3 Emotions As Viewed by Psychoanalysis and Neuroscience: An Exercise in Consilience

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Emotions as Viewed by Psychoanalysis and

Neuroscience: An Exercise in Consilience
Jaak Panksepp
Department of Psychology, Bowling Green State University, 1001 East Wooster Street,
Bowling Green, OH 43403, e-mail:
Published online: 09 Jan 2014.
To cite this article: Jaak Panksepp (1999) Emotions as Viewed by Psychoanalysis and Neuroscience: An Exercise in
Consilience, Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal for Psychoanalysis and the Neurosciences, 1:1, 15-38, DOI:
10.1080/15294145.1999.10773241
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Emotions as Viewed by Psychoanalysis and

Neuroscience: An Exercise in Consilience
Downloaded by [Gazi University] at 06:06 18 August 2014
Jaak Panksepp (Bowling Green, Ohio)
Affective and cognitive neuroscientists are now in a

position to link concrete neural entities to various abstract psychological and psychoanalytic concepts. Of
course, we can anticipate that psychoanalytic theory
and terminologies may need to be modified and finetuned when placed in the crucible of neuroscience.
Likewise, functional neuroscience may become more
refined by being ground with the pestle of psychoanalytic thought. Unfortunately, like the proverbial patient
with a full array of defenses, practitioners of both disciplines may be reluctant to embrace change. The best
that can be hoped for at present is that ongoing debates
will promote positive interchange that leads to informative empirical inquiries. Clearly, psychoanalysis
needs to anchor its thinking in a manner that will promote the empirical evaluation of ideas, and neuroscience needs to take emotional dynamics and defenses
more seriously than it has in the past.
The polarity between traditional psychoanalytic
and neuroscientific views can be documented by a
simple Medline search requesting papers from 1966
to the present (June 5, 1998) that concurrently discuss
psychoanalytic (a total of 2478 citations) and brain
issues (a total of 240,567 citations). Such a search
yielded only 40 papers, and it is noteworthy that none
appeared in journals devoted primarily to neuroscience. Thus, psychoanalysis is beginning to seek a substantive connection to neuroscience (Solms, 1996;
Schore, 1997) but there has been little reciprocity.
Some of the causes for the lack of substantive
interchange are straightforward. Neuroscientists are
generally proud of possessing ears that are deaf to
Acknowledgment. This work was supported by The Memorial Foundation for Lost Children, Bowling Green, Ohio. I appreciate comments
from Ken Shemberg on an earlier draft of this manuscript.
Jaak Panksepp is Distinguished Research Professor of Psychobiology,
Emeritus, Department of Psychology, Bowling Green State University,
Ohio.
higher integrative issues, especially ones like' 'central

states" that can only be indirectly measured. On the
other hand, Freud, writing in 1895, intentionally chose
to distance his thought from brain matters when he
could not bring his alchemical "Project for a Scientific
Psychology" (1950) to a satisfactory conclusion.
When Freud was young and driven to relate mental
and neural processes, available knowledge about the
brain could sustain no credible fusion.
Now that a century has passed since Freud abandoned his premature aspirations for a coherent psychobiology, the time is ripe, perhaps for the first time,
to blend psychoanalytic and neural thought into a coherent synthesis (Bilder, 1998). To reemphasize the
obvious-in order to make scientific progress, psychoanalysis needs to anchor many of its concepts in brain
matters. It may also behoove neuroscience to begin
seriously entertaining the existence of those subtle
emotional processes, heretofore prodigal, that are absolutely essential for the construction of human and
animal minds. Mainstream neuroscience should certainly become conversant with the fact that the mammalian brain can generate a variety of affective
feelings which probably reflect long-term causes of
behavior rather than epiphenomenal flotsam, as all too
many behavioral neuroscientists are still prone to believe.
Throughout the twentieth century, psychoanalysis remained a bastion among the human sciences that
acknowledged the deeper emotional currents of the
human mind. In order to understand the brain, neuroscience must also become conversant with such realities. Affective processes are engraved deeply within
the evolutionarily provided structures and dynamics
of the mammalian brain. Psychoanalytic theory may
now help guide neuroscientific thinking concerning
various emotional dynamics that transpire within neural tissues. Conversely, neuroscience can provide the
16
facts which may allow psychoanalytic theory to link

up firmly with objective approaches, and thereby submit itself to the type of disciplined empirical inquiry
that is the hallmark of all true sciences. In order for
our concepts to have scientific substance, they must
be capable of being quantified (whether it be by direct
or indirect measures), and to specify systematic relationships to other variables than can also be quantified.
How well such hybridization can work remains an
open issue, but all who are interested in clarifying the
affective mysteries of human existence will need to
pay attention to how neuroscientific, psychoanalytic,
psychobiological, and sociobiological modes of
thought can intersect and evolve. As Freud sought to
do through his depth psychology, we still need to deal
credibly with the relatively invisible neurodynamic
underbelly of the mind. Obviously, there are many
subtle brain processes that help us maximize our fitness, and no single discipline has a comprehensive
view of the relevant matters. The places where all
relevant approaches can "conciliate" and work together (the domain I would call affective neuroscience)
should yield some of the most fascinating scientific
breakthroughs concerning brain organization in the
next century.
The preceding article provides fertile ground for
planting hybrid seeds. In their contribution, Solms and
Nersessian offer a synopsis of Freud's views on affective processes, providing a rich array of ideas and
questions for generating testable associations between
psychoanalytic views of emotions and emerging neuroscientific ones (e.g., MacLean, 1990; Damasio,
1994; LeDoux, 1996; Panksepp, 1998a). Their article
may be considered an attempt to fulfill the hope of
Freud's youthful "Project." Indeed, many of the spectacular new findings from modern neuroscience and
psychobiology can be interpreted in ways that are generally coherent with many of Freud's ideas. However,
all proposed relationships must be deemed provisional
until they are subjected to rigorous empirical evaluation. The critical question will remain: To what extent
can objective breakthroughs and fruitful theories
emerge from the blending of approaches? At present,
we can only hope that their intersections will be intellectually lively and scientifically productive.
The journey ahead is unlikely to be smooth, not
only because of the complexity of the underlying issues but also because so many biases surround Freudian theory. Just consider the recent claim by E. O.
Wilson (1998) that "Freud's conception of the unconscious, by focusing attention on hidden irrational processes of the brain, was a fundamental contribution to
Jaak Panksepp
culture. It became a wellspring of ideas flowing from

psychology into the humanities. But it is mostly
wrong. Freud's fatal error was his abiding reluctance
to test his own theories-to stand them up against
competing explanation-then revise them to accommodate controverting facts" (p. 74).
The failure to subject ideas to the acid test of
empirical evaluation remains the time-honored criticism of psychoanalytic views (Macmillan, 1997).
However, in making such criticisms, we should also
recognize that most of Freud's ideas, especially in the
area of emotions, remain to be evaluated. From that
perspective, it is nonsense for anyone to declare the
ideas wrong-they simply have not been adequately
tested. In fact, it is only with the advent of modern
neuroscience, with its many brain scanning and psychopharmaceutical tools, that most of the ideas can
be effectively evaluated. We can now estimate how
unconscious processes operate within brain emotional
systems (Morris, Ohman, & Dolan, 1998). Without
the' ability to directly manipulate and measure neural
activities, one could never provide causal evidence for
the deep affective issues that Freud was most eager to
clarify. For instance, the basic nature of "id energies"
(to coin a new catch-phrase) are incapable of being
evaluated without concrete neuroscientific hypotheses.
By linking Freud's ideas to neural systems (e.g.,
Shore, 1994), there are credible empirical ways to
proceed.
We should also remember that most of the criticism of Freudian perspectives is within the realm of
therapeutic practice. Thus, we must clearly distinguish
between Freud's theoretical ideas concerning the
foundations of psychology and his advancement of a
specific type of psychotherapy. Each set of ideas needs
to be taken on its own merits, and the failure of psychoanalysis to alleviate certain psychiatric symptoms
(e.g., those associated with schizophrenic and autistic
disorders) says little about the credibility of psychoanalytic theory in our attempt to understand human emotionality.
Solms and Nersessian have now gathered together Freud's views on emotions from widely scattered sources, and I find much merit in those ideas.
Still, it is a daunting task to juxtapose Freud's wideranging hypotheses, often metaphorically expressed,
against the accumulating peppercorns of evidence
from the basic and clinical neurosciences. Even though
neuroscience has little taste for incorporating such
complex functional domains into its conceptual
schemes, the time is ripe for doing so (Leak and Christopher, 1982; Schore, 1997; Bilder, 1998). For exam-
Emotions: Psychoanalytic and Neuroscientific Views

pIe, a striking demonstration of how effectively
psychological and neuropathological data can be
joined to highlight the nature of dreams has recently
been provided by Solms (1997). Comparable levels
of neuropsychological insight are being achieved for
affective processes (Damasio, 1994). In my commentary I will largely focus on how the basic neuroscience
issues may promote such analyses, and I will seek
potential conceptual connections where empirical
ones do not yet exist.
I will organize my commentary in parallel with
the organizational structure of the target article-four
major themes followed by a conclusion. To facilitate
reading, I use text heads similar to those in the target
article, modified to highlight the points of view I wish
to share. Since some of the most relevant issues appear
at several points in the target article, there will also
be some recursions in my commentary, which may
not be inappropriate when we discuss recursive, hierarchically self-organizing systems like the brain
(Kelso, 1995), where no accepted scientific vocabulary
yet exists for many of its "modular" functions. I will
not provide extensive referencing for the basic neuroscience issues which are well covered in many other
sources, including my recent effort in clarifying the
neuroscience of emotions (Panksepp, 1998a).
A General Orientation to Modern Emotion

Theory: Prevailing Premises and Biases
Before focusing on Freud's views, let me make a few
general remarks about traditional theorizing in the
psychological sciences. Modern emotion theories generally attempt to be safely catholic-eovering all essential attributes of emotionality (with lots of inclusive
information-flow block-diagrams), without attempting
to highlight essential ingredients above others. Often
the one factor that is missing, or deemed of secondary
importance, is the internal feeling state of the emotions. While this attribute is commonly believed to be
the essential ingredient by nonspecialists (Figure 1), a
position with which I agree, it is also the most elusive
attribute when one tries to approach emotional matters
objectively. However, I believe it can be probed credibly with neuroscientific approaches by (1) seeking essential brain processes that synchronize the visceral
and somatic motor expressions of emotions; which (2)
are also key ingredients in the cognitive and memorial
aspects of emotions; and (3) combining these findings
experimentally with a study of the subjective reports
of humans.
17
PRIORITIZATION OF VARIABLES
IN THE STUDY OF EMOTIONS
5r---------------------.
en
z
CJ
i=
c(
::E 2
1 FEELINGS
COGN.
AUTON.
FACIAL
VOCAL
EMOTIONAL ATTRIBUTES
Figure 1. Average ( SEM) opinions of 40 psychology graduate and undergraduate students requested to prioritize the following five major attributes of emotions from least important (rating of 1) to most important
(rating of 5). The options were listed in the following order: Facial Expressions, Vocal Expressions, Feeling States, Cognitive Changes and Autonomic Changes, with an open space for any other options, which was never
used. Although Feeling States had the highest overall rating, Cognitive and
Autonomic Changes were not far behind. However, these results are not
representative for the population at large. When 10 music majors were
asked the same questions, the ratings were more clearly skewed for Feeling
State (mean 4.6) compared to Cognitive Changes (mean 2.9) (p<.01). In
contrast, the response generated by 10 philosophy students was essentially
just the opposite (p< .05) To evaluate the lower strataes of society, of 35
drivers incarcerated for drinking and driving, 30 listed Feeling State as
the most important attribute of emotions. In sum, most people probably
believe that Feeling States are the most important attributes of emotions,
but this opinion is not necessarily shared by highly cognitivized individuals
and/or those who have been exposed to the intellectual biases that are
traditional in psychology.
My personal assumptions, harmonious with

