University of Utah

Western Political Science Association

International Crises: A Note on Definition

Author(s): James M. McCormick
Source: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Sep., 1978), pp. 352-358
Published by: University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science Association
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INTERNATIONAL

CRISES:
JAMES

M.

A NOTE

ON DEFINITION

MCCORMICK

Iowa State University

NE prominentfeatureof the recentpostwarperiod is the occurrenceof

international
crises.WhileKorea, Berlin,Cuba, Vietnam,and theMiddle
East immediately
come to mind,thesefewexampleshardlyexhaustthe
ofthesecrisesin thecurrentinternational
listof suchevents.Despitethefrequency
relativelylittleis knownabout the crisisprocess. In fact,onlywithinthe
system,
to gain systematic
last ten to fifteen
yearshave therebeen efforts
empiricalknowland
about
this
more
have
there
been attemptsto
recently
edge
phenomenon, only
such
knowledge.1
synthesize
to the
Partofthereasonforthelackofcumulativeknowledgecan be attributed
complexityof the phenomenonand the recencyof its investigation.But part of
also liesin thefailureof researchers
in thisarea to defineclearlywhat
thedifficulty
situationsconstituteinternationalcrises.Differentsituationsare labeled "crises"
scholars. Oftenresearchers
by different
onlyemployintuitivenotionsof when a
crisisexistedand immediately
proceedto analyzecrisisbehavior. Or, alternately,
even whencrisiscriteriaare spelledout,thestandardsare notwhollyadequate or
are not consistentacrossresearchers.
If we are to obtain meaningfulcumulative
knowledgeaboutcrises,thisdefinitional
problemmustbe confronted.In an attempt
to sensitizeresearchers
the
to thisfirststep in crisisanalysis,thispaper identifies
two major approachesto definingan international
crisis,discussestheproblemsin
relyingsolelyon eitherone, and arguesforcombiningbothapproachesin orderto
ofcrisissituations
forfutureanalyses.
improveidentification
ALTERNATE APPROACHES TO CRISIS DEFINITION

In reviewingthecrisisliterature,
Wienerand Kahn, Robinson,and Hermann
crisisconcepthas no generallyaccepted definition.2
agree that the international
Their analysesfurthersuggest,however,that different
theoreticalorientations
to
the studyof international
have
influenced
used
in
the
elements
politics
conceptual
variouscrisisdefinitions.In thissense,whileit may not be possibleto identify
a
it is possibleto identify
two different
singlecrisisdefinition,
approachesused by
scholarsto definethe concept: (1) researchers
who definean international
crisis
in termsof thedecision-making
within
a
and
who
those
define
nation,
process
(2)
a crisisin termsoftheinteraction
processbetweennations.3
To researchersanalyzinginternationalbehaviorfromthe decision-making
a crisissituationis definedin termsof thedecision-makers'
"definition
perspective,
viewof theinternational
is
environment
of thesituation."As thedecision-makers'
alteredby thebehaviorof anothernation,a crisissituationsetsin and becomesan
Thanks are due James Hutter, Charles Wiggins, and anonymous readers for several
constructivecommentson earlierversions. All errorsare mine.
See, for example, Charles F. Hermann and Linda P. Brady, "Alternative Models of Inter-

NOTE:

nationalCrisisBehavior,"in CharlesF. Hermann,ed., InternationalCrises: Insights

fromBehavioralResearch(New York: FreePress,1972), pp. 281--307;JamesA. Robin-

son, "Crisis Decisionmaking," in James A. Robinson, ed., Political Science Annual II,
1969-1970 (Indianapolis: Bobbs, Merrill, 1970), pp. 111-48; and Oran R. Young,
The Politics of Force (Princeton: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1968).
2
AnthonyJ. Wiener and Herman Kahn, Crisis and Arms Control (New York: Hudson Institute, 1962); James A. Robinson, "Crisis" in International Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences (New York: MacMillan, 1968), pp. 510-14; and Charles F. Hermann, Crises
in Foreign Policy (Indianapolis: Bobbs, Merrill, 1969).
3 For a discussion of the
prevalence of these two approaches in conceptualizing international
crises, see Robinson, "Crisis" in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences;
Young, The Politics of Force; and Hermann, Crises in Foreign Policy.

