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The Association for Family Therapy 2002.

Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley


Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
Journal of Family Therapy (2002) 24: 385401
01634445

How to be a postmodernist: a users guide to


postmodern rhetorical practices
Charles Legg and Paraskevi Stagakia
Family therapists are being encouraged to adopt a postmodern approach
to therapy and knowledge. Postmodernism is more than a set of beliefs
that therapists can either accept or reject; it is an approach to the construction of truth that eschews many of the forms of argumentation, such as
appeals to logic or evidence, characteristic of earlier writing in family therapy. In this paper we present some of the alternative rhetorical strategies
used by contemporary family therapy and family therapy texts in the
construction of novel truths. These strategies include: writing in the first
person; making qualified or conditional assertions; implying rather than
stating truths; delegitimizing conflicting views; and ignoring disagreement. We discuss the value of these strategies in maintaining the authority
of therapists and commentators on therapy in the face of the widespread
incredulity towards metanarratives, such as science, that characterize postmodern society.

Introduction
Postmodernism has profoundly affected both the practice, and
justification of practice, of family therapy (Cecchin, 1992; Epston
and White, 1992; Madigan, 1992a; White, 1992, 1993; AdamsWestcott et al., 1993; Chang and Phillips, 1993; Par, 1995).
Postmodernism figures as a philosophical position, such as empiricism or existentialism, that has displaced earlier, less sophisticated
philosophies (Par, 1995). Although we are convinced by the postmodern position, our reading of much-quoted authors, such as
Derrida, Foucault and Lyotard, has impressed us with the incoherence of postmodernism; it is not so much a philosophy as a crisis in
philosophy. Thus Lyotard defines postmodernism as incredulity
toward metanarratives (Lyotard, 1984, p. xxiv), by which he means
all-encompassing intellectual frameworks such as science, logic,
a Department of Psychology, City University, Northampton Square, London
EC1V 0HB, UK.

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philosophy or religion, that are supposed to settle arguments about


what is true. Postmodernism is a condition, defined by a crisis of
legitimization, within which we all live (Lyotard, 1984). We say
things but recognize that we can no longer demonstrate their truth.
Indeed we cannot even tell each other what we really mean by
something, because all we do is convert one set of words, of uncertain meaning, into another, equally uncertain, set (Derrida, 1976;
Gasche, 1987). Postmodernism is a crisis for the intellectual, undermining the claim that all problems in this world can be solved by the
application of reason, because reason itself collapses under the
weight of self-scrutiny (Feyerabend, 1975, 1987; Derrida, 1976) but
also a crisis for practitioners, such as family therapists, leaving them
with the need to practise, without the intellectual resources previously available to legitimize practices (e.g. Bateson, 1973). The
crisis is acute because most Westerners, including the clients of
family therapists, are postmodernists, living in a consumer society
that has rejected the metanarratives of science and religion
(Lyotard, 1984).
Remarkably, the world still goes on without its intellectual props.
We evaluate statements as true or false. We all use language and act
as if we know what each other means. The only thing that has
changed is belief in those discourses that are designed to persuade
us of the validity of other peoples truths. For many authors it is the
process of persuasion that has changed, not the reality of which they
are trying to persuade us (Cromby and Nightingale, 1999; Parker,
1999). Even authors who invite us to replace the notion of reality
with that of interpretation may also maintain that some interpretations, in some contexts, at some times deserve to be favoured
(Par, 1995, p. 6).
How are people persuaded to favour an interpretation if the
intellectual devices of logic and evidence, designed to persuade
people of the superiority of ideas, are unavailable? Persuading
people of things involves rhetoric, defined by the Shorter Oxford
English Dictionary as the art of using language so as to persuade or
influence others. The rhetoric within postmodern family therapy
discourse should be distinctive. To become postmodernists, readers
must change their rhetorical practices. Even if readers do not want
to adopt postmodernism, they still need to be aware of its rhetorical
practices to read postmodern text appropriately.
Our postmodern perspective precludes addressing these issues
prescriptively, because there is nothing to which convincingly to
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anchor prescriptions, so we must approach them descriptively, looking at the ways in which authors and therapists drawing on postmodern ideas prompt their audiences to construct one set of truths
in preference to another. We have approached this work from
a Foucaultian perspective, focusing on the identification of rules
of the production of statements and the identification of rules
that delimit the sayable (Kendall and Wickham, 1999, p. 42). Our
postmodern perspective inclines us to incredulity towards metanarratives, including scientific method (Feyerabend, 1975).
Consequently, we are warranting the truth of our observations
against the degree to which our readers recognize the practices we
describe in their own explorations of the literature, rather than in
terms of the degree to which we have adhered to method. Some of
the practices we have identified are present in both writing about
therapy and discourse within it, but others are more common in
one or the other. Where practices occur in both discourses, we
discuss them separately.
Practices
Write in the first person
The first person is unexceptional within therapy. Academic writing
is, conventionally, kept impersonal, authors writing either in the
declarative or passive voice (as in authors write . . . or texts are
written) rather than attributing ideas or beliefs to themselves.
Postmodernism favours the first person.
Writing about therapy. Postmodern writers write in the first person
(singular or plural). Examples include:
I am willing to concede . . . (Madigan, 1992b, p. 285).
Thus I chose . . . (Kogan, 1998, p. 231).
I have found myself on a journey of exploration . . . (Friedman,
1993, p. 252).
I was educated as a medical doctor . . . (Andersen, 1993, p. 305).
I will propose that the widespread critique. . . (Par, 1995, p. 2).
We believe that. . . White and Epston, 1990, p. 1).
Comment. Writing in the first person makes reading like a conversation. In conversation, the first person invites the engagement
of the listener by acknowledging that they may think differently
and encouraging exchange of views. Since the reader cannot
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influence the author, the use of the personal voice in text has a
different impact. Rather than inviting debate, it can close it down
since, while it is possible to dispute the reasons why someone
thinks something, it is impossible to dispute the fact that they
think it.
Make assertions
Although incredulous about the metanarratives that legitimize
them, postmodernists make assertions about the nature of the
world. Assertions lead the reader/listener to conclude both that
there are fundamental truths and that the writer/speaker has privileged access to them. The effect is often to present postmodernism as a description of the world, converting it from problem
into solution.
Writing about therapy.
These core concepts [language and conversation] are rooted in contemporary hermeneutics and social constructionism, or what may be referred
to as a postmodern interpretative perspective. . . . They [hermeneutics and
social constructionism] emphasise meaning as an intersubjective phenomenon, created and experienced by individuals in conversation and action
with others and with themselves.
(Anderson, 1993, p. 324)
It is a cultural practice to strip problems from their social relations and
assign them to persons. Two stages in the history of this process can be
identified (Foucault, 1965, 1973).
(White, 1989a, p. 37)