Freud's, are as follows: I believe that biological values
and the affective neural processes via which they are
instantiated penetrate all of the cognitive structures of
the mammalian brain-mind. Although certain sensory-perceptual processes may be free of affect, all of
the higher association areas of the brain, at least as
they operate in the natural world, are permeated by
the sustaining and guiding effects of biological values.
This is not to say that the conditioning of emotional
responses cannot proceed without any mediation by
consciously perceived affect; they certainly can (LeDoux, 1996; Morris et aI., 1998). However, most of
the emotional behavior we see in the world is probably
modulated by the background effects of low-level
emotions (i.e., moods), and it is within these longerterm influences that affective experience may be critical. Thus, I believe that in early childhood there is no
sustained line of thought without a sustained line of
affect, and if we really want to understand how people
and animals behave in the long run, we must under-
18
stand their emotional feelings. It is only in adulthood,

when long-term behavior patterns and habits of thinking and defenses have been established, that the obvious linkages between affect and behavior diminish. In
fact the affective regulators may have simply descended to preconscious levels of neural processing,
still exerting fundamental controls over mind and behavior while leaving the propositional attitude functions (i.e., appraisals) that arise from our higher
abilities quite confused about the types of psychological functions that actually control our behaviors (Griffiths, 1997).
I personally interpret the available evidence,
culled from divergent empirical studies (for a thorough
review, see Panksepp, 1998a), as being consistent with
the conclusion that a variety of executive systems for
distinct emotional processes do exist within the mammalian brain. Of course, the systems are not simple
and modular, but widely ramifying, interacting with
many other specific and nonspecific processes of the
brain. However, contrary to much of current theorizing, I do not think all of these interactive processes
are of equal importance in our quest to understand
emotions. To put it in Freudian terms, I believe the
key issue in emotion research is the characterization
of the instinctual id energies or in my preferred terminology, affect generating "emotional command systems" that instigate and orchestrate the diverse
aspects of emotionality within the brain.
Freud conceptualized such id processes not only
as the foundation of emotions and personality, but also
as essential substrates for the maturation of ego functions. Unfortunately, Freud had no credible way to
scientifically taxonomize the various id functions of
the brain, and they remained the most ambiguous of
the many psychological processes that he discussed.
Affective neuroscience has now provided abundant
evidence for the types of basic id functions that are
contained in the mammalian brain, ranging from basic
SEEKING systems, through the RAGE, FEAR,
PANIC, LUST, and CARE systems, to those that elaborate PLAY (Panksepp, 1998a). If it were willing, cognitive neuroscience could now highlight the neural
nature of some of the ego defenses that emerge when
unbridled id functions come under higher neural controls, partially via associative learning and partially
via the evolution of more subtle emotion-regulating
neuropsychological processes such as the various defenses conceptualized by Freud. Evolutionary psychology is just barely beginning to conceptualize how
powerfully such sociobiological strategies reflect the
inclusive-fitness pressures that permeate our higher
Jaak Panksepp
cerebral rationalizations, but it has yet to deal effectively with the basic biological nature of affective
feelings.
By trying to cover all aspects, while disregarding
the most troublesome and essential attributes of emotions (i.e., the nature of subjective states), modern psychological theories of emotions often do not provide
the necessary analytic simplifications that can yield
robust empirical evaluations of key issues. Although
Freud's view was also quite broad, encompassing most
of the now well-accepted attributes of emotions, he
did take a harder stance on the primacy of emotional
feelings. I respect the fact that he placed affect-the
pleasure-unpleasure principle-at the center of his
scheme. This can still be deemed courageously controversial, but in my estimation, it is the correct point of
view. Without such functions, we cannot even make
computers truly intelligent (Clark, 1997), and humans
seem to lose a lot of their common sense when emotional systems are damaged (Damasio, 1994; Picard,
1997). Without emotions we would probably be little
more than the zombies of philosophical renown (Harnad, 1994).
Of course, id functions need to be subdivided and
taxonomized more extensively than Freud was able to
do. Such deep functional issues must be clarified
through conjoint psychological and brain research,
and it should be more widely recognized that animal
work is absolutely essential to resolve the fine details
of the underlying systems with adequate clarity. Because of the lack of any credible methodology or database, Freud had remarkably little to say about the deep
nature of the id-based foundation for his system of
thought. He devoted his efforts to discussing the higher
psychological processes-how ego and superego functions are molded through experience. My own work
for the past quarter of a century has been based on the
supposition that it will be through the neuroanatomical
and neurochemical clarification of the various id energies of the mammalian brain that our understanding
of the fundamental nature of the basic forms of human
emotional experience and behavioral control must be
based. I work from the premise that the id energies
evolved long ago and remain homologous in all of our
close evolutionary relatives. This is not a view shared
by many of my colleagues, especially when it comes
to the importance of internal feeling, which cannot be
directly observed, in the governance of animal behavior.
Even though emotional systems, as all brain systems, have changed during speciation as a result of
selective pressures, it is reasonable to assume that di-

vergence has been most extreme among the more recent layers of brain evolution (i.e., the higher
regulatory elements), while remaining most similar at
the more ancient levels. Indeed, some of our higher
processes, such as language, may often tend to homogenize a variety of distinct subcortical emotional entities into broader valence categories such as positive
and negative affective arousal which can confuse basic
brain issues as readily as clarify them. Those concepts,
like "weather" and "motivation," are little more than
class identifiers for a host of distinct subprocesses that
need to be empirically specified. For some reason,
these broad categories of approach and avoidance,
positive and negative affect (reminiscent of Freud's
global pleasure-unpleasure dimension), are accepted
more readily than narrower categories, perhaps because they appear to simplify matters, when, in fact,
they may be obfuscating our pursuit of the basic systems that actually exist in the brain. Most humans have
little difficulty distinguishing more than a dozen basic
emotional feelings, and I believe most of them could
be clarified by conjoint human and animal brain research (Panksepp, 1998a).
Of course, the study of feeling states remains
among the most troublesome issues in animal research.
Animals can provide no verbal reports of their internal
feelings, and only general measures of approach and
avoidance are presently reasonably well accepted as
indicators of valence. The use of more indirect indices,
namely the quantification of various correlated spontaneous behavioral and autonomic changes is not generally accepted by the neuroscientific community as
compelling evidence for the estimation of internal
states. However, to differentiate the distinct processes
that fall under the broad categories of approach and
avoidance, we currently have few alternatives but to
assume that various animal behaviors (perhaps a premier measure being their affective vocalizations and
other straightforward instinctual responses) may be
used to index the presence of various affective processes in their brains (Panksepp, 1998a). Obviously, in
using such measures to base our theoretical inferences,
every interpretative challenge needs to be experimentally contrasted and evaluated. Fortunately, triangulation between mammalian brain research, the study of
animal behavior, and the systematic analysis of human
subjective experience is a sufficiently robust strategy
to sustain a credible level of scientific progress (Panksepp, 1998a). Once this level of analysis has been satisfactorily consummated, we may be in a position to
monitor affective processes more directly from brain
activities (Panksepp, in press).
19
Accordingly, the issue of affective experience in
other animals is gradually becoming a scientifically
workable problem. Now that we are recognizing the
deep homologies that exist in the (1) anatomical structure; (2) neurophysiological dynamics; and (3) neurochemical coding of brain processes across all
mammalian species, we have the opportunity to validate many of the findings and conclusions derived
from animal behavior and brain research with subjective reports derived from human research. Although,
informative correspondences can be achieved at all
those levels of analysis, the most useful ones are
bound to emerge from a study of the neurochemical
coding of behavior. Young Dr. Freud realized this in
the 1890s when he discussed the pleasure and unpleasure of "sexual release" in his "Project," and speculated that' 'a suspicion forces itself on us that in both
instances the endogenous stimuli consist of chemical
products, of which there may be a considerable number" (Freud, 1950, p. 321). Also, as Solms and Nersessian note in their sixth footnote, the elderly Freud
still held out the hope that: "The future may teach us
to exercise a direct influence, by means of particular
chemical substances, on the amounts of energy and
their distribution in the mental apparatus" (1940, p.
182). And he followed that with a statement which
remains as true now as it was then: "It may be that
there are still undreamt-of-possibilities of therapy" --especially since the day is approaching when we
will be able to pharmacologically modulate specific
neuropeptide-based emotional systems of the brain.
Even with the currently splendid, but still quite limited, stockpile of accepted pharmacological tools for
human research-from amphetamines to Viagra, so to
speak-we can initiate many experimental inquiries
that may highlight the causal underpinnings of id energies in humans. Credible predictions can be derived
from the many studies that have already been done in
other species.
Although considerably less useful for deriving
causal connections, neurophysiological and neuroanatomical correspondences also help highlight affective
homologies within human and animal brains. Localized brain stimulation has yielded remarkable correspondences (Panksepp, 1985), and more recently,
noninvasive stimulation of the cortical surfaces with
rapid transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS)
(George, Kettner, Kimbrell, Steedman, and Post,
1996) is providing a powerful way to analyze the role
of higher cerebral domains. Neuroanatomical correlates of emotional processing can now be achieved
with various modern modes of brain imaging (George
20
et aI., 1996; Lane, Reiman, Bradley, Lang, Ahern, Davidson, and Schwartz, 1997).
Unfortunately, many of these correlative techniques, which detect changes of activity in cerebral
canopies more readily than subcortical trunk lines,
tend to promote and reinforce corticocentric views of
emotional systems. This has led to a neglect, during
the current era, of the many subcortical systems that
are absolutely essential for the basic emotions to be
generated within the brain. In fact, it remains possible
that cortical inhibition of lower processes actually suppresses the conscious experience of affect in humans,
leading to the internalization or "binding" of emotional energies as Freud discussed extensively. In any
event, most of Freud's theorizing was also devoted to
the higher cognitive levels where the basic instinctual
energies are dealt with by various emotion-regulatory
mechanisms including repression, projection, reaction
formation, and so on (issues that are almost impossible to address in animal research except to the extent
that different memory processes can be shown to govern emotional output). My personal view is that the
shared subcortical heritage, from which the various id
energies emerge across mammalian species, provides
an essential and solid foundation for understanding
the nature of affective processes as well as higher emotion-regulating functions of the brain. Unfortunately,
these central state controls can only be monitored, at
present, with indirect behavioral measures.
Although Freud did not take any clear positions
on the brain organization of emotionality, I find it
intriguing how closely so many of his ideas, as outlined by Solms and Nersessian, mesh with my own.
Most importantly, in putting affect at the heart of his
analysis, he recognized that the assignment of value
to behavioral and higher psychological processes was
the key function of emotions. Freud did not equivocate
on the issue that still plagues most neuroscientists interested in the problem of emotions. Freud recognized
that affect registers the importance of salient world
events, and thereby, permeates the higher conscious
functions of the brain-mind. He also viewed affect as
arising from fundamental biological mechanisms (presumably brain circuits), which guide instinctual action
tendencies. The affect programs of the brain that have
now been revealed are probably the immediate infrastructures of such processes (Panksepp, 1998a). At the
heart of these systems there are a variety of chemical
codes (largely neuropeptidergic) that may eventually
permit powerful new modes of psychiatric intervention, and new ways to evaluate how feelings are con-
Jaak Panksepp
structed in the human brain. These findings can now
enrich psychoanalytic thought.
Affect Is an Internally Generated

