Both this
changing understanding of the nature of command of the sea, and understanding of the
importance which air power would have to play in future amphibious operations would later be
reflected in British interwar amphibious doctrine. Whilst the 1913 Manual of Combined Naval
and Military Operations had merely stated that command of the sea, was a requisite for
conducting an amphibious landing, the 1923 edition reflects a changing understanding of what
this means, instead stating the need for a certain degree of control both by sea and air of the
sea lines of communication, and in the case of opposed landings, local command of the sea
and air superiority.154
The importance that air power would now have on the conduct of amphibious operations
was recognised early on. The very first page of the Camberley report from 1919 argued that
all three services would now have to be involved in the planning and execution of such
operations, rather than just the army and navy.155 Aircraft posed both challenges and
opportunities to a force wishing to land on a hostile coast. In defence, aircraft were able to
provide reconnaissance of the enemys approach; contest the enemys efforts at gaining air
superiority; attack transports, escorting warships and store-ships both prior to and during the
landing; attack troops on the beach or the landing craft transporting them there; and provide

152

Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, pp. 77-92.

For example, see NMM, Vice Admiral Thomas Hope Troubridge papers, TRO/401/5 (6), Combined
Operations, I-III, Lt. Colonel Foster, n.d. [c1924-1925], p. 1; NMM, Admiral Sir Arthur Malcolm Peters papers,
PET/7 (2), Precis of lecture on Combined Operations The Army Point of View, Col. Mayer, 15 May 1930, p. 3.
154 TNA, WO 33/644 Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations (1913), p. 7; TNA, AIR 2/1059 Manual
of Combined Naval, Military and Air Operations (1923), p. 13.
155 TNA, ADM 116/2086, Report on Combined Naval and Military Exercise, 1919, W. H. Anderson, n.d., p. 1. For
more information on the report, see page 17 of this work.
153

32

artillery observation for batteries firing on any of the former.156 The difficulties posed by
attempting a landing against an enemy who possessed an air force were immense, as even if
a force was landed on an undefended beach, the speed at which the defenders air forces
could reinforce and concentrate in the landing area could still threaten the entire operation.157
These were the challenges which led to an emphasis on the need to gain air superiority, if not
outright air supremacy, in British amphibious theory and doctrine during the interwar period.
All interwar editions of the Manual of Combined Operations stated the need to gain air
superiority before the landing commences.158 If the intended landing site was close enough to
an already established British airbase, this was relatively straight forward. However, if not, this
would cause major difficulties, as the consensus at the time was that land-based aircraft would
always possess an advantage over carrier or other sea-based aircraft.159 As one contributor
to the Journal of the Royal United Services Institution explained it:
The aeroplanes which are most powerful in relation to their weight are those equipped
to work from land aerodromes. On the other hand, aircraft carriers are very vulnerable
to attack, both from the air and sea; and seaplanes, flying boats and amphibians, and
aeroplanes launched from aircraft carriers and other warships, all suffer from
disabilities, either as to speed, ceiling or hardiness. Nevertheless, they have to be
employed unless the coast of the assailant, or other land in his possession, is in close
proximity to that of the defender. Therefore, plane for plane, the defender will
generally have over his adversary an advantage which will go far to cancel any
numerical superiority the latter may possess, and this advantage will naturally grow in
proportion to the length of the assailants stroke.160
Once air superiority had been gained, however, the attackers aircraft could then be employed
in assisting the landing by attacking the enemys troops and communications, observing for
naval gunfire, and conducting further reconnaissance of enemy movements.161 The new

