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Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal

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Seeing Beyond Representation and Modularity:

Commentary by Arnold H. Modell (Boston)
Arnold H. Modell

82 Kirkstall Road, Newtonville, MA 02460, e-mail:

Published online: 09 Jan 2014.

To cite this article: Arnold H. Modell (2001) Seeing Beyond Representation and Modularity: Commentary by Arnold H.
Modell (Boston), Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal for Psychoanalysis and the Neurosciences, 3:1, 29-32,
DOI: 10.1080/15294145.2001.10773332
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Psychoanalysis and Cognitive Neuropsychology

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Seeing Beyond "Representation" and "Modularity":

Commentary by Arnold H. Modell (Boston)

Carlo Semenza's essay regarding the relation between

neuropsychology and psychoanalysis, invites us to reexamine the basic assumptions that influence our theories about the mind-brain. Can the functions of the
mind-brain be thought of as logical computations from
which can be derived predictable universal laws, or
are such functions indeterminate and unpredictable as
suggested by nonlinear dynamics? Semenza makes his
own position clear in that he believes that psychoanalysis, as does cognitive science, derives "laws" of
mental functioning from observation. He appears to
share the assumptions of many cognitive scientists,
that brains "compute." Semenza also suggests that
psychoanalysis should pay special attention to the concepts of representation and modularity, basic assumptions of many versions of cognitive science. But I plan
to show that these concepts are seriously misleading.
Semenza has, in my opinion, b~cked the wrong metaphors.
The theory of a modular mind assumes a "representational theory of mind." The philosopher Jerry
Fodor, who popularized this concept, linked modularity to representation, as modularity implicitly assumes
functionally distinct neural structures that are "computationally" autonomous (Fodor 1983, 1998). Many
cognitive scientists have espoused these concepts in
an understandable effort to find scientific theories that
would explain how the mind-brain wor ks. Freud's
"Project" (1895) was an analogous attempt to recast
psychological processes in the language of energy and
quantity, the variables of physical science. It should
be recognized, however, that cognitive scientists do
not all speak with one voice, and theoretical assumptions may fairly quickly alter. Nevertheless, modularity and representation are representative assumptions
of the cognitive science community at the present
time.
The concept of representation can be traced back
to the 17th century and the philosophy of Descartes,
who believed that thoughts, if clear and distinct, could
be treated as a form of mathematics, thus anticipating
the widely held, current assumption that the mind
"computes." This idea of an algorithmic, computaArnold Modell, M.D., is a Training and Supervising Analyst at the
Boston Psychoanalytic Institute.

tional theory, the mind-brain, again a mainstream assumption, has been criticized by neurobiologists such
as Changeux (1997), Edelman (1992), and Freeman
(1999).

The Methodological Similarity of

Neuropsychology and Psychoanalysis
Since Semenza is a neuropsychologist it is understandable that he is attracted to the concept of modularity,
because neuropathology correlates functional deficits
with localized anatomical lesions. He correctly observes a methodological analogy between cognitive
neuropsychology and psychoanalysis. In both disciplines individual case studies contribute to knowledge
acquisition and furthermore both disciplines assume
that pathology can be used to understand normal functioning. Psychoanalysts infer functional absences and
deficits in their assessment of their patients' mental
functioning. Semenza refers to the principle of transparency that is true both for psychoanalysis and neuropsychology; both psychopathology and neuropathology
can be seen as a kind of deconstruction that teases
apart functions that are transparent and cannot easily
be observed in health. Some psychoanalytic observations could be translated into the language of cognitive
science. For example, psychoanalysts have inferred a
cognitive deficit when they describe disorders of affect
regulation, which can be thought of as an exaggerated
perceptual sensitivity to the experience of feelings.
Psychoanalysis can also profit from the investigations
of neuropsychologists that report specific cognitive
deficits in neurologic disorders; for example, the observation that autistic children can be shown to suffer
from a relative absence of what cognitive scientists
describe as a "theory of other minds." This concept
has been usefully introduced into psychoanalysis by
Fonagy who described a failure of mentalization in
the parents of disturbed children (Fonagy and Target,
1998). So I fully agree with Semenza that there can
be a very useful interchange between cognitive neuropsychology and psychoanalysis. But this does not
mean that psychoanalysts should uncritically accept
the concepts of representation and modularity.

