Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Survey of Literature
3.1
Introduction
3.2
how to measure capital structure, cost of capital and value of the firm.
use
of long-term
loans,
debentures
and
bonds
creates
33
tenure of these securities and repaying the principal amount at the end of
the tenure. These are called external equities.
The use of equity shares and retained earnings does not create such
contractual obligations. These are called internal equities.
Preference shares fall in the category of external equities so far as
payment of dividend and repayment of principal are concerned. A firm
has to pay dividend on preference shares, if profit is earned, periodically
during the tenure of these securities and has to repay the principal amount
at the end of the tenure. Even if the firm fails to earn a profit or earns
insufficient profit, the dividend on preference shares gets accumulated
and when it earns sufficient profit it has to pay accumulated plus current
dividends on preference shares first before distributing any dividend to
the equity shareholders. But the claims of the preference shareholders are
met after the claims of the external equities (i.e., debtholders) are fully
met. So preference share is a hybrid security. It has the features of both
debt and equity share.
So the use of external equities creates fixed claim on the cash
inflows of the firm and they get priority over the equity shareholders in
the matter of distribution of income in case of a going concern and
distribution of assets in case of liquidation of the firm.
The combination of external and internal equities which are used in
creating the pool of fund of the firm is known as its capital structure. So
capital structure represents the proportions of various securities used in
financing the pool of fund of the firm.
Van Horne (2002) defines capital structure as the proportions of
debt instruments and preference share capital and equity share capital on
the company's balance sheet. Being hybrid securities preference shares
can be treated as debt. But preference share capital has been included in
the shareholders' equity in the "Finances of Public Limited Companies"
published in the bulletins of the Reserve Bank of India. Due to this
reason preference share capital has been included in the shareholders'
equity in our study.
34
Clerkson and Elliott (1970) state that the capital fund (referred to
as pool of fund in our study) shows the long-term financial strength of
the firm.
The balance sheet of a company shows the amounts of long term
capital raised by issuing ordinary and preference shares, long term debt
instruments and by retaining earnings. The total value of these funds
equals the sum of fixed assets and net working capital. Thus the net asset
of the firm is financed by long-term capital.
Creation of pool of fund
(Sources)
(Uses)
Retained Earnings,
Pool
Of
Fund
--~
Fixed Assets
--.
Long-term Loans,
Debentures, Bonds etc.
35
returns.
An investor's
of return for
36
and
Miller
( 195 8)
argue
that
the
market
value
>
37
imputed cost that equals the cost of equity fund derived externally
assuming that shareholders are in zero tax brackets and there are no
underwriting and floatation costs. Management harms the interests of its
shareholders if it fails to generate a rate of return, on internally derived
funds, that at least equals the expected rate of return of its equity
shareholders. In that case it should distribute the earnings to its equity
shareholders as dividends.
Cost of debt
Solomon (1955) argues that the real cost of debt to the borrower
sour~e
CFn
C~ + CF2 +------+--(1 + k)n
(1 + k) (1 + k) 2
where,
Po = capital supplied by the investors or the market price of a security at
time t=O,
CF,
k
= returns
investors.
Since the overall cost of capital is the weighted average of the cost
of each component of capital let us first see how the cost of each
component can be measured.
common stock is the owner of a stream of returns from that holding and
so the holder is concerned with the impact of policy on the future returns
per share. He proposes to estimate cost of equity share capital by dividing
management's best estimate of average future earnings per share with the
39
current market price per share if the proposed capital expenditure is not
made, assuming that there are no underwriting and flotation costs and
management
Is
acting
in
the
best
interest
of the
firm's
equity
( 1972)
argues
that
defining
and
measunng
the
expected dividend yield plus capital gain rate reflecting the expected rate
of growth in market price, earnings and dividends.
In case of a single-period model"
40
Pr=DIV0 (1+g)+ ~
0
(l+ke)
(l+ke)
Or
k =DIVo(l+g)+~-Po
' e
Pr
p
0
Or,
ke
DJV0 (l+g)
Po
+g
(l+ke)
(l+ke)n
i DIV (1 + ~)'
0
(1 + ke)
t=l
When n ~ oo, we can derive-
k =DIV0 (l+g)+g
e
p
0
where,
Po= market price per equity share at time t=O,
P 1 = market price per equity share at time t= I,
kc = cost of equity share capital,
DIV 0 = dividend per share at time t=O,
g = annual rate of growth in market price, earnings and dividends.