NMM, Vice Admiral Thomas Hope Troubridge papers, TRO/401/5 (4), Combined Operations (Air Aspect),
n.d. [c1925], pp. 1-2.
157 NMM, Admiral Sir Arthur Malcolm Peters papers, PET/7 (2), The Air Aspect of Combined Operations, Grp
Captain Banatt, 13 May 1930, p. 1.
158 TNA, AIR 2/1059, Manual of Combined Naval, Military and Air Operations (1923), pp. 14-15; TNA, AIR
10/1206, Manual of Combined Naval, Military and Air Operations (1925), pp. 12-13; TNA, DEFE 2/708, Manual
of Combined Operations (1931), pp. 4-5; TNA, ADM 186/117, Manual of Combined Operations (1938), pp. 120121.
159 Geoffrey Till, Air Power and the Royal Navy, 1914-1945: A Historical Survey (London, 1979), pp. 68-70.
160 H. Rowan-Robinson, The Role of Aircraft in Coast Defence, Journal of the Royal United Services Institution,
75/499 (1930), p. 474.
161 NMM, Vice Admiral Thomas Hope Troubridge papers, TRO/401/5 (4), Combined Operations (Air Aspect),
n.d. [c1925], pp. 1-2.
156

33

importance given to the aerial aspect of British amphibious doctrine is evident from the
decision to retitle the publication as the Manual of Combined Naval, Military and Air Operations
for both the 1923 and 1925 editions.162
As much of a challenge as aircraft posed to amphibious operations, they were not the
only concern for advocates of amphibious warfare the problems of assaulting a defended
beach still remained and at this time there were doubts in some circles as to whether or not a
successful opposed landing was still possible in modern warfare. These views have been
magnified by some historians,163 yet are better understood as either just one side of a dispute
rather than a consensus, or as comment on current capability, rather than on what would be
possible within the foreseeable future if advances in training, doctrine or materiel were made.
One such historian, David Macgregor, argued in his 1992 article The Use, Miss-use and NonUse of History: The Royal Navy and the Operational Lessons of the First World War, that the
British armed forces during the interwar period focused almost entirely on conducting
unopposed night landings, that they placed an over-emphasis on the need for secrecy, and
that they believed that landings which were either opposed or were conducted in daylight
would be impossible, something which he believed held British amphibious capability back
prior to the start of the Second World War.164 Although it is certainly true that unopposed
landings were seen almost unanimously as preferable to opposed landings, to claim that
opposed landings were ignored, or that efforts to examine the possibility of reducing expected
opposition and ensure secrecy were wasteful or counterproductive, would be a mistake.
Following the Camberley exercise in 1919 there was certainly doubt as to Britains ability
to conduct opposed landings with the available equipment and doctrine. For instance, the
commandant of the Naval Staff College, Admiral Reginald Drax, opined that: It is very possible

TNA, AIR 2/1059, Manual of Combined Naval, Military and Air Operations (1923); TNA AIR 10/1206, Manual
of Combined Naval, Military and Air Operations (1925).
163 See Fergusson, The Watery Maze; Marder, The Influence of History on Sea Power: The Royal Navy and the
Lessons of 1914-1918; Adrian R. Lewis, Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory (Chapel Hill and London, 2001), pp.
34-56.
164 David MacGregor, The Use, Miss-use and Non-Use of History: The Royal Navy and the Operational Lessons
of the First World War, Journal of Military History, 56/4 (October 1992), pp. 603-616.
162

34

that science and careful preparation will provide in the future the requirements needed for
success, but there is little doubt that we are not in possession of those essentials at the present
time.165 But a pessimistic opinion of current capability is not the same as discrediting a concept
or method of war. Commenting on the same report, the commandant at Camberley, Major
General W. H. Anderson, claimed that if the operation of landing [is] to be carried out in the
face of even moderate opposition, it will almost certainly be doomed to failure, - that is, if we
do not revolutionise our methods.166 As he elaborated:
We have but to apply our experiences in the late war, gained in any theatre, in order
to realise that an advance by troops, however brave, against unbroken machine guns
can have little or no chance of success. We cannot therefore in the future be satisfied
to rely upon improvisations: the same methods must be employed to overcome
machine guns whether placed on a foreshore or in an organised inland battle position.
If fire from H.M. Ships is unable to locate and destroy hidden machine guns we must
place Tanks in the first line to reach the shore. . . . Herein lies but one of the many
new problems for which a solution will be required, if we are to be ready to undertake
an amphibious operation in the future.167
In both the staff colleges and in the interwar editions of the Manual, officers were taught that
unopposed landings were likely to be exceptional,168 and the consensus was that if an
opposed landing was to be overcome then it must be done, as one lecturer at Greenwich
stated, as was finally done in France [1918],169 namely through the coordinated use of
artillery, aircraft and tanks.170
The experience of the First World War on all fronts had emphasised the importance of
artillery in modern warfare,171 and many interwar accounts of the Gallipoli campaign
emphasised the lack of adequate artillery fire as a reason for the failure of the expeditionary

