Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
PAO
FACTS:
1. On April 26, 1973 Amado G. Garcia died and it was alleged that he
owned property in Calamba, Laguna.
2. On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule field with CFI Laguna a petition for
letters of administration and ex parte appointment as special administratix
over the estate. Motion was granted.
a. there was an allegation that the wife was Carolina Carpio
3. Preciosa B. Garcia, wife of deceased, and in behalf of their child:
Agustina B. Garcia opposed, which was denied by CFI.
a. Preciosa alleged that Fule was a creditor of the estate, and as a mere
illegitimate sister of the deceased is not entitled to succeed from him
4. CA reversed and annulled the appointment of Fule.
a. Preciosa became special administratrix upon a bond of P30k.
ISSUES:
a.) Are venue and jurisdiction the same? How can it be determined in the
present case?
b.) What does the word resides in Revised Rules of Court Rule 73 Section
1 Mean?
c.) Who is entitled as special administratix of the estate?
HELD/RATIO:
a.) Under RULE 73, SECTION 1. if the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will
shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled
at the CFI in the province in which he resides at the time of his death,
And if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the CFI of any province in
which he had estate.
The court 1st taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceedings, except in an appeal from that court, in
the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
Fules own submitted Death Certificate shows that the deceased resided in
QC at the time of his death, therefore the venue of Laguna was improper.
Venue is subject to waiver (RULE 4 SECTION 4), but Preciosa did not waive
it, merely requested for alternative remedy to assert her rights as
surviving spouse.
However, venue is distinct from jurisdiction which is conferred by
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended to be with CFIs independently from the
place of residence of the deceased.
RULE 79, SECTION 2, demands that the petition should show the existence
of jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should allege all the
necessary facts such as death, name, last residence, existence, situs of
assets, intestacy, right of person who seeks administration as next of kin,
creditor or otherwise to be appointed.
b.) The doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini
"actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This
term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and
should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or
rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the
statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence
and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction
between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same
meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual
or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts.
The residence of the decent or the location of his estate is not an element
of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. If this were
otherwise, it would affect the prompt administration of justice.
The court with whom the petition is first filed must also first take
cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction
over it to the exclusion of all other courts.
3. Gerona, et al. vs. De Guzman, et al., L-19060, May 29, 1964
Facts: Petitioners all surnamed Gerona, alleged that they are the
legitimate children of Domingo Gerona and Placida de Guzman.
Placida was a legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his first wife,
Teodora de la Cruz.
After the death of his first wife, Marcelo de Guzman married Camila
Ramos, who begot him several children, namely the respondents.
Marcelo de Guzman died and subsequently, respondents executed a deed
of "extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Marcelo de
Guzman", fraudulently misrepresenting therein that they were the only
surviving heirs of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman, although they well
knew that petitioners were, also, his forced heirs.
After appropriate proceedings, the trial court rendered a decision finding
that petitioners' mother was a legitimate child, by first marriage, of
Marcelo de Guzman; that the properties described in the complaint
belonged to the conjugal partnership of Marcelo de Guzman and his
second wife, Camila Ramos; and that petitioners' action has already
prescribed, and, accordingly, dismissing the complaint without costs. On
appeal taken by the petitioners, this decision as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, with costs against them.
But the probate court erred in declaring that the will was void and in
converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding.
The will is intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be given effect if
it does not prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes. The
distribution and partition would become effective upon the death of Felix
Balanay, Sr.
In the meantime, the net income should be equitably divided among the
children and the surviving spouse.
Aldino and Constancio, along with the other devisees and legatees, filed a
motion in S.P. No. 1736 for, among others, the allowance of the will of
Adriana Maloto. The CFI judge denied the motion on the ground that the
said motion had been filed out of time. The petitioners (Aldino et al.) filed
a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the SC but it was denied on
the ground of improper remedy.
The petitioners then commenced S.P. No. 2176 in the CFI of Iloilo for the
probate of the alleged last will and testament. The probate court dismissed
the petition on the basis of the finding of said court in S.P. No. 1736 that
the alleged will sought to be probated had been destroyed and revoked by
the testatrix.
Issue: Whether the dismissal of S.P. No. 2176 by the CFI of Iloilo was
proper?
Held: No. The probate court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition
for the probate of the alleged will of Adriana Maloto in S.P. No. 1736.
Indeed, the motion to reopen the proceedings was filed out of time.
Moreover, it is not proper to make a finding in an intestate proceeding that
the discovered will has been revoked. In fact, the probate court in S.P. No.
1736 stated in its order that Movants should have filed a separate
actionfor the probate of the will. Even this Court, in dismissing the
petition for certiorari, said that the more appropriate remedy is a separate
proceeding for the probate of the alleged will.
Thus, the order of the probate court in S.P. No. 1736 is not a bar to the
present petition for the probate of the alleged will of Adriana Maloto.
Doctrine: It is not proper to make a finding in an intestate proceeding
regarding the validity of an alleged will.