LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
MORENO DUMAPIS, ELMO TUNDAGUI and FRANCIS LIAGAO, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the November 7, 2003 Decision1 and April 15, 2004 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 75860.
The antecedents of the case are as follows:
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Corporation (petitioner), a domestic juridical entity engaged in
mining, employed Moreno Dumapis and Elmo Tundagui as lead miners; and Francis Liagao, as
load, haul and dump (LHD) machine operator (respondents). 3 All three were assigned at the
850 level, underground, Victoria Area in Lepanto, Mankayan, Benguet. This is a known
"highgrade" area where most of the ores mined are considered of high grade content. 4
In the afternoon of September 15, 2000, at 2:00 p.m., Dwayne Chambers (Chambers), one of
its foreign consultants who was then acting as Assistant Resident Manager of the Mine, went
underground at the 850 level to conduct a routinary inspection of the workers and the working
conditions therein. When he went to the various stopes of the said level, he was surprised to
see that nobody was there. However, when he went to the 8k stope, he noticed a group of
workers sitting, sorting, and washing ores believed to be "highgrade." Realizing that
"highgrading"5 was being committed, Chambers shouted. Upon hearing his angry voice, the
workers scampered in different directions of the stope. 6 Chambers then reported the incident
to the security investigation office. 7
After investigating, Security Investigators Paul Pespes, Jr. and Felimon Ringor (Security
Investigators) executed a Joint Affidavit, which reads as follows:
xxxx
At about 3:40 PM of September 15, 2000, while we were at the Lepanto Security
Investigation office, we received a report that the LMD Asst. Resident Manager, Mr.
Dwayne Chambers saw and surprised several unidentified miners at 8K Stope, 850
level committing Highgrading activities therein;
Consequently, all miners assigned to work therein including their supervisor and SG
Ceasarion Damoslog, an element of the Mine Security Patrol posted therein as
stationary guard were called to this office for interrogation regarding this effect;
In the course of the investigation, we eventually learned that the highgrading event
really transpired somewhere at the roadway of 8K Stope, 850 level at about 2:00
oclock PM of September 15, 2000. That the involved participants were all miners
assigned to work at 7K Stope, 8K Stope, 240 E, Cross Cut South level drive, all located
at 850 mine level. Likewise, the detailed stationary guard assigned thereat and some
mine supervisors were also directly involved in this activity;
Security Guard Ceasarion Damoslog honestly confessed his direct participation then
claimed that he was allegedly convinced by Mr. Joel Gumatin, one of the miners
assigned at Panel No.1-est-North, 8K Stope, 850 level to cooperate with them to
commit Highgrading. He revealed his companions to be all the miners assigned at 8K
stope, namely, Joel Gumatin, Brent Suyam, Maximo Madao, Elmo Tundagui and Daniel
Fegsar. He also included those who were assigned to work at 240 E, XCS, namely:
Thomas Garcia (immediate supervisor), John Kitoyan, Moreno Dumapis, and Marolito

Cativo. He enumerated also messrs. Benedict Arocod, Samson Damian, and Dionisio
Bandoc, 7K Stope, 850 level assigned miners and shiftboss, respectively;
Mr. Pablo Daguio, the shiftboss of 240 E, XCS, 850 level also positively confirmed the
Highgrading activity. He added that actually he came upon the group and even
dispersed them when he went therein prior to the arrival of Mr. Chambers;
Furthermore, we also learned from the confession of Mr. Maximo Madao that its was
messrs. Joel Gumatin and Brent Suyam who took their issued rock drilling machine then
drilled holes and blasted the same at the 8K Stope roadway with the assistance of
Thomas Garcia, John Kitoyan, Benedict Arocod, Samsom Damian, Daniel Fegsar and
Francisco Liagao. That SG Ceasarion Damoslog was present on the area standing and
watching the group during the incident;
That we are executing this joint affidavit to establish the foregoing facts and to support
any complaint that may be filed against respondents;
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto set our hands and affix our signature this
28th day of September 2000, at Lepanto, Mankayan, Benguet. 8
(Emphasis supplied)
On October 24, 2000, petitioner issued a resolution finding respondents and their co-accused
guilty of the offense of highgrading and dismissing them from their employment. 9
On November 14, 2000, respondents together with the nine other miners, filed a Complaint
for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter (LA), docketed as NLRC Case No. 11-0607-00
against petitioner.10On August 21, 2001, the LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
On September 22, 2001, the miners appealed the decision of the LA to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). On August 30, 2002, the NLRC rendered a Decision, declaring
the dismissal of herein respondents as illegal, but affirming the dismissal of the nine other
complainant miners. The dispositive portion of the NLRC Decision insofar as respondents are
concerned, reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the DECISION dated August 21, 2001 is hereby
MODIFIED declaring the dismissal of complainants [herein respondents] Moreno
Dumapis, Elmo Tundagui and Francis Liagao illegal and ordering respondent to pay
them backwages in the total amount of four hundred eighty thousand one hundred
eighty two pesos and 63/100 (P480, 182.63) and separation pay in the total amount of
four hundred seventeen thousand two hundred thirty pesos and 32/100 (P417,230.32)
as computed in the body of the decision.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit by the NLRC in
its Resolution dated on November 22, 2002.12
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA
assailing the aforementioned decision and resolution of the NLRC. The CA affirmed the
decision of the NLRC13 and denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, herein petition on the following grounds:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSIONS

DECISION DATED AUGUST 30, 2002 WHICH DECLARED AS ILLEGAL THE

DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE OF HEREIN RESPONDENTS.14
A. The Court of Appeals strict application of the hearsay rule under Section
36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court to the present case is uncalled for.
B. In cases of dismissal for breach of trust and confidence, proof beyond
doubt is not required, it being sufficient that the employer has reasonable
ground to believe that the employees are responsible for the misconduct
which renders them unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by their
position.15
The petition is devoid of merit.
In finding the dismissal of respondents illegal, the CA upheld the NLRC in considering the Joint
Affidavit of the Security Investigators (Joint Affidavit) as hearsay and therefore inadmissible, to
wit:
We subscribed to the conclusion of the NLRC that the Joint Affidavit of Security
Investigators Paul D. Pespes, Jr. and Felimon Ringor is hearsay and thus, inadmissible.
Their narration of factual events was not based on their personal knowledge but on
disclosures made by Chambers and Daguio. Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
defined the nature of hearsay:
Witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, that
is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these
rules.16
Arguing for the admissibility of the Joint Affidavit, petitioner cites Article 221 of the Labor
Code, as amended, which provides:
Article 221. Technical rules not binding and prior resort to amicable settlement. In any
proceeding before the Commission or any Labor Arbiters, the rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is
the spirit and intention of the Code that the Commission and its members and the
Labor Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each
case speedily and objectively and without regard to the technicalities of law or
procedure, all in the interest of due process. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
We agree with the petitioner.
Administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of law and
procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court and
prevailing jurisprudence may be given only stringent application, i.e., by analogy or in a
suppletory character and effect. 17
In a number of cases, 18 this Court has construed Article 221 of the Labor Code as permitting
the NLRC or the LA to decide a case on the basis of position papers and other documents
submitted without necessarily resorting to technical rules of evidence as observed in the
regular courts of justice. Rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before
administrative bodies like the NLRC. 19
In Bantolino v. Coca-Coca Bottlers Phils., Inc.20 the Court ruled that although the affiants had
not been presented to affirm the contents of their affidavits and be cross-examined, their
affidavits may be given evidentiary value; the argument that such affidavits were hearsay was
not persuasive. Likewise, in Rase v. National Labor Relations Commission,21 this Court ruled
that it was not necessary for the affiants to appear and testify and be cross-examined by
counsel for the adverse party. To require otherwise would be to negate the rationale and