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The Limitations of Modularity and a

"Representational Theory of Mind"
The contemporary philosopher Jerry Fodor linked the
concept of modularity to a computational brain. Fodor
(1998) acknowledges his debt to Descartes as well as
to Turing, who challenged observers to distinguish a
computing machine from human thought. Indeed, Fodor's concept of modularity resembles a Turing machine. Information is fed into a "module" and the
output is then a representation' 'of the environmental
states with which they covary" (Fodor, 1983, p. 39).1
In this model of the mind, "representations" mirror
the environment and can be "computed" as if representations consisted of a mental code; Fodor refers to
representations as "tokens or symbols" (Fodor,
1998). It is assumed therefore that all mental processes
are algorithmic. In rebuttal, I would suggest that variant algorithms cannot explain images, algorithms cannot account for fantasy and imaginary thoughts, for
error and for novelty, and for the idiosyncratic construction of meaning that is at the heart of the psychoanalytic process. I do not know to what extent
Semenza accepts Fodor's conception of modularity,
he may have his own version of modularity, but as I
have described, these terms, as currently understood,
carry a heavy conceptual baggage.
The concept of modularity, as introduced by Fodor, was suggested to him by Chomsky's proposal of
an innate universal grammar. Modularity is therefore,
for many cognitive scientists, linked to the idea of
innateness. This assumption of functional innateness
has made modularity attractive to evolutionary psychologists who believe that some aspects of mind are
genetically preordained and relatively uninfluenced by
the experience of the individual. This view of the mind
would fail to recognize the developmental plasticity
of the brain. The developmental neuropsychologist
Annette Karmiloff-Smith (1995, 2000) had attacked
the innateness assumptions of modularity noting that
damage to the brain in adulthood will impair specialized areas of processing, but that this does not necessarily mean that the brain started out with the
specialized circuits already in place. She asserts: "babies' brains are not Swiss Army knives." Whether
the language function is modular is also debatable.
Terrence Deacon (1997) has challenged Chomsky's
proposal of an autonomous language module as he
IFrom the perspective of a philosopher of language, Hilary Putnam
(1988) has totally rejected Fodor's concept of modularity, that attempts to
make the psychology of "desire and belief scientific," inasmuch as meaning cannot be generated from a symbolic code.

Arnold H. Modell
demonstrated that the evolution of language cannot be
separated from other global cognitive functions.
It should be acknowledged, however, that the visual cortex is distinctly modular in its organization. It
is now well established that our visual cortex consists
of modular elements in that there are specialized clusters of cells for the detection of color, the direction
and velocity of motion, and the orientation of lines,
whether vertical or horizontal. It would seem likely
that the visual cortex functions by means of an algorithmic process, that it does in fact "compute," and
cognitive science has described "laws" of visual perception (Hoffman, 1998). The point here is: Different
parts of the brain operate under different rules. As
vision is the primary source of our knowledge of the
world, from an adaptational perspective, one might
reason that visual perception needs to be stable and
invariant. But visual perception is a very different cortical function from that of the neural correlates of
thoughts and feelings and the generation of meaning,
functions that are of central concern to psychoanalysts. Representation and modularity cannot explain
the meaningful brain.

Freud's On Aphasia-The Problem of

Localization
The problem that modularity addresses, that of the
relation between anatomic localization and brain function, has been debated for at least 200 years. The 19th
century embraced an exaggerated faculty psychology,
expressed in the pop psychology of that era as phrenology. The investigations of Broca and Wernicke
seemed to support correlating disturbances in language
function with damage to specific areas of the left hemisphere. Broca reported that damage to the ventral premotor and prefrontal cortex could result in an inability
to speak, while Wernicke later described that damage
to the left temporal cortex could result in a disturbance
in the ability to understand speech. Against this background of functional localization Freud reexamined
this question of brain structure and brain function in
1891 in his monograph On Aphasia. Freud's opinion
is, I believe, contemporary in its relevance for cognitive science and neurobiology. Oliver Sacks (1998) in
his paper "Sigmund Freud: The Other Road" observed that Freud in this book On Aphasia wrote that
instead of localized cortical centers, static depots of
images, one must think of "cortical fields," large areas of cortex endowed with a variety of functions,
some facilitating, some inhibiting each other. And fur-

