SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R.

LLAMAS,
respondent.
Facts:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues
filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas. It appears that Atty. Llamas, who
for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP OR Nos. and
data in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicated IBP Rizal 259060 but he has been
using this for at least 3 years already. On the other hand, respondent, who is now of
age, averred that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having paid
his IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by
complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed
in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that
such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which
those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a
"limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the
payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, as a senior citizen since
1992.
Issues:
(1) Whether respondent is exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines.
(2) Whether the respondent has misled the court about his standing in the IBP by
using the same IBP O.R. number
in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his actions.
Held:
(1) NO. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay
annual dues and default thereof for six months shall warrant suspension
of membership and if nonpayment covers a period of 1-year, default shall be a
ground for removal of the delinquents name from the Roll of Attorneys. It does not
matter whether or not respondent is only engaged in limited practice of law.
Moreover, While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, grants senior citizens "exemption from
the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income
does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption however does not
include payment of membership or association dues.
(2) YES. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby
misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the
Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His act is also a violation of Rule 10.01
which provides that: A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in court; nor mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in
the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in

view of respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea
for a more temperate application of the law, we believe the penalty of one year
suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is
later, is appropriate.

Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr. B.M. No. 1370 May 9, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioners files a motion for exemption for paying his IBP dues from 1977-2005 in
the amount of P12,035.00. He contends that after admission to the Bar he worked
at the Phil. Civil Service then migrated to the US until his retirement. His contention
to be exempt is that his employment with the CSC prohibits him to practice his law
profession and he did not practice the same while in the US. The compulsion that he
pays his IBP annual membership is oppressive since he has an inactive status as a
lawyer. His removal from the profession because of non-payment of the same
constitutes to the deprivation of his property rights bereft of due process of the law.
ISSUE: WON inactive practice of the law profession is an exemption to payment for
IBP annual membership.
RULING: The court held that the imposition of the membership fee is a matter of
regulatory measure by the State, which is a necessary consequence for being a
member of the Philippine Bar. The compulsory requirement to pay the fees subsists
for as long as one remains to be a member regardless whether one is a practicing
lawyer or not. Thus, his petition for exemption from paying his IBP membership fee
dues is denied.
In Re: Arthur Cuevas, Jr.

In 1991, a neophyte died during the initiation rites of Lex Talionis Fraternitas in the
San Beda College of Law. Arthur Cuevas Jr was one of the persons charged (with
murder) for the death of the neophyte. He pleaded guilty and was later convicted to
the lesser crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide. Thereafter, Cuevas
was granted probation and he continued taking up law. In 1995, he was discharged
from probation. In 1996, the Supreme Court allowed Cuevas to take the bar on the
condition that in case he will pass, his oath taking will have to be approved by the
Supreme Court first. Cuevas did pass the 1996 bar exams and in 1997, he filed a
petition before the Supreme Court asking the latter to allow him to take the
Lawyers Oath.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cuevas may be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court is duty bound to prevent the entry of undeserving
aspirants, as well as to exclude those who have been admitted but have become a
disgrace to the profession. Cuevas participation in the senseless killing of the
neophyte is highly reprehensible however, the Supreme Court is willing to give him
a chance considering that Cuevas has received various certifications regarding his
good behavior while on probation.
The Supreme Court also stressed that the lawyers oath is not a mere formality
recited for a few minutes in the glare of flashing cameras and before the presence
of select witnesses. As a lawyer, Cuevas shall be expected to abide by the oath
strictly and to conduct himself beyond reproach at all times. As a lawyer he will now
be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate
members of society.

BARANDON, JR. vs. FERRER, SR.

Facts:
Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. filed a complaint with the IBP seeking the disbarment,
suspension from the practice of law, or imposition of appropriate disciplinary action
against respondent Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. for series of offenses, such as;
falsification of public documents, abusive, offensive, improper language, sexual
harassment and acts of lasciviousness. The Investigating Commissioner
Milagros V. San Juan of the IBP-CBD submitted to the Court a Report,
recommending the suspension for two years of Atty. Ferrer. The Investigating
Commissioner found enough evidence on record to prove Atty. Ferrers violation of
Canons 8.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The IBP Board of
Governors however, passed Resolution adopting and approving the Investigating
Commissioners recommendation but reduced the penalty of suspension to only one
year. Atty. Ferrer filed a motion for reconsideration but the Board denied. Nonetheles
s, the Courtresolved to treat Atty. Ferrers comment as a petition for review under
Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether the respondent, Atty. Ferrer, violated Canons 8.01 and 7.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
Held:
Yes. The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards
of legal proficiency and morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the
lawyer to administrative liability. Atty. Ferrer violated Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which commands all lawyers to conduct
themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor towards their fellow lawyers and
avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel, specifically, in Rule 8.01. The
Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified language in their pleadings
despite the adversarial nature of our legal system. Though a lawyers language may
be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the

dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind
ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. Atty. Ferrer had likewise
violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that enjoins lawyers to
uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession at all times. Rule 7.03 which
prohibit lawyers, whether in public or private life, to behave in scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession. Atty. Ferrer ought to have realized that this
sort of public behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the public
estimation and erode public respect for it. All lawyers should take heed that they
are licensed officers of the courts who are mandated to maintain the dignity of the
legal profession, hence they must conduct themselves honorably and
fairly. Atty. Ferrers display of improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, and miscon
duct in theperformace of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court, before
the public and thecourt, was a patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers
are sworn to uphold.
ALCANTARA VS. PEFIANCO (A.C. NO. 5398 12/03/2002)

FACTS:
This is a complaint against Atty. Mariano Pefianco for conduct unbecoming a
member of the bar for using improper and offensive language and threatening and
attempting to assault complainant. The complainant, Atty. Antonio A. Alcantara, is
the incumbent District Public Attorney of the Public Attorneys Office in San Jose,
Antique. He alleged that while Atty. Ramon Salvani III was conferring with a client
in the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) at the Hall of Justice in San Jose, Antique, a
woman approached them. Complainant suggested Atty. Salvani to talk with her
when respondent Atty. Mariano Pefianco, who was sitting nearby, stood up and
shouted at Atty. Salvani and his client. Atty Pefianco was asked to calm down but he
did not refrain from his outburst. This caused a commotion in the office wherein
respondent tried to attack complainant and even shouted at him, "Youre stupid!"
Complainant also submitted the affidavits of Atty. Ramon Salvani III, Felizardo Del
Rosario, Atty. Pepin Joey Marfil, Robert Minguez,Herbert Ysulat and Ramon Quintayo
to corroborate his allegations.
In his Comment and Counter-Complaint, respondent Pefianco said that the sight of
the crying woman, whose husband had beenmurdered, moved him and prompted
him to take up her defense. He also averred that it was Alcantara who punched him
and called him stupid.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents act violate
Responsibility.

the

Code

of Professional

HELD:
YES. Pefianco violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: CANON 8 A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR

TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS

AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.
Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must act
honorably, fairly and candidly toward each other and otherwise conduct themselves
without reproach at all times. In this case, respondents meddling in a matter in
which he had no right to do so caused the untoward incident. Though he thought
that this is righteous, his public behaviour can only bring down the legal
profession in the eyes of the public and erode respect for it. An injustice cannot be
righted by another injustice.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Mariano Pefianco is found GUILTY of violation of Canon 8 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and, considering this to be his first offense,
is hereby FINED in the amount of P1,000.00 and REPRIMANDED with a warning that
similar action in the future will be sanctioned more severely.
Cambaliza vs. Cristal-Tenorio [A.C. 6290. July 14, 2004]
FACTS:
[C]omplainant Ana Marie Cambaliza, a former employee of respondent Atty. Ana Luz
B. Cristal-Tenorio in her law office, charged the latter with deceit, grossly immoral
conduct, and malpractice or other gross misconduct in office. Case on deceit and
grossly immoral conduct did not pursue lacking clear and convincing evidence. On
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the complainant alleged that the
respondent cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband, who is not a
member of the Philippine Bar and two other allegations. The respondent averred
that this disbarment complaint was filed by the complainant just to get even with
her. The complainant later filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint as she is no longer
interested in pursuing the case. This motion was not acted upon by the IBP and the
case was pursued. The IBP found the respondent guilty of assisting in unauthorized
practice of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Cristal-Tenorio violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
YES. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
RATIO:
A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to misrepresent himself as a lawyer
and to practice law is guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which read as follows:

Canon 9 A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice
of law.
Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance
of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good
standing.
The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized
practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that
the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education
and character.

