Rule 76

1. Sumilang vs. Ramagosa 21 SCRA 1369

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a petition for probate of the purported last will of Hilarion Ramagosa
instituting petitioner as the sole heir.
Respondents Opposed the same and questioned the due execution.
At the hearing of the petition, respondents moved to dismiss the petition for probate
BUT THE SAME WAS DENIED.
Respondents elevated their case to the SC where the Court pointed out that the
respondents did not attack the issue w/ respect to the finding of the lower court that they
have no relationship whatsoever within the 5th degee as provided by law and are
totally strangers to the estate of the deceased whose will is under probate. THEY
DO NOT ATTEMPT TO SHOW THAT THEY HAVE SOME INTEREST IN THE ESTATE
WHICH MUST BE PROTECTED.
ISSUE:
Who are allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding?
HELD:
"It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate
proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property
to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate
And an interested party has been defined as one who would be benefited by the
estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor."
The reason for the rule excluding strangers from contesting the will is that the
courts and the litigants should not be injured by the intervention in the proceedings of
persons with no interest in the estate which would entitle them to be heard with relation
thereto."

2. Guevara vs. Guevara 98 Phil 249

FACTS:
Victorino Guevara executed a will distributing his properties among his children,
stepchildren and his second wife.
Rosario, one of his children, filed for the probate of the will.
Ernesto, his brother, filed for the dismissal of the case ARGUING, among others,
THAT THE PROBATE OF THE WILL HAS BEEN BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION.
ISSUE:
Can a petition for probate of a will be barred by the statue of limitations/
prescription>
HELD:
PROBATE PROCEEDINGS NOT BARRED BY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
Reason and precedent (cited many cases and foreign cases) reject the applicability of
the Statute of Limitations to probate proceedings,
because the same(probate proceedings) are established not exclusively in the
interest of the heirs, but primarily for the protection of the testators expressed wishes,
which are entitled to respect as a consequence of his ownership and right of
disposition.
Inasmuch as the probate of wills is required by public policy, the State could not
have intended to defeat the same by applying thereto the statute of limitations of action.
Therefore, prescription is not a defense in probate proceedings.

3. In the matter of the petition to approve the will of Ruperta Palaganas, GR

No. 169144 Jan 26, 2011
FACTS:
Ruperta Palaganas a naturalized US Citizen executed a will in California before she
died.
In the said will, she designated her brother (SERGIO) as the executor of her will she
had left in the PH and US.
Respondent (ERNESTO), another brother, filed for the probate of Rupertas will and
his appointment as special administrator.
Petitioners, nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition ON THE GROUND THAT THE
WILL SHOULD NOT BE PROBATED IN THE PHILIPPINES BUT RATHER IN THE U.S.
WHERE IT WAS EXECUTED
ISSUES:
W/N A WILL EXECUTED BY A FOREIGNER IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY MAY BE
PROBATED IN THE PHILIPPINES ALTHOUGH IT HAS NOT BEEN PROBATED IN THE
COUNTRY WHERE IT WAS EXECUTED.
WHAT DO THE TERM JURISDICTIONAL FACTS MEAN AS REQUIRED TO BE
STATED IN THE PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF A WILL?
HELD:
Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although
the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution.
A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil
Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made
in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or
according to the formalities observed in his country.
Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so
far as known to the petitioner:
(a) the jurisdictional facts;
(b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator or decedent;
(c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and
(e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having
custody of it.
JURISDICTIONAL FACTS refer

to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the
province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
estate he left in such province.
The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and
probated in the country of its execution.

4. Cuenco vs. CA 53 SCRA 360

FACTS:
Mariano Cuenco died and was survived by his
Widow PETITIONER
Two minor Sons; and
Children by first marriage RESPONDENTS
Respondents filed a petition for letters of administration w/ the Cebu court alleging
among other things that Cuenco died intestate.
On the other hand, Petitioner filed a petition for probate of the will of Cuenco and for
the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor w/ the Quezon City court.
The issue raised in this was who between the Cebu court and Quezon city court
should take cognizance of the case.
The SC ruled that it should be the Quezon city court and explained in the case the
meaning of the phrase to the exclusion of other courts under Rule 73.
One of the reasons cited by the SC upheld the QC court is that it took consideration
of Section 2 of Rule 76 and defined the terms jurisdictional facts. The SC had the
opportunity to define such term.
(magulo to haha ewan ko kung bakit biglang nasingit yan. Wala nang futher explanation
binigay lang yung definition. Based my digest sa footnotes sa book nalang)
ISSUE:
WHAT DO THE TERM JURISDICTIONAL FACTS MEAN AS REQUIRED TO BE
STATED IN THE PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF A WILL?
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF A PROBATE PROCEEDING?
HELD:
With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings be upheld when it is taken
into consideration that Rule 76, section 2 requires that the petition for allowance of a will
must show: "(a) the jurisdictional facts."
Such "jurisdictional facts" in probate proceedings, as held by the Court
in Fernando vs. Crisostomo
" are the death of the decedent,
his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate
court is sitting, or
if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his estate in such
province."
This tallies with the established legal concept as restated by Moran that "(T)he probate of
a will is a proceeding in rem.

The notice by publication as a pre-requisite to the allowance of a will, is a

constructive notice to the whole world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of
the court is binding upon everybody, even against the State. The probate of a will by a
court having jurisdiction thereof is conclusive as to its due execution and validity."

5. Alaban vs. Court of Appeals GR No. 156021 September 23, 2005

FACTS:
Respondent filed a petition for the probate of the will of Soledad; alleged that he was the
heir of the decedent and the executor of his will.
The RTC allowed the probate of the will and issued the letters testamentary to the
respondent.
MORE THE 4 MONTHS LATER, Petitioners filed for a motion for reopening of the probate
proceedings and filed and opposition to the allowance of the will.
Petitioners claimed that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition DUE TO,
among others, DEFECTIVE PUBLICATION AND LACK OF NOTICE TO THE OTHER HEIRS,
THUS, THEY DID NOT BECOME A PARTY TO THE PROBATE PROCEEDINGS
The RTC denied the motion holding that THE DECISION FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF THE
WILL WAS ALREADY FINAL AND EXECUTORY even before the motion to reopen.
The CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
W/N THE DECISION OF THE PROBATE COURT IN ALLOWING THE WILL IS NOT
BINDING WITH/TO THE PETITONERS BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT PARTIES TO THE
PROBATE PROCEEDINGS.
HELD:

Petitioners in this case are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have not
become parties to the probate proceedings.
Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any
other person interested in the estate may, at any time after the death of the testator,
petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed. Notice of the time and place
for proving the will must be published for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province, as well as furnished to the designated or other known
heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator.
Thus, it has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in
rem, such that with the corresponding publication of the petition -----the court's
jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of
the decedent.39
Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to
bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right
sought to be established.
It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the
case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.
Thus, even though petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they
eventually became parties thereto as a consequence of the publication of the
notice of hearing.

6. Fleumer vs Hix 54 Phil 610

FACTS:
The special administratior of the estate of Hix appealed the decision of the RTC
denying the probate of the will of the deceased.
The oppositor contended THAT AS A MERE SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIOR; HE IS
NOT AUTHORIZED TO CARRY ON THE APPEAL.
ISSUE:
W/N A SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR OF AN ESTATE IS PERMITTED TO APPEAL
THE ADVERSE DECISION OF THE PROBATE COURT.
HELD:
The appellant, who appears to have been the moving party in these proceedings, is
a "person interested in the allowance or disallowance of a will by a Court of First
Instance," and
so should be permitted to appeal to the Supreme Court from the
disallowance of the will.

RULE 77-Allowance of Will Proved Outside of the Philippens and Administration of

Estate
7. Ancheta vs. Dalaygon GR NO. 139868 JUNE 8, 2006.

490 SCRA 140

Facts: Spouses Audrey and Richard Guersey, US citizens, but residents of Philippines for 30
years.
They adopted Kyle Guersey Hill. Audrey died in 1979 leaving a will bequething entire estate
to Richard (executor). It was admitted to probate in US court (Maryland). Atty. Ancheta
(petitioner) was designated as ancillary administrator in Philippines. Audrey's will was also
probated in CFI Rizal. Richard then married Candelaria Dalaygon (respondent) but died
in1984. He left will leaving most of properties to respondent.
As ancillary administrator, Atty. Ancheta filed special proceedings before RTC Makati to
declare Richard and Kyle as Audrey's heir. This is in contrary with Audrey's will instituting
Richard as sole heir.According to Atty. Ancheta, this is to protect the interest of Kyle. He
filed a project of partition giving 3/4 of estate with Richard and 1/4 to Kyle.
Respondent disapproved it on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, "a
legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the
legacy" meaning she gets all Richard's property. Trial court ruled for respondent and this
was affirmed by CA. Petitioner comes to SC averring that he acted in good faith in
performing his duties as an ancillary administrator. He maintains that at the time of the
filing of the project of partition, he was not aware of the relevant laws of the State of
Maryland, such that the partition was made in accordance with Philippine laws.

Issue: Did Atty. Ancheta performed his duty as ancillary administrator in good faith?
Ruling:No. Under the Rules on Special Proceedings,when a will is allowed abroad, the
testator's estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be
disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it;
While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them, petitioner, as ancillary administrator of Audreys
estate, was duty-bound to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.
How can petitioner honestly presume that Philippine laws apply when as early as the
reprobate of Audreys will before the trial court in 1982, it was already brought to fore that
Audrey was a U.S. citizen, domiciled in the State of Maryland.He had all the legal resources
to determine the applicable law. It was incumbent upon him to exercise his functions as
ancillary administrator with reasonable diligence, and to discharge the trust reposed on him
faithfully. Because of his actions, the will of Audrey was disregarded by the trial court.

RULE 78-Letters Testamentary and Administration; Who and to Whom Issued

8. Suntay III vs Cojuangco-Suntay GR no. 183053 October 10, 2012
Background: RTC-Bulacan issued letters of administration to Emilio Suntay III (petitioner).
CA reversed it and grants it to Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay (respondent). On appeal to SC,
both are appointed as co-administrator of estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (decedent)
considering Emilio's demonstrable interest in the subject estate.
Facts: Respondent filed this Motion for Reconsideration question SC's decision to issue joint
letters of administration to Emilio Suntay III and respondent over estate of decedent, their
grandmother. Isabel is legitimate while Emilio is illegitimate.
Specifically, she bewails that: (1) Emilio III is an illegitimate grandchild and therefore, not
an heir of the decedent; (2) corollary thereto, Emilio III, not being a "next of kin" of the
decedent, has no interest in the estate to justify his appointment as administrator thereof;
(3) Emilio IIIs actuations since his appointment as administrator by the RTC on 9 November
2001 emphatically demonstrate the validity and wisdom of the order of preference in
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court; and (4) there is no basis for joint administration as
there are no "opposing parties or factions to be represented."

Issue: Who, as between Emilio III and Isabel, is better qualified to act as administrator of
the decedents estate?
Held/Ruling: Isabel. The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a
decedent is laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in
the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give
bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of preference, in the
appointment of an administrator. This order of preference, which categorically seeks out the
surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors in the appointment of an administrator,
has been reinforced in jurisprudence.
The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the estate of a
decedent
is
the
prospective
administrators
interest
in
the
estate.
Under certain circumstances and for various reasons well-settled in Philippine and American
jurisprudence, we have upheld the appointment of co-administrators: (1) to have the
benefits of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented;
(2) where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the
management of the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any
cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle;(4) to have all interested persons satisfied

and the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate; and when a
person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have another competent person
associated with him in the office.
Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that Emilio IIIs demonstrable interest in
the estate makes him a suitable co-administrator thereof, the evidence reveals that Emilio
III has turned out to be an unsuitable administrator of the estate. Respondent Isabel points
out that after Emilio IIIs appointment as administrator of the subject estate in 2001, he has
not looked after the welfare of the subject estate and has actually acted to the damage and
prejudice thereof as evidenced by the following:
1. Emilio III, despite several orders from the probate court for a complete inventory,
omitted in the partial inventorieshe filed therewith properties of the estate.
2. Emilio III did not take action on both occasions against Federicos settlement of the
decedents estate which adjudicated to himself a number of properties properly belonging to
said estate.
They remove Emilio as co-administrator because he is neglecting his duties.
9. Ventura vs. Ventura 160 SCRA 810 (1988)
Key: will by decedent, pretirition (omit compulsory heir) so a new admin was appointed
Facts:Decedent Gregorio Ventura filed a petition for the probate of his will before CFI Nueva
Ecija in 1953. In the said will, the appellant Maria Ventura, although an illegitimate child,
received all the inheritance and was also appointed by the testator to be the executrix of his
will and the administratrix of his estate. Nothing was left to his legitimate children Mercedes
and Gregoria Ventura. He died in 1953.
Maria then was appointed executrix and the corresponding letters testamentary was issued
in her favor in 1955 and she filed her accounts of administration for the years 1955 to
1960. Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and their respective spouses (appellees) opposed
said account of administration alleging that they were declared by another civil case as the
legitimate children of decedent. It was denied by CFI.
They appeal in the CA, both filing joint motions to remove the executrix Maria Ventura are:
(1) that she is grossly incompetent; (2) that she has maliciously and purposely concealed
certain properties of the estate in the inventory; (3) that she is merely an illegitimate
daughter who can have no harmonious relations with the appellees; (4) that the executrix
has neglected to render her accounts and failed to comply with the Order of the Court. CA
finding that the executrix Maria Ventura has squandered the funds, removed her as
executrix and administratrix of the estate and in her place Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria
Ventura are hereby appointed joint a tratrices.
Issue: Whether or not the removal of Maria Ventura as executrix is legally justified.
Ruling: Yes. There is preterition in this case and this shall annul the institution of heirs and
as a result, intestacy follows, thereby rendering the previous appointment of Maria Ventura
as executrix moot and academic. This would now necessitate the appointment of another
administrator. Under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court: If .. a person dies intestate, a
petition shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;"
In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona
while the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura.
The "next of kin" has been defined as those persons who are entitled under the statute of
distribution to the decedent's property. It is generally said that "the nearest of kin, whose
interest in the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator.
'Among members of a class the strongest ground for preference is the amount or
preponderance of interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred."

10. Villamor vs. Court of Appeals 162 SCRA 574 (1988)

Facts: Two special proceedings cases were filed by heirs of Rufino and Barbara. Both of
them were children of spouses Victor Cortes and Maria Castaneda. For heirs of Rufino, it is
the estate of Rufino Cortes while for the heirs of Barbara, it is the estate of
Bartolome,Eustaquio and his children.
Since both involves the same properties, the two heirs agreed to settle and adjudicate
themselves the properties. After six months of negotiation, or on December 7, 1946, a
Project of Partition was executed by Sixta Ceniza (daughter in law of Barbara and husband
of Eustaquio) and Father Camomot, in his capacity as administrator of the Estate of
Bartolome Cortes (son of Barbara), assisted by their counsels and Ireneo and Paula Cortes
Villamor (children of Rufino), assisted by Atty. Gaudencio Juezan, on the other. On April 14,
1948, Judge S. C. Moscoso approved the project of partition, and on September 30, 1948,
the administrators delivered the seven parcels of land to Ireneo and Paula Villamor. Special
Proceedings Nos. 262 and 343 were ordered closed and terminated by Judge Florentino
Saguin on November 25, 1953. Entry of judgment was made on March 18, 1954.
(PARTITION APPROVED). Nicanor, son of Eustaquio and Sixta, was not given any property in
the partition. It was revealed in letters he had written that he might renounced his
inheritance since he being a priest, he took a vow of poverty.

Meanwhile, upon the death of Sixta Ceniza on July 28, 1948, one Cristina Ceniza, sister of
respondent Daniela Ceniza Urot instituted Special Proceedings No. 364-R for the
administration of the estate of Sixta Ceniza. One Escolastico Ceniza, brother of respondent,
was appointed special administrator. The latter's appointment, however, was revoked on
February 20, 1954 upon petition of Fr. Nicanor Cortes through his counsel, Atty. Fermin Yap
on January 14, 1954, and in his stead, Victorio Perez was appointed the special
administrator. In this proceedings, the nephews and nieces of Sixta Ceniza, including herein
respondent, prayed that they be declared the sole and only forced heirs of Sixta Ceniza,
although at the time, Fr. Nicanor Cortes, the only surviving child of Sixta Ceniza, was still
alive.

On October 21, 1954, Fr. Cortes executed a power of attorney before the Vice-Consul of the
Republic of the Philippines in Madrid, Spain, constituting and appointing Fr. Diosdado
Camomot as his attorney-in-fact and giving him the power to appear for me and in my
behalf in Special Proceedings No. 364-R
On August 18, 1955, the court, through Judge Clementino Diez, denied the motion of the
nephews and nieces of Sixta Ceniza to be declared her heirs and declared Fr. Nicanor Cortes
as the only and universal heir of Sixta Ceniza. (NOTE: Parang gusto makisawsaw nung
relatives ni Nicanor who were not related to the Cortes)
In the complaint, respondent alleged inter alia that upon learning of the death of Fr. Nicanor
Cortes, some of his nearest of kin who are his surviving first cousins, the Cenizas [all from
the side of Sixta Ceniza] initiated Special Proceedings No. 3062-R for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased monk; that prior to and in the course of initiating said proceedings,