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International Crises 353

"occasion fordecision."4The definition

developedby CharlesHermannis most
of
this
representative
decision-making
approach: "Crisisis a situationthat (1)
threatensthe high-priority
unit; (2) restrictsthe
goals of the decision-making
amountof timeavailableforresponsebeforethesituationis transformed;
and (3)
unitwhenit occurs."5Additionally,
surprisesthe membersof the decision-making
Hermannexplicitlystatesthathis definition
is formulated
fromtheperspectiveof
the decision-makerswho are experiencing the crisis: ". .. the situation threatens

theirgoals, it surprisesthem,and it is theywho are faced with shortdecision

- and especiallyperceptions
of thedecision-makers
time."6Thus, theperceptions
- are thecrucialelementsforidentifying
of threat,as Hermannlaterdemonstrates7
an international
crisis.Even thoughexternaleventsmay have been initiallyresponsiblefor altered perceptions,researcherswho use the decision-making
approachdo notemphasizesucheventsin theircrisisdefinitions.
In sharpcontrastto thisdefinitional
approachis the one used by researchers
whoexamineinternational
politicsfromthesystemic
perspective.To thesescholars,
an international
crisisis usuallydefinedas a situationin whichthereis some significantchange in the normal interactionpatternsbetween nations. Charles
McClellandand Oran Young provideexamplesofthiscrisisdefinition.McClelland
crisisas "a 'change of state'in the flowof international
definesan international
as "when... a successionof extraordinary
inpoliticalactions..." or, alternately,
puts begettingnew outputsbegettingnew inputs,etc.,betweencompetingparties
the whole phenomenonbeginsto be
passes some point in volumeand intensity,
called an international
crisis."8Young generallyagreeswith McClelland's definition:
An international
crisisis a set of rapidlyunfoldingeventswhichraises
the impactof destabilizing
forcesin thegeneralsystemor any of itssubabove "normal" (i.e., average) levelsand increases
systemssubstantially
thelikelihoodofviolenceoccurring
in thesystem.9
Thus, thisdefinitional
approachemphasizesthe actual decisionstakenby nations,
and the resultantbehaviorbetweenthem,formarkingthe occurrenceof a crisis
situation.Researcherswho use thisapproachdo not indicateconcernfortheperceptionsof the policymakers
(althoughon at least one occasion McClelland has
alluded to theirimpact'0); rathertheyare primarilyconcernedwith behavior
changeforcrisisidentification.
4 Ibid.,p.

29; Robinson,"Crisis,"p. 511.

6 Hermann,
Crisesin ForeignPolicy,p. 29.

" Ibid.,p. 34; emphasisin original.

7Ibid., pp. 108, 202-3.
8 The first

quotationappearsin CharlesA. McClelland,"Accessto Berlin:The Quantityand

Varietyof Events,1948-1963," in J. David Singer,ed., QuantitativeInternational
Politics(New York: Free Press,1968), p. 160, whilethe secondone is fromCharles
A. McClelland,"The Acute International
Crisis,"WorldPolitics14 (October 1961):
199.

9Oran R. Young, The Intermediaries:Third Parties in InternationalCrises (Princeton:

Princeton
University
Press,1967), p. 10.
on the argumentthatcrisisand non-crisis
In commenting
behaviorare markedly
different
onlyin a psychological
sense,McClellandin "Accessto Berlin...," pp. 164-65, states
that:
... a givenact committed
at one momentand in a certaincontextis provocative,
while at anothertimeand in a different
settingit may be merelyirritating.A
statement
by the head of stateon one occasionwill be dismissedin othergovernmentsas blusterdirectedstrictly
to the home audience,while at anothertimeit
willbe takenas a seriousthreat.
In a sense,then,he seemsto recognizethisperceptualside of crisis.However,McClelland continuesby sayingthatif thepsychological
is the essentialcharactercomponent
- a
isticof crisis,anyprospectat crisismanagement
or crisisunderstanding
is unlikely
positionthathe doesnotaccept.