RODRIGO E. TAPAY and J. RUSTIA, Complainants, versus ATTY. CHARLIE

L.BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER, Respondents
FACTS:
Rodrigo
Tapay
and
Anthony
Rustia,
both
employees
of
the
Sugar
Regulatory Administration received an Order from the Office of the OmbudsmanVisayas requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of authority,
falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed against them by
Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr., a co-employee. The Complaint was allegedly signed on behalf
of Divinagracia by Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo. When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally
chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the case filed against them.
Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia
and declared that the signature in the Complaint was not his. Thus, Atty. Bancolo signed an
affidavit denying the said signature. This affidavit was used by Tapayand Rustia in filing a
counter-affidavit
accusing
Divinagracia
of
falsifying
the
signature
of Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia, denying the same, presented as evidence an affidavi
t byRichard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo Law
Office accepted Divinagracias case and that the Complaint filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman was signed by the office
secretary per Atty. Bancolos instructions.
Thecase was then dismissed. Tapay and Rustia then later filed with the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines a complaint
to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolos law partner. The complainants
alleged that not only were respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices,
they were also involved in falsification of documents used to harass and persecute innocent
people. In their Answer, respondents admitted that due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo
permitted that the pleadings be signed in his name by the secretary of the law office. After
investigation, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission
on Bar Discipline of the IBP, submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo
violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility while Atty. Jarder
violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1of the same Code, and recommended that Atty. Bancolo be
suspended for two years from the practice of law and Atty. Jarder be admonished for his
failure to exercise certain responsibilities in their law firm.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Bancolo is guilty of violating Canon 9 of the Code of

ProfessionalResponsibility.
HELD:
YES. Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of
the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. He likewise
categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the communications and pleadings
filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit with his tolerance. Clearly,
he violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which
provides:
CANON 9

A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST INTHE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE

OF LAW.
Rule 9.01

A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by
law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
AMALGAMATED LABORERS ASSOCIATION and/or FELISBERTO M. JAVIER for
himself and as General
President, ATTY. JOSE UR. CARBONELL, ET.AL.(petitioners) vs. CIR and
ATTY.
LEONARDO
C.FERNANDEZ
(respondent)GR No. L23467 March 27, 1968FACTS:
Amalgamated Laborers Association won a case of unfair labor practice against
Binalbagan Sugar
Central Company, Inc. (Biscom). Upon motion of the complainants, CIR sent the
Chief Examiner to go to Biscom and compute the backwages. Total net backwages
amounted to P79,755.22. Appeals were made against this decision. In the interim,
Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez (herein respondent), in the same case, filed a Notice of
Attorneys Lien over the amount to be awarded. He alleged therein that he had
beenthe attorney of record for the said case since the inception of the preliminary
hearings of said case up tothe Supreme Court in Appeal, as chief counsel. He
claimed that the labourers have voluntarily agreed to give him as attorneys fees on
contingent basis 25% of the award. He further averred that this is already a
discounted fee out of the plea of the unions president to reduce it from 30% for
them to also satisfy Atty. Jose Ur Carbonell. Meanwhile, CIR decided the appeals still
in favour of the petitioners and ordered Biscom to deposit the amount representing
25% of P79,755.22 with the cashier of the court to be awarded and granted to Atty.
Fernandez. Atty. Carbonell and ALA appealed from the decision contending that 1)
CIR is bereft of jurisdiction to adjudicate contractual disputes over attorneys fees
averring that a dispute arising from contracts for attorneys fees is not a labor
dispute and is not one among the cases ruled to be within CIRs authority and to
consider such a dispute to be a mere incident to a case over which CIR may validly
assume jurisdiction is to disregard the special and limited nature of said courts
jurisdiction; 2) the award of 25% as attorneys fees to Atty. Fernandez is excessive,
unfair and illegal. This and a subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Is CIR bereft of jurisdiction over the claim for attorneys fees?
2. Is 25% of the award a reasonable attorneys fee?
RULING:
1. No. Court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to
effectuate its jurisdiction. In the absence of such express grant, and in the
absence of prohibitive legislation, it shall also be impliedly granted. In the
case at bench, to direct that the present dispute be lodged in another court
as petitioners advocate would only result in multiplicity of suits, a situation
abhorred by the rule. Since the court of Industrial Relations obviously had the
jurisdiction over the main cases, it likewise had jurisdiction to consider and
decide all matters collateral thereto, such as claims for attorneys fees made
by the members of the bar who appeared therein.
2. Yes. An examination of the record of the case will readily show that an award
of 25% attorneys
fees reasonably compensates the whole legal services rendered in the case. This
must however be shared by petitioner Atty. Carbonell and respondent Atty.
Fernandez. Afterall, they are the counsel of record of the complainants. Though
common effort is presumed, the rightful shares of both must be ascertained. As
such, the case has been remanded to the CIR for the sole determination of shares.
OTHER IMPORTANT POINTS:

Canon 34 of Legal Ethics condemns the arrangement wherein union presidents

should share in
the attorneys fees. No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with
another lawyer,
based upon a division of service and responsibility. The union president is not the
attorney forthe labourers. He may seek compensation only as union president.

A contingent fee contract specifying the percentage of recovery an attorney is to

receive in asuit should be reasonable under all circumstances of the case, but
should always be subject tothe supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness.