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1NC Obama DA
1NC
Iran deal will be completed, Obamas political capital is key to
ensure congress accepts whatever terms are negotiated
Kimberly Atkins, 7-8-2015, Atkins: Expect a battle on the Hill after Iran deal
done," Boston Herald,
http://www.bostonherald.com/news_opinion/columnists/kimberly_atkins/2015/07/atki
ns_expect_a_battle_on_the_hill_after_iran_deal, Accessed: 7-11-2015, /Bingham-MB
WASHINGTON As Secretary of State John Kerry and a team of negotiators
continue eleventh-hour talks in hopes of securing a nuclear pact with Iran,
lawmakers on Capitol Hill are gearing up for a battle over whatever plan emerges
and the GOP-dominated Congress could have considerable influence over how the
deal is implemented, even if Republicans cannot swing enough Democratic votes to
shoot the pact down. Congress can establish a Team B, a technique that has been
used in the past to monitor the implementation of this agreement so that there are
outside experts with access to all the intelligence who can confirm compliance or
ensure that noncompliance is detected, said Robert Joseph, senior scholar at the
National Institute for Public Policy and former George W. Bush administration State
Department undersecretary. The White House has already begun an urgent
behind-the-scenes campaign to sell the pact to Democratic lawmakers not only
to prevent intra-party defections that could help Republicans torpedo the
agreement, but also to help combat the expected firestorm of criticism from GOP
presidential candidates. President Obama met with several Democratic senators last
night, and Iran was on the agenda. The pact is expected to ease sanctions against
the Iranian regime in exchange for limits on its nuclear program and monitoring
intended to prevent the development of weapons. Critics, including Israeli officials,
have said the U.S. appears likely to give too much in exchange for too little.
Although negotiators have extended the deadline for reaching a deal to Friday, the
timing for Kerry is more urgent. If a deal is sent to Congress for review by tomorrow,
lawmakers will have 30 days to approve or reject it. If a deal is reached after that,
lawmakers get a 60-day review, giving critics more time to drum up opposition , and
giving GOP presidential candidates another talking point as debate season begins
next month. Even if a deal is approved, lawmakers have already promised to push
to continue or even ratchet up sanctions against Iran, a move White House officials
have warned could derail the pact.
[Insert Link]
Deal failure causes Iran prolif and Israeli strikes
Ross, 10-16-2014
[Dennis, Foreign Affairs, How To Muddle Through With Iran,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142219/dennis-ross/how-to-muddle-throughwith-iran] /Bingham-MB
One negotiator from the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security
Council plus Germany) told me that he expects that if there is no agreement before
the talks end, the Iranians will take the lid off their program and rapidly ramp up
Impact is extinction
John Scales Avery, Associate Professor, University of Copenhagen,
COUNTERCURRENTS, 11513,
http://www.countercurrents.org/avery061113.htm
Despite the willingness of Iran's new President, Hassan Rouhani to make all
reasonable concessions to US demands, Israeli pressure groups in Washington
continue to demand an attack on Iran. But such an attack might escalate into a
global nuclear war, with catastrophic consequences. As we approach the 100th
anniversary World War I, we should remember that this colossal disaster escalated
uncontrollably from what was intended to be a minor conflict. There is a danger that
an attack on Iran would escalate into a large-scale war in the Middle East, entirely
destabilizing a region that is already deep in problems. The unstable government of
Pakistan might be overthrown, and the revolutionary Pakistani government might
enter the war on the side of Iran, thus introducing nuclear weapons into the conflict .
Russia and China, firm allies of Iran, might also be drawn into a general war in the
Middle East. Since much of the world's oil comes from the region, such a war would
certainly cause the price of oil to reach unheard-of heights, with catastrophic effects
on the global economy. In the dangerous situation that could potentially result from
an attack on Iran, there is a risk that nuclear weapons would be used, either
intentionally, or by accident or miscalculation. Recent research has shown that
besides making large areas of the world uninhabitable through long-lasting
radioactive contamination, a nuclear war would damage global agriculture to such a
extent that a global famine of previously unknown proportions would result. Thus,
nuclear war is the ultimate ecological catastrophe. It could destroy human
civilization and much of the biosphere. To risk such a war would be an unforgivable
offense against the lives and future of all the peoples of the world, US citizens
included.
Uniqueness Congress
justifiably concerned that some Americans might believe what the Supreme Leader
is saying. He urged us that that should not be our source as to what's in the
agreement." Senate Democrats, meanwhile, are making their own priorities clear.
Inspections are "vital," said Sen. Christopher Coons, a Democratic member of the
Foreign Relations Committee, which wrote the bill laying out how Congress would
review the prospective accord. "That is a central point. Exactly what the mechanism
is by which we have assurances that we can inspect sites reasonably quickly
anywhere in the country is going to be a central piece of whether or not this is an
agreement that we should sign, and whether or not this is an agreement that will
enjoy broad congressional support." "There really has to be full access, anytime, to
sites where there may be development or production of nuclear weapons," added
Sen. Richard Blumenthal. "I think that the agreement has to be airtight,
comprehensive, long-lasting, and maybe most important, verifiable." So far the
administration has said little in public about whether the deal will meet that
demand. But it's possible that the deal will be announced very soon. Under the law,
after July 9, Congress will have 30 extra days to review the deal and act upon it. If
Congress fails to act during that period, the deal will be considered approved. Some
opponents, like Republican Sen. John McCain, believe that the additional time could
help increase scrutiny and change some members' minds. "The longer there is to
examine it, the more likely it is, in my view, for people to reject it because it's a bad
deal," McCain said on Tuesday. "As George Shultz and Henry Kissinger wrote, it went
from the purpose was to eliminate Iran's capacity for nuclear weapons to delaying
it." Even Coons said it is a possibilityalthough in his mind not a likely onethat
Congress will vote against it, "if it is a genuinely bad deal." Other senators, including
Cardin, and some outside experts don't see the enhanced time frame making much
of a difference. "If the substance of the deal is right (e.g. meeting the terms of the
Washington Institute statement I signed), 30 vs. 60 day review doesn't matter," said
Gary Samore, a former Obama official and the president of the nonprofit United
Against Nuclear Iran. That letter, signed by four other former Obama advisers, said
that Iran cannot "deny or delay timely access to any site anywhere in the country,"
a demand rebuked recently by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who opposes international
inspection of Iran's military sites. Democratic Sen. Chris Murphy, a progressive
member of the Foreign Relations committee, said Tuesday that "anytime, anywhere"
inspections weren't realistic. "There aren't going to be inspections anytime,
anywhere," Murphy said. "There are going to be certain military sites in which you
are going to have to have credible evidence in order to get access. I think it's not
fair to set up a standard by which Iran is going to give inspectors access to
anything, at any time, for any reason. There has to be a meaningful process to get
access to military sites if we have information that compels an inspection. But
frankly, we shouldn't have unfettered access to military sites. We should only be
able to get onto those sites if we have evidence there's covert nuclear activity
happening there." The negotiators announced a framework agreement in the
beginning of April, limiting Iran's nuclear capabilities and extending the length it
would take to build a bomb from a few months to about a year in exchange for
reducing sanctions and increasing inspection capabilities. No member wants to see
the strength of the negotiatorsincluding the U.S., Russia, China, France, Germany,
and Britaingo to waste after 18 months of talks and over a decade of dreaming to
get to this point. "The imbalance here is dramatic," said Coons. "It is the allied
powers of the modern world against one isolated extremist theocracy in the Middle
East. And if they get a deal, they will get over $100 billion with which to do mischief
in the region and a pathway towards being a renewed participant in the global
economy. That's huge for them, and we should hold out for the best deal we can
get." "I am disheartened," added Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Bob Corker on
Tuesday. "It is just amazing to me that Iran, with a boot on its neck, has ended up in
this place with six important countries. From their standpoint, they've done just an
incredible job of outmaneuvering. I don't know. I am sort of despondent over where
we are. But I do want to read it and then figure out what direction to go."
reached on or by Thursday, Congress gets 30 days to review it. But if the agreement
talks go past that date, the resolution will have a 60-day congressional review
period. The approval or disapproval resolution will start with the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. On Tuesday, committee Chairman Sen. Bob Corker, R-Tenn.,
told MSNBC's Andrea Mitchell that he is looking forward to the deal, but urged
negotiators to take their time, as he remains "very, very concerned about the trend,
the direction, I've said this several times, the direction of these negotiations for
some time. ... on these final points, you know, any time, anywhere inspections,
please, yes, take your time and at least try to get these in the best place you
possibly can." Corker told Politico he has spoken privately with McConnell, and
"discussed every option known to man," but still doesn't know what direction will be
taken Republicans are not yet conceding that 34 or more Democrats will stand with
Obama. "I really think theres a better than 50-50 chance that well get enough 'no'
votes," Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., said. "If the Arabs come out and say this is a
bad deal, if AIPAC says this is a bad deal, if public opinion says we dont trust this
deal, then our Democratic colleagues will hopefully come forward to say, 'We can do
better.
2NC AT PC Low
Has PC now, and enough to succeed on Iran
Jordan Fabian, The Hill, 7-7-2015, Nuclear deal with Iran appears elusive,"
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/247156-nuclear-deal-with-iran-appearselusive, Accessed: 7-10-2015, /Bingham-MB
While Obama is riding the momentum from a series of successes on the domestic
front, on trade, same-sex marriage and healthcare, failure on Iran could blunt his
gains. He had secured his domestic legacy in a pretty dramatic fashion in the last
two weeks. Thats always been his No. 1 priority, said James Jeffrey, a distinguished
fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and a former ambassador to
Iraq under Obama. He realizes his international legacy is a mess. Obama has
spent a tremendous amount of political capital in pursuit of the deal both with
Democrats in Congress and the U.S.s traditional allies in Persian Gulf states and
Israel, who fear the deal could embolden Iran in its pursuit of dominance in the
Middle East. Deputy national security adviser Ben Rhodes acknowledged last week
the president is taking on some sacred cows in dealing with hostile regimes. But
he said the aim of dealing with Iran is to avoid being pulled into another conflict in
the Middle East while preventing it from becoming a nuclear power. Administration
officials told The Wall Street Journal Monday that they hope a successful Iran deal
could open the door to resolving lingering conflicts in Syria and Yemen, where Iran is
involved. But Obama is coming under pressure from lawmakers in both parties not
to agree to a deal at all costs. On Tuesday evening, the president met with Senate
Democrats at the White House, where he was expected to sooth members of his
party who are worried about the talks. Influential Democrats, including Senate
Foreign Relations Committee ranking member Ben Cardin (Md.), have demanded
anytime, anywhere inspections of Iranian nuclear facilities. But those conditions
are unlikely to be met, making it tougher for the administration to prevent a vetoproof majority from voting to disapprove of a deal, if one is reached. Complicating
that effort further is the fact that a deal is unlikely to be reached by Thursday, when
the congressional review period doubles from 30 days to 60 days. That could allow
opposition to build. Republicans were emboldened in their calls for Obama to walk
away from the talks following Tuesdays extension. The stakes are too high for this
diplomatic charade to continue, Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), a 2016 presidential
candidate, said in a statement. Iranian leaders continue to walk back previous
commitments, even as they actively sponsor terrorism, pursue regional domination
and hold American citizens hostage. At the same time, Obama seems to
understand the risks failure could pose to his legacy . Look, 20 years from now, Im
still going to be around, God willing. If Iran has a nuclear weapon, its my name on
this, he told The Atlantic in May. Obama is closely following the talks, receiving
updates from national security adviser Susan Rice and other aides multiple times
daily, Earnest said. There are major risks for Iran too. The regime in Tehran
desperately wants relief from international sanctions related to its nuclear program,
which have crippled the countrys economy. Sanctions caused its gross domestic
product to shrink by 5 percent in 2013, and its economy has recovered only slightly
since an interim agreement was reached that year. Despite the delay, Jeffrey
believes Obama is in a strong position heading into the final stretch of the talks . He
predicted the presidents legacy would not be hurt if, at this point, a deal falls
through because Iranian intransigence. By taking a tough position at the talks to
the point where well walk out or the Iranians will have to walk out were basically
making it clear to the Iranians that we cant be pushed around, he said. That we
are deadly serious in this process.
Link
Link Surveillance
Post USA Freedom actany changes to government
surveillance will be large fights that require massive
government investment
Grant Gross Washington Correspondent for IDG news service, 6-5-2015, Don't
expect major changes to NSA surveillance from Congress," PCWorld,
http://www.pcworld.com/article/2932337/dont-expect-major-changes-to-nsasurveillance-from-congress.html, Accessed: 7-10-2015, /Bingham-MB
After the U.S. Congress approved what critics have called modest limits on the
National Security Agencys collection of domestic telephone records, many
lawmakers may be reluctant to further change the governments
surveillance programs. The Senate this week passed the USA Freedom Act, which
aims to end the NSAs mass collection of domestic phone records, and President
Barack Obama signed the bill hours later. After that action, expect Republican
leaders in both the Senate and the House of Representatives to resist further calls
for surveillance reform. That resistance is at odds with many rank-and-file
lawmakers, including many House Republicans, who want to further limit NSA
programs brought to light by former agency contractor Edward Snowden. Civil
liberties groups and privacy advocates also promise to push for more changes. It
may be difficult to get broad, sweeping reform through Congress , but
many lawmakers seem ready to push for more changes, said Adam Eisgrau,
managing director of the office of government relations for the American Library
Association. The ALA has charged the NSA surveillance programs violate the Fourth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures. Congress is not allowed to be tired of surveillance reform unless its
prepared to say its tired of the Fourth Amendment, Eisgrau said. The American
public will not accept that. Other activists are less optimistic about more
congressional action. It will a long slog getting more restraints, J. Kirk Wiebe, a
former NSA analyst and whistleblower said by email. The length of that journey will
depend on public outcrythat is the one thing that is hard to gauge. With the USA
Freedom Act, elected officials have opted to reach for low-hanging fruit, said Bill
Blunden, a cybersecurity researcher and surveillance critic. The theater weve just
witnessed allows decision makers to boast to their constituents about reforming
mass surveillance while spies understand that whats actually transpired is hardly
major change. The actual physical mechanisms of surveillance programs remain
largely intact. Blunden added by email. Politicians may dither around the periphery
but they are unlikely to institute fundamental changes.
Republican leaders opposed to more changes Supporters of new reforms will have
to bypass congressional leadership, however. Senate Republican leaders attempted
to derail even the USA Freedom Act and refused to allow amendments that
would require further changes at the NSA. In the House, Republican leaders
threatened to kill the USA Freedom Act if the Judiciary Committee amended the bill
to address other surveillance programs. Still, many House members, both
Republicans and Democrats, have pushed for new surveillance limits, with
lawmakers adding an amendment to end so-called backdoor government searches
of domestic communications to a large appropriations bill this week. Obamas
administration has threatened to veto the appropriations bill for several unrelated
reasons, but several House members have pledged to push hard to prohibit the FBI
and CIA from searching the content of reportedly tens of thousands of U.S.
communications swept up in an NSA surveillance program targeting overseas
terrorism suspects.
lobby is functioning here, so will simply note this passage from a recent report from
the ACLU of Iowa on its attempts to persuade legislators to enact statutory limits on
the use of domestic drones: "Drones have their own trade group, the Association for
Unmanned Aerial Systems International, which includes some of the nation's leading
aerospace companies. And Congress now has 'drone caucuses' in both the
Senate and House." Howie Klein has been one of the few people focusing on the
massive amounts of money from the drone industry now flowing into the coffers of
key Congressional members from both parties in this "drone caucus". Suffice to say,
there is an enormous profit to be made from exploiting the domestic drone market,
and as usual, that factor is thus far driving the (basically nonexistent) political
response to these threats.
Amazon (AMZN) is set to ask Congress Wednesday for fewer restrictions on U.S.
drone usage in order to get its Prime Air service off the ground. Amazon Prime Air is
designed to deliver packages up to five pounds to customers in 30 minutes or less
using small drones. Paul Misener, Amazon's vice president for global public policy,
will appear in front of the U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform to argue against current Federal Aviation Administration rules. According to
his prepared testimony, Misener explains that he disagrees with the FAA's current
opinion that extending see-and-avoid principles on small drones presents 'unique
safety concerns' which warrant delayed consideration. Misener plans to urge the
FAA to act expeditiously, and ask that Congress provide legislative guidance and if
necessary, additional legal authority.
Internal Link
2NC PC Key
PC key to passage of the Iran deal
Jordan Fabian July 06, 2015, 06:38 pm Obama to host Senate Dems
http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/246998-obama-to-host-senatedems
President Obama will host Senate Democrats for a meeting and reception on
Tuesday, a White House official said. The White House says the gathering will mostly
be a social occasion. But it gives the president a chance to huddle with his allies in
Congress who have a long to-do list this month, including a partisan standoff over
government spending that could result in a shutdown. The White House is also
expected to lean heavily on Senate Democrats to support a nuclear agreement with
Iran if one is reached this week. Republicans in Congress have said they will vote
against the deal so Obama will need to limit defections from Democrats to prevent
the GOP from amassing a veto-proof majority. Obama has threatened to veto GOP
spending bills because they do not lift sequestration spending caps and he is
backed by Senate Democrats, who are threatening to block the proposals. But that
has not stopped Republicans, who are advancing the bills and accusing Democrats
of obstructionism. Congress faces a Sept. 30 deadline to fund the government, but
lawmakers only have a few weeks to resolve the dispute because they will leave
Washington for a month-long recess in August. Another top priority is highway
funding, which is set to expire on July 31, and a renewal of the Export-Import Bank.
Obama will need all his current political capital to sustain veto
of disapproval vote from congress which would prohibit the
president from lifting sanctions
Scott Johnson, Goodnight Vienna, Powerline, 7/12/15
Presumably more details will leak as reporters start to hunt down details, but it
looks like a done deal. Congress will now have 60 days to review the agreement,
and lawmakers will be specifically looking for how the Obama administration
managed to overcome the final issues that held up a deal over the last two weeks:
anytime/anywhere inspections including access to military sites, the IAEAs
concerns over the possible military dimensions of Irans nuclear program, and the
Iranian/Russian demand that the United Nations arms embargo against Tehran be
lifted. Based on how negotiations have progressed since mid-March Iranian
intransigence followed by repeated American collapses on nearly every core issue
its unlikely that Congress will like what it finds. Mitch McConnell predicted this
morning on Fox News Sunday that the deal will be a very hard sell in Congress.
The Corker legislation allows lawmakers to introduce a resolution of disapproval,
introduce a resolution of approval, or do nothing. A resolution of approval would be
loaded with symbolism. It would most likely be introduced and then voted down: a
rebuke by a co-equal branch of the U.S. federal government of inarguably the most
important diplomatic gamble in decades. But it wouldnt have any legal force. A
resolution of disapproval would carry all of the symbolism of a failed resolution of
approval, but it would also prohibit the President from lifting some sanctions. The
trick is that the President would have the ability to veto it, and then Congress would
have to override that veto. There may be enough worried Democrats in the Senate
to get to 67, but the conventional wisdom is that the White House retains sufficient
political capital to prevent 290 votes in the House (there are simply too many safe
seats where the general elections dont matter, and members existence relies on
not getting primaried and the President is still the most powerful force in the
Democratic party). In any case, this will be the next 60 days in Washington DC.
reset button after parting ways on trade legislation. With Iran nuclear negotiations
nearing an end and time running short for the presidents domestic to-do list, Mr.
Obama turned to Democrats on the Hill for help advancing his policy objectives. The
most immediate White House priorities include marshaling lawmakers support for a
possible deal to curb Irans nuclear program, reauthorizing the U.S. Export-Import
bank and passing a highway funding measure. Tuesdays meeting came two weeks
after the president partnered with Republican congressional leaders to pass a fasttrack trade bill amid a messy battle that divided the Democratic Party. With the
approval of the trade package, Mr. Obama notched his biggest win to date in this
Republican-controlled Congress, but he clashed with many Democrats in the
process. Administration officials have dismissed suggestions of any lingering hard
feelings, saying that the president and Democratic lawmakers would quickly return
to work on shared goals. Still, the gathering in the State Dining Room signaled a
concerted outreach effort aimed at ensuring that the president has Senate
Democrats in his corner on several key issues. Chief among them is a long-sought
nuclear agreement with Iran. While the diplomatic process has extended into
overtime and the outcome remains uncertain, any eventual deal will be vetted by
Congress. White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest said lawmakers are closely
following the nuclear talks, and the administration is doing the best we can to try
to be responsive to that interest and help them understand exactly where things
stand. Mr. Obama is working to corral Democratic support for a potential deal as
many Republicans express deep reservations about an accord with Iran and some
urge the White House to suspend negotiations.
Obama has the political capital to push Iran deal nowhe will
use it
David Jackson, 6-28-2015, On a hot streak, Obama looks to Iran deal," USA
TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/story/theoval/2015/06/28/obama-iran-nucleardeal-health-care-gay-marriage-free-trade-charleston/29423255/, Accessed: 6-292015, /Bingham-MB
Following perhaps the most momentous week of his tenure, President Obama looks
to what could be another major event next month: The Iran nuclear deal. Obama -coming off major victories on free trade, health care, and gay marriage, as well as a
much-praised eulogy on the Charleston church killings -- has set a Tuesday deadline
for completion of an Iran nuclear agreement, though there are definite signs that
the deadline will slip. "Given the dates, and that we have some work to do ... the
parties are planning to remain in Vienna beyond June 30 to continue working," a
U.S. official told the Associated Press about the ongoing talks. The administration is
putting out the word that July 9 is the "real" deadline for a deal in which the U.S.
and allies would reduce sanctions on Iran if it agrees to give up the means to make
nuclear weapons. The July 9 date would give Congress time to review the
agreement before its August recess. Further evidence that Tuesday's deadline will
slip came Sunday as Iran's foreign minister prepared to leave talks in Vienna for
consultations back in Tehran. The Obama administration enters the final stages of
the Iran talks following a string of remarkable victories within the past week. First,
Congress cleared the way for a major free trade agreement with Asia, a deal that
some thought dead in the water earlier in the month. Then the Supreme Court
handed down landmark decisions on items of high importance to the Obama
administration, its health care law and the right of gay marriage. The president
capped the week with a moving eulogy on the Charleston church shootings, urging
Americans to confront long-festering problems of gun control and racial prejudice.
Now, on to Iran -- though the proposed agreement has fierce critics in Israel and the
U.S. Congress who believe it will actually pave the way for Iran to secure nuclear
weapons. It will be a busy few weeks. From the Associated Press: "Both sides
recognize that there is leeway to extend to July 9. As part of an agreement with the
U.S. Congress, lawmakers then have 30 days to review the deal before suspending
congressional sanctions. But postponement beyond that would double the
congressional review period to 60 days, giving both Iranian and U.S. critics more
time to work on undermining an agreement. Arguing for more time to allow the U.S.
to drive a harder bargain, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu -- a fierce
opponent of the talks -- weighed in on Sunday against 'this bad agreement, which is
becoming worse by the day.' "'It is still not too late to go back and insist on
demands that will genuinely deny Iran the ability to arm itself with nuclear
weapons,' he said."
contemporary politics to trends that emerged then. Americans' confidence in government began a precipitous decline as the tumult and tragedies of the 1960s gave way to the scandals
and economic uncertainties of the 1970s. Long-standing party coalitions began to fray as the New Deal coalition, which had elected Franklin Roosevelt to four terms and made
Democrats the indisputable majority party, faded into history. The election of Richard Nixon in 1968 marked the beginning of an unprecedented era of divided government. Finally, the
two parties began ideologically divergent journeys that resulted in intense polarization in Congress,
diminishing the possibility of bipartisan compromise. These changes, combined with the growing influence of money and interest
groups and the steady "thickening" of the federal bureaucracy, introduced significant challenges to presidential
leadership. Political capital can best be understood as a combination of the president's party support in Congress, public approval of his job performance, and the
president's electoral victory margin. The components of political capital are central to the fate of presidencies. It is difficult to claim warrants for leadership in an era when job approval,
player in the national political system. Jimmy Carter and George H.W. Bush joined the small ranks of incumbents defeated while seeking a second term. Ronald Reagan was elected in
two landslides, yet his most successful year for domestic policy was his first year in office. Bill Clinton was twice elected by a comfortable margin, but with less than majority support,
and despite a strong economy during his second term, his greatest legislative successes came during his first year with the passage of a controversial but crucial budget bill, the Family
and Medical Leave Act, and the North American Free Trade Agreement. George W. Bush won election in 2000 having lost the popular vote, and though his impact on national security
policy after the Sept. 11 attacks was far reaching, his greatest domestic policy successes came during 2001. Ambitious plans for Social Security reform, following his narrow re-election in
2004, went nowhere. Faced with obstacles to successful leadership, recent presidents have come to rely more on their formal powers. The number of important executive orders has
increased significantly since the 1960s, as have the issuance of presidential signing statements. Both are used by presidents in an attempt to shape and direct policy on their terms.
Presidents have had to rely more on recess appointments as well, appointing individuals to important positions during a congressional recess (even a weekend recess) to avoid delays
and obstruction often encountered in the Senate. Such power assertions typically elicit close media scrutiny and often further erode political capital. Barack Obama's election in 2008
seemed to signal a change. Mr. Obama's popular vote majority was the largest for any president since 1988, and he was the first Democrat to clear the 50 percent mark since Lyndon
Johnson. The president initially enjoyed strong public approval and, with a Democratic Congress, was able to produce an impressive string of legislative accomplishments during his first
year and early into his second, capped by enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. But with each legislative battle and success, his political capital waned. His
impressive successes with Congress in 2009 and 2010 were accompanied by a shift in the public mood against him, evident in the rise of the tea party movement, the collapse in his
approval rating, and the large GOP gains in the 2010 elections, which brought a return to divided government. By mid-2011, Mr. Obama's job approval had slipped well below its initial
levels, and Congress was proving increasingly intransigent. In the face of declining public support and rising congressional opposition, Mr. Obama, like his predecessors, looked to the
energetic use of executive power. In 2012, the president relied on executive discretion and legal ambiguity to allow homeowners to more easily refinance federally backed mortgages, to
help veterans find employment and to make it easier for college graduates to consolidate federal student loan debt. He issued several executive orders effecting change in the nation's
enforcement of existing immigration laws. He used an executive order to authorize the Department of Education to grant states waivers from the requirements of the No Child Left
Behind Act though the enacting legislation makes no accommodation for such waivers. Contrary to the outcry from partisan opponents, Mr. Obama's actions were hardly
unprecedented or imperial. Rather, they represented a rather typical power assertion from a contemporary president. Many looked to the 2012 election as a means to break present
Obama's narrow re-election victory, coupled with the re-election of a somewhat-diminished Republican majority House and
Democratic majority Senate, hardly signals a grand resurgence of his political capital. The president's recent issuance of
trends. But Barack
multiple executive orders to deal with the issue of gun violence is further evidence of his power trap. Faced with the likelihood of legislative defeat in Congress, the president must rely
on claims of unilateral power. But such claims are not without limit or cost and will likely further erode his political capital. Only by solving the problem of political capital is a president
times been able to overcome contemporary leadership challenges by adopting as their own issues that the public already supports. Bill Clinton's centrist "triangulation" and George W.
Bush's careful issue selection early in his presidency allowed them to secure important policy changes in Mr. Clinton's case, welfare reform and budget balance, in Mr. Bush's tax cuts
and education reform that at the time received popular approval. However,
success for a president but do not serve as an antidote to declining political capital over time, as the
difficult final years of both the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush presidencies demonstrate. None of Barack Obama's recent predecessors solved the political capital
problem or avoided the power trap. It is the central political challenge confronted by modern presidents and
one that will likely weigh heavily on the current president's mind today as he takes his second oath of office.
associated with the debates we arent having, and the valid ideas were not considering, when our time is wasted
upon nonsense that is useful only to political re-election campaigns.
paramount example
of our time, as countless real, workable market-based reforms were obscured by the
flaccid bulk of ObamaCare. The Buffett Rule, like all talk of tax increases in the shadow of outrageous government
spending, likewise distracts us from the real issues.
Obama seems to be most influenced by his inherent political pragmatism. I've heard
Barack Obama speak on several occasions. The first was February 19, 2007, at a San Francisco ore-election
fundraiser with a lengthy question and answer session. Towards the end of the event a woman asked then
presidential-candidate Obama what his position was on same-sex marriage. For an instant, Obama seemed
surprised; then he gathered himself and responded he was aware of strong feelings on both sides of this issue and
his position was evolving. Five years later, in May of 2012, President Obama announced his support for same-sex
marriage. What took Obama so long to make up his mind? No doubt he needed to clarify his own moral position -although the Protestant denomination he was baptized into, the United Church of Christ, announced its support for
Obama has several personas. On occasion he moves us with stirring oratory; that's Reverend Obama, the rock star.
Once in a while, he turns philosophical; that's Professor Obama, the student of American history. On April 3, I saw
most Democrats know this about the president. At the beginning of 2012, many Democratic stalwarts were less
than thrilled by the prospect of a second Obama term. While their reasons varied, there was a common theme,
"Obama hasn't kept his promises to my constituency." There were lingering complaints that 2009's stimulus
package should have been bigger and a communal whine, "Obama should have listened to us." Nonetheless, by the
end of the Democratic convention on September 6, most Dems had come around. In part, this transformation
occurred because from January to September of 2012 Dems scrutinized Mitt Romney and were horrified by what
they saw. In January some had muttered, "There's no difference between Obama and Romney," but nine months
later none believed that. While many Democrats were not thrilled by Obama's first-term performance, they saw him
Even his health care proposal -- denounced by the right as a 'government takeover' and 'socialism' -- was
economy. We gather here knowing that there are millions of Americans whose hard work and dedication have not
yet been rewarded. Our economy is adding jobs -- but too many people still can't find full-time employment.
Corporate profits have rocketed to all-time highs -- but for more than a decade, wages and incomes have barely
budged. It is our generation's task, then, to reignite the true engine of America's economic growth -- a rising,
thriving middle class. He also spoke passionately about the need to address to address global warming, "For the
sake of our children and our future, we must do more to combat climate change." But it's clear that's a secondary
objective. At one of the Bay Area fundraisers, President Obama observed that his big challenge is to show middleclass families that, "we are working just as hard for them as we are for an environmental agenda." Obama isn't
going to block the Keystone XL pipeline because he doesn't believe that he can make the case his action will help
the middle-class.
2NC AT Hirsch
Hirsh agrees with the thesis of the politics DA even if he
disagrees with the term political capital
Michael Hirsh, National Journal, 2/7/13, Theres No Such Thing as Political Capital,
www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital20130207
Presidents are limited in what they can do by time and attention span, of course, just
as much as they are by electoral balances in the House and Senate. But this, too, has nothing to do with political
capital. Another well-worn meme of recent years was that Obama used up too much political
capital passing the health care law in his first term. But the real problem was that the plan
was unpopular, the economy was bad, and the president didnt realize that the national mood (yes, again,
the national mood) was at a tipping point against big-government intervention, with the tea-party revolt about to burst
on the scene. For Americans in 2009 and 2010haunted by too many rounds of layoffs, appalled by the Wall Street bailout,
aghast at the amount of federal spending that never seemed to find its way into their pocketsgovernment-imposed health care
said.
infusion of political capital, C, to 4, an agenda-centered lobbying strategy allows a president to exert even more influence than
would be possible with a massive investment (up to Gj) in voce-centered lobbying. And granting the president even more
political capital to invest in an issue (c,. < C) only adds to an agenda-centered strategy's attractiveness
and effectiveness compared to the more familiar vote-centered strategy. Overall, the predicted impact of
the president's agenda-centered lobbying is real, and potentially substantial, but also
highly conditional. In contrast to a vote-centered strategy, which can be employed whenever a president is willing and
able to invest lobbying resources in advocating an issue, the White House's agenda-centered strategy only applies with (I) a faroff status quo, and (2) a medium to large supply of political capital. Absent these prerequisites, the president's fate turns on
- and when they do, an agenda-centered strategy affords presidents not just a second path for exerting influence but also a
under these favorable conditions, the president gets far more policy
bang for his lobbying buck from an agenda-centered strategy than a vote-centered one - without having to
better path. Indeed,
discussing White House decisions, personality being the dominant factor. Yet, given
low levels in presidential capital, even the most positive and most active executive
could make little impact. A president can be skilled, charming, charismatic, a
veritable legislative wizard, but if he does not have the basic congressional
strength, his domestic agenda will be severely restricted capital affects both the
number and the content of the Presidents priorities. Thus, it is capital that
determines whether the President will have the opportunity to offer a detailed
domestic program, whether he will be restricted to a series of limited initiatives and
vetoes. Capital sets the basic parameters of the agenda, determining the size of the
agenda and guiding the criteria for choice. Regardless of the Presidents personality,
capital is the central force behind the domestic agenda.
cannot be more than they are: one form of floor action on legislation. If analysts insist on scoring the president, concentrating on
this stage of lawmaking can provide no more than a partial tally (195). And Jon Bond and Richard Fleisher (1990) note that even if
they ultimately are reflected in roll-call votes, many important decisions in Congress are made in places other than floor votes and
recorded by means other than roll calls . . . (68).
Impact
Extinction
Moore 2009, Carole, author, activist, leader of Libertarians for Peace, Israeli
Nuclear Threats and Blackmail,
http://www.carolmoore.net/nuclearwar/israelithreats.html
The phrase the Samson Option is used to describe Israels strategy of massive
nuclear retaliation against enemy nations should its existence as a Jewish state be
jeopardized through military attack. Israeli leaders created the term in the mid1960s, inspired by the Biblical figure Samson, who destroyed a Philistine temple,
killing himself and thousands of Philistine enemies.[1][2] Israel refuses to admit
officially that it has nuclear weapons - a policy known as nuclear ambiguity or
"nuclear opacity."[3] This despite government officials inferring repeatedly - and
occasionally admitting - the fact. And despite Israeli nuclear whistle blower
Mordechai Vanunu making public smuggled photographs of nuclear weapons and
production equipment in the 1980s.[4] Israel now may have as many as 400 atomic
and hydrogen nuclear weapons,[5][6] as well as the ability to launch them via long
range missiles, submarines and aircraft.[7] It can use them in a second strike even if
its military is devastated. Originally a strategy of last resort retaliation - even if it
means Israels annihilation - it has developed into being a nuclear bullying strategy
to further Israels territorial goals through threats and blackmail. Israel has bullied
not only Arab and Muslim nations, but the United States and Russia with its Samson
Option threats. Mordechai Vanunu has alleged that Israel uses for purposes of
blackmail its ability to "bombard any city all over the world, and not only those in
Europe but also those in the United States."[8] Official policy and threats During the
1960s Israel concentrated on conventional military superiority to defend lands
confiscated in the 1948 and 1967 wars - and to convince Palestinians in Israel and
the occupied territories that they could not break free of it. However, in 1973's Yom
Kippur War Israel was almost overwhelmed by Arab forces. Prime Minister Golda
Meir authorized a nuclear alert, ordering 13 atomic bombs be prepared for missiles
and aircraft. Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Simha Dinitz threatened very serious
conclusions" if there was not an immediate airlift of supplies.[9] This forced U.S.
President Richard Nixon to make emergency airlifts of state of the art military
supplies to Israel.[10][11] Fearing intervention by the Soviet Union, U.S. forces went
on Defense Condition (DEFCON) III alert status[12], something which could have led
to full scale nuclear war in case of misinterpretation of signals or hardware or
software failures. Additionally, as Seymour Hersh documents in detail in his book
The Samson Option, from 1973 these weapons have been used to discourage the
Soviet Union - now Russia - from intervening militarily on behalf of Arab nations.[13]
Obviously an Israeli nuclear attack on Russia by the United States great ally Israel
would result in Russia sending thousands of nuclear weapons towards the U.S. and
the U.S. responding in kind. Not surprisingly, no nation state has attempted to
attack Israel since 1973. A former Israeli official justified Israels threats. You
Americans screwed us in not supporting Israel in its 1956 war with Egypt. We can
still remember the smell of Auschwitz and Treblinka. Next time well take all of you
with us.[14] General Moshe Dayan, a leading promoter of Israels nuclear
program[15], has been quoted as saying Israel must be like a mad dog, too
dangerous to bother.[16] Amos Rubin, an economic adviser to former Prime
Minister Yitzhak Shamir, said "If left to its own Israel will have no choice but to fall
back on a riskier defense which will endanger itself and the world at large... To
enable Israel to abstain from dependence on nuclear arms calls for $2 to 3 billion
per year in U.S. aid."[17] In 1977, after a right-wing coalition under Menachen Begin
took power, the Israelis began to use the Samson Option not just to deter attack but
to allow Israel to redraw the political map of the Middle East by expanding
hundreds of thousands of Israeli settlers into the West Bank and Gaza.[18] ThenMinister of Defense Ariel Sharon said things like "We are much more important than
(Americans) think. We can take the middle east with us whenever we go"[19] and
"Arabs may have the oil, but we have the matches."[20] He proclaimed his - and
many Likud Party members' - goals of transforming Jordan into a Palestinian state
and transferring all Palestinian refugees there.[21][22] A practice known
worldwide as "ethnic cleansing." To dissuade the Soviet Union from interfering with
its plans, Prime Minister Begin immediately gave orders to target more Soviet
cities for potential nuclear attack. Its American spy Jonathan Pollard was caught
stealing such nuclear targeting information from the U.S. military in 1985.[23]
During the next 25 years Israel became more militarily adventurous, bombing Iraqs
under-construction Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981, invading Lebanon to destroy
Palestinian refugee camps in 1982 and to fight Hezbollah in 2006, massively
bombing civilian targets in the West Bank Jenin refugee camp in 2002 and
thoughout Gaza in 2008-2009. There are conflicting reports about whether Israel
went on nuclear alert and armed missiles with nuclear weapons during the 1991
Gulf War after Iraq shot conventionally armed scud missiles into it.[24][25] In 2002,
while the United States was building for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, then Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon threatened that if Israel was attacked Israel will react. Is it
clear?[26] Israeli defense analyst Zeev Schiff explained: Israel could respond with
a nuclear retaliation that would eradicate Iraq as a country. It is believed President
Bush gave Sharon the green-light to attack Baghdad in retaliation, including with
nuclear weapons, but only if attacks came before the American military invasion.
[27] Former Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres has admitted that nuclear
weapons are used by Israel for compellent purposes - i.e., forcing others to accept
Israeli political demands.[28] In 1998 Peres was quoted as saying, "We have built a
nuclear option, not in order to have a Hiroshima, but to have an Oslo," referring to
imposing a settlement on the Palestinians.[29] In her book Israels Sacred Terrorism
Livia Rokach documented how Israelis have used religion to justify paramilitary and
state terrorism to create and maintain a Jewish State.[30] Two other Israeli
retaliation strategies are the popularized phrase Wrath of God, the alleged Israeli
assassination of those it held responsible for the 1972 killings of Israeli athletes
during the Munich Olympics[31], and the Dahiya doctrine of destruction of civilian
areas to punish Palestinians for supporting their leaders.[32] Israeli Israel Shahak
wrote in 1997: "Israel clearly prepares itself to seek overtly a hegemony over the
entire Middle East...without hesitating to use for the purpose all means available,
including nuclear ones."[33] Zeev Schiff opined in 1998 that "Off-the-cuff Israeli
nuclear threats have become a problem."[34] In 2003 David Hirst noted that The
threatening of wild, irrational violence, in response to political pressure, has been an
Israeli impulse from the very earliest days and called Israel a candidate for the
role of 'nuclear-crazy' state.[35] Noam Chomsky said of the Samson Option the
craziness of the state is not because the people are insane. Once you pick a policy
of choosing expansion over security, that's what you end up getting stuck with.[36]
Efraim Karsh calls the Samson Option the rationality of pretended irrationality, but
warns that seeming too irrational could encourage other nations to attack Israel in
their own defense.[37] Samson Option Supporters Two Israel supporters are
frequently quoted for their explicit support of the Samson Option. Martin Van
Creveld, a professor of military history at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, has
been quoted as saying: "Most European capitals are targets for our air force....We
have the capability to take the world down with us. And I can assure you that that
will happen before Israel goes under."[38] In 2002 the Los Angeles Times, published
an opinion piece by Louisiana State University professor David Perlmutter in which
he wrote: "What would serve the Jew-hating world better in repayment for
thousands of years of massacres but a Nuclear Winter. Or invite all those tut-tutting
European statesmen and peace activists to join us in the ovens? For the first time in
history, a people facing extermination while the world either cackles or looks away-unlike the Armenians, Tibetans, World War II European Jews or Rwandans--have the
power to destroy the world. The ultimate justice?"[39]
analyses, have
highlighted the risk that a nuclear-armed Iran could trigger additional nuclear
proliferation in the Middle East, even if Israel does not declare its own nuclear arsenal. Notably,
Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia,Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates all
signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (npt)have recently announced or initiated nuclear
energy programs. Although some of these states have legitimate economic rationales for pursuing nuclear
power and although the low-enriched fuel used for power reactors cannot be used in nuclear weapons, these
moves have been widely interpreted as hedges against a nuclear-armed Iran. The npt
does not bar states from developing the sensitive technology required to produce nuclear fuel on their own, that is,
the capability to enrich natural uranium and separate plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. Yet enrichment and
reprocessing can also be used to accumulate weapons-grade enriched uranium and plutoniumthe very loophole
that Iran has apparently exploited in pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. Developing nuclear weapons remains a
slow, expensive, and dicult process, even for states with considerable economic resources, and especially if other
nations try to constrain aspiring nuclear states access to critical materials and technology. Without external
support, it is unlikely that any of these aspirants could develop a nuclear weapons capability within a decade.
at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi
Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi
Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to
respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and
subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the
Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which
could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be
able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in
There is, however,
response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region,
Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen css-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from
China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also oered to
sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads
develop in one of several dierent ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to
Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to
an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on
Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could
be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not
violating the npt since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from
Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi
territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops.
Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi
weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather
than violates, the NPT. n-player competition Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons,
would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how
such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are
based on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the
interaction among three or more nuclear -armed powers would be more prone to
miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and
the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other.
generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift
quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging
nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve
regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of
deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an
attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However,
emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as
hardened missile silos or submarinebased nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close
proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in
the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to launch on warning of an
attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also
delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of
miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust
command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And
argument is whether the gains from a nuclear deal will come at the expense of
regional stability. Israel and Americas Sunni allies contend that the Obama
administration is going easy on Iran. Some say that this is in order to secure a deal.
Others think that the nuclear diplomacy is part of a grand plan to turn Iran into a
strategic partner of America to help it manage the Middle East. That would count as
an act of betrayal made all the worse by the threats that Iran habitually makes
against them. The coming months may indeed deepen the hatreds that are raging
from the Mediterranean to the Arabian Sea. You could imagine Iranian leaders
stepping up their meddling in the regionto show, perhaps, that supping with the
Great Satan has not made them soft. It is no accident that the Sunni monarchies
have been turning away from America: backing an army coup against the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, attacking fighters in Libya without forewarning America and,
rushing into Yemen to take on Iranian-funded Houthis. But before blaming this mess
on Mr Obamas nuclear diplomacy, consider two arguments. First, the catastrophe in
the Middle East has its own, murderous dynamic that is quite separate from the
nuclear deal. Iran has set out ruthlessly to exert control over neighbouring Iraq, to
protect its links to Hizbullah in Lebanon and to shore up Bashar Assad in Syria. Deal
or no deal, this meddling is driven by a desire to support fellow Shias, to exert
regional influence and to keep conflagrations far away from its own borders. There
is no sign that, as yet, sanctions or the talks have made much of a difference.
Second,theideathatAmericaisbeingtreacherousdoesnotaddup.BlameMrObamaforstandingbackwhentheuprisinginSyriawasstillpeaceful,andagainwhenMrAssadgassed
hisownpeople.ButthetimeislonggonewhenAmericaalonecouldmanagetheconflictdevouringtheMiddle
East.TodayregionalmayhemistuggingtheUnitedStateseverywhichway.Inthecrosscurrentsofasectarianwar,AmericaisworkingagainstIranianbackedforcesinYemenandSyria,
andwiththeminthewaragainstIslamicState.Thatisnottreachery,butpragmatismbornoutregionalcollapse.ThefalloutofadealAmidthechaos, a nuclear could
deal actually help--by enabling America and Iran to develop a pragmatic
relationship.Overseeinganagreementwouldnotbeeasy.Iranwouldchafe;therewouldberowsanddisputes.Butnucleardiplomacycouldforce
AmericaandIrantoworktogetherafter35yearsofenmity thatthrustAmericafirmlyintotheSunnicamp.Atworstrelations
withIranwouldremaindysfunctional;butatbestAmericawouldforthefirsttimeindecadesfinditselfina
positiontomediatebetweenSunniandShia.Thatmatters,becauseIrananditsSunnirivalsmustthemselvesreinintheir
proxiesandmilitiassothatlocalpeoplecanbegintoputtheircommunitiesbacktogether .Such a
process would get a further boost if a deal brought change within Iran .MostIraniansare
younganddisillusionedwiththeirleaders.Theywantnormal,prosperouslives.InnonstopwranglingbetweenfactionsinTehran,adealcould
strengthenHassanRohani,whohasstakedhispresidencyonitandwhoisthoughttofavourengagementwiththe
world.Inadealsdecadelongfirstphase,Iranislikelytoseeanewsupremeleader.NobodyknowswhowilltakeoveritmayevenbeMrRohanihimselfbut the new
leader is more likely to work with the West if America and Iran are no longer riven
by mutual hatred.AthawbetweenIranandAmericaisnotguaranteed,obviously.ThepossibilityofwholesalemoderationwithinIranianpoliticsisevenmoreremote.
Butneitherdoesanucleardealdependonsuchthingstobesuccessfulortobeworthhaving.Onthecontrary, successreliesontheroutineofinspections
andtheslowaccumulationofconfidence;andthedealwillbemeasuredchieflyonwhetheritputsabomboutofreach.Everythingelseisa
bonus.SomepeoplethinkthatanydealmustbewrongbecauseitturnsIranfromaninternationalpariahintoapartner.
Butthat world view leads inexorably toward warand an Iranian bomb .WellfoundedmistrustofIranisa
reasontobevigilant,butintherealworldthemostimportantdiplomacytakesplacebetweenenemies. Theexhaustednegotiatorsin
Lausannetookavaluablestepthisweek.Theymustfinishtheirwork.
Impact Syria/Yemen
Political capital is key to holding off opposition to iran deal
solves middle east conflicts including Syrian and Yemen
Jordan Fabian, The Hill , nuclear deal with iran appears elusive, 7/7/ 15.
Obama has spent a tremendous amount of political capital in pursuit of the deal
both with Democrats in Congress and the U.S.s traditional allies in Persian Gulf
states and Israel, who fear the deal could embolden Iran in its pursuit of dominance
in the Middle East. Deputy national security adviser Ben Rhodes acknowledged last
week the president is taking on some sacred cows in dealing with hostile regimes.
But he said the aim of dealing with Iran is to avoid being pulled into another
conflict in the Middle East while preventing it from becoming a nuclear power.
Administration officials told The Wall Street Journal Monday that they hope a
successful Iran deal could open the door to resolving lingering conflicts in Syria and
Yemen, where Iran is involved. But Obama is coming under pressure from
lawmakers in both parties not to agree to a deal at all costs. On Tuesday evening,
the president met with Senate Democrats at the White House, where he was
expected to sooth members of his party who are worried about the talks. Influential
Democrats, including Senate Foreign Relations Committee ranking member Ben
Cardin (Md.), have demanded anytime, anywhere inspections of Iranian nuclear
facilities.
This deal drains the uranium from Mr. Netanyahus bomb. It drains the amount of 20
percent enriched uranium [Iran has]. It makes it much less likely Iran could break
out and make a bomb. And it goes further: It stops the manufacturing of new centrifuges.
It changes the inspection regime from weekly to daily. If Iran wanted to do anything
suspicious, theres a high probability we'd know about it and could act instantly to
stop them. EK: Whats the counterfactual here? Imagine this deal wasnt struck and things simply kept on
trend. Where would this issue be going? JC: If Iran hadnt paused, in a matter of months they would
cross Israels red line. In perhaps a year they couldve constructed a crude nuclear device. In another year,
they could construct a warhead to put on a missile. While we might think we had two years or so
to act, Israel doesnt look at it that way. They wanted to kill the nuclear baby in the
crib. So the alternative to this deal was war. We shouldnt kid ourselves. Theres no sanction
regime known to man thats been able to coerce a country into compliance. So if
you don't like negotiating with Iran, what you're really saying is you want to go to
war. We should be clear-eyed about this. We shouldnt think theres some better deal out there.
leader issuing them. Even Saudi Arabia, which has serious qualms about the deal, is issuing positive statements at the
start.
I thought this framework was going to suck . Actually, its not bad. My main
concern all along was that the P5+1 countries (technically the E3/EU+3; congratulations if you know
the difference) were too focused on breakout time imposing arbitrary limits on Irans centrifuge
K, I admit it.
program to ensure that if Iran used its known nuclear infrastructure, it would take at least a year to build a bomb.
The bigger worry about Irans nuke program, I always thought, was unknown
nuclear infrastructure, such as any hidden centrifuge sites. To my surprise, the deal at
least as it is described in the fact sheet released by the White House manages to impose measures
to guard against breakout, while also providing for a number of measures that help
substantially with the problem of covert facilities. All in all, its a pretty
comprehensive framework for managing the problem. Its certainly worth
lifting some sanctions, though a crucial detail is how quickly that will happen and whether sanctions can be
reimposed if things go pear-shaped. But there are still reasons to be cautious. First, all we have at the moment area
White House-released fact sheet and a couple of ambiguous news conferences in Lausanne, Switzerland, and the
White House Rose Garden. (Javad Zarif, Irans foreign minister and lead negotiator, is already complaining about the
White Houses fact sheet.) There is, after all, a reason one writes these things down. The parties will need a few
more months to work out the details of the actual agreement in order to implement the framework that was
announced Thursday, April 2. Those negotiations will be crucial because the kind of language in the statements and
fact sheet which probably seem pretty detailed to a casual observer doesnt provide the sort of clarity that a
final agreement will need in order to work. (Ask me about long-range missiles of any kind sometime.) Second,
getting a deal on paper is only the first step. The parties have agreed to do all sorts of things. This
may shock you, but sometimes parties have trouble delivering on such promises . Agreements
arent self-implementing, so a major test will be how the parties deal with the inevitable challenges that human
beings pose to implementing even a beautifully written final agreement. Thats not a reason to reject agreements,
just a caution about being realistic. Finally, please keep in mind that this deal makes it marginally less likely that
Iran will build a nuclear weapon. Thats great. But it doesnt solve the problem of Irans missile program or Tehrans
less-than-stabilizing role in the Middle East. Expectations for any written agreement should be modest. I wouldnt
let myself get swept up in loose talk about a new relationship with Tehran. Were agreeing to not kill each other, for
the moment, over this one thing. In my business, thats pretty good! Still, the details are pretty interesting. The bigticket item for the U.S. national security community will be the breakout timeline. I am not going to do a
kilograms. The fact sheet claims this extends the breakout timeline from two to three months to more than a year. I
dont see any reason to doubt the administrations math, but I just dont think the breakout timeline matters. So I
The provisions
against covert sites what my friend James Acton calls sneak-out and what I worry about most look
very strong. The fact sheet asserts that the International Atomic Energy Agency ( IAEA) will have
continuous access to the facilities that produce Irans centrifuge rotors and bellows
for 20 years. The agreement also provides access to Irans uranium mines and mills,
as well as a dedicated procurement channel for any goods destined for Irans nuclear program.
Iran will return to the Additional Protocol and modified Code 3.1 of the subsidiary arrangements
will just step aside and let other people who are invested in this argument fight it out.
these are improvements to the safeguards agreement and subsidiary arrangements that Iran has with the IAEA.
intelligence, such as the infamous laptop of death, that suggests Iran had a covert bomb program until 2003.
Iran also agreed to limit enrichment to a single site at Natanz. Again, the details will matter here.
The E3/EU+3 would be well advised to make sure the agreement includes a nice map of the Natanz facility lest
we find secret centrifuge halls in a Natanz annex down the road. The advantage of limiting work to a single site is
that, should the U.S. intelligence community catch Iran building a centrifuge site elsewhere (again), Tehran wont be
able to make any tendentious legal excuses. Finally, there are reasonable limits on Tehrans program to develop
new generations of centrifuges. These measures cant guarantee that Iran doesnt have a parallel, secret program.
reactor at Arak. Fordow the covert enrichment site under a mountain and revealed in 2009 will be converted
into non-nuclear isotope separation. An earlier story indicated that a small number of centrifuges at Fordow would
separate stable isotopes stable here means non-radioactive. The nuclear fuel company Urenco has a side
business that sells stable isotopes, so its not a crazy idea. Its a little hard to tell from the fact sheet, but that
seems to be what has happened. The IAEA will still have access to the site to make sure that its only used for nonnuclear purposes. The heavy-water reactor at Arak, meanwhile, will apparently be redesigned so that it will not
produce weapons grade plutonium. There are real benefits to redesigning the reactor to produce less plutonium,
though the fact sheet isnt clear about the nature of the redesign. Iran also committed to ship the spent fuel from
the reactor out of the country and to refrain indefinitely from reprocessing or reprocessing-related research. The
terms reprocessing and reprocessing research are not defined, but if the goal is to make Arak no scarier than,
say, the light-water reactor at Bushehr, theyve succeeded.
agreement on limiting the countrys nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief.
anxious allies (Saudi Arabia and Israel) and some domestic opposition (especially among Republicans in Congress),
negotiations will keep the White House busy. Nonetheless, this is a good agreement for both sides, as
indicated by some of its key components. First, most of the public discussion about the negotiations has until now
been focused on quantifiable elements, such as the number of centrifuges and amount of low-enriched uranium
existing IAEA safeguards agreement, granting the nuclear watchdog more inspections authority. (Iran had
inspectors will be
able to regularly monitor Iranian facilities and can conduct unannounced inspections
as well. Inspectors will also have access to the supply chain through which Iran obtains
materials for its nuclear program. Inspections will likely last for about 25 years, longer than the
implementation period of the agreement itself. Second, Irans enrichment program will be limited. It has
previously implemented the Protocol but stopped adhering to it.) This means that IAEA
agreed not to build any new enrichment facilities for 15 years, and will not enrich uranium above 3.7 percenta
level suitable for commercial power plants, but too low to practically be used in a nuclear weaponfor at least that
long. It is also reducing its current stockpile of 10,000 kilograms of low-enriched uranium to a small fraction of that
amount. The Fordow nuclear facility will cease enriching any uranium and will be converted into a research center
insteadone barred from doing research on enrichment. In fact, Iran will not keep any fissile material at Fordow for
15 years. Iran will instead make the Natanz facility the focus of all enrichment activities. There, it will use only its
first-generation (IR-1) centrifuges to enrich for 10 years. The more advanced IR-2m centrifuges will be stored for
that period, under IAEA monitoring. In fact, advanced centrifuge models (the IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, and IR-8) will not
be used for enrichment for 10 years. In total, Iran will reduce its current enrichment apparatus by roughly two
thirds. It will have only 6,104 installed centrifuges, as opposed to the current 19,000. All of them will be the IR-1
model. Third, Iran will implement Modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its IAEA Safeguards
Agreement, which requires it to give early notification that it is constructing new nuclear facilities. Fourth, Iran will
take steps to address concerns over the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of its program. Fifth, Iran will redesign
and rebuild the Arak heavy water reactor. The design will be agreed upon by negotiators from the six world powers,
China, France, Germany, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States. The redesign will mean that the reactor will
not be able to produce weapon-grade plutonium. Iran is also recommitting itself to not developing a reprocessing
capability. (Reprocessing, the back end of the fuel cycle, is a vital component in developing a plutonium bomb.) The
original core of the reactor will be removed and either destroyed or taken out of the country. Additionally, Iran
what it needs for civilian nuclear development while giving assurances to the world that the materials will not be
diverted for non-peaceful use. Third, the
help Iran in research and development. This stipulation was a sticking point over the last couple of weeks.
But as Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif said at the press conference announcing the deal, it will now allow
countries that had been reluctant to engage with Tehran to help the country further its technological and scientific
progress. In the following weeks, the agreement will doubtless receive much criticism. Many will claim that one side
Ahead of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference that begins in late April, where no major
achievements in nonproliferation are likely to be announced, the framework agreement is a very important success.
The negotiating partners will have to meet major political, legal, and financial challenges to turn
the framework agreement into a final deal. For the moment, though, it represents a promising and
beneficial achievement for all sides.
If this assessment is correct, it is possible to devise an arrangement that will satisfy Irans needs for a peaceful
A
sound deal, in short, would have to convince Iran that the risks of cheating and the cost of
non-compliance are too high. Rather than trust but verify, as Ronald Reagan defined his
approach to nuclear arms control, the logic with Iran should be distrust, verify, and deter.
nuclear energy program and the international communitys requirement that Iran not acquire nuclear weapons.
The benefits Iran hopes to accrue from sanctions relief can themselves augment deterrence of cheating. To the
extent that Iranian businesses and citizens welcome the economic improvements that follow, they will hold their
government responsible if it acts in ways that cause sanctions to be snapped back on. While the Iranian internal
security apparatus remains repressive, it is sensitive to popular discord, which can be expressed even in
least as much as the United States distrusts them. They have struggled to retain leverage in the negotiated
arrangements to deter the U.S. and its partners from reneging on our side of the bargain. The underground research
and development facility at Fordow, for example, is retained as insurance against military attack. The likely phasing
of disclosure of past activities with possible military dimensions is meant to bide time to see if sanctions relief will
that Iran is deterrable. Iran began its secret quest for enrichment capability in 1985 during the war with Iraq.
Saddam Husseins forces were attacking Iranian cities with ballistic missiles armed with chemical weapons. The
United States and France rebuffed Iranian efforts to mobilize the UN Security Council to make Iraq stop. Iranian
leaders then began looking for a nuclear option to ensure that their country would never again face such a threat.
Throughout the 1990s the United States and others reasonably sought to block most of Irans nuclear initiatives, as
they also sought to verifiably eliminate all of Iraqs weapons of mass destruction. While Iranians quietly welcomed
the efforts in Iraq, they noticed the Bush Administrations increasingly dire warnings that Iraq had WMDs and would
use them. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 removed the perceived Iraqi threat. At the same time, intelligence exposed
that Iran was secretly building facilities to enable it to enrich uranium and produce plutonium, for which there was
no realistic civilian requirement. The International Atomic Energy Agency began investigating and uncovered a long
list of Iranian violations of requirements to report sensitive nuclear activities. The threat of possible U.S.
intervention from Iraq into Iran also loomed. At this point, according to the U.S. intelligence community, Tehran
halted its nuclear weapons program primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure
resulting from exposure of Irans previously undeclared nuclear work. Negotiations ensued in 2003 and continued
on and off until today. Since early 2014, the Joint Plan of Action that Iran implemented has essentially frozen its fuelcycle program. Throughout, Iranian leaders have assiduously sought to preserve space for an ambitious nuclear
energy program, relenting only where the terms of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty clearly require and when
international pressure, including economic sanctions, made it too painful to press for more. The NPT clearly
proscribes acquiring nuclear weapons, but it does not define precisely which enabling activities and capabilities are
forbidden. Irans performance since 2003 suggests, but does not prove, that its interests can be served without
nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia is a leading source of Sunni resistance to Iran, in terms of ideology and funding. But
as long as Saudi Arabia does not have nuclear weapons, Iran will retain a significant power advantage over it. If
making and keeping a nuclear deal reduces the likelihood of a Saudi bomb, Iran will be better off. And Iran does not
latter possibilities will not be welcome in Israel and the U.S., but this only buttresses the assessment that Iran would
have an interest in upholding a nuclear deal. To reinforce this Iranian calculation, the details of a comprehensive
agreement should combine deterrence and positive incentives. On the deterrence side, verification is vital.
Iranian leaders should conclude that efforts to cheat will be detected with enough
time to allow military interdiction before Iran could acquire nuclear weapons. The
primary risk is in the domain of uranium enrichment. Here, Irans activities must be monitored from mining of ore all
the way through the enrichment process, as the U.S. fact sheet released April 2 says it will. All of Irans facilities and
activities involved in producing centrifuges must be monitored, as well as all operations of centrifuges, from
research and development to larger-scale production of low-enriched uranium for reactor fuel. A satisfactory
agreement also should prohibit research and development activities whose purposes are closely associated with
nuclear weaponization. Even if Iran will not resolve the IAEAs ongoing questions about past activities with possible
military dimensions until the later stages of an agreed arrangement, Iran should conduct no new activities of this
sort. To verify this, Iran will have to agree to procedures for international inspections of any facilities reasonably
suspected of conducting work related to nuclear weaponization. Such arrangements would correct a shortcoming of
Deterrence
of cheating will be further enhanced by the process designed for relieving sanctions on
the 1968 NPT and serve as an important precedent to be applied to all non-nuclear-weapon states.
Iran. In the initial years of an agreement, Irans performance of its obligations should be reciprocated by waivers of
if
Iran fails to perform, sanctions can be snapped-back into place quickly by ending
waivers. A final comprehensive nuclear agreement should be codified in a UN Security Council resolution, under
U.S. and other sanctions, rather than the removal of the underlying legal authorities behind them. This way,
Chapter VII, as it now appears has been agreed in Switzerland. The U.S. and other Security Council members can
augment deterrence by explaining that violation of such a resolution may be punished by force. The U.S. Congress
could affirm that it would support the use of force in the event Iran materially breeched the agreement. None of this
is to gainsay the violence Irans protgs and its Revolutionary Guard forces perpetrate in neighboring countries.
Nor is it to accept the theocratic repressiveness of Iranian politics and governance. The U.S., Israel and Irans Arab
neighbors will continue to contest Iranian assertiveness, as Iran will in reverse. Washington will continue to press for
democratization and protection of human rights in Iran, just as Iran will denounce Israels treatment of the
Palestinians and Washingtons complicity with it. A nuclear deal will limit the dangers of this competition by
significantly reducing the risks of nuclear proliferation and war, and providing an opportunity to test whether
NEG update
UQ/Internal Link
PC Key
Obamas PC is key to passagehe has to convince Congress
its a good idea
French, 7/27/15 Congress reporter for POLITICO, formerly a tax policy reporter
for POLITICO Pro (Lauren, with John Bresnahan. House Democrats whip for Iran
deal. http://www.politico.com/story/2015/07/house-democrats-whip-iran-deal120642.html)
Obamas personal outreach may be helping as well. A group of freshmen members
who met with the president during a 90-minute briefing last week in the Situation
Room said he is more engaged with the grueling work of lobbying than
theyve ever seen him. Its clear that the president, the lawmakers said, deeply
understands the details of the accord and is making the argument that this is the
best deal for the U.S. The president also warned the freshman lawmakers he met
with last week none of whom have committed to supporting the deal that the
White House would be closely watching their votes and no Democrat would get a
pass for voting against it.
Impacts
Turns Hegemony
The DA turns hegCongressional rejection decimates US credibility
Sanders, 7/20/15 2009-2010 Kroc Fellow at National Public Radio (Sam, U.S.
Will Lose 'All Credibility' If Congress Rejects Nuclear Deal, Kerry Says.
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/07/20/424735984/in-interview-withnpr-kerry-defends-iran-nuclear-deal-and-cuba-diplomacy)
On Iran, Kerry said if Congress failed to approve a nuclear deal with the country, the
results would be disastrous. "I'm telling you, the U.S. will have lost all credibility,"
Kerry told Inskeep. "We will not be in the hunt. And if we then decided to use
military [after a deal fails], do you believe the United Nations will be with us? Do you
think our European colleagues will support us? Not on your life ." Kerry said Iran
would use the deal's failure as an excuse to enrich uranium. "[The deal's failure] will
be a travesty, and Iran will begin enriching, claiming it is a right that they only gave
up in the context of negotiations, but since negotiations are dead, they're going to
resume their rights." He continued, "Iran will say, 'Aha, you see!' The Ayotollah will
say, 'I told you, you can't trust the West. I told you you can't negotiate with these
guys. They will lie to you. They will cheat you. And here they are, they let us down,
and the Congress walked away. They have 535 secretaries of state. There's nobody
to negotiate with.'"
Affirmative
Aff update
Wont passGOP will torpedothinks there are secret side deals
AT: Uniqueness
UQ No Deal
No deal and congressional disapproval Obama downplaying
and McConnell opposing
Ken Thomas, Associated Press, McConnell: Iran deal will be hard sell to
congress, The Rundown, July 12, 2015.
Obama downplayed chances for an Iran nuclear deal during a closed-door meeting
with Senate Democrats last week, telling participants that an agreement was at
best a 50-50 proposition. McConnell said a resolution of disapproval is likely to be
introduced in the Senate and predicted it would pass with more than 60 votes. If
Obama vetoed the resolution, McConnell noted that the president would need 34
votes, or more than one-third of the Senate, to sustain it.
whether the United States will soften its opposition to the lifting of a U.N. embargo
on sales of conventional arms to Iran. Moscow and Beijing support Iran on the issue,
and Russian President Vladimir Putin on Friday called for the embargo to be lifted as
soon as possible.
AT: Links
Personal values are theorized to form the bases of political belief systems
(Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1994). According to Schwartzs (1992) theory of basic human values, there are ten
universal value orientations, two of which we expected to be directly relevant to
drone policy attitudes: security values, which express the goal of maintaining the
safety, harmony and stability of society, and universalism values, which express the
goal of protecting the welfare of all people (Schwartz, 1992). A host of studies have found positive
drone strikes.
correlations between conservatism and security values, on the one hand, and liberalism and universalism values,
on the other (Braithwaite, 1998; Cohrs, Maes, Moschner, & Kielman, 2007; Morgan, Mullen, & Skitka, 2010). Other
evidence indicates that security values are positively associated with support for war, whereas universalism values
are negatively associated with support for war (Cohrs et al., 2005). Together, these findings suggest that
conservatives should support drone warfare because of its relevance to security values, whereas liberals should
oppose drone warfare because of its relevance to universalism values.
would be more likely to evaluate drone strikes in terms of universalism valuesand subsequently oppose the policy
if they see the issue in terms of a human costs frame. These frames are echoed in the arguments for and
against drone strikes: supporters argue that drone warfare is a necessary and efficient means of ensuring U.S.
national security (e.g., Curtis, 2011), whereas critics have called on the United States to clarify, revise or dismantle
its drone warfare policy because of the resulting civilian casualties (e.g., Human Rights Watch, 2011).
PC Fails
Political capital fails on Iran, Obama has no capital on this
issue
Todd Tiarht, Washington Times Http, 7-10-2015, TODD TIAHRT: Know When to
Hold Them," Washingtion Times,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/10/know-when-to-hold-them/,
Accessed: 7-10-2015, /Bingham-MB
Little has been done by President Obama to gain support for his Iranian negotiation
with Congress. Republicans hold majorities in both the House and Senate and we
would expect opposition but even his own party has been skeptical. Winning over
Congress requires political capital or goodwill. It isnt something purchased it
earned with time, confidence and amity in action. It is the only currency on the Hill.
After six and a half years of White House occupancy, most presidents would know
the value of political capital. President Reagan spent time with former Speaker of
the House, Tip ONeill to build a relationship and an understanding of issues they
could agree and areas that needed work. Mr. Obamas political capital wallet is
rather thin. Its time for Secretary Kerry to walk away. The Obama Administration
needs to build political capital with Congress and our allies. Congress needs to know
what is going on, what are the terms and conditions, what are the likely outcomes.
Similarly, a conversation needs to be held with Israels Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu, whos our closest Middle Eastern ally and the country with the most to
lose in an Iranian nuclear agreement.
President Obama went all-out to convince two dozen or so House Democrats to vote
for the Trans Pacific Partnership trade deal Friday afternoon, a level of effort that laid
bare his desire to make the deal a centerpiece of his second-term legacy. And he
failed. For all of his courting -- he went to the Congressional Baseball Game on
Thursday night, for pete's sake! -- the effort failed miserably after a 302-126 vote
against granting financial aid to displaced workers, which was needed to pass the
full package. Wrote WaPo's David Nakamura before the votes: "The presidents pitch
has been met with widespread skepticism among Democrats who blame past trade
deals for killing jobs and depressing wages for Americans in traditional
manufacturing work." This tweet from freshman Pennsylvania Democratic Rep.
Brendan Boyle, written in the wake of Obama's surprise visit to Capitol Hill on Friday
morning, speaks to the president's problems: And shortly before the votes, House
Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) -- a pivotal figure in the debate -- broke with
the president. How can this be, you ask? How can a sitting Democratic president -elected and re-elected convincingly, popular among his party's base -- not be able
to convince a tiny sliver of his own caucus -- or even his party's leader -- in the
House to be for something that he quite clearly sees as legacy-defining (not to
mention good for the country)? And the answer is that the persuasive powers
of the president are simply overrated in this modern political age -- for lots
of reasons. This overestimation is grounded in the idea that presidents lead, that
the job description includes finding a way when no way appears available.
Defenders of that view cite the likes of Theodore Roosevelt (who coined the term
"bully pulpit") and Abraham Lincoln -- presidents who, at times, dragged the country
along with them on the right path. Presidents like them reveal that leadership can
overcome even the greatest obstacles thrown before the Congress or the country.
After all, compared to slavery, what's a little trade deal? The problem with that
analysis is, of course, that neither Roosevelt nor Lincoln nor anyone who has been
president anytime other than the last 10 years (or so) had to deal with the
unique challenges of this moment in political life -- all of which conspire to
make the idea of the president leading from the bully pulpit look like a
quaint relic of times past. Consider: 1. The massive fracturing of the media
-- and not just the political media -- means that "talking to the country" is
simply impossible. The closest a president can get to talking to the country is
when Obama gives an interview just before the Super Bowl. Short of that, things like
the State of the Union, addresses to joint sessions of Congress and other attempts
to reach a large portion of the electorate are just non starters. Even when all three
broadcast networks carry an Obama speech live -- and that is a tremendous rarity
these days -- the White House is reaching far fewer people than it could even
a decade ago. 2. The political polarization of the country coupled with the two
straight decades of redistricting that have made 90 percent of congressional
districts almost impermeable to a serious challenge means that the number of
persuadable members on any vote is just not very high. Most Members of
Congress only have to worry about losing in a primary and, therefore, are constantly
worried about getting out of step with their activist base.
Winners Win
Political capitals irrelevant and winners win
Hirsch 2013, 2-7-13. Michael Hirsh Theres No Such Thing as Political Capital.
chief correspondent for National Journal. He also contributes to 2012 Decoded. Hirsh
previously served as the senior editor and national economics correspondent for
Newsweek, based in its Washington bureau.
[http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital20130207]
The point is not that political
concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real investment capitalthat a particular
leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history.
Naturally, any president has practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress
and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at present. And
at the moment, still stuckor
inevitable
get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any concessions that make him (and the
Democrats) stronger. But the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues
illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can
align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital
masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just dont know what you can do until
wins. In theory, and in practice, depending on Obamas
handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term
goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when
you try. Or
many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote.
Some
It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a presidents popularity, but theres no mechanism there.
Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus
That makes it kind of useless, says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University .
issue; there is
if an issue comes up where the conventional
wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants, and he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of
the other actors Ornstein says. If they think hes going to win, they may change
positions to get on the winning side. Its a bandwagon effect.
is far more complex than the term suggests.
Winning on one issue often changes the calculation for the next
of capital.
second dinner with another group of Republican senators. He also made trips to
Capitol Hill to meet separately with both Republican conferences and Democratic
caucuses. Initial reactions from participants were favorable, but it wasnt long
before reporters wondered if the presidents charm offense was failing. The
framing of this question reveals much about the state of American politics and
media commentary on dysfunctional government. Presidential leadership is
contextualshaped by our unique constitutional arrangements and the electoral,
partisan, and institutional constraints that flow from and interact with them. Under
present conditions of deep ideological polarization of the parties, rough parity
between Democrats and Republicans that fuels a strategic hyperpartisanship, and
divided party government, opportunities for bipartisan coalitions on controversial
policies are severely limited. Constraints on presidential leadership today are
exacerbated by the relentlessly oppositional stance taken by the Republicans
since Obamas initial election, their continuing embrace of Grover Norquists no
new tax pledge, and their willingness since gaining the House majority in 2011 to
use a series of manufactured crises to impose their policy preferences on the
Democrats with whom they share power. Persuasion matters if the people you
are trying to persuade have any inclination to go along, or any attachment to
the concept of compromise. But if a mythical magician could create a president
from the combined DNA of FDR, LBJ, Tip ONeill, Ronald Reagan, and Bill Clinton, the
resulting super-president would be no more successful at charming or working
his will in this context. Ironically, Obama made great efforts to work cooperatively
with Republicans during his first term. He learned painfully that his public embrace
of a policy virtually ensures Republican opposition and that intensive
negotiations with Republican leaders are likely to lead to a dead end. No bourbonand-branch-water-laced meetings with Republicans in Congress or preemptive
compromises with them will induce cooperative behavior. The scope for presidential
leadership is limited, and based not on navet about the opposition he faces but on
a hard-headed determination to make some cooperation in the electoral interests of
enough Republicans to break the taxes are off the table logjam and move forward
with an economic agenda that makes sense to most nonpartisan analysts and most
Americans.
mood of the electorate. When Colorados Cory Gardner attacked Sen. Mark Udalls partisanship, he focused not on
criticism of Democratic positions but on his own pledge to get things done in a bipartisan fashion. When my party
is wrong, Ill say it, Gardner vowed. When something is broken, Ill fix it. Similarly, North Carolinas Thom Tillis
parried attacks on his state legislative record by assuring voters, I worked with both parties to raise education
being caricatured by Democrats as the face of Washington dysfunction to win re-election, seems to grasp the public
mood. In an interview with Roll Call, McConnell said he detected two separate messages from voters. People were
mad as hell at the president, he said. Our new members were also hearingand I was hearing as wellthat
people didnt like the fact that the Congress was dysfunctional. Thats going to change. But when McConnell
talks about change, he mainly discusses tinkering with Senate procedures. Hes mentioned having committees take
the lead in shaping legislation, allowing senators to propose more floor amendments, pursuing individual
appropriations bills instead of omnibus bills and continuing resolutions. None of these changes, in and of
themselves, guarantees that Congress and the White House will become partners in functionality. Committee
squabbling, poison pill amendments, and general ideological inflexibility could still mean that, despite
McConnells best intentions, the Senate remains a legislative sinkhole. More worrisome, when McConnell talks about
his policy agenda, is that he offers little to suggest he comprehends the voters larger message about effective
cooperation. We certainly will have a vote on proceeding to a bill to repeal Obamacare, he promises, as if that
wouldnt be the epitome of grandstanding over governing. Acknowledging that Obama will never sign a repeal, he
insists, We will go at that law in every way that we can," including attempts to repeal the laws linchpin, the
individual mandate. This is hardly thoughtful reform designed to make the nations health care system work better,
but a ham-fisted attempt to mangle the law beyond recognition and send us back to square one. Likewise, his
claims about turning the appropriations process into a model of efficiency are undermined by his promise to use the
bills that keep the government open for riders that would rein in Obamas regulatory powers. Specifically,
McConnell wants to attach prohibitions on the Environmental Protection Agency that would thwart, in his words,
Obamas crusade on CO2 emissions. In other words, McConnell wants to stop Obama from trying to solve the
problem of climate change. The first vote the new majority leader plans to schedule is a bill to override the
executive branchs authority regarding the Keystone oil pipeline. On its face, this would be a bill designed to do
something instead of blocking something. But the choice of Keystone is a strange issue to prioritize. Plunging
domestic gasoline prices hardly make bringing Canadian tar sands oil to the world market an urgent matter.
Furthermore, its not clear McConnell wants a bill that will become law or another vehicle for partisan combat, since
the legislation appears headed for a presidential veto. McConnells insistence on a freewheeling amendment
process means that the measure could become another vehicle for anti-Obama poison pills. Even if the bill stays
clean, Obama has repeatedly said a decision on Keystone should wait until the Nebraska Supreme Court rules on
whether the state can use eminent domain to run the pipeline through private land. Instead of beginning on an
antagonistic note by trying to jam Obama, McConnell could wait until the court rules, assess the White House
response, and perhaps pursue a compromise if the president remains resistantbefore embarking on contentious
and if the resistance from the other side is perceived as being too heavy-handed,
they can suffer (OOTC:WLVTQ) from a sort of "attrition", as their own political capital
is diminished. And even if you lose, there's still a lot to be gained in the effort,
although you might not see the results until further down the road. As we said at
the top of the story, there are lots of battles left over, including what is going to
happen to Social Security and the potential for reforming Senate rules; but win or
lose, it's probably a better idea to be trying to fight these fights, loudly and logically,
just as we wish the President would, then to find ourselves hanging back and doing
nothing at all today...and then voting for Jack Box for President 2012 as a way of
expressing our frustration.
political capital. During his tenure in the White House, Obama has done this by
reaching out to a range of constituencies, moderating some of his programs,
pursuing middle of the road approaches on key foreign policy questions and, not
insignificantly, working to ensure that his approval rating remains quite high.
Political capital is not, however, like money, it cannot be saved up interminably
while its owner waits for the right moment to spend it. Political capital has a shelf
life, and often not a very long one. If it is not used relatively quickly, it dissipates
and becomes useless to its owner. This is the moment in which Obama, who has
spent the first few months of his presidency diligently accumulating political capital,
now finds himself. The next few months will be a key time for Obama. If Obama
does not spend this political capital during the next months, it will likely be gone by
the New Year anyway. Much of what President Obama has done in his first six
months or so in office has been designed to build political capital, interestingly he
has sought to build this capital from both domestic and foreign sources. He has
done this by traveling extensively, reintroducing to America to foreign audiences
and by a governance style that has very cleverly succeeded in pushing his political
opponents to the fringes. This tactic was displayed during the effort to pass the
stimulus package as Republican opposition was relegated to a loud and annoying,
but largely irrelevant, distraction. Building political capital was, or should have been,
a major goal of Obama's recent speech in Cairo as well. Significantly, Obama has
yet to spend any of his political capital by meaningfully taking on any powerful
interests. He declined to take Wall Street on regarding the financial crisis, has
prepared to, but not yet fully, challenged the power of the AMA or the insurance
companies, nor has he really confronted any important Democratic Party groups
such as organized labor. This strategy, however, will not be fruitful for much longer.
There are now some very clear issues where Obama should be spending political
capital. The most obvious of these is health care. The battle for health care reform
will be a major defining issue, not just for the Obama presidency, but for American
society over the next decades. It is imperative that Obama push for the best and
most comprehensive health care reform possible. This will likely mean not just a
bruising legislative battle, but one that will pit powerful interests, not just angry
Republican ideologues, against the President. The legislative struggle will also pull
many Democrats between the President and powerful interest groups. Obama must
make it clear that there will be an enormous political cost which Democrats who
vote against the bill will have to pay. Before any bill is voted upon, however, is
perhaps an even more critical time as pressure from insurance groups, business
groups and doctors organizations will be brought to bear both on congress, but also
on the administration as it works with congress to craft the legislation. This is not
the time when the administration must focus on making friends and being liked, but
on standing their ground and getting a strong and inclusive health care reform bill.
Obama will have to take a similar approach to any other major domestic legislation
as well. This is, of course, the way the presidency has worked for decades. Obama is
in an unusual situation because a similar dynamic is at work at the international
level. A major part of Obama's first six months in office have involved pursuing a
foreign policy that implicitly has sought to rebuild both the image of the US abroad,
but also American political capital. It is less clear how Obama can use this capital,
but now is the time to use it. A cynical interpretation of the choice facing Obama is
that he can remain popular or he can have legislative and other policy
accomplishments, but this interpretation would be wrong. By early 2010, Obama,
and his party will, fairly or not, be increasingly judged by what they have
accomplished in office, not by how deftly they have handled political challenges.
Therefore, the only way he can remain popular and get new political capital is
through converting his current political capital into concrete legislative
accomplishments. Health care will be the first and very likely most important, test.
AT: Impact
strikes and restore its honor. The two parameters are connected, since an American response in the event of
it would
be a more credible and effective threat that would encourage Iranian restraint in
response to a Western attack. Against this background a scale of five possible Iranian strategies can be
posited (from the limited and measured to the very massive): a. Total military restraint: This is an
extreme scenario in which the Iranian regime chooses not to respond immediately after an
attack on its facilities. Two examples of this strategy are the lack of immediate Iraqi
response following the Israel Air Force attack on the Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981, and the
absence of a Syrian response to the attack on the Deir ez-Zor nuclear reactor in 2007.13 However, there is little
escalation would include a broader and more powerful attack on regime assets as well. For this reason,
likelihood of Iran adopting such a strategy. In contrast to Iraq and Syria, Iran is aware that the West knows about its
nuclear program, and an attack would not be a strategic surprise. Even if the timing and nature of the attack are a
surprise, Tehran has likely prepared a response in the event of a strike. Tehran would presumably decide to use this
plan, even if it were partial and restrained, to show the strength of the regime, deter Irans enemies from additional
actions in the future, and restore the countrys honor after the attack on its nuclear project. In other words, there is
Tit for
tat:14 This is the classic reactive strategy because it mimics the strategy of the
attacker. Irans response to a strike against the countrys nuclear facilities would be
an attack on Israels nuclear facilities. In this scenario, a significant number of missiles
would be launched from Iran and Lebanon in the direction of Dimona or any other target in Israel
perceived as nuclear associated, in order to convey a message of parity between Iran and
Israel, and perhaps even to damage Israels facilities. There is a high likelihood that this method of
operation would be chosen, independently or as part of a broader Iranian response. c. A response that is
limited in scope but more significant: A broader Iranian response would include the use of
terrorist cells and a restrained launch of missiles one or two missiles volleys at Israels cities,
and perhaps also Saudi and Western targets in the Gulf. Suicide missions from the air and the sea
are also possible in this limited response scenario. If the Western strike damages Irans
nuclear infrastructure but does not harm other regime assets, there is a high
likelihood of such an Iranian response, because the regime in Tehran will seek to
balance the need to respond to an attack with the fear of escalation that would
threaten regime assets not directly connected to Irans military nuclear program. Again, the main
interest of the regime of the ayatollahs is to preserve their power. Therefore, it
seems that they would not carry out an action that is perceived as likely to threaten
the stability of the regime. Thus, in a scenario involving a pinpoint strike on the Iranian
nuclear program, the regime would seek to respond without causing
escalation and significant American intervention in the crisis. d. The
maximalist response against Israeli targets: Despite what has been noted thus far, it is possible that Iran
a high level of certainty that there would be an Iranian response, and the question is about its scope. b.
would seek an aggressive, maximalist response to a strike against its military nuclear project and its national honor,
while attempting to isolate Israel from the United States. It could launch dozens of missiles a day against Israeli
cities in a number of volleys spread throughout the day. The strategic purpose would be to punish Israel for the
attack, paralyze life in Israel, exact as heavy a price as possible from Israel, and increase the psychological effect of
the attack on the Israeli populace. Iran would attempt to achieve the maximum deterrent effect and deter Israel
The regime in Tehran likely assumes that such a response would lead
to a significant Israeli response and could lead to escalation of the conflict between
the two countries which in turn could allow another strike against the nuclear
infrastructure and a broad and comprehensive attack on Iranian economic and government
assets. Such escalation could spiral out of control and encourage American military
intervention, which could threaten the continued survival of the regime. Given this, the
Iranian regime will likely refrain from such a response against Israel as long as a Western strike
regarding a future conflict.
focuses on the nuclear program. If the Iranian regime feels that the attack reflects an effort to threaten its survival
or that Israel and the United States are less willing to respond with force, it is liable to believe that it has less to lose
from possible escalation. This scenario, in an extreme configuration, could also include Iranian use of
seems to be limited probability that Tehran would use nonconventional weapons at the start of a future crisis
resulting from an attack on Iran, or in a scenario of conflict with Israel that does not develop into an all-out clash
that clearly threatens the survival of the regime. e. Regional escalation:
an assessment that an
attack on Irans military nuclear facilities would necessarily lead to a large scale,
prolonged regional war is highly questionable.15 A scenario of regional escalation
would require the United States to intervene and would significantly change the regional
including threatening to close or actually closing the Strait of Hormuz. However,
balance of power. Therefore, Tehran would choose such a response only if it did not
fear that such a move would lead to further significant harm to regime assets, because it
would already feel a real threat to the survival of the regime, or as a last resort in an attempt to set the entire
region ablaze in order to press for international intervention (apparently led by Russia) to achieve a ceasefire as
Without the US presence, a second argument goes, nothing would prevent SunniShia violence from sweeping into every country where the religious divide exists. A
Sunni bloc with centres in Riyadh and Cairo might face a Shia bloc headquartered in
Tehran, both of which would face enormous pressure from their own people to fight
proxy wars across the region. In addition to intra-Muslim civil war, cross-border
warfare could not be ruled out. Jordan might be the first to send troops into Iraq to
secure its own border; once the dam breaks, Iran, Turkey, Syria and Saudi Arabia
might follow suit. The Middle East has no shortage of rivalries, any of which might
descend into direct conflict after a destabilising US withdrawal. In the worst case,
Iran might emerge as the regional hegemon, able to bully and blackmail its
neighbours with its new nuclear arsenal. Saudi Arabia and Egypt would soon
demand suitable deterrents of their own, and a nuclear arms race would envelop
the region. Once again, however, none of these outcomes is particularly likely.
Wider war
No matter what the outcome in Iraq, the region is not likely to devolve into chaos.
Although it might seem counter-intuitive, by most traditional measures the Middle
East is very stable. Continuous, uninterrupted governance is the norm, not the
exception; most Middle East regimes have been in power for decades. Its
monarchies, from Morocco to Jordan to every Gulf state, have generally been in
power since these countries gained independence. In Egypt Hosni Mubarak has
ruled for almost three decades, and Muammar Gadhafi in Libya for almost four. The
region's autocrats have been more likely to die quiet, natural deaths than meet the
hangman or post-coup firing squads. Saddam's rather unpredictable regime, which
attacked its neighbours twice, was one of the few exceptions to this pattern of
stability, and he met an end unusual for the modern Middle East. Its regimes have
survived potentially destabilising shocks before, and they would be likely to do so
again.
The region actually experiences very little cross-border warfare, and even less since
the end of the Cold War. Saddam again provided an exception, as did the Israelis,
with their adventures in Lebanon. Israel fought four wars with neighbouring states in
the first 25 years of its existence, but none in the 34 years since. Vicious civil wars
that once engulfed Lebanon and Algeria have gone quiet, and its ethnic conflicts do
not make the region particularly unique.
The biggest risk of an American withdrawal is intensified civil war in Iraq rather than
regional conflagration. Iraq's neighbours will likely not prove eager to fight each
other to determine who gets to be the next country to spend itself into penury
propping up an unpopular puppet regime next door. As much as the Saudis and
Iranians may threaten to intervene on behalf of their co-religionists, they have
shown no eagerness to replace the counter-insurgency role that American troops
play today. If the United States, with its remarkable military and unlimited
resources, could not bring about its desired solutions in Iraq, why would any other
country think it could do so?17
Common interest, not the presence of the US military, provides the ultimate
foundation for stability. All ruling regimes in the Middle East share a common (and
understandable) fear of instability. It is the interest of every actor - the Iraqis, their
neighbours and the rest of the world - to see a stable, functioning government
emerge in Iraq. If the United States were to withdraw, increased regional
cooperation to address that common interest is far more likely than outright
warfare.
Layne 9 Intl Affairs Prof, Texas A&M, Visiting Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies,
Cato Institute (Christopher, Americas Middle East grand strategy after Iraq, Review
of International Studies 35, Cambridge Journals)
Of course, hard-line US neoconservatives reject this approach and argue that a
nuclear-armed Iran would have three bad consequences: there could be a nuclear
arms race in the Middle East; Iran might supply nuclear weapons to terrorists; and
Tehran could use its nuclear weapons to blackmail other states in the region, or to
engage in aggression. Each of these scenarios, however, is improbable.24 A nuclear
Iran will not touch off a proliferation snowball in the Middle East. Israel, of course,
already is a nuclear power. The other three states that might be tempted to go for a
nuclear weapons capability are Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. However, each of
these states would be under strong pressure not to do so, and Saudi Arabia lacks
the industrial and engineering capabilities to develop nuclear weapons
indigenously. Notwithstanding the Bush administrations hyperbolic rhetoric, Iran is
not going to give nuclear weapons to terrorists. This is not to deny Tehrans close
links to groups like Hezbollah and Hamas. However, there are good reasons that
states even those that have ties to terrorists draw the line at giving them nuclear
weapons (or other WMD): if the terrorists were to use these weapons against the US
or its allies, the weapons could be traced back to the donor state, which would be
at risk of annihilation by an American retaliatory strike.25 Irans leaders have too
much at stake to run this risk. Even if one believes the administrations claims that
rogue state leaders are indifferent to the fate of their populations, they do care very
much about the survival of their regimes, which means that they can be deterred.
For the same reason, Irans possession of nuclear weapons will not invest Tehran
with options to attack, or intimidate its neighbours. Israels security with respect to
Iran is guaranteed by its own formidable nuclear deterrent capabilities. By the same
token, just as it did in Europe during the Cold War, the US can extend its own
deterrence umbrella to protect its clients in the region Saudi Arabia, the Gulf
states, and Turkey. American security guarantees not only will dissuade Iran from
acting recklessly, but also restrain proliferation by negating the incentives for
states like Saudi Arabia and Turkey to acquire their own nuclear weapons. Given the
overwhelming US advantage in both nuclear and conventional military capabilities,
Iran is not going to risk national suicide by challenging Americas security
commitments in the region. In short, while a nuclear-armed Iran hardly is desirable,
neither is it intolerable, because it could be contained and deterred successfully by
the US.
existing grievances with the status quo, particularly in the Arab world. Traditional containment options may actually create
further opportunities for Tehran to exploit, thereby amplifying the very influence the United States is trying to mitigate. A more
integrates elements of engagement and containment while de-escalating unilateral U.S. pressure on Tehran and applying
increased multilateral pressure against its nuclear ambitions. The analyses that informed these conclusions also yielded the
following insights for U.S. planners and strategists concerning Irans strategic culture, conventional military, ties to Islamist
groups, and ability to influence Arab public opinion.
Although not a member of the P5+1 itself, Israel has always loomed large over the negotiations
concerning Irans nuclear program. For example, in explaining French opposition to a possible nuclear
deal earlier this month, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius stated: The security concerns of Israel
and all the countries of the region have to be taken into account.
Fabius concern derives from the long-held fear that Israel will launch a
preventive strike against Iran to prevent it from obtaining nuclear weapons. For some, this
possibility remains all too real despite the important interim agreement the P5+1 and
Part of
Iran reached this weekend. For example, when asked on ABCs This Week whether Israel would attack
Iran while the interim deal is in place,William Kristol responded: I don't think the prime minister will
think he is constrained by the U.S. deciding to have a six-month deal. [] six months, one year, I
mean, if they're going to break out, they're going to break out.
and obligation to defend itself with its own forces against every threat.
Many dismiss this talk as bluster, however. Over at Bloomberg View, for instance, Jeffrey
Goldberg argues that the nuclear deal has boxed-in Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu so comprehensively that it's unimaginable Israel will strike Iran in the
foreseeable future. Eurasia Group's Cliff Kupchan similarly argued: The chance of
Israeli strikes during the period of the interim agreement drops to virtually zero.
the truth is that the
likelihood of an Israeli strike on Irans nuclear facilities has always been greatly
exaggerated. There are at least five reasons why Israel isnt likely to attack Iran.
Although the interim deal does further reduce Israels propensity to attack,
First, if Israel was going to strike Irans nuclear facilities, it would have done so a
long time ago. Since getting caught off-guard at the beginning of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, Israel
has generally acted proactively to thwart security threats. On no issue has this been truer than with
nuclear-weapon programs. For example, Israel bombed Saddam Husseins program when
it
consisted of just a single nuclear reactor . According to ABC News, Israel struck Syrias
lone nuclear reactor just months after discovering it . The IAEA had been completely in the
dark about the reactor, and took years to confirm the building was in fact housing one.
Contrast this with Israels policy toward Irans nuclear program. The uranium-enrichment facility in
Natanz and the heavy-water reactor at Arak first became public knowledge in 2002. For more than a
decade now, Tel Aviv has watched as the program has expanded into two fully operational nuclear
facilities, a budding nuclear-research reactor, and countless other well-protected and -dispersed sites.
Furthermore, Americas extreme reluctance to initiate strikes on Iran was made clear to Israel at least
as far back as 2008. It would be completely at odds with how Israel operates for it to
standby until the last minute when faced with what it views as an existential threat.
2. Bombing Iran Makes an Iranian Bomb More Likely
At home, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei could use the attack to justify rescinding his fatwa against
possessing a nuclear-weapons program, while using the greater domestic support for the regime and
the nuclear program to mobilize greater resources for the countrys nuclear efforts.
Israels attack would also give the Iranian regime a legitimate (in much of the worlds
eyes) reason to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and kick out
international inspectors. If Tehrans membership didnt even prevent it from being attacked, how
could it justify staying in the regime? Finally, support for international sanctions will
crumble in the aftermath of an Israeli attack, giving Iran more resources with which to
rebuild its nuclear facilities.
3. Helps Iran, Hurts Israel
an Israeli strike on Irans nuclear program would be a net gain for Iran and
a huge loss for Tel Aviv. Iran could use the strike to regain its popularity with the
Arab street and increase the pressure against Arab rulers . As noted above, it would also
Relatedly,
lead to international sanctions collapsing, and an outpouring of sympathy for Iran in many countries
around the world.
Were Iran
to respond by attacking U.S. regional assets, this could greatly hurt Israels ties with
the United States at both the elite and mass levels . Indeed, a war-weary American public is
Meanwhile, a strike on Irans nuclear facilities would leave Israel in a far worse-off position.
adamantly opposed to its own leaders dragging it into another conflict in the Middle East. Americans
would be even more hostile to an ally taking actions that they fully understood would put the U.S. in
danger.
the quiet but growing cooperation Israel is enjoying with Sunni Arab
nations against Iran would evaporate overnight . Even though many of the political elites in
Furthermore,
these countries would secretly support Israels action, their explosive domestic situations would force
them to distance themselves from Tel Aviv for an extended period of time. Israels reputation would
also take a further blow in Europe and Asia, neither of which would soon forgive Tel Aviv.
4. Israels Veto Players
security cabinet and in certain cases, the full cabinet the decision is not made by two
people, nor three, nor eight. Its far from clear Netanyahu, a fairly divisive figure in
Israeli politics, could gain this support. In fact, Menachem Begin struggled to gain
sufficient support for the 1981 attack on Iraq even though Baghdad presented a
more clear and present danger to Israel than Iran does today.
What is clearer is that Netanyahu lacks the support of much of Israels highly
respected national security establishment. Many former top intelligence and military
officials have spoken out publicly against Netanyahus hardline Iran policy, with at
least one of them questioning whether Iran is actually seeking a nuclear weapon .
Another former chief of staff of the Israeli Defense Forces told The Independent that, It is quite clear
that much if not all of the IDF [Israeli Defence Forces] leadership do not support
military action at this point. In the past the advice of the head of the IDF and the head of
Mossad had led to military action being stopped.
5. A Deal is Better Than No Deal
Finally, Israel wont attack Iran because it is ultimately in its interests for the US and
Iran to reach an agreement, even if it is a less than an ideal one . To begin with, an
agreement is the only way to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons short of an invasion and
occupation of the country. Moreover, Israel would benefit both directly and indirectly from a U.S.Iranian nuclear deal and especially larger rapprochement. Israel would gain a number of direct
benefits from a larger warming of U.S.-Iranian relations, which a nuclear deal could
help facilitate. Iran currently pays no costs while benefiting significantly from its anti-Israeli tirades
and actions. A rapprochement with the U.S. would force Iranian leaders to constrain their anti-Israeli
rhetoric and actions, or risk losing their new partner. While Israel and Iran might not enjoy the same
relationship they did under the Shah or the first decade of the Islamic Republic, a U.S.-allied Iran would
be much less of a burden for Israel. History is quite clear on this point: U.S. Middle Eastern allies
notable Egypt under Sadathave been much less hostile to the Jewish state than countries that have
been U.S. adversaries.
Tel Aviv would also benefit indirectly from a U.S.-Iran nuclear deal and possible rapprochement. Thats
because either of these agreements would spark panic in Sunni Arab capitals. For the foreseeable
future, then, Israel would enjoy some breathing room, which would obtain as these governments would
be preoccupied with Iran for the foreseeable future. Indeed, just the possibility of an interim
nuclear deal between the U.S. and Iran has created rumors of Saudi Arabia seeking
tighter cooperation with Israel.
For these reasons, the interim nuclear deal has made it less likely that Israel will attack Iran. That
being said, the possibility of an Israeli attack on Iran was already remote long before Iran and the P5+1
held their talks in Geneva last month.
grant the hardliners firmer motive to reach the nuclear threshold with
full-fledged speed . Thirdly, the Islamic Republic will likely decline to
cooperate with the international community as well as pull out of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty. As a result, the unintended repercussions and
negative consequences of an Israeli attack- such as Iran becoming more
determined to accelerate its nuclear program -- do outweigh the delay
that the strikes might impose on Iran's nuclear program. While it might be
easy to start a war or carry out strikes, it is almost impossible to know where
the war will head afterwards. In case Iran responds militarily, few strikes can
turn the region into a conflagration affecting many lives of ordinary civilians, the
Gulf (with the price of oil skyrocketing and price of gasoline increasing in Western
countries), and impacting the security of other regional countries including Turkey
and Saudi Arabia. The war can not only endanger regional security, but also
Israel's own security , and drag in global powers including the United States and
Russia. According to polls, many Israeli citizens are against their country
attacking Iran unilaterally. Finally, although Israeli leaders believe that the
Obama administration has not been firm enough in terms of thwarting Iran's
ambition to reach a nuclear threshold, Israel is in fact dependent on the United
States when it comes to dealing with Iran's nuclear program. In the case
of a military response from Iran, and considering Israel's regional security
and geopolitical affairs, Israel is in need of the United States. On the other
hand, the Obama administration's foreign policies towards Iran's nuclear
program have been clear: the administration has avoided considering a
military option against the Islamic Republic. In addition, the US still
contends that all diplomatic venues have not been exhausted. Considering
the aforementioned factors and realistically speaking, it will be unlikely
for Israel carry out any attacks against Iran's nuclear installations.
bad thing about him is that he wont do anything to reach an accommodation with the Palestinians or with the Sunni
The only thing hes interested in is protecting himself from political defeat.
Hes not [Yitzhak] Rabin, hes not [Ariel] Sharon, hes certainly no [Menachem] Begin. Hes got no guts. I ran
this notion by another senior official who deals with the Israel file regularly. This official agreed that Netanyahu
is a chickenshit on matters related to the comatose peace process, but added that
hes also a coward on the issue of Irans nuclear threat . The official said the Obama
administration no longer believes that Netanyahu would launch a preemptive strike on
Arab states.
Irans nuclear facilities in order to keep the regime in Tehran from building an atomic arsenal. Its
too late
for him to do anything. Two, three years ago, this was a possibility. But ultimately he couldnt bring
himself to pull the trigger. It was a combination of our pressure and his own
unwillingness to do anything dramatic. Now its too late. This assessment represents a
momentous shift in the way the Obama administration sees Netanyahu. In 2010, and again in 2012,
added, referring to the successful 1981 Israeli Air Force raid ordered by the ex-prime minister on Iraqs nuclear
The belief that Netanyahus threat to strike is now an empty one has
given U.S. officials room to breathe in their ongoing negotiations with Iran. You might
reactor.
think that this new understanding of Netanyahu as a hyper-cautious leader would make the administration
somewhat grateful. Sober-minded Middle East leaders are not so easy to come by these days, after all. But on a
number of other issues, Netanyahu does not seem sufficiently sober-minded.
their commitments (which the Islamic Republic does not have a good record of
doing so), Iran's nuclear break-out capacity will shrink to zero, meaning Iran will be
a nuclear power. Secondly, Iran will gain more advanced weaponry, the IRGC will
solidify its economic power, and the government will receive billions of dollars.
Another issue is that, even if the six world powers and the Islamic Republic reach a
"final" nuclear deal, the deal is not going to be final. Apparently, both sides will not
be signing the final agreement until a few months later. First, the US Congress and
Iranian domestic counterparts will review the agreement. Then, the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will have to inspect Iran's nuclear activities and verify
the compliance with the article of the agreement. Finally, after the IAEA verified
compliance, sanctions will be lifted and both sides will sign the deal. This method
also appears to be a solution not to discredit Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei's redline. Khamenei previously demanded that all sanctions should be
lifted upon the signing of the final agreement. While in international diplomacy,
deals are first signed and then implemented, the six world powers and the Islamic
Republic are reversing the process. If a Deal Reached: Will it be a Good Deal? Who
will be the Winner? Another crucial and lingering question is whether the potential
deal will a good one, and who will be the primary winner or losers. The response to
such questions depends on the terms of the deal and the lenses through which one
analyzes and examines the nuclear deal. It is crucial to point out that the winners
and losers of such a deal will not be limited to the seven countries engaged in the
talks. The repercussions or positive aspects of such a deal goes beyond the gilded
circle. One can argue that the winners will be primarily President Obama, the Iranian
government, Shiite proxies in the region, Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps,
President Rouhani, the Syrian government, Bashar Al Assad, as well as Western
corporations and companies. President Obama will finally have a quiet night as he
would seal and achieve his awaited dream and foreign policy legacy. President
Obama and his administration will also be creating the narrative that the deal is
historic and a positive one for the world. On the other hand, the easing of sanctions
on Iran will create a whole array of other winners including the IRGC, office of the
Supreme Leader, and the Quds force (elite branch of IRGC which operates in
extraterritorial landscapes). As the economic power of the IRGC and the Quds force
increases, Iran's Shiite proxies in the region will benefit from the trickling down of
these funds. Al Assad can be more assured that the Islamic Republic will continue
supporting his government financially, economically, militarily, and through
intelligence and advisory roles. Finally, non-state or state actors which will not
benefit from the potential deal are those that are resisting the Shiite militias or are
concerned with regards to the Iran's hegemonic ambitions, it's search for regional
preeminence and supremacy and are worried about Iran's attempts to tip the
balance of power in its favor. The question of whether the deal will be a good or bad
one depends on how and who looks at the deal. When we analyze the negotiations
and terms comprehensively and meticulously, it becomes evident that the current
terms being negotiated will not only keep Iran's nuclear infrastructure and threat
primarily intact, but it will create a whole new regional security dilemma,
geopolitical concerns, and nuclear arms race in the region.
texthasbeenreleasedandthatIranianandEU
officialswerevagueintheirstatementsabouttheframework.EarliertodayonNationalReview,PatrickBrennanwroteabouttweetsbyAbas
Aslani,theheadofanIraniangovernmentnewsagency,thatshowhowtheIranianview
oftheagreement
differsfrom
the
Obamaadministrationsview.Aslanitweeted,forinstance,thatIranwillcontinuetodevelopadvancedcentrifuges
duringthedurationofthedealandalleconomicsanctions
byEU,US
willbelifted
immediatelyincluding
financial,banking,insurance,oil.Herearemyinitialthoughtsaboutthepreliminaryagreement,basedonourknowledgeofitatthishour.
UraniumEnrichmentAccordingtotheWhiteHousefactsheet,Iranwillgofrom9,000operationalcentrifugesto6,104.Of
these,5,060willenrichuraniumfortenyears.AllcentrifugeswillbeIransfirstgenerationIR1design.Theremaining10,000
operationalandnonoperationalcentrifugeswillbeputinstorageandmonitoredbytheIAEA.Thesemachineswillbeusedtoreplaceoperating
centrifuges.For15years,Iranhasagreednottoenrichover3.67%U235andnottobuildadditionalenrichmentfacilities.Iranalsohasagreedto
reduceitscurrentenricheduraniumstockpileofabout10,000kilograms(enoughtofueleightormorenuclearweaponsifenrichedtoweapons
grade)to300kilograms.PresidentObamasaidinhisspeechtodaythatIransenricheduraniumwouldbeneutralized.TheU.S.factsheetsays
Iranwillnotuseadvancedcentrifugemodelsfortenyearsandwilldevelopthemaccordingtoascheduleworkedoutundertheagreement.
However,anIranianspokesmantweetedthatIranwillcontinueits
R&D
onadvancedcentrifugesduringthe
agreementandwilldothebeginningandcompletingprocess ofIR4,IR5,IR6toIR8centrifugesduringthetenyear
spanoftheagreement.IranwillmovemostofitscentrifugesoutofitsundergroundFordowenrichmentfacilityandwillnotenrichuraniumthere
foratleast15years.TwothirdsofFordowscentrifugeswillbeputinstorage,andthefacilitywillbeusedforpeacefulpurposes.Comment
Thisagreement
willallow
Irantocontinueuranium
enrichment,anactivitythattheUnitedStateshasrefusedto
agreetoinnucleartechnologycooperationagreementswithitsfriendsandalliesbecauseitissoeasytouseapeacefulenrichmentprogramto
makeweaponsfuel.ThereisnopracticalreasonforIrantoconducturaniumenrichmentwith6,000centrifuges.Itwouldtakeabout200,000
centrifugesforIrantoenrichenoughuraniumtofuelitsBushehrpowerreactor.5,000centrifugesarefartoomanyforother
peacefulpurposessuchasproducingmedicalisotopesorfuelplatesfortheTehranresearchreactor .
Moreover,itwouldbefarmoreeconomicalforIrantopurchasereactorfuelrods,fuelplates,andmedicalisotopesfromothercountries.The
ObamaadministrationhopestoaddresstherisksofIranianuraniumenrichmentbyhavingintrusiveIAEA
inspectionsandbyrequiringIrantoreduceorneutralizeitsenricheduraniumstockpile .Fromthe
presidentsstatementandtheWhiteHousefactsheet,itappearsthatIranisrefusingtosenditsenricheduraniumtoRussiaastheU.S.had
proposed.Also,theU.S.factsheetsaysonlythatIranscurrentenricheduraniumstockpilewillbereduced; itdoesnotsaywhatwill
happentouraniumenrichedduringtheagreement.Wealsodontknowwhatthewordsreducedor
neutralizedmean.TheObamaadministrationpreviouslyclaimedthattheriskofIransenricheduraniumstockpilehadbeenreduced
becausesomeofithadbeenconvertedtouraniumpowder.Expertslaterdiscountedthisclaimbecausethisprocesscanbereversedinabouttwo
weeks.IfIransenricheduraniumstockpileremainsinthecountryandisonlyreducedtopowder ,Iranwill
retainthe
capability
tomakeeightormorenuclearweaponsinaboutthreemonths.FormerIAEAdeputydirectorOlli
HeinonenrecentlypublishedachartonIransnuclearbreakouttimethatshowshowIrancouldmakeenoughenricheduranium
foroneweaponintwelveweeksfromreactorgradeuraniumusing6,000centrifuges ,andhowitcoulddosoin16
weeksusingonly1,000centrifuges.Clickheretoview.ThedecisiontoletIrankeepitspreviouslysecret,heavily
fortifiedFordowenrichmentfacilityisamajor
American
cave.PresidentObamasaidin2012aboutthisfacility:
Weknowtheydontneedtohaveanunderground,fortifiedfacilitylikeFordowinordertohaveapeaceful[nuclear]program.Bottomline
Thepreliminary
agreement
legitimizesandeven
allowstheadvancementof
Irans
uranium
enrichmentprogram.Itdoesnotappearto
delay
the
breakouttimefora
nIraniannuclear
weapon
.
Incredibly,noenrichment
equipmentorfacilitieswillbe
disassembledor
destroyed.GivenIranslonghistoryof
cheatingonnuclearagreementsandcovertnuclearactivities,allowingittodoanyuranium
enrichmentis
very
dangerous.ThisiswhyPrimeMinisterBenjaminNetanyahuofIsraelhassaidthatIransenrichmentprogramhasonlyonepurpose:tomake
nuclearbombs.ThisisreasonenoughfortheU.S.CongresstorejectthisagreementandimposenewsanctionsuntilIrancomplieswithU.N.
SecurityCouncilresolutionsrequiringittohaltalluraniumenrichment.InspectionsandVerificationPresidentObamasaidtoday:Iranwillface
strictlimitationsonitsprogram,andIranhasalsoagreedtothemostrobustandintrusiveinspectionsandtransparencyregimeevernegotiatedfor
anynuclearprograminhistory.Sothisdealisnotbasedontrust.Itsbasedonunprecedentedverification.AccordingtoObama,IfIrancheats,
theworldwillknowit.Thepresidentalsosaid,IranhasagreedtogivetheIAEAaccesstotheentiresupplychainthatsupportsIransnuclear
program,fromuraniummillsthatprovidetherawmaterialstothecentrifugeproductionandstoragefacilitiesthatsupporttheprogram.
AccordingtotheWhiteHousefactsheet,theIAEAwillhaveaccesstothesefacilitiesfor20to25years.Accordingtothefactsheet,Iranhas
agreedtoimplementtheIAEAadditionalprotocol,whichrequiresittoprovidetheIAEAwithinformationondeclaredandundeclarednuclear
sites.IranalsowillberequiredtogivetheIAEAaccesstopossiblecovertsitesrelatedtouraniumenrichment.ThepresidentsaidIranspast
effortstoweaponizeitsprogramwillbeaddressed.ThefactsheetsaysIranwillimplementanagreedsetofmeasurestoaddresstheIAEAs
concernsregardingthepossiblemilitarydimensionsofitsprogram.CommentAlthoughtheverificationmeasuresdetailedby
thepresidentgobeyondwhatIraniscurrentlysubjectto, Tehranhasneverfully
cooperatedwith
IAEA
inspectors.Moreover,thisverification
plan
doesnotpermitsnapinspections
andunfetteredaccesstoall
Iraniannuclearfacilities,includingmilitarybaseswhereIranisbelievedtohaveconductednuclear
weaponswork.TheagreementalsoisvagueonrequiringIrantoanswerquestionsaboutpastweapons
relatedwork.IranagreedtoatwelvestepprogramwithIAEAinlate2013toaddressthesequestionsbuthasaddressedonlyoneofthem.It
ishardtotrusttheObamaadministrationandIranonverificationandcompliance .Iranviolatedthetermsofthe
interimagreementthatsetupthenucleartalks ,buttheObamaadministrationrepeatedlyhasclaimeditwasincompliance.
PresidentObamaagainmadethisfalseclaiminhisspeechtoday.BottomlineVerificationofafinalagreementmustrequire
IrantoansweralloutstandingquestionsaboutweaponsrelatedworkandallowunfetteredaccessbytheIAEAtoallfacilities
wherenuclearactivitiesarebelievedtohavetakenplace.ThepreliminaryagreementappearstogiveIranapasson
previousnuclearweaponsworkandsetupaverificationplanthatwillnotdetectallweaponsrelated
activities.ArakHeavyWaterReactorAccordingtotheWhiteHousefactsheet,Iranwillremovethecoreofthisreactorandinstall
anewcoresothisreactorwillnotproduceweaponsgradeplutonium.Thisreactorwillremainaheavywaterreactorandwillbe
operatedforpeacefulpurposes.Iranhasagreednottoreprocessthespentfuelofthisreactortoproduceplutoniumindefinitely,will
sellitsexcessheavywaternotneededfortheredesignedreactor,andwillnotbuildmoreheavywaterreactorsfor15years.CommentHeavy
waterreactorsareaveryseriousproliferationriskbecausetheyareasourceofplutonium.Ifthisreactorremainsaheavywaterreactor,itwillbe
aplutoniumsource.IranconstructedthisreactorindefianceofIAEAresolutions.AllowingTehrantooperateitunderminesthe
credibilityoftheWesternstateswhopushedtheseresolutionsandincreasesIransexpertiseinoperating
andbuildingplutoniumproducingreactors.SanctionsAccordingtothefactsheet,U.S.andEUsanctionswillbeliftedafterthe
IAEAverifiesthatIranhascompliedwithallofitskeynuclearrelatedsteps.ThesesanctionswillsnapbackifIranfailstocomplywithits
commitments.PreviousU.N.SecurityCouncilresolutionsonIranwillmostlybeliftedifIrancomplieswithkeynuclearrelatedsteps,including
resolvingpossiblenuclearweaponsrelatedactivities.Asstatedabove,theIraniangovernmentappearstobelieveallsanctionswillbelifted
immediately.U.S.sanctionsonIranforterrorism,humanrightsabuses,andballisticmissileswillremaininplace.Comment Iranian
cheatingonnuclearagreements
has
usually
been
slowand
subtle
.Itisunlikelytoengageinany
unambiguouscheatingthatwillforcetheObamaadministrationtorestoresanctionsiftheyarelifted.Moreover,
oncesanctionsareliftedespeciallyEUandU.N.sanctionsitwillbeverydifficulttoreimposethem. Theframeworkseemstoset
fairlyeasybenchmarksthatwouldallowmostsanctionsagainstIrantobeliftedquickly. Thiswouldbea
boonfortheIranianeconomyandwouldgeneratesignificantlymorefundsthatIrancouldusetobolster
itseverincreasingeffortstointerferewithitsneighborsandspreaditsinfluence intheMiddleEast.AnAmerican
CapitulationThisframeworkappearscertaintoleadtoadealthatwillsignificantly
advanceIrans
uraniumenrichmentprogram,thoughagreementissupposedtoreducethethreatfromIransnuclearprogram.Byallowing
Irantoimproveitsexpertiseinuraniumenrichmentandplutoniumproductionandbylegitimizingits
nuclearprogram,adealbasedonthisframeworkwill
increasetherisk
from
an
Iraniannuclear
weapon.SuchanagreementwillprobablyfurtherdestabilizetheMiddle
Eastandcouldleadtoaregional
nucleararmsrace.PresidentObamasclaimthattheonlyalternativetothisagreementiswarwithIranisfalse .
Continuingthestatusquowouldbe
amuch
better
outcomethananagreementthatpavesthewaytoanIraniannuclear
bomb.ThepresidentclaimedthattheUnitedStateswillbeblamedforthefailureofdiplomacyifCongresskillsthisdeal.Ibelievetheoppositeis
thecase.OurMiddleEastfriendsandalliesarelikelytorejectthispreliminaryagreementasasellout tothe
IranianmullahsthatputstheirsecurityatriskatatimewhenIranianinfluenceisgrowingintheregion.ForthesakeofAmericansecurityandthe
securityofAmericasMiddleEastfriendsandallies,Congressmustdowhatitcantokillanynuclearagreementwith
Iranbasedonthedeeplyflawedframeworkunveiledtoday.
uranium at the same rate since the nuclear talks began early last year and
increased its stockpile of enriched uranium. It would take Iran about three months to produce fuel
for its first nuclear weapon by refining its low-enriched uranium to weapons-grade material. At the end of 2013, it
had on hand enough low-grade uranium for at least seven bombs; by the end of 2014, enough for at least eight. In
answer to criticism that a potential nuclear deal wont be strong enough, Obama officials have claimed it will be
subject to stringent inspections by International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors. This argument is hard to take
Iran has never fully cooperated with the IAEA. During the talks, it has
specifically refused to cooperate with IAEA inspectors one of its several violations
of the interim agreement that set up the talks. The alternative to a deeply
flawed nuclear deal is not war, it is continued stalemate more of the slow
development of the Iranian nuclear program that has persisted despite 13 months
of nuclear talks. Stopping the talks might actually lower regional tensions
by easing the fears of Israel, Saudi Arabia and other states that a weak,
short-lived nuclear agreement is coming soon one that will end sanctions
on Tehran and all restrictions on its future nuclear activities. Congress should not be fooled by
seriously:
the Obama teams false claim that its either their way on the Iranian nuclear program or war with Iran. The truth is
the flawed agreement being negotiated will make a war more likely and kicks
hard-to-solve elements of Irans nuclear program down the road for a future
president to deal with. Far better to halt the nuclear talks and return to the pre-2012
Western approach that required Iran to end uranium enrichment, disable its
centrifuges, send its enriched-uranium stockpile out of the country and disassemble
the Arak reactor. Charles Krauthammer had it right last week on Fox News: The Iranian nuclear talks are
that
**Iran DA**
This file just has the cards specific to the iran DA use the TPP DA to get evidence
about PC theory, winners win, etc
Iran Neg
Topshelf
1NC
Deal passes now --solves iran prolif
Aaron Mehta, 7-18-2015, "Experts Praise Iran Deal, Despite Congressional
Concerns," Defense News, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policybudget/2015/07/18/experts-praise-iran-deal-despite-congressionalconcerns/30261893/
where it really gets contentious is at the political level; thats where facts dont
really matter anymore. Indeed, while experts are happy with the deal,
members of Congress moved quickly to criticize the agreement in some
cases, before the final wording was even released publicly. The most audible
criticisms are coming from Republican members of the House and Senate, as well as
the bevy of GOP presidential hopefuls who seem to view a deal with Iran as a cudgel
that can be wielded during campaign season. Much of the criticism is of the same
flavor: that the US and Israel are less safe because of the agreement reached with
Tehran. Sen. Kelly Ayotte, R-N.H., said the deal "appears to be an historic
capitulation on Iran's nuclear program," while her counterpart on the Senate Armed
Services Committee, Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., slammed the deal in a series of
television appearances. Graham, notably, is a GOP presidential hopeful who is
staking his campaign on his foreign policy and defense credentials. The
committee's chairman, Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., cited concerns that Iran already is
expanding in other parts of the region and that loosening restrictions will allow the
Iranian government to spread its influence unchecked. Ultimately, the problem
with this agreement is that it is built far too much on hope, on the belief that
somehow the Iranian government will fundamentally change in the next several
years, McCain said in a statement. "This is delusional and dangerous.
Realistically, Lewis sees little chance that Congress successfully blocks the
deal, as it would require veto-proof majorities in both the House and
Senate. Instead, he said, expect a lot of talk, a lot of posturing, and potentially, a
way for members of Congress to avoid the issue entirely.
<<Insert Link>>
iran prolif snowballs and causes nuke war
Matthew Kroenig 12 (1-24, Stanton Nuclear Security fellow at the Council on
Foreign Relations. Five reasons to attack Iran
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2012/0124/Five-reasons-to-attackIran/A-strike-is-the-least-bad-option
The who-said-what game about last weekends talks in Geneva has become a
distraction. The six-power negotiations with Tehran to curb Irans nuclear
programme may yet succeed or fail. But wrangling between the US and France on
the terms of an acceptable deal should not allow the trees to obscure the forest.
The organising facts shaping the negotiations have not changed. The first of these
is that Tehrans acquisition of a bomb would be more than dangerous for the
Middle East and for wider international security. It would most likely set off a
nuclear arms race that would see Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt signing up
to the nuclear club. The nuclear non-proliferation treaty would be shattered. A
future regional conflict could draw Israel into launching a pre-emptive nuclear
strike. This is not a region obviously susceptible to cold war disciplines of
deterrence. The second ineluctable reality is that Iran has mastered the nuclear
cycle. How far it is from building a bomb remains a subject of debate. Different
intelligence agencies give different answers. These depend in part on what the
spooks actually know and in part on what their political masters want others to hear.
The progress of an Iranian warhead programme is one of the known unknowns that
have often wreaked havoc in this part of the world. Israel points to an imminent
threat. European agencies are more relaxed, suggesting Tehran is still two years or
so away from a weapon. Western diplomats broadly agree that Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei has not taken a definitive decision to step over the line. What Iran has
been seeking is what diplomats call a breakout capability the capacity to dash to a
bomb before the international community could effectively mobilise against it. The
third fact and this one is hard for many to swallow is that neither a negotiated
settlement nor the air strikes long favoured by Benjamin Netanyahu, Israels prime
minister, can offer the rest of the world a watertight insurance policy. It should be
possible to construct a deal that acts as a plausible restraint and extends the
timeframe for any breakout but no amount of restrictions or intrusive monitoring
can offer a certain guarantee against Tehrans future intentions. By the same token,
bombing Irans nuclear sites could certainly delay the programme, perhaps for a
couple of years. But, assuming that even the hawkish Mr Netanyahu is not
proposing permanent war against Iran, air strikes would not end it. You cannot
bomb knowledge and technical expertise. To try would be to empower those in
Tehran who say the regime will be safe only when, like North Korea, it has a
weapon. So when Barack Obama says the US will never allow Iran to get the bomb
he is indulging in, albeit understandable, wishful thinking. The best the
international community can hope for is that, in return for a relaxation of sanctions,
Iran will make a judgment that it is better off sticking with a threshold capability. To
put this another way, if Tehran does step back from the nuclear brink it will be
because of its own calculation of the balance of advantage. The fourth element in
this dynamic is that Iran now has a leadership that, faced with the severe and
growing pain inflicted by sanctions, is prepared to talk. There is nothing to say that
Hassan Rouhani, the president, is any less hard-headed than previous Iranian
leaders, but he does seem ready to weigh the options.
end of the talks. Russia and China, two of the world powers involved, had taken
Iran's side and pushed for the arms embargo to be lifted. She insisted that while
Iran wanted an immediate lifting of the embargo, the United States won a very
tough bargain in stretching it out for years. With a U.N. Security Council vote on a
resolution considered likely as early as next week, the Republican chairs of the
House Foreign Affairs and Homeland Security Committees have sent a letter to
Obama asking him to delay the vote. The embargo issue was the final major holdup
before a deal was sealed. On July 8, Obama, under pressure from critics who
accused him of giving too much ground, held a video conference with his team in
Vienna in which he "essentially rejected the deal that was on the table", in part
because he didnt like the how fast the U.N. embargo would be removed, a White
House official said. The compromise that ultimately won Obamas approval
extended that timetable. Republicans would need the support of dozens of
Democrats to sustain a "resolution of disapproval" that could [destroy] cripple a
deal. But the odds are considered slim that they could muster enough support to
overrule an Obama veto.
the talks, called the agreement "a terrible, dangerous mistake that's going to pave
the path for Iran to get a nuclear weapon." Rep. Lee Zeldin (R-Long Island) a
hawkish freshman said Obama "just negotiated away our sanctions that made for
critical leverage to deal with so many other completely unacceptable acts."
Iran deal will likely pass, but Republicans will make it a tough
fight, Obama will have to go all out to make sure it passes
Borger 7/15; JULIAN BORGER is the Guardian's diplomatic editor. He was
previously a correspondent in the US, the Middle East, Eastern Europe and the
Balkans; 7/15/15; Iran nuclear deal moves to battleground of US Congress;
(http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/14/iran-nuclear-deal-moves-tobattleground-of-us-congress)
The battle over the Iran nuclear agreement is set to move to Washington as
the Obama administration begins a three-month campaign to stop the hardwon deal being derailed by congressional Republicans. The deal reached in a
Vienna hotel early on Tuesday morning after prolonged talks between foreign ministers binds Iran, the
US, UK, France, Germany, Russia and China to a series of undertakings
stretching over many years. Iran will dismantle much of its nuclear infrastructure, while the UN, US
and European Union will remove a wall of sanctions built around Iran over the last nine years. Republicans
and some Democratic hawks in Congress, who have long argued that there
should be no nuclear programme on Iranian soil whatsoever, are determined
to find ways to sabotage an agreement that they argue seeks to manage
rather than prevent an Iranian nuclear programme and endangers Israel. The
struggle to win over wavering Democratic votes in the Senate will pit some
American allies against others. The Israeli prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, signalled that he
would intervene assertively in the debate on Capitol Hill in an attempt to kill the deal, which will grant sanctions
relief to Iran in return for its acceptance of long-lasting curbs on its nuclear programme. In that debate, Israel will be
assisted by the Gulf Arab monarchies. On the other side, Britain, France and Germany all parties to the historic
agreement will be called on to support the administrations argument, that the agreement protects the US and its
friends in the region. In a statement to coincide with the announcement of the deal, known officially as the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Barack Obama said: I
The Obama
administration has a few days to present the agreement to Congress, which
then has 60 days to review it. Another 22 days is set aside for an initial vote,
in which the Republican majority is likely to reject the deal, and then a
Atid party, said Netanyahus campaign over Iran had been a colossal failure.
second vote, over which there is a presidential veto. The Republicans have to
win over just a handful of Senate Democrats to ensure a congressional vote
of disapproval is not blocked by a filibuster. They would have to peel off 12
Democrats or independents to override Obamas veto, an uphill task.
Republicans were vociferous in denouncing the JCPOA. One of the partys presidential hopefuls, the former Arkansas
governor Mike Huckabee, said: Shame on the Obama administration for agreeing to a deal that empowers an evil
Iranian regime to carry out its threat to wipe Israel off the map and bring death to America. Other
The
The Iran Deal will pass barely, there will be a huge political
battle, Obama will have to push the bill to pass
- So I am split about this card. It could be used as the bill
will or wont pass. It could technically be used for either
side. It could also be an ! extension card.
Abdullah 7/15; HALIMAH ABDULLHA is published by CNN. He is also published
by ABC News, Google News, Market Watch, The Next Web, and The New York Times;
7/15/15; Obama: Iran Nuke Deal Makes Our Country, World Safer;
(http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/coming-obama-takes-questions-irannuclear-deal-n392511)
more secure." Six world powers, including the United States, reached the deal on Tuesday. It aims to limit
Iran's nuclear capability in exchange for lifting punishing economic sanctions. Obama has said the deal eliminates
conference, the president referred to notes and dissected point by point the type of criticism leveled at the deal
since it was announced. He also said that critics of the deal have not presented a better alternative and indicated
that he was ready for an engaged conversation on the matter. " I
President Joe Biden, New York Democrat Rep. Steve Israel said he is a "skeptic" of the agreement, but will take the
entire 60-day review period to figure out if this deal is worth supporting. "I think the vice president made as
convincing of an argument as he can make, but I think there are a lot of questions to be answered," Israel said. "I
had been skeptical from the beginning of this. I am still skeptical. I read the Joint Comprehensive plan of action last
night and there was nothing in it to relieve my skepticism." Israeli leadership has been more blunt in its criticism.
until Iran proves to the International Atomic Energy Agency that it has met its obligations under the terms of the
Energy Agency confirmed Iran also has signed a roadmap with his organization to clarify outstanding issues. The
agreement also makes no mention of the four Americans who have been held in Iran for years, a fact Obama said
"nobody is content" over in fiery remarks.
Obama has promised to exercise his veto if Congress rejects the deal, which curbs
Iran's nuclear program while allowing an easing of economic sanctions. Try
Newsweek for only $1.25 per week Overriding it would require a two-thirds
majority of both the House of Representatives and Senate, so the administration is
working to win over enough of Obama's fellow Democrats to offset strong
Republican opposition.
U: A2 U Overwhelms
Uq doesnt overwhelm- obamas involvement is key
Chris Villani, 7-19-2015, "Dem, GOP reps: Murky forecast for Iran deal in
Congress," Boston Herald,
http://www.bostonherald.com/news_opinion/local_coverage/2015/07/dem_gop_reps_
murky_forecast_for_iran_deal_in_congress
The future of the Iran nuclear deal in Congress is uncertain, congressmen from both
sides of the aisle said on Boston Herald Radio today. I think its going to be
close, but its hard to tell, Massachusetts Democrat Michael Capuano said. It
looks at the moment as though most of the Republicans will be in lock-step against
whatever the president supports and there are some Democrats who will have some
problems with this. I think there are enough votes to support a veto, but the
president has his work cut out for him. On my side of the aisle, I think there
will be strong agreement to override, the question is what to the Democrats do?
Oklahoma Republican Jim Bridenstine said. From what I have been hearing from
some Democrats, it seems they are very concerned about this.
U: A2 Deal Expires
Even if the deal expires in 10 years, sanctions and other
regulations will be in place which checks Irans nuclear
capabilities
Jalabi 7/15; RAYA JALABI is a reporter and editor for The Guardian; 7/15/15;
Obama defends Iran nuclear deal as battle moves to Congress live updates;
(http://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2015/jul/15/barack-obama-iran-nucleardeal-congress-live-updates)
Obama addresses what happens if the deal holds, at the end of the set 10
years. Some of the restrictions will still be in place, he says. The inspections
will not go away. Theres no scenario in which the US president is not in a
stronger position 15 years from now, if Iran wanted to develop a nuclear weapon
down the line, he says. Even if what the critics say are true, Obama says, that at
the end of 10-15 years, Iran is now in a position to develop a nuclear weapon,
that they are at a breakout point, they wont be at a more dangerous breakout
point than they are now. It wont be shorter than the one that exists today, he
says.
often balked at this, saying the military installations are not part of its nuclear
facilities. A compromise was reached that would allow inspectors to monitor military
sites, but Iran could challenge requests for access, according to The Associated
Press. Iran's 'Breakout Time' Will Be Lengthened: There's broad consensus that Iran,
at present, could produce enough highly enriched uranium to build a nuclear
weapon within a few months. The deal is designed to extend Iran's nuclear
"breakout time" to at least a year. The thinking is this would give the U.S. and
others plenty of time to respond if Iran scraps the agreement and makes a sprint
toward a weapon. Iran will be required to reduce its current stockpile of enriched
uranium by 98 percent, according to the White House. The remaining uranium it
keeps will be at low levels, sufficient for a power plant, but nowhere near what's
needed for a weapon. Iran will also have to reduce by two-thirds its centrifuges that
can enrich uranium. This has not impressed critics who say Iran developed its
program at secret, hidden facilities in the past and could do so again. Some say
they would not be satisfied even if Iran sticks to the letter of the deal. They argue
that Iran's nuclear enrichment program is now entrenched in the agreement and
that, after a decade, many restrictions will begin to fall away. Sanctions Relief:
Sanctions have been biting. Perhaps the most punitive measure took effect three
years ago, when Europe and others stopped buying Iran's oil, its main export. Iran's
oil exports have been down by roughly half, delivering a major economic blow. Iran
wanted all sanctions lifted immediately. But the U.S. says inspectors must first verify
that Iran has met all its obligations, and this process could take months. The U.S.,
the United Nations and the European Union all have their own sanctions against
Iran, and each would have to act independently to lift them. Republicans in the U.S.
Congress are authorized to review the agreement, but they will need a two-thirds
majority to block the deal and override a veto by Obama. From Iran's perspective,
the EU oil and banking sanctions are the ones that have the greatest adverse effect
on their economy. Assessing the overall sanctions picture, analysts have tossed
around the figure of $100 billion in relief that could come Iran's way in the short
term. The Broader Middle East: Obama has sketched an optimistic scenario in which
Iran observes the nuclear deal, which builds trust and shows Iran the benefits of
cooperation in the region and with the West. One possible example: Both the U.S.
and Iran are battling the self-described Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, though they
insist there's no formal collaboration. If the nuclear deal goes well, it could open up
the possibility for the U.S. and Iran to work together, formally or informally, for the
first time since Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution. But the critics see a much more
pessimistic future. Iran is emboldened by the deal, receives a badly needed influx of
cash and pushes to further extend its influence in countries where it already plays a
key role, including Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. Reaching a deal was tough.
Some of the hardest questions are still ahead.
This Thanksgiving had an extra reason to be thankful the new deal between Iran
and six superpowers. Last week, the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany,
Russia and China (the P5+1 group) reached an interim deal with Iran to stop their
nuclear weapons program. Four key provisions were obtained in this deal:
1) no enrichment of U above 5% U-235, and all highly-enriched materials, some as
high as 20% U-235, must be blended down to less than 5% or altered to a form not
usable for weapons. 2) no additional centrifuges are to be installed or produced, and
three-fourths of the centrifuges at Fordow and half of the centrifuges at Natanz will
be inoperable, 3) stop all work on the heavy-water reactor at Arak, provide design
details on the reactor (which could be used to produce Pu for the other type of
atomic weapon) and do not develop the reprocessing facilities needed to separate
Pu from used fuel, 4) full access by IAEA inspectors to all nuclear facilities, including
daily visitation to Natanz and Fordow, and continuous camera surveillance of key
sites. Despite all the rhetoric of horror and claims that this deal is a mistake, this
deal is just what we all hoped for as the first step to resolving the Iranian nuclear
weapons issue, the structure of which weve been proposing for years. It is the first
step to bringing Iran into the worlds nuclear community as a partner instead of an
adversary, making Iran a compliant signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. While
this may make some of its neighbors nervous, there is no real alternative that does
not involve lots of destruction and death. Old orders are falling in the Middle East.
The region is in upheaval, Shia and Sunni are as far apart as ever, and Irans
theocracy, embodied by their new President Hassan Rouhani, has decided that the
cost/benefit of maintaining an expensive, useless nuclear program that is still a long
way from producing a reliable weapon, while being starved by a barrage of
sanctions, on the heels of a global economic meltdown, has now gone into the toomuch-cost-and-not-enough-benefit category. Thus, there is now an opening to
change the game. This deal is not about trust, as the last point above about access
addresses. No one trusts governments, even supposedly good ones. There must be
unfettered access to verify that the nuclear facilities are not being used to produce
weapons and that is what this deal allows, and it will be easy to determine when
Iran breaks this deal (The Economist; The Guardian; Fox News).But the facilities can,
and will, be used to support nuclear power, as was the original purpose of Irans
nuclear program when the United States set it up under the Shah in the 1960s, and
that is the actual end point of this whole deal. Not the end of Irans nuclear program
or the destruction of their facilities, their country or their people.
Earlier today in Vienna, international negotiators reached a deal with Iran over its
nuclear program. The New York Times reports that the agreement will
eventually lift oil and financial sanctions, in return for limits on Irans
nuclear production capability and fuel stockpile over the next 15 years.
The international restrictions on Iranian arms exports will remain in place for up to 5
years, and the ban on ballistic missile exports could remain for up to 8 years. In a
televised statement this morning, President Obama defended his decision to engage
in the negotiations from a position of strength and assured the American people
that, under the deal, Iran will not be able to achieve a nuclear weapon.
His opponents are sure to challenge both assertions. The deal, Obama said, is
not built on trust, it is built on verification. Those verification provisions
appeared to have been one of the final sticking points in the negotiations. According
to the Associated Press, the Iranians agreed to allow inspection of Iranian military
sites, something the countrys supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, had long
vowed to oppose, but such inspections are not the surprise, snap inspections that
some had pushed for. The focus now turns to the Senate, which has 60 days
to review the agreement. Senators could vote to block it, but Obama has
already pledged that he would veto any legislation that prohibits the
deals implementation. He has a reasonably strong hand to play. Even if all
Senate Republicans vote to kill the deal, opponents would need at least a dozen
Senate Democrats to vote with them in order to override the president. Expect the
details of the nearly 100-page document to come under close scrutiny, even though
many opponents dont appear to believe that the specifics matter that much. For
them, nearly any deal is a bad deal. For example, the latest entrant into the 2016
Republican presidential contest, Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker, yesterday
pledged to terminate the bad deal with Iran on Day One before the terms were
even finalized. And he predicted that any other Republican president would do the
same. Arkansass freshman Senator Tom Cotton has publicly stated that his object
has been to blow up any deal. For Walker, Cotton, and others you dont negotiate
with a regime like Irans you destroy it. But counter proliferation by means of
regime change has a bad odor today, thanks chiefly to the Iraq war that,
coincidentally, many of the most outspoken Iran deal opponents had a hand in
pushing on the American people beginning in the late 1990s. They have learned
nothing, it appears, but most Americans have: refusing to engage diplomatically
with an odious regime, or waging war to separate said regime from its weapons by
removing the regime from power is a costly proposition, and there is no guarantee
that the government that emerges in its place will be better than that which came
before. George W. Bush came around to this view by the middle of his second term
in office: the man who in 2002 cast Iran as a charter member of the Axis of Evil
along with Iraq and North Korea supported the P5 + 1 negotiating process that
eventually led to todays deal. So keep all this in mind in the coming weeks as the
details of the Iran deal are debated in Washington and around the country. Deal
opponents have an obligation to describe their preferred alternative, not merely
what they are against.
(http://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2015/jul/15/barack-obama-iran-nucleardeal-congress-live-updates)
Thats it from Barack Obamas press conference on Iran. Heres a summary of what
the US president said: Obama argued the debate over the landmark nuclear
agreement was ultimately a choice between diplomacy and war. He praised the
historic deal, preempted critics by saying the deal meets the national security
interests of the US and its allies, and reminded all present that the sole priority was
always to stop Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. Obama said he hoped the
deal would help encourage Iran to decrease its regional involvement and terrorist
activities, but he wasnt betting on it. Obama said that Irans support for terrorism
remained a concern, but said blocking Iran from getting a nuclear weapon was more
important than blocking Iran from funding its regional proxies. Obama said he hoped
Congress would evaluate the deal based on the facts, though he conceded that
politics would inevitably intrude.
Haaretz, 7-16-2015, "Iran deal: good or bad? Five analyses you don't want to
miss," http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.666240, Haaretz is a
newspaper based out of Israel. WGR 7-16-15
Barak Ravid acknowledges various shortfalls in the agreement, but says that Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is mistaken and misleading when he suggests a good
agreement was even possible. At least this deal, Ravid says, will compel Iran to take
steps that it would unlikely take under any other scenario. Ravid adds that a decade
in the Middle East is a long time, and an Iran that is closer to the U.S. could be an
Iran that's less dangerous for Israel.
Peter Beinart, on the other hand, says this deal, while imperfect, achieves
America's goal of peacefully preventing Iran from achieving a nuclear weapon. He
says the real reason behind the drama playing out between Israel and the United
States over the deal is that the two countries have conflicting vital interests: the
U.S. does not want to keep Iran weak. In fact, the United States would prefer a
relatively strong Iran to maintain the balance of power in the Middle East and
possibly even help in the fight against Islamic State. Israel, on the other hand, has a
vital interest in keeping Iran weak. What scares Jerusalem most is that the deal
legitimizes Irans regime internationally and ends sanctions, giving Tehran a lot
more cash, and with it a lot more power.
the US, world powers, and Iran would ever reach a nuclear deal. And he was
skeptical that if they did reach a deal, it would be good enough. But when the
negotiators released the "framework" in April, describing the broad strokes, Lewis
came away impressed and happily surprised but with some caveats and some
unanswered questions. I called up Lewis to see what he thought of the final deal. His
assessment was very positive: Asked to grade the deal, he said, "I would give it an
A." Max Fisher: Talk me through what your reactions were as you were reading
through the text of the deal. Jeffrey Lewis: I'm reading it and I'm bored, because it
looks like exactly the fact sheet from the spring [from the framework deal] and the
explanations that Obama administration officials gave privately. There were little
points where I though, "Oh, that's an interesting little detail, I'm glad they caught
that." Or, "Oh, they dealt with that problem." It's exactly the deal they had in the
spring. There are little things that they improved on, or that they fussed with, but
it's the same. Max Fisher: Well, but there are some holes they filled in, some
unresolved stuff in the framework, and I want to ask you about that later on. But
first I want to ask more broadly, back in April you told me that the framework was
very good if they could get it on a formal agreement and if they could resolve the
open issues. So did they do that? Jeffrey Lewis: Yes. That's exactly what I was going
to tell you. The thing I was saying at the time was, "The fact sheet looks great, good
luck getting that on paper." And then they did it. Max Fisher: Are you surprised?
Jeffrey Lewis: Well, there was always a deal to be had here if reasonable people
could make reasonable compromises. I never really count on that, but it seems like
they did it. I wouldn't say I'm surprised, but I am pleased. I'm happy with it. I was
talking to a colleague who is unhappy [with the deal], and it's kind of fascinating.
He's unhappy because, he said, "We spent eight years, and the deal we got is not
better than the deal we could have gotten eight years ago." And it's like, oh, no
kidding. That's not an indictment of the deal, my friend, it's an indictment of eight
years of fucking around. "I SEE IT AS A REALLY STRAIGHTFORWARD MEASURE TO
SLOW DOWN AN ENRICHMENT PROGRAM THAT WAS GOING GANGBUSTERS " Max
Fisher: Why is this a good deal? Jeffrey Lewis: It's a good deal because it slows down
their nuclear program which they say is for civilian purposes but could be used to
make a bomb, and which we think was originally intended to make a bomb. And it
puts monitoring and verification measures in place that mean if they try to build a
bomb, we're very likely to find out, and to do so with enough time that we have
options to do something about it. There's a verifiable gap between their bomb
option and an actual bomb. That's why it's a good deal. Max Fisher: So that rests on
Iran looking at all of this and saying, "It's not worth even trying to cheat on the
deal." Jeffrey Lewis: It's a slightly more resigned attitude. I can't get inside the
supreme leader's head. He might be a guy who likes to take risks. He might be
stupid, he might get bad advice. So I don't ever look at a situation where you're
trying to deter someone and say, "This will work." Because you can never know
that. What I try to do is ask, "Have we done all of the things that we reasonably can
so that more will not help, and we can't imagine more intrusive mechanisms that
are likely to be accepted?" What you want is to feel like the administration has
maxed out what they could have reasonably hoped to achieve. You can't know that
[Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei] will be deterred. But I don't know
that there's any way to make him more deterred than this . "I KNOW IT MAKES THE
FRENCH REALLY ANGRY WHEN THEY HEAR THIS, BUT..." Max Fisher: When we talked
in April, just after the framework came out, the biggest unresolved issue was
sanctions relief for Iran. It wasn't clear how the timing would work, how the
sanctions would come off. So how did this work out in the final deal? Jeffrey Lewis: It
looked like we thought it would look. They knew they would have to massage the
Iranian demand for immediate sanctions relief, and the American demand for
sanctions to be lifted conditionally, and they did it the way we thought they would
do it, which is with an implementation period. The simple version is that the US can
say, "Sanctions don't come off until the agreement is implemented," and Iran can
say, "Sanctions come off immediately." And that satisfies the requirements of each
political system. Max Fisher: The two other components that are getting a lot of
discussion are "managed access" for inspectors to certain Iranian military sites,
which I talked about with Aaron Stein in a separate Q&A [to be published soon]. The
second is the "snapback" process for bringing back sanctions in case Iran cheats.
What do you make of that? Jeffrey Lewis: The snapback thing is really clever , I had
to read it a couple of times to make sure it said what I think it said. According to the
deal, the way this is going to work is that sanctions will be lifted, but in a conditional
fashion. If any party to the deal and, not to spill the beans, that means the United
States is dissatisfied with Iran's compliance, then first it has to go to the joint
commission [of the seven states that signed the Iran deal plus the European Union].
If they don't get satisfaction, then they go to the UN Security Council. And they can
notify them that they're not satisfied with the compliance of another party. That
starts a 30-day clock ticking. The Security Council must act to resolve the concerns
of the state. If the Security Council does nothing which could include them trying
to pass something and the US vetoing it at the end of the 30 days, if there's no
action from the Security Council, the sanctions are reimposed automatically. Max
Fisher: You wonder how they got Russia and China on board for this, given that the
entire snapback arrangement is basically a fancy way of cutting Russia and China
out of any decision on reimposing sanctions and stripping them of their Security
Council veto authority on this issue. Jeffrey Lewis: This was, I suspect, satisfactory to
Russia and China for two reasons. One is they seem to really care about the
principle of their veto, and so even though this in practice provides an end run
around their veto, it doesn't take it away from them. I think they cared about that
principle more than anything else. It's the same way that they set it up so that the
cowards in Congress don't have to vote on the deal if they don't want to. They can
talk for 60 days, and talk about how much they hate it, and then filibuster it into
action. Lotta profiles of courage on this deal. The second reason, which I do think
makes sense, is that through the perspective of the Chinese and Russians and
even the Iranians this is really a deal between the US and Iran. I know it makes
the French really angry when they hear this they played an important role, and I
don't want to diminish it but at the end of the day, if this deal collapses it's the
US that would end up bombing Iran. So even though it sounds like the US can blow
up the deal any time it wants and revert to sanctions, that's just how things are
anyway. So it's kind of a nod to the reality that, on some level, this is really just a
US-Iran deal. "THESE ARE PEOPLE WHO ARE BUILDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS
THERE ARE NO NOT-MORALLY-DUBIOUS PEOPLE INVOLVED" Max Fisher: A lot of what
you wrote throughout 2014 was skeptical. Not of the idea of the Iran deal, but rather
skeptical that they could make it work, that they would get there in time, that they
would have all the right conditions. Jeffrey Lewis: That's right. I had no faith
whatsoever that they could pull this off. Max Fisher: Now that we're here, what
grade would you give it? Jeffrey Lewis: I would give it an A. Max Fisher: A solid A!
Jeffrey Lewis: I mean, it's hard. There are two pieces to this. Compared to the deal
we could have gotten 10 years ago, if the Bush administration hadn't had their
heads up their butts? Not an A! That would have been a great deal! I remember
when they had 164 centrifuges, in one cascade, and I said, "You know what, we
should let them keep it in warm standby. No uranium, just gas." And people were
like, "You're givin' away the store!" Max Fisher: We would kill for that now! They got
cut down to 5,000 centrifuges, and it's a huge deal. Jeffrey Lewis: Exactly. And that's
been the fundamental experience of this for me. Every six months, the deal we
could have gotten six months before looks better. Every time we tried to hold out for
a better deal, and every time we got in the position of a worse deal. So, compared
to where they started, and what I thought was feasible to achieve, this team I
thought did a fantastic job. If this team had been in place in 2003 or 2004 or 2005,
it might have looked even better. But they inherited what they inherited, and they
did a pretty decent job with it. How could I give them less than A? Max Fisher: We
did a post just rounding up tweets from arms control analysts on what they're
saying about the Iran deal, and it was really hard to find arms control analysts who
seem to be critical of the deal on the nonproliferation merits. Maybe there are some
we just missed, but it seems like the consensus was overwhelmingly positive, which
was so interesting to me because it's very different from the conversation among
Middle East policy analysts, which is much more divided. Why do you think that is?
Jeffrey Lewis: If you are interested in the nonproliferation piece how to say this.
As a deal, this is what deals look like. Actually, they usually don't look this good. So
if you don't know that... When I read people saying, you know, "I can't believe we're
making a deal with these morally dubious people," I understand why a regional
security specialist might feel that way. But when you work in the arms control field,
they're all morally dubious people! These are people who are building nuclear
weapons there are no not-morally-dubious people involved. So when you take
that out of the equation, you end up just looking at, "Do these limits slow them
down, are they verifiable, are we likely to catch them if they cheat, are we likely to
have enough time to do anything?" The problem [for regional analysts] is not going
to be the terms. It's not going to be how it's written. It's going to be the fact that
one side or another decides they don't like the idea of it. But the deal itself can still
be perfectly workable. "WHEN I SEE IRANIANS POURING OUT INTO THE STREETS
WITH JOY, THAT GIVES ME A LITTLE BIT OF ANXIETY" Max Fisher: So if regional
analysts look at a deal with a terrible regime and see it as morally dubious, and
arms control analysts look at it and aren't bothered, is that because arms control
people are just amoral monsters? Jeffrey Lewis: Maybe! But I think it's more that
they're looking at it differently. Whenever I hear regional security specialists talk
about the deal, it is just a bizarre conversation . Because they all talk about how
either it will fundamentally alter our relationship with the Islamic Republic [of Iran],
which I think is just silly, or about how it's a mistake to try to fundamentally alter
our relationship with the Islamic Republic . I just don't think that the deal does any of
those things. I see it as a really straightforward measure to slow down an
enrichment program that was going gangbusters . So you ask, "Does it slow it
down?" Yes. "Does it slow it down in a way that is verifiable ?" Yes. "Does it slow it
down more than bombing it would?" Yes. "Okay, good deal." That might be a
different way of looking at it. But when two countries have a security situation that
is so poor that one or both of them feels the need to acquire weapons, you're really
just trying to keep them from killing each other. You're not hoping for a fundamental
transformation. Like the reason that the Agreed Framework [the 1994 nuclear deal
with North Korea] didn't work well, it didn't work for lots of reasons, but at its
core, North Koreans want to be accepted as a normal country. And that was not
going to happen. We wanted them to be a non-nuclear pariah as opposed to a
nuclear pariah; we did not want to accept them as a normal country. So they were
always disappointed that this tiny little bit of disarmament that they engaged in
didn't cause us to forget that that they have labor camps and that they execute
people with anti-aircraft guns. Libya's the other place where this happened [after
Libya negotiated a 2003 deal with the US to give up its entire nuclear program].
Qaddafi thought this would give him a good relationship with the West. Except
guess what! Max Fisher: But if you're saying that part of what Iran wants here is to
not be a pariah state anymore, doesn't that mean transforming the relationship on
some level beyond just nonproliferation? Jeffrey Lewis: I interpret them as being
interested in sanctions relief, and that's I suppose a way in which they're becoming
less of a pariah, that they can trade. So I guess in a narrow sense that's not being a
pariah. But until they stop supporting [Lebanese terrorist group] Hezbollah, doing
what they're doing in Syria and Iraq and Yemen, I don't think there's going to be a
transformation in the relationship. If that's their hope when I see Iranians pouring
out into the streets with joy, that gives me a little bit of anxiety. They need to
manage their expectations a little better than that.
said David Makovsky, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. The
negative optic would be, he is being bought off from his principled opposition. He
sees any package now as muddying what he sees as the moral clarity of his
objection. In Israel, the question was not whether the deal would be followed by a
robust new military aid package from Washington, but rather when such discussions
would commence and what might be on the shopping list. Isaac Herzog, the leader
of the opposition in Parliament, said Tuesday night that he would soon travel to the
United States to advance a package of security measures to suit the new
situation. Yuval Steinitz, the senior Israeli minister sent Wednesday morning to
brief international journalists, was blunt when asked about Mr. Obamas promises:
Its wrong to use the word compensation because there is no real compensation
from a nuclear threat. When pressed, he said, Of course we are ready to speak on
everything we never said no. Our attitude is first to focus on the agreement,
Mr. Steinitz said, adding that there might still be room to fix some things.
American officials said the Israelis were not interested in engaging in the kind of
quid pro quo that appeared to go on when Mr. Obama invited Persian Gulf leaders to
Camp David earlier this year. During that May visit, Mr. Obama offered Saudi Arabia
and smaller Arab states new support to defend against potential missile strikes,
maritime threats and cyberattacks from Iran. The United States has offered Israel an
array of defense capabilities in recent years, some of which Israel decided against
because of budget constraints. United States Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel
offered V-22 Osprey aircraft and aerial refueling tankers when he visited Tel Aviv in
2013. But Israel decided that its own money and the security aid provided by
America were better used on other items, said Derek Chollet, a United States
assistant secretary of defense at the time. Giora Eiland, a former Israeli national
security adviser, said that adding batteries, radars and missiles to the Arrow missiledefense system should be the No. 1 priority. Focusing on such defensive
capabilities would enable both sides to frame the deal not as political
compensation but rather as a response to Israels concerns that lifting sanctions
will increase the threats against it by Iranian-backed groups like Hezbollah and
Hamas, he said. Some officials suggested that one way to indirectly placate Israel
involved how much security assistance the United States will offer in coming years,
under a memo of understanding being renegotiated before it expires in 2018. The
current agreement, which went into effect in 2009, provides for $3 billion a year,
most of which is used by Israel to buy American military hardware, such as jets and
components for missile defense. In talks that started long before the Iran nuclear
deal began to take shape, Israel requested between $4.2 billion and $4.5 billion a
year for the next 10 years, an official familiar with the talks said.
Kahl 12 (Colin H.,an associate professor in the Security Studies Program in the
Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, where he
teaches courses on international relations, international security, the geopolitics of
the Middle East, American foreign policy, and civil and ethnic conflict. He is also a
senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), a Washington, DCbased think tank. Current research projects include assessments of the geopolitical
implications of Iranian nuclearization and a separate study of the evolution of U.S.
counterinsurgency practices during the Iraq war. , Iran and the Bomb
Would a Nuclear Iran Make the Middle East More Secure? ,September/October,
Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2012-07-17/iran-andbomb, LS)
Kenneth Waltz is probably right that a nuclear-armed Iran could be deterred from
deliberately using nuclear weapons or transferring a nuclear device to terrorists
("Why Iran Should Get the Bomb," July/August 2012). But he is dead wrong that the
Islamic Republic would likely become a more responsible international actor if it
crossed the nuclear threshold. In making that argument, Waltz mischaracterizes
Iranian motivations and badly misreads history. And despite the fact that Waltz is
one of the world's most respected international relations theorists, he ignores
important political science research into the effects of nuclear weapons, including
recent findings that suggest that new nuclear states are often more reckless and
aggressive at lower levels of conflict. RATIONAL BUT DANGEROUS Waltz correctly
notes that Iran's leaders, despite their fanatical rhetoric, are fundamentally rational.
Because Iran's leadership is not suicidal, it is highly unlikely that a nuclear-armed
Iran would deliberately use a nuclear device or transfer one to terrorists. Yet even
though the Islamic Republic is rational, it is still dangerous, and it is likely to become
even more so if it develops nuclear weapons. Iran's government currently sponsors
terrorist groups and supports militants throughout the Middle East, in part to
demonstrate a capability to retaliate against the United States, Israel, and other
states should they attack Iran or undermine its interests. If the Iranian leadership's
sole concern was its own survival and it believed that a nuclear deterrent alone
could give it enough protection, then as a nuclear state, it might curtail its support
for proxies in order to avoid needless disputes with other nuclear powers. But Iran is
not a status quo state, and its support for terrorists and militants is intended to be
for more than just defense and retaliation. Such support is an offensive tool,
designed to pressure and intimidate other states, indirectly expand Iran's influence,
and advance its revisionist agenda, which seeks to make Iran the preeminent power
in the Middle East, champion resistance to Israel and "arrogant powers" in the West,
promote its brand of revolutionary Islamist ideology, and assert its leadership in the
wider Islamic world. Tehran currently calibrates its support for militants and
sponsorship of terrorism to minimize the risks of a direct confrontation with more
powerful states. But if Iranian leaders perceived that a nuclear arsenal provided a
substantially more robust deterrent against retaliation, they would likely pursue
their regional goals more aggressively. Specifically, a nuclear-armed Tehran would
likely provide Hezbollah and Palestinian militants with more sophisticated, longerrange, and more accurate conventional weaponry for use against Israel. In an effort
to bolster the deterrent capabilities of such allies, Iran might consider giving them
"dual-capable" weapons, leaving Israel to guess whether these systems were
conventional or armed with chemical, biological, or nuclear material. A nucleararmed Iran might also give its proxies permission to use advanced weapons
systems instead of keeping them in reserve, as Tehran reportedly instructed
Hezbollah to do during the militant group's 2006 war with Israel. A nuclear-armed
Iran, believing that it possessed a powerful deterrent and could thus commit
violence abroad with near impunity, might also increase the frequency and scale of
the terrorist attacks against U.S. and Israeli targets carried out by Hezbollah and the
Quds Force, the covert operations wing of Iran's elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps. And a bolder Iran might increase the number of Revolutionary Guard forces it
deployed to Lebanon, allow its navy to engage in more frequent shows of force in
the Mediterranean, and assert itself more aggressively in the Persian Gulf and the
Strait of Hormuz. To further enhance its image in the eyes of domestic and regional
audiences as the leader of an anti-Western resistance bloc, a nuclear-armed Iran
might respond to regional crises by threatening to use all the means at its disposal
to ensure the survival of the Assad regime in Syria, Hezbollah, or Palestinian groups.
And Iran might be emboldened to play the spoiler in the Israeli-Palestinian peace
process by encouraging large-scale militant attacks and might try to destabilize its
neighbors through more coercive diplomacy and subversion in Iraq and the Gulf
states. The growing influence of "principlist" hard-liners in Tehran makes those
possibilities even more likely. The principlists' view of the world is shaped by their
ideological belief in the inevitability of U.S. decline, Israeli defeat, and Iranian
ascendance. They see the competition with the United States and Israel as a zerosum game. If Iran obtains a nuclear weapon, the principlists will see it as a
confirmation of their convictions and push the Iranian government further in the
direction of risk and provocation. To be sure, a nonnuclear Iran already engages in
many destabilizing activities. But equipped with nuclear weapons, Tehran would
likely dial up its trouble-making and capitalize on its deterrent to limit the response
options available to threatened states. THE STABILITY-INSTABILITY PARADOX "History
shows that when countries acquire the bomb, they feel increasingly vulnerable and
become acutely aware that their nuclear weapons make them a potential target in
the eyes of major powers," Waltz argues. "This awareness discourages nuclear
states from bold and aggressive action." In writing this, Waltz ignores a long history
of emerging nuclear powers behaving provocatively. In 1950, for example, Soviet
leader Joseph Stalin gave North Korea the green light to invade South Korea, thus
beginning the Korean War. Stalin apparently assumed (incorrectly) that the United
States was unlikely to respond because the Soviets had by then developed their
own nuclear weapons. Waltz also claims that China became less aggressive after
going nuclear in 1964. But in 1969, Mao Zedong authorized Chinese troops to attack
Soviet forces on the Chinese-Soviet border. The attack was meant to warn Moscow
against border provocations and to mobilize domestic Chinese support for Mao's
revolution. Like Stalin before him, Mao was probably confident that China's recently
acquired nuclear capabilities would limit the resulting conflict. (In the end, the
border clashes produced a larger crisis than Mao had expected, raising the
possibility of a Soviet nuclear strike, and China backed down.) Waltz also asserts
that "India and Pakistan have both become more cautious since going nuclear." But
Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons has in fact facilitated its strategy of
engaging in low-intensity conflict against India, making the subcontinent more
crisis-prone. As the political scientist S. Paul Kapur has shown, as Islamabad's
nuclear capabilities have increased, so has the volatility of the Indian-Pakistani
rivalry. Since 1998, when both India and Pakistan openly tested nuclear devices,
Islamabad has appeared more willing to back militant groups fighting in disputed
Kashmir and to support groups that have conducted terrorist attacks elsewhere in
India. Furthermore, in 1999, Pakistan sent conventional forces disguised as
insurgents across the Line of Control in the Kargil district of Kashmir, triggering a
limited war with India. This move was encouraged by the Pakistanis' belief that their
nuclear deterrent placed clear limits on India's ability to retaliate with conventional
weapons. Additionally, over the past decade, Pakistani-backed militants have
engaged in high-profile terrorist attacks inside India itself, including the 2001 attack
on the New Delhi parliament complex and the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Waltz writes
that "policymakers and citizens in the Arab world, Europe, Israel, and the United
States should take comfort from the fact that history has shown that where nuclear
capabilities emerge, so, too, does stability." In fact, the historical record suggests
that competition between a nuclear-armed Iran and its principal adversaries would
likely follow the pattern known as "the stability-instability paradox," in which the
supposed stability created by mutually assured destruction generates greater
instability by making provocations, disputes, and conflict below the nuclear
threshold seem safe. During the Cold War, for example, nuclear deterrence
prevented large-scale conventional or nuclear war between the United States and
the Soviet Union. At the same time, however, the superpowers experienced several
direct crises and faced off in a series of bloody proxy wars in Korea, Vietnam,
Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and elsewhere. A recent statistical
analysis by the political scientist Michael Horowitz demonstrated that inexperienced
nuclear powers tend to be more crisis-prone than other types of states, and
research by another political scientist, Robert Rauchhaus, has found that nuclear
states are more likely to engage in low-level militarized disputes with one another,
even if they are less likely to engage in full-scale war. If deterrence operates the
way Waltz expects it to, a nuclear-armed Iran might reduce the risk of a major
conventional war among Middle Eastern states. But history suggests that Tehran's
development of nuclear weapons would encourage Iranian adventurism, leading to
more frequent and intense crises in the Middle East. Such crises would entail some
inherent risk of a nuclear exchange resulting from a miscalculation, an accident, or
an unauthorized use -- a risk that currently does not exist at all. The threat would be
particularly high in the initial period after Iran joined the nuclear club. Once the
superpowers reached rough nuclear parity during the Cold War, for example, the
number of direct crises decreased, and the associated risks of nuclear escalation
abated. But during the early years of the Cold War, the superpowers were involved
in several crises, and on at least one occasion -- the 1962 Cuban missile crisis -they came perilously close to nuclear war. Similarly, a stable deterrent relationship
between Iran, on the one hand, and the United States and Israel, on the other,
would likely emerge over time, but the initial crisis-prone years would be hairraising. Although all sides would have a profound interest in not allowing events to
spiral out of control, the residual risk of inadvertent escalation stemming from
decades of distrust and hostility, the absence of direct lines of communication, and
organizational mistakes would be nontrivial -- and the consequences of even a lowprobability outcome could be devastating. A VERY REAL THREAT Because Waltz is
sanguine about the effects of Iranian nuclearization, he concludes that "the United
States and its allies need not take such pains to prevent the Iranians from
developing a nuclear weapon." Waltz believes that the only utility of continued
diplomacy is to maintain "open lines of communication," which "will make the
Western countries feel better able to live with a nuclear Iran," and he argues that
"the current sanctions on Iran can be dropped." Waltz is wrong. The threat from a
nuclear-armed Iran might not be as grave as some suggest, but it would make an
already volatile Middle East even more conflict-prone. Preventing Iran from crossing
the nuclear threshold should therefore remain a top U.S. priority. Because a
preventive military attack on Iran's nuclear infrastructure could itself set off a series
of unpredictable and destabilizing consequences, the best and most sustainable
solution to Iran's nuclear challenge is to seek a negotiated solution through a
combination of economic pressure and diplomacy. It is possible to oppose a rush to
war with Iran without arguing, as Waltz does, that a nuclear-armed Iran would make
the world a better place. COLIN H. KAHL is an Associate Professor at Georgetown
University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and former Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East. He is also a Senior Fellow at the
Center for a New American Security and a co-author of its report Risk and Rivalry:
Iran, Israel, and the Bomb, from which this response is adapted.
(**note** this article was written in response to the previous card Nuclear Iran balances out
powers in the Middle East creating stability and security by Kenneth N. Waltz)
crisis over Iran's nuclear program could end in three different ways. First,
diplomacy coupled with serious sanctions could convince Iran to abandon its pursuit
of a nuclear weapon. But this outcome is unlikely: the historical record indicates that a
country bent on acquiring nuclear weapons can rarely be dissuaded from doing so .
The
Punishing a state through economic sanctions does not inexorably derail its nuclear program. Take
North Korea, which succeeded in building its weapons despite countless rounds of sanctions and UN
Security Council resolutions. If Tehran determines that its security depends on possessing nuclear
weapons, sanctions are unlikely to change its mind. In fact, adding still more sanctions now could make
Iran feel even more vulnerable, giving it still more reason to seek the protection of the ultimate
deterrent. The second possible outcome is that Iran stops short of testing a nuclear weapon
but develops a breakout capability, the capacity to build and test one quite quickly.
Iran would not be the first country to acquire a sophisticated nuclear program without building an
actual bomb. Japan, for instance, maintains a vast civilian nuclear infrastructure. Experts believe that it
could produce a nuclear weapon on short notice. Such a breakout capability might satisfy the
domestic political needs of Iran's rulers by assuring hard-liners that they can enjoy all the
benefits of having a bomb (such as greater security) without the downsides (such as international
isolation and condemnation). The problem is that a breakout capability might not work as intended.
The United States and its European allies are primarily concerned with weaponization, so they might
accept a scenario in which Iran stops short of a nuclear weapon. Israel, however, has made it clear that
it views a significant Iranian enrichment capacity alone as an unacceptable threat. It is possible, then,
that a verifiable commitment from Iran to stop short of a weapon could appease major Western powers
but leave the Israelis unsatisfied. Israel would be less intimidated by a virtual nuclear weapon than it
would be by an actual one and therefore would likely continue its risky efforts at subverting Iran's
nuclear program through sabotage and assassination -- which could lead Iran to conclude that a
breakout capability is an insufficient deterrent, after all, and that only weaponization can provide it
with the security it seeks. The third possible outcome of the standoff is that Iran continues its
current course and publicly goes nuclear by testing a weapon. U.S. and Israeli
officials have declared that outcome unacceptable , arguing that a nuclear Iran is a uniquely
terrifying prospect, even an existential threat. Such language is typical of major powers, which have
historically gotten riled up whenever another country has begun to develop a nuclear weapon of its
own. Yet so far, every time another country has managed to shoulder its way into the nuclear club, the
other members have always changed tack and decided to live with it. In fact, by reducing
imbalances in military power, new nuclear states generally produce more regional
and international stability, not less.
are highly dependent on the magnitude of the weapon event and do not scale in a
linear fashion. The cost to clean up or remediate the affected area will depend on the
cleanup standard applied to the event and is highly sensitive to this standard. Currently,
there are no cleanup standards specifically designed for Rad/Nuc terrorist events, but it
is likely that the existing Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) standards would apply defacto. The Department of Energy (DOE) has
spent billions of dollars on superfund cleanup, under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) guidance, at former weapons production
sites, and the cleanup is expected to continue through 2035. This paper offers an economic
perspective on the magnitude of the consequences for a selected class of targets in the
United States, with an emphasis on cost sensitivity as the cleanup standard changes. The
prospect of a nuclear attack on the United States was long thought to be restricted to the
domain of state actors.
Following the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, and other more recent
terrorist activities around the world, concerns about all types of terror attacks,
including potential radiological and nuclear attacks, have been magnified. The
spotlight has shifted to countermeasures that will either reduce the likelihood or
reduce the consequences of a radiological or nuclear (Rad/Nuc) terrorist attack. The
decision to invest in Rad/Nuc countermeasures can be viewed as a tradeoff between
investment cost of the countermeasure and the consequences of the event. There
are both physical consequences and economic consequences that would result from
a Rad/Nuc event. Economic impacts caused by an event, and the subsequent
response to the event, need to be addressed in sequential order and begin with the
physical impacts of the detonation, atmospheric dispersion, and deposition of the
fallout from the weapon. Physical consequences dictate the response function
including the long-term cleanup and site restoration actions taken. One of the
recurring themes regarding event response is that there are currently no federal
standards that cover the long-term site restoration and cleanup following a
radiological or improvised nuclear device (IND) terrorist attack. The cost to clean up
or remediate the affected area is highly sensitive to the cleanup standard applied to
the event. There are currently no cleanup standards specifically designed for
Rad/Nuc terrorist events, but it is likely that the existing EPA and NRC standards
would apply defacto [1]. The General Accounting Office (GAO) reports that the
current EPA and NRC cleanup standards differ and these differences have
implications for both the pace and ultimate cost of cleanup [2]. The Department of
Energy (DOE) has spent billions of dollars on superfund cleanup at former weapons
production sites and the cleanup is expected to continue through 2035 [3]. In 2003
recognizing the importance of this issue, the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) tasked an interagency working group to address the issue of Protective Action
Guidelines (PAGs) for radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) and improvised nuclear
device (IND) incidents. DHS anticipates a draft of that guidance to be issued in the
Federal Register in June of 2005.
Fears are compounded by the danger of internal coups in which the control of nuclear weapons may he
the main object of the struggle and the key to political power. Under these fearful circumstances to
maintain governmental authority and civil order may be impossible. The legitimacy of the state and
the loyalty of its citizenry may dissolve because the state is no longer thought to be capable of
maintaining external security and internal order. The first fear is that states become tyrannical; the
second, that they lose control. Both these fears may be realized, either in different states or, indeed, in
the same state at different times. What can one say? Four things primarily. First, Possession of nuclear
weapons may slow arms races down, rather than speed them up, a possibility considered later.
Second, for less developed countries to build nuclear arsenals requires a long lead
time. Nuclear power and nuclear weapons programmes, like population policies, require
administrative and technical teams able to formulate and sustain programmes of considerable cost
that pay off only in the long run. The more unstable a government, the shorter becomes the attention
span of its leaders. They have to deal with today's problems and hope for the best tomorrow. In
countries where political control is most difficult to maintain, governments are least
atomic weapons in a struggle for political power than that they will be used in a crisis of
succession in the Soviet Union or China. One or another nuclear state will experience uncertainty of
succession, fierce struggles for power, and instability of regime. Those who fear the worst have not
shown with any plausibility how those expected events may lead to the use of nuclear weapons.
Fourth, the possibility of one side in a civil war firing a nuclear warhead at its opponent's
stronghold nevertheless remains. Such an act would produce a national tragedy. not an
international one. This question then arises: Once the weapon is fired, what happens next? The
domestic use of nuclear weapons is, of all the uses imaginable, least likely to lead to escalation and to
threaten the stability of the central balance. The United States and the Soviet Union, and other
countries as well, would have the strongest reasons to issue warnings and to assert control.
Proliferation is indeed still bad for the world. The spread of nuclear weapons in some
cases may make war more likely, because such weapons temptingly suggest
preemptive strikes by the air forces of a region. And in most cases the spread of
nuclear weapons will make war enormously more deadly and destructive, as entire
cities become vulnerable to the strike of a single bomber. If one concluded that the
Indian detonation made the further spread of nuclear weapons inevitable, this
author would see that detonation as a disaster for the world. An alternative
possibility will be explored here, however, that proliferation may yet be containable,
even after the Indian action.
Aff Answers
Aff: Nonunique
Votes for veto override now
Fox News, 7-19-2015, "Congressional Democrats acknowledge Iran deal will be
tough sell on Capitol Hill,"
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/07/19/congressional-democrats-acknowledgeiran-deal-will-be-tough-sell-on-capitol/
A top Senate Democrat said Sunday he will decide whether to approve the Iran
nuclear deal based on the best interest of the county, not on his allegiance to
President Obama or the entire party. Its not a matter of what party I belong to,
Maryland Sen. Ben Cardin, the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, told Fox News Sunday. It's not a matter of supporting the president.
The question is: What's in the best interest of this country? Congress has 60 days
to approve the deal in which Iran agrees to curtail its nuclear program in exchange
for the lifting of billions of dollars in sanctions. There has been widespread concern
about the deal since it was signed last week by Iran, the United States and five
other world powers, including its provision to lift an arms embargo, if it includes
enough authority to inspect nuclear-related sites and whether Israel is protected
enough. The GOP-led Senate will likely have enough votes to disapprove of the
deal, based on strong and early opposition. However, Senate Republicans will need
support from about 13 Senate Democrats to get the 67 votes needed to override
President Obamas almost certain veto of a disapproval resolution. Roughly 15
Democratic senators appear skeptical of the deal. The Republican-control
House would also need Democratic support for an override. Cardins committee is
expected to hold at least three public hearings on the issue before a projected
September vote, starting Thursday when Secretary of State John Kerry, Energy
Secretary Ernest Moniz and Treasury Secretary Jack Lew are scheduled to testify.
There is bipartisan skepticism about the deal, Wyoming Sen. John Barrasso,
chairman of the Senate Republican Policy Committee, told Fox News on Sunday.
Arkansas GOP Sen. Tom Cotton, an Iraq and Afghanistan war veteran, told NBCs
Meet the Press that he agrees with Cardin and House Minority Whip Steny Hoyer,
D-Md., that the administration shouldnt take the deal to the United Nations before
Congress decides. However, he said the more important issue is the $150 billion in
sanction relief and what Iran might do next. Iran is a terror-sponsoring, antiAmerican outlaw regime, Cotton said. And if you think Iran is going to change their
behavior in a decade, I can tell you how unlikely that is because just nine years ago,
they were trying to kill me and my soldiers. California Sen. Dianne Feinstein, the
top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Intelligence Committee, told CBS Face the
Nation that she hopes fellow congressional Democrats will support Obamas
nuclear deal but the jury is out.
expanded hostilities between Shiite and Sunni Arabs all over the region. If I had
property in the Middle East, I would think about selling it after this deal.
Aff: UQ Overwhelms
Republicans not likely to acquire enough support to topple Iran
nuclear agreementthe agreement will pass
Zengerle 7-14-15 Patricia Zengerle covers foreign policy and national security
on Capitol Hill for Reuters. She recently covered the 2012 campaign and the White
House and had been an editor in Washington, D.C., an editor in London, and a
correspondent in Miami, Pittsburgh and New York. 7/14/15. Iran deal faces fight in
Congress, but will likely survive http://www.businessinsider.com/r-iran-deal-facesfight-in-congress-but-will-likely-survive-2015-7. 7/14/15
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The nuclear deal between world powers and Iran starts a
new phase of intense negotiation - this time between the Obama administration and
the U.S. Congress, where some Republicans have long been working to sink an
agreement. Any effort in Congress to overturn the deal would face an uphill fight.
Republicans have majorities in both the House of Representatives and Senate, but
they would need the support of dozens of President Barack Obama's fellow
Democrats to sustain a "resolution of disapproval" that could cripple a deal. The
chances of that happening are slim. A resolution of disapproval would need only the
support of the Republican majority to pass the House, but would require the votes of
at least six Democrats to get the 60 to advance in the Senate. The chances of
mustering enough votes to then overrule a near-certain Obama veto are slimmer
still. The second-ranking Democrat in the House, Steny Hoyer, said after the deal
was announced: "It is now up to members of Congress to work carefully through
every detail, particularly given Irans likelihood to exploit any ambiguity or loophole
to its benefit and to the detriment of the security of America, Israel, and our allies in
Europe and the Gulf." Senate Democrats have stood firm to date against
Republican-led efforts to interfere with the talks, which included Iran and the United
States, Britain, China, France, Germany and Russia. In the House, more than 150
Democrats, including party leader Nancy Pelosi, signed a letter in May strongly
supporting the nuclear negotiations. "I understand the heavy lift that's involved,"
Tennessee Republican Senator Bob Corker, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, told reporters when asked about the chances of passing a "resolution of
disapproval." Obama in May signed a law, authored by Corker, giving Congress the
right to review the agreement and potentially sink it by passing a disapproval
resolution that would eliminate the president's ability to waive sanctions passed by
Congress. Easing sanctions is an integral part of the deal, under which Iran will
curtail its nuclear program. Under the Iran Review Act, lawmakers have 60 days to
review the agreement and decide whether to seek a resolution of disapproval.
During that period, plus an additional 22 days in which Obama could veto a
resolution and Congress could try to override it, Obama cannot waive the
congressional sanctions. A veto override would require a two-thirds majority in both
houses - or 13 Democrats along with all 54 Republicans in the Senate, and 43
Democrats plus as all 236 House Republicans. Party leaders have said there is no
guarantee that every Republican would back a disapproval resolution. Sanctions
passed by Congress account for the overwhelming majority of those imposed by the
United States. U.S. sanctions are especially important to the international sanctions
regime because of the country's influence on global trade and banking. "CONGRESS
GAVE AWAY ITS POWER" The congressionally mandated sanctions can be
temporarily waived by the president for national security reasons, which he would
do under the deal with Iran. That waiver ability stays in place unless Congress is
able not just to pass a disapproval resolution, but override Obama's expected veto
of it. "Congress gave away its power by granting national security waivers with all of
these sanctions," Corker said. Congressional leaders said they plan to begin
briefings and hearings on the Iran deal as soon as they receive the agreement, with
an eye toward deciding on a course of action this month, before lawmakers leave
for summer recess. Obama administration officials, including the president himself,
have reached out to members of Congress, holding hundreds of meetings and
hearings and making telephone calls in the past four months. Those efforts are
expected to intensify now with a deal. Acknowledging the difficulty of passing a
disapproval resolution, some lawmakers suggest that Congress would do better to
consider, and then reject, a "resolution of approval." Defeating such a resolution by
a large margin would not affect the sanctions regime, but would send a strong
message that the United States is not united behind a "bad" Iran pact and was
prepared to act if Iran made moves toward building a bomb, they said. Lawmakers
from both parties acknowledged that the debate will not end with the review period
this year. Some Republicans have discussed passing legislation to impose more
sanctions over Iran's human rights record or for supporting terrorism. The Iran
Review Act requires the president, Obama and his successor after the 2016 election,
to regularly certify that Tehran is adhering to terms of a deal. There is no guarantee
a Republican president, in particular, would do so. Several of the GOP White House
hopefuls have already said they are skeptical about the deal. Read more:
http://www.businessinsider.com/r-iran-deal-faces-fight-in-congress-but-will-likelysurvive-2015-7#ixzz3fsebmEJM
already said he will veto any such bill. To override the veto, opponents of the deal
will need to assemble a two-thirds majority in both the Senate and the House of
Representatives. Thats always a difficult bar to clear and its even harder when
partisan passions are running high. cComments The fact that politics plays anything
in this agreement stinks. It makes me feel that these lawmakers are in government
for themselves not for the good of the nation. RKAMINS AT 12:07 PM JULY 15, 2015
ADD A COMMENTSEE ALL COMMENTS 2 In the Senate, if all 54 Republicans voted to
kill the Iran deal, 13 Democrats or independents would need to join them to reach
the 67 needed to override a veto. But so far, only one Democrat, Robert Menendez
of New Jersey, has indicated that hes likely to vote against the deal and even he
hasnt made a final decision, a spokeswoman said Wednesday. Plenty of others,
including the incoming Democratic leader, Charles E. Schumer of New York, are on
the fence. But at this point, as my colleague Lisa Mascaro notes, its not even clear
that opponents of the deal can muster the 60 votes they would need to bring a
resolution of disapproval to the floor. Is the Iran deal good enough? Is the Iran deal
good enough? In the House, the obstacles are even higher. To override a veto,
opponents of the deal would need at least 44 of the Houses 188 Democrats
(assuming all members voted and all 246 Republicans stayed together). But the
House has been even more polarized than the Senate, mostly because so many
members come from lopsidedly partisan districts. House Democratic Leader Nancy
Pelosi of San Francisco has already made it clear that she plans to fight to protect
the deal and Pelosi has been able to keep her members in line on key votes. One
more factor may prevent many Democrats from bolting: Hillary Rodham Clinton. The
presidential front-runner announced on Tuesday that she not only supports the Iran
deal, she intends to campaign for it. That means any Democrat who votes against
the deal would be going up not only against the partys incumbent president, but
against the partys most likely presidential nominee. So while Obama has often
bemoaned the partisan polarization that has made bipartisan cooperation
impossible, in this case he may be (quietly) grateful for it.
The man who first publicly warned the West about Irans nuclear intentions is
blasting Tuesdays agreement as one that allows the worlds top sponsor of
terrorism to grow its program, fails to provide meaningful inspections and
does not force Iran to change its behavior at all. Alireza Jafarzadeh is deputy
director of the Washington office of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, which
is the Iranian parliament in exile from the government that was overthrown by
Islamic radicals in 1979. Jafarzadeh says assurances from President Obama and
Secretary of State John Kerry that this agreement will prevent Iran from obtaining a
nuclear weapon are fiction. First, the agreement does not prevent the Iranian
regime from having a nuclear weapons capability, he told WND and Radio America.
Second, it actually maintains and legitimizes the entire nuclear
infrastructure of the Iranian regime. Jafarzadeh has reviewed the agreement
and is troubled by many aspects, starting with how little it actually restricts Iranian
activities. It puts some cap on for the next 10-15 years, but it allows the regime to
build an industrial-size nuclear program with very little limitations in about a
decade, he said. It also allows the Iranian regime to conduct research and
development on advanced centrifuges. These are significantly more efficient
centrifuges that allow the Iranian regime to use a much smaller number of
centrifuges in a hidden place to provide fissile material that they need for the
bomb. Listen to the WND/Radio interview Alireza Jafarzadeh: And inspections?
Jafarzadeh said not to count on those to accomplish anything. It doesnt provide
anytime, anywhere access to suspect nuclear sites, including the military sites, he
said. It basically provides what they call managed access with significant delays,
which takes away the whole surprise element completely. It undermines the very
purpose of intrusive inspections. The deal also provides no specifics on allowing
inspections of several sites that Iranian officials have blocked United Nations
weapons inspectors from visiting. While the agreement is light on verification in his
estimation, Jafarzadeh said U.S. and allied concessions are very clear. It is very
specific when it comes to sanctions relief and the kind of break that is provided to
the Iranian regime, including giving them relief in five to eight years on weapons
and missile trade, which is a big problem, he said. It actually enhances the
terrorism network of the Iranian regime. He added, When you have the
worlds leading state sponsor of terrorism having a nuclear weapons program
legitimized by the international community, and over time they can actually expand
it and not diminishing it or having any requirement to change their behavior, its a
major, major concern. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, or ICBMs, are the most
likely delivery system for a future nuclear weapon. Jafarzadeh said that program
isnt addressed in the agreement, either. Why do you want to have an
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile program? he asked. The only use for is delivering
nuclear weapons. Theres no country in the world that has so far developed ICBM
without using it for nuclear weapons. What do YOU think? Sound off on Obamas
nuclear deal with Iran in todays WND poll Along with the legitimizing of the Iranian
nuclear program, some of the most nefarious groups associated with Iran would no
longer be considered pariahs in the eyes of the U.S.. A number of entities and
individuals who have been involved in terrorism and weapons of mass destruction
and the exporting of violence in the region are going to be off the list, said
Jafarzadeh, specifically listing the Quds force and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard in
that category. Earlier this year, after Obama announced he would not submit any
agreement to Congress as a formal treaty, congressional leaders pushed legislation
to give lawmakers the power to review and vote on the deal. However, instead of
needing a two-thirds majority to approve it as in the case of treaties, a two-thirds
majority is now needed to override a promised Obama veto and sink the deal.
Jafarzadeh also blasted Obama for insulting the Iranian people by referring to them
and the Iranian regime interchangeably, which he called an insult to the people of
Iran. The Iranian people reject this regime, he said. Jafarzadeh also disputes
Obamas contention that the agreement will prevent rather than trigger a Middle
East arms race. He said Irans neighbors know exactly what this regime is
capable of. Look at the countries that are all being troubled by the Iranian regime
when they dont have the bomb, he said. Imagine what things would look like in
the region when the Iranian regime will get the bomb.
Not since the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki
nearly 70 years ago has the world been closer to the use of nuclear weapons,
former Vice President Dick Cheney told Fox News Sean Hannity on Tuesday night.
And if Iran ends up with nuclear weapons, Cheney said, it would compel others in
the region to work toward getting their own. As for the nuclear deal with Iran,
Cheney called it a lie on the part of President Barack Obama to claimed that the
accord would stop further nuclear proliferation. What Obama has done has, in
effect, sanctioned the acquisition by Iran of nuclear capability. And it can be a few
years down the road. It doesnt make any difference. Its a matter of months until
were going to see a situation where other people feel they have to defend
themselves by acquiring their own capability, Cheney said. And that will, in fact, I
think put us closer to use actual use of nuclear weapons than weve been at any
time since Hiroshima and Nagasaki in World War II. Cheney added that nuclear
ambitions in the region posed some of the biggest problems during his time in the
White House, noting the 1981 Israeli destruction of an Iraqi nuclear reactor, the
1991 U.S. destruction of the Iraqi nuclear program during Operation Desert Storm
and the toppling of Saddam Hussein in 2003, which he said led to Libyan leader
Muammar Qaddafi giving up his countrys nuclear program. I think that was one of
the biggest problems that we had when we were in office, that we were concerned
with about this nuclear proliferation. Wed seen the Iraqis in 81 with a nuclear
reactor, the Israelis took it out. In 91, they had a second program, we took it out in
Desert Storm. When we took down Saddam Hussein in 03, Qaddafi gave up his
nuclear materials, and that let us wrap up [Pakistani nuclear scientist] A.Q. Khan,
he said.
United Nations arms embargo on Iran, which was imposed in 2007 in response to the country's nuclear program, will be lifted in five
years for most weapons, and in eight years for ballistic missiles. T his
Washington's reassurance. "They're going to want to make sure that the U.S. will make good on its security guarantees, that it will
be a partner, that there will be, in any emergency, U.S. support," he says. Those assurances will likely be delivered next week, when
Defense Secretary Ash Carter travels to Israel and other nations in the Middle East.
Presidential hopeful Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas) on Wednesday slammed legislation that
would allow Congress to review and vote on a final Iran nuclear deal, 2the proposal
a "bad bill."
"I agree that it is of paramount important to give Congress its proper role in an international agreement of this magnitude," he said.
The Iran deal is a disaster. No, Im not talking about the nuclear agreement
President Obama is negotiating with Tehran (though that is a disaster, too), but
rather the Iran deal that Obama cut with Congress.
The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act that Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) negotiated
with Obama comes up for a vote in the Senate this week. It is a terrible bill that
virtually guarantees that Congress will give its de facto stamp of approval to any
agreement Obama concludes with Iran. The reason is simple: Instead of requiring
that Congress vote to affirmatively approve any Obama-Iran agreement before it
can take effect, the Corker-Cardin bill allows the agreement to take effect unless it is
disapproved by Congress. Big difference. An affirmative vote would have required
Obama to persuade a simple majority in both houses of Congress to approve his
agreement. If he failed, the agreement would be dead. Now, under a disapproval
mechanism, the burden shifts to congressional opponents of the Iran deal, who
need to convince not simple majorities, but super majorities, in both houses if they
want to kill the deal. The bill allows opponents to pass a resolution of disapproval,
which requires only a simple majority. That allows congressional critics to claim that
they voted against the agreement. But Obama can veto the resolution of
disapproval and send it back to Congress. When that happens, opponents need twothirds of the House and Senate to override his veto. There is no chance that will
happen. In fact, this is precisely why the Corker bill is so appealing to some
Democrats. They get the political cover of voting against Obamas Iran deal without
being responsible for actually delivering an embarrassing defeat to Obama. Thats a
win-win on Capitol Hill. Failure to override Obamas veto would mean that
Congress will have effectively assented to the deal, giving the agreement a
congressional imprimatur. Obama will be able to claim that Congress reviewed the
agreement under a procedure of its own creation, and the result of the review was
that the agreement was approved for implementation . That is worse than if
Congress had never voted in the first place. While Obama strong-arms Congress, he
continues to capitulate to Iran. The Obama administration has long insisted that
there would be no immediate sanctions relief for Iran. Just two weeks ago, State
Department spokesman Jeff Rathke reiterated Sanctions will be suspended in a
phased manner upon verification that Iran has met specific commitments under a
finalized joint comprehensive plan of action, adding The process of sanctions
suspension or relief will only begin after Iran has completed its major nuclear steps
and the breakout time has been increased to at least a year.
What Obama has done is in effect sanctioned the acquisition by Iran of nuclear
capability. And it can be a few years down the road, it doesn't make any difference ,
it's a matter of months until we're going to see a situation where other people feel
they have to defend themselves by acquiring their own capability, Cheney said
Tuesday night on Fox Newss Hannity. And that will in fact I think put us closer to
use actual use of nuclear weapons than we've been at any time since
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in World War II. Cheney joins the large swath of
Republicans who are criticizing Tuesdays deal, in which Iran promised to scale down
its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. President Obama and his
administration have lauded the deal as a victory for diplomacy, one that greatly
scales down Irans nuclear program with verifiable proof along the way. Those
concessions include a drastic reduction of Irans uranium stockpile and centrifuges,
which lengthens the time Iran would need to build a bomb if it violates the deal.
While an independent nuclear agency gets full access to Irans declared nuclear
sites, the steps needed to gain access to an undeclared site are a sticking point with
some, since it could take up to 24 days for inspectors to be granted access. Cheney
said that the delay is certainly enough for Iran to hide potential weapons and that
weve historically underestimated the nuclear efforts of others. I don't think we
know everything there is to know about the nuclear program in Iran. Fact of the
matter is, our capabilities have never been perfect in terms of being able to read
other nations and what they were doing, he said. This is a situation where we
don't have the kind of access we need to be able to get in and know what is going
on from a covert standpoint. They've had covert programs in the past. And I
wouldn't be at all surprised that they have things underway now that we don't know
about.
Charles Krauthammer told viewers on "Special Report with Bret Baier" Tuesday that a
proposed agreement that would allow Iran to development nuclear capabilities
would be "simply catastrophic." "The latest details that are coming out now about
the agreement being time-limited meaning that in a decade, Iran can essentially
become a legitimate nuclear power, develop its weapons, without any restraints is
simply catastrophic. It's really unbelievable," the syndicated columnist said. Iranian and US officials on Monday wrapped
up a round of negotiations on the issue in Geneva, Switzerland. The plan reportedly limits Iran's nuclear activities for 10 years, but
Ilene Prusher raises the concern that the deal does not provide for an inspections
regime that is nearly as "robust and intrusive" as U.S. President Barack Obama
promised it would be back in April, when the framework agreement was signed. She
cites an atomic energy expert who provides specific examples of the inspections
mechanism's shortcomings. One such example is that if the world powers suspect
Iran is violating the terms of the agreement, they will unlikely gain access to an
inspection of the nuclear site in question, for under the terms of the agreement, this
would require revealing the intelligence that aroused suspicion and the world
powers are unlikely to want to reveal such sources.
Amos Harel writes that other than depriving Iran of a military nuclear capability for
the next decade, the deal doesn't give the West or Israel much to rejoice over: the
Iranians probably only signed the deal, despite their reservations, because it was an
offer too good to refuse; and some of the money that will soon start flowing in may
go toward propping up Iran's proxies. Israel, however, can expect Obama to offer it
a generous package of military aid as compensation.
Iran deal may be bad for US oil, but is good for the world
Forbes, 11-30-2013, "Iran Deal Could Lead To Scuttling Of The Great U.S. Oil
Boom," Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2013/11/30/the-iraniannuclear-deal-is-a-good-one/, WGR 7-16-14
In the short term, the Iran deal will ease the political risk premium baked into oil
prices. In the medium term a comprehensive deal could add 1 million or more
barrels per day to the market. In the long-term a gush of Iranian oil could soften oil
prices enough to kill the economics of Americas tight oil boom. In Monday trades,
after the weekend signing of an interim resolution between the U.S. and Iran, the
price of benchmark Brent crude slid about 1.5% to $109 per barrel. West Texas
Intermediate crude was down about 1% to $94 per barrel in mid-morning trades.