Discourse within therapy. Direct assertion is rarer within therapy, but


still occurs. For example, Friedman (1993) recasts a clients view
that her past has caused her present difficulties as her being in the
control of old messages from the past:
Your wife is a tough judge of herself. She keeps giving herself
messages (p. 255).
Theyre old messages from the past (p. 255).
He also introduces the idea of stress:
I think at this point it seems the familys under some stress. . . . Clearly,
your job situation is an important piece of that. And, clearly, when stresses
are up, chances are that people are more reactive to one another.
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Everyone is just more sensitive. And as irritability levels go up, there are
more chances for friction.
(Friedman, 1993, p. 255)

Comment. Postmodernism makes the truth of assertions problematic, but does not outlaw them. Assertions are a legitimate move in
our language game (Wittgenstein, 1968) but postmodernism
encourages readers and listeners to reconsider how we should interpret them. In modernist text an assertion strives to be an absolute
description of the world, the truth of which is independent of the
author position. In postmodern text, an assertion is best considered
as an opening move in a negotiation between author and reader or
listener: This is what I believe to be true and I want you to believe
it too.
Assert uncertainly
The danger of assertions being read as position-independent statements of truth may be avoided by qualifying them, either by using
the conditional form of verbs, or hedging the statement with qualifications. Conditionals work well in text, while qualification works
better in speech.
Writing about therapy. I [Michael White] have argued that the text analogy provides a frame that enables us to consider the broader sociopolitical
context of a persons lives and relationship, and that Foucaults analysis
can provide us with some details of that broader context.
(White and Epston, 1990, p. 27)
It can be argued that the basic values referred to here relate to our culturally produced notions about the specification of personhood, a specification that is highly individualistic. Foucault (1979).
(White, 1989b, p. 50)

Discourse within therapy. Kogan and Gale (1997, p. 114) describe


hedging assertions with qualifications as reciprocal editing:
Reciprocal editing . . . is a mutual process whereby the attributions evolving between all participants are open and fluid. In this session, it begins
with the therapist offering a shift in meaning in response to a client
account. This editing process is made reciprocal in the hesitancy and
uncertainty of the delivery, and the use of a tag question to clarify or revise
the therapists revision.
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One of their examples illustrates this tactic being used by a therapist to redefine the word control:
Client: And I have to say that um (.) that I would always I had to um be in
control of everything (.). . . .
Therapist: (hh) When you say in control you mean like sort of take responsibility for most things or feel that you are responsible for lots of
things is that what you mean by in control or do you mean something else?