Neurodynamic Process, Probably Closely
Related to Subcortical Emotional Circuits
Freud's insights on the nature of affect were prescient.
The notion that various types of affect are intrinsic
value-coding functions of the nervous systems is, in
my estimation, a view that needs to be incorporated
into modern neuroscience, both computational and biologic, as well as into the emerging field of consciousness studies. So far, with a few exceptions, this
essential dimension is lacking in both fields. Freud
distinguished between the qualia emerging from exteroceptive modalities, and the affects which emerge
much more from intrinsic internal functions of the nervous system. I prefer to call these affective brain functions, emotional or evolutionary qualia (equalia, for
short). It seems likely that the neural process "that
affect is a perception of' has to be fundamentally unconscious (during its early evolutionary stages), and
that it became preconscious and then conscious as certain types of additional neural systems evolved. Unless
one subscribes to the minority view that some intrinsic
aspect of matter generates consciousness (e.g., emergent processes arising from the "quantum sea"), we
must accept that a great deal of the neural infrastructure for emotionality operates automatically, with few
conscious causes, but always, in mammals at least,
with the potential for abundant effects on consciousness. Affective states, arising from a variety of emotional and motivational processes, may constitute the
"ground" in the figure-ground relationships that constitute ordinary conscious experiences. Even though
our conscious mind is not prepared to focus on the
ground processes as readily as on the figurative contents of mind (indeed it has great difficulty remembering emotional intensity, even though it easily
remembers the events associated with emotional episodes), those affective states may be absolutely essential for any type of consciousness to have emerged in
brain evolution.
In the mammalian brain, all higher forms of consciousness may still be grounded on the most primitive
forms of consciousness, which I assume were affective in nature. As already mentioned, without the
ground of affective experience, I suspect that individuals would present themselves as the proverbial "zombies" of philosophical discourse. This may also be the

main reason it has been so difficult to build computers
that behave as intelligent organisms (Clark, 1997; Picard, 1997). If this is so, rational thought may only
be a relatively fragile tip on the iceberg of affective
experience. In line with this metaphor, we should also
assume, as did Freud, that most of the primitive
sources of mind lie submerged below conscious appearances. However, we should also keep open the
possibility that there exist several distinct areas of consciousness in the brain that normally communicate
poorly with each other (and not just of the right and
left hemispheric variety), and that when one is online, the others are not.
The neural substrate that permitted the emergence of affective feelings in brain evolution may, in
agreement with basic psychoanalytic theory, provide
the primitive foundation for ego development.
Whether these ego functions are quite high or low in
the neuroaxis, or as is most likely, widely distributed,
may eventually be capable of being empirically evaluated. So far there have been regrettably few explicit
proposals as to how basic ego functions within the
brain should be conceptualized, probably because they
remain to be generally accepted as neurodynamic realities worthy of analysis. However, we can now envision the ego to sprout from rather primitive areas of
the brain where basic emotional systems interact with
basic neural representations of the body (Panksepp,
1998a). This is not to deny that in neural evolution,
as in the epigenetic growth of each human brain-mind,
ego maturation is not based on additional vast and
luxurious neural and psychological growths within the
brain (for recent reviews, see Mascolo and Griffin
[1998]).
My own take on this subtle matter is that at low
levels of the neuroaxis brain evolution established a
neurosymbolic "virtual body" which represents the
organism as a coherent entity. I assume that this neural
process was initially the key actor, as opposed to the
key observer, within the Cartesian Theater (Panksepp,
1998b). Affective feelings may be instantiated in the
brain by emotional operating systems interacting with
the neurosymbolic representation of such a "virtual
body." To facilitate communication, I have chosen to
designate such an entity as the SELF (a simple egotype life form), and this process may correspond to
the most primitive aspect of Freud's ego structure. I
have suggested that this hypothetical entity is
grounded within centromedial areas of the brain
stem-areas such as the periaqueductal gray (PAG)
and surrounding collicular and tegmental zones-but
its influence broadcasts widely in the brain through
21
many direct and indirect influences such as the strong
two-way connections with frontal executive areas of
the brain and widespread influences on sensory cortices through the extended reticular and thalamic activating systems (ERTAS) conceptualized by Newman
and Baars (1993). I believe that various emotional systems create affective experiences by interacting with
such an extended ego structure. The resting level of
reverberation within this system is an epicenter (homeostatic settling point) upon which the various basic
pleasures and unpleasures of life may be predicated.
Because of the centrality of such a value coding
system for everything an animal does, I disagree with
the widespread assumption among behavioral neuroscientists that feelings may be causally inefficacious
epiphenomena within the human brain. Even though
unconscious processes are obviously much vaster in
the brain than conscious ones, the denial of affective
consciousness in animals is certainly a dubious and
potentially nefarious point of view. It will not serve
our neuroscience well, in the long run, to make wrongheaded choices about such matters. Such points of
view compromise the ability of neuroscience to establish better relations with the social sciences and humanities, as well as the everyday society in which our
work is embedded. In any event, I believe that the
neural grounding of the virtual body of the SELF is
such that it can interrelate external stimuli (simple
perceptions) and internal values (emotional states)
with a coherent and stable motor representation of the
body (a basic action system). In this scheme, feelings
may ultimately reflect the various types of action
readiness that permeate the extended neurodynamics
of the SELF. In other words, the distinct, primal feeling states may simply reflect the natural types of neurodynamics (resonances) that can exist within the
animate core of our being.
The anatomy of the underlying neural structures
are congruent with the view that the centromedial
brain stem contains essential ingredients for organismic coherence and action readiness (Figure 2). (1) The
PAG contains a massive convergence of many distinct
emotional systems which are strongly connected to
spinal sensory and motor systems. (2) The overlying
colliculi contain a massive convergence of most of the
major external sensory systems. (3) Nestled between
them there exist motor maps that can yield coherent
bodily movements, especially of the orienting and simple rhythmic locomotor varieties. I assume that this
primal SELF anchors organisms as coherent, feeling
creatures with a basic form of self-identity, but also,
the widespread neural connections of the primitive
Jaak Panksepp
22
A //
/
..-' ..-' ---
CINGULA TE
"" \
"',SC
\....
BASAL FOREBRAIN
'\--I
'\
TEMPORAl. l.OBE
AMYGDALA
"
CONVERGENCE OF SOMATIC
INFORMATION IN THE
SUPERIOR COLLICULUS
PANIC
FEAR
Figure 2. Cartoon representation of the general spheres of influence for

certain major emotional processes in the human forebrain (A) and the
convergence of these kinds of information in the periaqueductal gray
(PAG) and surrounding centromedial areas of the mesencephalon (B)
where an integrated neural system for the SELF is proposed to arise. These
figures are adapted, with permission, from Panksepp (1998a), courtesy of
Oxford University Press.
SELF, especially directed toward frontal cortical areas, may provide various forms of affective arousal
and coherence throughout the neuroaxis. Also, as indicated, it has strong connections to the ERTAS which
has been postulated to be the staging ground for a
generalized work-station of sensory consciousness
(Baars, 1996; Newman, 1997), whereby perceptions
can become imbued with affect. With such an extended neural entity, it is easy to imagine how emotional and motivational values could percolate
throughout the neuroaxis, and how it may be the foundation for higher forms of consciousness, and its various satisfactions and discontents. All that is required is
strong modulation of ascending ERTAS components
(including cholinergic and catecholaminergic) from
the PAG/SELF system, and such neural connections
have been demonstrated. The wide neural extents of
these systems permit abundant types of emotional expression-from passionate addictions and fixations to
repressions and rationalizations-to be constructed
from raw feelings. In this view, the essence of affective
feelings arises from various basic emotional operating
systems interacting with the extended SELF networks,

while higher associative/memory processes extend
and modify these special forms of action readiness
with cognitive contents. Such a view is compatible, at
least in general principle, with Freudian thought.
Although affective feelings may reflect the neurodynamics of such a system in action, a great deal of
detailed neuroscientific work needs to be done before
we shall have definitive evidence for such assertions.
In any case, we now have abundant evidence for more
distinct emotional systems in the brain than those that
simply subserve positive and negative valence, or
pleasure and unpleasure. As already mentioned, those
broad distinctions (which probably reflect the way our
higher brain systems categorize affective events) may
hide a vast number of affective types that need to be
specified and studied. At present, only animal brain
research in conjunction with reports of human affective experience has the resolution to distinguish basic from derivative processes.
Thus, while for Freud a paradigmatic example of
affect was anxiety, which came in three basic variants-neurotic, moral, and reality anxieties-it is
highly unlikely that they all arise from distinct emotional command systems within the lower reaches of
the brain. As Freud recognized, they emerge from various higher intrapsychic/intrabrain interactions. To a
large extent they may emerge from the conflicts and
frustrations of thwarted id energies that led to the internalization of emotions and ego development within
the Freudian scheme of things.
However, existing evidence does suggest that
there are several distinct primary process (or reality)
forms of anxiety within the brain. One massive system
runs from the central amygdala to the PAG (Panksepp,
1990a; Panksepp and Bekkedal, 1997a; Rosen and
Schulkin, 1998). Another is a distinct separation-distress system, coursing from cingulate and preoptic/
ventral septal regions through the dorsomedial thalamus to the PAG, which governs bonding processes
throughout youth, and is probably a key ingredient in
establishing a secure base that permits the growth of
psychological functions such as adaptive and maladaptive social attachments (Panksepp, Siviy, and
Normansell, 1985). The probability that early arousal
of such an emotional system can promote future depressions seems likely (for review see Harkness and
Tucker, in press; Panksepp, Yates, Ikemoto, and Nelson, 1991).
As we come to the other essential questions raised
by Solms and Nersessian, neuroscience can only provide some best guesses. In the murky world of the

