1

Research paper: Why has no comprehensive action been taken against MQM?
Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) is a Karachi based political party that allegedly
represents interests of Muhajirs (Urdu-speaking) in Pakistan since 1984 (Ahmar, 1996). Over
the years, MQM has evolved from a political party in to an organized criminal unit that conducts
crimes such as mobile-snatching, car theft, robberies, target-killing, strikes, city-shutdowns and
extortions (Schelling, 1967; Siddiqi, 2010). Despite their criminality and its deleterious effects
on Karachi, other than sporadically introducing short-term solutions, the state of Pakistan has not
taken concrete steps to tackle the MQM problem. This paper aims to show that there are two
reasons why MQM has been allowed to persist in its criminal form in Pakistan, one being that
MQM vote base is needed by subsequent regimes to consolidate their power in Karachi, while
the other reason is rooted in the potential violence that will arise if any action is taken against
MQM. This paper will address these concerns raised by the government through studying past
cases in order to establish the validity, or lack thereof, of their concerns; and through devising a
comprehensive action strategy that will take their reasoning into account. For this purpose, the
paper will be divided in to three sections. The first section will detail MQMs evolution from an
ethno-political group to a criminal enterprise. In the second section the two causes for giving
MQM a free reign will be explored by using available empirical data and utilizing examples of
past cases in which action was taken against MQM. The third section will attempt to address
states reasoning by formulating a strategy that will incorporate and attempt to solve their
concerns. In the end, a conclusion will be presented.

Literature review

Karachi, the megacity of Pakistan, has a population of approximately 20 million. It is the

main sea port of Pakistan and handles 95% of its foreign trade (Robotka, 2013). Karachi is also
the commercial hub of Pakistan; it contributes 60% of the countrys overall taxes, 30% to
Pakistans manufacturing sector, and houses almost 90% of the head offices of banks, financial
institutions and multinational companies in Pakistan (Robotka, 2013; Esser, 2004). However,
Karachi is also a city where violence has become a daily fact of life (Malik, 1995). Violence in
Karachi stems from multiple sources, one of them being the lack of planning that has gone in to
the citys infrastructure as urban density and sprawl provides safe haven for militants and
criminals alike (Gazdar, Mallah, 2013; International Crises Group, 2014; Yusuf, 2012). In
addition, terrorists and sectarian militants also adversely affect the stability of Karachi.
Religiously motivated bombings and terrorists suicide attacks are routine occurrences in Karachi
(Gazdar, Mallah, 2013). The destabilization that stems from violence in Karachi has
repercussions for Pakistan and for the larger international community as the region is said to
contain figures of international terrorism, extremists and sectarian militants (Esser, 2004; Yusuf,
2012).
While acknowledging the significance of terrorist groups, and lack of urban planning as
factors that contribute to levels of violence in Karachi, this paper will focus on ethno-political
violence that is prevalent in Karachi, concentrating specifically on the case of the political party
cum organized criminal group MQM (Haq, 1995; Waseem, 1996; Gayer, 2014; Esser, 2004;
Khan, 2010; Shahzad 2013; Malik, 1998; Robotka; Malik 1995). The disturbances caused by
MQM become particularly important to analyze when one considers that they affect the stability
of Karachi which in turn impacts the success of national and regional counterterrorist programs
(Yusuf, 2012). As destabilizing Karachi is akin to destabilizing Pakistan, exploring one of the

facets that causes this destabilization, ethno-politics caused by MQM, becomes vital (Yusuf,
2012).
This paper advances the idea that the main party of Karachi, MQM, is actually an
organized criminal unit. The literature on organized crime defines organized criminals as groups
that mainly deal with the provision of the commodity protection or security (Gambetta, 1993;
Schelling, 1967; Tilly, 1985; Skaperdas, 2001) but that might expand their operations to control
the production and distribution of other commodities illegally (Varese, 2010). This group will
have its own history; its tradition and customs; its own method and techniques; its highly
specialized machinery for attacks upon persons and property; its own highly specialized modes
of defense that is, means to be able to enforce their rule so that they can effectively provide
protection (Varese, 2010). In addition, it will also have a structure, a system for issuing orders,
and someone who benefits from such governance and some continuity over time (Varese, 2010).
The literature also applies several theories and explores different scenarios- originally posited by
academics working on drug cartels and prison gangs in different areas- that explain levels of
violence perpetuated by organized criminal groups when state repression on them increases
(Lessing, 2015; Dube, 2013; Cruz, 2011).
This paper will attempt to extend the literature of organized crime, which looks at drug
cartels and prison gangs in Columbia, Mexico and Brazil; and apply it to a political party, namely
MQM in Pakistan. The paper will contest that MQM is an organized criminal group that operates
under the guise of a political party. Moreover, it will attempt to show through past cases that in
situations of state crackdowns members of MQM are likely to respond similarly to members of
organized criminal groups (Lessing, 2015).