Comment. In using both conditionals and reciprocal editing, ideas


are introduced without the author/speaker claiming they are true.
Paradoxically, this makes the statements true because conditionals
are always true, and the utterances involved in reciprocal editing
contain so many separate assertions and qualifications that some
component must be true.
Imply assertions
Readers or listeners may be drawn to conclude that something is
true, even if the speaker/writer has never actually said it. In written
text, truth may be implied by citation of authorities. This has two
benefits: (1) citation brings the truth of the authority into the text,
without the author having to say whether they are claiming that it is
true; (2) the expertise of the author may be implied by the selection of authorities and the way citations are made. While simple
assertions are rare within therapy, therapists regularly introduce
ideas without explicitly stating them by building them up over a
series of conversational turns.
Writing about therapy. In considering the constitutive dimension of power,
Foucault concludes that. . . .
(White and Epston, 1990, p. 21)
Writing both as a philosopher and a historian, Michel Foucaults polemic
voice was raised against the practice of . . . .
(Madigan, 1992a, p. 266)

Attributing ideas to authors whose works are known to be obscure


or even impenetrable can enhance the impact of citation. This
places the author in the role of translator and guide, and may be
experienced as implying superior knowledge on the part of the
author:
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We believe that Foucault provides a way out of this impasse. However,


those who are unfamiliar with his ideas and writing style often find him
difficult to read. Here, I have done my best to present some of his ideas in
a way that I hope makes them reasonably accessible.
(White and Epston, 1990, p. 1)
I will include clear and concise definitions, as well as historical and
present-day examples of Foucaults unique terminology.
(Madigan, 1992a, p. 266; italics added)

Discourse within therapy. Family therapists imply themes by introducing them across conversational turns. Anderson (1993) provides a
series of good examples. The clients are a mother and her daughter, a minor, who had been referred to another therapist via the
probation service, which had become involved due to the daughter
running away and engaging in other, unspecified, activities.
Although the purpose of the referral was to enable the daughter to
find ways of complying with the disciplinary demands of being a
minor, much of the work in the session relates to the mothers way
of relating to her children. There is the unstated implication that
the problems which led to the referral will disappear if the mother,
not the daughter, changes her view of the problem and how it
should be resolved.
This is achieved in three ways: (1) giving the daughters position
equal time, by spending part of the session alone with the mother
and another part alone with the daughter, while the other person is
behind the one-way mirror, thus obliging each to listen to the
others view without being able to interrupt; (2) normalizing the
daughters behaviour by statements likening the daughters to the
mothers behaviour, indicating that although it is upsetting, it is not
as extreme or inappropriate as the mother might think; (3) transferring control of the agenda to the daughter, making it difficult for
the mother to sustain her demands during the session.
Examples of normalizing include:
H [Therapist]: So weve got two women in this family with very strong opinions and minds of their own. (Anderson, 1993, p. 329).
H: So when you [daughter Anna] run away, is that similar to when your
mother says she closes the doors to kind of get away from it. . .?
(Anderson, 1993, p. 337)
D [Mother]: But as long as there is authority over her, she has problems
with it.
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H: So that part of her personality, you are saying, sort of clashes with the
everyday rules of life in terms of school and . . . .
H: So you think that all this has been complicated by the medical problems.
(Anderson, 1993, pp. 3334)

Transfer of the agenda is illustrated by the following:


D [Mother]: This is like an old clich, but when I was your age if I were to
pull the things that you could pull I wouldnt even be seeing
my friends on weekends.
A [Daughter]: But Im not you. . . .
D: Youve got a lot of different things happening for you.
A: I know, but Im not you.
H [Therapist]: (to Anna) Well, let me ask about the . . . you said confusion
about the fighting at home. . . . Can you say a little bit more
about that?
(Anderson, 1993, p. 330)