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354 WesternPoliticalQuarterly
Too often,however,thesetwoapproacheshave been used in virtualisolation
of one anotherin identifying
crisesforanalyses.One researcher
mayexamineperto earmarka crisis,whileanothermay
ceptualchangeamongthe decision-makers
use behaviorchangeamongnations.Whilesomemayarguethatbothapproaches
are sufficiently
relatedto one anotherto justifytherelianceupononlyone approach
forcrisisidentification
withinthedecisionunitleads
(i.e., perceptualmodification
to behaviorchangebetweennations,and behaviorchangein turnleadstoperceptual
severalseriousconceptualand empiricalproblems
modification),we demonstrate
in adoptingsuch a strategy.Then we argue that a crisissituationshould be
labelledas such onlywhenthe conditionsof bothapproachesare satisfied.
SOME CONCEPTUALANDEMPIRICALPROBLEMSWITH THESE APPROACHES
The fundamental conceptual problem in relyingsolely on either approach is

that situationsidentified
as crisesby one group of researchers
may not be recognized as such by the other. By employingthe decision-making
approach,forex-

ample, one could identifya situation as a crisis in which altered perceptions occurred but which resulted in little or no change in the actions between nations.
One might be justifiedin labeling the situation as a crisiswithin the bureaucracy,
but it hardly seems to qualify as an international crisis. A well-known example
from previous research underscores this possible confusion in crisis recognition.
When applying the decision-makingcriteria,Khrushchev's ultimatum over Berlin
in November 1958 seemed to initiate a crisisfor the Western nations. For example,

Eisenhoweradmitsthathe was surprisedby thebelligerence

of the Sovietmessage

over Berlin, but that he "put less credibilityin Khrushchev's threat to move in
the following May than he [Khrushchev] possibly expected." Eisenhower also indicated, however, that the time for decision-makingwas compressed: "But every
tick of the clock broughtus nearer to the momentwhen we had to be ready to meet
him [Khrushchev] head on, if necessary. Though six months can sometimesseem

like an age, therewas littleenoughtimeto perfectcontingency

planningwithour

allies.""l In his interactionanalyses of East-West encountersover Berlin, however,

Charles McClelland fails to confirmthe occurrence of this "Deadline Crisis." Ac-

cordingto hisdata results,thesequenceofeventsduringthisperiodfailedto reach

the thresholdhe had set forearmarkinga crisissituation.'2

who use the interaction

approachmaylabel a situation
Similarly,researchers
as a crisisbecause therehas been a markedchange in the interactionpatterns,
has not been altered
even thoughthe perceptualview of the decision-makers
markedly.For example, in the recent period of detente between the Soviet Union
and the United States, undoubtedly a sharp change in behavior patterns has occurred without much apparent change in the perceptual views of one another.13

DwightD. Eisenhower,
WagingPeace 1956-1961 (Garden City: Doubleday,1965), pp.
of thiscrisisis not clear336-37. But even on the perceptuallevel,the identification
cut. The accountsbyJeanE. Smith,The DefenseofBerlin(Baltimore:JohnsHopkins
Press,1963) and by JackM. Schick,The BerlinCrisis1958-1962 (PhilaUniversity
of Pennsylvania
delphia: University
Press,1971), are mixedin termsof evidencefora
crisissituationamongthe Westernnations. Smithgenerallyviewsit as an immediate
testof resolveon the part of the West. He triesto showthatthe Westernleadership
viewedit as such and acted on thatbasis. Schick,however,impliesthatthe United
but rather
did not regardthe ultimatumas quite so threatening,
Statespolicy-makers
overBerlin,Germany,
and European
theysaw it as a maneuverto re-opennegotiations
in general.
security
"McClelland in "Access to Berlin... ," p. 178, reportsthat ". . by the criterionof gross
volume,the Deadline Crisiswas not a crisis...." Likewise,his "relativeuncertainty"
of .700 for1958 or 1959 (p. 179). (For
measurefailsto reachthe specifiedthreshold
ofthemeasure,see footnote
a discussion
19.)
3In
of bothSovietand American
fact,the aim of de6tente,
accordingto officialstatements
is the lesseningof behavioralconfrontations
betweenthem,withoutany
policy-makers,
oftheirideologicaldispute.
lessening