purpose of the summary nature of the proceedings mandated by the Rules and to make
mandatory the application of the technical rules of evidence.
Thus, the CA and the NLRC erred in ruling that the Joint Affidavit is inadmissible for being
hearsay. The Joint Affidavit of the Security Investigators is admissible for what it is, an
investigation report.
However, the admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value.
Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered
at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the admitted evidence proves
an issue.22 Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight
depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. 23 The
distinction is clearly laid out in Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission.24 In finding that the Report of the Chief Engineer did not constitute substantial
evidence to warrant the dismissal of Rosaroso, this Court ruled:
According to petitioner, the foregoing Report established that respondent was
dismissed for just cause. The CA, the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter, however, refused to
give credence to the Report. They are one in ruling that the Report cannot be given any
probative value as it is uncorroborated by other evidence and that it is merely hearsay,
having come from a source, the Chief Engineer, who did not have any personal
knowledge of the events reported therein.
xxxx
The CA upheld these findings, succinctly stating as follows:
Verily, the report of Chief Engineer Retardo is utterly bereft of probative value. It is not
verified by an oath and, therefore, lacks any guarantee of trusthworthiness. It is
furthermore, and this is crucial, not sourced from the personal knowledge of Chief
Engineer Retardo. It is rather based on the perception of "ATTENDING SUPT. ENGINEERS
CONSTANTLY OBSERVING ALL PERSONNELS ABILITY AND ATTITUDE WITH REGARDS TO
OUR TECHNICAL CAPABILITY AND BEHAVIOURS WITH EMPHASY [sic] ON DISCIPLINE"
who " NOTICED 3/E ROSAROSO AS BEING SLACK AND NOT CARING OF HIS JOB AND
DUTIES x x x." Accordingly, the report is plain hearsay. It is not backed up by the
affidavit of any of the "Supt." Engineers who purportedly had first-hand knowledge of
private respondents supposed "lack of discipline," "irresponsibility" and "lack of
diligence" which caused him to lose his job. x x x
The Courts finds no reason to reverse the foregoing findings. 25 (Emphasis supplied)
While it is true that administrative or quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the
technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases, this procedural rule should not be
construed as a license to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules. The evidence
presented must at least have a modicum of admissibility for it to have probative value. 26 Not
only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must
be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. 27 It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 28 Thus,
even though technical rules of evidence are not strictly complied with before the LA and the
NLRC, their decision must be based on evidence that must, at the very least, be substantial. 29
Pursuant to the aforementioned doctrines, we now look into the probative weight of the Joint
Affidavit.
An examination of the Joint Affidavit reveals that the facts alleged therein by the Security
Investigators are not of their own personal knowledge. They simply referred to the facts
allegedly relayed to them by Chambers, Damoslog, Daguio, and Madao. Thus, there is a need
to individually scrutinize the statements and testimonies of the four sources of the Joint
Affidavit in order to determine the latters probative weight.

The Joint Affidavit states that, "Mr. Dwayne Chambers saw and surprised several unidentified
miners x x x."30 Chambers simply narrated to the Security Investigators what he saw but did
not indicate herein respondents.
Also stated in the Joint Affidavit is the alleged confession of Damoslog wherein he named
respondents Tundagui and Dumapis as his companions in the act of highgrading . 31
Records show that Damoslog submitted two sworn statements. In his first
statement,32 Damoslog claimed that he was unaware of the act of highrading, and denied any
involvement therein. However, in his second statement, 33 Damoslog claimed to have
personally witnessed the act of highgrading and named the miners involved to wit:
07. Ques - Could you narrate briefly how it transpired then?
Ans - On the first hour of this specific dated and shift at about 0800hrs, while we were
at the 8K stope, 850 level, Mr. Joel Gumatin approached me that he could not procure
some needed amount of money and if possible we will commit highgrading for that
effect to settle his problem. That because I pity him, I just answered that if they could
manage to do it then they could do it.
08. Ques - Who was the companion of Mr. Gumatin when he approached you?
Ans - He was alone.
09. Ques - Did Gumatin specifically informed [sic] you his problem?
Ans - I did not asked him honestly but he only insisted that he needed an amount of
money badly as I earlier said.
10. Ques - So just after telling his purpose did he started [sic] the highgrading activity?
Ans - No, the highgrading scheme started at past 1300 Hrs.
11. Ques - How did it started [sic]?
Ans - They started after they all finished their respective drilling assignment. That while
I was near the panel 2-West located at the inner portion of 8K Stope, I observed the
LHD unit coming from the roadway near the 8K Eating station which was previously
parked thereat proceeded to the roadway of panel 1-West then started cleaning and
scraping said roadway. That after cleaning he parked it at the inner portion of the
roadway. Then afterwhich one among the miner who was not assigned therein and I
failed to identify his name shove two shovels on the roadway recently cleaned by the
LHD then handed it to us with another man whom I dont know his name but could
recognize and identify him if I will meet him again then we washed the same in the
inner area of panel 2-West which is adjacent. That after washing and sorting the same,
we placed it atop of an spread cartoon [sic] sheet. That while we were busy washing
and sorting, Mr. Gumatin also was fixing and spreading the airhose for rockdrilling
machine. That few moments thereafter, I heard the running engine of the drilling
machine but I can not identify the operator as my line of view was obstructed by the
curbed angle of the panel where we are washing the ores. That afterwhich I heard
somebody that they are now going to blast the drilled holes but we remained in our
place continuing washing the stones. That after the blast Mr. Garcia and one other
companion whom I failed to identify due to foggy condition caused by the explosive
blasting then handed us the additional newly unearth ores for washing. That while were
still busy washing, Gumatin approached us then told us that he will collect what was
already washed and sorted and start to process the same. That Gumatin took the items
then started to pound the ores atop of an LHD unit parked near the entrance of panel 2East which was not used during the shift. That after that, I stood up then subsequently
proceeded to panel 2-West then observed messrs. Maximo Madao, Benedict