When the mother starts indicating how she would like things to be
different, the therapist moves the conversation on to other topics,
suggesting that the mothers agenda for change is inappropriate. In
contrast, when the daughter indicates how she would like things to
be different, the therapist seeks elaboration, confirming the daughters right to expect change:
H [Therapist]: What if you were a mother and you had a thirteen-year-old
daughter and some of the same kinds of things were going
on, what, as a mother, would you do to solve this problem?
A [Daughter]: Well, Id understand.
H: How would you understand?
H: How does a mother understand a daughter? Say more about that.
(Anderson, 1993, p. 338)

Comment. Implication is effective because it elides the crisis of legitimization by transferring the onus to the reader or listener. All
White and Epston (1990) are doing is reporting on the contents of
another text, while Madigan (1992a) is expressing the difficulty he
has encountered in understanding Foucault, and the fact that
other, unnamed individuals have experienced similar difficulty. If
readers choose to interpret what they have heard or read in a particular way, such as concluding both that White and Epston agree with
Foucault and that what Foucault says is true or that Madigan, unlike
many others, has mastered the unique terminology of Foucault
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and must be attended to as a consequence, the responsibility lies


with them. Similarly, if the mother and daughter in Andersons
transcript choose to interpret what has happened in the session as
implying that the mother should change her attitude towards her
daughter and try to control her less, they are responsible for their
own decision. There is nothing explicit to which they could point to
demonstrate that they were being directed to that conclusion.
Use postmodernist ideas reflexively to pre-empt a postmodern critique
Postmodern ideas may also be applied to the text that is advancing
them. Postmodern philosophy may be difficult to read because
authors are aware of this paradox and avoid advancing coherent
views, the legitimacy of which are immediately called into question. Family therapists cannot avoid coherence. New therapeutic
approaches have to be coherent before they can be adopted. New
life stories have to be coherent before clients can live by them.
Postmodern family therapists deal with the problem by applying
postmodern ideas pre-emptively, in the form of caveats, mostly
writing as if legitimization was not a problem but occasionally
remarking on the consequences of postmodernism for their own
text.
Writing about therapy. If we accept that power and knowledge are inseparable . . . then we are unable to take a benign view of our own practices.
(White and Epston, 1990, p. 29)
Neither can the present discussion be excluded. It can be seen as a
construction, a story, a postmodern narrative founded upon a range of
assumptions depicting one way of viewing our experience.
(Par, 1995, p. 8)

Comment. Acknowledging the difficulty created by postmodernism


disarms criticism because the text continues despite the acknowledgement of its own impossibility, suggesting that it is in some way
exempt from constraints applying to other texts.
Use postmodernist ideas to delegitimize other peoples positions
Instead of suggesting that an opposing argument is incorrect,
delegitimization involves refusing to acknowledge the assumptions
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underlying the opposing discourse itself. It works best in writing


about therapy.
Writing about therapy. Madigan (1992b, p. 285) offers some excellent examples in his rebuttal of Luepnitzs (1992) claim that his
main paper (Madigan, 1992a) misrepresents Foucault:
I am willing to concede that Dr. Luepnitz has a variety of useful ideas . . .
but I wonder which discursive practices restrain her from seeing a different interpretation and practice. . . . Could it be the modern discourse of
structuralism?
I find myself amused by the showing of Dr. Luepnitzs modernist slip.

Madigan emphasizes that Luepnitzs problems stem from not grasping the subtlety of the post-structuralist position which emphasises the interaction of reader and text as productivity. Whites
interpretation of Foucault is not one of passive consumption but
performance, where the unity of the sign is considered unstable
and is viewed as operating in structures of power, knowledge and
rhetoric (p. 286).
Comment. Criticism is equated with incomprehension. Critics
have failed to understand the nuances of arguments; hence their
criticisms must be discounted. Conventional argument is like
playing a game (Wittgenstein, 1968) where the rules and acceptable moves are established and the winner is the person who has
operated most effectively within them. Postmodern argument
centres on the rules of the game themselves. Unacceptable arguments are not wrong but derive from applying inappropriate
rules.
Repeat yourself
In writing about therapy, repetition is achieved in multi-authored
texts in which all contributors present essentially the same position
(e.g. Friedman, 1993) and by the same author publishing the same
ideas in a number of different places (White and Epston, 1990;
Epston and White, 1992; White, 1989a, 1989b, 1992, 1993).
Repetition is one of the fundamental rhetorical tools used within
therapy (Gale, 1991; Gale and Newfield, 1992; Kogan and Gale,
1997; Kogan, 1998).
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Discourse within therapy. Friedman (1993, p. 254) writes:


[Barbara starts crying, saying, I always thought that when I had my children everything would be perfect . . . . We discuss Barbaras perception
that John isnt like other children, who are more affectionate and verbally
expressive of their feelings. Barbara presents a picture of herself]
Barbara: Ive been in therapy before, by myself . . . I think I came from a
dysfunctional home . . . I feel guilty about being at work when the
children come home from school . . . . I do . . . .
Therarist: (returning to the miracle question) Give me a picture of what
things will look like after this miracle happens?

