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Melina G. Mouzala
Department of Philosophy
University of Patras
I
The core problematic that emerges in the Platonic dialogue Cratylus
(or, On the Correctness of Names: a logical work), through the con
frontation of two prima facie radically contrasting philosophical con
ceptions of language, based on the Sophistic antithesis between the
conventional (nomi) view and the natural (phusei) one, may be encap
sulated in the question: what is the cognitive value of names (onomata)
in respect of things (pragmata) or of beings (onta)? Employing this in
augural question as his vehicle, and armed with the elenctic power of
his dialectic, Plato strives to lay bare the inherent dangerousness of the
positions held by his philosophical opponents on certain leading prob
lems of the time, problems falling within the domains of logic, episte
mology and ontology.
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of the natural correctness of names there is room also for a distinct, fully
admissible role to be played by the conception of correctness as being
a matter of convention (thesei). In virtue of its creative cause, which is
endowed with scientific knowledge which is to say, in virtue of the
legislative demiurge a name is by law and convention (nomi kai
thesei); and in virtue of its paradigmatic cause it is by nature (phusei).
Names possess both matter and form, and in respect of their matter they
participate rather in the conventional (thesei), while in respect of their
form in the natural (phusei).12
Consequently, in contradistinction to Sprague, we esteem that the
exposition of a theory of his own on the relation of language to reality,
offering a distinctive interpretation of the correctness of names, does
not represent for Plato a purpose subsidiary to the primary one of up
holding the theory of Forms, but rather a parallel one, because it is pre
cisely in that section of the dialogue (386e-391b) in which a distinctive
defence of the natural relation of names to things is presented in the
voice of Socrates that the theory of Forms also makes its appearance,
and indeed in such a manner as to link the two subjects inextricably to
one another. The close affinity of the two subjects is also demonstrated
by the fact that both phusis (i.e. nature)13 and dunamis (the latter as in
dunamis tou onomatos, i.e. the force or power of a name),14 terms
occupying a ruling position in Socrates exposition of the Platonic
version of the natural correctness of names, are construed by Plato in
the Cratylus within the framework of his own theory of language in a
manner which discernibly alludes to the Platonic theory of Forms,
since the notion of phusis appears clearly to be linked to the dimension
of paradigmatic cause and perhaps also, in some measure, to that of
transcendence which characterizes the Platonic Forms, while the no
tion of dunamis clearly appears to contain a dimension that is first and
foremost ekphantorikon to borrow a term from Proclus15 or revela
tory of a things nature, a meaning which, according to one interpreta
tion, marks a stage preliminary to that which dunamis was to acquire
in the definition of a being (on) encountered in the Sophist.16
According to our view, in the section of the dialogue which in
cludes the passage 386e-391b, the presentation of the Platonic version
12 See Proclus, In Platonis Cratylum commentaria, G. Pasquali (ed.), Lipsiae 1908,
4.1618, 8.1114, 18.1517; for a translation into English, see Proclus, On Platos Cratylus, tr.
B. Dubick, London and Ithaca, N. Y. 2007.
13 See Plato, Cratylus, 387a-394d.
14 Ibid., 393e-394b.
15 Proclus, op. cit., 16.1215.
16 See Plato, Sophist, 247d-e; also D. Mannsperger, Physis bei Platon, Berlin 1969,
191196.
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in our view a clear indication that the Euthydemus preceded the Cratylus.
Responding in the latter work to the argument deployed in the former,
Socrates begins from the same starting-point, but proceeds to reverse
the line of reasoning: speaking (legein) is construed as linguistic action
(praxis),30 and once one has admitted to using the expressions speak
ing the truth (alth legein) and speaking a falsehood (pseud legein),
one has confirmed the existence not only of the corresponding actions,
namely speaking the truth and speaking a falsehood, but also of the
products of these actions, namely true and false statements (logoi), and
consequently also of true and false names (onomata), given that a name
is the smallest part of a statement.
The Platonic counter-argument upholding the possible existence
of falsity is the one Ctesippus holds up against Euthydemus, at 284c of
the homonymous dialogue (tr. Sprague): he (sc. the person who tells lies)
speaks things that are only in a certain way (alla ta onta men tropon
tina legei), and not as really is the case (ou mentoi hs ge echei). We
find the same reasoning at 385b of the Cratylus, where Socrates is ask
ing Hermogenes about statements (tr. Sedley): Is it then the one which
states things that are as they are that is true (ar oun houtos hos an ta
onta legi hs estin, alths), and the one which states them as they are
not which is false (hos d an hs ouk estin, pseuds)?31 We may also
regard as a continuance of the Euthydemus, and a foreshadowing of the
Sophist, the passage at 429d of the Cratylus, where speaking falsely is
described as not saying things that are (to m ta onta legein).32 When
we come to the Sophist, we find it said that a false statement may be
considered one which conjoins things that are (onta) to non-being (m
einai), or things that are not (m onta) to being (einai).33 Apart from
the Euthydemus34 and the Cratylus, the problem of the possibility of
falsity is also examined at some length in the Theaetetus,35 where the
investigation centres principally on falsity in the form of false belief.