According to Pandey (2005) this equation is based on the following
assumptions:
41
The market capitalization rate (ke) is greater than the rate of growth
in dividends (g).
But it is difficult to estimate dividends and the rate of growth
10
IS
actually
So
investors should get premium only for systematic risk. The risk of an
individual security, in CAPM, is stated as the volatility of that security's
return vis-a-vis the return of a well-diversified market portfolio, and is
measured by
p.
So
Pmeasures
42
>>>>-
>-
= Beta of security i,
/3
(jm
rim()i
and market
portfolio m,
cri = Standard deviation of returns on security i,
crm= Standard deviation of returns on market portfolio m,
rim= Correlation co-efficient between the return on security i and market
portfolio m,
crm 2 ::oVariance of returns on market portfolio m.
Here, market portfolio is represented by a well-diversified share
price index like BSE Sensex which is a 30 share index.
>-
43
);>
Cost of debt
The after-tax interest charge can be taken as the explicit cost of
Dn
+---(1 +kd)n
Where,
Dn
T
= rate
Assuming that the firm will continue to use debt and the existing
debt instruments will be replaced with new ones when these instruments
fall due, we can get the explicit cost of debt by the following formula: -
D _ 1(1-T)
0k
'
when n-+ oo
1(1-T)
Or,
);>
44
Where,
when n ---+ oo
cost of each component of capital and this represents the average rate of
return expected by all the investors. This can be measured by the
following formula: -
E
D
PF
k=-k +-k +-k
V e V d V p
where,
k =overall cost of capital,
E = market or book value of common shareholders' equity,
45
represented by the market value of equity shares and where book values
are considered, this is represented by the book value of equity shares plus
retained earnings.
securities. The sum of the market values of those securities represents the
market value of the firm. A firm can issue security, by collateralizing its
assets, on which it commits itself of paying fixed return periodically and
repaying the principal at the end of the tenure of the security. This type
of security is called debt instrument. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue
that debt instruments are easy to value where there are abundant
collaterals. Again, a fairly certain stream of returns, in case of highly
rated debt instruments, accrues to the debt holders. Since future returns
that are expected to accrue to the debt holders are fairly certain and the
rate of return expected by them is also contractual and fixed so the value
of debt securities is also stable. So according to them, the debt holders
need only to be concerned about the value of the collaterals for
safeguarding their investment value and not with the value of the entire
firm.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that although its shareholders
own the firm but they are not promised any return on their investment in
the firm and since they have no specific claim on the assets of the firm
they have no right to pull the collaterals. Since they are the residual
claimants they bear the highest proportion of all the risks the firm faces.
Because of these reasons the common shareholders' welfare should be
maximized for inducing them to part with their funds for more risky
46
equity shareholders' funds (E), preference share capital (PF) and debt
(D). So the value of the firm can be measured as follows: V
);;>
E + PF + D
be taken as the value of common shareholders' equity for that year. In the
absence of market value, book value of the equity share capital
outstanding plus average retained earnings during that year will represent
the same.
);;>
47
Debt
The sum of the market values of long term debt instruments like
The value of the firm represents the present value of all future
returns accruing to all the investors of the firm. The investors consist of
the subscribers of various instruments issued by the firm like debt
instruments, preference shares and equity shares. Since retained earnings
would otherwise be distributed to the equity shareholders and should be
reflected in the price of those shares, this is a part of the common
shareholders' equity.
The future returns expected to accrue to a particular class of
securities holders are capitalized at a rate expected by that class of
investors. The future returns and the rate of returns expected by the debt
holders and preference shareholders are contractual and stable and so are
the values of those securities. Thus if the value of the firm is maximized
then the value of the shareholders' equity can also be maximized
assuming that the management is acting in the best interest of its
shareholders besides meeting the fixed claims and safeguarding the
interests of the debt holders and preference shareholders.
The wealth of the shareholders can be maximized, given a rate of
return on investment, if the overall cost of fund with acceptable risk is
minimized. Clerkson and Elliott (1970) state that different types of costs
and risks with varying degrees are associated with each component of
capital. These costs and risks associated with long-term debt differ
48
3.3
Relationship
between
Financial
Market
Development,
capital
market,
capital
structure
decisions
do
not
matter
leverage.
The
opportunities. These firms would select only those projects which are
highly profitable. So profitability of these firms is expected to be high
and these firms are expected to retain more to finance new projects. In
the absence of adequate internal finance firms would raise debt first, then
issue convertible debentures and issue equity shares as the last alternative
(Myers, 1984).