the surviving first cousins came upon documents showing that Fr. Cortes during his absence
from the Philippines to pursue a monastic life was deprived of his inheritance by fraud,
stealth and stratagem perpetrated by Paula and Ireneo Villamor.
Petitioners, instead of filing an answer, filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the cause of
action is barred by prior judgment and by the statute of limitations.
On May 13, 1971, a receiver was appointed by the court in the person of Atty. Andres
Taneo, Branch Clerk of Court. After trial, on January 21, 1972, the court rendered judgment
against the petitioners holding that Ireneo and Paula Villamor took advantage of the
helplessness of Sixta Ceniza .So the RTC annulled the original partition of properties ruling
fraud was used to procure it. CA uphold the RTC ruling
Issue: Should the original project of partition be annulled because it was attended by fraud?
Held: Court of Appeals, like the trial court, totally ignored the letters of Fr. Nicanor Cortes
disclaiming ownership and acknowledging the fact that petitioners and/or their
predecessors-in-interest are the owners and possessors of the lands in question, which
exhibits could have decided outright all the issues that Fr. Cortes had personal knowledge of
Special Proceedings Nos. 262-C and 343-C and that the predecessors-in-interest of
petitioners did not commit fraud against him. In his testimony, Fr. Diosdado Camomot
declared categorically that he informed Fr. Nicanor Cortes about Special Proceedings and
that he sent him a copy of the project of partition.He explained that as administrator of the
estate of Fr. Bartolome Cortes, he encountered trouble with the administrator. The
testimony of Fr. Diosdado Camomot, however, is too detailed and straightforward to be a
mere product of concoction or fabrication or a device to cover-up the collusion imputed to
him by the trial court. Furthermore, said testimony is corroborated by other evidence on
record that sustains its veracity. Fr. Cortes' letters and Deed of Conveyance show beyond
any iota of doubt that he was kept posted on the developments in the Philippines. He know
that his mother received some lands as "share" and that Candelario had acquired lands. He
also knew the succession of ownership of the lands to which he succeeded as sole heir of his
mother in Special Proceedings.
REAL ISSUE: Could strangers to decedents be appointed as administrators of their estate?
Held: We do not consider as "intriguing" the observation of the lower court and concurred in
by the Court of Appeals that in both Special Proceedings in question, the administrators
appointed were complete strangers to the decedents. There is nothing repulsive in this nor
is this an indicium of fraud and collusion as found by the courts. Section 642 of the Code of
Civil Procedure enumerates the persons who can act as executors and administrators. It
provides that in case the persons who have the preferential right to be appointed are not
competent or are unwilling to serve, administration may be granted to such other person as
the court may appoint.
Note: Nicanor Cortes could have appointed her surviving first cousins (the petitioners in this
case) but he chose and preferred a stranger, Fr. Diosdado Camomot as his attorney-in-fact
to take charge of his and his mother's affairs. And even more intriguing is the fact that in
the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of his mother, he took steps to have the
appointment of Escolastico Ceniza.