Arocod, Brent Suyam, Daniel Fegsar, Thomas Garcia, Mariolito Cativo, John
Kitoyna and Samson Damian who acted as the look out at the junction of 240 E, XCS
and 8K Stope. The enumerated miners except Damian were in squatting position in
scattered adjacent places busy sorting ores. Moments later Shift boss Dionisio
Bandoc arrived then went to the place of Gumatin then told us that he will get a
portion of the already proceeded ores for the operator to handcarry so that he will not
need to come to 8K Stope, 850 level then after taking some of the loot he proceeded
out simultaneously uttering that he will check the look out at the outer area of the
mainline posted away from the 7K Stope.34 (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, Damoslog does not name respondents Dumapis and Tundagui as among the miners
involved in the act of highgrading; neither does he mention respondent Liagao.
The Joint Affidavit also states that Daguio positively confirmed the act of highgrading.
However, in his sworn statement,35 Daguio claims that he did not recognize nor did he identify
any of the miners, to wit:
11. Ques - In your own honest observation, what could be the estimate [sic] number of
this group of miners doing highgrading activities?
Ans - I dont know but obviously they were several as manifested by their number of
cap lamplights. I also speculated that some of them were hidden at the curved inner
access of the roadway enroute to the inner area.
12. Ques - Did you recognize nor [sic] identify any of them?
Ans - Honestly, no.36 (Emphasis supplied)
Lastly, the Joint Affidavit also points to the confession of Madao wherein he particularly named
respondent Liagao as one of the miners involved in the act of highgrading.
Madao submitted two sworn statements. In his first sworn statement 37 dated September 16,
2000, Madao claimed his innocence. He did not incriminate any of the respondents. However,
in his second sworn statement38 dated September 20, 2000, Madao claimed to have
knowledge of the act of highgrading and specifically named respondent Liagao as one of the
miners involved, to wit:
09. Ques - Do I understand that Mr. Suyam has companions and had drilled first the
flooring of that roadway before blasting it?
Ans - Yes, that is true I saw Suyam and Gumatin transferred [sic] their assigned drilling
machine at the said roadway and drilled the area with the company of Garcia, Kitoyan,
Arocod, Damian, Fegsar and Liagao. 39 (Emphasis supplied)
Nonetheless, the second sworn statement of Madao is not sufficient to find Liagao guilty of
highgrading. In a Joint Affidavit40 which he executed with respondent Tundagui, Madao made
the following declarations:
When I, MAXIMO MADAO reported for work on September 16, 2000, I am being required
to appear at the security investigation office. After quitting time I went to the security
office and was surprised to learn that my name is among those listed persons who were
seen by Mr. Chambers committing acts of highgrading on September 15, 2000.
However, when I quit work on September 20, 2000 I was again called through
telephone to appear at the security office. Investigator Felimon Ringor told me that I
will give another statement and convinced to tell me all the names of the persons
assigned thereat with the promise that I will report for work. With my limited education
having not finished grade 1, I was made to give my statement on questions and
answers which are self-incriminating and knowingly mentioned names of persons who
are innocent. Worst, when I got my copy and the contents were fully explained to me by

our legal counsel I was surprised that it was duly notarized when in fact and in truth
after I gave my statement I did not appear before Atty. Nina Fe Lazaga-Raffols for
swearing. With this circumstances, I hereby RETRACT my statement dated September
20, 2000 for being self incriminatory unassisted by my counsel or union representative
and hereby ADAPTS [sic] and RETAINS my sworn statement dated September 16,
2000.41 (Emphasis supplied)
In labor cases, in which technical rules of procedure are not to be strictly applied if the result
would be detrimental to the workingman, an affidavit of desistance gains added importance in
the absence of any evidence on record explicitly showing that the dismissed employee
committed the act which caused the dismissal.42 Accordingly, the Court cannot turn a blind
eye and disregard Madaos recantation, as it serves to cast doubt as to the guilt of respondent
Liagao.
Based on the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the Joint Affidavit, being sourced from
Chambers, Damoslog, Daguio and Madao, has no probative value to support evidence to
warrant the dismissal of the respondents. Chambers and Daguio did not identify the miners
involved in the act of highgrading. In addition, Damoslogs first and second sworn statements
did not implicate respondents, and Madao recanted his statement implicating respondent
Liagao. As earlier discussed, the sworn statements and joint affidavits of the sources do not
corroborate but actually cast doubt as to the veracity of the statements in the Joint Affidavit.
The second ground is not plausible.
While the Court agrees that the job of the respondents, as miners, although generally
described as menial, is nevertheless of such nature as to require a substantial amount of trust
and confidence on the part of petitioner, 43 the rule that proof beyond reasonable doubt is not
required to terminate an employee on the charge of loss of confidence, and that it is sufficient
that there be some basis for such loss of confidence, is not absolute. 44
The right of an employer to dismiss an employee on the ground that it has lost its trust and
confidence in him must not be exercised arbitrarily and without just cause. 45 In order that loss
of trust and confidence may be considered as a valid ground for an employees dismissal, it
must be substantial and not arbitrary, and must be founded on clearly established facts
sufficient to warrant the employees separation from work. 46
In the present case, the Court reiterates that the evidence is not substantial to hold
respondents guilty of highgrading so as to warrant the dismissal of respondents.
Moreover, it is a well-settled doctrine that if doubts exist between the evidence presented by
the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. It is
a time-honored rule that in controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts
reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation of agreements and writing,
should be resolved in the formers favor. The policy is to extend the doctrine to a greater
number of employees who can avail themselves of the benefits under the law, which is in
consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to
labor.47
Lastly, respondents prayer in their Comment48 and Memorandum,49 that the CA Decision be
modified by ordering their reinstatement to their former positions without loss of seniority
rights and with payment of full backwages from their alleged dismissal up to date of
reinstatement, deserves scant consideration. Respondents are estopped from claiming their
right to reinstatement. Records show that respondents along with their co-accused, filed an
appeal with the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 75457 questioning the decision of the NLRC.
The said appeal was denied by the CA. The case was then elevated to this Court through a
petition for review, entitled Thomas Garcia v. Court of Appeals, docketed as G.R. No. 162554.
However, the same was denied with finality for having been filed out of time. 50 In effect, it
serves to estop the respondents from praying for their reinstatement in the present case.
Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, which is also known as "reclusion of issues"

or "collateral estoppel," issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be
raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of
action.51 Applied to the present case, the "former suit" refers to CA-G.R. SP No. 75457 wherein
the CA ordered separation pay instead of reinstatement and G.R. No. 162554 wherein this
Court denied the petition for review filed by respondents together with other dismissed
workers. The "future case" is the present case in which the petitioner is Lepanto Consolidated
Mining Company assailing the validity of the CA Decision declaring the dismissal of
respondents to be illegal. Reinstatement was not an issue raised by herein petitioner.
Respondents cannot now be allowed to raise the same in the petition filed by petitioner, for
that would circumvent the finality of judgment as to separation pay insofar as respondents
are concerned.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November
7, 2003 and its Resolution dated April 15, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 75860 are AFFIRMED.
Double costs against petitioner

PEOPLE OF THE
appellant.