preconscious, there is abundant room for alternative
interpretations, and it is not possible to make any firm
claims about how neuroscience knowledge relates to
Freudian inferences. We can produce various forms
of approach and escape/avoidance using brain stimulation applied to very specific transdiencephalic circuits that course bidirectionally between the PAG and
a variety of higher limbic areas (especially the amygdala, cingulate, frontal and insular areas). However,
once again, approach does not simply mean "pleasure" and avoidance does not simply mean "unpleasure." There are many distinct bads and goods within
the brain, as indicated by the distinct type of coordinated emotional behavior patterns that can be evoked.
For instance, the most vigorous form of self-stimulation obtained from the medial forebrain bundle (MFB)
corridor that arises from the ventral tegmental area
(VTA) to the ventral striatum, septum, and several
frontal cortical areas, seems to generate a behavioral
state of anticipatory eagerness rather than a simple
and unitary sensation of positive affect (Panksepp,
1981a; Depue and Collins, 1999). I have called this a
SEEKING system (Panksepp, 1998b) since it is a general purpose neural mechanism that can serve a large
variety of distinct motivational urges (drives?). Others
have called such neural substrates the basic "wanting" system of the brain (Berridge, in press), which
is also a good label. Affectively, this system probably
mediates feelings of an obsessively energized sense of
desire and power rather than any simple pleasurable
sensation that we normally experience when we fulfill
our needs.
On the other hand, stimulation of other areas such
as the medial septal nuclei, can provoke pleasurable
feelings (much more akin to those seen during consummatory activities), but these brain sites are off the
beaten track from the major MFB highway where the
most vigorous forms of self-stimulation are obtained.
Likewise, there are many distinct forms of aversion
in the brain, and the "unpleasure" principle needs to
discriminate various forms of fear, rage, separationdistress, and pain. More work needs to be done, especially with electrical and chemical brain stimulation
in conjunction with place preference and avoidance
paradigms, before we can be confident exactly which
brain areas mediate which affective qualities. In any
event, I believe the basic emotional affects may be
more closely linked to basic instinctual action readiness systems (Panksepp, 1998a) while the motivational affects are more closely linked to sensory
systems (Berridge, in press; Solms, 1996). But ultimately, both types of affect are mediated by intrinsic,
23
unlearned sensorimotor integrative abilities of ancient,
subcortical regions of the brain that can establish various types of neurodynamic feeling states within the
brain.
We can be certain that there is much more affective information encapsulated in the brain (via extended, "modular" circuits) than could have been
anticipated when Freud was pursuing his synthesis.
Simply consider the fact that there are ludic circuits
in the mammalian brain which generate joyous social
engagement (i.e., play and laughter). Freud barely anticipated such id/ego functions in his Jokes and Their
Relation to the Unconscious (1905). At present, the
infrastructure of the PLAY system includes the reticular nuclei of the posterior thalamus and centromedial
brain stem. Indeed, ludic urges may reflect one of the
earliest coherent manifestations of ego functions that
emerged from the neural evolution of the primitive
SELF. This is suggested by the dramatically assertive
way in which organisms spontaneously throw themselves into playful activities when such brain systems
are active (Panksepp, 1993). How these systems control psychological and neural maturation should be an
interesting chapter in brain research (Panksepp,
1998b).
From my vantage, Freud did not adequately recognize the existence of emotional systems devoted to
distinct social processes. Although he gave abundant
attention to sexuality, perhaps rather too creatively,
he failed to acknowledge the probable existence of
basic instinctual systems for maternal devotion (tenderness), social attachment (lovingness), separation
distress (sadness), and playfulness (joyfulness), all of
which are heavily represented in midline thalamic and
limbic cortices (frontal, anterior cingulate, and insular
areas) (Panksepp, 1998a). Of course, later generations
of psychoanalytic thought developed some of these
themes under the rubric of "object relations," but
much of this was discussed in the context of derivative
rather than basic emotional processes. We can now
hypothesize that it is through the auspices of the various basic social-emotional systems that such psychodynamics emerge. Indeed, the types of self-serving
cognitive patterns and deceptive tendencies promoted
by exigencies of reproductive success are vaster than
anyone could have imagined in Freud's day (Zahavi
and Zahavi, 1997). How higher social emotions (presumably superego functions), such as envy, guilt, jealousy, and shame emerge from these systems will be a
fascinating chapter of neuropsychology, that has received some attention from psychoanalytically oriented investigators (Lewis, 1988). The refinement of
24
such higher social emotions may proceed through

"prepared" forms of learning that emerge from the
neurodynamics of the more basic emotional tendencies
reverberating through evolutionarily prepared channels of the extended SELF.
Likewise, social dominance and submission arise
from learning processes attached to these basic systems, and a deeper understanding of the social dimensions may provide some important insights as to why
psychoanalysis works well in the treatment of some
"neurotic" disorders. One may view the classic form
of psychoanalytic therapy to reflect, and perhaps operate through, the establishment of dominance-submission relationships. A consistent observation from
animal behavior is that submissive animals commonly
exhibit more social solicitation (resembling behavioral
free association) while dominant animals exhibit less
friendly behaviors and typically only respond if actively solicited. This type of dominant-passive role is
all too commonly assumed by psychoanalysts. Sometimes, therapy ends rapidly when this asymmetrical
relationship, typically characterized by a lack of reciprocity, becomes psychologically intolerable to the client. On the other hand, therapy comes to a more
satisfactory conclusion when the initially submissive
client, working through negative emotional energies,
emerges with a more well-individuated, dominant and/
or accepting attitude toward life.
We can be certain that the brain areas that generate all of these affective responses are anatomically
distinct from the thalamocortical systems that mediate
the basic qualia arising from exteroceptive sensations.
This is not to say these systems do not functionally
interact at many places in the brain, allowing values
to permeate perceptions as external stimuli gain access
to internal value systems to help establish more sophisticated learned behavior patterns. These interactions open the door to various phobias, and other
defenses and consequent neurotic behaviors. The acquired linkages have been most thoroughly analyzed
in the amygdala (LeDoux, 1996), but we can anticipate
that there will be many brain areas where the learning
of anticipatory defensive strategies can transpire for
this as well as other basic emotional systems. For instance, a great deal of social learning and emotional
regulation transpires within frontal cortical and anterior cingulate areas of the brain, especially for frustrations and social losses (Devinsky, Morrell, and Vogt,
1995; Drevets, Price, Simpson, Todd, Rich, Vannier,
and Raichle, 1997), and it has been gratifying to see
documentation that psychotherapies can ameliorate
Jaak Panksepp
the overarousal of these brain areas (Schwartz, Stoessel, Baxter, Martin, and Phelps, 1996).
It will be most interesting to conceptualize how
the more subtle defenses may be constructed in the
brain. They probably are not simply the straightforward associative processes that have been the stock in
trade for behaviorists, but may include various forms
of internally mediated implicit learning, including
condensations, displacements, projections, and transferences. For instance, as Freud also explicitly emphasized, excessive early experiences with certain
negative emotional states may promote different routes
of self-organization within the hierarchical processes
that control behavior (Mascolo and Griffin, 1998).
There is little relevant research, except for the fact that
certain experiences can sensitize emotional responses
(Rosen and Schulkin, 1998), perhaps by promoting
the ability of higher functions to trigger subcortical
emotional systems, a process that has been conceptualized as an increase in "limbic permeability" (Adamec, 1991, 1993). From this perspective, the
supposition that many psychiatric ailments may reflect
imbalances within and among the activities of the basic emotional systems, deserves more attention (Panksepp, 1988). In any event, the aim of therapy should
be to establish more harmonious emotional resonances
within the primitive neural infrastructures, and it now
seems that psychopharmaceuticals are most efficacious in achieving such results. However, systematic
evaluation of the long-term benefits of nontraditional
approaches ranging from rTMS to music and other
somatic therapies need to be considered by those who
wish to entrain beneficial brain rhythms and thereby
indirectly change behavioral patterns by inducing positive mood states. It would be most interesting to determine how affective id energies might be recruited for
therapeutic change when free-association therapies are
combined with such modalities. In general, psychoanalytic approaches need to develop stronger relations to
all of the somatic approaches that are known to modify
moods (Thayer, 1989; Parkinson, Tottersdell, Briner,
and Reynolds, 1996).
A key empirical issue at the present time is the
clarification of the manner in which the various affective states are represented within the brain. Most
likely the answer is "widely," but one of the least
likely places is the neocortex. This is not to say that
cortical processing is not massively affected by emotions. To document this, one need only analyze how
heavily the cortex is aroused during emotional episodes using techniques ranging from EEG to cFos expression. If you simply allow animals to play or force
25

them to swim for their lives, the whole cortical mantle
is aroused as indicated by the widespread expression
of cFos throughout the cerebral cortex (Campeau,
Falls, Cullinan, Helmreich, Davis, and Watson, 1997;
Kollack-Walker, Watson, and Akil, 1997; Burgdorf
and Panksepp, 1998). Unfortunately the meaning of
such effects remains ambiguous, and they are not
prognostic, in any simple way, of where the basic affective feelings are elaborated in the brain.
Since we are now in a corticocentric era of emotion research, most investigators probably still tend to
favor frontal lobe or higher limbic (anterior cingulate,
frontal, insular, and amygdalar) localizations for the
neural processing of affect, and there should be little
doubt that these brain areas do help regulate affective
processes. Indeed, we can obtain various correlations
between affect and higher cortical activities (George
et aI., 1996; Lane et aI., 1997; Panksepp and Bekkedal,
1997b; Paradiso, Robinson, Andreasen, Downhill, and
Davidson, 1997), but it should require a great deal
more evidence to convince us that those correlates
reflect the essential neurodynamics of the affective
states themselves. They may be more influential in
the complex regulations of emotions and the abundant
emotion--cognition interactions. A few, like myself,
favor the view that the extensively ramifying subcortical command circuits that generate and synchronize
various emotional behaviors and accompanying bodily
changes are essential for generating affective feelings,
and there is abundant evidence for such conclusions
(Panksepp, 1998a). Let me just mention one of the
most recent nuggets: Opiates produce more rewarding
effects in areas such as the PAG and ventral tegmental
area than in higher areas such as the amygdala and
frontal cortex (David and Cazala, 1996; Olmstead and
Franklin, 1997).
Unfortunately, for most basic feelings, it is not
yet clear whether the higher reaches (e.g., the amygdala) or the lower reaches (e.g., the PAG) are more
important. Adolphs, Tranel, and Damasio (1998) close
their most recent contribution to this exciting area of
research (in this case, the recognition of emotions in
the face) with the provocative statement: "An intriguing question that remains to be addressed is the amygdala's relative participation in triggering information
that is innate, versus information that is acquired
through individual experience in a cultural setting" (p.
473). I assume that the innate information referred to
would be some type of perceptually induced internal
feeling state induced by certain intrinsic aspects of
perception, and I personally believe the evidence will
eventually show that the amygdala cannot elaborate
the feeling of fear or trepidation without its descending

connections to the hypothalamus and PAG. On the
other hand, those lower areas can generate unconditional fearful feelings, albeit not certain learned fears,
without the amygdala.
According to the subcortical view, all of the basic
emotional systems are modulated by a large number
of inputs, ranging from simple sign stimuli entering
emotional systems (e.g., the smell of feline predators
to rats) to higher level associative inputs (appraisals
and conditioned stimuli) that have received much attention from neuroscientists. There will also be intrinsic physiological and hormonal parameters that
modulate circuit sensitivities, and most importantly,
there appears to be a substantial form of neuropeptidergic coding within many emotional systems. For instance, endogenous opioids and oxytocin are essential
for regulating social emotions, corticotrophin releasing
factor (CRF) mediates a very basic form of anxiety
(Figure 3), Substance P is important in instigating aggression, and there are many other neuropeptidergic
relations that have been revealed by preclinical work
(Panksepp, 1998a). As mentioned before, the neurodynamics of these systems may be modulated in many
ways, providing various opportunities for establishing
emotion-regulatory effects that remain to be deployed
for promoting positive emotional health (Ryff and
Singer, 1998).
a-ENDORPHIN
(Function: Counteracts homeostatic

imbalances; ereates pleasure)
VASOPRESSIN/OXYTOCIN
(Functions: AVP promotes male-typical persistence:
Oxytocin, female-type nurturance and aeceptance)
CORTICOTROPHIN
RELEASING FACTOR
(Function: Promotes effects of stress