Section 1:
Formation of MQM
Karachi is the most populous city of Pakistan with a population of over twenty million
(Khalid, et al., 2015). It is a city that boasts a variety of people who come from different
regional, linguistic and ethnic backgrounds and for this reason it is often referred to as a MiniPakistan (Malik, 1998). One of the ethnicities that form a major chunk of Karachis population
(49.9%) is the Muhajirs (Khattak, 2002). Muhajir is a term which means refugee in Urdu and
is used, along with the term Urdu-speaking, to signify those people who fled from India to
Pakistan at the time of independence (Ahmar, 1996). After independence, majority of Muhajirs
settled in Sindh, predominantly in its relatively urban regions namely Karachi, Hyderabad and
Sukker (Arif, 2000). The greatest number of Muhajirs, however, settled in Karachi which led to
Karachi becoming the largest Muhajir city early in the history of Pakistani (Malik, 1998).
The presence of different ethnicities, their desire to hold on to their distinct identities and
their competition among each other over limited resources; coupled with their mismanagement
and misrepresentation by the authorities can be said to be the reason for MQMs emergence
(Malik, 1998). More narrowly, the alienation of Muhajirs and emergence of MQM can be linked
to three events in Pakistans history: the 1964 presidential elections, the 1972 language riots and
the 1985 ethnic clashes between Urdu-speaking and other ethnicities in Karachi (Ahmar, 1996).
During presidential elections of 1964, ethnic riots took place between Pathan and the
Muhajir community (Ahmar, 1996). The source of this tussle was the fact that each ethnicity
supported a different candidate in the elections; while Muhajirs sided with Fatima Ali Jinnah
(sister of the founder of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah); Pathans vote was declared for Ayub

Khan, the Pathan military dictator who had assumed office in 1958 (Ahmar, 1996). Because the
Muhajir community did not extend their support to the military dictator, they were at the
receiving end of Pathan backlash led by Ayub Khans son. Not only were Muhajirs unhappy by
the allegedly fake election held by the authoritarian ruler, they were also displeased Ayub had
renamed Rawalpindi as the new federal capital of Pakistan, taking the position away from
Karachi (Ahmar, 1996). The riots that broke out between Pathans and Muhajirs in 1964 and early
1965 were the very first ethnic riots of Karachi and in retrospect, they seemed to set the tone for
future ethnic encounters in urban Sindh (Ahmar, 1996).
In 1972, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, leader of the Sindhi majority party, was the president of Pakistan.
His regime worsened the relations between Muhajirs and Sindhis because of his policy of
nationalization of banks, insurance companies and industries that adversely affected the jobs
available to Muhajirs who were mostly employed in the non-governmental sector. In addition,
Bhutto also introduced regional quota for federal bureaucracy that allotted 7.6% of seats to urban
Sindh, while 11.4% were reserved for rural Sindh. Since Muhajirs resided in urban Sindh and
Sindhis in rural areas, Muhajirs felt this exclusionary policy only benefitted Sindhis while
worsening their own economic prospectsii (Siddiqi, 2010). But the final straw that resulted in a
split between the two ethnicities was the introduction of Sindhi as the other provincial language
of Sindh; previously Urdu had been the only official language of Sindh (Ahmar, 1996). The
approval of this bill in the Sindh assembly caused riots all around Muhajir dominated areas of
Sindh. All these issues combined placed an irrevocable dent on the relations between Muhajirs
and Sindhis (Ahmar, 1996).
In 1985, ethnic riots between Pathan and Muhajir once again plagued Karachi. The cause this
time was the death of a female Muhajir student who died by being run over by a bus that was

driven by a Pathan (transport in Karachi was mainly the domain of Pathans) (Ahmar, 1996). This
issue served as the tipping point for tensions that had been brewing for some time; tensions
rooted in unfavorable bureaucratic reforms, Karachis urbanization and underdevelopment and a
lack of leadership for the representation of Muhajirs in the government; all of these issues led to
riots and an emergence of Muhajir nationalism (Ahmar, 1996; Baig, 2005). This social,
economic and political sense of deprivation was furthered by the next ruler, General Zia-ul-Haq,
whose policies increased Punjabi hegemony in bureaucracy and military; and led to the creation
of MQM by university students in Karachi in 1984; however, the party officially emerged as a
political contender in 1986 (Siddiqi, 2010).
Organized Criminal Group
MQM emerged in a climate of violence; it was formed in an era during which Pakistan
experienced internal war that resulted in the loss of East Pakistan and creation of Bangladesh in
1971; while in the 1980s war was ongoing in neighboring Afghanistan. The 1971 Indo-Pak war
is an important factor in explaining criminality in Karachi because it led to several members of
the population receiving combat training; including MQMs founding members and the pool of
people (Biharisiii) from whom MQM gained its early recruits (Malik, 1995; Pattanaik, 1999). On
the other hand, war in Afghanistan can provide insights in to violence levels in Karachi during
the 80s as it led to easier access to arms through the Afghan channel (Dube, 2013; Haq, 1995).
However, one main factor that can explain MQMs initial dependency on violence is the ethnic
riots that preceded its formation. MQM emerged in a time when politics was changing and
adopting a more coercive nature; from student politics iv to local level politics, everyone seemed
to be updating their technologies of defense and persuasion and supporting their ideology with
arms. Therefore, in a setting where probability of violent clashes with other parties increased, it