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. TOMAS

TUNDAG, accused-

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For automatic review is the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch
28, in Criminal Cases Nos.DU-6186 and DU-6203, finding appellant Tomas Tundag guilty of two
counts of incestuous rape and sentencing him to death twice.
On November 18, 1997, private complainant Mary Ann Tundag filed with the Mandaue City
Prosecutors Office two separate complaints for incestuous rape. The first complaint, docketed
as Criminal Case No. DU-6186, alleged:
That on or about the 5th day of September, 1997, in the City of Mandaue, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the father of
complainant MARY ANN TUNDAG, who is a 13-year-old girl, with deliberate intent, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the said offended party
against the latters will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
The other, docketed as Criminal Case No. DU-6203, averred:
That on or about the 7th day of November, 1997, in the City of Mandaue, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the father of
complainant MARY ANN TUNDAG, who is a 13-year-old girl, with deliberate intent, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the said offended party
against the latters will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Upon arraignment appellant, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded Not Guilty to the
charges.
The two cases were consolidated and a joint trial ensued.
Appellants defense was bare denial. He claimed that private complainant had fabricated
the rape charges against him since he and his daughter, had a quarrel when he accordingly
reprimanded her for going out whenever he was not at home. [3]
Appellant did not present any witness to reinforce his testimony.
On August 31, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Joint Judgment is hereby rendered, to wit:
I. In Criminal Case No. DU-6186 a) Finding the herein accused TOMAS TUNDAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
of rape, said accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty of death;
b) To indemnify the offended party Mary Ann Tundag the following amounts:
(1) P50,000.00 by reason of the commission of the offense of rape upon her; and
(2) Another P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages under Article 2219 in relation to
Articles 2217 and 2230 of the New Civil Code for the pain and moral shock suffered by her

and for the commission of the crime of rape with one qualifying aggravating circumstance;
and
c) To pay the costs.
II. In Criminal Case No. DU-6203 a) Finding the herein accused TOMAS TUNDAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
of rape, said accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty of death;
b) To indemnify the offended party Mary Ann Tundag the following amounts:
(1) P50,000.00 by reason of the commission of the offense of rape upon her; and
(2) Another P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages under Article 2219 in relation to
Articles 2217 and 2230 of the New Civil Code for the pain and moral shock suffered by her
and for the commission of the crime of rape with one qualifying aggravating circumstance;
and
(3) To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[4]
In its judgment, the court below gave credence to complainants version of what accused
did to her.
The evidence for the prosecution as adduced during the trial on the merits clearly shows that
private complainant Mary Ann Tundag is a 13 year old girl who does not know how to read and
write and has an IQ of 76% which is a very low general mental ability and was living with her
father, the herein accused, at Galaxy Compound, Mandaue City.
xxx
That on September 5, 1997 at about 10:00 oclock in the evening, she was in the house
together with her father. But before she went to sleep, her father was already lying down on
the mat while herself (sic) just lied down at his head side which was not necessarily beside
him. However, when she was already sleeping, she noticed that her father who was already
undressed was beside her and was embracing her. Then, he undressed her which she resisted
but her father used a knife and told her that he would kill her if she shouts and after that, he
inserted his penis into her vagina and told her not to shout or tell anyone. In effect, his penis
penetrated her genital, which made her vagina bleed and was very painful.
That when the penis of her father was already inserted in her vagina, her father was all the
time asking by saying (sic) : Does it feel good? And at the same time, he was laughing and
further, told her that a woman who does not marry can never enter heaven and he got angry
with her when she contradicted his statement.
That while the penis of her father was inside her vagina and (he) was humping over her, she
felt intense pain that she cried and told him to pull it out but did not accede and in fact,
said: Why will I pull it out when it feels so good(?)
That after removing his penis from her vagina and after telling her that she could not go to
heaven if she did not get married, her father just stayed there and continued smoking while
she cried.
That in the evening of November 7, 1997, she was at home washing the dishes while her
father was just smoking and squatting. That after she finished washing the dishes, she lied
(sic) down to sleep when her father embraced her and since she does not like what he did to

her, she placed a stool between them but he just brushed it aside and laid down with her and
was able to take her womanhood again by using a very sharp knife which he was holding and
was pointing it at the right side of her neck which made her afraid.
That in the early morning of the following day, she left her fathers place and went to her
neighbor by the name of Bebie Cabahug and told her what had happened to her, who, in turn,
advised her to report the matter to the police, which she did and accompanied by the
policemen, she went to the Southern Islands Hospital where she was examined and after her
medical examination, she was brought back by the police and was investigated by them. [5]
Appellants claim that the complainants charges were manufactured did not impress the
trial court, which found him twice guilty of rape. Now before us, appellant assails his double
conviction, simply contending that:[6]
THE TRIAL COURT HAS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN NOT ABSOLVING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
OF THE CRIMES CHARGED IN THE INFORMATIONS DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF REASONABLE
DOUBT TO EXCULPATE HIM OF THE SAME.
Appellant flatly denies that the incidents complained of ever took place. He contends that
on September 5, 1997, he was working as a watch repairman near Gals Bakery in Mandaue
City Market and went home tired and sleepy at around 11:00 oclock that evening. On
November 7, 1997, he claims he was at work. In his brief, he argues that it was impossible for
him to have raped his daughter because when the incidents allegedly transpired, he went to
work and naturally, being exhausted and tired, it is impossible for him to do such
wrongdoings.[7]
The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with appellant and urges the Court to affirm
the trial courts decision, with the recommendation that the award of damages and
indemnity ex delicto be modified to conform to prevailing jurisprudence.
Considering the gravity of the offense charged as a heinous crime and the irreversibility of
the penalty of death imposed in each of these cases before us, the Court leaves no stone
unturned in its review of the records, including the evidence presented by both the
prosecution and the defense. Conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of
guilt.[8] But here we find no room to disturb the trial courts judgment concerning appellants
guilt, because his defense is utterly untenable.
Appellants defense of alibi and denial is negative and self-serving. It hardly counts as a
worthy and weighty ground for exculpation in a trial involving his freedom and his life. Against
the testimony of private complainant who testified on affirmative matters, [9] such defense is
not only trite but pathetic. Denial is an inherently weak defense, which becomes even weaker
in the face of the positive identification by the victim of the appellant as the violator of her
honor.[10] Indeed, we find that private complainant was unequivocal in charging appellant with
ravishing her. The victims account of the rapes complained of was straightforward, detailed,
and consistent.[11] Her testimony never wavered even after it had been explained to her that
her father could be meted out the death penalty if found guilty by the court. [12]
In a prosecution for rape, the complainants credibility is the single most important issue.
The determination of the credibility of witnesses is primarily the function of the trial
court. The rationale for this is that the trial court has the advantage of having observed at
first hand the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand and, therefore, is in a better position to
form an accurate impression and conclusion. [14] Absent any showing that certain facts of value
have clearly been overlooked, which if considered could affect the result of the case, or that
the trial courts finding are clearly arbitrary, the conclusions reached by the court of origin
must be respected and the judgment rendered affirmed. [15]
[13]

Moreover, we note here that private complainants testimony is corroborated by medical

findings that lacerations were present in her hymen. The examination conducted by Dr. Bessie
Acebes upon the private complainant yielded the following results:
Genitalia: grossly female