165

TNA, ADM 116/2086, Plunkett-Ernle-Erle-Drax to Admiralty Director of Training and Staff Duties Division, 8
December 1919, p. 3.
166 TNA, ADM 116/2086, Report on Combined Naval and Military Exercise, 1919, W.H. Anderson, n.d., p. 2.
Italics added for emphasis.
167 Ibid.
168 NMM, Admiral Sir Arthur Malcolm Peters papers, PET/7 (2), Precis of lecture on Combined Operations The
Army Point of View, Col. Mayer, 15 May 1930, p. 3; TNA, AIR 2/1059, Manual of Combined Naval, Military and
Air Operations (1923), p. 101; TNA, 186/117, Manual of Combined Operations (1938), p. 10.
169 NMM, Vice Admiral Thomas Hope Troubridge papers, TRO/401/5 (6), Combined Operations, I-III, Lt. Colonel
Foster, n.d. [c1924-1925], pp. 5-6.
170 As the role of aircraft in amphibious operations has already been covered (see pages 32-34), the following
paragraphs will focus on the role of artillery and tanks only.
171 Jonathan Bailey, British Artillery in the Great War, in Paddy Griffith (ed.), British Fighting Methods in the
Great War (London, 1996), pp. 23-49.

35

force to push into the peninsula once they had landed.172 According to the Camberley report,
there were four main roles for artillery to fulfil during an amphibious operation: to provide
barrages to cover the landings and the initial advance inland; to provide close support for the
landing force, relying on direct communication from the landing force in order to fire on specific
targets; to conduct counter-battery work; and finally, to maintain interdictive fire on enemy road
and rail communications.173 Of these four tasks, the second and third were the most
problematic. In a later report, Anderson, still commandant at Camberley at the time, stated
that he believed that ships guns would not be able to give either close support to the landing
forces or provide adequate counter-battery fire due to both the flat trajectory of naval gunfire
at such close range, and the fact that the ship itself was a moving platform.174 One solution,
which he himself proposed, was the mounting of land-based artillery pieces, such as
howitzers, on small barges which would be beached along with the first wave of the landing
forces, providing them with immediate artillery support from the beach without having to
unpack them.175
The greatest problem concerning British amphibious doctrine at the time, however, was
the ability to land tanks. Anderson, once again reviewing the situation, claimed that the use of
tanks in the first wave of a landing was vital to the success of landing in the face of possible
opposition.176 The first proposed use of tanks in amphibious operations in fact pre-dated the
end of the First World War. The proposed landing in Belgium in support of the offensive of the
Third Battle of Ypres in 1917, often referred to as the Hush-Hush operation, relied greatly on
the supposition that the tanks embarked on the transport pontoons would be able to clear the

Speller, In the Shadow of Gallipoli?, pp. 140-142. Specific examples include: Callwell, The Dardanelles, p.
180; Anon., Naval Bombardment, Naval Review, XII/3 (August 1924), pp. 492-497.
173 TNA, ADM 116/2086, Report on Combined Naval and Military Exercise, 1919, W. H. Anderson, n.d.,
Annexure II. As well as appearing in the report, these roles were copied almost verbatim into the 1923 edition of
the Manual. TNA, AIR 2/1059, Manual of Combined Naval, Military and Air Operations (1923), p. 87.
174 TNA, ADM 203/61, Comments on the Manual of Combined Operations (1921 Provisional), W. H. Anderson,
17 February 1922, p. 12.
175 Ibid.
176 TNA, ADM 203/61, Comments on the Manual of Combined Operations (1921 Provisional), W. H. Anderson,
17 February 1922, p. 16.
172

36

barbed wire defences, shield troops and take out German machinegun positions.177 Although
many interwar commentators expressed some doubt as to whether this scheme would have
worked,178 it nevertheless demonstrates that the need to land tanks in the first wave of an
amphibious operation was established early on, even before the question of how to land tanks
had been resolved,179 they became a common feature of amphibious paper exercises carried
out at the Staff Colleges.180
There were two major difficulties when it came to landing tanks. Firstly, either the tank
itself would have to be amphibious, able to move from the transports onto the beach under its
own motive power, or specialised craft would have to be constructed in order to land the tanks.
Secondly, whether the tanks would require landing craft or not, they would still have to make
it off the transports. During the First World War transports had tended to be merchant vessels
which were temporarily commandeered by either the navy or the Board of Trade.181 The ships
derricks were usually used to hoist out equipment onto lighters or other craft to transport to
shore, but those of most merchant ships were not capable of supporting the weight of existing
tanks.182 There were suggestions that specialised ships designed to carry tanks and heavy
artillery could be made by converting obsolete battleships, which would have a stern that could
open up in order to allow specialised landing craft to transport the tanks to the beach without
having to rely on derricks.183 Although no such ships were built by the British during the

Andrew Weist, The Planned Amphibious Assault in Peter Liddle (ed.), Passchendale in Perspective: The
Third Battle of Ypres (London, 1997), pp. 201-212.
178 For example, see F. Mitchell, Tank Warfare, The Story of Tanks in the Great War (London, 1933), pp. 94-98;
J. F. C. Fuller, The Development of Sea Warfare on Land and its Influence on Future Naval Operations, Journal
of the Royal United Services Institution, 65/458 (1920), pp. 291-292.
179 Although large tank-carrying pontoons had been constructed for the proposed Belgian landings in 1917, they
were considered unsuitable for anything other than a short distanced cross-channel operation in calm seas. See
TNA, ADM 116/2086, Plunkett-Ernle-Erle-Drax to Admiralty Director of Training and Staff Duties Division, 8
December 1919, p. 8.
180 NMM, Vice Admiral Thomas Hope Troubridge papers, TRO/401/5 (10), Combined Operations, Camberley,
1925, General description of the operation, n.d., p. 3.
181 TNA, ADM 203/61, Military Sea Transport. General Principles, H. Stansbury, 1 October 1921, pp. 5-6.
182 TNA, ADM 116/2086, Plunkett-Ernle-Erle-Drax to Admiralty Director of Training and Staff Duties Division, 8
December 1919, pp. 6-7.
183 TNA, ADM 203/61, Paper on Sea Transport, Captain E. Unwin, n.d. [c1921], pp. 3-4.
177

37

interwar period, both the British and American navies would construct such ships during the
Second World War.184
The introduction of the Vickers light tanks in the early 1930s meant that the British Army
now possessed a tank which could both be carried in the landing craft currently being trialled
by the navy (the MLC 10) and were light enough for most ships derrick to hoist.185 As a result,
in the 1931 edition of the Manual of Combined Operations we begin to see the development
of established tactical and operational doctrine for the conduct of an opposed landing against
a well-armed and organised enemy with prepared defences involving the attainment of air
superiority, the employment of tanks in the first wave, smoke screens to conceal the
approaching landing craft, and heavy naval gunfire support conducted in daylight.186 Problems
still persisted however. As the 1931 edition of the Manual points out:
Owing to the combined weight of the tank and landing craft, and the construction of
the latter, it is not possible to hoist out the landing craft with the tank already
embarked. They must consequently be hoisted out separately, but the operation of
lowering the tank into the landing craft in a sea way may be a difficult one, and this
fact must be taken into consideration when tanks are included in the first flight of the
covering force.187
In addition to the suggestion of specialised ships mentioned before, the other possible solution
was to have an amphibious tank which could traverse from the transport to the landing site
itself. Thoughts on the subject ranged from analysis of how these would ease the problems
already discussed,188 to considerably more outlandish views, such as one 1919 article in the
Naval Review in which the author suggests that in the future the submarine would merge with
the tank, with the resultant hybrid coming under naval control and thus eliminating the
problems of inter-service dispute over command in amphibious operations.189 Unlike the
specialised ships, there were experiments on creating an amphibious armoured vehicle during