and negative emotional stimuli)
CHOLECYSTOKININ
(Functions: Regulation of emotional systems:
feeding, sex, exploration, anxiety, and pain)
Figure 3. Cartoon parasaggital rat brain representations of four neuropeptide systems that are important in various positive emotions (left side)
and various negative emotions (right side). Anatomical designations are:
LC-Iocus coeruleus; DB-dorsal noradrenergic bundle; VB-ventral
noradrenergic bundle; CN-Caudate nucleus; AC-anterior commmissure; OB-olfactory bulb; CTX-eortex; BF-basal forebrain; HC-hippocampus; TH-thalamus; SC-superior colliculus; IC-inferior
colliculus; CC-eorpus callosum; POA-preoptic area; VTA-ventral tegmental area. Small circles in the cortex indicate dispersion of local interneurons. The figure is adapted, with permission, from Panksepp
(1998a), courtesy of Oxford University Press.
In sum, to my way of thinking, the interaction of

emotional systems with lower substrates such as the
26
PAG may be essential for creating feeling states which
are then broadcast widely in the brain. If so, a key to
understanding the nature of feelings is the identification of the various neurodynamic and neurochemical
correlates that accompany the various types of feeling,
and the evaluation of their causal roles through parallel
lines of manipulative research. Such lines of inquiry
have barely been initiated (for summary, see Panksepp, in press).
This should make the study of affective processes
a primary goal for both psychology and neuroscience,
but it is understandable why progress has been so slow
on the most basic issues-we cannot visualize the
spontaneous and long-term internal neurodynamics of
the brain as readily as we can image how the brain
responds to events in the world. Being human, we
prefer to look where the light is brightest, so we often
focus on rapid onset emotional responses to conditioned stimuli, where affect clearly cannot be the primary mediator of the observed behavior (LeDoux,
1996).
Historically, the hope was that emotions could be
explained by focusing on the autonomically induced
cognitive commotion that accompanies emotional
arousal (e.g., leading to the James-Lange,
Schacter-Singer, cognitive-attributional traditions).
Some also hoped that we could ignore the likelihood
that there were specific brain mechanisms that were
evolutionarily designed to instigate and coordinate affective responses. The same bias is still evident in
modern emotion research, both psychological and neuroscientific, with more effort devoted to peripheral autonomic and cognitive issues than the lowest common
denominators in the brain. I suspect that a clarification
of the core brain issues (i.e., the pathways and neurochemistries for the instinctual id energies) will be essential for establishing a substantive foundation for
psychoanalytic thought, even though the other levels
of analysis may be more important for developing new
ideas of how emotions become "bound," potentially
yielding various defense mechanisms.
Although a definitive answer to the question
posed by Solms and Nersessian, "what are affects a
perception of," cannot yet be provided, relevant empirical work can now be conducted, even in the social
realm (Panksepp, Nelson, and Bekkedal, 1997). There
are bound to be some surprises-for instance neuropeptides such as GLP-l (Glucagon Like Peptide-I)
and urocortin that are thought to control feeding behavior, may do so only indirectly by modulating emotional processes (Panksepp and Bekkedal, 1997a).
While many levels of the neuroaxis surely provide
Jaak Panksepp
important ingredients for fully resolved affective responses, the integrity of the higher functions is bound
to be more dependent on the integrity of the lower
functions than vice versa. Accordingly, I strongly urge
investigators to devote more research to brain zones
like centromedial areas of the mesencephalon and the
reticular nuclei of the thalamus where emotional values and external events are first coordinated with a
coherent map of the body and exteroceptively triggered perceptions. These may be critical brain zones
where id and ego processes begin their massively entangled battle for primacy that reverberates through
all subsequent levels of neural development of each
individual and species. This is where the various "energies" of the anima emerge. With each layer of development, there are new opportunities for the
emergence of defenses, displacement activities, and
neural sensitizations that will be most difficult to disentangle.
Basic Affects May Reflect Distinct

Neurodynamic Resonances of the Primal Self
While Freud had to generally consider that affect was
controlled in some way by "the quantity of excitation
that is present in the mind," investigators have now
identified a large array of specific and nonspecific neurochemical participants in each of the "affect programs" of the brain. There are some systems that are
very generalized, participating in practically all emotional and cognitive responses (e.g., norepinephrine
[NE], serotonin [5-HT], acetylcholine [ACh], and glutamate), while others, especially the neuropeptide neuromodulators, have more discrete effects limited to
particular emotional-affective states (Figure 3). Thus
when we analyze these systems, it is evident that ~
endorphin and oxytocin promote positive affective
states, while CRF and cholecystokinin (CCK) promote
negative ones. I assume that the arousal of these systems generates distinctive affective responses, but relevant empirical work is scarce. It is hard to imagine
how the role of such systems can be fully evaluated
without careful human research in which qualitative
mental contents are evaluated with closed-ended questionnaires as well as open-ended techniques such as
psychoanalysis provides. Obviously, each emotional
and motivational feeling will have to be taken on its
own terms, and how such findings may relate to earlier
generalizations such as Freud's pleasure-unpleasure
principle will remain open issues for some time to
come.

While it is now quite easy to imagine how the
degree of affect could be related to the degree of synaptic activation in certain neurochemical systems, the
objective measurements remain difficult. For instance,
take the so-called PANIC system: We can generate
different amounts and durations of separation calls by
varying the degree to which we experimentally activate specific neurochemical systems. In experimental
animals we can promote calls with CRF (see Figure
4) and glutamate, and we can systematically decrease
calling, for a set amount of time, by promoting opioid,
oxytocin, or prolactin activities or by decreasing brain
glutamate arousal (for summaries, see Panksepp,
1998b). There are many examples for other affective
systems-for instance, a female rat can be persuaded
into a high state of sexual receptivity for approximately a third of a day by infusing miniscule amounts
of leutinizing hormone releasing hormone (LH-RH)
into the brain (Moss and Dudley, 1984); freezing can
be induced for many hours following small alpha melanocyte stimulating hormone (a MSH) infusions
(Panksepp and Abbott, 1991); and the list goes on.
Unfortunately, none of these chemistries has been
measured in vivo in organisms that are actually undergoing separation or sexual experiences.
Chick DVs as a function CRF Treatment and Time
2000
1800
'Ii 1600
c
~ 1400
0
C")
1200
(/)
1000
a.
...
.... ~......
-0....
......0- .....
---e-
VEHICLE
0'
CRF (0.5 ug)
...'"
0
.....,.. ..... '0.
.......0. ...
"0- '0.
>
a
Q)
0)
......0- . 0
800
600
CD
>
ct
400
200
TIME (Hrs.)
Figure 4. A summary of the prolonged elevation of separation distress

calls in 3-week-old domestic chicks (n = 10 per group) treated intraventricularly with 0.5 f.1g of corticotrophin releasing factor (CRF). Every animal exhibited a massive elevation of distress calling following social
isolation that lasted up to 6 hrs. When these same animals were treated
again, the same response was provoked for another 6 hrs. The data are
adapted from Panksepp (1990b).
How we might conceptualize "bound" and

"free" excitation is, at present, strictly a matter for
speculation. One could talk about these matters in various ways-from focusing on pools of transmitters
that are readily available for synaptic release to neural
systems that are under tonic inhibition through explicit
as well as implicit learning influences. However, none
27
of these possible connections can be asserted with assurance, except to note that one of the major functions
of the neocortex (especially the frontal cortex), in its
role of processing exteroceptive information, is to inhibit more impulsive subcortical processes.
As suggested by Solms and Nersessian, a provocative way to make the distinction between the "quantitative" and "qualitative" aspects of affective life
may be to focus on the generalized systems (e.g., NE,
5-HT and ACh) shared by all of the discrete functional
systems of the brain which contribute substantially to
a quantitative dimension of affect while the more specific neuromodulators, like many of the neuropeptide
systems, are more influential in establishing the qualitative differences among affects. This seems highly
promising. However, it is unlikely that neuroscientific
investigators would be eager to relate the nonspecific
components to a vague, hydraulic concept like
"drive," for they already have more specific descriptions of how these systems operate in the brain. For
instance, NE controls how efficiently the cortex processes information by increasing the effects of incoming signals as compared to background noise; 5-HT
tends to diminish the impact of information on the
cortex; and ACh focuses attentional resources. All of
these generalized functions interact with a host of specific brain systems for discrete types of information
processing (both exteroceptive-cognitive and interoceptive-emotional), which necessitates that we study
their various localized effects only under the most exacting experimental conditions.
Periodically there has been a desire to relate these
systems to specific affects, especially fear, but the data
remain most consistent with the existence of broad and
nonspecific affective as well a cognitive informationprocessing effects. Although these systems act globally, if one restricts focus to limited areas of the brain,
they may appear to have distinct qualitative effects on
emotional memories within very specific brain circuits
such as the FEAR circuits of the amygdala (McGaugh,
Cahill, and Roozendaal, 1996). However, it may well
be that normally such effects are not seen within the
brain except when FEAR systems have already been
aroused by other, more specific stimuli. For the time
being we must remain cautious in reaching any definitive conclusions, since it is certainly possible that a
great deal more qualitative specificity may emerge
through the overall circuit neurodynamics, as well as
the effects of the remarkably diverse types of receptor
subpopulations that aminergic transmitters act upon.
The possibility that a single chemical system can
have both qualitative and quantitative consequences is
28
also a reasonable conceptual alternative. This is especially evident for glutamatergic transmission in the
brain. Glutamate appears to operate directly in practically every cognitive and affective process that has
been studied in animals. Along with some other excitatory amino acids, it appears to construct the skeletal
form of every thought and emotion of which the brain
is capable. This is evidenced by the large number of
emotional responses-from anger to fear to separation-distress-that can be activated by glutamatergic
stimulation of different brain areas. However, it would
seem that most of these fundamental potentialities are
not manifested until instigating stimuli arouse more
specific emotion control systems such as the various
neuropeptide circuits. The way I would envision this
process is that once a neuropeptidergic command influence is aroused in the brain (both at synaptic sites
of interaction as well as in more nonspecific broadcasting via paracrine transmissions), the selected glutamatergic response within a subset of available
response elements may carry the functional message
forward both in qualitative and quantitative terms.
Meanwhile, its metabolically related cousin
gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA), the most prolific
inhibitory transmitter of the brain, exerts local inhibitory controls over these same neuropsychological and
behavioral potentials. Thus, one can envision glutamate as controlling both quantitative and qualitative
excitatory components of each emotional response,
while GABA can do the same, by controlling the inhibitory components of such responses, both in functionally restricted circuits as well as broader brain
networks that mediate supportive psychological processes. No doubt, tonic activity in all of these systems
might also contribute to a general concept like
"drive" for it is known that brains with low GABA
are very excitable, tending toward epileptic activity,
while facilitation of glutamatergic activity also promotes epileptic arousal. Conversely, if we markedly
reduce glutamate activity and increase GABAergic activity (as can be done with sedatives ranging from
alcohol to barbiturates), organisms become unconscious. In sum, a variety of generalized brain influences as well as the arousal of specific emotional
systems contribute to overall affective integration in
the brain.
Freud did anticipate that the neurochemical control of affective states could eventually become a reality. The rise of biological psychiatry has amply
confirmed this prediction, and thereby diminished the
influence of psychoanalysis. But we are now on the
verge of a second great revolution of biological psy-
Jaak Panksepp
chiatry-one that may allow us to harness specific
neuropeptidergic emotional controls within the brain.
Such a revolution may eventually help reopen the
doors to certain psychoanalytic concepts. However,
none of those findings may be able to breathe life into
Freud's generalized concept of "drive." It is simply
too broad and imprecise for any compelling neuroscience treatment. The hydraulic concept of drives building up that was so popular in Freud's day now appears
to be misleading in so many ways, even though it is
not difficult to imagine how such metaphoric entities
may correspond to the intensity of excitatory inputs
to central integrative systems such as the SELF. Unfortunately, there are too many distinct influences to subsume them under a single concept, except perhaps as
a general class-identifier. Ultimately Freud's drive
concept probably reflected the way higher conceptmediating areas of the brain seek to create order from
the complexities of subcortical neurodynamics. It is
reminiscent of the arousal axis in current dimensional
theories of emotions (Lang, 1995), which may also
simply be another broad, higher order abstraction that
has no unidimensional representation within the subcortical dynamics of emotional systems.
Also, it is worth noting that the term has been
used in too many ways in the history of psychology
to be resurrected as a major explanatory concept in
any system. The traditional utilization of the "drive"
concept in psychology fell into disfavor when it was
realized that it was intrinsically ambiguous and might
be devoid of explanatory power (Bolles, 1975). In my
own recent overview of emotions and motivations
(Panksepp, 1998b), the "drive" concept was relegated
to those specific regulatory motivational functions
such as hunger, thirst, and thermoregulation, where
specific interoreceptive detector elements have been
identified in medial strata of the diencephalon. One
could also employ the drive concept for transmitters
such as dopamine (DA) that help regulate generalized
appetitive arousal functions (which I have conceptualized as a SEEKING function), but it should be noted
that such circuits do not directly up-regulate other energetic affective behaviors such as playfulness and
fear. Thus it seems conceptually fuzzy to label such
systems as general behavioral arousal or facilitation
systems as some have done. We should avoid talking
about these systems as if they "energize" every behavior or provide an infrastructure for an omnibus
"positive affect" system of the brain. Of course, seeking an optimal conceptual structure that does not do
injustice to the underlying complexities, remains a