is reasonable to expect MQM, as a party taking off in such an atmosphere, to equip itself with
means of conducting violence in order to effectively counter coercive threats of their opponents
(Nasr 1992; Gayer, 2014). However, this explanation does not account for the manner in which
coercion, violence and criminality became core practices of MQM; how these initial violent
leanings were institutionalized in the party to make it an organized criminal group.
Based on the literature available on organized crime, there are multiple similarities that
can be drawn between the political party MQM and organized criminal groups. For one, MQM
has a highly sophisticated, local organizational structure in Karachi that consists of three levels.
At the top level, there is Nine Zero that is the nation-wide headquarter of the party located in
Azizabad, a middle-income neighborhood in Karachis District Central (Khan, Karimi, 2015).
Nine Zero is a place where partys chairman, secretaries, MNAs (members of the national
assembly), MPAs (members of the provincial assembly), and other functionaries often meet
(Gayer, 2014). Next in the hierarchy are sectors headed by a sector-in-charge (Khan, Karimi,
2015; Baig, 2005). There are 26 city-wide sector offices that in turn ensure the effective running
of the 8-10 unit offices, each run by a unit-in-charge, that are embedded in different
neighborhoods (Khan, Karimi, 2015). Thus, in this manner MQM has offices at the district,
zonal-town and neighborhood level in Karachi (Baig, 2005). In such a system, all the decisions
are made at the top and then relegated down in the hierarchy (Gayer, 2014; Levitt, Venkatesh,
2000). The sector-in-charge and unit-in-charge reside within the mohallah (neighborhood) that
they are responsible for (Gayer, 2014). These neighborhood heads are expected to resolve
problems of the area such as ensuring access to utilities (water and electricity) and solving
neighborhood disputes (Khan, Karimi, 2015). Their main purpose is to make sure that they
effectively carry out orders from above (Gayer, 2014). In this manner, through their dedicated

foot-soldiers MQM is able to establish a comprehensive network that gives them complete
knowledge of each neighborhood in Karachi (Baig, 2005). Furthermore, it also leads to their
complete control of each area which in turn makes other activities, such as strikes and extortion,
easier.
An important piece of this organizational structure is the leader of MQM, Altaf Hussain. Altaf
was born in Karachi to an Urdu-speaking family in 1953 (Baig, 2005). He had a modest
upbringing as he belonged to a middle-class family who had a house in a lower-middle class
neighborhood of Karachi (Nine Zero, Altafs house, as noted above serves as the party
headquarters in Karachi) (Baig, 2005). After finishing high school in 1969, he decided to join the
army (Baig, 2005). Altaf faced discrimination based on his ethnicity during his brief stint in the
army and during his time as a pharmacy student at the University of Karachi, which he had
enrolled in after leaving the forces (Haq, 1995; Baig, 2005). Because of this discrimination, Altaf
founded the All Pakistan Muhajir Student Organization (APMSO) while at university. During its
formative years, APMSO was unable to appeal to the Muhajir students as Altaf had hoped (Baig,
2005). After he completed his degree, Altaf went to the United States and started working as a
taxi-driver in Chicago (Baig, 2005). Once the APMSO started performing well in student
elections, Altaf decided to try his hand at politics once again and with his return, he devoted all
his efforts to APMSO which culminated in the creation of MQM in 1984.
Altaf Hussain plays a pivotal role in the organizational structure of MQM as the
decisional hierarchy starts with him. He continues to dictate all the actions of the party despite
being in a voluntary exile in London since 1992 (Haq, 1995). Altafs hold over MQM is
absolute; his followers consider his life to be the epitome of the Muhajir struggle that each of
them has to face; to them Altaf Hussain is the Muhajir community (Haq, 1995; Baig, 2005). In