These modest declines are a reasonable reaction to the deal signed over the
weekend. No one is expecting any flood of Iranian crude back to the market. The
White House insists that sanctions on Irans oil and banking sectors remain in place
and that the international community will continue to enforce these sanctions
vigorously. But successful diplomacy reduces geopolitical risk. Although any
military strike on Irans nuclear facilities was exceedingly remote before the deal
(President Obama was not about to start another war in the Middle East), it is now
virtually inconceivable for at least the six months during which the U.S. and the rest
of the P5+1 group of nations will negotiate what the White House refers to as a
long-term, comprehensive solution that addresses all of the international
communitys concerns. Israel, despite Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahus
condemnation of the deal as an historic mistake, is unlikely to attack Iran
unilaterally during this time. How much geopolitical risk is baked into the price of a
barrel of oil? At the height of former President Ahmadinajads bellicose anti-Israel
rhetoric and threats to blockade the Straits of Hormuz, it was understood that as
much as $20 per barrel represented a risk premium. About that much could quickly
melt off of benchmark prices in the days and weeks to come, bring crude oil down
from about $100 a barrel in the U.S. into the $80 range. But what about the price
impact of an uptick in longer-term supplies? This interim deal naturally makes the
chances of a long-term deal more likely, so traders will naturally price in marginally
higher exports from Iran starting in six months or so. That could soften prices even
more. Since the toughest sanctions were imposed in 2012, Irans oil production has
declined 900,000 barrels per day, according to analysts at Tudor, Pickering & Holt.
Much of that production is heavy oil. Saudi Arabia has adeptly replaced those
Iranian barrels in the market by boosting their own production by roughly 1 million
bpd. But when it comes time for Iranian oil to come back onto the market, the
Saudis (though no friends of Iran), would likely dial back their exports to make room.
But how much room will the Saudis be willing to make in the years ahead? Iran has
the reserves to add millions more in supplies. It would take awhile. As Bill Herbert,
analyst at Simmons & Company, points out in his morning note, sustainably
increasing production levels well above 3 million bpd for a consistent period of time
will most likely require substantial foreign investment from global IOCs and western
service companies. Some of those IOCs like Exxon Mobil XOM -0.42%, Chevron
CVX -1.37% and Total TOT -1.5% have jumped at the opportunity to invest in
untapped oil fields just over the border from Iran in the Kurdish region of Iraq. The
fields there have proven to be enormous, the flow rates prodigous, the ease of
recovery unmatched anywhere else in the world. Irans potential is even greater.
Given sufficient investment in drilling and infrastructure, there are ample oil
reserves in Iraq and Iran to add another 5 million bpd to global oil supplies within 10
years. In addition to those two, there remains roughly 1 million bpd of Libyan
production offline due to continued unrest there. Nigeria too has at least 250,000
bpd shut in. Solve political and security problems in those countries and the world
could suddenly be awash in excess oil supply. Over the long run the easing of
sanctions against Iran spells trouble for the economics of the tight oil plays that
have sprung up across the United States in recent years. The Eagle Ford and
Permian Basin and Bakken need sustained high oil prices to make the economics of
expensive drilling and steep decline rates pay off. Its no coincidence that Americas
great oil and gas renaissance has coincided with sanctions on Iran and unrest in
Libya. The concern for U.S. drillers is that successful Middle Eastern diplomacy could
end up being the worst thing for their business. If crude oil benchmarks were to fall
to $75 a barrel and stay there for a couple months youd see drilling rigs across
Texas and North Dakota fall silent. The U.S. onshore oil industry has been perhaps
the brightest spot in what passes for Americas economic recovery. How ironic that
it could end up being a casualty of the Middle Eastern peace process. Im not sure
what the naysayers of this deal think the sanctions were suppose to do. The
purpose of sanctions is to get a specific party to the negotiating table. Sanctions are
not meant to destroy a nation, cause widespread poverty of its people and
destruction of their economy, or topple governments. The fear of these happening,
not the reality of them, is what gets a government to the table. As much as some
leaders in Israel and Saudi Arabia want to use the U.S. to decapitate their nemesis,
this is not the point of these talks. And what happens here goes far beyond just Iran.
We need nuclear energy to spread around the world without proliferating weapons.
How we handle Iran will determine the future of nuclear energy in many countries
outside of the developed world, and we better get it right. There will always be
pressures to develop weapons and we need strategies and experience in diverting
these programs away from weapons. Besides, the art of diplomacy is the art of
finding a win-win for all parties. Its significant that the Obama Administration knows
how to use diplomacy the way only the U.S. can. It is in both our and the worlds
best interest, to find a solution that allows Iran nuclear energy without weapons. All
other rhetoric is posturing. Isolation is the worst strategy for bringing a country into
the civil worlds fold. Just look at North Korea. Rouhani has to move forward in a way
that does not shame Iran. The celebration in Iran over this deal is a strong indication
of the win-win nature of this deal, not the ridiculous charge of the opposition that
the U.S. was taken for a ride. Iran wants to, and according to international law can,
have a nuclear energy program, including enrichment and production, as long as it
falls under the appropriate international controls and is not producing weapons. It is
no wonder that Iran wants this deal as badly as it seems. It is a way out of a very
tricky and dangerous situation. Countries having the bomb never seem to get
attacked, but those that give up their nuclear programs completely tend to end
badly. Just ask Iraq and Libya. To avoid this fate, Iran has to back away from nuclear
weapons while retaining a nuclear energy program. The U.S. understands that this
deal is a good step toward that end. A final deal will include a structure that
precludes the ability to make a weapon, such as abandoning or altering the reactor
at Arak, and closing the Fordow enrichment facility because it is basically immune
from attack being under a mountain. But the whole deal doesnt have to be done all
at once. All things considered, this deal with Iran is a good one for the world.
Technical Endnotes Just a few technical clarifications since science rarely enters
media coverage of nuclear issues, yet is extremely important. The original level of
U-235 in the uranium ore, that is mined like any other ore, is 0.7% U-235. 5% U-235
is the level of enrichment for nuclear fuel for power reactors. Although some reactor
designs can use anything from natural uranium to highly-enriched material, most
power reactor fuel is between 3% and 5% enriched as is used in Irans Bushehr
reactor, a reactor no one cares much about for this reason. You cant make a bomb
out of these materials. This is the basis for the first key provision of the deal. And
while discussions focus on 20% U-235 as sufficiently enriched to make an atomic
weapon, that is only theoretically correct. No one has made a weapon from such
lowly-enriched materials and no one ever will. Enrichment needs to be >90% to
make a reliable weapon. Reliability in this case is not like having a reliable flashlight.
Reliable in this case means the atomic weapon will work when you want it to. Its
why theres so much testing associated with a weapons program. If youre going to
make the fatal decision to field a nuke, it better work, and everyone knows it has to
be over 90% U-235 to be really useful. Finally, an atomic weapon is fission-based
such as U-235 and Pu-239 whose nuclei split to change a bit of matter into a huge
amount of energy. These are what was dropped during WWII, what Iran was working
towards with U, and what North Korea has developed with Pu. In contrast, a nuclear
weapon is fusion-based such as a hydrogen bomb, whose nuclei fuse to change a bit
of matter into even more energy.
The end of sanctions means new investments in Iran's oil production Crude
oil prices are testing three-month lows after Iran struck a deal that will lead to the
lifting of international sanctions on its struggling economy in return for curbs on its
nuclear program. The benchmark futures contract for U.S. crude fell by over
a dollar a barrel in early trade in Europe Tuesday after negotiators
confirmed that they had struck an agreement after years of fraught talks.
The gradual end to sanctions foreseen under the deal will allow Iran,
which has the worlds third-largest oil and gas reserves, to attract
investment into its long-isolated energy sector, adding to world oil
supplies at a time when the market is already massively oversupplied,
according to the Paris-based International Energy Agency. The Financial Times
reported in June that European oil majors such as Royal Dutch/Shell [fortune-stock
symbol=RSDA] and Italys Eni SpA [fortune-stock symbol=E] have already
visited Tehran, with a view to clearing old debts and paving the way for new deals.
Thats bad news for U.S. shale oil producers, which have struggled to
adapt to a world of lower prices since Saudi Arabia pushed the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries into a fight for market
share at the end of last year. However, its not the Iran deal per se thats the
bad news, but the fact that it adds to a list of factors that have stopped the rebound
in oil prices in its tracks in the last couple of weeks. Onshore storage space is
limited. So is the tanker fleet. New refineries do not get built every day. Something
has to give, the IEA wrote in its latest report on the world oil market. That
something, it added, is most likely to be U.S. light, tight oil. Analysts at Wood
Mackenzie estimate as a base case that Iran will only add 120,000 barrels a day by
the end of the year to the 2.7 million it currently produces. Thats little more than a
drop in the bucket next to the surge in output thats already happened this year as
Saudi Arabia, smaller Gulf producers, Russia and Brazil have pumped furiously to
ensure they keep their share of the pie. WoodMac reckons that it could add a total of
600,000 b/d by the end of 2017, with 260,000 b/d coming next year and another
220,000 b/d the year after. Thats based on the assumption that sanctions are fully
lifted by the middle of 2016. Iran itself wants to increase its oil output to 5 million
barrels a day by the end of the decade. That may seem ambitious, but Iraq has
managed a similar increase since the toppling of Saddam Hussein despite having to
cope with the constant chaos of civil war and, more recently, the rise of Islamic
State. If the deal holds, and Iran can overcome its diplomatic isolation for good,
then it seems destined to have a major impact on global supplies in the long term.
Over three-quarters of its recoverable reserves are still to be developedand most
can be developed without the state-of-the-art technology required in most new oil
producing regions, whether in shale formations or offshore. That cant help but
have an impact on the math for the U.S. shale industry. So far, the weaker
companies in the sector have relied largely on new stock issuance and
drastic cutbacks in investment spending to ride out what they hoped
would be a temporary setback. If Iran ever starts to realize its full
potential as a producer, the sector will have to accept that prices are
going to stay lower for longer.
Russia, a long-term strategic ally of the Islamic Republic, would not desire to fall
behind. As Andrei A. Klimov, the deputy chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee in the Federation Council (Russia's Senate), told The New York Times,
"We need to think about the future of our trade partnership [with Iran]. We don't
want to wait for anybody else. It is a kind of competition, if you like." Iran would
welcome any military deal that could further advance its regional hegemonic
ambitions. As Iran's deputy defense minister, Reza Talaienik, told the semiofficial
Tasnim News Agency in response to Russia's decision to lift the ban on missile sales,
"If Russia fulfills its commitment to deliver the S-300 missile system to Iran, it will
be a step towards boosting the relations and collaborations between the two
countries. It will be a step forward." In addition, as Tehran is considered a strategic
ally of Moscow, bolstering Iran's military power will further advance Russia's
strategic geopolitical objectives in the region. The heightened tensions between the
Obama administration and President Putin pushed Moscow much closer to the
Islamic Republic as well. Although some experts, policy analysts, and politicians
might argue that Russia's move would complicate the nuclear talks, it is
unlikely that the Obama administration or Western allies would scuttle the
final nuclear deal because of an Iran-Russia arms deal. The recent
developments clearly indicate that Iranian leaders will not moderate their objective
of regional preeminence or scale down their military influence over other countries
in the region. It appears that the easing of sanctions will be utilized by Iranian
leaders to further invest in their country's military and ratchet up Iran's strategic
geopolitical and economic influence in the Middle East. Russia and the Iran have
leveraged the international legitimacy that the Islamic Republic has gained from the
nuclear talks to strengthen their strategic defense ties. This international legitimacy
will not only bolster Iran's military power, which would further destabilize the region
and pose security concerns for other regional state actors, but will set off a global
race to increase trade with Iran, including trade in arms.
Saudi initiatives. "In general, such an outcome would accrue to the benefit of
Russia, which stands to gain the most from a newly empowered Iran able to more
effectively pursue its Middle East agenda," Schwartz wrote. Furthermore, Russia and
Iran stand to benefit from some trade opportunities on nuclear fuel, military
equipment, and sale of the advanced S-300 anti-missile system. "Russia had long
been Iran's primary arms supplier, with total sales of nearly $3.4 billion between
1991 and 2010," Schwartz noted. "Russia hopes that the lifting of US sanctions will
lead to a resumption of large-scale arms transfers."Russia S-300 systemReuters
Graphics And at this point, "Irans military is in dire need of modern weapons, but
because of ongoing disputes and residual mistrust, the West is unlikely to sell such
weapons to Iran for some time to come, even after a deal is reached on the Iranian
nuclear program," he added. Consequently, Moscow welcomes the new era and
even appears to be calling for Iran which the US considers the " the world's
most active state sponsor of terrorism" to join the international community's
fight against terrorism. "In the next five years deliveries of arms to Iran will be
possible, under the conditions of the relevant procedures, notification and
verification by the U.N. Security Council," Russia foreign minister Sergei Lavrov
reportedly said in comments broadcast from Vienna by Russian television, according
to the Moscow Times.
After nearly two years of incremental and painstaking negotiations, a full deal on
Irans nuclear program has at last been struck. In a feat of diplomacy and patience,
Iran and the P5+1the U.S., the UK, France, Germany, Russia and Chinahave
managed to construct a deal that limits Irans nuclear activity and the sanctions
imposed on it. Early reactions deemed this a new chapter of hope in more ways
than one; not just a victory for diplomacy, but a major victory in the efforts against
nuclear weapons proliferation. This is somewhat misguided. In reality, however,
even a nuclear-armed Iran would not have meant that a nuclear weapons
proliferation among states was underway. Proliferation, after all, means rapid
spread. And whereas nuclear weapons have proliferated vertically, with existing
nuclear states adding to their existing nuclear arsenals, there has not been a
horizontal nuclear weapons proliferationthat is, a fast spread of these weapons
to new nations. On the contrary, nuclear weapons have spread slowly across the
world, even though academics, politicians, and the media frequently discuss
horizontal nuclear weapons proliferation as if it was a matter of fact. Reality check
Currently, there are only nine states in the world with nuclear weapons among the
UNs 193 members: the U.S. (since 1945), Russia (since 1949), the UK (since 1952),
France (since 1960), China (since 1964), India (since 1974), Israel (since 1979,
unofficial), Pakistan (since 1998), and North Korea (since 2006). Other countries
have dropped off the list. South Africa joined the nuclear club in the 1980s, but
dismantled its weapons in the early 1990s. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine
inherited nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union when they became independent
states after the Cold War, but they transferred their nuclear arsenal to Russia in the
1990s. In other words, only a handful of countries in Europe, Asia, and North
America possess these weapons, while Africa, Australasia, and Latin America are
devoid of nuclear weapons states. In fact, the number of nuclear weapons
states has actually decreased ever since the 1990s. And even though the
Pakistani nuclear weapons scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan confirmed the existence of a
global nuclear black market which purportedly provided nuclear technology,
expertise, and designs to various countries, including Libya, no horizontal nuclear
weapons proliferation has taken place. Libya eventually voluntarily renounced its
secret nuclear weapons efforts in December 2003. Argentina, Brazil, South Korea,
and Taiwan have also shelved their nuclear weapons programs. As of now, there are
31 countries with nuclear power plant units in operation; countries such as
Australia, Canada, and Japan are widely believed to have the technological
sophistication to become nuclear weapons states in relatively short amount of time
should they want tobut they have not pursued that path. In other words, even
though there have been opportunities for nuclear weapons proliferation across a
range of new states, such a development has not materialised. All of the available
evidence thus unanimously suggests that no horizontal nuclear weapons
proliferation has taken place throughout the 70 years that these weapons have
existed. Claims to the contrary lack basis, whether they are made for political or
economic reasons, sheer ignorance, or for any other purposes. Horizontal nuclear
weapons proliferation is a bogeyman that does not exist. If we are to devise sound
Still, he believes it is important for Americans to debate the Iran issue honestly
and consider the use of force. He also echoed what Defense Secretary Leon
Panetta reportedly suggested: that the possibility of an Israeli strike on Iran
continues to increase heading into 2012 as Iran's "capability continues to
evolve." But John Ghazvinian, a historian who is working on a book on the
history of U.S.-Iranian relations, doubts that Israel or the United States will
conduct a military strike on Iran anytime soon. "The likelihood of military
action against Iran is almost zero," claimed Ghazvinian, who was born in Iran
and has conducted recent field research there. "It would be such a poor decision
that I can't imagine it being taken quite frankly. From the Israeli perspective,
there's a strategic advantage to ensuring that the think tank consensus is that
an Israeli attack on Iran is imminent and the only way to prevent it is to ratchet
up pressure on Iran. But I believe that for Israel, this type of pressure on Iran is
itself, in fact, the end game." Walt argues that Israel wants to keep the
world's focus on Iran, in part to distract from the stalled peace process with the
Palestinians. He believes an attack on Iran would help rally support around the
regime and that patient diplomacy and sanctions are the best way to deal with
Tehran. Ledeen contends that this approach has failed miserably.
did prior
acts of nuclear proliferation have the same fearsome consequences that Iran hawks
now forecast? The answer is no. In fact, the spread of nuclear weapons has had remarkably
little impact on the basic nature of world politics and the ranking of major powers. The main
effect of the nuclear revolution has been to induce greater caution in the
behavior of both those who possessed the bomb and anyone who had to deal with a
nuclear-armed adversary. Proliferation has not transformed weak states into
influential global actors, has not given nuclear- armed states the ability to blackmail
their neighbors or force them to kowtow, and it has not triggered far-reaching
regional arms races. In short, fears that an Iranian bomb would transform regional or global politics have been greatly
exaggerated; one might even say that they are just a lot of hooey. Consider the historical record . Did the world
Yet this "mother of all assumptions" is simply asserted and rarely examined. The obvious question to ask is this:
turn on its axis when the mighty Soviet Union tested its first bomb in 1949? Although alarmist documents like NSC-68 warned of a
vast increase in Soviet influence and aggressiveness,
caution that both superpowers were already displaying towards each other. The United States already saw the USSR as an
enemy, and the basic principles of containment were already in place. NATO was being formed before the Soviet test and Soviet
dominance of Eastern Europe was already a fait accompli. Having sole possession of the bomb hadn't enabled Truman to simply
dictate to Stalin, and getting the bomb didn't enable Stalin or his successors to blackmail any of their neighbors or key U.S. allies.
It
toward Moscow."
Nikita Khrushchev's subsequent missile rattling merely strengthened the cohesion of NATO and other U.S.-led alliances, and we now
de frappe may have made De Gaulle feel better about French prestige and having their own deterrent made both states less
dependent on America's security umbrella, but it didn't give either state a louder voice in world affairs or win them new influence
anywhere. And you might recall that Britain couldn't get Argentina to give back the Falklands by issuing nuclear threats -- even
though Argentina had no bomb of its own and no nuclear guarantee -- they had to go retake the islands with conventional forces.
Did China's detonation of a bomb in 1964 suddenly make them a superpower? Hardly. China
remained a minor actor on the world stage until it adopted market principles, and its rising global influence is due to
three decades of economic growth, not a pile of nukes. And by the way, did getting a bomb enable Mao
Zedong--a cruel megalomaniac who launched the disastrous Great Leap Forward in 1957 and the destructive Cultural Revolution in
-- to start threatening and blackmailing his neighbors? Nope. In fact, China's foreign
Does Israel's nuclear arsenal
allow it to coerce its neighbors or impose its will on Hezbollah or the Palestinians?
No. Israel uses its conventional military superiority to try to do these things, not its nuclear arsenal. Indeed, Israel's bomb
didn't even prevent Egypt and Syria from attacking it in October 1973, although it did help
convince them to limit their aims to regaining the territory they had lost in 1967. It is also worth noting that Israel's
nuclear program did not trigger a rapid arms race either. Although states like Iraq and Libya did
the 1960s
policy behavior after 1964 was generally quite restrained. What about Israel?
establish their own WMD programs after Israel got the bomb, none of their nuclear efforts moved very rapidly or made it across the
nuclear states have concluded that getting the bomb isn't worth it. But a few states-and usually those who are worried about being
attacked-decide to go ahead. The good news is that when they do, it has remarkably little impact on world affairs.
Waltz 12 (Kenneth N., an American political scientist who was a member of the
faculty at both the University of California, Berkeley and Columbia University and
one of the most prominent scholars in the field of international relations He was a
veteran of both World War II and the Korean War. Founder of neorealism, or
structural realism, in international relations theory. , Why Iran Should Get the
Bomb.Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability, July/August, Foreign Affairs,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2012-06-15/why-iran-should-get-bomb,
LS)
The past several months have witnessed a heated debate over the best way for the
United States and Israel to respond to Iran's nuclear activities. As the argument has
raged, the United States has tightened its already robust sanctions regime against
the Islamic Republic, and the European Union announced in January that it will begin
an embargo on Iranian oil on July 1. Although the United States, the EU, and Iran
have recently returned to the negotiating table, a palpable sense of crisis still
looms. It should not. Most U.S., European, and Israeli commentators and
policymakers warn that a nuclear-armed Iran would be the worst possible outcome
of the current standoff. In fact, it would probably be the best possible result: the one
most likely to restore stability to the Middle East. POWER BEGS TO BE BALANCED
The crisis over Iran's nuclear program could end in three different ways. First,
diplomacy coupled with serious sanctions could convince Iran to abandon its pursuit
of a nuclear weapon. But this outcome is unlikely: the historical record indicates that
a country bent on acquiring nuclear weapons can rarely be dissuaded from doing so.
Punishing a state through economic sanctions does not inexorably derail its nuclear
program. Take North Korea, which succeeded in building its weapons despite
countless rounds of sanctions and UN Security Council resolutions. If Tehran
determines that its security depends on possessing nuclear weapons, sanctions are
unlikely to change its mind. In fact, adding still more sanctions now could make Iran
feel even more vulnerable, giving it still more reason to seek the protection of the
ultimate deterrent. The second possible outcome is that Iran stops short of testing a
nuclear weapon but develops a breakout capability, the capacity to build and test
one quite quickly. Iran would not be the first country to acquire a sophisticated
nuclear program without building an actual bomb. Japan, for instance, maintains a
vast civilian nuclear infrastructure. Experts believe that it could produce a nuclear
weapon on short notice. Such a breakout capability might satisfy the domestic
political needs of Iran's rulers by assuring hard-liners that they can enjoy all the
benefits of having a bomb (such as greater security) without the downsides (such as
international isolation and condemnation). The problem is that a breakout capability
might not work as intended. The United States and its European allies are primarily
concerned with weaponization, so they might accept a scenario in which Iran stops
short of a nuclear weapon. Israel, however, has made it clear that it views a
significant Iranian enrichment capacity alone as an unacceptable threat. It is
possible, then, that a verifiable commitment from Iran to stop short of a weapon
could appease major Western powers but leave the Israelis unsatisfied. Israel would
be less intimidated by a virtual nuclear weapon than it would be by an actual one
and therefore would likely continue its risky efforts at subverting Iran's nuclear
program through sabotage and assassination -- which could lead Iran to conclude
that a breakout capability is an insufficient deterrent, after all, and that only
weaponization can provide it with the security it seeks. The third possible outcome
of the standoff is that Iran continues its current course and publicly goes nuclear by
testing a weapon. U.S. and Israeli officials have declared that outcome
unacceptable, arguing that a nuclear Iran is a uniquely terrifying prospect, even an
existential threat. Such language is typical of major powers, which have historically
gotten riled up whenever another country has begun to develop a nuclear weapon
of its own. Yet so far, every time another country has managed to shoulder its way
into the nuclear club, the other members have always changed tack and decided to
live with it. In fact, by reducing imbalances in military power, new nuclear states
generally produce more regional and international stability, not less. Israel's
regional nuclear monopoly, which has proved remarkably durable for the past four
decades, has long fueled instability in the Middle East. In no other region of the
world does a lone, unchecked nuclear state exist. It is Israel's nuclear arsenal, not
Iran's desire for one, that has contributed most to the current crisis. Power, after all,
begs to be balanced. What is surprising about the Israeli case is that it has taken so
long for a potential balancer to emerge. Of course, it is easy to understand why
Israel wants to remain the sole nuclear power in the region and why it is willing to
use force to secure that status. In 1981, Israel bombed Iraq to prevent a challenge
to its nuclear monopoly. It did the same to Syria in 2007 and is now considering
similar action against Iran. But the very acts that have allowed Israel to maintain its
nuclear edge in the short term have prolonged an imbalance that is unsustainable
in the long term. Israel's proven ability to strike potential nuclear rivals with
impunity has inevitably made its enemies anxious to develop the means to prevent
Israel from doing so again. In this way, the current tensions are best viewed not as
the early stages of a relatively recent Iranian nuclear crisis but rather as the final
stages of a decades-long Middle East nuclear crisis that will end only when a
balance of military power is restored. UNFOUNDED FEARS One reason the danger of
a nuclear Iran has been grossly exaggerated is that the debate surrounding it has
been distorted by misplaced worries and fundamental misunderstandings of how
states generally behave in the international system. The first prominent concern,
which undergirds many others, is that the Iranian regime is innately irrational.
Despite a widespread belief to the contrary, Iranian policy is made not by "mad
mullahs" but by perfectly sane ayatollahs who want to survive just like any other
leaders. Although Iran's leaders indulge in inflammatory and hateful rhetoric, they
show no propensity for self-destruction. It would be a grave error for policymakers in
the United States and Israel to assume otherwise. Yet that is precisely what many
U.S. and Israeli officials and analysts have done. Portraying Iran as irrational has
allowed them to argue that the logic of nuclear deterrence does not apply to the
Islamic Republic. If Iran acquired a nuclear weapon, they warn, it would not hesitate
to use it in a first strike against Israel, even though doing so would invite massive
retaliation and risk destroying everything the Iranian regime holds dear. Although it
is impossible to be certain of Iranian intentions, it is far more likely that if Iran
desires nuclear weapons, it is for the purpose of providing for its own security, not
to improve its offensive capabilities (or destroy itself). Iran may be intransigent at
the negotiating table and defiant in the face of sanctions, but it still acts to secure
its own preservation. Iran's leaders did not, for example, attempt to close the Strait
of Hormuz despite issuing blustery warnings that they might do so after the EU
announced its planned oil embargo in January. The Iranian regime clearly concluded
that it did not want to provoke what would surely have been a swift and devastating
American response to such a move. Nevertheless, even some observers and
policymakers who accept that the Iranian regime is rational still worry that a nuclear
weapon would embolden it, providing Tehran with a shield that would allow it to act
more aggressively and increase its support for terrorism. Some analysts even fear
that Iran would directly provide terrorists with nuclear arms. The problem with these
concerns is that they contradict the record of every other nuclear weapons state
going back to 1945. History shows that when countries acquire the bomb, they feel
increasingly vulnerable and become acutely aware that their nuclear weapons make
them a potential target in the eyes of major powers. This awareness discourages
nuclear states from bold and aggressive action. Maoist China, for example, became
much less bellicose after acquiring nuclear weapons in 1964, and India and Pakistan
have both become more cautious since going nuclear. There is little reason to
believe Iran would break this mold. As for the risk of a handoff to terrorists, no
country could transfer nuclear weapons without running a high risk of being found
out. U.S. surveillance capabilities would pose a serious obstacle, as would the
United States' impressive and growing ability to identify the source of fissile
material. Moreover, countries can never entirely control or even predict the
behavior of the terrorist groups they sponsor. Once a country such as Iran acquires
a nuclear capability, it will have every reason to maintain full control over its
arsenal. After all, building a bomb is costly and dangerous. It would make little
sense to transfer the product of that investment to parties that cannot be trusted or
managed. Another oft-touted worry is that if Iran obtains the bomb, other states in
the region will follow suit, leading to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. But the
nuclear age is now almost 70 years old, and so far, fears of proliferation have
proved to be unfounded. Properly defined, the term "proliferation" means a
rapid and uncontrolled spread. Nothing like that has occurred; in fact, since
1970, there has been a marked slowdown in the emergence of nuclear states. There
is no reason to expect that this pattern will change now. Should Iran become the
second Middle Eastern nuclear power since 1945, it would hardly signal the start of
a landslide. When Israel acquired the bomb in the 1960s, it was at war with many of
its neighbors. Its nuclear arms were a much bigger threat to the Arab world than
Iran's program is today. If an atomic Israel did not trigger an arms race then, there is
no reason a nuclear Iran should now. REST ASSURED In 1991, the historical rivals
India and Pakistan signed a treaty agreeing not to target each other's nuclear
facilities. They realized that far more worrisome than their adversary's nuclear
deterrent was the instability produced by challenges to it. Since then, even in the
face of high tensions and risky provocations, the two countries have kept the peace.
Israel and Iran would do well to consider this precedent. If Iran goes nuclear, Israel
and Iran will deter each other, as nuclear powers always have. There has never
been a full-scale war between two nuclear-armed states. Once Iran crosses the
nuclear threshold, deterrence will apply, even if the Iranian arsenal is relatively
small. No other country in the region will have an incentive to acquire its own
nuclear capability, and the current crisis will finally dissipate, leading to a Middle
East that is more stable than it is today. For that reason, the United States and its
allies need not take such pains to prevent the Iranians from developing a nuclear
weapon. Diplomacy between Iran and the major powers should continue, because
open lines of communication will make the Western countries feel better able to live
with a nuclear Iran. But the current sanctions on Iran can be dropped: they primarily
harm ordinary Iranians, with little purpose. Most important, policymakers and
citizens in the Arab world, Europe, Israel, and the United States should take comfort
from the fact that history has shown that where nuclear capabilities emerge, so,
too, does stability. When it comes to nuclear weapons, now as ever, more may be
better.
Waltz 12 (Kenneth N., an American political scientist who was a member of the
faculty at both the University of California, Berkeley and Columbia University and
one of the most prominent scholars in the field of international relations He was a
veteran of both World War II and the Korean War. Founder of neorealism, or
structural realism, in international relations theory. Iran and the Bomb
Would a Nuclear Iran Make the Middle East More Secure? ,September/October,
Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2012-07-17/iran-andbomb, LS)
In arguing that a nuclear-armed Iran would represent an unacceptable threat to the
United States and its allies, Colin Kahl rejects my contention that states tend to
become more cautious once they obtain nuclear weapons and claims that I
minimize the potential threat of an emboldened Islamic Republic. He accuses me of
misreading history and suggests that I overestimate the stability produced by
nuclear deterrence. In fact, it is Kahl who misunderstands the historical record and
who fails to grasp the ramifications of nuclear deterrence. In Kahl's view, new
nuclear states do not necessarily behave as status quo powers and can instead be
highly revisionist. Seeking a precedent, he highlights the fact that the Soviet Union
encouraged North Korea to launch a potentially risky invasion of South Korea in
1950, shortly after the Soviets had tested their first nuclear bomb. But Kahl neglects
to explain the context of that decision. Some time before, U.S. Secretary of State
Dean Acheson had publicly identified the United States' security commitments in
Asia; defending South Korea was not among them. The United States had also
signaled its lack of interest in protecting the South Koreans by declining to arm
them with enough weapons to repel a Soviet-backed invasion by the North. The
Soviet Union therefore had good reason to assume that the United States would not
respond if the North Koreans attacked. In light of these facts, it is difficult to see
Stalin's encouragement of the invasion as an example of bold, revisionist behavior.
Contrary to Kahl's claims, the beginning of the Korean War hardly supplies evidence
of Soviet nuclear adventurism, and therefore it should not be understood as a
cautionary tale when considering the potential impact that possessing a nuclear
arsenal would have on Iranian behavior. Kahl seems to accept that nuclear weapons
allowing Iran to keep centrifuges. Indeed, a deal that leaves Iran with sufficient
centrifuges to flip back on the switch, block inspectors and waltz into the club of
nuclear powers would be disastrous. What is going on here? Michael Singh argues,
The central aim of American policy toward Iran in recent years had been to
persuade Tehran to make a strategic shift: away from a strategy of projecting power
and deterring adversaries through asymmetric means, and toward one that would
adhere to international norms and reinforce regional peace and stability . . . Iran
does not, however, appear to have undergone any such change. That is because
the U.S. is giving Iran what it wants. We are choosing to overlook, rather than
counter, long-standing Iranian policies. This combined with the concessions we
have made in the nuclear talks, the ambiguity of U.S. policy toward the Assad
regime and rising tensions with once-stalwart allies in the region reinforce the
impression that the United States, not Iran, is undergoing a strategic shift. Now,
however, a new factor is added to the mix: A GOP-majority Senate. With that on the
horizon, Sen. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) tells me this morning: With each passing day, U.S.
diplomats are offering more desperate concessions on Irans nuclear program
concessions making it inevitable that Iran will get nuclear weapons.
Congress needs to quickly pass the Menendez-Kirk legislation to prevent a nucleararmed Iran.
Notes
Ravi
Neg
Obama can hold off a veto now but his political capital is key
Walsh and Barrett 7/16 (Deirdre, Senior Congressional Producer for CNN,
Ted, senior congressional producer for CNN Politics, WH dispatches Joe Biden to
lock down Iran deal on Capitol Hill, CNN, 7/16/2015,
http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/15/politics/iran-deal-white-house-democratscongress/)//duncan
Two days after the Iran deal was unveiled, the Obama administration's sales job
is in full swing. Vice President Joe Biden traveled to Capitol Hill on Wednesday to
convince House Democrats to support the deal, while a small group of senators were invited to
the White House to get their questions answered directly from officials who sat across from the Iranians at the
negotiating table. Biden meets with Senate Democrats of the Foreign Relations Committee on Thursday. House
lawmakers said Biden was candid about the strengths and weaknesses of the compromise deal. One described his
behind closed doors pitch. "I'm going to put aside my notes and talk to you from my heart because I've been in this
business for 45 years," Biden said in his opening comments, according to Rep. Bill Pascrell, D-New Jersey, who
attended the session. "I'm not going to BS you. I'm going to tell you exactly what I think," the vice president
Obama got a boost from the leader of his party in the chamber when
Pelosi formally announced Thursday that she was backing the deal. SInce
Republicans in the House and Senate are firmly against the Iran nuclear deal -- announced
by President Barack Obama on Tuesday -- the administration is cranking up its campaign
to sway concerned Democrats to back the agreement. Under legislation that allows
Congress to review the agreement, the White House needs to secure enough votes from
members of his own party to sustain the President's promised veto on an resolution of
disapproval -- 145 in the House and 34 in the Senate. After the session with Biden, several House Democrats
stressed that while the process is just beginning, right now the administration
likely has the votes to sustain the President's veto on a resolution to block
the deal. "I'm confident they will like it when they understand it all," the vice president told reporters on his
reportedly said.
way into the session, beginning what will be a two month campaign culminating in a vote, expected in September.
Democrats, both for and against the deal, praised Biden's presentation. "Joe Biden was
as good as I've seen him," Rep. John Larson, D-Connecticut, told CNN. "I thought he did an excellent job." Texas
Democratic Rep. Henry
Cuellar said Biden is a "master of detail" and helped clarify some concerns
but he still planned to carefully study it and said he was
undecided. Pascrell also cited the verification issue as a potential sticking point but said he is leaning 'yes' on
the agreement. "On our side of the aisle there is concern and skepticism shared by a
number of members but an openness to be persuaded if the facts take them
that way," Rep. Gerry Connolly of Virginia said. "I think (Biden) made some real progress on behalf of the
administration today." But Democratic Rep. Steve Israel of New York, a former member of Democratic leadership,
told reporters he wasn't sold yet. "For me, I still have some very significant questions with respect to lifting of the
embargo on conventional arms. And missiles. The (International Atomic Energy Agency) verification process for me
is not any time anywhere, I think there are some very significant delays built into that," Israel said. Larson noted
Biden's presentation, along with Hillary Clinton's a day earlier, who he said spoke favorably about
the deal, helped lay the groundwork for most Democrats to back the White House . At
that both
the same time on Wednesday that the President held a news conference trying to persuade the public he had
brokered an strong and effective deal with Iran, Sen. Joe Manchin, a Democrat from West Virginia, and a handful of
other senators, were in a separate part of the White House meeting with some of the President's top negotiators,
who had just returned from Vienna. "I was very satisfied with an awful lot of the answers we received," Manchin
hard, hard opposition. I did not," he said. In fact, Manchin said he thought Republicans actually might struggle
getting the 60 votes they will need to pass the disapproval resolution, much less the dozen or so votes that might
White House and his colleagues from both parties on the Hill,
support it before doing his homework. "I will sit down, I will read the agreement thoroughly and then I'm gonna
speak with officials -- administration officials, people all over on all different sides," he said when asked about his
decision-making process. "Look, this is a decision that shouldn't be made lightly and I am gonna just study this
Committee, McCain said he intends to hold hearings to demonstrate what he calls the "fatal flaws" in the deal.
conservatives speaking at a forum sponsored by the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank,
one after another ripped the Iran deal. But they conceded that ultimately they may not be
able to block it. "The game is rigged in favor of getting this done" Ohio Rep. Jim Jordan
House
said.
latest deadline for a final agreement between the United States and Iran over the latter's nuclear program. That'll
Throughout his
presidency, Obama has prioritized these negotiations; he likely doesn't want to leave
office without having made a deal. But if Congress doesn't like the deal, or just wants to see
Obama lose, it has the power to torpedo it by imposing new sanctions on Iran .
likely be extended, but it's a reminder that the negotiations could soon come to a head.
Previously, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid used procedural powers to stop this from happening and save the
their most basic level, the international negotiations over Iran's nuclear program (they include several other
nations, but the US is the biggest player) are a tit-for-tat deal. If Iran agrees to place a series of verifiable limits on
its nuclear development, then the United States and the world will relax their painful economic and diplomatic
sanctions on Tehran. "The regime of economic sanctions against Iran is arguably the most complex the United
States and the international community have ever imposed on a rogue state," the Congressional Research Service's
Dianne Rennack writes. To underscore the point, Rennack's four-page report is accompanied by a list of every US
sanction on Iran that goes on for 23 full pages. The US's sanctions are a joint Congressional-executive production.
Congress puts strict limits on Iran's ability to export oil and do business with American companies, but it gives the
president the power to waive sanctions if he thinks it's in the American national interest. "In the collection of laws
that are the statutory basis for the U.S. economic sanctions regime on Iran," Rennack writes, "the President retains,
says. "You could also see a bill that says the president can't agree to a deal unless it includes the following things or
that Mitch McConnell's Senate wants to. Congress could easily use its authority to kill an Iran deal To understand
why the new Senate is such a big deal for congressional action on sanctions, we have to jump back a year. In
November 2013, the Obama administration struck an interim deal with Iran called the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA). As
part of the JPOA, the US agreed to limited, temporary sanctions relief in exchange for Iran limiting nuclear program
components like uranium production. Congressional Republicans, by and large, hate the JPOA deal. Arguing that the
deal didn't place sufficiently serious limits on Iran's nuclear growth, the House passed new sanctions on Iran in
December. (There is also a line of argument, though often less explicit, that the Iranian government cannot be
trusted with any deal at all, and that US policy should focus on coercing Iran into submission or unseating the
Iranian government entirely.) Senate Republicans, joined by more hawkish Democrats, had the votes to pass a
similar bill. But in February, Senate Majority leader Harry Reid killed new Iran sanctions, using the Majority Leader's
power to block consideration of the sanctions legislation to prevent a vote. McConnell blasted Reid's move. "There is
no excuse for muzzling the Congress on an issue of this importance to our own national security," he said. So now
that McConnell holds the majority leader's gavel, it will remove that procedural roadblock that stood between
Obama and new Iran sanctions. To be clear, it's far from guaranteed that Obama will be able to reach a deal with
Iran at all; negotiations could fall apart long before they reach the point of congressional involvement. But if he
does reach a deal, and Congress doesn't like the terms, then they'll be able to kill it by passing new sanctions
make no mistake
imposing new sanctions or limiting Obama's authority to waive the current ones
would kill any deal. If Iran can't expect Obama to follow through on his promises to
relax sanctions, it has zero incentive to limit its nuclear program. "If Congress
legislation, or preventing Obama from temporarily waiving the ones on the books. And
adopts sanctions," Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif told Time last December, "the entire deal is dead." Moreover,
it could fracture the international movement to sanction Iran. The United States is
far from Iran's biggest trading partner, so it depends on international cooperation in
order to ensure the sanctions bite. If it looks like the US won't abide by the terms of
a deal, the broad-based international sanctions regime could collapse. Europe,
particularly, might decide that going along with the sanctions is no longer worthwhile. "Our ability to coerce Iran is
largely based on whether or not the international community thinks that we are the ones that are being
constructive and [Iranians] are the ones that being obstructive," Sofer says. "If they don't believe that, then the
It's true
that Obama could veto any Congressional efforts to blow up an Iran deal with
sanctions. But a two-thirds vote could override any veto and , according to Sofer, an
override is entirely within the realm of possibility . "There are plenty of Democrats that will
probably side with Republicans if they try to push a harder line on Iran," Sofer says. For a variety of
reasons, including deep skepticism of Iran's intentions and strong Democratic support for Israel, whose
government opposes the negotiations, Congressional Democrats are not as open to making a
international sanctions regime falls apart." This could be one of the biggest fights of Obama's last term
deal with Iran as Obama is. Many will likely defect to the GOP side out of principle.
The real fight, Sofer says, will be among the Democrats those who are willing to take
the administration's side in theory, but don't necessarily think a deal with Iran is
legislative priority number one, and maybe don't want to open themselves up to the
political risk. These Democrats "can make it harder: you can filibuster, if you're
Obama you can veto you can make it impossible for a full bill to be passed out of Congress on Iran," Sofer
says. But it'd be a really tough battle, one that would consume a lot of
energy and lobbying effort that Democrats might prefer to spend pushing
on other issues. "I'm not really sure they're going to be willing to take on a fight about an Iran sanctions
bill," Sofer concludes. "I'm not really sure that the Democrats who support [a deal] are really fully behind it enough
that they'll be willing to give up leverage on, you know, unemployment insurance or immigration status these
become one of the biggest legislative fights of Obama's last two years.
Nuke war
Stevens 13 (Philip Stevens, associate editor and chief political commentator for
the Financial Times, Nov 14 2013, The four big truths that are shaping the Iran
talks, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/af170df6-4d1c-11e3-bf32-00144feabdc0.html)
France on the terms of an acceptable deal should not allow the trees to obscure the forest. The organising facts shaping the negotiations have not
Tehrans acquisition of a bomb would be more than dangerous for the Middle
East and for wider international security. It would most likely set off a nuclear arms race that
would see Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt signing up to the nuclear club. The
nuclear non-proliferation treaty would be shattered. A future regional conflict could
draw Israel into launching a pre-emptive nuclear strike. This is not a region
obviously susceptible to cold war disciplines of deterrence. The second ineluctable
reality is that Iran has mastered the nuclear cycle. How far it is from building a bomb remains a subject of
changed. The first of these is that
debate. Different intelligence agencies give different answers. These depend in part on what the spooks actually know and in part on what their political
masters want others to hear. The progress of an Iranian warhead programme is one of the known unknowns that have often wreaked havoc in this part of
the world. Israel points to an imminent threat. European agencies are more relaxed, suggesting Tehran is still two years or so away from a weapon.
Western diplomats broadly agree that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has not taken a definitive decision to step over the line. What Iran has been seeking is what
diplomats call a breakout capability the capacity to dash to a bomb before the international community could effectively mobilise against it. The third
fact and this one is hard for many to swallow is that neither a negotiated settlement nor the air strikes long favoured by Benjamin Netanyahu, Israels
prime minister, can offer the rest of the world a watertight insurance policy. It should be possible to construct a deal that acts as a plausible restraint
and extends the timeframe for any breakout but no amount of restrictions or intrusive monitoring can offer a certain guarantee against Tehrans future
bombing Irans nuclear sites could certainly delay the programme, perhaps
But, assuming that even the hawkish Mr Netanyahu is not proposing permanent war against Iran, air strikes
would not end it. You cannot bomb knowledge and technical expertise. To try
would be to empower those in Tehran who say the regime will be safe only when, like North
Korea, it has a weapon. So when Barack Obama says the US will never allow Iran to get the bomb he is indulging in, albeit understandable,
wishful thinking. The best the international community can hope for is that, in return for
a relaxation of sanctions, Iran will make a judgment that it is better off sticking with
a threshold capability. To put this another way, if Tehran does step back from the nuclear brink
intentions. By the same token,
for a couple of years.
it will be because of its own calculation of the balance of advantage. The fourth
element in this dynamic is that Iran now has a leadership that , faced with the severe and growing pain
inflicted by sanctions, is prepared to talk. There is nothing to say that Hassan Rouhani, the president, is any less
hard-headed than previous Iranian leaders, but he does seem ready to weigh the options.
Uniqueness
Will Pass
Obama can pass the deal now, but congress is still not entirely
on board
Richard Cowan, journalist for Reuters, 7/12 2015, Congress promises rough ride
for any nuclear deal with Iran, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/12/us-irannuclear-usa-congress-idUSKCN0PM0M720150712
The top Republican in the U.S. Senate cast doubt on Sunday on whether President
Barack Obama would be able to win approval in Congress for any nuclear deal with Iran, and
some Democrats also expressed reservations. "I think it's going to be a very hard sell , if it's
completed, in Congress," Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell told "Fox News Sunday".
"We already know it's going to leave Iran as a threshold nuclear state." T he U.S. Congress could play a
key role in the future of any deal to curb Iran's nuclear program, with negotiations reaching
a critical juncture in Vienna on Sunday. Obama can enter a deal with Iran, which Congress
would review. If the review went against him, Obama could veto the disapproval
legislation. Congress could then try to reverse his veto, which is difficult . But if it
succeeded, its disapproval would take away Obama's ability to temporarily waive
many U.S. sanctions on Iran. Robert Menendez of New Jersey, a leading foreign policy voice among
Senate Democrats, said the prospect of a deal made him "anxious," saying the talks had moved from preventing
Iran from having a nuclear capability, to managing it. Western diplomats say the goal of the deal is to increase the
time it would take for Iran to produce enough enriched uranium fuel for a weapon to at least one year, from current
estimates of 2-3 months. In return for curbs on its nuclear activities, Iran would get relief from economic sanctions.
Many
congressional Republicans, including McConnell, have criticized the negotiations ,
saying the United States should be increasing economic sanctions against Iran. Tehran
Menendez, interviewed on ABC's "This Week" program, did not rule out supporting a deal.
maintains its nuclear work is solely for peaceful purposes. Referring to the congressional review process,
McConnell said: "He (Obama) will have to get at least 34 votes " in the 100-member
Senate to sustain his veto, adding that he hoped Democrats would resist a "strong
pull" not to buck Obama. The debate in Washington over any deal would happen with the 2016 U.S.
presidential campaign already under way. One Republican candidate, Senator Lindsay Graham, said on CNN's "State
of the Union" the negotiations should be left to the next president, who would take office in January 2017. "I think a
good outcome is to basically leave the interim deal in place" with Iran until then, Graham said. House Speaker John
Boehner said failure of the talks would not be a bad outcome. On CBS's "Face the Nation," Boehner said: "If, in fact,
there's no agreement, the sanctions are going to go back in place," prodding Iran to "abandon their efforts to get a
nuclear weapon, and stop being the largest state sponsor of terrorism in the world."
Because of the way the Congressional oversight mechanism is structured, the deal moves forward for now if slightly
more than one-third of a single chamber sticks with Obamas veto of any GOP-driven measure disapproving of the
deal.