50
are
inadequate
to
finance
the
profitable
new
investment
opportunities. On the other hand, Booth et. al., (200 1) argue that with the
development of the equity capital markets, firms might find it viable to
depend on the equity share capital and make less use of debt. Rajan and
Zingales (1995) argue that orientation of the financial system (whether
bank-oriented or market-oriented) does not affect leverage but influence
the choice of financing between public (bonds and equities) and private
(bank loans). Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that where banks provide
equity as well as debt finance or where debt as well as equity markets are
developed, firms may not borrow beyond a point and in those cases
orientation of the financial system does not affect the leverage.
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimivic ( 1996) argue that leverage depends
on the level of stock market development. At the initial level of stock
market development, the quality of information, monitoring and control
of large firms improve significantly and reduce the costs of both external
equity as well as external debt. The aggregation of information by market
about the prospects of the large firms reduces the cost of monitoring of
51
debt-equity
ratio
on funds
debt
and
encourage
inter-company
holdings
and
such
other
52
Titman and Wessels ( 1988) argue that firms maintain low debt
ratios where liquidation of a firm is costly to the suppliers, workers and
customers. The suppliers of debt are also expected to exert pressure to
contain the proportion of debt in that case.
Concentration of ownership
Friend and Lang (1988) find that leverage decreases as the level of
management's
shareholding
increases
even
when
there
exist
non-
3.4
);>
);>
Firms can be divided into equivalent risk classes. This also implies
that within a group, firms are perfect substitutes for each other.
);>
);>
There is no tax.
On the basis of these assumptions they provide the following
propositions:-
53
ke
k + (k - kd) DIE
Proposition III: A firm that acts in the best interest of its shareholders
accepts only that investment opportunity which generates a rate of return
which is at least equal to its cost of capital.
So Modigliani and Miller (1958)
argue
that
substitution of
expensive equity with cheap debt does not yield any effect on the value of
the firm since the overall cost of capital remains constant because the
favourable effect of cheap debt is nullified by an exactly unfavourable
effect of expensive equity. So, Modigliani and Miller (1958) argue that
financial innovation does not matter.
On
the
basis
of the
costlessly
enforceable
'me-first
rule'
54
Durand
( 1961)
severely
criticizes
the
assumptions
on
which
Modigliani
&
Miller's
assumption
to
regard
retention
equivalent to fully subscribed issue of common stock, does not hold good.
But in real world shares are hardly traded at book value.
We have divided the literature survey section into theoretical and
empirical works. The theoretical works are followed by the empirical
evidences.
The main approaches to capital structure theories are described as
follows:
Trade-off Theory
Trade-off theory can be presented with the help of following
assumptions:
Firm can raise funds from various sources which can be broadly
divided into debt and equity.
55
IS
expected to select that capital structure which trades off the benefits
(i.e., present value of interest tax shield) of debt with the possible
financial distress and agency costs (i.e., present value of expected
financial distress and agency costs), after considering its own attributes.
This capital structure maximizes the value of the firm and is the optimal
capital structure of that firm. The value of the firm is maximized when
the overall capitalization rate or cost of capital is minimized given the
return on investment in the assets of the firm.
VL = Vu + {teD- (CF + CA)}
where,
V L = value of levered firm,
V u = value of unlevered firm,
teD =present value of expected debt tax shield,
CF = present value of the possible financial distress costs,
CA =present value of the possible agency costs,
Trade-off theory explains why profitable firms having stable and
tangible assets tend to have high optimal debt-equity ratio. This is
because the tax benefit associated with debt tends to be high and the costs
of financial distress and agency costs tend to be low. On the other hand,
unprofitable firms having risky and intangible assets tend to have low
optimal debt-equity ratio because the tax benefit of debt tends to be low
and the financial distress and agency costs tend to be high (Chandra,
2002).
Agency Theory
The emergence of large-sized joint stock compames paved the
separation of ownership and management. These firms are owned by a
well-dispersed large number of shareholders called principals. These
firms are managed by managers who act as agents of the shareholders. A
56
firm can raise funds by issuing equity and debt instruments. The
objectives of debt holders may be to have fixed but secured returns, the
goals of equity shareholders may be to have risky but maximum returns
and managers may aim at increasing their own benefits at the cost of the
shareholders.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) identify two types of conflicts.