early years of MQM, Altaf wielded significant power over the Muhajir youth through his oratory
skills. His speeches led to devotional responses such as:
Hes [Altafs] a great leader and if you listen to him once he will change your life
forever. He was perfect his words were like magic. They went straight into my heart.
(Khan, 2010)
Moreover, he demanded absolute loyalty from his followers, by making them take oaths v at their
initiation into the party. His party workers in turn, perceived his words as divine and hailed him
as a pir (saint) and quaid (leader); chanting slogans such as, jo quaid ka ghaddar hai wo maut
ka haq daar hai" (he who betrays their leader deserves only death) (Baig, 2005). Thus, it can be
said that MQM is more like a personality cult, with Altaf capturing the central position in the
party hierarchy (Malik, 1998; Baig, 2005; Ahmar, 1996).
Another crucial similarity between organized criminals and MQM is extortion. MQM wanted to
provide resources for the disenfranchised Muhajirs who joined its ranks. The most convenient
method of acquiring those resources was by acting like a protection racket (Tilly, 1985). In order
to become a racket, MQM first gained the means through which they would coerce people to pay
them: they gained arms and recruits. They then built a reputation for using means of violence as
credibility to carry out threats is extremely important for a racketeer (Tilly, 1985; Schelling,
1967). They built a reputation by carrying out threats against those who refused to comply;
refusal to pay [by shopkeepers, businessmen and industrialists], or a sign of dissent in the MQM
strongholds, could result in torture, loss of property and even loss of life (Siddiqi, 2010). MQM
gained charity from businessmen and citizens all over Karachi; their unit and sector-in-charge
greatly facilitating this process (Haq, 1995). In return for paying this tribute, these people were

10

considered to be under MQMs protection which basically meant that until the next payment
was due, MQM will not cause them any harm. According to columnist Irfan Hussain, boys as
young as thirteen and fourteen roam the streets with automatic weapons. Young recruits [of
MQM] cant get a job but in the profession of killing they are adequately compensated out of
bhatta [extortion money] (Khan, 2010). The money generated was also used to help Muhajirs
get jobs, admissions in to schools and universities and it was also used to perpetuate the system
of corruption in which local citizens were helpless bystanders who had to pay their protectors in
order to ensure their safety from them.
This section briefly explained the key events in Pakistans history that fueled Muhajirs
grievances and culminated in the creation of MQM. It then traced the causes of MQMs early
criminal leanings and explained how over the years those criminal tendencies became
institutionalized in the party turning MQM into an organized criminal group. It did so through
corroborating the practices of MQM with available literature on organized criminal groups; by
showing that MQM has its own traditions (oath taking), an organizational structure (Nine Zerosectors-units), someone who benefits from that structure (Altaf Hussain) and by showing that
MQM operates like a protection racket. The next section will explore the two reasons that
explain why state of Pakistan hesitates in taking action against this criminal organization.
Section 2:
Vote base
After MQM was launched, it soon established itself as the sole political representative of
the Urdu-speaking community in Pakistan (Baig, 2005). This popularity of MQM has manifested
itself repeatedly in electoral support since MQM took part in national and provincial elections for
the first time in 1988 (Siddiqi, 2010). In 1987, MQMs agenda gained it votes in the municipal

11

elections in Karachi and Hyderabad (Khalid, et al., 2015). Then in the 1988 general elections,
MQM achieved success in urban areas of Sindh and emerged as the third largest political party of
the country (Shahzad, 2013). The rural areas of Sindh were dominated by the Pakistan Peoples
Party (PPP)vi, which also came first at the national level, however, without an absolute majority
(Khalid, et al., 2015). Benazir Bhutto, PPPs chairperson, decided to form an alliance with MQM
as by combining MQMs seats with their own, PPP could form an absolute majority in the
national assembly and come to power (Khalid, et al., 2015).
Since then, MQM has formed political alliances with each government that has come in
to power; after PPP in 1988, it formed a coalition with Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) in 1990 and
then again with PPP in 1993 and in 1996, it joined hands with Pakistan Muslim League- Nawaz
(PML-N) and then with the Pakistan Muslim League- Quaid (PML-Q) in 1999 (Pattanaik, 1999).
Some of these alliances were formed because MQMs seats were needed by different political
parties in order to form a majority in the national assembly (as in 1988, and in 1999).
Interestingly, even when MQM was a part of the ruling coalition, data vii shows that it did not stop
its criminal activities; but a reduction was noticeable (Pattanaik, 1999). However, in 1988 and
1999 due to the ruling partys reliance on MQMs vote bank it became harder for them to take
any formal measure against the criminality and violence that MQM continued to generate, albeit
at a marginally lower level. For example, in 1988 there was tremendous pressure on the PPP
from the powerful army and equally powerful president to take action against those engaged in
violence in Karachi however, since Bhutto depended on the 13 MQM seats in the national
assembly to maintain her parliamentary majority, she had to balance several, and at times
contrasting, interests in order to ensure the continuity of her rule (Haq, 1995). On the one hand,
this led her to not initialize a crackdown against MQM while on the other hand, in order to