These were designated as Landing Ship, Docks or (LSD), see Speller and Tuck, Amphibious Warfare:
Strategy and Tactics, p. 140.
185 Harding, Amphibious Warfare, 1930-1939, p. 60.
186 TNA, DEFE 2/708, Manual of Combined Operations (1931), p. 70.
187 TNA, DEFE 2/708, Manual of Combined Operations (1931), p. 57.
188 For examples, see Anon., An Amphibious Tank, Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, 76/504
(1931), pp. 812-813; ; J. F. C. Fuller, The Development of Sea Warfare on Land and its Influence on Future
Naval Operations, Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, 65/458 (1920), pp. 292-293.
189 Landships Past and Future, Naval Review, VII/3, (August 1919), pp. 314-316.
184

38

the interwar period,190 although the designs were never adopted and it would not be until the
adoption of Duplex Drive (DD) tanks in the Second World War that Britain would possess such
vehicles.191
The final feature of the tactical aspect of British doctrine for opposed landings to emerge
during the interwar period was the emphasis on using smokescreens to mask individual
soldiers, vehicles and craft from direct enemy fire. Early on, this was often coupled with an
emphasis on night landings,192 as MacGregor suggested, although by the publication of the
1931 edition of the Manual, the problems with conducting a landing at night had been outlined:
Though a landing in the dark may conduce local surprise and freedom from air attack,
such a landing presents many difficulties; it will be difficult to ensure anchoring the
transports silently in their correct positions, the troops will take longer to disembark
into small craft, and some of the tows may not reach the correct beaches. During
darkness it is difficult to exploit success, while naval artillery support and air cooperation will be lacking.193
Instead, smoke would be used to counter the vulnerability of the troops and their equipment
during both the ship-to-shore and initial landing stages where they would be most exposed. 194
However, the ability to successfully employ smokescreens would rely heavily in both the force
and direction of the wind, and as such although its use was encouraged, officers were warned
not to devise plans which relied on deploying smoke screens for success.195
This is not to say that night landings did not have a place in British amphibious doctrine.
They were in fact the preferred method of landing either for small raids or when there was
expected to be no opposition on the beaches themselves. Understanding that unopposed
landings are not always an exception to the rule is important when examining the subject of
amphibious operations;196 in the century before the outbreak of the First World War, almost all
successful amphibious operations, including those conducted by Japanese and US forces,

Harding, Amphibious Warfare, 1930-1939, p. 60.

Speller and Tuck, Amphibious Warfare: Strategy and Tactics, pp. 80-81.
192 For instance, see TNA, AIR 2/1059, Manual of Combined Naval, Military and Air Operations (1923), p. 107.
193 TNA, DEFE 2/708, Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations (1931), p. 69.
194 Ibid., p. 78.
195 Ibid.
196 Speller and Tuck, Amphibious Warfare: Strategy and Tactics, pp. 71-72.
190
191

39

were launched against undefended beaches.197 As many of the scenarios in which the British
Army and Royal Navy believed that a landing would have to take place were against forces
whom they believed to be inferior, or against targets which were likely to be relatively lightly
defended,198 a tactical doctrine for maximising the impact of an unopposed landing was
important. As the final edition of the Manual of Combined Operations published during the
interwar period describes it:
In general, it may be said that, where the enemy has considerable forces in the area
of operations, but where at the same time the choice of landing places is so wide that
he cannot defend them all, a night landing will probably offer the best chance of
success. . . Conversely, should the choice of landing places be so restricted that the
enemy, though lacking in total strength in the area, has been able to establish
defences at each, the best way of overcoming those defences will be an exactly
executed and accurately co-ordinated attack, carried out with the assistance of smoke
and with the support of naval gunfire and air operations against ground targets. Such
a landing must be made by day.199