most difficult issue in psychology and functional neuroscience.
Obviously, it is scientifically counterproductive
to resurrect or sustain vague general terms when more
specific concepts will suffice. However, at the present
time we also have to be able to talk about coherent
processes that are incompletely understood. A similar
debate is raging in the use of certain neuroanatomical
terminologies. Some are deriding the continued use
of the "limbic system" concept when we have more
precise anatomical terminologies, while others point
out that in the absence of an international convention,
comparable ambiguities exist for the more distinct
structures like the amygdala. My own take on the matter is that fairly broad class identifiers are still needed
for heuristic and didactic purposes even after their explanatory value has declined. In this same way, we
will never have precise neural boundaries for psychodynamic concepts such as the id, ego, and superego,
and various subjectively experienced "psychic energies," but we must provisionally continue to use some
of them as class-identifiers for the types of global categories or processes that the brain most certainly contains. Some will' have to be discarded when their
communicative utility has become degraded. At present, the Freudian "drive" concept retains little value,
and in my estimation, should be put to rest. Still, it
seems evident that certain types of emotional and motivational urges do build up in the nervous system, so
let me at least dwell a bit further on some other possible neuroscience linkages, especially for those inclined
to believe that the burial of the' 'drive" concept is premature.
In doing so, we should recognize that Freud was
using the drive concept slightly differently than I
would prefer to use the term (i.e., as various brain
states that arise directly from bodily need detectors).
For Freud, "drive" seemed to be the generalized tension or arousal that accompanied all of the various
homeostatic imbalances. Thus, if one is seeking to
shore up this Freudian concept with modern neuroscience data, one would certainly focus heavily on the
types of general arousal and dysarousal systems already discussed (glutamate and GABA) but also the
well studied ascending DA, NE, and 5-HT circuits, as
well as the less appreciated ones such as histamine
pathways. Most of these systems are responsive to
certain bodily state variables, such as levels of circulating steroids and vigilance states. Also, it should be
noted that while the NE system is highly responsive
to all types of stimuli that alert animals, the 5-HT
system is comparatively unresponsive to world events,
29
increasing its activity only modestly to highly stressful
stimuli. One could propose that NE and DA arousal
and 5-HT quiescence promote drive, while catecholaminergic quiescence and 5-HT arousal tend to reduce
the overall perceived feeling of drive tension.
However, for all this to be a useful exercise, it
should provide some explanatory power for existing
observations concerning the normal human psyche.
There simply is not sufficient data at that level to proceed very far. Indeed, carefully conducted studies that
specifically modify these systems are just becoming
available, and so far the results generally indicate that
global affective-personality tendencies can be
changed in predicted directions. For instance, increasing 5-HT in the normal human brain reduces negative
affect and increases social cooperation without influencing positive affect (Knutson et aI., 1998). Thus, we
can be confident that affect intensity can certainly be
linked to the synaptic levels of such neurochemical
activities, but I expect that the qualitative aspects of
affective feelings do emerge largely from other, concurrently aroused, neuropeptide systems. In any event,
the database remains too meager to proceed confidently much farther on such fragile limbs of speculation.
Neuroaffective Brain Systems Orchestrate

Various Coherent Internal and External
Expressions Called the Basic Emotions
I find Freud's distinction between the inner and outer
perceptual and motor modalities an especially important one for modern neuroscience to consider. Obviously, within the behaviorist tradition in which most
of neuroscience has been conducted, the outer expressions have received considerably more attention than
the inner ones. Now that we are finally in a new era
of consciousness research, the inner modalities that
generate our subjective experiences and project them
into the world are again becoming more prominent in
discussions while remaining more difficult to analyze
objectively. However, if we do not account for those
inner dimensions in our theorizing (as neurodynamic
entities rather than simply leaving them as mysterious
or neglected forces), we shall come away with very
faulty views of how the brain operates. I suspect that
at least half of what is important in understanding
mind-brain functions is to be found among the inner
directed processes that Freud courageously outlined.
All serious neuroscientists should be willing to
entertain how subjectivity-affective and other-
30
wise-arises from brain matter, and how such processes are intermeshed with the long-term regulation
of behavior. There is no question that a great deal of
emotional behavior, usually the rapid-reflexive variety, requires no precipitous arousal of affective consciousness in order for emotional behaviors to be
initiated (LeDoux, 1996), but we may be seriously
amiss in our judgment if we believe longer-term emotional processes do not control future behaviors. And
in that trailing role, affective states are not just epiphenomena; they surely have longer-term regulatory effects on future behavioral outputs. In other words,
internally experienced emotional feelings may be seen
as long-term modulatory influences which figure most
heavily in the planning of behaviors and the more deliberate selection of future actions, rather than in the
mere emission of eruptive emotional acts (which is
only one component, and a transient one, of the overall
emotional response). In the same way, in young people
thoughts may more commonly follow impulsive actions than precede them. In other words, most conscious brain activity, affective as well as cognitive,
is not simply devoted to generating behavior, but for
dwelling on future behavioral strategies. In their longterm regulatory role, affective states can create inner
turmoil and conflict in people's lives leading them to
seek assistance (therapy) or to indulge in psychological and behavioral diversions (fixations, sublimations,
and displacement behaviors of various kinds).
It is probably fair to say, that for humans, more
theorizing has been devoted to the sensory-appraisal
side of the affective integration than to the motor side.
I believe that more effort should now be devoted to
the motor side, recognizing that mind is typically embodied in actions. This may sound like a perplexing
assertion, since behavioral neuroscience has in fact
expended most of its resources on analyzing explicit
motor processes. In clarification, I would suggest that
in situations where explicit actions are inhibited by
learned social-display rules, many motor responses of
the nervous system continue to be reflected in various
bodily tensions, small twitches, postures, gestures as
well as many other local bodily effects, from autonomic to hormonal. These small motor responses
should figure as heavily in our analysis of affective
states of consciousness as the grosser forms of action
readiness that are typically manifested in the varieties
of instinctual motor actions that characterize the eruptive emotional states of animals. Indeed, psychoanalysis is better positioned than most other disciplines to
try to analyze these small but powerful outputs that
seem to reflect a battle between the various id energies
Jaak Panksepp
and ego controls, but verbal approaches may need to
be supplemented with ethological analysis of both
gross and subtle neuromuscular tendencies. The nervous twitches of facial muscles and gaze aversions
may eventually allow us to read a person's affective
state more accurately than what they say, especially
if it turns out, as some lines of research suggest, that
the speech functions of the left hemisphere evolved as
much for lying and deception as for straightforward
communication.
Freud recognized such issues in his concept of
"bound" affective energy, and in this context, Solms
and Nersessian encourage us to conceptualize how
voluntary-instrumental actions emerge developmentally from the more primitive affective actions of the
nervous system. A simple and straightforward answer
to this may be that changes in internal affective states,
as they relate to both implicit and explicit motor actions, probably reinforce the preceding behavior patterns. Emotional states may constitute the major
reinforcers for the development of long-term behavior
patterns. An underutilized but complementary approach to the problem may be to search for the neural
instantiation of certain emotional affects more within
the motor organization of the brain rather than among
neural systems that are closely related to the afferent
side (which may contribute more to the classical motivational rewards, as in the pleasures of gustatory and
other bodily sensations).
It is widely recognized by embryologists that motor competence emerges in the nervous system earlier
than sensory guidance, suggesting its primacy in brain
evolution. For instance, in the chick embryo, we observe coherent whole-body motor movements before
they are capable of being modulated by sensory inputs
(Provine, 1980; Oppenheim, 1991). This primacy of
the motor system should be of considerable interest
for those who wish to clarify affective consciousness,
and Damasio (1994) has emphasized the role of the
whole body in affective experience. However, rather
than focusing on the material body (which is obviously
important for harvesting all manner of sensory and
reafferent impressions), I suspect that it is the neurosymbolic representations of the' 'virtual body" of the
SELF within fairly low levels of the brain that will
give us the greatest leverage in understanding the fundamental nature of affect within the brain.
The distinct resonances of emotional systems on
such a "virtual body" may yield emotion specific neurodynamics, which are broadcast widely in the brain,
thereby constituting the very essence of emotional
feeling. As feelings are transmitted through the brain,