Pubic Hairs: scanty

Labia Majora: coaptated
Labia Minora: do

Fourchette: U-shaped
Vestibule: pinkish
Hymen: + old healed laceration at 3 and 9 oclock position(s).
Orifice: admits 2 fingers with ease
Vagina:
Walls: pinkish
Ruganities: prominent
Uterus: small
Cervix: closed
Discharges: Mucoid, minimal
Smears:
Conclusions: sperm identification (-)
Gram staining of vaginal disc.[16]
Dr. Acebes testified that her findings of healed hymenal lacerations in the complainants
private parts meant a history of sexual congress on her part. [17] According to her, the
lacerations may have been caused by the entry of an erect male organ into complainants
genitals. The examining physician likewise pointed out that previous coitus may be inferred
from complainants U-shaped fourchette since the fourchette of a female who has not yet
experienced sexual intercourse is V-shaped. [18] While Dr. Acebes conceded under crossexamination, that the existence of the datum U-shape(d) fourchette does not conclusively and
absolutely mean that there was sexual intercourse or contact because it can be caused by
masturbation of fingers or other things, [19] nonetheless, the presence of the hymenal
lacerations tends to support private complainants claim that she was raped by appellant.
Appellant next contends that his daughter pressed the rape charges against him because
she had quarreled with him after he had castigated her for misbehavior. He stresses that the
prosecution did not rebut his testimony regarding his quarrel or misunderstanding with private
complainant. He urges us to consider the charges filed against him as the result of his
frequent castigation of her delinquent behavior. [20]
Such allegation of a family feud, however, does not explain the charges away. Filing a case
for incestuous rape is of such a nature that a daughters accusation must be taken seriously. It
goes against human experience that a girl would fabricate a story which would drag herself as
well as her family to a lifetime of dishonor, unless that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct
to protect her honor. [21] More so, where her charges could mean the death of her own father,
as in this case.
Appellant likewise points out that it was very unlikely for him to have committed the
crimes imputed to him considering that he and his wife had ten children to attend to and care
for. This argument, however, is impertinent and immaterial.Appellant was estranged from his

wife, and private complainant was the only child who lived with him. [22] As pointed out by the
Solicitor General, appellant was thus free to do as he wished to satisfy his bestial lust on his
daughter.[23]
Nor does appellants assertion that private complainant has some psychological problems
and a low IQ of 76 in any way favor his defense. These matters did not affect the credibility of
her testimony that appellant raped her twice. We note that the victim understood the
consequences of prosecuting the rape charges against her own father, as shown by the
following testimony of the victim on cross-examination:
Q : Were you informed that if, and when your father will be found guilty, your father will be
sentenced to death?
A : Yes.
Q : Until now you wanted that your father will be sentenced by death?
A (Witness nodding.)
xxx
Q : I will inform you, Miss Witness, that you have filed two cases against your father and in
case your father would be found guilty, two death sentences will be imposed against
him?
A: Yes.
Q: With that information, do you still want this case would proceed?
A: I want this to proceed.[24]
Indeed, appellant is guilty. But is the penalty of death imposed on him correct?
Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659,
penalizes rape of a minor daughter by her father as qualified rape [26] and a heinous
crime. In proving such felony, the prosecution must allege and prove the elements of rape: (1)
sexual congress; (2) with woman; (3) by force or without her consent [27] and in order to
warrant the imposition of capital punishment, the additional elements that: (4) the victim is
under 18 years of age at the time of the rape and (5) the offender is a parent of the victim. [28]
[25]

In this case, it was sufficiently alleged and proven that the offender was the victims father.
But the victims age was not properly and sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt. She
testified that she was thirteen years old at the time of the rapes. However, she admitted that
she did not know exactly when she was born because her mother did not tell her. She further
said that her birth certificate was likewise with her mother. In her own words, the victim
testified - [30]
[29]

COURT TO WITNESS
Q: When were you born?
A: I do not know.
Q: You do not know your birthday?
A: My mama did not tell me exactly when I asked her.
COURT: Proceed.
FISCAL PEREZ: For our failure to secure the Birth Certificate Your Honor, may we just
request for judicial notice that the victim here is below 18 years old.
ATTY. SURALTA: Admitted.
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act
on without proof because they already know them. [31] Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice
may either be mandatory or discretionary. Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides
when court shall take mandatory judicial notice of facts -

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice without the
introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history,
forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and
maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the
Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
Section 2 of Rule 129 enumerates the instances when courts may take discretionary
judicial notice of facts SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. - A court may take judicial notice of matters which
are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be
known to judges because of their judicial functions.
Thus, it can be considered of public knowledge and judicially noticed that the scene of the
rape is not always nor necessarily isolated or secluded for lust is no respecter of time or
place. The offense of rape can and has been committed in places where people congregate,
e.g. inside a house where there are occupants, a five (5) meter room with five (5) people
inside, or even in the same room which the victim is sharing with the accuseds sister. [32]
The Court has likewise taken judicial notice of the Filipinas inbred modesty and shyness
and her antipathy in publicly airing acts which blemish her honor and virtue. [33]
On the other hand, matters which are capable of unquestionable demonstration pertain to
fields of professional and scientific knowledge. For example, in People v. Alicante,[34] the trial
court took judicial notice of the clinical records of the attending physicians concerning the
birth of twin baby boys as premature since one of the alleged rapes had occurred 6 to 7
months earlier.
As to matters which ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions, an
example would be facts which are ascertainable from the record of court proceedings, e.g. as
to when court notices were received by a party.
With respect to other matters not falling within the mandatory or discretionary judicial
notice, the court can take judicial notice of a fact pursuant to the procedure in Section 3 of
Rule 129 of the Rules of Court which requires that SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. - During the trial, the court, on its own
initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any
matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on
request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.
In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper, despite the defense
counsels admission, thereof acceding to the prosecutions motion. As required by Section 3 of
Rule 129, as to any other matters such as age, a hearing is required before courts can take
judicial notice of such fact. Generally, the age of the victim may be proven by the birth or
baptismal certificate of the victim, or in the absence thereof, upon showing that said
documents were lost or destroyed, by other documentary or oral evidence sufficient for the
purpose.
Thus, in People v. Rebancos, 172 SCRA 426 (1989), the victim was below 12 and we found
that the rape committed was statutory rape. The mother testified that her daughter was born
on October 26, 1974, and so was only 9 years old at the time of the rape on February 12,
1984. Although no birth certificate was presented because the victims birth had allegedly not
been registered, her baptismal certificate was duly presented. Hence, we ruled that the
mothers testimony coupled with the presentation of the baptismal certificate was sufficient to
establish that the victim was below 12 at the time of the rape.