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Psychoanalysis and Cognitive Neuropsychology

ther "there are no autonomous, isolable centers or
functions in the brain but rather systems for achieving
cognitive goals-systems which have many components and which can be created or gently modified by
the experiences of the individual" (p. 15). As Oliver
Sacks illustrates, Freud observed that many of the
symptoms of aphasia could be interpreted psychologically rather than physiologically. That the verbal errors and substitutions that characterize aphasia can
be interpreted in the context of the individual's life
experience, that is to say, the associations chosen by
the aphasic patient had personal meaning. Freud's approach to aphasia, in Sacks's words, opened a "universe of meaning." It is hard to imagine that Freud
would have accepted a computational theory of mind.

Some Freudian Insights Regarding the MindBrain

Although Freud abandoned the "Project," he used it
as a kind of mental exercise from which fundamental
psychoanalytic concepts were later evolved. One such
fundamental idea that emerged from the "Project" is
that of cathexis, a border-crossing concept. Cathexis is
a metaphor inferring both psychic energy and quantity.
Psychic energy can be attached to a thought, a part of
the body, or to an object in the world. The concept of
cathexis is, in this sense, distinctly unmodular as it
combines the separate faculties of memory, emotion,
and motivation (desire). Cognitive scientists Tucker
and Luu (1998), in their commentary on the "Project," have noted the importance of Freud's integration
of memory and motivation, which is fully consistent
with current evidence on corticolimbic interaction of
memory and emotion.
Although Freud was mistaken when he wrote in
the' 'Project" that memory and perception where separate systems, expressed as permeable and impermeable neurons, he recognized a problem that is vital to
our understanding of how the mind-brain works. This
is the problem that contemporary cognitive scientists
(Tucker and Luu, 1998) have described as the dilemma
between stability and plasticity. Freud states (Freud,
1895): "There are permeable neurons (offering no resistance and retaining nothing), which serve for perception and impermeable ones loaded with resistance,
and holding back Qn (quantity), which are the vehicles
for memory" (p. 299). Freud would much later in his
essay "A Note Upon the Mystic Writing-Pad" (Freud,
1925) return again to the problem of the brain's stability and plasticity when he stated: "an unlimited re-

ceptive capacity [conscious perception] and retention

of the permanent [memory] traces seem to be mutually
exclusive properties" (p. 227).
I use these examples to illustrate that Freud's insights regarding the relationship between mind and
brain were functionally dynamic and global and as
such are inconsistent with the contemporary cognitive
scientist's concepts of modularity and representation.
Despite these differences with Semenza regarding the
usefulness of these ideas, I fully agree with him that
cognitive neuropsychology and psychoanalysis have
much to learn from each other. But psychoanalysts
should also recognize that the cognitive science community is just as divided about its basic assumptions
as psychoanalysts are divided about their theories.
Concepts and assumptions that appear to be fashionable today, may and frequently do become obsolete tomorrow.

References
Changeux, J.-P. (1997), Neuronal Man. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Deacon, T. W. (1997), The Symbolic Species. New York:
W. W. Norton.
Edelman, G. (1992), Bright Air, Brilliant Fire. New York:
Basic Books.
Fodor, J. A. (1983), The Modularity of Mind. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
- - - (1998), Concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fonagy, P., Target, M. (1998), Mentalization and the changing aims of child psychoanalysis. Psychoanal. Dial.,
8(1):87-114.
Freeman, W. J. (1999), How Brains Make Up Their Minds.
London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson.
Freud, S. (1891), On Aphasia. New York: International
Universities Press, 1953.
- - - (1895), Project for a scientific psychology. Standard Edition, 1:381-391. London: Hogarth Press, 1966.
- - - (1925), A note upon the "mystic writing-pad."
Standard Edition, 19:225-232. London: Hogarth Press,
1961.
Hoffman, D. D. (1998), Visual Intelligence. New York: W.
W. Norton.
Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1995), Beyond Modularity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- - - (2000), Why babies' brains are not Swiss army
knives. In: Alas, Poor Darwin, ed. H. Rose & S. Rose.
New York: Harmony Books, pp. 173-187.
Putnam, H. (1988), Representation and Reality. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.