Friedman (1993) presents two themes: old messages and the


furies. He repeats old messages nine times and the Furies
twenty-two times in two separate sessions, even though the clients
only use the phrase old message once and never use the phrase
the Furies in the sessions concerned.
Comment. Repetition, or pursuing a response over several turns
(Gale and Newfield, 1992) is widely used in postmodern therapy
but the reasons for its efficacy are unclear.
Ignore disagreement
The conventions of academic writing make it difficult completely to
ignore opposing positions. Within therapy, ignoring what clients say
completely, or purposefully misunderstanding it, so as to ignore the
clients meaning, is both possible and widespread (Gale, 1991; Gale
and Newfield, 1992; Kogan and Gale, 1997; Kogan, 1998).
Discourse within therapy. Friedman (1993, p. 262) reports that
Barbara, the mother in the family with which he was working, introduces the theme of coming from a dysfunctional family:
Barbara: It was a dysfunctional family. I know it was. She [her sister] came
out of our childhood hating more than I did.
Therapist: She was more angry?
Barbara: Angry, but able to get out of the house. . . .
Therapist: What are your thoughts about how youve prevented the Furies
from taking over completely?

Andersen (1993, p. 313) also reports not attending to some of the


things said by his clients:
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Linda [the wife] interrupted and said that when George called some time
ago and wanted a divorce, she knew that she did not want to go back to
how it had been. The fighting made her crazy. I [Andersen] waited until
Linda finished and turned to Arlene [the consulting therapist] again . . .
T [Tom Andersen]: I wondered about what you said. In Norway there are
very many types of dances.

Comment. Ignoring what people say controls the contents of conversations and marginalizes discourses (White and Epston, 1990).
However, since it represents a profound violation of conversational
conventions (Potter, 1996) it works best when the person using it
has sufficient power to be able to resist the listeners demands for a
reply.
Summary
These are some of the rhetorical devices used in contemporary
family therapy. They are persuasive even though, when text is
considered in detail, it is impossible to identify any unqualified
claims that something is actually true. How can we be persuaded of
truths when authors/speakers have eschewed asserting them?
Under what conditions does postmodern rhetoric actually work? Is
its widespread application desirable?
Paradoxically, while postmodernism has undermined the status
of truth, postmodern rhetoric restricts discourse to utterances that
are either true or impossible to deny. It also relies on control of the
discourse to limit the other parties opportunities to assert contrary
positions. Writing in the conditional voice, or using the technique
of reciprocal editing, ensures the automatic truth of some statements. Working with citation achieves a similar effect. Using the
first person is particularly effective, because it moves the debate
from disputable statements like X is true to indisputable statements like I believe that X is true. Controlling discourse allows the
author/speaker to determine what are legitimate statements so that
contrary positions are not untrue but simply inappropriate moves
in a novel language game. Thus authors adduce postmodern ideas
to protect their own statements from dispute and to delegitimize
arguments. Within therapy, the combination of the repetition of the
therapists view with a refusal to acknowledge unacceptable client
positions allows the therapist to control the range of permissible
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statements. Postmodern discourse is persuasive because it avoids