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International Crises 355

In this instance, the interactionconditions for crisisare probably satisfied,but this
situation would hardly merit being called a crisis. Furthermore,continual perceptual hostilitymay exist between the Arab states and Israel, although theremay not
be much behavioral change between the states. Would we thus be justified in
labeling the situation as an internationalcrisis? In short,this kind of conceptual
confusionseems to existwhenevereach approach is used separately.
A second problem also arises from this conceptual divergence: Current work
on internationalcrises stronglysuggeststhat the varyingdefinitionshave hindered,
rather than helped, cumulative theoretical research. Consider a recent volume
edited by Charles Hermann.'4 A recurrenttheme throughoutseveral of the articles
is that the differentdefinitionshave been an obstacle to advancing crisis knowledge.15 This same problem is highlightedin the concluding essay by Hermann and
Brady. From the earlier ten articles, they firstidentifiedsome 311 crisis propositions and suggested how several of them were contradictory. Then they suggested
part of the reason why:
How can we account for these apparent contradictions?Various competing explanations warrant examination. For one thing it is by no means
certain that the same variable mentioned in two differentstudies is conceptualized in identical fashion,and even when the conceptualizations are
the same operationalization can differ. With no termis this point clearer
than with the basic termof crisis.In general, the authors of the ten studies
employ one of two definitionsof crisis... When one selects actual situations in internationalpolitics that are consistentwith each alternativedefinition, a considerable number of the same events appear in both groups.
Nevertheless,the differencesin definitionmay account, for some contradictoryhypotheses.16
Furthermore,even when Hermann and Brady develop four separate models (and
later a fifth,integratedone) to accommodate the disparate propositions,the alternate approaches to crisis identificationare still very much evident. In this sense,
the fundamentalproblem continuesto retardintegratedresearch.17
Another unfortunateresult which follows from these diverse research efforts
is the paucity of crisis theory. As James Robinson has said: ". . . [T]here is no such

thing as a theory of crisis or even theories of crisis."s1 In addition, Robinson is

hard-pressed to cite other social theories that employ the crisis concept in their
formulations. While a number of reasons may be cited for the failure to develop
adequate theory, no doubt a central one must be the ambiguity of the concept
itself. As a consequence, until the concept assumes a more accepted definitionacross
researchers,a theoryof crisiswill not be developed, and the use of the crisisconcept
in theoriesof social processwill continue to be infrequent.
14Charles F.
Hermann, International Crises: Insights fromBehavioral Research (New York:

Free Press, 1972).

See, for example, Charles F. Hermann, "Some Issues in the Study of International Crises,"
in Charles F. Hermann, ed., International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research
(New York: Free Press, 1972), pp. 3-17; Charles F. Hermann, "Editor's Introduction:
Chapter Two," in Charles F. Hermann, ed., International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research, pp. 18-19; and James A. Robinson, "Crisis: An Appraisal of Concepts and Theories," in Charles F. Hermann. ed., International Crises: Insights fron
Behavioral Research (New York: Free Press, 1972), pp. 20-35.
'6 Hermann and Brady, "Alternative Models of International Crisis Behavior," in Hermann.
International Crises.. ., p. 282; emphasis added.
" It is only fair to note that Hermann and Brady argue that their models are generally applicable to either definitionalapproach. Despite this contention,however, each model
-- the individual stress,organizational response,hostile interaction,and cost calculation
-seems to suggest the continued influence of differingdefinitionsfor hypothesizing
about crisis process.
' Robinson, "Crisis: An Appraisal of Concepts and Theories," in Hermann, International
Crises... p. 27.
8

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356 WesternPoliticalQuarterly
apFinally,empiricalproblemsexistin relyingsolelyon onlyone definitional
researchersnor the interactionscholars
proach. Neither the decision-making
thedegreeof perceptualor behavioralchangethatmustexistto qualifyas
identify
a crisis."' The decision-making
the level of perceived
approachdoes not identify
threatnecessaryforthe onsetof a crisisnor does it suggestwhenthreathas been
reduced to a non-crisiscondition. Similarly,the interactionapproach does not
of behaviorthatmarkthebeginningand theend of a crisis
the thresholds
identify
situation.Instead,one mustdetermine
the"normal"behaviorbetweennationsand
thenspecifythe non-normalbehavior. As a result,bothapproachesrelyon arbiofcrisisthresholds.Moreover,suchthresholds
are oftendifficult
traryspecifications
to defendon theoretical
grounds.
TOWARD CONCEPTUAL CLARITY: COMBINING THE