The final element in British amphibious theory and doctrine during this period, and one
which concerned both opposed and unopposed landings, was that of secrecy and surprise.
Once again, Andersons recommendations from 1919 outlined what would remain the basis
of British thought on the matter for the next twenty years, claiming I cannot think that a landing
without surprise against a civilised enemy in prepared defences can in future be regarded a
feasible operation of war.200 The need to keep the final destination of an amphibious force
secret was considered by Anderson to be so vital to the successful conduct of a landing that
he even argued that reconnaissance should be avoided during wartime if it would in any way
prejudice the element of surprise.201 Yet although MacGregor and others have insinuated that
such concerns held British amphibious doctrine back during the interwar years, 202 this

Allan R. Millet, Assault from the Sea: The development of amphibious warfare between the wars-the
American, British, and Japanese experiences in Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet (eds.), Military Innovation
in the Interwar Period (Cambridge: USA, 1996), p. 51.
198 See Chapter II of this Work.
199 TNA, ADM 186/117, Manual of Combined Operations (1938), p. 134.
200 TNA, ADM 203/61, Comments on the Manual of Combined Operations (1921 Provisional), W. H. Anderson,
17 February 1922, p. 15.
201 TNA, ADM 116/2086, Report on Combined Naval and Military Exercise, 1919, W. H. Anderson, n.d., p. 9.
202 Similar views to Macgregors can be found in Fergusson, The Watery Maze; Lewis, Omaha Beach: A Flawed
Victory.
197

40

emphasis on surprise would lead to what was perhaps the most important advance in British
amphibious theory and doctrine during the interwar period the need to deceive ones
enemies as to the point of landing.
Factors such as aerial reconnaissance, the long periods of time it took to organise for
an amphibious operation, and the dangers of enemy intelligence, meant that maintaining
complete secrecy over the preparations for any sizeable amphibious operation was
considered a near impossibility.203 Instead, by convincing the enemy that the landing would
take place elsewhere, the attacking force could achieve tactical, operational, or possibly even
strategic surprise over an enemy and thus face depleted forces in the actual landing area. In
an early lecture to his students at Greenwich, Richmond argued that after the initial attempt to
force the Straits had failed, the best course of action would then have been to have boasted
of an attack on Alexandretta and made reconnaissances, bombardments, speeches, in
anticipation of such a blow and then, when all was ready, to have carried the whole thing to
the [Gallipoli] Peninsula.204 The need to deceive the enemy as to the intended landing site
was a prominent feature in both lectures,205 and in the Manuals during the interwar period, the
1923 outlining the need for a deceptive plan to:
(a) Be one which conforms to the general plan of operations and allows for
developments which may subsequently arise.
(b) Be secure from disclosure by subsequent events.
(c) Be a reasonable alternative to the actual operation to be carried out.
(d) Be worked out to the minutest detail.
(e) Supply the enemy with some correct information which, while it cannot disclose
our true plan, will help to confirm his belief in the false one.
(f) The information supplied to the enemy must appear to be borne out by
subsequent events.
(g) The scheme must suit the enemys psychology.206

NMM, Captain Richard Oliver-Bellasis papers, BEL/151, The Army in Combined Operations, unknown
author, n.d. [c1936], p. 1.
204 NMM, Admiral Sir H.W. Richmond papers, RIC/10/1, Lectures at R. N. War College, Greenwich: Spring
Session, 1920, Volume I, Policy and Strategy, n.d., p. 21.
205 NMM, Vice Admiral Thomas Hope Troubridge papers, TRO/401/5 (6), Combined Operations, I-III, Lt. Colonel
Foster, n.d. [c1924-1925], p. 2; NMM, Admiral Sir Arthur Malcolm Peters papers, PET/7 (2), Precis of lecture on
Combined Operations The Army Point of View, Col. Mayer, 15 May 1930, p. 2; NMM, Captain Richard OliverBellasis papers, BEL/151, The Army in Combined Operations, unknown author, n.d. [c1936], p. 1.
206 TNA, AIR 2/1059, Manual of Combined Naval, Military and Air Operations (1923), pp. 30-31.
203

