DAVEYTRONIC HIGH ACCURACY DIGITAL

BLASTING SYSTEM
bY

Robert McClure, Douglas A. Bartley

DAVEYFIRE , I NC.
Powell, Ohio, USA

ELECTRONIC DETONATOR TECHNOLGY5

A SAFETY APPROACH
bY

R. Trousselle

DAVEY BICKFORD
Rouen, France

2000 HIGH-TECH SEMINAR

Blasting Technology, Instrumentation
and Explosives Applications
~

Orlando, Florida, USA

July 24 - 27,200O

Copyright 2003 International Society of Explosives Engineers

2000 BAI - DAVEYTRONIC HIGH ACCURACY DIGITAL BLASTING SYSTEM & ELECTRONIC DETONATOR TECHNOLOGY: A SAFETY APPROACH

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Electronic Detonator Technology: a safety approach

R. Trousselle

Davey Bicrjcord, Rouen, France

ABSTRACT This paper discusses the advances in programmable, testable high accuracy electronic detonator technology. The operation and safety of electronic detonator systems are required to meet rigid safety standards and withstand the demanding environment of in-field applications. These requirements are discussed
through comments on existing safety requirements in Europe.

1 INTRODUCTION
The emergence of electronic detonators in the late 1980s in the mining and quarrying industry has
revolutionised both procedures and habits. Over recent years, many field results have confirmed the
advantages of the new-generation detonators over traditional initiation techniques, both electrical
and non-electrical. The first results to be observed were in the area of vibration control. It is the case
that the precision made possible by electronic delay detonators in controlling delay times makes it
possible to eliminate all risk of blast overlap in the firing sequence, to avoid any risk of simultaneous
detonation and, by the same token, to reduce the level of vibration automatically. This became evident all the sooner since there is no need to modify the conventional firing sequence to achieve such
a result. Computed simulations of blast-induced vibration patterns have made it possible to optimise
the firing sequence in order to reduce vibration even further.
Another objective achieved by electronic delay detonators is fragmentation control. On this point,
numerous tests have been required in order to determine the best sequences in the light of geological
factors and blast parameters: drilling, loading, spacing. Here again, significant results have been obtained. Most users of electronic detonators are today beginning to see the potential of this new technology and to assess to the full the advantages it offers where operating costs are concerned. A general awareness has also arisen that electronic detonators are just one factor among others for the
improvement of blasting and that other parameters just as important as the drilling and loading of
boreholes must be totally mastered if the best use is to made of the electronic detonator.
There remains one point generally of concern to users, and that is safety. The aim of the present paper is to discuss this aspect, avoiding an exhaustive list of the safety requirements of electronic
blasting systems but ftiliarising the reader with the basic principles, some of which derive directly
from conventional electrical systems, while others are closely linked to system architecture.
2 THE LIMITS OF THE ANALOGY WITH ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS
In figure 1, an electronic detonator looks much the same as a conventional electrical or nonelectrical detonator. In figure 2, it is still apparent that the mechanical and pyrotechnic portions of
both are very similar. It is for this reason that a number of the industrial standards laid down for
electrical or non electrical detonators remain valid in this context.

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2000 BAI - DAVEYTRONIC HIGH ACCURACY DIGITAL BLASTING SYSTEM & ELECTRONIC DETONATOR TECHNOLOGY: A SAFETY APPROACH

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For example, the performance of electronic detonators in terms of given climatic or mechanical
environments must be at least as good as that of conventional products.
Conversely, the electrical portion is fundamentally different. In the case of an electric detonator
this section amounts to no more than a fusehead, that is to say an electrical resistance wire that heats
up when the firing current travels through it, thereby igniting a nearby pyrotechnic composition.
Such a fusehead is also to be found in one form or another in the electronic detonator, but in this
case it is associated with electronic circuitry, which replaces the pyrotechnic delay composition.