engaging with legitimizing discourses that can form the basis of
dispute. Avoiding statements like X is true because Y is true preempts debate about both the truth of the assumption Y is true and
the logic connecting X with Y. Postmodern rhetoric shifts the onus
of proof from the person making an assertion to the person rebutting it.
The fact that postmodern rhetoric has been effective in the work
we have cited does not mean that it will be universally persuasive.
The sophistication of the audience and the power of the
writer/speaker may influence its impact. Whether or not postmodern writing persuades depends on how it is read. If read from a
modernist perspective it has a profound effect. If read from a postmodern perspective its impact is muted. The difference lies in the
status of the author in the two approaches.
Modernist interpretation is an attempt to work out what the
author really meant. An intelligence behind the text is assumed
and, even if the words used to express them are imperfect, the ideas
behind them need not be so (Hepburn, 1999). Awareness of the
author is enhanced by use of the first person in postmodern writing, since it is difficult to conceive of the word I being present in
text without an I having used it. As modernists, we construct narratives about the author that fill in the missing parts of the text and
make the incoherent coherent. When authors cite Foucault, we
conclude that they agree with Foucault and are justified in agreeing
by virtue of the persuasive force of Foucaults writing. We therefore
move from Foucault says to it is the case that.
As postmodernists, we do not consider the mind of the author,
since there is nothing but the text, and do not attempt to make the
incoherent coherent by filling in detail and making up narrative
around the text. We work with the text alone and arrive at its meaning through complex processes like deconstruction (Derrida,
1976; Hepburn, 1999). When an author cites Foucault, we consider
the meaning of citation, asking how citation transforms the meaning of the text in a way not achieved by direct assertion. We notice
and interpret the gaps in the text, rather than filling them in for the
author. As a consequence, the common-sense meaning of the text is
lost but new meaning may emerge. Read deconstructively, persuasive texts lose their power of persuasion (Parker et al., 1995).
Does postmodernism give voice to marginalized discourses
(White and Epston, 1990; Parker et al., 1995) or does it enable
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dominant discourses to overcome postmodern scepticism and


retain their hegemony (Lyotard, 1984)? Little in the literature
suggests that those without dominance (Foucault, 1980) can operate comfortably as postmodernists. All our quotations are from
established family therapists and commentators in dominant positions. Coming from published sources, they are backed by institutional power. All accounts of postmodern therapeutic practices
come from the therapists, not their clients. Even in volumes like The
New Language of Change (Friedman, 1993), where case material is
presented verbatim with commentary, there is none from clients.
Much of the debate about the desirability of postmodern
discourse centres upon power and the belief that postmodern
discourse in family therapy serves to liberate clients from networks
of power. White and Epston (1990) imply that awareness of the relationship between knowledge and power enables therapists to mitigate the effects of their own power:
If we accept that power and knowledge are inseparable . . . and if we accept
that we are simultaneously undergoing the effects of power and exercising
power over others, then we are unable to take a benign view of our own
practices. . . . Instead, we would assume that we are always participating
simultaneously in domains of power and knowledge.
(White and Epston, 1990, p. 9)

Foucaults (1980) analysis of knowledge and power suggests that


those asserting knowledge cannot distance themselves from power.
The forms of power in a society create the conditions of possibility
for particular domains of knowledge, and particular domains of
knowledge create the conditions of possibility of particular forms of
power. To understand power, one needs to understand the dominant forms of knowledge. To understand forms of knowledge, one
needs to understand power relationships. Knowledge does not
confer power; neither does power create knowledge. If there were a
simple causal relationship, societies would rapidly become homogeneous as power and knowledge reinforced each other. Rather,
domains of knowledge, such as statistics and literary theory,
create the possibility of particular forms of power relationship such
as eugenics and postmodern family therapy. Similarly, forms of
power relationship, such as regulating large populations through
their desires rather than their fears, create the need for particular
domains of knowledge, such as psychology. Thus postmodernism
transforms, rather than dissolves, power.
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The shift to postmodernism may be read as a change in the forms


of knowledge resulting from changes in the operation of power in
contemporary society. The combination of the general crisis of
legitimization (Lyotard, 1984) and a local failure to develop coherent legitimizing discourse within science (Legg, 1997) has diverted
power from professional groups such as family therapists to clients
acting as consumers. Cynics might think that postmodern discourse
allows family therapists to retain their right to practise and society
at large to retain their services to enforce what some might think to
be a conservative social agenda (Hare-Mustin, 1994; Kogan, 1998).
In the hands of current protagonists, postmodern rhetoric may
be benign, but there is nothing within postmodernism to constrain
the arguments advanced using them. The rhetoric that is used to
advance the idea that well-being is served by enabling clients to view
experiences in terms of the Western heroic tradition of power over
external forces and triumph over obstacles may be used to foster
alternative positions, such as that well-being is best served by
enabling them to view experience in terms of passivity and inability
to influence the world or from adherence to a rigid social structure
in which everyone knows their place, and in which place is a
matter of birth, skin colour and race.
Readers may have little choice about the application of postmodern rhetorical practices. Postmodernism has become the contemporary mode of discourse and its power drives out all others. Ask
someone for evidence and they may call you po-faced and out of
touch! (Parker et al., 1995, p. 34). Write as a modernist and your
text may be re-presented in a postmodern perspective (Carr, 2000).
Readers must decide for themselves whether this situation empowers clients or re-establishes the control of professionals in the face
of the challenge of the postmodern condition.
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