Two

APPROACHES

Becauseof theseproblems,it is now necessaryto seeksomeconceptualclosure

in definingthe international
crisisterm. Moreover,we believethat a combining
of thetwoapproacheswould bestservetheoretical
to analyze
and empiricalefforts
international
crisissituations.Specifically,
an international
crisisshouldbe defined
as a situationbetweentwo (or more) nationsthatis characterized
by perceptual
conditionsof high threat,surprise,and shortdecisiontime,and by behavioral
conditionsof markedchange in theirinteraction
patterns.In otherwords,only
as
whenbothsetsof crisisconditionsare satisfied
shouldthesituationbe identified
an international
crisissituation.
Any discussionof conceptualclosurefor the crisistermundoubtedlyraises
questionsamong some researchers.Is it feasibleto seek closurebetweentwo apdo not identify
the same underlying
phenomenonfordeproachesthatseemingly
prematurein lightof the research
fininga crisissituation?Are not such efforts
knowledgegained throughseparatelines of inquiry? And, is such closureconsistentwith the opennessof scientific
especiallyin its earlystages?
investigation,
and
some
comment.
deserve
These are important
questions
The answerto the firstquestionlies in the fact that the two approachesdo
phenomenon.Both approachesattemptto
attemptto tap the same underlying
measurethe degreeof threatpresentin a particularsituation;20
however,each one
uses conditions(or indicators)that are incompleteby themselves.For example,
the conditionsfromthe decision-making
approachseem to focuson threatas rewhiletheconditions
oftheinteraction
ofthepolicy-makers
flectedin theperceptions
in behaviorchanges.As we suggested
approachseemto focuson threatas reflected
in
in our earlierdiscussion,however,neitherset of conditionsis fullysatisfactory
In
because
the
definitional
threat
the
then,
essence,
property.
identifying underlying
" Instead, both approaches make research design decisions on how to operationalize the
presence of a crisis or its intensity. For example, the principal means to determinethe
intensityof a threat for researcherswho use the decision-makingapproach has been to
content analyze statementsor messages of the decision-makers.See, for example, Ole R.
Holsti, Crisis, Escalation, War (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972).
An alternate strategywithin this approach has been to simulate high threat,short decision time, and surprise. See Hermann, Crises in Foreign Policy. With the interaction
approach, McClelland's "Access to Berlin..." is an example of employingoperational
thresholdsof behavior change to identifythe presence of a crisis. He arbitrarilyuses a
relative uncertaintyindex score of .700 as the beginningpoint for a crisissituation. The
relative uncertaintyindex measures the varietyof action by one nation toward another
and ranges from .000 (highly patterned and repetitivebehavior) to 1.000 (disordered
and irregularbehavior). McClelland states that he chose the .700 thresholdbecause it
shows that "a measurable change of state takes place in the transitionfroma non-crisis
situationto a crisissituation."
20For another discussion that identifiesthreat as an
underlyingphenomenon in both definitional approaches, see Hermann and Brady, "AlternativeModels of International Crisis
Behavior," in Hermann, International Crises. . . p. 284.