There the question is raised whether erroneous judgement may be in
terpreted as other-judging (allodoxia: 189b-c) or heterodoxy (hetero30 See Plato, Cratylus, 387b (tr. Reeve): Now isnt speaking or saying (to legein) one
form of action (mia tis tn praxen)? Cf. Plato, Euthydemus, 284b-c.
31 P. Natorp, Platons Ideenlehre, Leipzig 19212 (1903), 125, construed the phrases hs
estin and hs ouk estin not as relative clauses of manner, but as substantive clauses in indi
rect discourse.
32 Cf. also Plato, Cratylus, 385b (tr. Reeve): So it is possible (estin ara touto,) to say
both things that are and things that are not in a statement (logi legein ta onta kai m)?
33 See Plato, Sophist, 240e-241b.
34 In respect of the correlation existing between the Euthydemus and the Cratylus, we
may observe that it is not by chance that the correctness of names is presented as an object of
investigation in the Euthydemus as well; see Plato, Euthydemus, 277e.
35 See Plato, Theaetetus, 187d-200d.
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doxein: 190d-e; the translations are those of Levett and Burnyeat), and,
in order to decipher the nature of error and decode the mechanisms at
work in its creation, resort is made to the parables of the waxen block
and the aviary (191c-200c). In the Sophist the possible existence of fal
sity in the form of either false judgement or false statement is examined
as a timeworn but ever relevant problem, full of confusion (236e: mesta
aporias) and associated with the bold hypothesis of the existence of
non-being, which contravenes the incontrovertible principles of Parme
nidean ontology (237a). In this dialogue Plato proffers his own solution
to the problem, one that is articulated within the coordinates determined
by the ontological domain of the communion of Forms.
The thread of this problematic which runs through and intercon
nects the aforementioned works is also readily perspicuous during Soc
rates elenctic refutation of the views of Cratylus (429b-430a) in the
second part of our dialogue, where Socrates again poses the problem of
the possibility of falsity and of the distinction between the true and the
false. The familiar Sophistic reasoning establishing the impossibility
of false speaking is here again put forward, this time in the voice of
Cratylus (tr. Reeve): But Socrates, how can anyone say the thing he
says and not say something that is? Doesnt speaking falsely consist in
not saying things that are?36 In order to subject it to dialectical elen
chus, Socrates examines whether Cratylus thesis as to the impossibili
ty of falsity applies to all forms of logos, spoken or thought (cf. 429e:
legein, phanai, eipein, proseipein). We note that in the ensuing ques
tions and answers we are presented with a scale of semantic nuances of
logos which, insofar as false statements refer to that which is not, it
would be reasonable to place alongside the negative predications of to m
on in the Sophist, which are also distributed across the whole spectrum
of uttered or cogitated statement: [Eleatic Stranger] Do you under
stand, then, that its impossible to say, speak, or think that which is not
itself correctly by itself? Its unthinkable, unsayable, unutterable, and
unformulable in speech (tr. White).37
By the repeated questioning to which he submits Cratylus, Socra
tes is seeking to lay bare how extreme can be the implications of the
line of argument employed by the Sophists, here represented by Cratylus,
in respect of names. Cratylus takes as his own starting-point the rigid
position that all names have been correctly given (panta ... ta onomata
orths keitai) as many of them, certainly, as are names at all (hosa ge
36 See Plato, Cratylus, 429d: ps gar an, Skrates, legn ge tis touto ho legei, m to
on legei? ou touto estin to pseud legein, to m ta onta legein?
37 See Plato, Sophist, 238c: sunnoeis oun hs oute phthenxasthai dunaton horths out
eipein oute dianothnai to m on auto kath hauto, all estin adianoton te kai arrhton kai
aphthenkton kai alogon; the translation above is by N. P. White. Cf. op. cit., 241a.
61
onomata estin) (429b), and replies that in the case where a person ad
dresses someone with a name which is not appropriate for him and
does not correspond to his nature, he does give voice to some sounds
or syllables (phthengesthai), but his action does not amount to the pro
nouncement of a name. To Socrates question whether whoever gives
voice to such sounds is articulating truth or falsity, or at least a part of
truth and a part of falsity, Cratylus gives the astonishing answer that
such a person is merely making noise and acting pointlessly, as if he
were banging a brass pot (430a tr. Reeve).