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The 1938 edition elaborates by adding the additional criterion that a deceptive operation
should If possible, be supported by noticeable, but false, preparation.207
The importance that deceptive operations would later have on the success of British
amphibious operations during the Second World War should not be underestimated; barring
the hastily assembled force sent to Norway in 1940,208 the largest amphibious operations of
the war which involved a significant number of British forces, Operation Ironclad (the invasion
of Madagascar), Operation Torch, the invasions of Sicily and mainland Italy, and the
Normandy invasion, were all proceeded by deception campaigns to mislead the defending
forces as to where the amphibious force would strike.209 Unlike the other aspects of British
amphibious doctrine developed over this period, which for opposed landings differed relatively
little from that of the US Navy and Marine Corps,210 this emphasis on deception marks the only
major difference between the amphibious doctrine of the two predominant western Allies, one
historian noting that, before Operation Torch, American planners viewed strategic and
operational deception with scepticism.211

. . .

TNA, ADM 186/117, Manual of Combined Operations (1938), p. 34.

Stephen Roskill, The Navy at War, 1939-1945 (London, 1960), pp. 62-70.
209 Thaddeus Holt, The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War (New York, 2007), pp. 177178, 249-273, 368-375, 383-384, 577-583. At least one historian has blamed the failure of the smaller Dieppe
raid of August 1942 on a lack of any prior deceptive measures, see Jock Haswell, The Intelligence and deception
of the D-Day Landings (Frome, 1979), pp. 13-20.
210 Namely that in an opposed landings, the attacking force must gain air superiority, commence with a heavy
bombardment of enemy positions, and land with the use of both smoke and armoured vehicles, preferably in
daylight. See Office of Naval Operations, Landing Operations Doctrine United States Navy (FTP-167)
(Washington, DC, 1938). Unlike the British Manual produced the same year, there is no detailed consideration of
the use of deceptive measures.
211 Holt, The Deceivers, pp. 247-250.
207
208

42

Conclusion

An inaccurate understanding of the development of British amphibious theory and doctrine

during the interwar period has led to distorted analyses of later events, something which a
more accurate understanding would have in part corrected. For instance, in his 2001 book
Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory, Adrian Lewis asserts that the high casualty rates inflicted on
the landing force at Omaha Beach were mainly the result of an attempted compromise between
British and American amphibious doctrine.212 Lewis, whose source material draws almost
entirely from MacGregors work, characterises British doctrine in the same vain as MacGregor:
being overly reliant on night landings and taking an almost counter-productive approach to
tactical surprise by avoiding large bombardments; whilst US doctrine, based on that developed
by the US Marine Corps during the mid-1930s, entailed the use of overwhelming firepower in
daylight attacks.213 By attempting a compromise, Lewis argued, the attack was made at dawn
with only a thirty minute naval bombardment and as a result, the advantages which either
method might have provided were nullified.214 Although he does recognise that Omaha would
have been the most difficult beach to assault under any circumstances,215 he asserts that if
one method had been chosen over the other, the casualty rate would have been significantly
reduced and the beach taken far sooner.
Not only is Lewiss understanding of British amphibious doctrine ill-informed, but his
argument is weakened further when one notes that the naval bombardment covering the British
sector of Normandy lasted for two hours before the first British and Canadian troops landed,216
and had been preceded by a two hour aerial bombardment.217 If anything, a dawn landing was

212

Lewis, Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory, pp. 1-8.

Ibid., pp. 34-56.
214 Ibid., pp. 291-295. Other historians have given slightly longer estimates for the length of the bombardment at
Omaha Beach, with Ian Speller and Christopher Tuck claiming it lasted forty minutes and Stephen Roskill
claiming it lasted fifty minutes. See Speller and Tuck, Amphibious Warfare, p. 80; Roskill, The Navy at War,
1939-1945, p. 378.
215 Ibid., p. 5.
216 Roskill, The Navy at War, 1939-1945, pp. 375-378.
217 Carlo DEste, Decision in Normandy (London, 2001), pp. 112-113.
213