12

appease her Sindhi voters, she continued to delay the implementation of certain policies that she
had agreed with MQM at the time the coalition was formed (Khalid, et al., 2015). Because she
continued to ignore MQMs demands, MQM escalated the level of violence in Karachi (Shahzad,
2013) that eventually forced Bhutto to agree to a crackdown against the perpetrators of violence,
a move that officially ended the MQM-PPP alliance (Pattanaik, 1999). Therefore, this example
shows how forming a coalition at the national level with MQM put the PPP administration
between a rock and a hard place: on the one hand, in order to continue the alliance no action
could be taken against MQM, on the other, MQMs violent orientation seemed to intensify every
time one its demands was not met- a scenario that is inevitable when a ruling party is trying to
keep all its voters happy- causing a greater need for a crackdown against MQM. In this instance,
since Benazir did not react swiftly to MQMs increasing levels of violence, she was dismissed by
her own president on the pretext of not being able to handle the deteriorating law and order
situation in Karachi (Shahzad, 2013).
However, it is not only those parties who lack a majority in the national assembly that
need MQMs votes. Since MQM persistently wins in the most vital and largest city in Pakistan,
no peaceful rule can be implemented in Pakistan without MQM on board (Malik, 1995).
Therefore, all governments who come in power try to keep good relations with MQM, at least
initially until MQMs antics might force them to change tactics. Even in situations where
governments have taken steps against MQM, they have not developed a strategy to counter the
MQM problem once and for all as each governments focus is instead to introduce short term
measures to keep MQM in check and at the same time, in their corner. This dilemma stems from
the immense disruptive capacity that MQM possess; that is its ability to conduct violence.

13

Violence
One of the other reasons why I think subsequent governments have not taken action
against MQM is because of MQMs ability to conduct violence and destabilize Karachi. Violence
would occur in Karachi if MQM feels that a crackdown is being launched against them. This
claim is made because history of MQMs exploits shows that strong-arming is the predominant
strategy used by MQM to achieve its aims. Hence, if such a group finds its back against the wall
in a crackdown instituted by the state then it will have a limited number of options. The group
will either bribe or hide or it may choose to fight (Lessing, 2015). In a situation where bribery is
not effective, criminals may choose to hide, depending on the time horizon that is, if they expect
the enforcement from above to not last long, they are likely to hide it out only to emerge once
again when the crackdown ends (Lessing, 2015). In such cases, violence will increase once the
crackdown ends. A scenario that substantiates my claims can be found in MQMs history.
In the period of 1990-1992, MQMs street power seemed undisputed. During these two years,
MQM was accused of destroying 20 banks, 95 shops, 102 houses, and conducting 35 strikes and
extortion (in which they collected monthly tax from each and every shop, house and industry)
(Shahzad, 2013). Journalists and press became a special target of MQM as its workers burnt
hundreds of thousand copies of different dailies - Jang, Dawn, The News, monthly Herald and
weakly Takbeer between 10 20 March 1991 (Shahzad, 2013). Moreover, MQM killed
journalists who wrote against them, tortured professionals who refused to pay them and also took
on the military when they abducted and tortured a serving army officer (Waseem, 1996). Due to
these growing disturbances, the army stepped in and launched Operation Clean Up in June
1992 in order to reestablish order in Karachi by eliminating dacoits and terrorists (Arif, 2000).

14

The federal minister at the time explicitly assured MQM that the operation was not conducted
against them; however, it soon became apparent that MQM was the intended target (Malik, 1995;
Shahzad, 2013). As soon as it became evident who the intended target of the operation was,
MQM leaders ran away from Pakistan or went in to hiding while foot soldiers of MQM were left
floundering (Jaffrelot, Rais 1998). The army withdrew in November 1994 and the operation that
had begun in order to restore peace to Sindh actually led to a worsening of an already volatile
situation. For example, while 304 people were murdered in Sindh in 1991, in 1994 565 viii people
were killed in Karachi alone (Pattanaik, 1999). In 1995, the situation deteriorated further with the
killings of 2,095 people out of which 243 belong to MQM and 226 to law enforcement
personnel. "Never before in the history of this country have so many people been mowed down
in one city in a single year," wrote a columnist in 1996 (Baig, 2005).
As grim as these statistics are they lend support to the claim made earlier. Governments are
hesitant to take action against MQM due to the levels of violence such action entails. Violence is
generated because out of the three options available to MQM workers, the one option, bribe,
which could lead to a reduction in violence, is not applicable because the army has low levels of
corruption in Pakistan. Of the two options, the foot soldiers of MQM- people who were in charge
of units and other countless party workers- were unable to go underground or escape as
efficiently as the higher-ups in the party had and thus, their option was to fight. Those party
members who were able to hide during the crackdown reemerged once the operation ended and
to showcase their strength conducted even higher levels of violence.
This section explained the two reasons because of which I claim that the state of Pakistan
has been unable to commit long-term action against MQM. These include the dependency that
each party in office has on the MQM vote base and the penchant for violence that is