One hundred and fifty House Dems have already signed a letter
generally supporting diplomacy, which makes it very likely the veto wont get
overridden in the Lower Chamber. The odds are very good that we can sustain the
veto in both houses, but the firewall is clearly in the House, one source says. But
some Senate Democrats are already arguing that Dems should lean into the
contrast with Republicans that the battle over diplomacy with Iran will produce . After
all, likely Dem presidential nominee Hillary Clinton is already saying positive things about the deal, while all her
GOP rivals are trashing it. Republicans simply dont acknowledge the legitimacy of diplomacy as a tool of American
ourselves safe without engaging in endless war after endless war. Republicans risk being out of step with the
American public if their only answer to international problems is armed conflict.
Congress will soon begin reviewing the Iran nuclear deal, the outlines of which have
already deeply divided Republican leaders and left many Democrats skeptical but
willing to hear out President Obamas pitch. Under the terms of legislation passed in May, Congress has 60
days to scrutinize the accord between Iran and the United States, Britain, France, China, Russia and Germany, and then to vote to
Congress needs a twothirds majority in each house to override the veto, so to put the deal into force, Mr.
Obama only needs one-third of one of the houses to stand with him. At the White
House on Tuesday, Mr. Obama began what promises to be an arduous process
of pitching the historic agreement to Congress even as he was announcing its
outlines. He said it was based on strict verification requirements that would leave nothing to chance when it came to Irans
accept or reject it or to do nothing. The president can veto any resolution of disapproval.
compliance and to thwarting its means of obtaining a weapon. Saying he welcomed congressional scrutiny, the president offered
extensive briefings from members of his administration on the deal, and threatened to veto any effort by Congress to block it. But
he also previewed an overarching theme that senior officials and those close to the White House cite as a key component of their
argument for the pact. Consider what happens in a world without this deal, Mr. Obama said, arguing that without an accord there
would be no lasting constraints on Irans nuclear program, prompting other countries in the area to race for a weapon and
just over the next 18 months but over many years, Mr. Coons said Mr. Obama had told the gathering. If I put together a deal that
fails to stop Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, that would be part of my legacy as well, the president added, according to Mr.
The White House chief of staff, Denis R. McDonough, met last week with the
Republican chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Bob
Corker of Tennessee, and its ranking Democrat, Senator Benjamin L. Cardin of
Coons.
Maryland, to hear their concerns, Mr. Cardin said. After some initial reluctance to
share classified information on the talks, the White House has become far more
forthcoming, Mr. Cardin added. There are people who have already made up their
minds, no question about that, and I think thats unfortunate, Mr. Cardin said. But
at this point, a majority of Congress believes we have to objectively review whats in
the agreement before we decide what course were going to take. White House
officials must now decide whether the president should try to win over a majority of
Congress, including hostile Republicans, or focus on shoring up a Democratic base
to sustain a veto. Mr. Royce said he thought the strategy to protect the veto was
already in play. This is a good deal and a historic opportunity to win without war, Stephen Miles, the groups advocacy
director, said in a statement. Unfortunately, congressional opponents of any deal with Iran
will stop at nothing to scuttle this agreement and put our nation on the path to yet
another war in the Middle East. We have seen this movie before and we know how it
ends. We will not stand idly by while those who pushed for war with Iraq try to push
us into war with Iran.
The White House has launched a major lobbying push to win support for its nuclear
deal with Iran. President Obama will hold a news conference on Wednesday to take questions about the deal,
reached early Tuesday. He also will lobby lawmakers over the phone in the coming days,
according to White House officials. The Iran nuclear deal is a top priority for
Obama in his second term, and the White House quickly signaled it will spare no
effort in winning public and congressional support for the agreement. Besides the
press conference, the White House said Obama will also give a series of speeches
and interviews focused on the nuclear deal. Obama briefed congressional leaders
before the agreement was announced, and phoned Democratic presidential
candidate Hillary Clinton to tell her the news. Clinton, formerly secretary of State
under Obama, publicly backed the Iran deal during a visit to Capitol Hill, a move
that further united Democrats on the issue. Under legislation governing congressional review of
the deal, lawmakers may vote to approve or disapprove of the deal. The White House is also wary of efforts to reimpose sanctions on Iran, which would scuttle the agreement. Obama vowed to veto any legislation intended to
scrap the deal; the White House also wants to build support to make Democrats less likely to defect in
including a stint as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, to win over Senate Democrats. Biden was joined
The White
House plans to send Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Energy Ernest
Moniz, two top U.S. negotiators, to go over the details of the pact, deputy national
security adviser Ben Rhodes said on CNN. Obama and his top aides had already
by officials from the White House, State, Energy and Treasury departments in lobbying for the deal.
begun to woo Democrats before the deal was struck. The president hosted
Senate Democrats for a reception last week, where he spoke about the
importance of a deal. The White House is also receiving cover from a coalition of more than a dozen
liberal groups that are launching a lobbying campaign designed to pressure Democratic lawmakers to back the deal.
The effort is being led by Credo Action and includes progressive heavyweights like MoveOn, the Campaign for
Americas Future and Democracy for America, as well as media outlets like Daily Kos and The Nation. It includes a
petition drive and phone calls to lawmakers. The group warns it will hold accountable those Democrats who help
Republicans sabotage the deal and start a war.
outrage from congressional Republicans since the agreement was announced Tuesday makes it almost certain that
GOP majorities in the House and Senate will deliver majority support for opposing
the deal in what are likely to be a pair of mid-September votes. So, in addition to Thursdays meeting with
Senate Democrats, Biden spent Wednesday morning in a closed-door meeting with the
House Democratic caucus, taking many detailed questions from rank-and-file lawmakers with concerns
the
about the plan, particularly regarding Israels security. The immediate goal is to explain the intricacies of the plan
The main
goal is ensuring that enough Democrats stick with President Obama so that, even if
the resolutions disapproving of the deal win majorities, they would pass with less
than a two-thirds majority and his veto would be sustained. Bidens face-to-face pitch has
that allows sanctions on Iran to lapse in exchange for limitations on its nuclear program for a decade.
been personal, explaining his political roots as a strong proponent of Israel during his 36 years in the Senate and his
relationship with Obama. Ive been a very supportive vice president; I will always support the president, but my
deal with him from the very start was: I will always support you, but Im not going to sell if I dont agree with it;
dont ask me to come sell something if I dont agree with it, Biden told Democrats Thursday, according to Sen.
Timothy M. Kaine (D-Va.). According to Kaine, the vice president reminded the senators of his previous role as
chairman of their committee, helping negotiate arms treaties. Im here and Im selling, because I agree with this,
announcement that it would seek a U.N. vote of support next week, well ahead of the congressional schedule for
consideration. Liberals such as Sen. Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) and conservatives such as Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.)
expressed problems with that timing. I look at that as an affront to the American people, Corker told reporters at
a news conference outside the meeting Biden held with Democrats. The current procedure for handling the Iran
deal materialized earlier in the spring when Kaine worked with Republicans to come up with a congressional review
that will give the House and Senate as many as 60 days to consider the pact. During that time the president can
lift only sanctions that were imposed by the executive branch, leaving in place those sanctions against Iran that
previous Congresses imposed. Many officials in the administration are flooding Democrats with information,
working the phones and planning meetings. A group of Jewish Democrats received a classified briefing from Ben
Rhodes, deputy national security adviser, on Thursday. Kaine got a call early Tuesday, as the deal was being
unveiled, from Antony Blinken, the deputy secretary of state. Next week three secretaries John F. Kerry of State,
Ernest Moniz of Energy and Jack Lew of Treasury will be on Capitol Hill for briefings in the House and Senate. For
this week, however, Biden was the main pitchman for the deal to Democrats. His ties
to the Senate are legendary, but his connection to House Democrats is possibly
even stronger. Over the last seven years Biden has tended to dozens of fundraisers for rank-and-file
Democrats and made campaign stops in their districts, while Obama has generally appeared only at events for
himself or fundraisers for congressional campaign committees. Similar to his pitch to Senate Democrats, Biden
spoke very little at the beginning of his session with House Democrats and instead let them ask as many questions
as they could. The session paid a big dividend when House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) announced
Thursday morning that she would support the Iran deal and that she would aggressively lobby fellow Democrats to
back the president.
signing of the agreement on Tuesday, Netanyahu called the international deal with Tehran a historic mistake,"
Will PassMoniz
Energy secretary Ernest Moniz pushing for Iran Deal
Diamond 7/15/15 (Jeremy Diamond, "Energy Secretary Fights Iran Deal
Detractors", www.cnn.com/2015/07/15/politics/iran-deal-energy-secretary-ernestmoniz/index.html, 7/15/15, sr)
Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz on Wednesday defended the nuclear agreement with
Iran he helped broker, asserting that the deal is an improvement on the status quo
and that it will keep Iran from a nuclear weapon in the long-term. While critics have
pounced on the danger of a nuclear-armed Iran after the 10 to 15 years of restrictions expire, Moniz insisted
that the deal would stand the test of time . "The deal is not a 10-year deal or a 15-year deal or a 20year deal, it's a long-term deal that has various phases," Moniz said. "Make no mistake about it, forever this
agreement would have stronger restrictions on Iran than would be the case if we had no agreement ."
But Moniz
insisted that the U.S. has "bought considerable time to respond " to any potential
Iranian violation by extending Iran's breakout time from the current two to three
months to keeping Iran at least a year away from developing enough weaponsgrade nuclear material for a bomb. Critics contend that the economic relief from sanctions will be a
boon to Iran's sponsorship of terrorism around the world -- with billions of dollars flowing in, more funds will make
Top of Docket
Irans a top Congressional priority
Wicker 7-14 (Roger Wicker, Wicker: Congress Ready to Begin Iran Deal Review,
Wickers Press Office, 7/14/15, Roger Wicker is a republican senator of Missouri,
http://www.wicker.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=2640bb84-64164000-b6f5-3e6d7f339a9f, 7/15/15 AV)
WASHINGTON U.S. Senator Roger Wicker, R-Miss., a senior member of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
today issued the following statement regarding a final deal between Iran and members of the P5+1, which includes
the United States: I remain skeptical that the Iranian regime will cooperate with international inspectors and live up
to its obligations. History has taught us that Iran does not make good on its word, going to great lengths to cover up
and deceive the world about its nuclear ambitions and ballistic capabilities. This
Links
Tuesday afternoon as well, by a 67 to 32 margin. The bill officially ends 14 years of unprecedented bulk collection of
domestic phone records by the NSA, replacing it with a program that requires the government to make specific
requests to the phone companies. After Snowdens leak of NSA documents revealed it, the program was repeatedly
found to violate the law, first by legal experts and blue-ribbon panels, and just last month by a federal appellate
court. Its rejection by Congress is hardly a radical act it simply reasserts the meaning of the
word relevant (the language of the statute) as distinct from everything (how the government interpreted it).
McConnell and other fearmongers issued dire warnings until the very end. The
Senate is voting to take away one more tool from those who defend this country
every day, he said Tuesday McConnell tried to get support for some discrete and
sensible improvements to the Freedom Act on Tuesday, but failed. In one last stand
before his final defeat, he refused to allow debate on several amendments that
would have given the reforms more teeth.
spill disaster, stabilize Afghanistan, help fix Greece's ailing economy and do right by Shirley Sherrod, the Agriculture
dividends from passage of a healthcare overhaul or a financial regulatory bill have been fleeting. Instead, voters
are measuring his presidency by a more immediate yardstick: Is he creating enough jobs? So far the verdict is no,
and that has taken a toll on Obama's approval ratings. Only 46% approve of Obama's job performance, compared
with 47% who disapprove, according to Gallup's daily tracking poll. "I
But as a candidate in
2008, he set sky-high expectations about what he could achieve and what
government could accomplish. Clinching the Democratic nomination two years ago,
Obama described the moment as an epic breakthrough when "we began to provide
care for the sick and good jobs to the jobless " and "when the rise of the oceans began to slow and
our planet began to heal." Those towering goals remain a long way off. And most people
would have preferred to see Obama focus more narrowly on the "good jobs" part of
the promise. A recent Gallup poll showed that 53% of the population rated unemployment and the economy
bottom of the sea and plug the hole. "I can't suck it up with a straw," he said.
as the nation's most important problem. By contrast, only 7% cited healthcare a single-minded focus of the White
Obama took office, to 9.5%. Last month, more than 2 million homes in the U.S. were in various stages of foreclosure
up from 1.7 million when Obama was sworn in. "Folks just aren't in a mood to hand out gold stars when
Insulating the
president from bad news has proved impossible. Other White Houses have tried doing so
with more success. Reagan's Cabinet officials often took the blame, shielding the boss. But the Obama
administration is about one man. Obama is the White House's chief
spokesman, policy pitchman, fundraiser and negotiator. No Cabinet
secretary has emerged as an adequate surrogate. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner
unemployment is hovering around 10%," said Paul Begala, a Democratic pundit.
is seen as a tepid public speaker; Energy Secretary Steven Chu is prone to long, wonky digressions and has rarely
everything in the hundreds of public statements he has made: nuclear arms treaties, basketball star LeBron James'
career plans; Chelsea Clinton's wedding.
Losers Lose
(INSERT SPECIFIC LINK THAT SAYS OBAMA WILL OPPOSE THE
PLAN)
The plan is a perceived loss for Obama that saps his capital
and derails the agenda
Loomis, 7 --- Department of Government at Georgetown
(3/2/2007, Dr. Andrew J. Loomis is a Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Leveraging legitimacy in the crafting
of U.S. foreign policy, pg 35-36,
http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/7/9/4/8/pages179487/p179487-36.php)
Declining political authority encourages defection. American political analyst Norman
context,
In a system where a President has limited formal power, perception matters . The
reputation for successthe belief by other political actors that even when he looks down, a president will find a
way to pull out a victoryis the most valuable resource a chief executive can have .
Conversely, the widespread belief that the Oval Office occupant is on the defensive,
on the wane or without the ability to win under adversity can lead to disaster,
as individual lawmakers calculate who will be on the winning side and
negotiate accordingly. In simple terms, winners win and losers lose more often than not.
Failure begets failure. In short, a president experiencing declining amounts of
political capital has diminished capacity to advance his goals. As a result, political allies
perceive a decreasing benefit in publicly tying themselves to the president , and an
increasing benefit in allying with rising centers of authority. A presidents incapacity and his record of success are interlocked and
by ideational resources in the form of public perceptions of legitimacy. The public offers and rescinds its support in accordance with
normative trends and historical patterns, non-material sources of power that affects the character of U.S. policy, foreign and
domestic.
generate domestic support for the League of Nations to public pressure that is changing the current course of U.S. involvement in
Iraqthe effective execution of foreign policy depends on public support. Public support turns on perceptions of policy legitimacy. As
a result, policymakersstarting with the presidentpay close attention to the receptivity that U.S. policy has with the domestic
public. In this way, normative influences infiltrate policy-making processes and affect the character of policy decisions.]
Congress can override a presidential veto but does not do it very often; of 2,564 presidential vetoes in our
nations history, only 110 have ever been overridden. 44 The 2/3 vote of both houses needed to override a veto basically means
that unless the presidents executive order is grossly unconstitutional and thus capable of earning bipartisan opposition - one party
needs to have a supermajority of both houses. Even passing legislation to nullify an executive order can be difficult to accomplish,
always an option, but the gravity of such a charge would prevent many from supporting it unless the president was very unpopular
and truly abused his power. 46
presidents
should not veto without care, for if Congress overrides it is politically damaging to
the president.8 This means that if the president does not garner the required one-third plus one in either house of Congress
and his veto is overridden, he will not only lose face, but lose political capital that gives
him leverage in dealing with Congress. If the president loses political capital he can
put himself at a disadvantage for future interactions with Congress ; hence,
when vetoing he must consider his support in Congress and the potential
ramifications of an override. However, Gattuso adds that worse than having a veto overridden is a president who
Gattuso discusses four caveats that should be considered by presidents when devising a veto strategy. First,
threatens to veto and does not follow through once Congress has passed legislation.9 This is even more damaging than an override
because the president is caught making empty threats. Therefore, Congress will continue to produce legislation to their liking
rather than revising it because Congress is inclined to believe the president is no longer serious about his veto threats.
On the other hand, if the President's claim that he benefits from the testimony is obviously false, then his authority
exists. If the President makes officials available for testimony every time Congress asks for such testimony, and if
maintaining his constitutional powers will need to refuse to allow people to testify even when testimony would be in
his short-term interest.
Backdoors
Obama will fight curtailment of backdoors- Strong influence
from FBI and NSA to protect national security
Bennett 3/22 (Cory Bennett: Works for The Hill- Top politics organization,
Silicon Valley spars with Obama over 'backdoor' surveillance, 3/22/15,
http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/236512-silicon-valley-spars-with-obama-overbackdoor-surveillance, Accessed: 7/17/15, RRR)
Silicon Valley and a bipartisan group of lawmakers are lining up against the Obama
administration, criticizing what they see as a lack of support for total online privacy.
The steady rise of sophisticated privacy techniques such as encryption and
anonymity software has put the government in a difficult position trying to support the
right to privacy while figuring out how to prevent people from evading law enforcement. The technologies are
evolving in ways that potentially make this trickier, President Obama said during a January news conference with
British Prime Minister David Cameron. The conundrum has led to a heated debate in Washington: Should law
enforcement have guaranteed access to data? I think theres a little bit of a tug of war happening in the
government, said Jay Kaplan, co-founder of the security firm Synack and a former National Security Agency (NSA)
The Obama administration from officials with FBI and the National Security
to the president himself has come out in favor of some form of
guaranteed access while still endorsing strong encryption. If we get into a situation
in which the technologies do not allow us at all to track somebody that we're
confident is a terrorist, Obama said, that's a problem. What shape that access takes, however, is
cyber analyst.
Agency (NSA)
unclear. The dialogue that we're engaged in is designed to make sure that all of us feel confident that if there is
an actual threat out there, our law enforcement and our intelligence officers can identify that threat and track that
threat at the same time that our governments are not going around phishing into whatever text you might be
sending on your smartphone, Obama said. And I think that's something that can be achieved. Privacy hawks on
Capitol Hill arent buying it. I dont think much of that, Rep. Joe Barton (R-Texas), co-founder of the Congressional
Bipartisan Privacy Caucus, told The Hill. We have a huge homeland security apparatus with almost unlimited
authority to with some sort of a reasonable suspicion check almost any type of communication, whether its
voice, Internet, telephonic, electronic, you name it. Those were positions that did not receive rave reviews here
in Silicon Valley, said Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.), whose district includes parts of tech-heavy San Jose. Many
believe the administrations stance is inherently at odds with robust digital protection. In
order to fully
implement what he's suggesting, you would need one of two things, Lofgren said. One would
be installing so-called backdoors in encryption an access point known only to law
enforcement agencies. Security experts find this concept abhorrent, since cyber
crooks or foreign intelligence agencies would likely exploit it.
Obama will resist efforts to prevent backdoor tech accessCurrently increasing efforts to obtain private information
Albanesius 15 (Chloe Albanesius: Executive Editor for News and Features for
PCMag, Obama: Tech That prevents us from stopping an attack is a problem,
1/16/15, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2475343,00.asp, 7/17/15, RRR)
Obama today stopped short of calling for a ban on encryption, but said that
technology that prevents law enforcement officials from halting terrorist activity is a
"problem." "If we get into a situation where the technology does not allow us at all to track somebody that's a terrorist, if we find evidence of a terrorist plot somewhere in
President
the Middle East that traces directly back to London or New York, [and] we can't penetrate that, that's a problem," Obama said during a joint press conference with U.K. Prime Minister
David Cameron at the White House. His comments come shortly after Cameron suggested that the U.K. might, in fact,ban encryption technology that prevents officials from tracking
criminals via their phones, PCs, or other gadgets. That would likely be rather difficult given that iOS 8 and Android 5.0 Lollipop are encrypted by default, and the majority of U.K. citizens
use either iOS or Android devices. Not to mention the fact that popular apps like WhatsApp are also encrypted. Today, Cameron said that his objective is to "avoid the safe havens that
designed for the traditional wiretap have to be updated ," Obama said
to be debated, here in the U.S. and in the U.K.," he continued. "I think we're getting better at it." Tech companies recognize that they have a responsibility to the public but also want to
sending on your smartphone," Obama said. "I think that's something that can achieved, [though there are] going to be hard cases." The FBI has echoed Obama's concerns about
the White House and U.K. today announced several steps they will take to
enhance coordination on cyber-security issues. That includes increased threat information sharing and joint cyber-security and
encryption technology. To that end,
network defense exercises, the first of which will focus on the financial sector. Meanwhile, the U.K.'s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and Security Service (MI5) will
team with the NSA and FBI on a joint cyber cell, which will allow staff from each agency to be co-located for easier information sharing. Finally, the U.S. and U.K. will fund a new
Fulbright Cyber Security Award for up to six months of research. Applications will be accepted later this year for a 2016-17 session. MIT has also invited the University of Cambridge to
participate in a "Cambridge vs. Cambridge" cyber-security contest.
constitutional rights et cetera, et cetera, but it seems to me that our first obligation
is the protection of our citizenry against attack, which you agree is growing. None
of these assertions should be accepted at face value. For 15 years, the threat of
imminent terrorist violence has been used by the US government to bully the public
and justify a sustained assault on democratic rights. Meanwhile, the relationship of
the same state agencies demanding anti-democratic measures to those who have
actually carried out terrorist attacksfrom 9/11 to the Boston marathon bombing
has never been seriously investigated. The Obama administration and the domestic
and international spying organizations of the US government are alarmed because
commonly used data encryption methods are very effective at keeping themand
others, like hackers,from accessing live communications streams and data at rest.
Borders
Obama will fight for border control- Recent meeting proves
Wolfgang 14 (Ben Wolfgang: Covers the White House for The Washington Times,
Obama: Ive fought against activists who believe there should be open borders,
The Washington Times, 12/9/2014,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/dec/9/obama-ive-fought-againstactivists-open-borders/, Accessed: 7/17/15, RRR)
Critics say President Obama went too far with his executive action granting amnesty to more than 4 million illegal immigrants but behind the scenes,
the president said hes pushed back against those who believe the U.S. should
have an open border with Mexico. At a town-hall meeting in Nashville on Tuesday, Mr. Obama
defended the idea of a strong U.S-Mexico border and said hes had heated
debates with activists who want that border to disappear. There have been times, honestly, Ive had
arguments with immigration rights activists who say, effectively, There shouldnt be any rules. These are good people. Why should we have any
enforcement like this? My response is, In the eyes of God, everybody is equal I dont make any claims my child is superior to anybody elses child. But
The administration has called on Congress to provide $3.7 billion in emergency funding,
spread out among the U.S. Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, Health and Human Services and State, to combat what it
called a humanitarian crisis.
children, both accompanied and on their own, are fleeing Central America in
alarming numbers and that as a result, it needs more border surveillance and
security, as well as a surge in enforcement personnel, from immigration judges to
asylum officers.
The White House said that
The DHS would get a significant portion of the president's request, with $1.1 billion going to Immigration and Customs Enforcement
and $433 million going to Customs and Border Protection. The CBP's share includes $39.4 million to increase air surveillance
capabilities that would support 16,526 additional flight hours for border surveillance and 16 additional crews for unmanned aerial
systems to improve detection and interdiction of illegal activity, according to a White House fact sheet.
General
Ending Surveillance policy costs PC and creates backlash
Burnett 14
[Bob Burnett, writer at the Huffington Post and former technologist and one of the founding
executives at Cisco Systems. Why Hasn't Obama Reined in NSA?, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bobburnett/obama-nsa_b_4574910.html, January 10th, 2014//Rahul]
After the 2008 election, Barack Obama supporters had high expectations for his
national-security policy. We thought he'd end U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, and open talks with
Iran. We expected he would close down Guantanamo and end the National Security Agency's
(NSA) domestic surveillance program that collects Americans' phone and email data. He's accomplished
some of these objectives but he hasn't reined in the NSA. Why not? Writing in The New Yorker, Ryan
Lizza observed that before becoming president, Obama was inconsistent on national security
policy and the NSA. "In 2003, as a Senate candidate, he called the Patriot Act 'shoddy and dangerous.' And
at the 2004 Democratic Convention... he took aim at the 'library records' provision of the law." Nonetheless, in in
2006 Obama voted for a renewal of the Patriot Act. As a presidential candidate, Obama's attitude appeared to shift.
In 2007 Obama criticized Bush, "This administration acts like violating civil liberties is the way to enhance civil
liberties. It is not. There are no shortcuts to protecting America." In an August 2007, campaign speech Obama
criticized, "unchecked presidential power" and vowed a change in national security policy: "that means no more
illegal wiretapping of American citizens, no more national-security letters to spy on citizens who are not suspected
of a crime... [and] no more ignoring the law when it is inconvenient." Nonetheless, Obama's presidential record has
Obama has worked to bring them into narrow compliance with rules--set forth by a court that operates in secret-that often contradict the views on surveillance that he strongly expressed when he was a senator and a Presidential
candidate. A recent New York Times editorial noted: The N.S.A. broke federal privacy laws, or exceeded its
authority, thousands of times per year, according to the agency's own internal auditor. The agency broke into the
communications links of major data centers around the world, allowing it to spy on hundreds of millions of user
accounts and infuriating the Internet companies that own the centers. The N.S.A. systematically undermined the
basic encryption systems of the Internet, making it impossible to know if sensitive banking or medical data is truly
defense spending, expanded the national-security state, and maintained the hundreds of US military bases that dot
the globe. Obama tried to shut down Guantanamo but was thwarted by Congress. 2. Since becoming President,
Obama has been in a national security bubble . Writing in the New York Times, Peter Baker
reported that "the evening before he was sworn into office, Barack Obama [was informed] of a major terrorist plot
to attack his inauguration." (This turned out to be a false alarm.) In December of 2009, the President was shaken by
the failed attack of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab who tried to detonate an underwear bomb as his plane landed in
Over the past five years, the intelligence community has alerted Obama to
dozens of potential attacks. That's affected him . This past June Obama defended
NSA surveillance, saying, "We know of at least 50 threats that have been averted
because of this information." (Pro Publica reports that the NSA has provided specifics on only four of
Detroit.
these cases and there is little support for the president's contention that NSA surveillance actually "averted" these
Obama inherited a pit bull and decided to handle it with extreme care. Both the New York Times and Ryan Lizza
reported that James Clapper, the director of National Intelligence who oversees NSA, lied to Congress, in March,
when he denied that NSA was collecting data on millions of Americans. It wasn't the first time the national-security
state deceived us. Their litany of falsehoods and screw-ups stretches from Pearl Harbor through the Vietnam War to
the 9/11 attacks and the decision to invade Iraq. We may never know why President Obama has continued the
Bush-era domestic surveillance programs. Whatever his reasoning, it's time for him to rein in the NSA.
Obama finally joins the national debate he called for a long time ago but then
abandoned: the debate about how best to balance national security and civil liberty . As I
outlined in NPR's scene-setter this morning, this debate is a tricky one for a president who wants to lead from
behind. The public's view shifts markedly in response to perceptions of the threat, so a political leader who is only
following the public mood will crisscross himself repeatedly. Changing one's mind and shifting the policy is not
improving and the terrorist threat is receding, one set of trade-offs is appropriate. When security is worsening and
the terrorist threat is worsening, another might be. It is likely, however, that the optimal answer is not the one
Congress and the public are still uncomfortable doing the same
calculations they naturally do when getting into a car or eating a few pieces of bacon: what is the real
risk, and what costs are we willing to pay to ease that risk? The chances of dying in a terror attack,
even considering 9/11, are just one in four million, Mueller notes (it's one in 110 million if 9/11 is
taken out of the equation). "The issue is 'acceptable risk,' and nobody wants to use that
term," Mueller says. For when it comes to terrorism, any risk may be too much for
Congress and their constituents to take on.
security studies,
Drones
Domestic drone regulation unpopular- Angers influential
lobbyists
Morgan and Seetharaman 2/23 (David Morgan and Deepa Seetharaman:
Journalists for Reuters, Industry lobbyists take aim at proposed FAA drone rules,
2/23/15, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/24/us-usa-drones-lobbyingidUSKBN0LS04R20150224, Accessed: 7/15/15, RRR)
Businesses hoping to capitalize on the commercial potential of drones are preparing
to push back against proposed regulations that would strictly limit how the aircraft can be used.
During a 60-day public comment period on the rules, lobbyists representing a range of industries, from Internet
giants Amazon.com Inc and Google Inc to aerospace firms and the news media, say they will try to convince
regulators that cutting-edge technologies make some of the limitations proposed last week by the Federal Aviation
And the proposed rules provide a new focus of lobbying efforts. If approved as written, the new FAA rules would lift
the current near-ban on flying drones for commercial purposes, but its restrictions would make many business
applications, such as package delivery, unfeasible. Among other constraints, the proposed rules would limit
commercial drones to an altitude of 500 feet, allow flights only during daytime hours and require operators to keep
the aircraft in their sights at all times. Drones could not be flown near airports or directly over humans. Officials say
these precautions are needed for safety. But drone makers and other firms with a stake in unmanned aircraft
technology say they are already working on features that would allow drones to "sense and avoid" obstacles
including other aircraft and prevent link disruptions that could cause a drone to lose contact with ground
operations. For example, Amazon.com is developing autonomous drones that would navigate via GPS and use
redundant safety mechanisms and sensor arrays to avoid accidents as part of a "Prime Air" drone delivery service it
hopes to launch. Industry representatives say they will use the 60-day comment period to try to convince
regulators that breakthrough safety features could make drone flights safe and dependable. "This is the chance for
all the parties who think the FAA got it wrong to come forward and say why," said Jack Schenendorf, a former House
Transportation Committee staff member who now works for law firm Covington & Burling. The current ban on most
commercial drone flights will stay in place until the FAA finalizes its proposed rules -- which could take anywhere
from nine months to three years. During that period, companies can continue to apply for exemptions to use drones
under strict rules. But the FAA has so far granted only 28 of more than 325 exemption requests, according to
government documents. Amazon, which applied for an exemption to allow outdoor testing at its own U.S. facilities
last summer, says it has not yet received approval from the agency. It has been testing a number of drone
configurations at facilities in Washington state, Britain and Israel. But only in the Britain has the company been able
to conduct outdoor tests that it says are vital to its goal of developing a prototype that can be demonstrated to the
FAA. Meanwhile, a coalition of news media companies including NBC, the New York Times and Thomson Reuters
Separate forecasts by
government and industry officials expect businesses to invest nearly $90 billion in
drones worldwide over the next 10 years, as the technology takes root in hundreds
of markets that now rely on manned flights or ground operations for activities
ranging from pipeline inspections to aerial photography. The number of companies
and groups involved in drone lobbying now exceeds 50 . Senate documents show a broad range
hopes to test news-gathering drones in coming months at an FAA site in Virginia.
of parties from high-tech and aerospace manufacturers to electric utilities, realtors, filmmakers, universities, labor
end of September. That process allows lawmakers to direct regulatory agencies to take specific actions. For
Some influential
allies in Congress have already begun questioning the proposed rules . U.S. Senator
example, the last reauthorization in 2012 directed the FAA to pursue rulemaking on drones.
Charles E. Schumer said last week the FAA's "line of sight" rule appears to be a "concerning limitation on
commercial usage, and this proposed rule should be modified."
concerns about the spreading use of a technology that is rapidly evolving and comes at a relatively affordable price
But it was equally clear that theyve only just begun to grasp the dimensions of
the drone controversy, and are very far from being decided on whether a federal
law is need to regulate the use of drones inside the United States -- much less what
legislative approach to use. Last year, Congress gave the Federal Aviation Administration until 2015 to
tag.
devise rules to integrate drones into the national airspace system. The agency predicted last year that 30,000
drones will be traveling the skies above America in the next 20 years. To some degree senators at Wednesdays
hearing were still caught up in marveling at the gee-whiz, technological capabilities of UAVs. How small can these
things get? asked Sen. Al Franken, D-Minn. A drone as small as a hummingbird is being developed, replied a
witness at the hearing, Amie Stepanovich, director of the Domestic Surveillance Project at the Electronic Privacy
Information Center (EPIC). The technology is increasing at an exponentially rapid rate. Presumably at some point
you could have one the size of a mosquito that has a battery that operates for weeks and you could have the
mosquito following you around and not be aware of it, said Franken. God help us if an adolescent boy gets hold of
one of these. One witness at Wednesdays hearing, Benjamin Miller of the Mesa County, Colo., sheriffs office, who
was representing the Airborne Law Enforcement Association, brought a small two-pound UAV with him to the
hearing and assured committee members that his department was using its UAVs for traditional law enforcement
functions. His office used a UAV last May to search for a missing woman, saving much time by searching large areas
And cost is a major factor in domestic law enforcement drone use: drones
drive down the cost of aerial surveillance to worrisome levels, said University of Washington law
at low cost.
professor Ryan Calo, adding that he could imagine drones flying around with chemical sensors in order to detect
chairman Sen. Patrick Leahy of Vermont that domestic law enforcement agencies would absolutely not seek to
arm UAVs with lethal weapons. Miller also testified that hours and hours of tracking a criminal suspect was not
affordable and that need for persistent surveillance whether using an airplane or a drone was relatively low.
But EPICs Stepanovich told Leahy persistent surveillance was the greatest threat from domestic use of drones.
Some senators questions reflected a fear of an Orwellian Big Brother monitoring Americans.
NSA Reform
Obama will fight to maintain NSA surveillance Recent court
case proves
Ackerman 6/9 (Spencer Ackerman: National security editor for Guardian,
Obama lawyers asked secret court to ignore public court's decision on spying, The
Guardian, 6/9/2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/09/obama-fisacourt-surveillance-phone-records, Accessed: 7/17/15, RRR)
Obama administration has asked a secret surveillance court to ignore a federal court
that found bulk surveillance illegal and to once again grant the National Security Agency
the power to collect the phone records of millions of Americans for six months. The
The
legal request, filed nearly four hours after Barack Obama vowed to sign a new law banning precisely the bulk collection he asks the
Fisa court, a panel that meets in secret as a step in the surveillance process and thus far has only ever had the government argue
before it
according to a new survey from Pew Research , released on Monday, gauging post-Snowden
70
attitudes on digital privacy and surveillance. Of respondents who were familiar with the NSA spying revelations,
percent of Republicans and those leaning Republican said they were losing
confidence that the agency's surveillance programs served the public interest . Just 55
percent of Democrats and those leaning Democratic said they had lost faith . Overall,
61 percent of respondents said they had become less confident that surveillance operations had served the public
The
split is just one of several findings in the Pew survey , which measured how much the Snowden
interest, while 37 percent registered that they had become more confident in the benefits of the programs.
leaks, which began in June 2013, have changed how Americans try to protect their privacy online. Thirty percent of
adults aware of the government-surveillance programs said they had taken at least one step to change how they
communicate onlinesuch as changing privacy settings on social media or avoiding certain words in online
messagesalthough only 2 percent had adopted email encryption.
The split in each party could have practical and political consequences ahead of the 2014 midterm elections. There
are already signs that the debate is seeping into the next presidential contest. Speaking Tuesday to New
Hampshire voters, Rep. Darrell Issa, R-Calif., cited the spy agency's surveillance methods as another example of
broad overreach in what he called Obama's "imperial presidency." Issa called for reforms that would ensure
American people are represented during secret court proceedings that decide the scope of the NSA surveillance.
Obama has called for more oversight, too, and Issa stopped short of endorsing the plan to eliminate the bulk
collection program. Congress may address government surveillance this spring in one of its last major moves
before members head home to focus on the November elections. But if Congress punts the surveillance debate to
next year, it would resurface just as the presidential primary campaigns are beginning. The bulk collection of
Americans' phone records was authorized under Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act. Details of the program were
secret until June when a former NSA systems analyst, Edward Snowden, leaked classified documents that spelled
out the scope of the government's activities. The bulk collection provision in the law is set to expire June 1, 2015,
unless Congress acts to renew it. More than a decade after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Americans have become less
willing to support invasive surveillance tactics in the name of national security. Recent polls show a sharp decline in
the burden of simply doing the right thing," Hayden told USA TODAY's Capital Download. "And I think some of the
right things with regard to the commission's recommendations are not the popular things. They may not poll real
well right now. They'll poll damn well after the next attack, all right?" Obama, who received the report from the
five-member advisory committee just before he left to vacation in Hawaii, has promised to make "a pretty definitive
statement" in January about its 46 recommendations. He appointed the panel in the wake of a firestorm over
disclosures by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden about surveillance of all Americans' telephone calls and
spying on German Chancellor Angela Merkel and other friendly foreign leaders. The commission, led by former
acting CIA director Michael Morell, said the recommendations were designed to increase transparency,
The FREEDOM Act drained all momentum for surveillance cutsLegislation will be met with great opposition
Gross 6/5 (Grant Gross: IDG News Service, 'Don't expect major changes to NSA
surveillance from Congress, 6/5/15, www.pcworld.com/article/2932337/dontexpect-major-changes-to-nsa-surveillance-from-congress.html, Accessed: 7/15/15,
RRR)
After the U.S. Congress approved what critics have called modest limits on the National Security Agencys collection
That resistance is at odds with many rank-and-file lawmakers, including many House Republicans, who want to
further limit NSA programs brought to light by former agency contractor Edward Snowden. Civil liberties groups
Adam Eisgrau, managing director of the office of government relations for the American Library Association. The
ALA has charged the NSA surveillance programs violate the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Congress is not allowed to be tired of surveillance reform unless its
prepared to say its tired of the Fourth Amendment, Eisgrau said. The American public will not accept that.
activists are less optimistic about more congressional action . It will a long slog
getting more restraints, J. Kirk Wiebe, a former NSA analyst and whistleblower said by email. The length
Other
of that journey will depend on public outcrythat is the one thing that is hard to gauge. With the USA Freedom
Act, elected officials have opted to reach for low-hanging fruit, said Bill Blunden, a cybersecurity researcher and
surveillance critic. The theater weve just witnessed allows decision makers to boast to their constituents about
reforming mass surveillance while spies understand that whats actually transpired is hardly major change.
The
PRISM
PRISM reforms unpopular- Republicans oppose and many more
are indifferent
Gross 6/5 (Grant Gross: IDG News Service, 'Don't expect major changes to NSA
surveillance from Congress, 6/5/15, www.pcworld.com/article/2932337/dontexpect-major-changes-to-nsa-surveillance-from-congress.html, Accessed: 7/15/15,
RRR)
The USA Freedom Act also does nothing to limit the NSAs surveillance of overseas Internet traffic, including the content of emails
Significantly limiting that NSA program, called Prism in 2013 Snowden leaks, will be a
difficult task in Congress, with many lawmakers unconcerned about the privacy
rights of people who dont vote in U.S. elections . Still, the section of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act that authorizes those NSA foreign surveillance
programs sunsets in 2017, and that deadline will force Congress to look at FISA, although lawmakers may
wait until the last minute, as they did with the expiring sections of the Patriot Act covered in the USA Freedom Act. The
and IP voice calls.
House Judiciary Committee will continue its oversight of U.S. surveillance programs, and the committee will address FISA before its
Supporters of new
reforms will have to bypass congressional leadership, however. Senate Republican
leaders attempted to derail even the USA Freedom Act and refused to allow
amendments that would require further changes at the NSA.
provisions expire, an aide to the committee said. Republican leaders opposed to more changes
Prisons
Obama will push prison reform- Prioritizing prison overhaul
and criminal justice
Tau 7/14 (Byron Tau: A reporter in The Wall Street Journal's Washington, D.C.
bureau, where he covers the White House and politics, Obama Decries Mass
Incarceration in Call for Prisons Overhaul, 7/14/15,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-decries-mass-incarceration-in-call-for-prisonsoverhaul-1436917797, Accessed: 7/16/15, RRR)
President Barack Obama called for changes to national prison policy on Tuesday,
broadening a second-term push to tackle what he decries as systemic problems in
the criminal-justice system. Mass incarceration makes our country worse off, and
we need to do something about it, the president said at the NAACPs annual convention in
Philadelphia. Among other measures, the president said he had ordered Attorney General Loretta Lynch to review
the use of solitary confinement in federal prisons. The
Mr.
Obama has placed criminal-justice and prison overhauls among the top issues of his
final years in office. This week, he ordered 46 drug offenders released as part of a
broader review of federal drug sentences.
Correctional Institution in Oklahoma, where he vowed on Tuesday to shine a spotlight on these issues.
Religious Surveillance
Obama will fight the plan- Recent meeting proves he supports
surveillance of Muslims
Blumenthal 14 (Max Blumenthal: Writer for Alternet- Syndication
service and online community of the alternative press, featuring news
stories from alternative newsweeklies, magazines and web
publications, Obama Humiliates Muslim Guests at White House
Ramadan Event, Endorses Israels Gaza Assault and NSA Surveillance,
7/17/14, http://www.alternet.org/world/obama-humiliates-muslim-white-houseguests-endorsing-israels-gaza-assault-defending-nsa , Accessed: 7/17/15, RRR)
Obama endorsed
defended government spying on Muslim-Americans.
Alongside dozens of Muslim-American community activists and Muslim diplomats, the White House welcomed
Israeli Ambassador to the US Ron Dermer, an outspoken advocate of Israel's settlement
enterprise who has claimed Muslim and Arab culture is endemically violent . In
At the annual White House Iftar dinner commemorating the Muslim holiday of Ramadan, President Barack
Israels ongoing assault on the Gaza Strip and
the past, the annual Iftar dinner passed without much notice. Last year, President Barack Obama delivered a boilerplate speech to
the assembled crowd of Muslim-American community activists and Middle Eastern ambassadors about his efforts to spur
entrepreneurship. But this time, amidst a one-sided Israeli assault on the Gaza Strip that was about to claim its 200th death in just a
week, and which the US had backed to the hilt, the heat was on. While Obama prepared his remarks, calls rang out with
unprecedented intensity for invitees to boycott the July 14 ceremony. Among those who urged a boycott in protest of the Gaza
assault and ongoing government spying on Muslim-Americans was the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), an
established presence in Washington representing the countrys largest Arab-American advocacy group. Joining the boycott call was
Mariam Abu-Ali, the sister of Ahmed Abu Ali, a US citizen renditioned to Saudi Arabia for torture before being sentenced to life in
invitation to the State Departments Iftar), others defended their presence at the ceremony. Most vocal among them was Rep. Keith
Ellison (D-MN), one of the two Muslim members of Congress. I disagree with the tactic, Ellison remarked in a statement released
by his office. It will not close Guantanamo Bay, guarantee a cease-fire between Israel and Palestine or undo the NSAs targeting of
Muslims. The Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) echoed Ellison, insisting that the event would allow [them] to engage with
senior White House officials for a decent amount of time on substantive issues. While Muslim-American civil rights groups like the
Council on American Islamic Relations have assumed a more confrontational posture towards the White House and boycotted a
prayer breakfast with former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg in protest of his support for NYPD surveillance of Muslims,
MPAC has taken an altogether different tack. Its role as a paid consultant on the cable TV series, Tyrant, was perhaps the best
example of its accommodationist stance. Produced by Howard Gordon, the creator of 24 and Homeland, the show starred a
white actor playing a pathological Arab dictator who ruled over the deeply dysfunctional fictional nation of Abuddin. Even
mainstream TV critics derided the series as unbearably Orientalist, with the Washington Posts Hank Stuever describing it as a
stultifyingly acted TV drama stocked with tired and terribly broad notions of Muslim culture in a make-believe nation on the brink.
Leading up to the White House Iftar, a leader of a major Muslim advocacy organization told me on background that MPAC was
bleeding support, especially from younger activists. At the Iftar dinner, Obama launched into a defense of Israels assault on the
Gaza Strip, declaring, I will say very clearly, no country can accept rockets fired indiscriminately at citizens. And so, weve been
very clear that Israel has the right to defend itself against what I consider to be inexcusable attacks from Hamas. He went on to
claim against all evidence that his administration had worked long and hard to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, and that it
had emphasized the need to protect civilians, regardless of who they are or where they live. Ali Kurnaz, the central regional
attendees pointing out that Palestinians should have a right to defend themselves too, Kurnaz recalled. Like many others who
joined the dinner, Kurnaz was not aware that Israeli Ambassador Ron Dermer had been invited. Dermer was a longtime confidant of
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the son of the Republican former Mayor of Miami Beach. This year, Dermer broke
diplomatic protocol by appearing at a fundraiser for the Republican Jewish Committee, helping to raise money for a partisan
organization dedicated to undermining Obamas agenda.
presence at the Iftar dinner was his stated belief that a cultural tendency towards
belligerency is deeply embedded in the culture of the Arab world and its foremost
religion. According to Kurnaz, Dermer spent the evening isolated in the White Houses Green Room adjacent to the main
reception area, where he milled around mostly without company. None of the activists invited to the dinner approached him. When
story urgently requesting a meeting with Obama. Without that commitment yet in hand, took the opportunity to raise the issue with Obama personally at
the Monday dinner. "I specifically asked the president if he would meet with us to discuss NSA spying on the American Muslim community. The president
seemed to perk up and proceeded to discuss the issue, saying that he takes it very seriously," said Junaid Sulahry, the outreach manager for Muslim
Advocates, a legal and civil rights group. Obama was non-committal, Sulahry said, but displayed "a clear willingness to discuss the issue." Hoda
Elshishtawy, the national policy analyst for the Muslim Public Affairs Council, said that she brought it up as part of a "table-wide discussion" on post-9/11
That tension
has plagued the Obama administration's domestic counterterrorism or, as it
prefers, "countering violent extremism" for its entire tenure. The departments of justice and homeland
surveillance of US Muslims. "Our communities can't be seen as suspects and partners at the same time," Elshishtawy said.
security lead outreach efforts in Muslim and other local communities, stressing vigilance against radicalizing influences and dialogue with law
enforcement. Yet Muslim communities labor under widespread suspicion of incubating terrorism. Surveillance from law enforcement and US intelligence is
countries, a reluctance to foreclose on indefinite detention that functionally is only aimed at Muslims, and difficulty concluding the war in Afghanistan all
of which have strained relations with American-Muslim communities. Some of those community leaders have already come under fire for attending the
White House dinner. The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee urged a boycott over the surveillance and administration support for Israel during
the current Gaza offensive, rejecting what it called "normalization of the continuous breach of our fundamental rights." Representatives of organizations
that rejected the boycott argued that they can exercise greater influence through access than through rejection. "Our strategy is to worth through the
Section 702
Section 702 inevitably unpopular until the end of 2017Connected to FISA
Kayyali 5/1
(Nadia: Electronic Frontier Foundation activism team, Yesterday's USA Freedom
Markup: A Glimpse into the Fight to Reform Section 702, 5/1/15,
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/05/usa-freedom-markup-glimpse-fight-reformsection-702, Accessed: 7/16/15, RRR)
The amendment also addressed the NSAs backdoor into products and services .
Leaked documents have shown that the NSA, with the help of the FBI, has sought backdoors into products and
services, from encryption software to online communications tools like Skype. While the government claims that
these backdoors would only be accessible to them, tech companies and security experts have made it very clear
that security backdoors make products and services, and by extension the Internet, less secure for everyone. Yet
both the FBI and NSA Directors have recently urged companies to install security "backdoors" into hardware or
software, even while American businesses continue to suffer reputational harm overseas and even lose business.