Assuming that managers do not hold I 00% of the equity of the firm,
conflict arises between shareholders and managers. The managers cannot
capture the entire gain which arises out of their value increasing
activities but bear the entire cost of these activities and consequently
they are interested in increasing their own benefits instead of maximising
shareholders' wealth. Jensen and Meckling (1976) predict that larger is
the fraction of equity owned by the managers, lower is the possibility of
loss of value due to this type of conflict. Given the total absolute
investment in the firm and absolute investment in equity owned by the
managers, the fraction of equity owned by managers increases with the
increase in the proportion of debt.
The second type of conflict arises between debt holders and equity
shareholders. The managers, acting in the best interests of the equity
shareholders, would seek to undertake risky projects so that the wealth of
the shareholders increases (in the event of success of the projects) at the
expense of the debt holders who have to bear the loss in the event of
failure of the projects. In short, shareholders enjoy the upside potential
but debt holders suffer the downside risk associated with the risky
projects. In order to protect their interests, debt holders would seek
restrictive covenants which would restrict the operational flexibility of
the managers resulting into inefficiency. Debt holders would also seek to
monitor the adherence of the firm to the covenants. The loss of value due
to inefficiency and cost of monitoring will be borne by the shareholders.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) predict that an optimal capital structure can
be arrived at by trading off the agency cost of debt and the benefits of
debt.
o
Jensen (1986) argues that the conflicts of interests between
where firm generates substantial free cash flow which is left with the firm
after funding all profitable projects available to the firm during any given
planning period. Managers will have the incentive to increase their
perquisite or use free cash flow sub-optimally to maximise 'corporate
wealth' instead of 'shareholders wealth'. Managers can also increase
dividend payment or repurchase stock but they may not be able to
maintain high rate of dividend payment m future. Consequent cut m
dividend payment may be punished by capital markets by a large
reduction in share price. Jensen (1986) argues that debt can be an
effective substitute for dividends and can motivate managers to be
efficient in order to service the debt. Thus, Jensen (1986) argues that in
case of firms generating large cash flows but have low growth prospects
or may shrink, debt reduces the agency costs of free cash flow by
reducing the cash flow available for spending at the discretion of
managers. This 'control effect' is a potential determinant of capital
structure.
Managers
act
in
the
best
interest
of
the
ongoing
shareholders.
~
On the basis of these assumptions this theory predicts that firms are
expected to issue equity shares when market value of shares is high as
compared to their book value or past market value and repurchase shares
when market value is low. By exploiting the temporary fluctuations in the
market prices, market timing benefits the ongoing shareholders at the
expense of new and departing shareholders. Baker and Wurgler (2002)
argue that capital structure is determined by the cumulative effect of the
58
past attempts of the firm to time the equity market and so optimal capital
structure does not exist according to this theory.
as~mmetry
);>
);>
Managers know the real worth of the assets-in-place and the new
opportunity.
);>
Investors do not know the real worth of the existing assets or the
new opportunity but the subjective probability distribution of those
59
IS
requirement
of
funds
to
finance
the
profitable
investment
3.5
60
advertising
expenditures,
research
and
development
Titman and Wessels ( 1988) find that the uniqueness of a firm (that
produces a unique product) is highly negatively related to the long-term
debt ratios. They argue that where liquidation of a firm is costly to the
suppliers and workers (since they have job specific skills and technology)
and customers (since they may find it difficult to service the unique
products from alternative sources), firms maintain low debt ratios. They
also find a negative relationship between short-term debt ratios and the
size of the firm. They argue that small firms find it difficult to raise longterm funds due to high transaction costs. Moreover, the performance of
sma11 firms is highly sensitive to the temporary economic downturns
which do not significantly affect the large firms. They find a negative
61
correlation
between
profitability
and
debt
to
market
value
of
Hovakimian et. al., (200 1) find that in the long run, firm tends to
move towards its target debt ratio. They find that more profitable firms
have lower debt ratio due to retention of profit but these profitable firms
are expected to raise debt than equity or repurchase equity than debt to
offset the effect of retention. They also find that firms with higher
current share price relative to book value or past share price or earnings,
are expected to issue equity than debt. They argue that higher share prices
are expected to be experienced by those firms which have better growth
opportunities.