they presumably interact with the information-buffering abilities of higher brain areas. It may be through
these associative interactions that "free" (instinctual)
emotional energies become "bound" into higher networks of inhibition and regulation. In other words, in
line with traditional Freudian thinking, the primitive
id functions as well as basic SELF-identity functions
are closely related to the "free" affective energies
emerging from the emotional command systems already discussed, while the more deliberate, volitional,
and morally directed actions (the higher ego functions)
may only emerge through the auspices of various
forms of internal inhibition, the information-buffering
abilities of working memory and higher brain modules
such as those that can elaborate theories of mind
(Baron-Cohen, 1997). In this view, much of affective
feelings as well as the ensuing thought patterns follow
rather than precede eruptive behaviors. In other words,
most of affective feeling and thinking is devoted to
the generation of future behavioral strategies rather
than the generation of instinctual actions.
I suspect that the binding of "free" affective energies is largely related to how well local GABA and
5-HT systems throughout the higher reaches of the
brain are able to keep a tight lid on the primitive emotional energies that can well up from below. Obviously, the more effectively an organism can buffer and
plan its behavioral responses, the more adaptive it will
be in competing for resources. But, as Freud realized,
in humans this is a double-edged sword. By actively
suppressing primitive emotional energies in the service of long-term ego goals, one is at risk of having
those emotional energies redirected in unexpected
ways. They may then percolate up neurotically in
spheres of life where they may disrupt and modify
other aspirations and goals. This heart of Freudian
theory remains a fertile field for conceptual and empirical development in brain research. Indeed, displacement behaviors are common occurrences in animals
that are emotionally aroused but not allowed to dissipate their "energies" in goal-appropriate ways.
As Solms and Nersessian emphasize, one brain
region that certainly exerts regulatory control over
many basic affective energies is the ventromedial region of the frontal lobes. Because of their decisive role
in regulating emotions by promoting certain types of
obsessive ruminations, these brain regions became the
ultimate targets of destruction during the bygone era of
psychosurgery. The clinical benefits seen from frontal
lobe excisions were optimized by restricting damage
to the ventromedial quadrants of the frontal lobes
(Scoville and Bettis, 1977), and consisted mainly of
31
freeing patients from dwelling on certain negative life
events. These individuals could still exhibit practically
all forms of simple emotional arousal, but they would
not become entrapped in such episodes. Across the
years, it has become clear that other higher limbic
areas serve similar roles for other affective processes
(Figure 2). For instance, social-affective issues, which
characterize depression and obsessive--compulsive
disorders, find a focus of cogitation within anterior
cingulate areas (Drevets et aI., 1997; Mayberg et al.
1997). Anxious and angry thoughts probably find executive domains in lateral and medial temporal lobe/
amygdala zones, respectively, even though frontal areas are not without influence (Gloor, 1990).
There are reasons to suspect that the primary excitant for all such cogitations is glutamate, and the
main inhibitor is GABA, with a more general upward
and downward tuning of information processing in
these areas exerted by NE and 5-HT, respectively, and
ACh helping construct an attentional searchlight
which is directly under the control of the emotional
SELF. Individual neuropeptides apparently bring restricted parts of the widely distributed affect control
mechanisms to bear on specific types of life problems.
A detailed understanding of how so many systems
work together, and how they construct the abstract
neurodynamics of higher psychological processes, remains a great challenge for all of the mind sciences.
Conclusion
It is a daunting task to build solid linkages between
psychoanalytic ideas derived from clinical observations, especially ones that have not been adequately
subjected to standard modes of scientific validation,
and the incredibly rich empirical findings of modern
neuroscience, which have typically been harvested in
the most austere spirit of logical positivism. Regrettably, modern neuroscience has not been adept at conceptualizing how the internal neurodynamics of the
brain weave psychological realities by blending evolutionarily provided abilities with neurodynamic symbolizations of ongoing world events. This is
understandable; to accept the potential existence of
hidden functions, neuroscience would have to drop its
ultrapositivistic veil. It will not do so until the data
massively and unambiguously mandate acceptance of
a deeper integrative reality-complexity behind the surface appearances that we can directly measure. In my
estimation, compelling evidence for this has long been
available for both humans and related animals, but the
32
neuroscientific community has chosen not to pay attention.

In any event, during early phases of vertebrate
brain evolution, a variety of special-purpose neural
mechanisms were created that allowed animals to automatically cope with a limited set of life-challenging
situations. Many of these processes reside in the spinal
cord and lower brain stem. On top of such relatively
reflexive and predictable abilities, evolution added
more general purpose orchestral functions that could
coordinate various bodily functions, to allow organisms to cope more flexibly with key survival issues.
Some of these coordinating systems are the basic and
archetypal emotional circuits that all mammals share,
heavily concentrated in midline mesencephalic and diencephalic structures and in higher zones traditionally
conceptualized as the limbic system. As competition
for resources became more intense, general purpose
learning mechanisms added layers of cognitive flexibility, permitting animals to conceptualize their circumstances so they could behave with varying degrees
of foresight and hindsight. These biologically subtle,
abstract abilities arise from most recent neural developments of the mammalian brain such as the neocortex.
In the human brain, with its truly remarkable degree of encephalization that transpired only within the
passage of a mere few million years, higher order emotional regulatory mechanisms (superego functions)
have been added in such profusion that it is a major
scientific challenge to disentangle the resulting strata
of influence and counterinfluence. However, we can be
certain that the emotional values that were established
during earlier phases of brain evolution have remained
intimately coordinated with more recently evolved
functions. Among these new affective skills we find a
large number of socially constructed emotional tendencies which owe their existence definitively to cognitive functions. Thus, it is impossible to imagine
feelings like jealousy and shame without there existing
certain types of thoughts, and hence working memories, in the brain. On the other hand, the basic emotions
can probably all be experienced without any preceding
cognitive activity (at least of the variety that requires
neocortical participation), even though there are abundant cognitive changes when basic emotions are
aroused, leading to a variety of secondary emotional
constructions. I believe that the primal nature of emotions, conscious and unconscious, must be premised
on our understanding of the subcortical neural processes which coordinate certain types of action readiness, seen in their most dramatic but transient forms
Jaak Panksepp
in various eruptive emotional outbursts. However, the
volcano of active mood states can continue to smolder
even when such short-lasting emotional eruptions are
not evident. In humans, higher ego and superego functions can keep these eruptive forces from being expressed outwardly, but much less so inwardly.
Freud was among the first to probe into these
darker areas of the human psyche, and he sought to
untangle, at a conceptual level, how such functions
might generally be organized and internalized within
the psyche. Our concern here is to discuss whether his
insights can be linked credibly to modern neuroscience. I believe many can. But will such exercises provide new avenues of thought that can promote the
maturation of functional neuroscience and psychoanalysis? We must wait and see. There is much to gain
and little to lose in pursuing such endeavors, especially
if the work remains empirically focused.
I believe the "great intermediate net" of the
brain can only be disentangled if global psychodynamic and molecular and systems neuroscience approaches can be brought to bear on problems of mutual
interest. To bring this to pass, psychoanalysts will
have to invest more intensely in the study of experimental manipulations, especially psychopharmacological ones, where human verbal reports of internal
experiences and dynamics are studied after systematically induced transient changes in the arousability in
specific brain systems. We finally have a great many
experimental tools to pursue such studies well. Psychoanalysis has carefully nurtured a listening approach that can minimize the use of loaded questions
and other demand characteristics. Unfortunately, the
transcription and content analysis of free associations
is a tedious and a tricky business, but computerized
transcription techniques can now be implemented.
Such approaches should be supplemented with spectral analyses and electronic processing of the acoustic
data, as well as the development of new qualitative
tools to systematically probe the psyche.
But for all this to be useful, we must encourage
individuals to speak rather directly and systematically
about their internal experiences, perhaps in controlled
settings where the experimenter-therapist is not in the
physical presence of the person being studied. We
must cultivate a greater willingness to ask appropriate
questions concerning the affective changes that various individuals experience in various situations. There
may also need to be some careful personality descriptions and perhaps selection of individuals for such
studies. At times it may be essential to have wellprimed, cooperative individuals who are willing to try

to communicate with their less deceptive right hemispheres. In order for us to access their minds effectively, our subjects should feel like collaborators in
the research as opposed to simply guinea pigs to be
observed. The establishment of such working alliances
may run against the grain of certain neuropsychological and psychoanalytic traditions, but I think both the
ethics of research and methodological exigencies mandate we fully consider such courses of action.
What might prototypical experiments be like?
First, the questions asked should be based on solid
and theoretically interesting lines of work from animal
brain research which suggest especially clear and safe
ways to modify emotional reactivity. Not only would
it be interesting to catalog the effects of the many
drugs that modify cholinergic, glutamatergic, and biogenic amine systems, but soon we will be able to study
neuropeptide systems as well. Already there are nonpeptide antagonists for Substance P, and corticotrophin releasing factor (CRF), and several other
systems. The preclinical data suggest that these drugs
should reduce anger, fear, and separation anxiety in
humans (Baram, Koutsoukos, Schultz, and Rivier,
1996; Siegel, Schubert, and Shaikh, 1997; Panksepp,
1998a).
Of course the peptide system that has had a clinically available antagonist for the longest time is the
opiate receptor system, and I would suggest that careful psychoanalytic studies are warranted with drugs
such as naloxone and naltrexone. For instance, from
animal research, it is evident that brain opioids constitute a major part of a generalized' 'pleasure principle"
in the brain. Animal work has clearly indicated that
opioids mediate the positive incentive properties of
tasty foods, sex, play, and other positive social feelings
(Panksepp, 1998a). Surprisingly, past research has
suggested that such drugs have remarkably modest
affective consequences in humans (Panksepp, 1981b),
but in fact, there is a paucity of carefully collected
data to analyze how blocking brain opioid receptors
with long-acting antagonists, such as naltrexone, modifies human affective experiences, especially social
ones. A careful psychoanalytic probing of the feelings
of individuals challenged with opiate antagonists
should reveal many subtle changes in the underlying
fabric of affect, especially when they encounter various emotion provoking stimuli, ranging from those
that arouse our basic appetites to more cultural ones
such as art and music. One should be prepared to observe a variety of subtle changes, including an increase
in social sensitivity and a tendency to behave differently to the feelings of others.
33
Indeed, opiate antagonists have provided such effects in the treatment of autistic symptoms (Kolmen,
Feldman, Handen, and Janosky, 1997). In our experience with this medication in the treatment of autism
(Panksepp, Lensing, Leboyer, and Bouvard, 1991;
Bouvard et aI., 1995), modest benefits have been evident in about half the children, especially the highfunctioning ones. I am especially fond of insight provided by a highly self-centered and emotionally aloof
17-year-old teenager who had good language skills.
On naltrexone, she became more sensitive and concerned with the feelings of her parents, but when asked
what had changed inside her, she seemed perplexed
and answered that nothing had changed within her.
Only the world had changed from her point of
view-other people were simply behaving differently.
And perhaps they were, through subtle interactions,
that arose from her increased intimacy with their lives.
This, of course, is the great dilemma of the subjective phenomenological view. Our affects are value
constructions of the brain, and our emotional systems
are designed in such a way as to project our feelings
into the world. We are not just angry; we are typically
angry with someone who seems hateful. We are not
just in love, but we love someone who seems lovable.
We are not just emotionally moved by the music we
enjoy, but the emotions actually appear to flow directly
from the music. Even as we recognize that the information triggering the feelings is encapsulated within
the well-interpreted musical score, the resulting mood
changes arise from the dynamic responses of our
brains. Recently, Fried and colleagues (Fried, Wilson,
MacDonald, and Behnke, 1998) stimulated the human
prefrontal cortex and provoked feelings of hilarity in
humans with nothing special having happened in the
environment, and these feeling were also projected
outwards. During the brain stimulation, everything the
individual focused on seemed funny.
In short, our brains are designed to project affect
(as well as perceptions, of course) back into the world,
and even our animal subjects seem to imbue neutral
environmental events with affective salience for they
exhibit contextual conditioning remarkably easily.
This is the way the brain generates its highly adaptive
illusions of emotional realities, and that may also be
why behavioral scientists are so timid in trying to deal
forthrightly with such brain processes. After all, by
accepting the probable existence of emotional feelings
in other creatures, we may only be studying our own
anthropomorphistic tendencies, rather than the functional competencies of other animals. However, the
available data, taken together, do suggest that we are
34
not deluding ourselves, for a neurochemical understanding of the brain mechanisms that generate the
affective behavioral tendencies in other animals can
predict many of our own feelings (Panksepp, 1998a).
Similar types of correspondence maps cannot be generated for thoughts. Thus, in the restricted arena of
basic emotions and motivations, careful, scientifically
advised anthropomorphism is a viable preliminary
strategy for identifying which types of value-encoding
processes exist in other brains. Through a detailed
study of the underlying neural mechanisms in animals,
we can now achieve a general understanding of how
homologous neural processes operate in our own
minds. Now we need to figure out how the animal
brain actually generates affect, but that work is still
proceeding remarkably slowly, partially because of
the conceptual blinders that behavioral neuroscience
has imposed on itself and the resulting research funding policies.
In pursuing parallel phenomenological studies of
subjective emotional experiences in humans, we are
confronted by one enormous obstacle: The speaking
hemisphere appears to be a master of confabulation
and deception in its appointed role of verbally communicating with others in the world (LeDoux, 1985). Social desirability factors appear to be much more
important to the left hemisphere than to the emotionally deeper and more sincere, right hemisphere. This
hemispheric specialization of emotional values was
strikingly evident in a recent study by Ross, Homan,
and Buck (1994), where individuals changed their
heartfelt emotional confessions toward more superficial~avalier directions when their right hemispheres
were selectively anesthetized.
What problems does this pose for future psychoanalytic work? Would subjects coming to participate
in a study be more left-hemisphere oriented, focusing
their psychological resources toward sustaining a high
level of social desirability? If so, would they be less
likely to reveal their deeper emotional feelings? If the
left hemisphere is, in fact, an expert at emotional repression (i.e., having a preference for an alexithymic
communication style, especially in males), research
would have to try to work past that barrier. This is
where the psychoanalytic tradition may be a special
blessing to empirical pursuits in the area. Testing situations where individuals are willing to confide their
inner lives may help us see, more clearly, the deeper
feelings that reside beyond the surface veneer of social
desirability. Indeed, one could imagine that such studies could eventually be used to effectively probe, with
Jaak Panksepp
full client feedback, which types of psychotropic medications might have optimal effects for which patients.
In closing, I would again reemphasize that it is
unlikely that neuroscientific findings will match up
precisely with psychoanalytic concepts. Also, the levels of complexity already revealed at the neuroscience
level, mostly derived from animal brain research, are
so vast that no one can have confidence in relating
them to human psychodynamics that arise from the
immeasurably complex interactions of many neural
systems. Still, there is an incredibly rich neuroscientific database from which we can derive testable ideas,
and after preclinical testing, the best concepts should
eventually be taken to psychoanalytic laboratories.
Obviously, most of the basic knowledge concerning human emotions remains to be collected. We do
not yet understand the natural time-courses of emotional episodes (even though some progress is being
made, e.g., Potegal, Kosorok, and Davidson, 1996).
We know little about how various emotions interact;
few have tried to characterize the real oscillatory neurodynamics of the affective states (using not only electronic technologies but various depth psychological
approaches). A great deal of careful behavioral, psychological, and psychoanalytic work is needed to answer such questions, but ultimately, our explanations
for many human feelings must be based on our understanding of the neural processes that control homologous processes in related animals.
In pursuing such lines of inquiry, we should be
under no illusion that neuroscience has progressed farther toward a substantive understanding of emotional
processes than it actually has. Within the grand edifice
of modern neuroscience, the study of emotions remains little more than a cottage industry, even though
leaders in the field are recognizing that "the study of
emotion is enjoying a renaissance" (Hyman, 1998, p.
417). Still, to get support for such work, it is best not
to mention that you are interested in understanding
emotions, especially in animals. Feel free to highlight
learning or any variety of other accepted brain mechanisms, but please, please do not mention that you are
interested in understanding the fundamental nature of
affective experiences.
The majority of neuroscientists (and hence peerreview panels) still believe such questions are outside
the purview of standard science. This is most perplexing, for we can be certain that a great deal of brain
activity is devoted to creating the affective infrastructure upon which our cognitive abilities are built. Psychoanalysis has recognized that fact, and the
systematic study of human affective experience is one
35

