SPOUSES GAUVAIN and BERNARDITA BENZONAN, petitioners, vs.

COURT
OF APPEALS, BENITO SALVANI PE and DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents

the five-year period in foreclosure sale by not relying on the doctrine in Monge v.
Angeles and instead relied on the ruling in Belisario v. Intermediate Appellate
Court which was applied retroactively. Hence, the issue.

Facts: Pe obtained a parcel of land through Free Patent issued on Oct 29, 1969.
He mortgaged the land to secure a commercial loan, the proceeds of which he
used to build improvements upon the land.Upon failure to pay back his loan, DBP
foreclosed the mortgage on June 28, 1977 and was the highest bidder. The
certificate of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds on Jan
24, 1978.
Pe leased the lot and its improvements from DBP but failed to
redeem it within the one year period. DBP then sold the lot to spouses
Benzonan on Sept 24, 1979. On July 12, 1983, Pe offered to repurchase the land
from DBP. Upon denial, he filed a complaint for repurchase under Sec119 of CA
141. RTC and CA upon appeal both affirmed that the landshould be reconveyed
to Pe.

ISSUE:

Issue: When to count the five-year period for repurchase

from date of
foreclosure sale orfrom expiration of one year period to redeem foreclosed
property?
Section 119 of CA 141 provides: Every conveyance of landacquired under the
free patent or homestead provision, when proper,shall be subject to repurchase
by the applicant, his widow, or legalheirs, within a period of five years from the
date of conveyance.In the Mongan and Tupas cases prevailing at the time the
lotwas
mortgaged,
acquired
in
a
foreclosure
sale,
and
soldsubsequently to the Benzonan spouses, it was held that the five-yearperiod
should be counted from the date of the foreclosure sale.Reversing this decision
was the Bellisiano case (1988) whichheld that the five-year period should be
counted from the day afterthe expiration of the one-year period of repurchase
allowed in anextrajudicial foreclosure.
Held: Monge and Tupas cases hold in the instant case for whena doctrine of this
Court is overruled and a different view adopted, thenew doctrine should be
applied prospectively and should not apply toparties who had relied on the old
doctrine and acted on the faiththereof.
Other Source:
FACTS: In this case, petitioners Gauvain and Bernadita Benzonan want a review
on the decision made by herein respondent Court of Appeals sustaining the
right of private respondent Pe to repurchase a parcel of land sold to petitioners.
It started when respondent Pe was granted parcel of lands acquired through free
patent, however, Pe then mortgaged the lot to DPB; developed it into commercial
complex. Failed to pay the mortgaged, DBP foreclosed the lot; Pe leased it to
DBP; the former failed to redeem such property within one year period; DBP sold
it to petitioners Benzonan. Then Pe filed a complaint to repurchase. The RTC and
CA affirmed and granted the claim to repurchase. Petitioners filed a complaint
against CA, alledging, among other issues, that the latter erred in its decision re.

Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals erred in its decision regarding the
foreclosure sale by not applying the doctrinal law ruled in Monge v. Angeles and
instead applied retroactively the ruling in the case Belisario v. IAC?
HELD: Yes.
REASONING:
At the time of the foreclosure sale issue, the prevailing jurisprudence was still
the Monge case, hence, it is the doctrine that should be applied in the case at
bar. However, the respondent court applied the rulings in Belisario case in 1988
thereby rendering a decision in favor of the private respondent. But the Supreme
Court sustained the claims of the petitioners. The Court said that though they
are bound by decisions pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code, the Court also
stressed that: while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also
subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which states that laws shall have no
retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. Moreover, the Court
emphasized that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view
is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied PROSPECTIVELY xxx. Therefore,
respondents cannot rely on the Belisario ruling because it should be applied
prospectively and not the contrary. CA erred in its decision regarding this case.
Wherefore, such decision was reversed and set aside.

Pesca v. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001

FACTS: The petitioner and respondent were married and had four children.
Lorna filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of her husband. She alleged that he is
emotionally immature and irresponsible. He was cruel and violent. He was a
habitual drinker. Whenever she tells him to stop or at least minimize his drinking,
her husband would hurt her. There was even a time when she was chased by a
loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of their children. The
children also suffered physical violence. Petitioner and their children left the
home. Two months later, they returned upon the promise of respondent to
change. But he didnt. She was battered again. Her husband was imprisoned for
11 days for slight physical injuries. RTC declared their marriage null and void. CA
reversed RTCs ruling. Hence, this petition.

Mishing, Kareen, Patrick | 1

ISSUE: W/N the guidelines for psychological incapacity in the case of Republic vs
CA & Molina should be taken in consideration in deciding in this case.
HELD: Yes. The phrase psychological incapacity, borrowed from Canon law, is an
entirely novel provision in our statute books, and, until the relatively recent
enactment of the Family Code, the concept has escaped jurisprudential attention.
It is in Santos when, for the first time, the Court has given life to the term.
Molina, that followed, has additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist
the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded
on psychological incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not overturned, Santos.
As the CA observed, Lorna has not established the following: That Zosimo
showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause him to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of the Family Code;
that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is incurable; that his
incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is because of a psychological, not
physical illness; that the root cause of the incapacity has been identified
medically or clinically, and has been proven by an expert; and that the incapacity
is permanent and incurable in nature.
The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the plaintiff and any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This decision has force and effect of a law. These guidelines are mandatory in
nature. Petitioner utterly failed, both in her allegations and in her evidence to
prove psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent. Petition denied.
The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code,
expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall
form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the
settled legal maxim legis interpretado legis vim obtinet that the
interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the
force of law. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter
as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law
as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this
Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that
the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of
parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith
in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non
respicit.

MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO,

petitioners, vs. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE
AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS: There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a
casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the
project.The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in
several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro
City.he reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was
swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353.Nor was
this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93Pryce
assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by
PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded.
On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and
issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement,
ISSUE: WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid
HELD: No
Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or
suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance."
Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but
are in fact permitted by law.The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances
should not contravene a statute is obvious.Casino gambling is authorized by P.D.
1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified
by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the
use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93
prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these
ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein
and are therefore ultra vires and void.
Other source
Facts:
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end,
itleased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc.,
renovated andequipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there
during the Christmasseason.Civic organizations angrily denounced the project.
The religious elements echoed theobjection and so did the women's groups and
the youth. Demonstrations were led by themayor and the city legislators. The
media trumpeted the protest, describing the casino as anaffront to the welfare of
the city. The contention of the petitioners is that it is violative of the
Sangguniang Panlungsodof Cagayan de Oro City Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting
the use of buildings for the operationof a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93
prohibiting the operation of casinos.On the other hand, the respondents invoke
Mishing, Kareen, Patrick | 2

P.D. 1869 which created PAGCOR to helpcentralize and regulate all games of
chance, including casinos on land and sea within theterritorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. Hence, the
petition for review.
Issue: Whether or not the Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 337593 are valid
Held: No.
Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered toenact
ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is
expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the General
Welfare Clause nowembodied in Section 16 as follows:
Sec. 16. General Welfare Every local government unit shall exercise
the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as
well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of
the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local

government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety,
enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and
support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic
prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their
residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants.
There is a requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute.
Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local
councils exerciseonly delegated legislative powers conferred on them by
Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to
the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to
suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from
which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere
ordinance the mandate of the statute.

Mishing, Kareen, Patrick | 3