However, in People v. Vargas, 257 SCRA 603 (1996), we ruled that appellant can only be
convicted of simple rape, and not statutory rape, because of failure of the prosecution to
prove the minority of the victim, who was allegedly 10 years old at the time of the rape. The
prosecution failed to present either the birth or baptismal certificate of the victim. Also there
was no showing that the said documents were lost or destroyed to justify their nonpresentation. We held that testimony of the victim and her aunt were hearsay, and that it was
not correct for the trial court to judge the age of the victim by her appearance.
In several recent cases, we have emphasized the need for independent proof of the age of
the victim, aside from testimonial evidence from the victim or her relatives. In People v. Javier,
[35]
we stressed that the prosecution must present independent proof of the age of the victim,
even though it is not contested by the defense. The minority of the victim must be proved
with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself. In People v. Cula,[36] we reiterated that it
is the burden of the prosecution to prove with certainty the fact that the victim was below 18
when the rape was committed in order to justify the imposition of the death penalty. Since the
record of the case was bereft of any independent evidence thereon, such as the victims duly
certified Certificate of Live Birth, accurately showing private complainants age, appellant
could not be convicted of rape in its qualified form. In People v. Veloso,[37] the victim was
alleged to have been only 9 years of age at the time of the rape. It held that the trial court
was correct when it ruled that the prosecution failed to prove the victims age other than
through the testimony of her father and herself.
Considering the statutory requirement in Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by R.A. No. 7659 and R.A. No. 8353, we reiterate here what the Court has held
in Javier without any dissent, that the failure to sufficiently establish victims age by
independent proof is a bar to conviction for rape in its qualified form. For, in the words of
Melo, J., independent proof of the actual age of a rape victim becomes vital and essential so
as to remove an iota of doubt that the case falls under the qualifying circumstances for the
imposition of the death penalty set by the law.
In this case, the first rape was committed on September 5, 1997 and is therefore
governed by the death penalty law, R.A. 7659. The penalty for the crime of simple rape or
rape in its unqualified form under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 11
of R.A. 7659, is reclusion perpetua. The second rape was committed on November 7, 1997,
after the effectivity of R.A. 8353, also known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which took effect
on October 22, 1997. The penalty for rape in its unqualified form remains the same.
As to civil indemnity, the trial court correctly awarded P50,000.00 for each count of rape
as civil indemnity. However, the award of another P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 2217 and 2230 of the Civil Code for each
count is imprecise. In rape cases, the prevailing jurisprudence permits the award of moral
damages without need for pleading or proof as to the basis thereof. [38] Thus, pursuant to
current jurisprudence, we award the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count
of rape.
The award of exemplary damages separately is also in order, but on a different basis and
for a different amount. Appellant being the father of the victim, a fact duly proved during trial,
we find that the alternative circumstance of relationship should be appreciated here as an
aggravating circumstance. Under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code, exemplary damages may
be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances. Hence, we find an award of exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00
proper. Note that generally, in rape cases imposing the death penalty, the rule is that
relationship is no longer appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance in view of the
amendments introduced by R.A. Nos. 7659 and 8353. The father-daughter relationship has
been treated by Congress in the nature of a special circumstance which makes the imposition
of the death penalty mandatory. [39] However, in this case, the special qualifying circumstance
of relationship was proved but not the minority of the victim, taking the case out of the ambit
of mandatory death sentence.Hence, relationship can be appreciated as a generic
aggravating circumstance in this instance so that exemplary damages are called for. In rapes
committed by fathers on their own daughters, exemplary damages may be imposed to deter
other fathers with perverse tendency or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their
own daughters.[40]

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, in
Criminal Case Nos. DU-6186 and DU-6203, is hereby MODIFIED as follows: appellant Tomas
Tundag is found guilty of two (2) counts of simple rape; and for each count, sentenced
to reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Purisima,
Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MANUEL PRUNA y RAMIREZ or

ERMAN PRUNA y RAMIREZ, accused-appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
A rosebud that had been snuffed out of its fragrance long before it could even blossom
into a flower. Such is the case of Lizette Arabelle Gonzales (hereafter LIZETTE), who had been
defiled at a very tender age. She was at the time voiding her body waste at their neighbors
backyard, but that did not deter herein appellant from imposing his lechery on her. Indeed,
lust is no respecter of time and place. [1]
On 27 January 1995, an information [2] for rape was filed against accused-appellant Manuel
Pruna y Ramirez or Erman Pruna y Ramirez (hereafter PRUNA), the accusatory portion of which
reads:
That on or about January 3, 1995 at Sitio Tabing-ilog, Brgy. Panilao, Pilar, Bataan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused thru force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and succeed to have
sexual intercourse with the offended party, Lizette Arabelle Gonzales, a 3-year-old minor girl,
against the will and consent of the latter, to her damage and prejudice.
Upon motion of PRUNAs counsel, the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), the Information was
amended changing the name of the accused from Manuel Pruna y Ramirez to Erman Pruna y
Ramirez, which was the name reflected in his birth certificate. [3]However, when he testified in
court, he stated that his name was Manuel Pruna; and in the minutes of the court
proceedings, he signed the name Manuel Pruna.
On 27 November 1995, upon the Motion to Put the Accused Under Psychiatric or Mental
Examination[4] filed by PRUNAs counsel on the ground that he could not secure from PRUNA a
coherent answer to even simple questions, the trial court ordered that the accused be brought
to the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong City for psychiatric or mental examination.
[5]
Accordingly, the trial was suspended, and PRUNA was sent to the National Center for Mental
Health (NCMH), Mandaluyong City.
On 28 June 1996, the trial court received a telegram [6] from the NCMH stating that PRUNA
was in fair condition. The NCMH later submitted to the trial court a report [7] on the psychiatric
evaluation of PRUNA with a recommendation to put him back to jail for the resumption of
court proceedings. The report also stated that PRUNA narrated that while he and his friends
were under the bridge sniffing rugby and drinking alcohol, they saw a 3-year-old girl
defecating in the river bank; that they called her; and, upon the order of his friends he placed
her on his lap and attempted to caress her sensitive parts. Said report was not, however,
offered in evidence by the prosecution or the defense.
The prosecution presented five witnesses, whose testimonies can be summed up as
follows:
Jacqueline Gonzales, the mother of LIZETTE, testified that on 3 January 1995, at 9:30 a.m.,
she was fetching water from the artesian well located ten meters away from her house, while
LIZETTE was defecating at the back of the house of their neighbor Gloria Tolentino.Jacqueline
then carried her pail of water and went back to her house. Since LIZETTE was not home yet,
Jacqueline headed toward the place where the former was moving her bowel. She looked for
LIZETTE but did not find her. It was when Jacqueline was already returning to her house that
she saw LIZETTE from behind -- red-faced, crying, and appeared to be very frightened. When
asked where she came from, LIZETTE answered that she was brought by a certain Boy to the
grassy area at the back of Glorias house where she was sexually molested (or kinantot in the
Tagalog dialect). LIZETTE then pulled her mother and led her to the house of PRUNA, which
was about eight meters away from their house. PRUNA, the only one known in their
community as Boy, was not there. Jacqueline forthwith requested her mother-in-law to report

the matter to the police, while Jacqueline and LIZETTE went to the Bataan Provincial Hospital.
[8]

Jacqueline further declared that at the time of the alleged rape, LIZETTE was 3 years old,
but at the time Jacqueline testified on 17 October 1995, LIZETTE was 4 years old. LIZETTEs
last birthday was on 19 April 1995.[9]
LIZETTE testified that she knew PRUNA whom he called Boy. She pointed to him inside the
courtroom. According to her, PRUNA laid her down in a grassy area and inserted his penis into
her vagina. When the presiding judge asked her whether she knew that it is a sin to tell a lie,
she answered in the affirmative.[10]
Dr. Emelita Quiroz, an obstetrician and gynecologist at the Bataan Provincial Hospital,
testified that on 3 January 1995, she conducted a complete physical examination on LIZETTE
and took wet smear specimen from her vaginal wall through scraping. The specimen was sent
to the laboratory for analysis by a medical technologist. Further, she requested a urinalysis for
LIZETTE.[11] The Medico-Legal Report[12] prepared by Dr. Quiroz reveals the following findings:
Essentially normal PE-Findings
Infantile areola & nipples
Flat breasts (-) hematoma
(-) pubic hair
Labia minora and majora well coaptated
Hymenal ring intact (+) hyperemia (-) laceration
(Vaginal Opening)
LABORATORY RESULT:
WET SMEAR: KOH - Negative for T-Vaginalis
NSS- Negative for fungi
SPERM ANALYSIS -POSITIVE for sperm cells
Gram staining-few, epithelial cells seen, no other microorganism
URINALYSIS: RBC-3-7-/hpf epithelial cells few.
WBC-0-2
Although not stated in the Medico-Legal Report of Dr. Quiroz, the urinalysis
report[13] includes a positive finding for sperm cells. Dr. Quiroz explained that the presence of
sperm cells in the vaginal canal signified that sexual intercourse and ejaculation had occurred
on the person of the patient. There was no laceration; but there was hyperemia, which means
reddening of the tissue around the vaginal opening. Among the causes of hyperemia is the
insertion of a hard object like penis and finger. [14]
Teresita Magtagnob, the medical technologist who conducted the laboratory examinations
and prepared the corresponding reports, [15] testified that sperm cells were found in the wet
smear specimen and urine taken from LIZETTE. [16]
SPO2 Romeo D. Bunsoy, a member of the Philippine National Police assigned at the Pilar
Municipal Station, testified that on 3 January 1995 the parent of the minor rape victim filed a
complaint against PRUNA. He referred the matter to the desk officer to have it blottered. Upon