Ultimately, the amendment failed 9-24.[2] Rep. John Conyers echoed Rep. Goodlattes comments on the
amendment expressed clear support for what the amendment would have done. Rep Goodlatte noted, this
committee will exercise its jurisdiction on this and soon. We will hold a hearing on this . . . Echoing Rep. Goodlattes
sentiments, Rep. Darrell Issa noted: If I get an opportunity to vote for it on a bill that cannot be blown up by the
House leadership and/or the Senate, I will vote for it, and I think that is what we need to do. Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner
also said that he supports the policy, but stated, The
Zero Day
Obama included a major loophole in his decision, which falls far short of
recommendations made by a presidential review board last December: According to
Obama, any flaws that have a clear national security or law enforcement
use can be kept secret and exploited. This, of course, gives the government wide latitude to
York Times. But
remain silent on critical flaws like the recent Heartbleed vulnerability if the NSA, FBI, or other government agencies
uranium enrichment program, used five zero-day exploits to spread. Last December, the Presidents Review Group
on Intelligence and Communications Technologies declared that only in rare instances should the U.S. government
authorize the use of zero-day exploits for high priority intelligence collection. The review board, which was
convened in response to reports of widespread NSA surveillance revealed in the Edward Snowden documents, also
said that decisions about the use of zero-day attacks should only be made following senior, interagency review
involving all appropriate departments.
The Department of Homeland Security and the FBI are asking local law
enforcement officials to be prepared for any potential terrorist activity. Sen. Charles
Schumer (D-NY) says this alert reflects a new kind of radicalization. Sen. Charles Schumer
weekend.
(D-NY) talking about recent terror warning during a visit to Syracuse Monday. Sen. Charles Schumer (D-NY) talking
Whats
happened now is a new phenomenon which is lone wolves -- disturbed people,
lonely people, angry people, who are contacted on the Internet and importuned by
these Islamic fundamentalists to do serious, terrible things. And thats new, said
Schumer. They dont tell them what to do, they dont instruct them what to do,
they dont coordinate what they do. They just try to get them to do it. And praise
God, nothing bad has happened yet, but youve got to be really vigilant. Schumer
says the good news is that the governments surveillance tactics often have been
able to break up terrorist plans before they happen. Federal investigators stopped
Islamic State-inspired plots in Boston and the metro New York area in recent weeks.
about recent terror warning during a visit to Syracuse Monday. CREDIT ELLEN ABBOTT / WRVO NEWS
Schumer comes out and says, I looked at the bill and studied its
details and think its a good deal and will stop Iran from getting weapons, there will
be zero hope of overriding an Obama veto, said Noah Pollak, executive director of
the Emergency Committee for Israel, which funded a six-figure Web campaign
targeting Schumer earlier this year. If Schumer says this doesnt do it, it lifts the
arms embargo and doesnt have anytime, anywhere inspections, then we have a
fight on our hands. Hes a linchpin or a bellwether, he added. Schumer and
other Senate Democrats held off on judging the deal Tuesday. I intend to go
through this agreement with a fine-tooth comb, speak with administration officials,
and hear from experts on all sides, Schumer said in a statement. Supporting or
opposing this agreement is not a decision to be made lightly, and I plan to carefully
study the agreement before making an informed decision. Colleagues say Schumer appears
genuinely torn. Hes very sober. He said, Im going to make a decision on this based on whats best for the
country, said a Democratic colleague speaking on background. Republican leaders in Congress are crafting their
attack plan against the Obama administrations nuclear deal with Iran. Lawmakers will have 60 days to review the
deal after the White House delivers the text of the historic agreement to Capitol Hill. The GOP could seek to move a
measure of disapproval, but it will be difficult to win a filibuster-proof 60 votes, much less the 67 required to
overcome a presidential veto.
vocal on their opposition, even if the congressional math looked like less of an insurmountable hurdle for Obama.
Rep. Steve Israel, the highest-ranking Jewish Democrat in the House and a member of the Appropriations
Subcommittee on Defense, doubled down on earlier comments he made before the deal that he remained skeptical
of the Iranians. "In the fall, there will be a vote on this deal, and my obligation is to review every word, sentence,
and paragraph of the deal to ensure it satisfies my continued concerns," Israel said in a statement. "Until then, you
can continue to count me in the 'skeptical' column." Democratic Rep. Luis Gutierrez of Illinois pushed backed on
those outspoken against the deal noting that it is possible to change the plan in the future if needed. "Skeptics and
critics need to give this a chance to work because the consequences are so high and the prospects for a peaceful
resolution of Iran's nuclear ambitions are fragile," he said.
give us more confidence in the denominator, which has always been one of the
major problems in calculating the effectiveness, Napolitano said.
Schumer LinkMosques
Schumer supports mosque surveillance
NY Daily News 12 (New York Daily News, "Senator Chuck Schumer Stands Up
for the NYPD's Fight Against Terrorism", www.nydailynews.com/opinion/sen-chuckschumer-stands-nypd-fight-terrorism-article-1.1029599, 2/28/2012, sr)
Finally, after weeks of innuendo, half-truths and distortions that have depicted the NYPD as spying on the citys
series built on the false premise that to gather preventive information is to violate rights, the divisions work has
amounted, for the most part, to checking out facts that are in the public record. For example, where in the city
particular nationalities are clustered, according to the Census. For example, the locations and descriptions of
community institutions like mosques, schools and social gathering places. For example, whats written on publicly
widely understood that the NYPDs actions have kept us safer. Looking at public information and following leads is
perfectly acceptable as long as any one group, in its entirety, is not targeted based only on its religious or ethnic
the anti-terrorism effort. Public Advocate Bill de Blasio has ducked the issue entirely. They dont get what Kelly and
New Yorkers understand. Theres nothing abstract about terror, and theres no way for a mayor to duck the fight.
Schumer LinkPrisons
Schumer increased funding for monitoring and high resolution
surveillance programs of prisons/counties
New York Press Release 9 (New York Newsroom/Press Release, "SCHUMER
ANNOUNCES OVER $67,000 TO HELP MONITOR AND PREVENT CRIME IN DUTCHESS
COUNTY", www.schumer.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/schumer-announcesover-67-000-to-help-monitor-and-prevent-crime-in-dutchess-county, 8/31/2009, sr)
U.S. Senator Charles E. Schumer today announced that the Bureau of Justice
Assistance has awarded a total of $67,257 through a FY 09 Edward Byrne Memorial
Justice Assistance Grants (JAG) to Dutchess County. Funding will be used to
purchase high resolution surveillance cameras in Poughkeepsie and East Fishkill.
"The citizens of Dutchess County deserve the best in crime prevention technology,"
Schumer said. "This Edward Byrne Memorial Assistance Grant will provide Dutchess
County law enforcement agencies with the resources they need to ensure safety
and security for our citizens." The Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program (JAG) allows
states, tribes, and local governments to support a broad range of activities to prevent and control crime based on
Internal Links
PC Key General
Obamas gathered enough support among Dems to save the
deal but political capital is key
Lee et al 7/15 (Carol E, Colleen McCain Nelson, Kristina Peterson, all write for
the Wall Street Journal, Obama Girds for Battle With Congress on Iran Deal, WSJ,
7/15/2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-girds-for-battle-with-congress-oniran-deal-1437005023)//duncan
ramped up their criticism and organization against it on Wednesday. Mr. Obama, in a 67-minute news conference at the White
House, accused opponentsfrom Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu to Republican lawmakersof pushing political talking points to
simply discredit the accord as a bad deal. For all the objections of Prime Minister Netanyahu or, for that matter, some of the
Republican leadership thats already spoken, none of them have presented to me or the American people a better alternative, Mr.
Obama said. Either the issue of Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon is resolved diplomatically through a negotiation or its resolved
through force, through war, he added. Those are the options. President Obama talks about the details of the nuclear deal with
Iran at a White House news conference on Wednesday. The presidents aggressive defense of the deal drew quick pushback from
Republicans in Congress, where the criticism has largely been twofold: that the agreement wont stop Iran from acquiring a nuclear
weapon and that it doesnt address broader concerns about Tehrans behavior in the region. Rep. Lee Zeldin (R., N.Y.) disputed the
presidents assertion that this is a choice between the accord or war. Heres an alternative other than war: A better deal, Mr.
Zeldin said. For the security of America and the stability of the Middle East, we must pursue a better direction immediately. Sen.
Marco Rubio, a Florida Republican and 2016 presidential candidate, started an online petition opposing the deal, and the powerful
pro-Israel lobby Aipac is calling on lawmakers to vote against it. At the same time, J Street, a liberal pro-Israel group, said
Wednesday it will launch a multimillion-dollar effort, including ads in print and broadcast media, to lobby lawmakers to support the
deal. The agreement reached Tuesday in Vienna puts strict limits on Irans nuclear program for the next decade that are designed
to keep Tehran from being at least 12 months away from amassing enough nuclear fuel for a bomb. In exchange, the U.S., the
Democrats on Capitol Hill. Mr. Biden told Democratic lawmakers he was initially skeptical of the deal but is now convinced the
agreement, while not perfect, is worth supporting, according to participants. But
expressed concerns about the deal, particularly on the inspections provisions and the decision to lift United
Nations embargoes on arms and ballistic missile sales to Iran. As the Iran nuclear pact heads to Congress, WSJs Jerry Seib
identifies the key Democrats in the coming fight over whether to reject the deal. Photo: AP For most members, including myself, it
comes down to verification, said Rep. Ron Kind of Wisconsin, chairman of the New Democrat Coalition, a group of centrist House
Democrats. It comes down to access to the sites, making sure theyre not impeded in any way, that weve got unlimited access to
weighing the risks of spurning a deal painstakingly reached against embracing an agreement with an outcome that is ultimately
unclear. The risk of voting for it is that if the Iranians cheat and somehow achieve a path to a bomb in spite of the agreement,
then you look like you signed on to something that wasnt effective, said Sen. Angus King (I., Maine). Conversely, the risk of
rejecting the deal is that it scuttles the international agreement, unraveling the sanctions and leaving Irans nuclear ambitions
not a decision to be made lightly, and I plan to carefully study the agreement before
making an informed decision, he said. Oppenheimer said Schumer is an important
figure in this debate because he is electorally secure and he wants to support the
administration when he can, but he is also Jewish and has a large Jewish
constituency. If a prominent Democrat like Schumer did come out against the
agreement, it could give others in Congress cover to challenge Obama on the issue,
but there has been no indication of that level of defiance so far. 4. Israel Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been very vocal in opposing negotiations
with Iran, and he has already called Tuesdays agreement a historic mistake.
Members of Congress who strongly support Israe l, or are seeking the support of
Jewish-American voters, could be swayed by the hardline position of the Israeli
government. However, the politicians most likely to be influenced by Israel may
already be on their side of the issue. Republicans are strident defenders of Israels
security and place in the Middle East and fairly uncompromising about it, Skelley
said, whereas Democrats defend Israel but are not quite as strident. Skelley noted
that Republican presidential candidate Scott Walker mentioned in his speech
announcing his candidacy Monday that he has been to Israel and has met with both
Netanyahu and the opposition leadership. Collina said President Obama believes
this deal helps ensure Israels security, so other Democrats could support the
agreement based on the same position. 5. Iran Republicans and Democrats
skeptical of Irans willingness to comply with a deal have pointed to the countrys
failure to hold up its end of other agreements in the past. Even supporters of the
agreement say the burden of proof will, and should, rest on Iran. Iranian President
Hassan Rouhani sought to allay the fears of the deals critics on Twitter. Collina said
critics are right to doubt Irans credibility, which is why the agreement is dependent
on Iran proving they are complying with the international communitys demands.
This deal is not based on trust, Collina said. If you dont trust Iran, and people
shouldntfine. Lets try it." Sanctions can always be imposed again in the future if
Iran fails to comply, according to Collina, but this diplomatic effort would be
necessary before the United Nations agreed to military action anyway. The most
significant doubts about Irans ability to fulfill its obligations may come from the
American people. 6. The American Public A Monmouth University poll conducted last
week found that 55% of Americans do not trust Iran at all to comply with the
terms of a deal, including 45% of Democrats. However, polling earlier this year
indicated that a majority of Americans do support the framework of the deal and do
not want Congress to stop it. Oppenheimer said one aspect of the public's reaction
will be based on what the alternatives are if the deal does fall apart. "If the
alternatives start being committing U.S. troops to more activity, that may seem less
popular," he said. They do not want another war in the Middle East, but they do not
trust Iran, Collina agreed, and again, they shouldnt. Skelley said the public
likely will not understand all of the intricacies of the agreement, so both sides of the
debate will be pushing their interpretation of it to influence public perception.
Oppenheimer warned that it is risky to make any predictions at this point because
the congressional vote could also be affected by new developments in the Middle
East between now and then, but he said Senators Corker and Schumer may be the
people to watch as the debate progresses. Unless there is an unexpected
groundswell of public opposition to the deal, however, the experts believe it will
eventually make it through Congress. Getting there could just be a long, hard fight
for the Obama administration, and it may require a rare presidential veto. This deal
will go through, one way or the other, Collina said. The question is whether
Congress wants to give the deal a black eye along the way.
would want to win over a majority of the American people and convince them the deal is in their interest, said
Senator Chris Coons, Democrat of Delaware and a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Who wants
their legacy to be a deal that is barely approved by the narrowest of margins and is opposed by the majority of
Congress? That would indicate a depth of division that would put the whole venture into question. At the White
House on Tuesday, Mr. Obama began what promises to be an arduous process of pitching the historic agreement to
Congress even as he was announcing its outlines. He said it was based on strict verification requirements that
would leave nothing to chance when it came to Irans compliance and to thwarting its means of obtaining a
weapon. Saying he welcomed congressional scrutiny, the president offered extensive briefings from members of
his administration on the deal, and threatened to veto any effort by Congress to block it. But he also previewed an
overarching theme that senior officials and those close to the White House cite as a key component of their
Foreign Relations Committee will open a review of the deal on Tuesday with hearings before the details are widely
known. The committees chairman, Representative Ed Royce, Republican of California, expressed his concerns in an
interview on Monday, as a deal appeared imminent. We have given up not just all the leverage we had on Iran with
the sanctions. Weve also sent a message of weakness in the way this has been handled, he said. Mr. Obama and
White House aides have already begun the wooing. At a White House reception last week for Senate Democrats, Mr.
Obama spoke at length about the deals importance to his legacy, trying hard to assure his own party that he would
not rush into an accord just to have the accomplishment. My foreign policy legacy in this area will be judged on
whether or not the deal works, not just over the next 18 months but over many years, Mr. Coons said Mr. Obama
had told the gathering. If I put together a deal that fails to stop Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, that would be
part of my legacy as well, the president added, according to Mr. Coons. The White House chief of staff, Denis R.
McDonough, met last week with the Republican chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Bob
Corker of Tennessee, and its ranking Democrat, Senator Benjamin L. Cardin of Maryland, to hear their concerns, Mr.
Cardin said. After some initial reluctance to share classified information on the talks, the White House has become
far more forthcoming, Mr. Cardin added. There are people who have already made up their minds, no question
about that, and I think thats unfortunate, Mr. Cardin said. But at this point, a majority of Congress believes we
have to objectively review whats in the agreement before we decide what course were going to take. Mr. Cardin
said the Iran review, while proceeding in Congress initially over the White Houses objections, probably played to
the Wests advantage. Under the terms of the law that established the review, Congress has 30 days to examine
the agreement before sanctions can be lifted on Iran. But because Congress will be in its August recess when that
review period ends, the deal effectively has an additional month of public scrutiny before Congress can decide its
actions. Mr. Cardin said the Iranians thought they could force negotiators to accept terms more favorable to Tehran
to avoid that extra 30-day period. But American negotiators in the end let that deadline slip. Iran thought theyd
blink at the last minute, and they didnt, he said. White House officials must now decide whether the president
should try to win over a majority of Congress, including hostile Republicans, or focus on shoring up a Democratic
base to sustain a veto. Mr. Royce said he thought the strategy to protect the veto was already in play. I dont see
them convincing skeptical Democrats this is a good agreement. I see them pressuring Democrats to go along, he
said. Democrats see a broader strategy. Mr. Coons said earlier this summer that he had told administration officials
he did not just want political reassurances. He was trained as a chemist, and he said he had wanted to hear the
science backing the administrations contention that a deal could stop Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.
White House officials then arranged a classified briefing with Ernest J. Moniz, the energy secretary; a Nobel
Laureate; and three nuclear weapons scientists. It was substantively reassuring, Mr. Coons said. Mr. Cardin added,
They will be lobbying hard, not just with Congress but with the American people .
Several left-leaning groups, including many of the antiwar activists who helped propel Mr. Obama into the White
House, said on Tuesday that they would be working aggressively to defend the deal. The diplomatic negotiations
between the United States and five world powers have yielded a strong, verifiable deal with Iran, said Anna
Galland, the executive director of MoveOn.Org Civic Action. The group called the agreement a historic foreign
policy success for the Obama administration, and said it was urging all members of Congress to back it.
Persuading senators and representatives to do so will be MoveOn members top priority over the next 60 days,
Ms. Galland added. Win Without War, a coalition of national groups, said it too was launching a national campaign
in favor of the agreement. This is a good deal and a historic opportunity to win without war, Stephen Miles, the
groups advocacy director, said in a statement. Unfortunately, congressional opponents of any deal with Iran will
stop at nothing to scuttle this agreement and put our nation on the path to yet another war in the Middle East. We
have seen this movie before and we know how it ends. We will not stand idly by while those who pushed for war
with Iraq try to push us into war with Iran. Jeremy Ben-Ami, the president of J Street, a liberal pro-Israel group, said
his organization was likely to support the deal because the primary interest of the United States and Israel was to
prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and that is the outcome of this deal. But the American Israel Public
Affairs Committee, a pro-Israel group known as Aipac that is likely to campaign against the deal, said it was deeply
concerned about the contents. In a statement, the group said it feared the agreement had fallen short of critical
requirements it had insisted upon for a good deal, which included anytime, anywhere inspections of Iranian
nuclear sites and a duration of multiple decades. We are deeply concerned based on initial reports that this
proposed agreement may not meet these requirements, and thereby would fail to block Irans path to a nuclear
weapon and would further entrench and empower the leading state sponsor of terror, Aipac said.
theres a helicopter thats coming, but I really am enjoying this Iran debate. He
then disregarded a prepared list of reporters to call on and, like a boxer beckoning
someone to throw a punch, asked for more questions on Iran from the room. In the
past, Mr. Obama has often appeared defensive or defeated as he faced questions
about the failure of his health care website or other foreign policy challenges. But in
this case he avidly raised and dismissed many objections without even being asked.
For those who argue that the administration could have forced the Iranians to agree
to a deal that would leave Iran with no nuclear capacity, there is nobody who
thinks that Iran would or could ever accept that, he said. And for those who say
that the current sanctions on Iran are better than the negotiated deal, Mr. Obama
said that without a diplomatic agreement the present sanctions regime would break
down. Without a deal, the international sanctions regime will unravel with little
ability to reimpose them, he said.
Obama and John Kerry PC heavily invested into the Iran deal
Baker Institute 7/14 (James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice
University, "The Iranian Nuclear Agreement: A good, not perfect, deal",
blog.chron.com/bakerblog/2015/07/the-iranian-nuclear-agreement-a-good-notperfect-deal/, 7/14/2015, sr)
Well, we have a deal. After nearly two years of talks including multiple extensions
and roller-coaster last-minute negotiations in Vienna the United States and other
major powers have reached an agreement with Iran on the latters nuclear program.
It is hard to exaggerate the importance of the deal. The description historic has
grown cheap with overuse when it comes to international affairs; but the Iranian
agreement surely qualifies. Both the Obama administration and the government of
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani have invested huge political capital in striking an
agreement. The deal marks a significant victory for each. It also represents a
personal triumph for U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister
Mohammad Javad Zarif, who were deeply involved in the protracted and, at times,
contentious negotiations. On a substantive level, the agreement if successfully
implemented (and more of this later) will substantially diminish a major source of
contention between Iran and the international community. In the short term, it will
substantially extend the period required for Iran to develop nuclear weapons and, in
the longer term, lower the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. And it
might repeat might open up the possibility of more normal relations between
the United States and Iran.
U.S. policymaking in the region. Theres a real potential benefit when American
and Iranian diplomats have been talking so much and so intensively over the last 20
months, says Matthew Spence, who until recently served as deputy assistant
secretary of defense for Middle East policy. We can try to leverage those diplomatic
contacts to see if there are any possibilities that would arise from common interests
in the region. At the same time, the U.S. needs to signal that its not naive about
Irans intentions and behavior in the region beyond the nuclear issue, Spence added.
The duality was in evidence in the hours after the nuclear deals announcement, as Obama sent twin signals about
the future of Americas relationship with Iran. During his remarks on Tuesday morning, Obama raised the possibility
of new beginnings with a foe of more than 35 years. Time and again, I have made clear to the Iranian people that
we will always be open to engagement on the basis of mutual interests and mutual respect, Obama said. Our
differences are real, and the difficult history between our nations cannot be ignored. But it is possible to change.
This deal offers an opportunity to move in a new direction, Obama added. We should seize it. At the same time,
the administration sent a flurry of signals designed to assuage widespread fears in Israel and Saudi Arabia about a
possible U.S. partnership with a Shiite regime that both countries consider a mortal enemy. The Pentagon
announced Tuesday that Defense Secretary Ash Carter will travel next week to Israel, for what a White House
statement called close consultation on security issues with Israeli counterparts as we remain vigilant in countering
the Iranian regimes destabilizing activities in the region. Those activities include support for Hezbollah fighters in
Lebanon, Shiite militias in Iraq, the regime of Syrian dictator Bashar Assad, and the Houthi rebels of Yemen. Obama
also called top Sunni Arab monarchs, including the king of Saudi Arabia and the crown prince of the United Arab
Emirates, reassuring them that the U.S. is committed to their security. When asked on Tuesday whether Obama
might visit Iran before leaving office, a senior administration official quickly dismissed the idea. Even as this deal
holds out the prospects of the possibility for Iran to take a different path, we continue to have very serious
differences with Iran with respect to its support for terrorism, its threat towards Israel and its neighbors, its support
for various proxies across the region that are destabilizing, the official said. So, no, we are not considering travel,
he added. That sentiment will be appreciated by military officials who hold Iran responsible for the deaths of
hundreds of U.S. soldiers in Iraq during the past decade, and who plan constantly for the possibility of future conflict
with the highly anti-American Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. But Obama administration officials are keenly
aware of Irans potential, at least in theory, for helping to solve a slew of devilish problems in a region Obama sees
as a strategic sand trap at a time when China and its neighbors demand more U.S. attention. Many administration
officials are mindful of recent history in Afghanistan, sources said, where Iranian offers to help stabilize the country
in 2001 and 2002 were spurned by the administration of George W. Bush. James Dobbins, who helped to stand up
Afghanistans post-Taliban government in 2002 and served as Obamas special representative to the country in
2013 and 2014, said the two countries could cooperate in at least five countries across the Muslim world. Foremost
among them is Afghanistan, where neighboring Iran has an interest in stability and opposes the Sunni
fundamentalist Taliban. Dobbins said the U.S. has been quietly cooperating for years in the country, and that Iran
could help to stabilize the shaky government in Kabul. He said the U.S. and Iran could work together in Iraq, where
they share a common enemy in the Islamic State. Iranian foreign minister Javad Zarif appeared to refer to the
Islamic State, also known as ISIS, in a July 3 video message that described a common threat shared by Iran and
the U.S. embodied by the hooded men who are ravaging the cradle of civilization. To deal with this new
challenge, new approaches are badly needed, Zarif said. Dobbins said that collaboration is absolutely essential
to ending the savage civil war in Syria, which has claimed more than 200,000 lives though it will be difficult to
achieve given that Iran strongly supports Assad, whom Obama insists must step down. And in just one sign of the
complex calculus at work, the nuclear deal itself could make some problems harder to resolve. Shortly after the
accord was announced, Assad publicly congratulated Irans supreme leader and expressed confidence that Iran can
now support with greater drive what he called just causes of nations presumably including his own embattled
regime. With his Syria strategy faltering a once-heralded program to train and equip moderate Syrian rebels has
graduated just 60 of them a key decision for Obama will be how much to keep challenging Irans client in
Damascus. The core debate is, will it be engagement first with some push back or push back with some
engagement? said Ilan Goldenberg, a former Obama Pentagon and State Department official who recently
authored a paper on Americas post-deal strategy for the Center for a New American Security. Goldenberg argued
that the U.S. should step up the pressure in Syria, as part of a larger strategy to send our partners a signal that
were not pivoting strategically to Iran. Spence cautioned that any results from possible cooperation would not
come overnight. Dealing with the nuclear issue alone has been hard enough, he said.
PC Key Dems
PC Key to prevent veto overriding
Lee et al 7-15 (Carol E. Lee, Colleen McCain Nelson, and Kristina Peterson,
Obama Girds for Battle With Congress on Iran Deal, The Wall Street Journal,
7/15/15, Carol Lee is a White House correspondent in the Washington bureau,
Colleen McCain Nelson is a Washington, D.C.-based reporter for The Wall Street
Journal, and Kristina Peterson covers Congress from the Wall Street Journals
Washington bureau, http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-girds-for-battle-withcongress-on-iran-deal-1437005023, 7/16/15 AV)
WASHINGTONPresident Barack Obama delivered an unusually animated and sometimes combative defense of the
Iran nuclear deal the day after it was reached, girding for a complicated political challenge likely to force him to use
criticism and organization against it on Wednesday. Mr. Obama, in a 67-minute news conference at the White
House, accused opponentsfrom Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu to Republican lawmakersof pushing political
talking points to simply discredit the accord as a bad deal. For all the objections of Prime Minister Netanyahu or, for
that matter, some of the Republican leadership thats already spoken, none of them have presented to me or the
American people a better alternative, Mr. Obama said. Either the issue of Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon is
resolved diplomatically through a negotiation or its resolved through force, through war, he added. Those are the
options. The presidents aggressive defense of the deal drew quick pushback from Republicans in Congress, where
the criticism has largely been twofold: that the agreement wont stop Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and
that it doesnt address broader concerns about Tehrans behavior in the region. Rep. Lee Zeldin (R., N.Y.) disputed
the presidents assertion that this is a choice between the accord or war. Heres an alternative other than war: A
better deal, Mr. Zeldin said. For the security of America and the stability of the Middle East, we must pursue a
better direction immediately. Sen. Marco Rubio, a Florida Republican and 2016 presidential candidate, started an
online petition opposing the deal, and the powerful pro-Israel lobby Aipac is calling on lawmakers to vote against it.
At the same time, J Street, a liberal pro-Israel group, said Wednesday it will launch a multimillion-dollar effort,
including ads in print and broadcast media, to lobby lawmakers to support the deal. The agreement reached
Tuesday in Vienna puts strict limits on Irans nuclear program for the next decade that are designed to keep Tehran
from being at least 12 months away from amassing enough nuclear fuel for a bomb. In exchange, the U.S., the
European Union and the United Nations will lift economic sanctions on Iran. Mr. Obama said he is not betting on the
Republican Party rallying around this agreement, and Vice President Joe Biden met with Democrats on Capitol Hill.
Mr. Biden told Democratic lawmakers he was initially skeptical of the deal but is now convinced the agreement,
while not perfect, is worth supporting, according to participants. But even some Democrats expressed concerns
about the deal, particularly on the inspections provisions and the decision to lift United Nations embargoes on arms
and ballistic missile sales to Iran. For most members, including myself, it comes down to verification, said Rep.
Ron Kind of Wisconsin, chairman of the New Democrat Coalition, a group of centrist House Democrats. It comes
down to access to the sites, making sure theyre not impeded in any way, that weve got unlimited access to where
we need to go to make sure Iran is living up to their agreement. The White Houses effort to preserve the deal
depends on cohesion among Democrats in the House and persuading wavering Democratic senators to stick with
the president. That is because it became clear in the hours after the agreements unveiling that few, if any,
include Sen. Charles Schumer, a Democrat from New York who is expected to succeed Sen. Harry Reid of Nevada as
the Democratic leader, and others both on and off the Foreign Relations Committee. Holding the line in the House
will be a tough task, where legislation can pass on a majority vote. Mr. Obama has better prospects in the Senate,
where Republicans hold 54 of the 100 seats and most bills need 60 votes to clear procedural hurdles. Democrats
said they were weighing the risks of spurning a deal painstakingly reached against embracing an agreement with
an outcome that is ultimately unclear. The risk of voting for it is that if the Iranians cheat and somehow achieve a
path to a bomb in spite of the agreement, then you look like you signed on to something that wasnt effective, said
resolution disapproving the deal, Mr. Obama has said he would veto it. Democratic lawmakers and aides said they
thought there would be enough support to sustain the presidents veto. It takes a two-thirds majority in each
chamber to override a veto. The presidents overarching message was for lawmakers to study and judge the deal on
its merits. My hope is that everyone in Congress also evaluates this agreement based on the factsnot on politics,
not on posturing, not on the fact this is a deal I bring to Congress as opposed to a Republican president, Mr. Obama
said. Some lawmakers called on their colleagues to take a thorough look at the deal before rushing to judgment. To
denounce an agreement or a deal before the ink is even dry strikes me as an abdication of our responsibility, said
Mr. King, a member of the Senate Armed Services and Intelligence committees.
The lobbying
campaign are part of a strategy to shore up Democratic suppor t in Congress for a
key part of Obama's foreign policy agenda. It's a risky play that could run into the same type of
Security Advisor, is slated to huddle with Jewish Democrats on Capitol Hill Thursday morning.
trouble that bedeviled the president last month when he muscled trade proposals through the House and Senate
despite significant Democrat opposition. At issue is an internationally negotiated deal to rein in Iran's nuclear
program, which Congress will have 60 days to review, examine in hearings and ultimately decide whether to pass.
The administration has five days to certify the agreement and formally present the deal to Capitol Hill, which
officially starts the clock. Now that he has a deal with Iran, Obama must face Congress The Republican controlled
House likely has the votes to pass a resolution of disapproval, which would block the deal. But in the Senate,
Republicans would need to attract support from several Democrats to get that measure through the chamber. There
are a group of about 15 Senate Democrats considered in-play to possibly vote against the President on the Iran
deal. If they all joined with the GOP, it's possible that the Senate could override a veto. However, that would be a
huge mark against the President and the deal itself even if the House couldn't override the veto and the deal went
through. Senate Democrats Democrats who count votes have said they expect it to be razor close when an override
vote happens in mid-September and there will be enormous pressure on key Democrats like New York Sen. Charles
Schumer, who is one of the 15 Democrats whose expected vote is unclear. In a statement Thursday, Schumer, who
is close to American Israel Public Affairs, and who has many pro-Israeli Jewish constituents, promised to study the
agreement with a "fine tooth comb." "I supported legislation ensuring that Congress would have time and space to
review the deal, and now we must use it well. Supporting or opposing this agreement is not a decision to be made
lightly, and I plan to carefully study the agreement before making an informed decision," he said. Schumer, who is
poised to become the Senate Democratic leader in the next Congress, is very influential with rank and file
Democrats so his arguments will be watched very closely by other Democrats who are on the fence. Other key
Democrats in this group include Sen. Ben Cardin, the top Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee. Sen. Bob
Menendez, the former chairman of the committee who has led the charge to give Congress a say in the deal and
told CNN's Joe Johns Tuesday he has serious doubts about the agreement. Menendez, who has been a constant critic
of Iran and a thorn in Obama's side on the issue said Tuesday could be better. GOP 2016 hopefuls slam Iran nuclear
deal "It's pretty interesting to me that all of the world powers were sitting on one side of the table and Iran be
levered by sanctions and falling oil prices and sitting on the other side of the table," Menendez said. "That they can
still preserve their nuclear infrastructure. That they can get significant sanctions relief, access to conventional arms
in a couple of years. So those are going to be the hard questions to ask here." Among those immediately praising
the accord were California Sen. Dianne Feinstein, the top Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee who
called the deal a 'diplomatic resolution' to a significant matter of international security. "This is a strong agreement
that meets our national security needs and I believe will stand the test of time. I stand behind the U.S. negotiating
team and will support this agreement in the Senate," she said. "Most importantly, Iran's pathways to a nuclear
bombincluding through uranium and plutonium as well as covert effortsare blocked through this agreement."
The 15 Senate Democrats considered in-play by aides beyond Menendez, Schumer and Cardin are: Sen. Tim Kaine
of Virginia, Sen. Ben Nelson of Florida, Sen. Joe Donnelly or Indiana, Sen. Chris Coons of Delaware, Sen. Richard
Blumenthal of Connecticut, Sen. Bob Casey of Pennsylvania, Sen. Mark Warner of Virginia, Sen. Heidi Heitkamp of
North Dakota, Sen. Debbie Stabenow of Michigan, Sen. Michael Bennet of Colorado, Sen. Gary Peters of Michigan
and Sen. Angus King, an Independent of Maine who caucuses with the Democrats. House Democrats If Senate
Republicans are able to attract enough Democrats to override the President's veto on a disapproval resolution,
there would be intense pressure on Pelosi to assemble enough votes -- 145 -- in the House to sustain the President's
veto. Few if any House Republicans are likely to back the Iran deal so Pelosi could end up as the final line of defense
for the White House. She would need to convince the majority of her caucus to support the president. In a
statement, Pelosi called the deal "historic" and while acknowledging the need to review the details, she also
emphasized, "aggressive restrictions and inspections offer the best long-term plan to stop Iran from building a
nuclear weapon." Democrats skeptical of the deal were being just as vocal on their opposition, even if the
congressional math looked like less of an insurmountable hurdle for Obama. Rep. Steve Israel, the highest-ranking
Jewish Democrat in the House and a member of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, doubled down on
earlier comments he made before the deal that he remained skeptical of the Iranians. "In the fall, there will be a
vote on this deal, and my obligation is to review every word, sentence, and paragraph of the deal to ensure it
satisfies my continued concerns," Israel said in a statement. "Until then, you can continue to count me in the
'skeptical' column." Democratic Rep. Luis Gutierrez of Illinois pushed backed on those outspoken against the deal
noting that it is possible to change the plan in the future if needed. "Skeptics and critics need to give this a chance
to work because the consequences are so high and the prospects for a peaceful resolution of Iran's nuclear
ambitions are fragile," he said.
begin a 60-day review period, and the deal expected to linger for critics to attack during the August recess,
senators said Tuesday that the administration needs to mount a sustained lobbying push just as aggressively as it
did on the recent issue of international trade. They
fellow Democrats. [Obama] has his hands full . Most Democrats are supportive of the deal, hoping that
the effort to curb Iranian nuclear ambitions diplomatically could prevent the United States from engaging in yet
could pursue other avenues to rein in the president either through appropriations legislation or passing further
Key Democrats are so far withholding support for the White Houses Iran
deal, worried that the plan would undermine national security, threaten Israel and too easily let Tehran escape
sanctions.
punishing economic sanctions. Many of them will be in office beyond the end of Obamas term, so an affirmative
vote means they will effectively own the deal when they face voters again. That means they could pay a dear price
politically if the accord fails to curb Irans nuclear ambitions and proves to be a failure. Even members of Senate
Democratic leadership, like Chuck Schumer and Jon Tester, were explicitly noncommittal, a sign of the challenges
ahead for the president. Verification, verification, verification, verification, said Tester (D-Mont.). Thats the big
thing. Look, I dont trust these guys, I want to make sure that whatever weve agreed to, weve got verification
thats going to happen. Could he vote against the deal if those concerns arent satisfied? Oh sure, Tester said.
Speaking at the White House on Tuesday morning, Obama strongly defended the 109-page agreement, saying it
would stop Irans path to a nuclear weapon. He promised extensive briefings on Capitol Hill but also vowed to
veto any bill that would undo the agreement. No deal, he said, would further enable Irans ability to build a nuclear
weapon. This deal is not built on trust, Obama said, with Biden standing beside him. Its built on verification.
The agreement between the United States, five other world powers and Iran is aimed at forcing the country to
abandon its nuclear ambitions in exchange for the loosening of sanctions against the regime. Some of the details,
however, have caused ample concern from both parties. Most notably, the deal would lift the United Nations arms
embargo on Iran after five years for conventional weapons and eight years for ballistic missiles. While sanctions on
oil and financial sectors will be eased, they will be snapped back if a panel reviewing the matter believes Iran is
circumventing the requirements. The International Atomic Energy Agency can access sites anywhere in the country,
though Iran has as long as 24 days to heed such a request. Skeptical Democrats said the administration needs to
explain its rationale on those issues and address their belief that Iran should have to clearly detail the scope of
its military dimensions and its ability to develop advanced centrifuges before theyll commit. Several lawmakers
said they want technical briefings on the timeline for a theoretical path back to the bomb. Others were worried that
it would be too difficult to win support for new sanctions after they have been eased. And many want an
explanation of how relaxing an international arms embargo on Iran become part of the deal after the April interim
agreement appeared to be silent on that matter. I want to find out why it came back in. It was not part of the
original talks, said Sen. Joe Manchin (D-W.Va.). What did we get for that? Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), a harsh
critic on Iran, said it appeared the Obama administration had crossed red lines set by the president by lifting the
arms embargo and not having so-called anytime, anywhere inspections allowing IAEA inspectors into Iranian
nuclear sites. Menendez said he needs to hear strong reassurances directly from the president that if Iran cheats
there will be consequences beyond just strict economic sanctions. I wish the president [made] a very clear
definitive statement that Iran will never be allowed to achieve a nuclear weapon and that we will take any actions
necessary to ensure that, Menendez said in an interview. Schumer, the Democratic leader-in-waiting, is stuck
between his pro-Israeli allies, who strongly oppose the deal, and the progressive wing of his party, which backs
diplomacy with the rogue nation. How he comes down could influence other skeptical Democrats. Im going to talk
to the administration, Im going to talk to people on both sides, the New Yorker said, citing his support for the bill
requiring a congressional review period. Youve got to use [the review period] well and wisely. Its a decision that
requires very careful study. And thats what Im going to give it. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is
expecting to begin probing the deal this month, but Congress will take a break during the August recess. At that
point, Republicans hope, lawmakers will hear from voters, forcing nervous Democrats to buck their president when
Congress takes an up-or-down vote in September. Sen. Ben Cardin, the ranking Democrat on the committee, said it
was particularly important for the administration to hold thorough briefings to solidify support on Capitol Hill.
There are many aspects of this agreement that I need clarification on, Cardin said. There are certainly areas of
interest and concern. Coons, the Delaware Democrat who occupies Bidens old Senate seat, said that given Irans
past record of supporting terrorism globally, he enters the review process with a position of suspicion and
distrust of Iran. He added that he must be convinced that the inspections regime and the way the sanctions relief
is structured wont enable Irans long-term ability to build a bomb. Though Democratic leaders said it was
premature to try to predict how their caucus will end up voting, liberals are confident at least 34 Democrats will
back Obama. Sen. Martin Heinrich (D-N.M.) spent most of the morning poring over the agreement; after he was
finished, he issued one of the strongest statements of support on Capitol Hill. Eventually, he predicted, most of his
colleagues would do the same. Its a much better deal than a lot of people would have given the secretary credit
for ahead of the negotiations, Heinrich said of Secretary of State John Kerry. So I think at the end of the day that
theres going to be adequate support for the presidents position. The reality is the Republicans have nothing as an
alternative.
Vice President Joe Biden will head back to Capitol Hill on Thursday to urge Senate
Democrats to support the nuclear deal with Iran. The White House says Biden will
discuss the deal with the Democratic members of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. Maryland Sen. Ben Cardin, the top Democrat on the committee, invited
Biden to brief his party's senators. The meeting will come a day after Biden made a
similar pitch during a meeting with House Democrats. Biden has also been calling
lawmakers, including Senate leaders, to discuss the deal. Congress will have a 60day window to review the deal and could pass legislation stopping Obama from
lifting sanctions on Iran. The White House is focusing its outreach on Democrats in
hopes they'll provide enough votes to stop Republicans from undermining the deal.
Schumer Key
Schumers the vital vote to make or break the veto override
Associated Press, 7/16/2015, Schumer squeezed on Iran Nuclear deal,
http://nypost.com/2015/07/16/schumer-squeezed-on-obamas-iran-nuclear-deal/
Indeed, with the leaders of Israel and their supporters in the US strongly opposed to
the accord, observers on and off Capitol Hill say that the only chance congressional
opponents have is if they get Schumer in their corn er. Sometime in the fall,
Congress will vote on whether to approve or disapprove the Iran deal. If enough
hawkish Democrats join Republicans and the disapprove side prevails, Obama would
veto the legislation. At that point, the focus would turn to whether Congress could
override Obamas veto, which takes a two-thirds vote in both the House and Senate.
Chances of that are slim, but with Schumer on their side, opponents might stand a
chance. There is no way a veto would be overridden without Sen. Schumer, said
Aaron Keyak, a consultant to several Jewish groups and a former Democratic
congressional aide. Finding 67 votes to override a presidential veto is a very high
threshold and there is no way to get to that number without Sen. Schumer. That
helps explain the intense pressures on Schumer and a handful of other key senators
in a debate that pro-Israel groups have made clear will be their top focus, bar none,
in the months to come. With the deal just a few days old, Schumer is already being
targeted in advertising, news releases and social media from both sides. The
Emergency Committee for Israel announced an ad campaign on New York City cable
television encouraging New Yorkers to Call Sen. Schumer and tell him he must
stand firm on his insistence that the deal allow nuclear inspections anytime and
anywhere, which opponents contend it does not. Another group, Secure America
Now, has been urging supporters over Twitter to call Schumer and tell him to oppose
the deal. On the opposite side, the progressive group Credo issued a statement
warning that Democrats who sabotage the Iran deal will face consequences, and
listed Schumer, who likely will win re-election next year, as a top target. Adding to
the pressure, the Democrats likely presidential nominee, Hillary Rodham Clinton,
has cautiously embraced the deal. At the middle of the storm, the famously mediafriendly Schumer has gone uncharacteristically quiet. Questioned at an unrelated
news conference this week, he repeated his initial written statement nearly word for
word. I will sit down, I will read the agreement thoroughly, and then Im going to
speak with officials, administration officials, people all over, on all different sides,
Schumer said. This is a decision that shouldnt be made lightly, and I am going to
just study this agreement and talk to people before I do anything else.
Congressional allies say Schumer seems genuinely torn. Hes obviously got
pressures and I assume hes going to do the right thing, said Rep. Jerrold Nadler (DNY), who is undecided and facing similar pressures. There are very severe upsides
and very severe downsides. Obama argues the deal closes off Irans pathway to a
nuclear bomb for the next decade, and has challenged opponents to come up with
an alternative. The liberal Jewish group J Street is backing the deal, and the groups
vice president of government affairs, Dylan Williams, said Schumer risks angering
progressive voters if he breaks with the White House. This deal is and will continue
Impacts
The deal just struck by Iran, the United States, and five other world powers in
Vienna is a major victory for U.S. national security. It shrinks Irans nuclear complex
down to a token capability and wraps it in a permanent inspection and monitoring
regime. The new agreement doesnt overthrow the clerical regime ruling Iran. It doesnt change Irans policies toward Israel or
its Arab neighbors. And it doesnt force Iran to end the repression of its own people. The agreement forged between
Iran and the worlds powers does only one thing, but it is a big one: It reverses and contains what most
experts consider the greatest nuclear proliferation challenge in the world.
Whatever else Iran may do in the world, it will not do it backed with the threat of a
nuclear weapon. U.S. negotiators went into the Iran talks with three key objectives: cut off all of Irans pathways to a
nuclear bomb, put in place a monitoring system to catch any Iranian cheating, and keep together the global coalition that can snap
This
detailed 100-plus-page agreement dismantles much of Irans nuclear program ,
freezes it, and puts a camera on it. The deal eliminates the three ways Iran could
build a bomb. First, without the deal, Iran could use its centrifuges to purify enough
uranium for one or more bombs within weeks. These high-tech machines are the size and shape of water
back sanctions if Iran breaks the deal. After 22 months of hard bargaining they have emerged with that and more.
heaters but made of specialized metal alloys. They spin uranium gas at supersonic speeds, cascading the gas through assemblies of
thousands of machines. When it reaches a purity level of about 5 percent, the gas can be turned into a powder form used to make
made of uranium; the bomb at Nagasaki was made of plutonium. Unlike uranium, plutonium does not exist in nature. It is made
Iran is constructing a
research reactor at Arak that would have produced about 8 kilograms of plutonium
each year, or enough theoretically for about two bombs. Under the new deal, Iran has
agreed to completely reconfigure the Arak reactor so that it will produce less than 1
kilogram a year. The old core will be shipped out of the country. Further, Iran has
agreed to never build facilities that could reprocess fuel rods and all spent fuel will
be shipped out the country. Plutonium path, blocked. Finally, without the deal Iran could try to
build a covert facility where it could secretly enrich uranium. The verification and
monitoring system required by this deal makes that all but impossible.
Inspectors will now track Irans uranium from the time it comes out of the ground to
the time it ends up as gas stored in cylinders . There will be state-of-the-art fiber-optic seals, sensors, and
inside nuclear reactors, as part of the fission process, and then extracted from the spent fuel rods.
cameras at every facility, inventories of all equipment, tracking of scientists and nuclear workers, and 24/7 inspections.
Inspectors will also monitor the manufacture of all centrifuges and related
machinery. A special procurement channel will be set up through which all of
Irans imported nuclear-related equipment must go. This makes it
extraordinarily difficult for Iran to cheat. Iran might want to set up a covert
enrichment plant, but where would it get the uranium? Or the centrifuges? Or the
scientists? If a 100 scientists suddenly dont show up for work at Natanz, it will be
noticed. If the uranium in the gas doesnt equal the uranium mined, it will be
noticed. If the parts made for centrifuges dont end up in new centrifuges, it will be
noticed. Iran might be able to evade one level of monitoring but the chance
that it could evade all the overlapping levels will be remote. Covert path, blocked.
This agreement, however, does leave Iran with significant capabilities. It would be better if the entire nuclear complex was razed to
Such a deal
was the preferred option of most nonproliferation experts , including myself, 12 years ago when
the ground and the earth salted so it could never be rebuilt. But we are not Rome and Iran is not Carthage.
Irans enrichment program was first disclosed. But the Bush administration rejected talks with Iran, when it had only a few dozen
centrifuges. We dont negotiate with evil, said Vice President Dick Cheney, we defeat it. That strategy failed. Irans talks with the
European Union collapsed; Iran had 6,000 centrifuges by the end of the Bush administration, and even as sanctions against it
increased, Iran built thousands more. The interim agreement reached in November of 2013 froze that progress, and rolled back
some of the most dangerous parts, including the stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu warned with his cartoon bomb diagram at the U.N. could lead to an Iranian bomb within weeks. This final
comprehensive agreement goes much further. It is cleverly crafted so that all sides can claim victory. Iran can say with pride that its
rights have been recognized, that sanctions will be lifted, and that it will not destroy a single nuclear facility. And they will be
The beauty of this agreement is that Iran gets to keep its buildings and we get
to take out all the furniture. Centrifuges cut by two-thirds, research and new
facilities limited for 10 years. Uranium gas stockpile cut by 97 percent, no new
enrichment above 4 percent and no new facilities for 15 years. Plutonium
production in new reactor cut 90 percent, no new reactors for 15 years. Monitoring
of all centrifuge manufacturing for 20 years. Confinement of all purchases to
monitored procurement channel for 25 years. Monitoring of all uranium mines for
25 years. Permanent ban on any nuclear weapons research or activities. Permanent
ban on reprocessing of fuel to extract plutonium. Permanent intrusive inspections.