Figure 1: Electronic and non-electric detonators

Pyrotechnc

fectronu

delay

delay

detonator

detonator

Figure 2: Electronic and electric detonators

In most cases, the firing circuit of an electronic detonator (see figure 3) is effected by a condenser
(C2) that discharges current through the fusehead via a firing transistor (SW3) controlled by a microcontroller (PC). All these components are built into the detonator (see figure 3).
Charging (SWl) and discharging (SW2) transistors complete the firing circuit of the system.

Copyright 2003 International Society of Explosives Engineers

2000 BAI - DAVEYTRONIC HIGH ACCURACY DIGITAL BLASTING SYSTEM & ELECTRONIC DETONATOR TECHNOLOGY: A SAFETY APPROACH

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SW1

communication

IJ

--

+
I
Cl

pc

$,,,

--+,
c2

Figure 3: Electronic detonator block diagram

An electronic igniter is different from a straightforward fusehead in two respects:
It is no longer a simple electrical resistance wire but an organised assemblage of more or less
complex components. It usually includes not only one or more conventional components such as
resistors, condensers and transistors, but also an electronic chip specifically designed for the mnctions required (an Application-Specific Integrated Circuit or ASK). If complexity is measured in
numbers of primary components, the shift in level of complexity here is from 1 to 10 !
Given its initiation role, it can be considered to form part of the exploder. Compared with conventional electrical systems, the electronic detonator contains what is in fact its own exploder controlled by a micro-controller linked to the firing console via a wire connection.
Another novel feature of electronic initiation systems is that their design introduces a massively
important software dimension. Although sequential electrical exploders were the first devices to incorporate a software component, firing systems for electronic detonators are entirely based around
software, not only in the testing and firing consoles, but also in the detonator itself.
3

AN EXAMINATION OF THE CIRCUIT

There are, broadly speaking, two methods of evaluating the degree of safety offered by an electronic circuit: these are the probabilistic and the deterministic approaches.
The probabilistic approach involves attempting to calculate levels of reliability. To do this, the reliability level of each component is considered separately in the light of the operational conditions for
the circuit concerned (compared with its performance in limit cases for example) and a statistical law
enables a level of reliability to be defined for the circuit as a whole on the basis of the individual reliability of each of its components. This method is difficult to apply to our electronic circuitry as described above due to the inclusion of an ASIC. The reason for this is that the degree of reliability of a
condenser or a resistor can be easily determined using manufacturers data, but this is not true of an
ASIC.
There are two explanations for this:
l
Any ASIC is a new component developed specifically for a given application and for which,
as a result, no data series exist for its failure rate.
l
Although an ASIC is composed of tens of thousands of individual elements etched into the
silicon, because of the microscopic distances between them they cannot be treated as if they
were discrete components. This fact rules out any statistical approach to the computation of
ASIC failure rates.
The most straightforward methods for evaluating this type of circuitry are the fault tree or the reliability block diagram. The limitation of these approaches is that they take no account of the temporal dimension of the occurrence of failures or the precautions taken at the design stage to prevent
such failures from occurring: e.g. self-test protocols during the blast procedure.

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2000 BAI - DAVEYTRONIC HIGH ACCURACY DIGITAL BLASTING SYSTEM & ELECTRONIC DETONATOR TECHNOLOGY: A SAFETY APPROACH