It may be observed that this particular passage of the Cratylus dis
plays a noticeable similarity with passage 188d-189b of the Theaetetus,
the first part of which (to 189a) shows a marked affinity with passages
283e-284a and 286c-d of the Euthydemus. Just as according to Craty
lus it is not possible to state that which is not, nor is it possible for incor
rect names to exist, since if a name is not correct it is not even a name,
so according to Theaetetus (tr. Levett and Burnyeat) it is not pos
sible to judge that which is not, either about the things which are or just
by itself, given that a man who is judging something which is not (ho
m on doxazn) is judging nothing (ouden doxazei), and that a man
who is judging nothing (ho ge mden doxazn) is not judging at all (to
parapan oude doxazei). Besides, by studying the passage 189e-190b of
the Theaetetus, one is led to see the possibility of interpreting the vari
ety of semantic nuances of logos at 429e of the Cratylus (speaking,
saying, announcing, addressing) through the prism of the difference
between spoken and internal statement, as well as of the subdivisions
within this central distinction.
The danger threatening here if one were to admit the thesis that all
names are correct, and which Plato is intent on averting through the
intervention of Socrates, is that the possibility of the existence of falsi
ty will be abolished. Just as the thesis of Hermogenes denying that
there exists a natural correctness of names and that name-making is
subject to rules and conditions, if examined with respect to its logical
implications, will be seen to conclude in the impasse that the possibili
ty of the correct attribution of a name does not apply, i.e. in a sense to
abolish the possibility of the existence of truth, so, conversely, does the
thesis of Cratylus denying or doing away with the possibility of attrib
uting incorrect names abolish the possibility of the existence of falsity,
of the non-correct, and again, by extension, the possibility of the exist
ence of truth, since truth exists only in contraposition to falsity. Ac
cording to one credible interpretation,38 the thesis of Hermogenes leads
38 See P. Friedlnder, Platon, Band II: Die Platonischen Schriften, Erste Periode, Berlin
19643, 196.
62
to the Sophistic thesis of Protagoras, that every opinion is true for him
who formulates and expresses it, while the thesis of Cratylus leads to the
Sophistic thesis of Euthydemus, that all opinions and declarations are
true. Although these two Sophistic views are contrary to one another,
they have the same logically and epistemologically invidious implica
tion, namely the elimination of the possibility of distinguishing be
tween truth and falsity. The theses of Hermogenes and Cratylus which
respectively correspond to the two Sophistic theories may appear to be
mutually contradictory, but as far as Platos Socrates is concerned, they
are in fact compatible and together comprise the two aspects of the same
danger, since both of them pose an equal threat to the foundations of
Platonic logic, epistemology and ontology by abolishing the criterion
for the detection of the truth.
It is not by chance that immediately after grappling with the issue
of the distinction between truth and falsity in his exchange with Hermo
genes (385b-e), Socrates redirects the discussion towards the essence
of things themselves, placing under scrutiny the arbitrariness, indeter
minacy and lack of perspicuity entailed by the Sophistic dogmas of
Protagoras and Euthydemus, considered from the Platonic viewpoint.
Hermogenes conventionalist-relativistic theory of names recalls, as the
comparison which Socrates proceeds to draw (385e-386a) reveals, the
subjectivism and relativism of the theory promulgated by Protagoras,
which with its statement that man is the measure of all things in fact
maintains, according to Socrates interpretation, that the essence of
each thing is distinctive for each individual person. On the other hand,
Euthydemus theory, as presented in the Cratylus (386d) but also in the
Euthydemus (294a-295a and 296b-e), consists in the thesis that all
things appear to all people to be the same simultaneously and always
(cf. 386d: pasi panta homois einai hama kai aei), and that if someone
knows one thing, then he knows all things at once and forever.39
Socrates seeks to establish the certainty, stability and itselfness of
each things essence against both of these extreme Sophistic theories,
which when viewed through a Platonic prism, tend to abolish the pos
sibility of the separate and autonomous existence of things and the cer
tainty of a stable and immutable being, and cancel the possibility of
sure and objective knowledge, as well as of a clear, distinct and supra-individual criterion of truth. The thesis that things possess in and of
themselves some fixed being or essence (bebaiotta ts ousias) is made
fast by Socrates with the argument that if things are such as they ap
pear to each to be, then it will become impossible to distinguish people
39 See Proclus, op. cit., 13.1015: hoti allo to Prtagorou dogma kai allo to Euthudmou...
to de tou Euthudmou hekaston poiei ta panta on hama kai aei, kai panta altheuein.