I have to admit, naggulo nga case daytoy. As in I need to write all the parties family tree to
get the picture. Main point here is though there is an order of preference in choosing
executors, even strangers could become one.
11. Leon vs Manufacturers Life Insurance co. 90 Phil 459 (1951)
Facts: Decedent Basil Butler, resident of Philippines, died 1945 in the US leaving a will
probated in US court. In the residual clause of his will, he put all his moneys, securities and
valuable property to a trust to be held by his trustee Ross. Ross then put all the money into
an annuity he bought with Manufacturers Life Insurance designating her wife Mercedes De
Leon(petitioner) as beneficiary. Decedent did this since he thinks his wife might squander
the said money.
Petitioner, wanting to get hold all the money invested in annuity filed the will for probate
before CFI Manila (probate court). She then filed a motion to compel Manufacturers Life
Insurance Manila Branch manager to render accounting of the funds. It was denied by the
probate court.
Issue: Does the probate court have jurisdiction over funds in question?
Held: No. The funds in question are outside the jurisdiction of the probate court of Manila.
Having been invested in an annuity in Canada under a contract executed in that country,
Canada is the situs of the money. There is no showing or allegation that the funds have
been transferred or removed to the Manila Branch. Under the Rules of Court , when a will is
thus allowed, the court shall grant letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the
will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the
estate of the testator in the Philippines. Only those properties located in the Philippines
could
be
disposed.
Even if the money were in the hands of the Manila Branch, yet it no longer forms part of
Butlers estate and is beyond the control of the court. It has passed completely into the
hands of the company in virtue of a contract of annuity.
12.Republic of the Philippines vs Marcos GR NOS. 130371 and 130855 August 4
2009. 603 SCRA 348
Facts: RTC Pasig City, acting as a probate court, issued an Order in 1996, granting letters
testamentary in solidum to respondents Ferdinand R. Marcos II and Imelda Trinidad
Romualdez-Marcos as executors of the last will and testament of the late Ferdinand E.
Marcos. Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato of the Bureau of Internal Revenue is
authorized to continue her functions as Special Administrator of the Estate of Ferdinand
Edralin Marcos. The Republic, acting for the BIR wants to revoke the said letters
testamentary. It anchored its opposition to the grant of letters testamentary to respondents,
on the following grounds: (1) want of integrity, and (2) conviction of an offense involving
moral turpitude. Petitioner contends that respondents have been convicted of a number of
casesand, hence, should be characterized as one without integrity, or at the least, with
questionable integrity

Despite this, RTC affirmed the said order. CA affirmed the said ruling of the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not respondents are incompetent to serve as executors of the will of
Ferdinand Marcos?
Ruling: No. Rule 78 of the Rules of Court defines who are incompetent to serve as
executors, to wit:
(c)Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of trust by reason of
drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by reason
of conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude.
However, except for petitioner Republics allegation of want of integrity on the part of Imelda
Trinidad Romualdez-Marcos and Ferdinand Romualdez Marco II, named executors in the last
will and testament, so as to render them "incompetent" to serve as executors, the Court
sees at this time, no evidence on record, oral or documentary, to substantiate and support
the said allegation.
Though both were convicted by the lower court of tax evasion, they were acquitted by the
Supreme Court. The filing of a "fraudulent return with intent to evade tax" is a crime
involving moral turpitude as it entails willfulness and fraudulent intent on the part of the
individual. The same, however, cannot be said for "failure to file a return" where the mere
omission already constitutes a violation. Thus, this Court holds that even if the conviction of
respondent Marcos II is affirmed, the same not being a crime involving moral turpitude
cannot serve as a ground for his disqualification.
In In re Vinzon, the term "moral turpitude" is considered as encompassing "everything
which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals."
They are both competent to act as executor of the will.

HEIRS OFF MESINA vs. HEIRS OF DOMINGO FIAN

G.R. No. 201816

April 8, 2013

The Facts
The late spouses Mesina during their lifetime, bought from the spouses Fian two parcels of
land on installment.
Upon the death of the spouses Fian, their heirsrefused to acknowledge the payments for
the lots and denied that their late parents sold the property to the spouses Mesina.
Notwithstanding repeated demands, the Heirs of Fian refused to vacate the lots and to turn
possession over to the heirs of the spouses Mesina
The heirs of Mesina filed an action for quieting of title and damages before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), against the Heirs of Fian, naming only Theresa Fian Yray (Theresa) as the
representative of the Heirs of Fian
Respondent Theresa filed a Motion to Dismiss
She averred that the claim filed filed states no cause of action that since the names of all
the heirs of the late spouses Mesina and spouses Fian were not individually named, the
complaint is infirmed, warranting its dismissal.
RTC granted the motion to dismiss.
CA affirmed.
Issue: WON heirs of the spouses Fian are indispensable parties; hence, they should have
been impleaded in the complaint.
HELD: NO.
Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading. A complaint
states a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential elements of a cause of
action, namely:
(a) The legal right of the plaintiff;
(b) The correlative obligation of the defendant; and
(c) The act or omission of the defendant in violation of said right.9
By a simple reading of the elements of a failure to state a cause of action, it can be readily
seen that the inclusion of Theresas co-heirs does not fall under any of the above elements.
The infirmity is, in fact, not a failure to state a cause of action but a non-joinder of an
indispensable party.
Non-joinder means the "failure to bring a person who is a necessary party or in this case an
indispensable party into a lawsuit."10 An indispensable party, on the other hand, is a partyin-interest without whom no final determination can be had of the action, and who shall be
joined either as plaintiff or defendant.11
As such, this is properly a non-joinder of indispensable party, the indispensable parties who
were not included in the complaint being the other heirs of Fian, and not a failure of the
complaint to state a cause of action.
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At
any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on

the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to
implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may dismiss the
complaint for the plaintiffs failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the
non-party claimed to be indispensable.

AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON vs. MA. LOURDES BELEN

G.R. No. 189121

July 31, 2013

FACTS
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
(Elise), represented by her mother, (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo
having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to
marry each other. To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to
the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her
father.
The petitioners opposed the issuance of letters of administration. They averred that there
are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseos estate.
RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary
bond.
CA affirmed the decision of RTC.
ISSUE
WON ELISE QUIAZON HAS ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION.
HELD
YES.
Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must be filed by
an interested person, thus:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the
petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the
creditors, of the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate,
such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor.
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the
distribution of Eliseos estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming
evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo. Certainly, the right of
Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded
on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the

debts of the estate are satisfied.29Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseos estate
as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within
the purview of the law.

HILADO VS CA
FACTS: The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May
2000. He was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita and his only daughter. At the
time of his death, there were two pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the
petitioners.
Julita filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in
her favor. The Manila RTC issued an order appointing private respondent as administrator of
the estate of her deceased husband, and issuing letters of administration in her favor.

Petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela,[9]

praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the
intestate proceedings. Private respondent opposed the manifestation/motion, disputing the
personality of petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband.

RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are
not interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the
intestate proceedings.
The petition argued in general that petitioners had the right to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in the civil cases they
lodged with the Bacolod RTC.

CA affirmed the decision of RTC.

ISSUE: WON petitioners are interested parties to warrant their intervention in the intestate
proceedings.
HELD: YES petitioners are interested parties but they dont have the general right to
intervene.

Petitioners interest in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but they are viable
interests nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules of Special Proceedings allows not just
creditors, but also any person interested or persons interested in the estate various
specified capacities to protect their respective interests in the estate. Anybody with a
contingent claim based on a pending action for quasi-delict against a decedent may be
reasonably concerned that by the time judgment is rendered in their favor, the estate of the
decedent would have already been distributed, or diminished to the extent that the
judgment could no longer be enforced against it.

While there is no general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be
allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for
under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the
estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can be
protected.

OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, vs. PACITA DE LOS REYES PHILLIPS,

G.R. No. 129505

January 31, 2000

FACTS:
Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City, filed a petition for probate of his
will in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati. In his petition, Dr. De Santos alleged that
he had no compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the
Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.. He designated as executrix, private respondent Pacita de
los Reyes Phillips.
Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of RTC-Makati, Branch 61 issued an order granting the
petition and allowing the will.
Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died.
Petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention claiming that he was the sole
full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a
creditor of the testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the reconsideration of the order allowing
the will and the issuance of letters of administration in his name.
On the other hand, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips, the designated executrix
of the will, filed a motion for the issuance of letters testamentary with Branch 61. Later,
however, private respondent moved to withdraw her motion. This was granted, while
petitioner was required to file a memorandum of authorities in support of his claim that said
court (Branch 61) still had jurisdiction to allow his intervention. Respondent refiled to
Branch 65.
Judge Abad Santos (Branch 65) granted petitioner's motion for intervention.
CA set aside the trial court's order on the ground that petitioner had not shown any right or
interest to intervene.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner, being a nephew and creditor of the testator has a
right to intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by the
respondent.
HELD: NONE
Rule 79, 1 provides:
Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary. Simultaneous petition for administration.
Any person interested in a will may state in writing the grounds why letters testamentary
should not issue to the persons named therein as executors, or any of them, and the court,
after hearing upon notice, shall pass upon the sufficiency of such grounds. A petition may,
at the same time, be filed for letters of administration with the will annexed.
Under this provision, it has been held that an "interested person" is one who would be
benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as
a creditor, and whose interest is material and direct, not merely incidental or contingent.17
Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be considered an
"heir" of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one who has
no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will.

Compulsory heirs are limited to the testator's

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their
legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.18
Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have been preterited
in the testator's will.
Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings based on his
allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the testator instituted or named an
executor in his will, it is incumbent upon the Court to respect the desires of the testator.
Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to give bond may
the court appoint other persons to administer the estate.20 None of these circumstances is
present in this case.