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The deterministic approach involves assessing scenarios for breakdowns and/or malfunctions
leading to a serious incident. To accomplish this, it is necessary to examine the ASIC minutely in
terms of its architecture, its application software and its manufacturing technology.
The main risks of malfunction (electro-migration, internal component breakdown, ESD, etc.)
must be considered in the context of the architecture of the chip itself and its environment (service
voltage/current). Elementary precautions need to be taken in terms of system layout. The part of the
chip that controls the initiation process must be kept well away from any source of interference, the
sensitive connection paths need to be distant from any path likely to induce stray signals, safety
distances must be observed between analogic modules, and so on and so forth - all these are basic
precautions.
Next, the software portion of the chip needs to be written with great care in order to avoid any
possibility of unintended initiation. For example, the various safety locks leading up to firing must be
controlled by separate software segments.
Finally, the chip-manufacturers control of the silicon etching technology must be absolute, a need
comparable with that for other Asic made using the same technology. It then remains to inspect each
chip individually after manufacture using qualification test protocols aimed at checking operation in
both nominal and limit conditions.
Nevertheless, however reliable an ASIC may be, at the design stage for the chip as a whole it is
still imperative to include a number of redundant safety circuits involving components external to the
ASIC.
4 THE APPROACH TO SAFETY
It should be borne in mind at the outset that one of the fundamental objectives of the electronic
detonator is to fill a gap in safety and reliability observed in conventional priming systems, whether
they be electrical or non-electrical in nature.
This objective is a natural one for two reasons: firstly, too many accidents still occur because of
the reliability and safety problems inherent in conventional devices, and secondly, because the introduction of electronics can - indeed, must - make it possible to introduce new functions aimed at
raising safety levels.
We should also remember that electronic detonators are still basically electric detonators. This description can be seen to correspond closely to the reality if one compares electronic detonators to
non-electric devices, but it does not take into account the very real differences that exist between an
electric detonator and an electronic detonator. Although a number of rules can be automatically
transferred from electrical detonators to electronic detonators, it remains the case that the new technologies used in electronic detonators and the architecture of electronic initiation systems have both
rapidly brought along with them an entirely new approach to safety.
As is usually the case when a new technology emerges, electronic detonators arrived on the market before the corresponding regulatory controls could be put in place.
Initially, safety and reliability studies were conducted on various systems in order to define their
precise functioning, architecture and possible failure modes. These first studies laid the foundation
for the European regulations currently going through the process of harmonisation.
At the same time, these first safety principles for electronic initiation systems have allowed a
number of national authorities to issue, on a case-by-case basis, special permits allowing the use of
these devices for field tests carried out with maximum precautions and awareness of the safety of users.

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2000 BAI - DAVEYTRONIC HIGH ACCURACY DIGITAL BLASTING SYSTEM & ELECTRONIC DETONATOR TECHNOLOGY: A SAFETY APPROACH

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5 RISK ANALYSIS
We should restate at this point the basic principles of risk analysis. Risks must be assessed in
terms of the real-life situations of the product and possible serious incidents.
Rl risks: Failures that cannot cause harm to individuals but cause the system to fail to operate.
R2 risks: Failures that cannot cause harm to individuals but may marginally affect the quality of
the blast. Example: an error in initiation delay.
R3 risks: Failures that cannot cause direct harm to individuals but may lead to a misfire requiring
special procedures. Example: a misfire of one or more detonators or an unintended initiation prior to
the reception of a blast instruction.
R4 risks: Failures capable of causing direct harm to individuals. Example: an unintended initiation
during the field handling phase or programming.

Transportationktorage
Ageing
Temperature variation
Humidity variation
EMI
Mechanical stress
ESD
Programming

0
0
0
0
0
0

Field handling

Blast

Post-blast

0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0
0

000
000

000

Table 1: Stress on devices at different stages of its life cycle

Risk levels need to be taken into account at each stage in the life of the product (see table 1):
l
The transport and storage phase
l
The field handling phase
l
The actual blasting phase
l
The post-blast phase

Transport
/storage
Unintended firing (internal malfunction or
externally-sourced stress)
Damage to certain components
Programming error
Single detonator misfire
Misfire of several detonators
,.n.-

.,.-

-.