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into those who are wise and those who are unwise, with the result that
Protagoras will no longer be able to lay claim to the truth, since the truth
will have been rendered an individual matter. With the same argument
with which he rebuts Protagoras and Euthydemus in the Cratylus, the
Platonic Socrates also rebuts Protagoras theory in the Theaetetus.40
III
The impossibility of falsity is a thesis a thesis here in its Aristo
telian sense of paradoxical conception41 which is attributed by Aris
totle, in 29, 1024b34 of his Metaphysics, to Antisthenes, one of the
sharpest and most caustic critics of Platos theory of Forms. To An
tisthenes is also attributed by Aristotle, both in 29, 1024b3334 of
the Metaphysics and in A 11, 104b1921 of the Topics, one other such
thesis or paradoxical conception held by some renowned philosopher
(hupolpsis paradoxos tn gnrimn tinos kata philosophian), namely
the impossibility of contradiction. The rejection of this thesis by Plato
incited Antisthenes to compose and publish a dialogue against Plato,
which bore the title Sathon, or On Contradiction according to the in
formation handed down by Diogenes Laertius.42 In close proximity to
the passage in the Euthydemus where the sophism against the possibility
of falsity is expounded (283e-284d), and specifically at 285d-286d, is
recorded the argumentation on which the sophism concerning the im
possibility of contradiction is based. With these two theseis is connected
a third paradoxical conception of Antisthenes bequeathed to us once
again by Aristotle, at 29, 1024b3233 of the Metaphysics, namely the
view that there exists only one unique formula for each thing, its pro
prietary formula (oikeios logos), and that the correspondence between
a thing and its lexical expression is absolute and complete and exclu
sive: hen eph henos, one proprietary formula to each single thing.
The foundation of the Sophistic argumentation concerning the
impossibility of contradiction, as this is rehearsed at 285d-286d of the
Euthydemus, is the one-to-one correspondence of logos to pragma.
Since each thing has one sole formula which corresponds to it and
this expresses the thing as it is, and not as it is not, because no one says
that which is not it is not possible for two people to contradict one
another when they are speaking of the same thing. According to the
argument of Dionysodorus (286b), if one states the thing (legein to
pragma) and the other does not even refer to it, then it is not possible
40 See Plato, Theaetetus, 161c-162a.
41 See Aristotle, Topics, I 11, 104b1921.
42 See Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum,
64
III 35.
65
66
67
68
69
1958, 7.
68 See G. Prauss, Platon und der logische Eleatismus, Berlin 1966, 174. Also G. S.
Kirk, The problem of Cratylus, American Journal of Philology 72 (1951), 225253, esp. 230,
and finally H. U. Baumgarten, op. cit., 4748.
69 See Th. Veikos, Oi Proskratikoi, Athna 19954, 100101.
70
71
72
mann notes,80 a name constitutes only one aspect of reality and is con
sequently incapable of rendering it completely and correctly. Moreover,
Proclus interpretation,81 in particular, of the views of Hermogenes, be
cause it characterizes him as a man of opinion (doxastikos), depicts
Hermogenes as being much closer to the subjectivism and relativism of
Protagoras than to the Parmenidean philosophy, which holds the way
of opinion or conjecture to be the way of error, and the assignment of
names by human beings to be always a matter of convention, resting,
as it does, on their opinions and uncertain conjectures which are to
such a degree misguided as to have given rise within the Parmenidean
conception of language to a pronounced and firm contrast between the
name (onoma) and truth (altheia).82 But Cratylus also, according to
one interpretation,83 expresses in some manner the Protagorean notion
that man is the measure of all things, inasmuch as speech, conceived
in its irrefragable relation to things, is mans way of expressing himself
concerning the things of the world.
Based on the preceding remarks, one may conclude that from Par
menidean thought itself spring two divergent conceptions of the rela
tion of language to reality. On the one hand, thinking and speaking are
indefectibly bound to being, and thought and knowledge, as well as their
verbal expression, are ontic, i.e. true, because one cannot but think and
know and state that which is. On the other hand, however, because
thinking and being are identical, or at least because the former is re
ducible to the latter, whatever lacks being, i.e. that which is not, cannot
consist in thought or knowledge, but will instead constitute a mere
name, the progeny of opinion and convention.84
From this perspective, both the views of Hermogenes as well as
those of Cratylus appear to derive from a common source in Parmeni
dean reflection. From the same source there also derives, however, the
reflection of Plato, who turns his thought in the Cratylus to the problem
of the correctness of names (orthots onomatn), i.e. to the problem of
the relation between names and things, in order to show that on the one
hand things are possessed of a fixed essence (ousia bebaios), independent
of our own rational and representational faculties, and on the other that
names are incapable of leading us to the truth of things, i.e. to reveal to
us the things themselves. In order to accomplish this second goal, Plato
establishes as the central concern and primary mission of the dialogue
80 See F. Heinimann, op. cit., 5456. Cf. B. Snell, Die Sprache Heraklits, Hermes 61
(1926), 353381, esp. 368369.
81 See Proclus, op. cit., 5.1718.
82 See K. R. Popper, op. cit., 264 and 28990; also F. Heinimann, op. cit., 50.
83 See H.-U. Baumgarten, op. cit., 5152.
84 See Th. Veikos, op. cit., 104105.
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Summary
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