of the major pillars upon which a lasting understanding of emotions must be built (the others being careful
studies of the brain and the accompanying bodily-behavioral changes). It seems evident that in brain evolution, as in the psychological development of each
individual, feelings preceded thinking, and that practically all thoughts continue to be channeled by emotional and motivational processes, both conscious and
preconscious.
To understand how mind emerges from brain
functions, we must be willing to conceptualize new
coherent entities such as the SELF. We should be willing to consider that the brains of all mammals can
generate various basic feelings, including joy. By accepting such possibilities, we have recently discovered
what seems to be a primitive form of laughter in laboratory rats (Panksepp and Burgdorf, 1998). If such
research approaches grow and thrive, they can serve
as a basis for useful cross-fertilization with psychoanalysis as well as the social sciences and humanities.
It is time for neuroscientists to fully consider the evidence that points to the existence of internally experienced affective states which are causally efficacious
in the governance of behavior. We should now seek
a new consilience (Wilson, 1998) among the many
disciplines that are honestly seeking to reveal the
deeper layers of human nature. There should be a major scientific role for psychoanalytic approaches in
such endeavors, for the currents of mind run deeper
and in more complex patterns than anyone of our
methodologies can adequately probe. We must learn
to combine various approaches (Solms, 1997).
Freud's greatest legacy may have been his willingness to conceptualize, for the first time, how profoundly affective processes are ingrained in our being,
and how deeply unconscious processes undergird our
conscious experiences. It is regrettable that his ideas
could not be adequately tested at the time they were
generated. Still, he pointed us in the right direction,
and provided theoretical road maps for a depth psychology which, albeit rough and approximate, contains worthy paths for us to consider as we aspire to
understand the greater mysteries of human and animal minds.
To those who believe that we shall never understand the nature of subjective experiences since the
"explanatory gap" is simply too large, I would simply
note that the "predictive gap" shall continue to diminish markedly as our base of neuroscience knowledge
grows. Psychoanalysis could be of greater assistance
to neuroscience if it would scientifically clarify the
consistent patterns within the experiential side of life.
Neuroscience can be of great assistance to psychoanalysis and all the other social sciences, by providing
the foundational knowledge that is essential for us to
explain how minds exist. Progress will be made
largely by those who recognize that mind is a bodily
function of the brain and are willing to do the hard
scientific work.
As the predictive gap between neural and psychological processes narrows through the development of
conciliatory frameworks, the "explanatory gap" will
no longer be as intimidating as it used to be. Of course,
the critical ingredient for all modes of thought will be
their ability to generate predictions that can be supported or disconfirmed by generally accepted scientific
methodologies. For psychoanalysis a critical challenge
will be the extent to which it can refresh Freudian
theory, which now has an unpalatable and distinctly
post-Victorian flavor for many, into a modern and dynamic mode of thought that continues to be rejuvenated by the accumulating evidence. That, I believe,
is the goal of this new journal and, I hope, its many
future contributors.
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Jaak Panksepp
Department of Psychology
Bowling Green State University
1001 East Wooster Street
Bowling Green, OB 43403
e-mail: jpankse@bgnet.bgsu.edu
Commentary by Antonio R. Damasio (Iowa City)
I must begin this brief comment by confessing that I

read Freud in college, 30 years ago, and that in spite
of the delight and admiration he caused in me, I have
only returned to check quotes and, once again with
great delight, to Civilization and Its Discontents
(1930). Thus my words are based on memories that
may not be accurate although they have been supported, in part, by the helpful Freud quotes in Solms
and Nersessian's interesting article. Under the circumstances, I will comment only on the main ideas that
came to mind as I read the target article and the
thoughtful reaction to it prepared by Panksepp.
1. It makes good sense, given Freud's status as
biologist (yes, I think he was a biologist) and cultural
figure, to attempt a critical rereading of his writings
from the perspective of contemporary neuroscience,
cognitive science, and philosophy. It is important,
however, to turn the enterprise into a slowly evolving
"project" rather than attempt to fashion a position
paper based on the efforts of willing experts. There
are good reasons to choose the former. First, the topics
that have the most relevance to Freud's own thinking
are now receiving ample scientific attention. Second,
the scientific evidence on these topics is changing so
Antonio R. Damasio, M.D., is M. N. Van Allen Professor and Head,
Department of Neurology, University of Iowa, College of Medicine.
rapidly that interpretations are not stable enough for

anything but work-in-progress forms of discourse.
Third, as Panksepp correctly points out, some of the
aspects of neuroscience and cognitive science that are
currently least satisfactory are those that have to do
with emotion, certainly the matter closest to Freudian
thinking. The neuroscience of emotion needs to be reshaped first, and while this is happening even as we
write, we have far to go. The neuroscience of emotion
will make more significant progress when certain issues are given the importance they probably deserve:
the missing perspectives of evolution and homeostasis
in the conceptualization of the emotions; the frequently missed role of the body, real and as represented in the brain, in the process of emotion and
feeling; the scope of the neural correlates of emotion,
too narrowly conceived at present.
2. Notwithstanding the above reservations, I believe we can say that Freud's insights on the nature
of affect are consonant with the most advanced contemporary neuroscience views. Emotion and feeling
are operated in the brain, neurally speaking, in the
manner everything else is operated neurally, and yet,
emotion and feeling are distinctive on several counts:
Emotions are genomically preset and largely innate;
they have an indispensable ingredient (pleasure or unpleasure); and there is a unique within-ness about

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Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal

Emotions as Viewed by Psychoanalysis and

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Emotions as Viewed by Psychoanalysis and

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Jaak Panksepp (Bowling Green, Ohio)

Affective and cognitive neuroscientists are now in a

higher integrative issues, especially ones like' 'central

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facts which may allow psychoanalytic theory to link

culture. It became a wellspring of ideas flowing from

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Emotions: Psychoanalytic and Neuroscientific Views

A General Orientation to Modern Emotion

My personal assumptions, harmonious with

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stand their emotional feelings. It is only in adulthood,

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Emotions: Psychoanalytic and Neuroscientific Views

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Affect Is an Internally Generated

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Emotions: Psychoanalytic and Neuroscientific Views

..-' ..-' ---

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Figure 2. Cartoon representation of the general spheres of influence for

systems interacting with the extended SELF networks,

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Emotions: Psychoanalytic and Neuroscientific Views

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such higher social emotions may proceed through

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Emotions: Psychoanalytic and Neuroscientific Views

the feeling of fear or trepidation without its descending

(Function: Counteracts homeostatic

(Function: Promotes effects of stress

In sum, to my way of thinking, the interaction of

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Basic Affects May Reflect Distinct

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Emotions: Psychoanalytic and Neuroscientific Views

CRF (0.5 ug)

Figure 4. A summary of the prolonged elevation of separation distress

How we might conceptualize "bound" and

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Emotions: Psychoanalytic and Neuroscientific Views

Neuroaffective Brain Systems Orchestrate

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Emotions: Psychoanalytic and Neuroscientific Views

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neuroscientific community has chosen not to pay attention.

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Emotions: Psychoanalytic and Neuroscientific Views

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Emotions: Psychoanalytic and Neuroscientific Views

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Bolles, R. C. (1975), Theory of Motivation. New York:

zation of depression. In: Emotion, Self-Organization,