--

-_

-_

-.--

RI

h::Ip,g

R4

R3

R3
R3
I

Bast

R3
R2
R3

:kt;

Dl-K*A

R2
R3

Table 2: Serious incidents at different stages in the product life cycle - associated risk levels

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2000 BAI - DAVEYTRONIC HIGH ACCURACY DIGITAL BLASTING SYSTEM & ELECTRONIC DETONATOR TECHNOLOGY: A SAFETY APPROACH

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Simplifying to some extent, we could say firstly that the two gravest possible incidents are unintended priming and misfire and, secondly, that according to the stage at which these occur, the associated risk level may be either R3 or R4.
6 BASIC SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
We need therefore to assess the safety requirements associated with each level of risk. Such reliability requirements are expressed in terms of numbers of breakdowns or faults the system can tolerate without generating a risk for the user. For example, French regulations require that no R3 risk
must arise where one system fault is present and no R4 risk must arise when two system faults are
present. It is the manufacturers responsibility to ensure that these standards are met and/or surpassed. This does not preclude of course the existence of more stringent requirements in other
countries.
The control of the above risks naturally requires use of a fault tree and minute examination of the
electronic circuitry (cf. $3) but rules deriving from the use of electrical systems can be immediately
applied.
6.1.1 Handling components in the field
This phase in the life cycle of the product is the point at which the user is most exposed to risk
since he is in the immediate vicinity of the detonators and the loaded boreholes.
The demands of safety during this handling phase must obviously be more stringent. French regulations impose the requirement that unintended priming must not be possible even if two separate
system faults are present.
The setting up of certain systems requires the use of a programming and/or test console, in order
to program detonators with identification or delay numbers for example.
The first precaution to be taken is to ensure that the voltage or current at the output of such devices when used at the blast face never exceeds a set limit defined to match the system function of
the squib (fusehead or other use). This restriction derives directly from that applied to safety ohmmeters used in association with electric detonators. The limit value, usually between a tenth and a
third of the non-fire value for the squib (set at 1OmA in France) is a basic safety precaution that deliberately takes no account of system architecture, the aim being to protect the user in the event that
electric and electronic detonators are used together by mistake.
Of itself, however, the condition defined above is not enough and the actual design of the circuit
must include as many safeguards as possible in order to prevent unintended initiation. Care must be
taken to ensure that the firing circuit cannot be activated by the programming console, even if two
system faults are present:
0
Software protection: the programming or test console mustnot contain the instructions required for firing nor for the activation of any part whatsoever of the firing circuit (see figure
9
Hardware protection: the instruction carried out by the detonator when instructed by the programming console must not involve components directly associated with the firing process.
elementary precaution is to separate not only the two functions but also the actual power used
for circuit operation, on the one hand, and firing on the other, by using two quite separate condensers. This makes it possible to guarantee that no component of the firing circuit can be activated during the programming process.
Another requirement relates to data transmission. In some systems, information is transmitted to
the detonators in the field: i.e. an identification or delay parameter. The regulations require not only
reliable transmission oFthis data but also the possibility for checking its integrity. Only systems that
l