These terms effectively freeze the program for longer than it has been in full
operation. It will shrink and confine Irans nuclear work for a generation.
correct.
the Twisted Path to Confrontation, been to Iran 9 times, Iran nuclear deal shifts
tectonic plates in the Middle East, Al Jazeera, 7/14/2015,
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/7/14/iran-nuclear-deal-shifts-mideasttectonic-plates.html)//duncan
Iran and a U.S.-led consortium of the worlds top powers have achieved a historic
agreement that should keep Iran from developing nuclear weapons for at least a
decade and could lay the basis for broader cooperation on the multiple crises roiling
the Middle East. U.S. officials were quick to underline that other differences with Iran remain over its
support for groups on the State Departments terrorism list, its human rights abuses and its challenge of Israels
diplomats from Iran, the U.S., the U.K., France, Germany, Russia and China (the P5+1) as well as the European
Union finalized a 159-page joint comprehensive plan of action in the middle of the night in Vienna as the last piece
of what negotiators have called a Rubiks Cube locked into place. This was a disagreement over how long
restrictions should be maintained over Irans conventional arms trade even as other sanctions imposed because of
its nuclear activities are lifted several months from now. Economic impact of Iranian sanctions being lifted 3:00
business with Iran. Among the surprises is relief of U.S. sanctions on selling commercial airplanes to Iran a
provision that should delight both U.S. companies such as Boeing and beleaguered Iranians who risk their lives by
on research and development of more advanced centrifuges are meant to keep Iran from rapidly ramping up
The fourth pathway to a bomb the socalled sneakout is addressed by intensified monitoring and verification,
including the resolution of questions about past military dimensions of the
Iranian program. According to an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency,
the United Nations nuclear watchdog, Iran will allow the agency to visit sites where militaryrelated nuclear activity is believed to have taken place, including Parchin, a military base that
Iran has paved over three times to elude detection of suspected prior weapons research. Iran will
implement the additional protocol of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and provide
access to inspectors where necessary and when necessary, in the words of Obama, if Iran
uranium enrichment capacity from 2026 to 2030.
is suspected of illicit activity. A joint commission will be set up to supervise implementation and resolve the
inevitable disputes.
normalizing its political and economic relationship with the rest of the world. In short, both sides have reason to
celebrate. As global attention moves on, though, Iran still faces major challenges ahead. What was accomplished.
While many back home on both sides have been pushing their negotiators to do better, it's important to remember
that a deal can only be sustainable if both parties walk away feeling like they gained more than they conceded.
Advocates of zero enrichment for Iran have missed this point all along, pushing for a full Iranian capitulation. Even if
The P5+1China,
France, Germany, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States can now leave the negotiating table
with the assurance that they have effectively checked sensitive Iranian
nuclear activities. They have essentially closed off any possibility of Iran
getting the Bomb using plutonium, by getting it to agree to redesign the Arak
heavy water reactor, a virtually irreversible step, and formalizing Tehrans pledge
not to reprocess plutonium. The agreement also scales back Irans uranium
enrichment program, limiting the activity to a single facility, Natanz, and reducing
its capacity by two thirds. The Fordow plant, meanwhile, which was a key
proliferation concern, is being repurposed as a research and development site. This
step lengthens Irans breakout time, or the amount of time it would take
between choosing to build a nuclear weapon and accumulating enough
fissile material to do so. The agreement, furthermore, includes a permitted procurement channel, so
such a deal had been concludedwhich wouldnt have happenedit wouldn't have lasted.
that Iran can continue working on its nuclear program without resorting to black market equipment. This means
Tehran complies with its obligations under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol.
(Iran is voluntarily implementing the latter under the deal, pending its formal ratification through the legislative
country back into compliance through a negotiated process, rather than yet another military solution. Even critics of
the deal who were in favor of military intervention admitted that their option wouldnt have been a lasting solution;
some said the United States would have kept having to "mow the lawn," with all the costs that would have entailed.
the United States and its negotiating partners walk away with what looks like
a durable and effective solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis and a step forward for
the non-proliferation regime.
Instead,
http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/14/opinions/glaser-logan-iran-nuclear-dealpositive/)//duncan
(CNN)The
deal just struck between the U.S., world powers, and Iran is an historic
achievement that decreases the likelihood of an Iranian nuclear weapon and
forestalls the risk of another costly U.S. war in the Middle East. But while the
diplomats in Vienna are finished wrangling over the final details, the Obama administration is by no means finished
fighting for the agreement's survival. Congress has 60 days with which to review the deal for final approval, and
while Republicans may not have a veto-proof majority, they -- along with some Democrats -- remain vehemently
opposed to any plausible peaceful resolution. The debate over Iran diplomacy was really two debates, in which
the Iran hawk community, which focused less on the nuclear issue than on finding ways to isolate and ultimately
The near-consensus
among arms controllers is due to the deal's strong nonproliferation features. Under
the deal, Iran would reduce its stockpile of centrifuges by two-thirds and dismantle
about 97% of its low-enriched uranium. For 15 years, the Iranians will be prohibited
from enriching any uranium at their Fordow site and the Arak reactor for plutonium
production would be permanently disabled. Throughout, Iran would be subject to
one of the most robust and intrusive inspection regimes in the world , with
continuous video monitoring of its uranium mines for the next 25 years and
monitoring of centrifuge production facilities for 20 years. Expanded inspections under the
Additional Protocol are permanent. As 30 nonproliferation experts attested to in a
statement in April, "the agreement reduces the likelihood of destabilizing nuclear
weapons competition in the Middle East, and strengthens global efforts to
prevent proliferation, including the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty." Under the deal,
Iran's breakout time -- the amount of time it would take to produce one bombsworth of highly enriched uranium if it decided to do so -- would be extended to
roughly one year, up from roughly three months at the interim agreement's inception. To review these
technical parameters and feverishly warn that the deal "paves the way for a nuclear
Iran," as Sen. David Perdue, R-Georgia, and others recently have is bizarre. Similarly, to declare as Sen. Marco
destroy Iran's clerical regime, by military force if necessary, nuclear program or not.
Rubio, R-Florida, recently did that the deal would produce "a cascade of proliferation" in the region relies on an
array of interlocking dubious assumptions. What these wildly divergent assessments seem to indicate is that the
Instead, these claims seem to be part of a larger strategy under which everything that happens tied to Iran is
treated as a threat. But
agreement, which faces political obstacles in Washington and, to a lesser extent, Tehran. Questions remain about
how ironclad the provisions of the agreement will be in ensuring Iran does not "cheat," or breach any of the terms of
the deal. There will be a lot of political debate about this in the weeks ahead, but on Tuesday, it seemed a good
number of Western nonproliferation advocatesand arms control experts were satisfied with the Vienna agreement.
That included Thomas Shea, a veteran former inspector with the IAEA, the U.N.'s atomic agency, who oversaw the
design and implementation of safeguards for the world's evolving nuclear facilities. "This is a stunning
accomplishment," said Shea, who is now a Vienna-based consultant, speaking to WorldViews in Washington. "Ive
been a part of this business for 40 years at this point and Ive never seen anything that begins to approach the
comprehensiveness of this agreement." WorldViews earlier detailed the terms of the deal, which forces Iran to
dramatically reduce its number of centrifuges -- devices used to enrich uranium gas into more fissile material -- as
well as its stockpile of enriched uranium, and commit to long-term restrictions on the nature of the work that can be
anytime inspections" on Iran's facilities, Shea says, is something of a misnomer, given that's hardly been common
Economist explains: Inspectors will not be able to conduct anywhere, any time visits. Instead, they will have to
give grounds for their concerns about prohibited activities and give the Iranians an opportunity to address them
Refusal by
Iran to provide inspectors access that persisted for more than another week would
be deemed a violation of the agreement and therefore subject to re-imposition of
sanctions. My colleagues Carol Morello and Karen DeYoung offer more detail: Once it submits a request to Iran
before access is made mandatory by the joint commission. All this must take place within two weeks.
to visit an undeclared facility, the IAEA and Iran will have 14 days to agree on the terms of access. If IAEA
concerns are not met within that period, a joint commission made up of the seven negotiating countries Iran and
the United States and its partners plus the European Union, will have up to seven days to review the dispute and
decide what Iran needs to do. Only five of the eight members need to agree, effectively ensuring that Iran, Russia
and China cannot prevail if they vote together. Iran then has three days to implement the decision. If it does not,
then we can begin snap-back of sanctions, a [U.S.] administration official said. The process may seem
cumbersome, and another former IAEA official has expressed concerns over the days it may take to wrangle
permission for access. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, one of the deal's most outspoken critics, told NPR
on Wednesday that this procedure is "like telling a drug dealer: Were going to check your meth lab in 24 days.'"
But the IAEA, argues Shea, with logistical help from other member states, is well positioned to detect whether Iran
is in breach of its commitments or conducting clandestine work on a nuclear weapon. It has learned from its
shortcomings in the 1990s, when regimes in North Korea and Iraq exposed weaknesses in the U.N. agency's
safeguards and protocols. It commands a wide spectrum of tools from highly-sophisticated commercial satellite
technology, to infrared and radar imaging to its own laboratories where tests of environmental samples can be
carried out that can be brought to bear. "There's no comparison between the technologies available now and
those 20 years ago," says Shea. Combined with the likely cooperation of foreign intelligence organizations with the
IAEA, the scrutiny on Iran would make it difficult for the regime to hide the construction of another subterranean
nuclear facility like the Fordow enrichment plant, which is perched beneath a mountain near the holy city of Qom.
Moreover, the IAEA will have oversight over Iran's entire nuclear supply chain, from its uranium mills to its
procurement of nuclear-related technologies. As Shea notes in a June report posted on the Web site of the Arms
Control Association, the U.N. agency will be monitoring Iran's potential "use of black markets or front companies"
should Tehran attempt to secretly obtain specialized material for its nuclear program. "The beauty of this
agreement is that Iran gets to keep its buildings and we get to take out all the furniture," writes Joe Cirincione,
president of the Ploughshares Fund, which pushes for nonproliferation, and a proponent of the nuclear deal with
He sums up the checks in place: Iran might want to set up a covert enrichment
plant, but where would it get the uranium? Or the centrifuges? Or the scientists? If a
100 scientists suddenly dont show up for work at Natanz, it will be noticed. If the
uranium in the gas doesnt equal the uranium mined, it will be noticed. If the parts
made for centrifuges dont end up in new centrifuges, it will be noticed. Iran might
be able to evade one level of monitoring but the chance that it could evade all the
overlapping levels will be remote. Shea says the IAEA is a scientific institution and
will approach the task in "an impassioned way," focused on whether Iran, as a
signatory to a raft of agreements (including a new "roadmap" with the IAEA itself),
has set out to undermine the accord. But he is personally "hopeful" that the current deal will mark the
Iran.
beginning of a less acrimonious phase in the IAEA's dealings with the Islamic Republic. "Iran, through a painstaking
negotiated agreement, has established a very formal understanding with six of the most important countries in the
planet," said Shea. "To
imagine."
expect Iran would violate this from the outset is somewhat hard to
With or without an
agreement, the world is stuck with an Iran that continues to run a big nuclear
programme and remains slippery and dangerous. The real test of the deal is
whether it is better than the alternatives. It is . A nuclear balance-sheet The critics are right that
much reliance on a transformation of the Iranian regime that may never come about.
the agreement legitimises Iran as a threshold nuclear state. If it keeps its word and avoids further restrictions on its
programme, Iran will have the know-how and eventually the capacity to arm itself. Yet it will also face greater
restraints than it does today (see article). Irans ability to enrich uranium, the fuel for a bomb, and to develop a
weapon will be severely constrained for somewhere between ten and 15 years. After that, it will be subject to the
full force of the international treaty against proliferation. The government has agreed to intrusive monitoring of all
its nuclear facilities and to inspections on request of its military sites, under a system of managed access.
For those
who oppose this deal, the alternatives are to wait for a better one, or to go to war .
Some argue that since sanctions won concessions, more sanctions will win more concessions. Yet if America
walked away now, China, Russia and the EU would lose faith in the process and
sanctions would crumble instead. Moreover, to think that Iran would surrender the
heart of its programme is a reckless gamble. Threatened, it would be more likely to
dig in its heels. Irans nuclear expertise has grown since 2000, and would expand further still in the years
before talks were possible once again. Delay could thus end up making an ambitious
agreement even harder. Some critics may believe that attacking Iran is the only
option. But war is a poor form of arms-control . Even if America had the stomach for
a months-long campaign, and even if it could take out all of Irans many nuclear
sites, bombing cannot destroy nuclear know-how. Instead the programme would go
underground, beyond the reach of monitors. An attack would thus be a route to a
nuclear-armed Iran. Should Iran dash for the bomb, war might make sense as a last resort, but that option
Sanctions, which are to be lifted as a result of the agreement, can be reimposed if Iran violates it.
will not disappear just because of this weeks agreement. Get real But the deal brings dangers that its backers are
slow to acknowledge. Although the economy is hard-pressed, Iran devotes precious resources to Iraq and Syria; it
sponsors Hizbullah, the Lebanese militia-cum-party; and whips up emotions in Bahrain and Yemen. Relieved of
sanctions, a richer Iran would surely spend money extending what is mostly a malign influence. Iranian violence
abroad may well worsen, as a sop to hardline opponents of the deal in Tehran and as a gesture to show the world
that Iran has not gone soft. The perception that the United States is a declining power, which alarms Israel and
Americas allies in the Gulf, may feed Iranian ambitions. That is not the whole story, however. The nuclear deal
binds Barack Obama, Americas president, into the Middle East. This is his foreign-policy legacy and he is its
enforcer-in-chief, just as his successors will be. Irans empire is in turmoilroiled by jihadists (including Islamic
State), war with Saudi Arabia in Yemen, and a failing regime in Syria. Extra money will help Irans efforts, but as
America discovered in Iraq, dominance is not determined by resources. If the United States buttresses its oversight
of the agreement with sustained regional diplomacy, needed anyway after the Arab spring, then it can help contain
Although the deal will make Iran more powerful, it will also lead the country to
become more open. As in China, the Iranian theocracy rules over a population that long ago lost its
Iran.
revolutionary zeal (see article). The regime agreed to constrain its nuclear programme because, again as in China,
it calculated that it is more likely to survive if Iranians feel that they have a shot at prosperity. Unlike North Koreas
Kim dynasty, which cheated on its nuclear pact, Irans supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, decided that being
a pariah was worse for his regime than rejoining the world. That choice only makes sense if Iran can now attract
The more Iran trades with the rest of the world, the more
susceptible it will grow to international pressure. As the country becomes enmeshed
in the global economy, interest groups will emerge within Irans complex, factional
politics who will argue that the countrys future is better served by decent relations
with foreigners than by bad ones. The more Iranians benefit from ties with the
outside world, the stronger those moderating voices will become. A country of Irans
size and sophistication will get a bomb if it really wants one. Nothing can change
that. But this pact offers the chance of holding Iran back and shifting its course. The
world should embrace it, cautiously.
trade and investment.
Aff
Uniqueness
Wont Pass
Deal wont pass Republican and AIPAC opposition
Espo 7/16 (David, writes for the Associated Press, Analysis: GOP against Iran
deal, with or without reading it, AP, 7/16/2015,
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/9ca4c057cc0946bda2be9e7aa72aa90c/analysis-gopagainst-iran-deal-or-without-reading-it)//duncan
House news conference on Wednesday, inviting reporters to make sure they challenged him with each of the
criticisms coming from Republicans so he could rebut them all. More broadly, he recommended that critics "read the
agreement before they comment on it." It seemed a simple request on a diplomatic accord that politicians in both
parties agree is a momentous event particularly for tea party politicians who rode to power in 2010 vowing to
a prediction about the 2016 election. The second pointed toward a struggle over a coming attempt by congressional
Republicans to pass legislation that blocks Obama from lifting many economic and other sanctions whose removal
are part of the core of the deal. The Republican leadership sounded more open-minded, barely. House Speaker
Boehner, R-Ohio, told reporters this week that Obama had abandoned all the goals he
previously announced for a deal to lessen sanctions against Iran in exchange for
John
concessions in Tehran's nuclear program. "It blows my mind that the administration would agree to lift the arms
and missile bans and sanctions" in place, he added Thursday at a news conference. Senate Majority Leader Mitch
McConnell, R-Ky., said he wants to study the agreement then offered a prediction
that left little doubt where he will land. He said Obama will "work hard to get the 34
votes that I know he knows he needs in order to sustain" a veto of legislation the
Republican-controlled Congress intends to pass. The Israeli question is a constant
factor. "We think this is not only a threat to us. We think this is a threat to you as well," Israeli Prime Minister
Benyamin Netanyahu said in an interview with NBC, referring to the United States. His opposition is long-standing,
and Boehner angered the White House earlier this year by inviting the Israeli leader to outline his concerns in an
the votes in 2012, backing Obama by a margin of 69 percent to 30 percent for Republican Mitt Romney.
http://www.starherald.com/news/nation_world/veto-struggle-with-congress-possibleover-iran-nuclear-deal/article_b93ffba5-2eca-5bfe-9bbe-4e15f6629250.html
WASHINGTON The Republican-controlled Congress can't block the complex
nuclear agreement the Obama administration announced with Iran on Tuesday, but
a veto struggle is a virtual certainty as lawmakers try to undermine the deal by
insisting that numerous sanctions remain in place. "I think he's going to be working
hard to get 34 votes," Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell said of the coming
struggle, referring to the support President Barack Obama would need to sustain a
veto. One Democrat, California Sen. Dianne Feinstein, predicted Obama will prevail.
"I just don't think" that two-thirds of the Senate will override his objections, she
said. A law that Obama signed earlier this year gives him five days to submit the
agreement to Congress for review. It also provides for a condensed, 60-day period
for Congress to hold hearings and consider legislation that would bar him from
lifting sanctions that lawmakers have enacted in recent years. Republicans and
Democrats both noted the measure would be subject to a 60-vote requirement in
the Senate. The GOP holds 54 seats, meaning party leaders would need the votes of
at least six Democrats to pass the legislation, technically known as a resolution of
disapproval. Obama has already said he'll veto any legislation to leave sanctions in
place. A two-thirds majority in each house would be required to override him. As an
example, that means the administration would be assured of prevailing if it could
hold the votes of 34 Democrats in the Senate. A close vote on overriding a veto is
likely, and Obama's hopes would rest in part on the views of Democrats with close
ties to Israel, which vehemently opposes the lifting of any sanctions. Among them is
Sen. Charles Schumer of New York, a member of the leadership , who issued a noncommittal statement saying he would "carefully study the agreement before making
an informed decision."
South Carolina Sen. Lindsey Graham said the deal equals a "death sentence for
the state of Israel." The deal is supposed to curb Iran's efforts to obtain a nuclear
weapon for the next 15 years, but the Republicans universally said Iran could not be
trusted, despite requirements for Iran to open its nuclear sites to international
inspectors. "They don't want a power plant, they want a bomb," Graham said on CNN's "New Day," warning desire for nuclear
capability will spread. "So every Arab nation is going to have to say the following about 15 years from now, they're going to have a
"They come out of this a much, much stronger and I believe more virulent state with very, very few responsibilities. In fact, nothing
in this deal curbs their terrorism. There's nothing that says that they have to cease any type of terrorist activity."
Former
Arkansas Gov. Mike Huckabee vowed that, if elected, he would "keep all options on
the table, including military force, to topple the terrorist Iranian regime and defeat
the evil forces of radical Islam." Huckabee released a provocative campaign ad last week that replays Lyndon
Johnson's famous "Daisy" ad, but instead suggests Obama and Democrats have placed the U.S. under threat of nuclear attack.
Florida Sen. Marco Rubio said in a statement that he believes the deal undermines
U.S. national security. "President Obama has consistently negotiated from a position
of weakness, giving concession after concession to a regime that has American
blood on its hands, holds Americans hostage, and has consistently violated every
agreement it ever signed. I expect that a significant majority in Congress will share my skepticism of this agreement
and vote it down." In a statement, Louisiana Gov. Bobby Jindal not only called on Congress to
oppose the deal, but Democratic presidential frontrunner Hillary Clinton to do so as
well. "If Secretary Clinton goes along with President Obama's efforts to appease
Iran, it will make our enemies stronger, endanger our ally Israel and trigger a
nuclear arms race in the Middle East that will destabilize the region," Jindal said. And
Wisconsin Gov. Scott Walker, who on Monday became the latest Republican nominee to join the 2016 field, said on
Twitter that President Barack Obama's "nuclear agreement with Iran will be
remembered as one of America's worst diplomatic failures ."
"I will review the details of this agreement promptly, and I will only support it if this
deal prevents every Iranian pathway to develop a nuclear weapons capability." Sen.
Kirsten Gillibrand (D-N.Y.) Sen. Mazie Hirono (D-Hawaii): "The pathway to
implementing a deal to effectively prevent Iran from obtaining or developing a
nuclear weapon is in sight. Sen. Tim Kaine (D-Va.): " I think if it matches the April 2
framework and there is a solid verification and inspection regime, I think its going
to be good for our national security," he said on PBS July 15th. Sen. Angus King (IMaine) Sen. Joe Manchin (D-W.V.): "I believe that American strength is rooted in both
military might and diplomacy, and I am pleased that we have given diplomacy a
chance. However, we still need to look at the agreement in its entirety before
passing judgment." Sen. Ed Markey (D-Mass.) Sen. Brian Schatz (D-Hawaii) Sen.
Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.) Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse (D-R.I.) Purely undecided (6)
Sen. Michael Bennet (D-Colo.): "The stakes are high, and the details of this deal
matter." Sen. Ben Cardin (D-Md.): "There is no trust when it comes to Iran. In our
deliberations we need to ensure the negotiations resulted in a comprehensive, longlasting, and verifiable outcome that also provides for snap-back of sanctions should
Iran deviate from its commitments." Sen. Bob Casey (D-Pa.) "Over the coming days,
I will be conducting a thorough review of the agreement to evaluate whether it
protects our national security interests. Sen. Joe Donnelly (D-Ind.): In May, he said:
"A nuclear-armed Iran would be one of the most serious threats to our national
security interests, and I have long-supported diplomatic efforts, including the
ongoing negotiations and sanctions, to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear
weapon," and today he is undecided on the Iran deal. Sen. Bill Nelson (D-Fla.): "First
thing is to not tear down this agreement before the ink is even dry, before we even
read it. Congress has a role now, by law, and it's to thoroughly scrutinize the details
of the agreement." Sen. Mark Warner (D-Va.) Leaning no (44) Senate Majority
Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) Sen. Lamar Alexander (R-Tenn.) Sen. Kelly Ayotte (RN.H.) Sen. John Barrasso (R-Wyo.) Sen. John Boozman (R-Ark.): "We have a
responsibility to ensure that Iran never achieves its goal of becoming a nuclear
power. This deal give us little confidence that we will be successful in this regard."
Sen. Richard Burr (R-N.C.) Sen. Shelley Moore Capito (R-W.Va.) Sen. Bill Cassidy (RLa.) Sen. Dan Coats (R-Ind.): " Regardless of what the president has concluded and
what he tries to sell, we need to individually take a real hard look at this and make
our own decisions because they are going to have immense consequences for the
future." Sen. Thad Cochran (R-Miss.): "Iran cannot be allowed to gain nuclear
weapons capabilities, and I am skeptical whether the agreement reached by the
Obama administration is truly verifiable and enforceable." Sen. Susan Collins (RMaine) Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) Sen. John Cornyn (R-Texas) Sen. Mike Crapo (RIdaho): "The consequences of a bad deal are monumental," he said in May. Sen.
Steve Daines (R-Mont.) Sen. Mike Enzi (R-Wyo.): He signed a Republican human
rights letter to Secretary of State John Kerry saying "we are concerned the Obama
Administration is failing to recognize the inherent danger of engaging in nuclear
negotiations with this particular regime given their appalling record on human
rights." Sen. Joni Ernst (R-Iowa): She gave an April floor speech declaring a deal
should only lift sanctions if Iran abandons support of terrorism. Sen. Deb Fischer (RNeb.) Sen. Jeff Flake (R-Ariz.): The Senate Foreign Relations Committee member has
been quiet since the deal was announced but in 2013 signed a letter with 75 other
senators calling for tougher sanctions against Iran. Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa)
Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) Sen. Dean Heller (R-Nev.) Sen. John Hoeven (R-N.D.) Sen.
Johnny Isakson (R-Ga.) Sen. Ron Johnson (R-Wis.): "I have often stated that I believe
this negotiation was lost from the start ... That said, I will carefully review the details
before rendering my final judgment." Sen. James Lankford (R-Okla.) Sen. Mike Lee
(R-Utah) Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) Sen. Bob Menendez (D-N.J.): Menendez coauthored a bill that would have put sanctions on Iran if negotiations failed by June
30. "Im concerned that the deal ultimately legitimizes Iran as a threshold-nuclear
state. Im concerned the redlines we drew have turned into green-lights." Sen. Jerry
Moran (R-Kan.) Sen. Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska): "If todays agreement is historic as
some are claiming, its still very much unknown if the history being made is positive
or negative." Sen. David Perdue (R-Ga.): "Right now, I remain extremely concerned
that this deal does not go far enough to fully prevent Iran from developing a nuclear
weapons capability." Sen. Gary Peters (D-Mich.): Peters was an original co-sponsor
of the 2015 Kirk-Menendez Iran sanctions bill that Obama said would put
unnecessary pressure on the negotiations. Sen. Rob Portman (R-Ohio) Sen. Pat
Roberts (R-Kan.) Sen. Mike Rounds (R-S.D.): "It is important that any deal is
enforceable so that we can keep Iran accountable," he said in May. Sen. Chuck
Schumer (D-N.Y.): The potential next-in-line Democratic leader and ally of Israel has
stayed radio silent since the deal was announced, but he's signed onto past
legislation designed to derail the deal and said in February: "I have been one of the
leaders in pushing the toughest possible sanctions against Iran. If Iran does not
come to an agreement by March 24th I stand ready to vote for additional sanctions."
Sen. Tim Scott (R-S.C.): "Its hard to make a good deal with bad actors." Sen. Jeff
Sessions (R-Ala.) Sen. Richard Shelby (R-Ala.) Sen. Pat Toomey (R-Pa.) Sen. John
Thune (R-S.D.) Sen. Roger Wicker (R-Miss.) Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.): " I was
skeptical that Irans leaders would agree to dismantle their nuclear weapons
program and I have questions about whether this agreement accomplishes that,
particularly in light of Irans history on this issue." No (14) Sen. Roy Blunt (R-Mo.)
Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.): "If this deal is approved, it will represent a historic defeat
for the United States." Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas) Sen. Cory Gardner (R-Colo.): "This
deal is unwise. For the sake of the region, and the sake of the world, it must be
rejected." Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) Sen. Jim Inhofe (R-Okla.) Sen. Mark Kirk (RIll.) Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) Sen. Jim Risch (R-Idaho): "This deal falls disastrously short
of what the Obama Administration originally promised and gives the Iranian
government what it desires." Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.): "I expect that a significant
majority in Congress will share my skepticism of this agreement and vote it down."
Sen. Ben Sasse (R-Neb.): "The Administration just lit the fuse for a nuclear arms race
in the Middle East." Sen. Dan Sullivan (R-Alaska) Sen. Thom Tillis (R-N.C.) Sen. David
Vitter (R-La.): "This agreement is a really, really bad deal for America, for Israel, and
for freedom." Unknown / Unclear (9) Sen Cory Booker (D-N.J.) Sen. Maria Cantwell
(D-Wash.) Sen. Claire McCaskill (D-Mo.) Sen. Heidi Heitkamp (D-N.D.) Sen. Amy
Klobuchar (D-Minn.) Sen. Barbara Mikulski (D-Md.) Sen. Patty Murray (D-Wash.) Sen.
Debbie Stabenow (D-Mich.) Sen. Jon Tester (D-Mont.): "As these negotiations move
forward, I will monitor them closely to ensure that our national security is
protected," he said in May.
Links
Internal Links
The nuclear deal between world powers and Iran starts a new phase of intense
negotiation - this time between the Obama administration and the U.S. Congress,
where some Republicans have long been working to sink an agreement. Any effort
in Congress to overturn the deal would face an uphill fight . Republicans have majorities in both the House of
Representatives and Senate, but they would need the support of dozens of President Barack Obama's fellow Democrats to sustain a "resolution of disapproval" that could cripple [scuttle]
ranking Democrat in the House, Steny Hoyer, said after the deal was announced: "It is now up to members of Congress to work carefully through every detail, particularly given Irans
Senate
Democrats have stood firm to date against Republican-led efforts to interfere with
the talks, which included Iran and the United States, Britain, China, France, Germany and Russia. In the House, more than 150 Democrats, including party leader Nancy
likelihood to exploit any ambiguity or loophole to its benefit and to the detriment of the security of America, Israel, and our allies in Europe and the Gulf."
Pelosi, signed a letter in May strongly supporting the nuclear negotiations. "I understand the heavy lift that's involved," Tennessee Republican Senator Bob Corker, chairman of the
veto a resolution and Congress could try to override it, Obama cannot waive the congressional sanctions. A veto override would require a two-thirds majority in both houses - or 13
Under
legislation passed in May, Congress will have 60 days for public debate and hearings by as many as eight Senate and House
committees. Lawmakers then could vote on a joint resolution to approve or reject the nuclear deal, though they also may not act at
The Iran deal is going to be a hard sell in Congress, Senate Majority Leader
Mitch McConnell said on Fox News Sunday. He said President Barack Obama
knows that the resolution of disapproval is likely to be introduced, is very likely to
pass and very likely to get over 60 votes . Of course he does. In his statement
earlier today, Obama already announced that he would veto any measure of
disapproval: So I welcome a robust debate in Congress on this issue and I welcome scrutiny of the details of this agreement.
all.
But I will remind Congress that you dont make deals like this with your friends. We negotiated arms control agreements with the
Soviet Union when that nation was committed to our destruction and those agreements ultimately made us safer. I am confident
that this deal will meet the national security interests of the United States and our allies. So I will veto any legislation that prevents
the successful implementation of this deal. Ahem. Its not quite consistent to declare oneself welcoming of a robust debate while
at the same time pledging to ignore everyone elses advice on the subject of it. Obama isnt welcoming a debate or scrutiny at all;
hes telling Congress to sit down and shut up. Were used to Obama being inconsistent and hardline at home, though. We just wish
The Senate rejection of the deal under Bob Corkers bill takes 60
votes, and is almost a certainty. So is Obamas veto, which everyone understood
well enough without the reminder today. Under the Corker bill, that veto becomes
subject to an override, which will take 2/3rds of both the House and the Senate. Can
hed toughen up abroad.
the Senate get 67 votes to override Obamas attempt at legacy-building at the expense of our allies in the Middle East? Bloomberg
analyst Greg Valliere says the keys may be Chuck Schumer and Ben Cardin: Note too the dismissal of John Kerrys what if there
were no deal argument as weak tea. Its a flawed agreement with an untrustworthy partner, as one Bloomberg commentator
notes, which makes better than nothing a ridiculous excuse and just flat out not true. Nothing would have left sanctions in
place, which would have at least curtailed Irans ability to fund its terror operations in the region. Jeffrey Goldberg calls the deal a
morally dubious necessity anyway: This sad conclusion is unavoidable. The lifting of crippling sanctions, which will come about as
part of the nuclear deal struck in Vienna, means that at least $150 billion, a sum Barack Obama first invoked in May, will soon
enough flow to Tehran. With this very large pot of money, the regime will be able to fund both domestic works and foreign
adventures in Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, and elsewhere. It is hard to imagine a scenarioat least in the short termin which
Hezbollah and other terror organizations on the Iranian payroll dont see a windfall from the agreement. This is a bad development
in particular for the people of Syria. Iran, as the Assad regimes funder, protector, and supplier of weapons, foot soldiers, and
strategists, is playing a crucial role in the destruction of Syria. Now Syrians will see their oppressor become wealthier and gain
international legitimacy (legitimacy not just for Irans nuclear infrastructure, which this deal will leave in place.) I worry that
Obamas negotiators might have given away too much to the Iranians. On the other hand, Netanyahus dreamof total Iranian
capitulationwas never going to become a reality. The dirty little secret of this whole story is that it is very difficult to stop a large
nation that possesses both natural resources and human talent, and a deep desire for power, from getting the bomb. Well see, in
the coming days, if Obama and Kerry have devised an effective mechanism to keep Iran far away from the nuclear threshold. True,
but that doesnt mean we couldnt have continued to keep Iran from accessing all the cash. If nuclear proliferation is as inevitable as
Goldberg states and he may well be correct then sanctions would at least keep them from expanding other modes of terror. In
this argument, we have essentially surrendered on every front. We have taken off the leash in its entirety. Its a full retreat by the
West, as I wrote earlier. Certainly, many members of Congress will see it the same way. Can Obama keep 34 Senate Democrats in
his corner to avoid a veto override? A lot depends on how the Iranians act over the next 60 days, but its almost impossible to bet
against Obama in that scenario. Even those Democrats who have been rhetorically opposed to this deal will likely rationalize that
this negotiation belongs to the executive branch. In fact, it might be tougher for opponents of the deal to get enough Democrats in
the House to overturn a veto, given how entrenched those seats are. Unless those House Democrats are facing a primary
your final fallback to stopping Obama is Chuck Schumer and Ben Cardin, youve already lost.
"bottom lines" laid down in a preliminary agreement in early April. Congress, as part of the Iran Nuclear Review Act
(PL 114-17), will have 60 days to review the agreement, which means any potential vote of approval or disapproval
negotiators in Vienna would "phase in" U.S. and international sanctions relief for Iran as the country took steps to
implement the terms of the accord. He also said that international inspectors would have "24/7" access to Irans
"key nuclear facilities." "This deal demonstrates that American diplomacy can bring about real and meaningful
of the preliminary April agreement between Iran and the so-called P-5+1 world powers, which include the United
States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France and Germany. Obama said the United States would have the
ability to verify whether Iran was fulfilling each of its deal commitments. He said the International Atomic Energy
Agency had reached an agreement with Tehran that would allow it to complete a separate investigation into
potential past military research by Iran with nuclear implications. A key sticking point for Congress will likely be the
access that Iran grants to IAEA inspectors to visit potential undeclared sites that are suspected of housing nuclear
work. Congressional hawks have demanded "anytime/anywhere" access to these sites but Obama on Tuesday said
the deal would grant international monitors access "where necessary, when necessary." Another likely bone of
contention for lawmakers will be an agreement under the deal to lift a U.N. Security Council conventional weapons
embargo on Iran after five years and sanctions on the sale of ballistic missile technology after eight years.
Lawmakers are also likely to have questions about the mechanism that has been developed that Obama said will
allow sanctions on Iran to be snapped back if the country is found to be in violation of the deal. Early reaction
from Capitol Hill to the deals announcement was cautious with a number of lawmakers indicating they were
withholding judgment until they more fully understood the terms of the accord. Senate Foreign Relations Chairman
Bob Corker, who authored the Iran Nuclear Review Act said he comes from a place of deep skepticism that the
deal will succeed in preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Congress will need to scrutinize this deal and
answer whether implementing the agreement is worth dismantling our painstakingly-constructed sanctions
regime, he said. Virginia Democrat Tim Kaine, who sits on the Foreign Relations Committee, also welcomed the
chance for congressional review.
Impacts
If a Republican manages to
gain control of the White House in 2016, they could simply reject the
accord, remove US from its participation, and potentially reinstate
American sanctions on Iran. Some Republican candidates, such as Wisconsin Governor
Scott Walker and Florida Senator Marco Rubio, have already pledged to do so . The deal with Iran
A Republican president could immediately withdraw from the accord
will be remembered as one of Americas worst diplomatic failures, Walker said. In order to ensure the safety of
America and our allies, the next president must restore bipartisan and international opposition to Irans nuclear
program while standing with our allies to roll back Irans destructive influence across the Middle East. Rubio added
that should the deal go forward under Obama, It will then be left to the next President to return us to a position of
American strength and re-impose sanctions on this despicable regime until it is truly willing to abandon its nuclear
Bush, meanwhile,
called the accord a dangerous, deeply flawed, and short sighted deal . This isnt
ambitions and is no longer a threat to international security. Former Florida Governor Jeb
Politico, a new commander in chief could initiate a review of the agreement in order to determine whether Iran had
violated any of the provisions and, if so, the frequency of infractions.
Iran to continue R&D and testing of ever-more advanced centrifuges for enriching uranium centrifuges that can
dramatically speed Irans breakout to the bomb. But Iran would not agree! Well, this is because from the onset the
president conveyed weakness, displayed desperation, did not employ coercive diplomacy, made excuses for Irans
transgressions and signaled weakness by reversing himself on the red line in Syria and bugging out of Iraq, and
then waging a halfhearted war. Rather than go back to Congress or his advisers to increase pressure and figure out
the means of using our tremendous leverage over Iran, the presidents negotiators simply collapsed on point after
point. They had neither stomach nor spine for maintaining essential elements of a deal. When John Kerry says But
the Iranians promised . . . or The Iranians desire . . . or you hear Wendy Sherman coo about how the Iranians
were moved to tears by how Kerry never wanted to go to war again, you realize these people have become
confused and deluded about the opponent they face. If one really was not trusting Iran (as Kerry and Obama
swear up and down they are not), half of the agreement would be gone (the non-nuclear concessions) and the other
half would be rewritten (the nuclear terms). Aside from a certain Stockholm Syndrome, the negotiators one of
whom entirely misread the North Koreans before misreading the Iranians got this perspective directly from the
president. The presidents rhetoric over seven years suggests that he never had any intention of bringing Iran to
heel. In fact, the president from day one has spoken of transforming the region, making Iran a regional power. This
misguided fantasy that Iran would transform if showed respect is at the root of his negotiating approach and led
inevitably to an awful deal. Horovitz explains: As a big, sophisticated country, Iran could indeed be a regional power.
But so long as the current regime rules Iran, the free world, led by the president of the United States, should be
into the range of its missiles, that criminalizes homosexuality, that discriminates
against women, that jails, tortures and executes political opponents, that executes
more juvenile offenders than any other country on earth that Iran must not be
allowed to become a more dominant regional power. And yet, by concluding this weeks accord,
and thereby sending hundreds of billions of dollars into that regimes coffers, the US-led negotiators have
guaranteed this is precisely what will happen now. Well, only if Congress allows the deal to go forward. If you accept
the premise that Iran is like every other normal nation, will not use money and arms to harm its neighbors and its
own citizens, and will not pursue its avowed goal of destroying Israel, then the deal is fine. In fact, why have a deal?
continued, saying that capitulations by the West to the clerical establishment are in the opposite direction of
influx that will flow into the pockets of the regime must be subjected to strict supervision by the United Nations to
ensure that it is spent on the Iranian peoples essential needs, otherwise the regime will spend this money on its
policy of exporting terrorism and religious extremism to Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon.
Commission that brings together all the negotiating parties could obviously address such an issue of non-compliance. In this case,
Iran will likely to declare it made a mistake and say it will stop doing it. Sound
fine? Not really. Given Irans track record, it will likely cheat along the margins to
test the means of verification and see how it might be able to change the baseline
however,
and there needs to be a penalty for each such act of non-compliance and preferably not only by the US. I say this because
deterrence is going to be even more important as a result of this deal. Indeed, for me the greatest single problem with the
The agreement
requires Iran to dismantle none of its enrichment infrastructure and starting in year
15, it can have as large a nuclear program as it wants. The gap between threshold
and weapons status is small and will not take long to bridge. As such, deterrence is what will
agreement is that Iran is going to be left as a threshold nuclear state at the end of fifteen years.
matter. Iran must have no doubts that if we see it moving toward a weapon that would trigger the use of force. Declaring that is a
must even now. Proving that every transgression will produce a price will demonstrate that we mean what we say. If verification is
necessary because the agreement is not built on trust, so, too, is building the credibility of our deterrence because Iran will be a
threshold nuclear stateone that has deferred but not given up the option of being a nuclear weapon state.
No Cascading Prolif
Multiple technical and political barriers prevent cascade
proliferation
Esfandiary and Tabatabai 4/28 (Dina, a McArthur Fellow in the Centre for
Science and Security Studies at Kings College London, Ariane, a visiting assistant
professor in the Security Studies Program at the Georgetown University School of
Foreign Service and a columnist for The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Why an
Iran deal wont lead to nuclear proliferation, Washington Post, 4/28/2015,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/04/28/why-an-irandeal-wont-lead-to-nuclear-proliferation/)//duncan
some analysts
reiterated that a final deal would result in a proliferation cascade in the Middle East.
This widely held and long-standing assumption remains largely unchallenged. But a careful look at the
actual technical capability, political and security context, and intentions of
potential contenders confirms that much of this hype is baseless. Those who
When the P5+1 and Iran announced their framework agreement earlier this month,
invoke the proliferation cascade theory often confuse both the cause and the actual result. Would a nuclear
agreement with Iran or nuclear-armed Iran cause a cascade? Does the regional spread of civilian nuclear programs
civilian nuclear
programs are not a threat. They are permitted under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
count as a proliferation cascade, or is it restricted to the spread of the bomb? On their own,
Weapons (NPT). Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are pursuing or exploring
nuclear power to address growing energy demands needs that have been growing irrespective of Irans nuclear
for the UAE. But some states, such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, want to reserve the right to enrich. Riyadh went
Saudi Arabia,
Turkey, Egypt, Jordan and the UAE are all dependent on foreign suppliers and
expertise for their programs. They lack the human capacity for the programs. Foreign
involvement makes it difficult, though not impossible, to covertly develop a nuclear
weapon. This means that suppliers also need to do their due diligence and ensure that buyers use their
further and stated it wanted whatever Iran got out of the negotiations, including enrichment.
equipment for purely peaceful purposes. One explanation as to why Tehran went so far in developing its indigenous
nuclear technology, including enrichment, is that international suppliers werent as involved and reliable after the
1979 Islamic Revolution. Following the revolution, Irans original suppliers, the United States, France and Germany,
dumped the country, which then looked East. It went to Pakistan, including the illicit nuclear procurement network
led by Pakistans A.Q. Khan, Russia and China. But Irans government believed it could not rely on any of these
partners. Without a strong involvement in its program by foreign suppliers committed to nonproliferation, Iran was
able to pursue indigenous nuclear technology. This diminished the international communitys leverage on Tehran.
in 1988, when it learned that Riyadh purchased Chinese missiles and it threatened to block the sale of military
equipment.
fundamental problem is that were giving ground on what has been a principle of US
non proliferation policy for 70 years, which (views) the spread of enrichment and
reprocessing to any country, even our allies, as a problem," said Matthew Kroenig,
associate professor at Georgetown University. "What this Iran deal does is make an
exception, not just for any country, but for Iran, a country thats continually
cheating on its agreements. So in the wake of the deal, I think it becomes very hard
for us to go to our allies and say, we trust Tehran with this technology, but we dont
trust you.'" Brian Finaly, vice president of the Washington DC-based think tank
Stimson Center, added to Kroenig's troubling assessment. "As we understand how
the world is changing, it is certainly impacting how we manage the proliferation
threat, and I believe that getting out in front of this, thinking beyond the limited
ability of the state to control proliferation in the future, is going to be essential to
successful non-proliferation efforts," warned Finaly. He explained that non-state
actors such as multinational companies can play a role in preventing nuclear crises,
noting on the conflict between India and Pakistan in the 1980s . "A group of very
senior level executives from an array of companies got together and sent a very
clear message to the Indian Prime Minister: 'this crisis is bad for business and if we
decide to leave India, we will not return,'" Finlay said. That warning "had the
ultimate effect of, I think, contributing significantly to the easing of nuclear tensions
between the two countries, and it returned to semi-regular relations between the
two countries," he added. Regarding economic incentives, experts have warned that
the current sanctions regime against Iran has not been tough enough to have an
effect, as the Iranian GDP grew 3% in 2014. Just this Monday Iranian officials
announced that 13 tons of gold had been repatriated as part of sanctions relief,
bringing the total in unfrozen assets since the November 2013 interim deal was
signed to just under $12 billion.
Iran will have 24 days before it has to allow inspections at its sites, none of
which has been shut down or dismantled which will make cheating unbelievably
easy. And, while the president this morning declared that violations would make
sanctions snap back, the only way they will do so is after a U.N. commission
meets and agrees such violations have happened and then imposes them which
you know Russia will never allow. The president and the secretary of state are making large claims for
that
the deal that are not true; the same will be true of all of its signatories, who are seeing Nobel stars in their eyes.
This is an infamous day, and while those of us who see Irans nuclearization as the threshold threat for the rest
of the 21st century will not be silent and will not give up the fight against it, it is appropriate to take a moment to
despair that we the United States and the West have come to this.
Imprisoned American Pastor Saeed Behind, American Center for Law and Justice,
7/14/15, Jay Sekulow is Chief Counsel of the American Center for Law and Justice
(ACLJ), an accomplished Supreme Court advocate, expert on religious liberty, a
number 1 New York Times-bestselling author, respected broadcaster, an attorney
argued 12 cases - including several landmark cases, received his Ph.D. from Regent
University, with a dissertation on American Legal History, is an honors graduate of
Mercer Law School, where he served on the Mercer Law Review, and an honors
graduate of Mercer University, appointed a Visiting Fellow of Oxford University at
Harris Manchester College, serves as a member of the Summer Research Institute at
Oxford from 2013 to 2016, recently completed a course of study at Vanderbilt
Universitys Owen School of Management with certification in Executive Leadership
and Corporate Innovation, the author of numerous publications and legal articles
and immediately following graduation from law school, he served as a tax trial
attorney in the Office of Chief Counsel for the Internal Revenue Service.
http://aclj.org/persecuted-church/iran-deal-unconscionable-because-it-leavesimprisoned-american-pastor-saeed-behind, 7/15/15 AV)
The agreement reached between the United States and Iran is unconscionable
because it leaves Pastor Saeed, a U.S. citizen, behind imprisoned in Iran because
of his Christian faith. It is unconscionable that the Obama Administration would sign
a deal with Iran without securing the freedom of Pastor Saeed who has been
imprisoned for nearly three years simply because of his Christian faith. President Obama told the
Abedini family face-to-face that he considered the release of Pastor Saeed a top
priority. How could that be a top priority when a deal is reached and Pastor Saeed
is left behind? What happened today makes a bad deal even worse. We will now focus our
attention on convincing Congress to reject this deal. Naghmeh Abedini, the wife of American Pastor Saeed, is deeply disappointed
with todays outcome: I plead with Congress to ensure that my husband, an American citizen, is not left behind. With the
announcement of a deal and yet silence as to the fate of Saeed and the other Americans held hostage in Iran, their fate lies now in
the hands of Congress. I plead with each member of Congress to review the deal with our family at the forefront of their thoughts.
Congress holds the key to bringing my husband home, to returning the father to my children. My children have desperately missed
the loving embrace of their father for the last three years of their lives. They have grown up almost half of their lives without their
The State
Department is A.W.O.L. absent without leave nearly silent about the devastating
impact this deal has on the four wrongfully imprisoned Americans, including
Pastor Saeed, left behind to suffer in harsh Iranian prison conditions. Secretary of
State Kerrys brief mention of the American hostages almost appears to be an
afterthought. He stated: We continue to call on Iran to immediately release the detained U.S. citizens . . . . These Americans
father. Please help us ensure the remainder of their childhood includes both a mother and a father.
have remained in our thoughts throughout this negotiation. And we will continue to work for their safe and their swift return. And we
free Pastor Saeed, we have heard from more than one million people demanding his release. Now we have a new petition directed at
Congress. Please add your name today so we can tell your Members of Congress that their constituents are joining us in demanding
they reject the deal and bring Pastor Saeed and the other Americans home. We continue to call on Iran to immediately release the
detained U.S. citizens, Kerry said. These Americans have remained in our thoughts throughout this negotiation. And we will
continue to work for their safe and their swift return. And we urge Iran to bring our missing Americans home as well.