32
Sacks, O. W. (1998), Sigmund Freud: The other road. In:
Freud and the Neurosciences, ed. G. Guttmann & 1.
Scholz-Strasser. Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences
Press, pp. 11-22.
Tucker, D. M., & Luu, P. (1998), Cathexis revisited. In:
Neurosciences of the Mind on the Centennial of Freud's
Project for a Scientific Psychology, ed. R. Bilder & F.

Michael M. Saling
F. Lefever. New York: New York Academy of Sciences,
pp. 134-152.
Arnold H. Modell
82 Kirkstall Road
Newtonville, MA 02460
e-mail: amodell617@aol.com

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Is Cognition the Key?:

Commentary by Michael M. Saling (Melbourne)

Carlo Semenza argues that psychoanalysis and cognitive neuropsychology share certain assumptions, or at
least share some metatheoretical notions. At first this
comes as something of a surprise. Cognitive neuropsychologists often claim the Wernicke-Lichtheim tradition as an important root of their discipline. If Freud's
well-known critique (Freud, 1891) is taken as a significant milestone in the development of psychoanalysis, then Semenza's position loses plausibility. The
centers and fibers approach of the Wernicke-Lichtheim model has little in common with the cerebral
field approach adopted by Freud. The positions of psychoanalysis and cognitive neuropsychology on the
question of emotion are also profoundly different. Psychoanalysis does not recognize a boundary between
emotion and cognition, and is able, therefore, to move
seamlessly between them. In consequence, psychoanalysis does not (and indeed cannot) attach different
epistemological values to emotional and cognitive domains. Cognitive neuropsychology, by its very nature,
accepts (and promotes) a deep distinction between that
which is deemed to be cognition and that which is
considered to be emotion. Semenza reflects this when
he suggests that cognitive neuropsychologists suspended the study of emotional processes in the interests of developing an objective study of human
information processing. He suggests further that emotional variables were to be reinserted at some suitable
point in the future. There is a clear implication that the
emotional domain has a lower epistemic status than
cognition, and that it can be added and subtracted from
mental function without significant loss of meaning.
This attitude, in turn, must have a systemic influence
Michael Saling, Ph.D., is Associate Professor of Neuropsychology,
University of Melbourne, Australia, and Director of Neuropsychology,
The Austin & Repatriation Medical Centre, Melbourne.

on the discipline of cognitive neuropsychology that

renders it quite different from psychoanalysis.
It is often said that Freud devoted himself to psychology because the neurology of his day was too
primitive for the development of a true neuropsychology. Semenza wonders in his essay what Freud would
have felt about the neuroscience of today, but is understandably ambivalent. Would Freud have found anything of interest in modern-day molecular neurobiology,
electrophysiology, neuroimaging, or computational
modeling? In all probability Freud would have accepted, like current thinkers, that neuroscience is still
unable to explain mental phenomena. But would he
adopt Semenza's view that a purely cognitive approach is potentially capable of bridging the neurobiological domain and psychoanalytic concerns?
Historically, cognitive neuropsychology has
rested heavily on the lesion method. Within this
framework, brain lesions are of interest to the extent
that they fractionate cognitive functions along theoretically defensible lines. These dissociations, in turn, are
seen as important to the extent that they throw light
on the architecture of normal cognition. With the
emergence of functional neuroimaging techniques, the
somewhat problematic approach of generalizing from
pathology to normality appears to have been unseated
from its position of prominence in cognitive neuropsychology. It is now possible to study, noninvasively,
the cerebral response to cognitive challenge. Most of
this research has been concerned with the following
question: What structures respond to given cognitive
tasks? In other words, the predominating issue is one
of localization. The most highly acclaimed findings
are those which suggest discrete regions of activation,
and there is some concern that functional neuroimaging might herald the emergence of a neophrenology,
and a very large quantum of post hoc explanation