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allow detonators to communicate with outside devices can permit this requirement to be met (Z-way
communication systems).
61.2 Firing phase
The particular feature of the electronic detonator compared with its electric counterpart (cf. $2) is
that it contains its own exploder. This means that power (i.e. high voltage) signals are no longer carried along the wires to fire the detonators (as in electric systems), but only low-energy signals intended for the micro-controller.
The safety requirements associated with electric exploders also logically apply to the system as a
whole, that is to say the programming console, the firing console and the detonator.
1. The system must guarantee that the firing instruction cannot be sent to the detonators without a
check that the system is capable of delivering sufficient power for initiation to be ensured. This
means that the system must have some means of verifying the level of power stored in the detonators
for initiation.
This imperative is a difficult one to satisfy if the same condenser is used for the actual initiation
and for powering the circuit during the firing procedure. This is because such a condenser will discharge gradually during the delay countdown and it will be the residual charge that is used for initiation.
In addition, this check must be done just a few moments prior to the blast and for all detonators
on the line. The reason for this is that the time during which the sufficient power for initiation is present in the detonators must be reduced to a minimum in order to reduce the risk of unintended firing.
2. The system must be able to ensure that the firing condensers will be immediately discharged if
there is a break in firing circuit continuity before reception of the firing instruction. This safety measure must therefore be built into the detonator itself in order to ensure that it discharges its condenser
in the event that the wires are cut or broken before the firing instruction is received.
61.3 During take-up or break-up of blast material
During this phase, the main danger comes from the possible presence in the muck pile of detonators that have not fired. Here again, two-way communications systems offer many possibilities for
self-testing and verification prior to blasting in order to avoid exposure of users to risk from defective detonators. This feature represents a major advantage compared with conventional systems insofar as it offers the user an opportunity to replace dysfunctional detonators, or at least to detect
misfires before the blast.
The system must be capable of guaranteeing that for a certain time after the end of the firing condenser charging phase they cannot contain sufficient power to initiate the detonators. This time period must be reduced to a minimum (less than 10 minutes) in order to ensure that any detonators that
do not fire are deactivated during digging or crushing of blast material,
7 CONCLUSION
The rigorous analysis of the large amounts of data accumulated during the field testing procedures
indicates that the introduction of the Daveytronic detonator into the commercial explosives market
will provide the explosives industry with a very beneficial and necessary tool. The test data quantified
positive trends in the overall blast performance within the test parameters treated in this study.
This is a technology that the blasting industry has anticipated and viewed as a major technological
advancement and quantum leap in the science of blasting. The accuracy and flexibility of the programmable detonator is providing the explosives industry with options never before available to op-

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timize the timing designs for maximum benefits in the areas of ground vibration control and maximized fragmentation. The industrys whole approach to blast timing design can now be focused on
pure productivity and blast performance, rather than be restricted by the limited interval selections
and inaccuracies the conventional pyrotechnics timing systems offer.
In the same time, blasting systems based around electronic detonators have allowed further progress to be made toward greater safety for users. The importance of this stride forward is certainly
comparable with the revolution brought about in its time by the Bickford fuse or, another more recent example, electrical detonators compared with the safety fuse.
It is our opinion that such systems, despite the fact that they are highly tempting in economic
terms, must above all else offer maximum safety for users. It is not enough for them to be as safe as
conventional systems - they need to be much more safe. In other words, electronic blasting systems
must not be only super accurate electronic detonators. Basic principles like 2-ways communication,
separation of power, full control of firing energy, are the minimum guaranties for the user to be in
control of its blast with a maximum of safety.
However, there is a price to pay for such enhancements: each function, each safety circuit, each
redundancy has a direct impact on the cost of the chip and many more years will be needed before
the effects of volume production will bring prices down in what is currently an emerging market.
The diversity and breadth of the possibilities offered by existing systems make it difficult to harmonise regulations. However, it would be desirable if that the evolution and the harmonization of
these regulations find a compromise between the economic constraints and the fundamental objective
of security, major asset of these new systems.

R EFEREN CES

Anders Nilson, Jan Jacobson, Safety and Reliability in Initiation Systems with Electronic Detonators, SP REPORT, 1996: 37, Swedish National Testing and Research Institute, Sweden, 1996.
Stkuritk des SystSmes Electroniques de mise ~3 feu de Dktonateurs, Exigences de &wit& et de fiabilitk [The
safety of electronic detonator initiation systems - safety and reliability requirements], INERIS Report, 1996. hstitut National de I Environnement Industriel et des Risques, France [National Institute for the Industrial Environment and Risks].
A4ise au point de mkthodes en vue de 1 agrkment technique et de I utilisation de ddtonateurs 6lectroniques [The
design of methods to obtain technical certification and for the use of electronic detonators], INERIS Report, 1997.
EN XxXx, Explosives for civil uses - Detonators and relays, Part 27 Definitions, methods and requirements for
electronic initiation systems, CEN prEN xxxxx part 27: 1999=.

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