Friend and Lang (1988) find that leverage decreases as the level of
management's
allows
sharing
of risks
between
Davis and Stone (2004), using corporate-level data for the year
1999, find that emerging market corporate sector depend more on external
financing and specifically on finances from banks and has higher debtequity ratio than the corporate sector of the industrialised countries.
tax rates, bankruptcy laws, market for corporate control and bank verses
market-oriented financial system on the firm-level determinants of capital
structure. This study covers the period 1987 to 1991 and focuses on nonfinancial corporations. Raj an and Zingales ( 1995) find that despite the
institutional differences the variables that are correlated with leverage in
the USA appear to be similarly correlated in other industrialized
countries although the regression coefficients vary across countries.
Moreover, the theoretical explanations drawn from the experience of the
USA seem not to be strong in explaining the observed correlations
between variables in other countries. Rajan and Zingales (1995) consider
tangibility of assets (measured by fixed assets to total assets ratio),
growth opportunity (measured by market to book ratio), size of the firm
(measured by log of sales) and profitability (measured by earnings before
interest, tax and depreciation to book value of assets) as the firm-level
determinants of capital structure.
Booth et. al., (200 1) analyze the capital structure choices of firms
belonging to ten developing countries having different macro-economic
conditions, institutional and legal frameworks and diverse culture. Their
study covers the period from 1980 to 1990. They find that the firm
specific variables that are found to be relevant for capital structure
choices in the developed countries seem to be similarly correlated in the
developing countries. But the magnitudes of correlations of those
variables with leverage are found to vary widely among countries
indicating the weaknesses of their explanatory powers and probably
indicating the importance of the country specific factors in explaining the
capital structure choices. Booth et. al., (2001) consider average tax rate,
asset tangibility, profitability (measured by earning before tax to total
assets), business risk (measured by standard deviation of return on
assets), growth opportunities (measured by market to book ratio) and size
(measured by log of sales/1 00) as the determinants of capital structure.
and
Maksimovic
(1996b)
examine
what
extent
of
Maksimovic
(1996b)
find
statistically
significant
negative
65
Desai, Mihir A., Foley C. Fritz and Hines, James R. Jr. (2006),
using firm-level data for the period 1982 to 1999 of U.S firms operating
abroad, find that foreign subsidiaries of American multinational firms,
located in politically risky (which indicate higher business risk for the
subsidiaries) countries have higher financial leverage than other foreign
subsidiaries of the same multinational parents. American multinational
firms are also more likely to share ownership of their foreign subsidiaries
located in politically risky countries with local partners. They argue that
in order to mitigate the political risks, even when external financing is
costly, American multinational firms shift some of the risks to foreign
capital providers and foregoes some of the benefits of high level of
financial leverage. These multinational firms also reduce their domestic
financial leverage.
The data used in these studies are old and are not very relevant.
Moreover, the Indian financial system had been repressed before the early
1990s. Since the early 1990s, the financial sector reforms in India have
been initiated with the intention to unshackle the financial system from
the clutches of the bureaucrats of the Government. Our study aims at
examining the financing choices of the Indian companies in the changed
scenario.
pre-liberalisation
liberalisation period.
period
and
1992-93
to
1999-2000
argue
as
post-
that size,
liquidity, cost of debt, collateral value of assets, cost of equity and nondebt tax shield are the major determinants of capital structure in India.
This study does not specifically examine the effect of economic reforms
on the determinants of capital structure of firms and explain their
behaviour.
Majumder
(1997)
finds
significantly
negative
relationship
supenor
corporate
performance.
This
study
specifically
takeovers
in
India
but
post
announcement,
these
gains
are
Joseph et. al., (2002) find that Indian firms were heavily dependent
on external sources since internally generated funds were insufficient to
meet the funding requirements of new investment opportunities. During
the pre-liberalization period, due to the dominance of credit market, firms
were highly dependent on loans from banks and developmental financial
institutions. The significance of the stock markets has been increasing
since the mid 1980s. During the initial years of financial market reforms
(i.e., during the early 1990s), due to increase in flows of funds to the
stock markets from domestic and foreign sources, firms were tapping the
market with equity issues. However, bank credit again picked up in
subsequent years. As the dominance of the stock markets increases, the
importance
of the
equity
shareholders
(specially
the
institutional
argue that in bank-dominated Indian economy, both the credit and stock
markets will play important roles in monitoring and disciplining firms
and in improving corporate governance of these firms. The study covers
the period 1971-72 to 1995-96. But after this period significant changes
have taken place in the Indian financial system and efforts have been
made to improve the corporate governance practices in India. Our study
will cover the changes that have been made in recent times also.
69