his advise, the minor was brought to the hospital for examination. When they returned from
the hospital, he took their statements. Later, he conducted an ocular inspection and
investigation at the alleged place of the incident and caused the place to be photographed,
which showed that the grasses were flattened. He inquired from the people in the
neighborhood, and one of them answered that he saw the minor being brought by PRUNA to
the place where the minor was found. When PRUNA was brought to their station by
four barangay tanods of Panilao, Pilar, Bataan, SPO2 Bunsoy tried to converse with him, but
the former did not give any reply.[17]
On the part of the defense, Carlito Bondoc and PRUNA took the witness stand.
Carlito testified that on 3 January 1995, he fetched water at the public artesian well
together with Jacqueline. After having drawn water from the well, Jacqueline called her
daughter, who was then defecating on the road near the river; and they both went
home. After a while, the parents of LIZETTE shouted that their daughter was raped, and then
they proceeded to the house of PRUNA and accused him of having raped the child. Carlito
asserted that PRUNA could not have raped LIZETTE because he (PRUNA) was in his house
from the time that LIZETTE was moving her bowel up to the time that her mother went to the
house of PRUNA. Carlito knew that PRUNA was at home because the former was also in the
latters house to have coffee. Carlito and the Sulit family thereafter brought PRUNA to the
barangay hall. Since the barangay captain was not around, they brought PRUNA to the
municipal building to prove that he was innocent. [18]
PRUNA denied having raped LIZETTE. He claimed that in the morning of 3 January 1995,
he was in his house preparing coffee for Carlito. After Carlito left, several men arrived and
boxed him for reasons not known to him. Carlito and the latters friend then brought him to the
barangay hall. There, LIZETTEs father boxed him. He was thereafter brought to the Pilar
Municipal Jail. There, the mother of the child threw at him the lid cover of a kettle. He was also
asked by the police to take off his clothes and lie flat; then he was mauled. Thereafter, he was
told to put his feet between the grills, and he was made to masturbate. Worse, his testes were
burned with cigarette butts. Every night, he was asked to kneel on a chair and was hit with a
2x 2 piece of wood.[19]
After trial, PRUNA was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape in its qualified form
and sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death and to indemnify the victim in the sum
of P50,000, plus costs. [20] Hence, this automatic review.
In his Appellants Brief,[21] PRUNA attributed to the trial court the following errors:
I
IN RELYING ON THE TESTIMONY OF JACQUELINE S. GONZALES, THE MOTHER OF THE CHILD,
THAT THE LATTER WAS THREE (3) YEARS OLD WHEN THE ALLEGED RAPE OCCURRED WHEN
THE BEST EVIDENCE THEREFOR IS THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF THE CHILD.
II
IN RELYING ON THE HEARSAY TESTIMONY OF JACQUELINE S. GONZALES AS TO THE ALLEGED
RAPE OF HER CHILD.
III
IN ADMITTING AND RELYING ON THE TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINANT[ ] CHILD WHO WAS ONLY
THREE (3) YEARS OLD WHEN THE ALLEGED RAPE OCCURRED EVEN AS SHE WAS ONLY FIVE
(5) YEARS OLD WHEN SHE TESTIFIED.
IV
IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED ON DUBIOUS EVIDENCE.
The Office of the Solicitor General (hereafter OSG) seeks the affirmation of the trial courts
decision with the modification that an additional award of P50,000 as moral damages be
granted in favor of the offended party.

As culled from the arguments of the parties, the issues to be resolved in this case are as
follows:
(1) Whether LIZETTE was a competent and credible witness considering that she was
allegedly only 3 years old when the alleged rape occurred and 5 years old when she
testified;
(2) Whether Jacquelines testimony as to the declarations of LIZETTE is hearsay;
(3) Whether the failure of the prosecution to present Gloria Tolentino as a witness is
fatal;
(4) Whether appellants guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt;
(5) Whether the qualifying circumstance of minority has been duly proved as to justify
the imposition of the death penalty.
We shall resolve these issues in seriatim.

I. LIZETTEs Competency and Credibility as a Witness

Appellant disputes the competency of LIZETTE to testify by reason of her tender
age. When LIZETTE was called to testify, his counsel interposed a vigorous objection to the
admission of her testimony because of her tender age. The trial court noted the objection and
allowed her to testify; thus:
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY
PROS. LUMABAS:
Do you know Manuel Pruna?
A Yes, sir.
Q How do you call Manuel Pruna?
A Boy, sir.
Q Where is he?
A There, sir. (Witness pointing to a person wearing blue T-shirt, who when asked, gave
his name as Manuel Pruna)
PROS. LUMABAS:
What did Manuel Pruna or Boy do to you?
A Inihiga niya ako and inserted his penis to my vagina, sir.
Q And in what place did he do this to you?
A In the grassy area, sir.
Q After he inserted his penis to your vagina, what happened next?
ATTY. BALUYOT:
The witness for quite sometime could not answer the question.
PROS. LUMABAS:
I think that will be all for the witness. [22]
After which, the defense counsel manifested that he would not cross-examine her and that
he intended to file a motion for her disqualification as a witness. [23] The court then proceeded
to ask her a few questions, thus:
COURT :
Do you know what will happen to a child if she is not telling the truth?