15

characteristic of MQM. This violence not only destabilizes the city but also generates huge costs
in terms of lives that are lost and money spent to sustain the operation and money lost due to the
operationix. The next section will present a strategy to counteract MQM that will also address
states concerns.
Section 3:
Comprehensive action
In the past 30 years since its inception, MQM has morphed in to an organized criminal group
with an ironclad grip over Karachi. Though its had its ups-and-downs, MQM has shown
resilience by remaining the top contender in Karachi. The question then is what can be done to
effectively counter MQM considering that each party relies on MQM to consolidate its own
position in government and the violence that threatens to implode the moment any action is taken
against MQM?
While formulating a solution to the MQM problem one aspect that needs to be
understood is that any antidote to Karachis conundrum will have to be long-term x. The problem
that MQM poses does not have an easy fix; which is the very outlook that seems to characterize
all strategies implemented against MQM thus far. For example, in the 1992 operation against
MQM, the military had swept in to rid Karachi of all violent elements, alleging that they could
do the job in six months; something which they soon understood was not possible resulting in itsequally insufficient though extended- 2 year stay. Such myopic and one-dimensional solutions
have plagued Karachi on several occasions (in 1992, 1994, 2013). Instead of such measures, a
comprehensive solution will be one that is multi-pronged with a longer time horizon but has
certain short-terms goals as well (Cruz, 2011).

16

For the purposes of this paper, I will analyze some aspects of the most recent policy the
government has implemented to counter violence in Karachi and will propose amendments in
their design. On September 4, 2013 the government decided to launch an operation led by the
paramilitary Rangers to curb violence in Karachi (International Crises Group, 2014). The state
identified 450 terrorists, target killers, kidnappers and extortionists as the primary targets of the
operation (International Crises Group, 2014). The government stated that four committees would
supervise the operation: a weekly federal committee comprising the interior minister and
representatives of the Sindh government, Rangers, the National Database and Registration
Authority (NADRA), the National Alien Registration Authority (Nara) and the federal
intelligence agencies; a daily operational committee headed by the Rangers director general and
including civilian and military intelligence officials; a legislative committee to devise a legal
framework for expanding the Rangers powers in the operations; and a citizens committee
comprising respected civil society activists to oversee Rangers conduct (International Crises
Group, 2014).
These steps taken by the government in the latter part of 2013 seemed to be going in the
right direction as the government called the paramilitary to help with the situation in Karachi but
at the same time, it did not allow it complete reign and made sure the actions of Rangers were
kept under check by committees comprising of political members, intelligence personnel,
civilian officers and members of civil society. However, there was one instance in the early
stages of the operation where the government erred grievously: it gave Rangers shoot-to-kill
powers (International Crises Group, 2014). Such unbridled power can, and has in the past, led to
power abuses by the paramilitaries. Subsequently, abuse of power by those who are supposed to
enforce law can, as witnessed in the past, be counterproductive to the aim of restoring law to

17

Karachi. For example, in 1992 and 1996, a number of MQM members were killed in extra
judicial killings and as the stories of their torturous deaths were uncovered organizations such as
the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan began accusing the authorities of killing people
without due process of law (Shahzad, 2013). As news of these unlawful killings began to emerge,
MQMs popularity became further amplified as they were able to play the role of the victim since
the state had proved to be more violent than them (Baig, 2005). The government stands to go
down the same path if it does not effectively limit the power of the paramilitaries by placing
controls on them and not giving them authorization to kill suspects.
Moreover, it must be kept in mind that reliance on paramilitaries should not be the status
quo rather it should be a short term measure as a states local law enforcement should be
competent enough to deal with local criminals. Thus the government, keeping in mind the longer
time frame, should make an effort to strengthen the local police by increasing their pay, their
access to health facilities and improving their work conditions; all of which will help reduce their
susceptibility to corruption (International Crises Group, 2014). One important element that
compromises the police is its high level of politicization as around 40% of the police in Karachi
are recruited on political grounds (Yusuf, 2012). This results in police officers that have political
ties offering protection for the illegal activities of their political patrons (Yusuf, 2012). However,
it is not only political affiliations that cripple effective police operations but also the fact that
police officers who resist political pressures are often gunned down which goes to show the
inability of police to protect even itself (Yusuf, 2012). This dismal state of local police not only
provides further justification for relying on paramilitary, but also reveals the extent to which the
local law enforcement needs to be revamped and depoliticized so that in the long run it can step
up to protect the city (Yusuf, 2012).