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International Crises 357

thesameunderlying
problemdoes notresidein thefailureto identify
phenomenon
but ratherin thefailureto use whollysatisfactory
efforts
at conceptual
conditions,
closureare warranted.
in the case of incompleteconceptspecification,
AbrahamKapFurthermore,
lan suggeststhatthedefining
conditionscan be treatedas an open setof indicators
to assistin specifying
when a termshouldbe used.21As moreindicatorsare obfortheuse of a particular
servablein a givensituation,
thegreaterthejustification
concept. In the case of the internationalcrisisconcept,then,the greaterthe
thatthe situation
the greatertheprobability
presenceof the two crisisconditions,
meritsbeing called an international
crisis. Moreover,thisattemptat conceptual
closureis consistentwith scientific
gain a greater
methodology.As researchers
taken
in
of
a
be
care
should
definingit. Thus,
understanding
concept,greater
of scientific
inin
in
and
normal
the
constant
definition
are
changes
development
In this
quiry- a processwhichKaplan has aptlycalled "successivedefinition."22
method.
an integralpart of the scientific
sense,conceptualclosurerepresents
the
will
eliminate
definitional
not
both
fully
approaches
Althoughcombining
For
much
easier.
these
it
will
make
decisions
need to identify
example,
thresholds,
thedegreeof behaviorchangethatmarksthebeginning
theproblemof identifying
(or end) of a crisiswillbe lessenedbecauseperceptualchangewillalso need to be
a "bureaucraticcrisis"froman
of differentiating
present.Likewise,the difficulty
crisiswill also be reducedbecausechangesin behaviorwill also need
international
In essence,then,each set of conditions
to existforcompletecrisisidentification.
an international
crisissituaone anotherin orderto identify
will have to reinforce
ton. If both setsof conditionscannotbe met,the situationshouldnot be labeled
a crisis.
criseshas been made much
Employingboth setsof conditionsforidentifying
easierwiththe increasedavailabilityof empiricaldata. On the decision-making
level,forexample,thereseemsto be bothadequate analytictechniquesand suffitheperceptualconditionsof crises.Content
cientsourcematerialto operationalize
been
have
developed-including the use of computer-aided
analysisprocedures
and biogramethods- to analyzethe increasingvolumeof speeches,statements,
data
phiesof crisisparticipants.Moreover,at least one large and comprehensive
theprincipalperceptualvariablesofthe
sethas been coded in a way thatidentifies
The CREON (ComparativeResearchon theEventsofNations)
decision-makers.
forselectedmonthsof 1959-1968
morethan 11,000interactions
has
coded
Project
- thedegreeof threat/
forthe threecriticalvariablesof theperceptualdefinition
availableto thepolicytime
of
decision
amount
in
the
each
situation,
opportunity
in
the
occurrenceof each
or
and
extent
of
the
surprise anticipation
makers,
interaction.
indicatorsforassessingthe behavior
On the behaviorallevel,too, systematic
is largelya result
available. Such data availability
betweennationsare increasingly
someaction
eventsdata. This typeofdata identifies
of thegrowthof international
collected
in some
a
toward
an
actor
or behaviorby
target(NationB)
(NationA)
in
each
event
behavior
is
the
usuallycategorized,
regularizedway. Additionally,
scaled,and weightedalongsomedimension(mostcommonly
bythedegreeofconbetweennations.Some of themore
changesin intensity
flict)in orderto identify
are
banks
WEIS
events
data
(World
Event/Interaction
Survey),
prominent
CREON, COPDAB (Conflictand Peace Data Bank), and DON (Dimensionality
of Nations) Project,among others. These data sets (as well as numerousother
eitherthroughtheInter-University
smallercollections)are availableto researchers
21

AbrahamKaplan, The Conductof Inquiry(San Francisco:Chandler,1964), p. 68.

2Ibid., p. 77.

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358 WesternPoliticalQuarterly
Consortiumfor Politicaland Social Research,the publicationof data books23or
directaccessfromtheoriginalcollectors.
CONCLUSION

The crucialfirststepin doingresearchon crisisprocessis adequatelyidentifycrisissituation.The separateapproachesusedup to now,howingan international

forseveralimportantconceptualand emever,have not been whollysatisfactory
we believethatsatisfactory
can
crisisidentification
piricalreasons. Consequently,
bestbe achievedwhenresearchers
use definitional
elementsfromboththedecisionhas severalimmakingand interactionapproaches. Moreover,such a definition
portantadvantagesover othersingularapproaches: (1) it would alleviateboth
conceptualand empiricalerrorsthat occur in delimitingcrisissituationson the
basisof onlyone approach; (2) it wouldprovidesomecommonbase foridentifying
researchinterests;and finally(3) it
international
crisesforscholarswithdifferent
would allow scholarsto analyzebehaviorwithina crisiswithgreaterassurancethat
it would be recognizedas such by otherinvestigators.
may
Althoughthisstrategy
international
notresolveall problemsassociatedwithidentifying
crises,nevertheless
itshouldgreatlyenhancecumulativeresearchon thesecriticaleventsin international
behavior.

2 For example, the data book by Edward E. Azar and Thomas L. Sloan, The Dimensions of
Interaction (Pittsburgh: International Studies Association, 1975).

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