43

needed both to avoid many of the beach obstacles which would be underwater if landing at
high tide, allow the amphibious force to embark and reach an anchoring position off Normandy
under the cover of darkness and allow for as many hours of daylight as possible for the invasion
force to push inland, secure a defensible beachhead, and continue to bring equipment,
vehicles and reinforcements onto the beaches.218 Lewiss assessment also leaves out the
impact that previous amphibious assaults of the war, particularly Dieppe, Salerno and Anzio,
had had on allied planning for the invasion of Normandy.219
The question remains, however, that if British amphibious doctrine for opposed landings
was almost identical to that of the United States by the beginning of the Second World War,220
what factors made the latter so much more prepared for conducting amphibious operations
when they entered the war than the former? Allan R. Millet has argued that there are four
factors which need to be assessed when examining military innovation. The first is strategic
context; the second is the influence of technological discovery upon the development of
military capabilities; the third is the political behaviour of military organisations; and the fourth
is parallel development in civilian technology.221 In terms of strategic context, the armed forces
of both nations had either specific war plans, such as the USs War Plan Orange and the
UKs War Memorandum (Eastern),222 in which amphibious operations played a vital part, or
in the case of the United Kingdom a strong case for developing amphibious forces for the
defence and maintenance of the Empire.223 An important strategic context for amphibious
innovation was present in both countries. By the end of 1939 neither the US or Britain

218

Speller and Tuck, Amphibious Warfare, pp. 30-33, 98-101.

DEste, Decision in Normandy, pp. 71-104. Another omission of Lewiss is that the specific H-Hour for each
landing force was decided upon by each task force, with the American task force, by its own volition, choosing to
land an hour before the first British troops, allowing more time for the latter to produce a longer pre-landing
bombardment, and that even so, the ships of the American task force commenced their bombardment twenty
minutes after the British task force started theirs. See Correlli Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely: The
Royal Navy in the Second World War (London, 2001), pp. 813-815.
220 U.S Amphibious doctrine originated within the U.S. Marine Corps with the production of the Tentative Manual
for Landing Operations in 1934, which following several refinements was published as Landing Operations
Doctrine United States Navy in 1938 and was used by both the army and navy as well as the marines. See Allan
R. Millet, Assault from the Sea, pp. 76-77.
221 Allan R. Millet, Patterns of Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, in Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet
(eds.), Millitary Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge, 1996), p. 335.
222 Douglas Ford, A Statement of Hopes? The Effectiveness of US and British naval war plans against Japan,
1920-1941, Mariners Mirror, 101/1 (February 2015), pp. 63-80.
223 See Chapter II of this Work.
219

44

possessed anything which was technologically superior (as opposed to mechanically superior
or of a superior design) for use in amphibious warfare, the US Marine Corps amphibious
tracked landing vehicles only being introduced in 1941,224 and as such an examination of the
fourth factor will not be needed. It is perhaps the third factor which led to the greatest
divergence in amphibious capability between the two countries as, whilst the US Marine Corps
felt the need to push forward with developing an amphibious capability, which included
investing in new equipment and regular training, in part to secure its own independent
existence,225 there was no such institutional drive in Britain to do the same. The Royal Marines
had not evolved into a specialised amphibious assault force and the investment of time and
resources in building up such a capability and training for its use was split between the army
and navy, both of whom had other priorities.226 Millet himself comes to the same conclusion.227
There are many aspects of British amphibious theory and doctrine from the interwar
period which this work has been unable to cover, such as proposed solutions to the difficulties
of communication between the separate elements of an amphibious task force, debates over
the merits and disadvantages of having a single figure in charge of the operation as opposed
to joint command between an officer from each service, or suggested solutions to the many
logistical problems which are inherent in any amphibious operation.228 However, it is hoped
that this work has helped to shed some light onto a topic which has been all too often
overlooked due to the assumed apathy towards amphibious operations in Britain, and an
assumption that capability, or lack thereof, is an indication of intent.

224

Speller and Tuck, Amphibious Warfare, 147-148.

Allan R. Millet, Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps (New York, 1991), pp. 318-343.
226 Donald F. Bittner, Britannia's Sheathed Sword: The Royal Marines and Amphibious Warfare in the Interwar
Years - A Passive Response, Journal of Military History, 55/3 (July 1991), pp. 345-364.
227 Millet, Patterns of Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, p. 357.
228 These can be found in almost all of the lecture notes, correspondence and reports already referenced.
225

45

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