18

Poor law enforcement situation in Karachi is made worse by the equally ineffectual criminal
justice system (Yusuf, 2012). For instance, in 2011 Rangers arrested more than two hundred
suspected target killers and since then, not one of those has been successfully prosecuted (Yusuf,
2012). Majority of the criminals accused in anti-terrorism courts xi are let go because witnesses
are too scared to testify against them out of fear of retaliation by the accuseds fellow friends
(Yusuf, 2012). This fear on part of the witness stems from the lack of proper witness protection
programs in Pakistan (Yusuf, 2012). Moreover, there is also a backlog of unresolved cases; cases
that have been awaiting hearings for over eight years (Yusuf, 2012). For the state to launch any
effective policy against criminals in Karachi it needs to not only enhance the capacity of the
justice system but also to ensure transparency, impartiality, and prompt disposal of cases
(Yusuf, 2012).
To reiterate, the current government has given powers to the paramilitary in Pakistan and
additionally, it has lifted its seven-year ban on executions (Brennan, 2015). However, of the 8000
convicts on death row, only 299 have been put to death, as reported by BBC. Though the death
penalty has not been effectual since majority of the offenders remain untouched, its
reimplementation has led to interesting outcome: hours before his execution, Saulat Mirza, an
MQM hit-man who had been on death row for 17 years, revealed that all his orders to kill had
come from Altaf Hussain (Shah, Ahmed, 2015). Such confessions cause a chink in the armor of
MQM. Moving forward, the government needs to enhance the process that they have started by
building up local police force and speeding up the judicial process so that the backlog of decades
old cases reduces.
Such steps will help the state counter the threat of violence posed by MQM and others in
Karachi. By improving their law enforcement (increasing their resources and depoliticizing

19

them) and their judicial system (promptly disposing cases with transparency), the government
increases its potential of not only catching militants, those affiliated with MQM and others; but
also bringing them to justice. In order to increase their credibility as impartial suppliers of
justice, the state should not be discriminating in who they apprehend that is they should not be
charging only those criminals who are affiliated with MQM rather, for anyone studying the
pattern of arrests made by the Rangers it should be obvious that enforcement agencies are going
after all criminals, regardless of their ethnicity or political affiliations. If the state is able to
apprehend and convict criminals in a transparent process, by using the press and the media to
show that the individuals charged have indeed committed crimes, MQMs claims of being
unfairly treated will be less likely to gain support. Rather, it is possible that MQM might
disassociate itself with the arrested persons in order to distance itself from their crimes; a
situation that can cause the individuals to confess like in the case of Saulat Mirza.
While carrying out this process, the state should anticipate a possible backlash from
MQM in the form of resignation of MQM members from the national and provincial assemblies
and dissolution of previously formed coalitions. In such a situation, the government has several
options the first one being that it accepts MQM resignations and then, as per the constitution,
holds by-elections in former MQM constituencies. This will allow new members to get elected
thus ensuring the presence of representatives from Karachi in assemblies. In this scenario, since
MQMs usual fallback option- their ability to cause mayhem in the city- should have been
significantly reduced by paramilitaries and their action against criminals, resignation by the
members of MQM should not affect Karachi adversely. Another option that the government can
avail is not to accept MQM members resignations. This move stems from the tacit
understanding that MQM actually does not want to resign; it uses the threat of resignation as a

20

bargaining chip to pressurize the government to agree to its demands. This is based on the fact
that in real politik, despite all the seats from urban constituencies, the MQM cannot form any
provincial government on its own and it can operate only in coalition (Malik, 1995). The
aforementioned fact means that as much as certain parties might rely on MQM to form majorities
in national assemblies, MQMs reliance on all the parties is greater since it must form coalitions
in order to sustain its position of power.
Aside from the aforementioned steps, other measures that should be taken by the
government are concrete steps taken to address the grievances of Muhajirs. This is necessary
because MQM receives all its electoral support from the Muhajirs of Karachi (Waseem, 1996;
Malik, 1998; Haq, 1995; Baig, 2005) as it alleges to represent its interests. The governments
task is to break the hold of power that MQM has over the Muhajir voter by addressing the
problems of Muhajirs (and not by creating factions within MQM, a failed strategy of the state in
the 1992 operation) and the first step in this direction would be to alter the quota system. Rather
than feed the illusion of Muhajir being a helpless citizen of Karachi; someone whose interests are
not accounted for in the mandates of any party, the government would be wise to shatter it by
investing their energies in solving the social and economic factors that give rise to Muhajir
grievances. There are already factions of Muhajirs present who believe that rather than further
their cause, MQM is actually bad for them (Ahmar, 1996). For example, former party workers
express their dissatisfaction with MQM in statements such as:
Altaf Hussein spoke powerfully but was not committed to solving our problems. His
demands escalated. If the army refused he announced a strike. Not one vehicle moved on
the roads. Who was affected? Muhajir shopkeepers, taxi drivers and rickshaw drivers.
The violence was relentless, we were no nearer to our goals. We kidnapped rich people,

21

robbed banks. We gave everything we robbed to the party, something was wrong (Khan,
2010).
The state should exploit these dissatisfactions among Muhajirs, something which it cannot do
without addressing the social and economic problems faced by Muhajirs; problems that currently
only Altaf Hussain vows to address.
This section attempted to form a strategy through which MQMs hold on power in
Karachi could be challenged. Breaking MQMs monopoly on violence is the key through which
governments reliance on MQM goes down. In the short run, this monopoly will be broken by
initiating stricter law enforcement, such as the paramilitary action initiated by the current
government- one that did not need MQMs votes to form a majority in the national assemblyand in the longer run, MQMs monopoly over Karachi will weaken further through the
revamping of law enforcement and judiciary, and through the introduction of social and
economic policies that address Muhajir grievances.
Conclusion
Conventional wisdom states that organized criminal groups are those that do not seek
political power, their main aim is to continue their operations to generate profits. MQM is no
different: it is a group that seeks to further the interests of its higher ups only. However, the
advantage that MQM has over other criminal groups is the legitimacy it gains because of its
popular support. Because all the other parties do not focus on the grievances of the Muhajir
community, MQM is able to come in and fill this niche by proclaiming that it does what others
will not: represent Muhajirs. However, their actions on ground defy their claim; a deception not
recognizable to many of its supporters.

22

The purpose of this paper was to establish the criminal nature of MQM, present reasons
for why the party has not been targeted like a criminal group and provide steps through which the
government can begin to counter the MQM problem. I do not claim that this paper is a
comprehensive overview of the extent of the criminal nature of MQM, of the reasons why
government hesitates in taking action against it and the steps through which it can counter MQM.
Nor do I think that the steps proposed by the government thus far to counter MQM are incorrect.
However, I do believe that this paper presents a more comprehensive strategy to deal with
MQM; a strategy that keeps in mind several conditions that impact MQMs popularity which is
something that previous measures have not done. Having said that, with more research this paper
can be further refined.

23

i Over the years, in addition to housing the largest Muhajir population in Pakistan, Karachi has become the
largest Pathan, Sindhi, Baloch and Kashmiri city and the sixth largest Punjabi city.
ii After the introduction of this policy, the Muhajirs of urban Sindh experienced a fall in their civil service
recruitment percentages that fell from 30.1% in 1973 to 20.2% in 1983 while the Sindhi share in the federal
bureaucracy increased from 3.1% in 1973 to 5.1% in 1983 (Ahmar, 1996).
iii Bihari are also Muhajirs (refugees) who migrated to East Pakistan at the time of partition of India and
creation of Pakistan.
iv In Karachi University, for example, in late 1970s conflict among student politicians mainly led to fist-fights or
egg-tossing, however, with the passage of time students updated their means of violence and from fist-fights they
started engaging in gun-fights (Gayer, 2014).
v The oath: I,believing that Allah [God] is here and watching over me, swearing by His book and my mother,
take oath that I shall remain loyal to the MQM and Altaf Hussain for my whole life. I will not take part in any
conspiracy, planning or action against MQM or Altaf Hussain and I will not maintain any link with anyone who
is involved in any of the acts mentioned above. I swear by my mother that if any conspiracy against MQM or
Altaf Hussain or any act harmful to them comes into my knowledge, I shall immediately inform Altaf Hussain or
other main leaders, even if the conspirators be my brother, sister, mother, father, any relative or friendI swear
that I shall keep every secret of my party and regard it more precious than my life. I swear that I shall accept
Altaf Hussains decision as final in any matter and obey all his decisions. If I disobey any of his decisions, I must
be regarded as a traitor. I swear that I have and I will have blind trust in party leader Altaf HussainMay God
help me to remain firm and loyal to the MQM (Gayer, 2014).
vi PPP is a political party which is ethnically associated with Sindhis, the natives of the land of Sindh, and
although its leaders stress on agendas that aim to include other ethnicities, PPPs main electoral vote base comes
from the areas populated by Sindhis, such as rural Sindh.
vii This refers to statistics found in journal articles who cite their sources for these numbers to newspaper
articles.
viii Some sources report this figure to be as high as 1, 113 (Malik, 1995).
ix According to an official report presented in Pakistans national assembly on February 1995, the government
had invested 730 million rupees in Operation Clean Up over the course of which 4,091 people died and 3505
dacoities happened (Malik, 1995).
x Longer term approach which allows for the state to build capacity of its institutions (such as judiciary and law
enforcement) is essential to counter MQM. However, the main challenge to this long term approach arises from
the shorter time horizon characteristic of all political parties that come in to power. For this reason, I propose that
a neutral third-party, one that has the organization, capacity, and means to establish its writ, should take

responsibility for the situation in Karachi. The military in Pakistan is one institution that not only has the means
to sufficiently challenge MQM but it also has the influence to ensure that long term policies to counter MQM are
properly implemented by each successive government.
xi Antiterrorism courts in Pakistan are responsible for terrorist attacks, murder, extortion, arms trafficking, kidnapping,
hijacking, sectarian violence, and target political killings (Yusuf, 2012).

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