A Sa lupa.
Q Do you know that it is a sin to tell a lie?
A Yes, sir.
Q The witness is excused considering the manifestation of Atty. Baluyot that he will be
filing a written motion for the striking out of the testimony of the witness
considering her tender age.[24]
No such motion is extant on the records. At the next hearing, the defense counsel crossexamined LIZETTE, as follows:
ATTY. BALUYOT:
On January 3, 1995, in the morning where were you?
A I was in the grassy area, sir.
Q In that grassy area there were other children with you playing?
A None, sir.
Q You were then removing[sic] your bowel, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q Then while removing your bowel you saw your mother pass[ ] by, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q She was then carrying a pail to fetch some water, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q The water from where she will fetch is [sic] a few meter[s] away from you, is it not?
A Near, sir.
ATTY. BALUYOT:
Considering that the grassy place where you were then discharging your bowel is
beside a street?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you saw your mother bringing a pail of water towards your house after her
pumping from the well, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q When she passed by she likewise saw you, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q Then how far were you from your house when you were discharging your bowel?
Please demonstrate the distance?
A Up to that door, sir.
Q From that position you were at the grass you could see your house, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q Could you tell the Honorable Court how long did it take you to discharge your
bowel?
A For a short period of time, sir.
(Sandali lang po.)[25]
As a general rule, when a witness takes the witness stand, the law, on ground of public
policy, presumes that he is competent. The court cannot reject the witness in the absence of

proof of his incompetency. The burden is, therefore, upon the party objecting to the
competency of a witness to establish the ground of incompetency. [26]
Section 21 of Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence enumerates the persons who are
disqualified to be witnesses. Among those disqualified are [c]hildren whose mental maturity is
such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined
and relating them truthfully.
No precise minimum age can be fixed at which children shall be excluded from
testifying. The intelligence, not the age, of a young child is the test of the competency as a
witness.[27] It is settled that a child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can
perceive and, in perceiving, can make known his perception to others and that he is capable
of relating truthfully the facts for which he is examined. [28]
In determining the competency of a child witness, the court must consider his capacity (a)
at the time the fact to be testified to occurred such that he could receive correct impressions
thereof; (b) to comprehend the obligation of an oath; and (c) to relate those facts truly to the
court at the time he is offered as a witness. [29] The examination should show that the child has
some understanding of the punishment which may result from false swearing. The requisite
appreciation of consequences is disclosed where the child states that he knows that it is
wrong to tell a lie, and that he would be punished if he does so, or that he uses language
which is equivalent to saying that he would be sent to hell for false swearing. [30] A child can be
disqualified only if it can be shown that his mental maturity renders him incapable of
perceiving facts respecting which he is being examined and of relating them truthfully. [31]
The question of competency of a child-witness rests primarily in the sound discretion of
the trial court. This is so because the trial judge sees the proposed witness and observes his
manner of testifying, his apparent possession or lack of intelligence, as well as his
understanding of the obligation of an oath.[32] Since many of the witness manners cannot be
photographed into the record, the finding of the trial judge will not be disturbed or reversed
unless from what is preserved it is clear that such finding was erroneous. [33]
In this case, appellant questions the competency of LIZETTE as a witness solely on the
ground of her age. He failed to discharge the burden of showing her mental immaturity. From
the above-quoted testimony, it can be gleaned that LIZETTE had the capacity of observation,
recollection, and communication [34] and that she could discern the consequence of telling a
lie. We, therefore, sustain the trial court in admitting her testimony and according it great
weight.
We are not persuaded by appellants assertion that LIZETTE should not be allowed to
testify two years after the alleged rape when the interplay of frail memory combines with the
imagination of earlier years. It must be noted that it is a most natural reaction for victims of
criminal violence to have a lasting impression of the manner in which the crime was
committed and the identity of the person responsible therefor. [35]
In a string of cases, we have said that the testimony of a rape victim who is of young or
tender age is credible and deserves full credit, [36] especially where no motive is attributed to
the victim that would make her testify falsely against the accused. [37] Indeed, a girl of such
age as LIZETTE would not concoct a story of defloration; allow the examination of her private
parts; and undergo the expense, trouble, inconvenience, and the trauma of a public trial
unless she was in fact raped.[38]

II. The Alleged Hearsay Testimony of Jacqueline Gonzales

Contrary to appellants contention, Jacquelines testimony that LIZETTE told her that
appellant laid her in the grassy area and inserted his penis into her vagina is not covered by
the hearsay evidence rule, which finds application when the declarant does not testify. This
rule, as enunciated under Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, provides that a
witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge except as
otherwise provided in the Rules of Court.

The term hearsay as used in the law on evidence, signifies evidence which is not founded
upon the personal knowledge of the witness from whom it is elicited and which consequently
does not depend wholly for its credibility and weight upon the confidence which the court may
have in him; its value, if any, is measured by the credit to be given to some third person not
sworn as a witness to that fact, and consequently not subject to cross-examination. [39] If one
therefore testifies to facts which he learned from a third person not sworn as a witness to
those facts, his testimony is inadmissible as hearsay evidence. [40]
The reason for the exclusion of hearsay evidence is that the party against whom the
hearsay testimony is presented is deprived of the right or opportunity to cross-examine the
person to whom the statements are attributed. [41] Moreover, the court is without opportunity
to test the credibility of hearsay statements by observing the demeanor of the person who
made them.[42]
In the instant case, the declarant (LIZETTE) herself was sworn as a witness to the fact
testified to by Jacqueline. The appellant even cross-examined her (LIZETTE). Moreover, the
trial court had the opportunity to observe her manner of testifying. Hence, Jacquelines
testimony on the incident related to her by her daughter cannot be disregarded as hearsay
evidence.
Even assuming that the aforementioned testimony of Jacqueline is hearsay, its nonadmission would not save the day for the appellant. Such testimony is not indispensable, as it
merely serves to corroborate LIZETTEs testimony that PRUNA laid her down in the grass and
inserted his private organ into hers. As discussed earlier, LIZETTEs testimony, which was
found to be credible by the trial court, is sufficient basis for conviction.
At any rate, Jacquelines testimony is proof of the victims conduct immediately after the
rape. It shows that LIZETTE immediately revealed to her mother the rape incident and the
identity of her defiler. As will be discussed later, such conduct is one of the earmarks of the
truth of the charge of rape.

III Non-Presentation of Gloria Tolentino as a Witness

Appellant harps on the prosecutions failure to put on the witness stand Gloria Tolentino,
who was listed as a witness and executed an affidavit on 4 January 1995 that she saw the
appellant carrying and bringing LIZETTE to a grassy area at the back of her house.
It is undisputed that at the time the case was called for trial, Gloria had already moved
out of her residence in Panilao, Pilar, Bataan, and could not be found anymore. In any event,
as opined by the OSG, her intended testimony could be dispensed with, as it would only be
corroborative of LIZETTEs testimony that Pruna brought her to a grassy area.

IV. Sufficiency of the Prosecutions Evidence Against Appellant

When LIZETTE was put in the witness stand, she unhesitatingly identified PRUNA, their
neighbor, as the one who defiled her. A rape victim can easily identify her assailant especially
if he is known to her because during the rape, she is physically close to her assailant that
enables her to have a good look at the latters physical features. [43]
LIZETTE testified that on 3 January 1995 PRUNA, whom she called Boy, laid her in a grassy
area and inserted his penis into her genitalia. When a girl or a woman says that she has been
raped she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was truly committed. [44] She is
not expected to remember all the ugly details of the outrage committed against her. [45] And
when her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on the basis
thereof, for in most cases it is the only evidence that can be offered to establish his guilt. [46]
Likewise, LIZETTEs mother testified that right after the incident LIZETTE disclosed what
happened to her and readily identified PRUNA as the culprit. She even led her mother to the

house of PRUNA.[47] Thereafter, the two went to the police authorities to report the incident,
and then to the hospital for LIZETTEs medical examination.
By and large, the medical evidence lends credence to LIZETTEs testimony that PRUNA
inserted his penis into her vagina. The Medico-Legal Report shows that there was hyperemia
or reddening of the vaginal opening of LIZETTE. As opined by Dr. Quiroz, who was presented
as an expert witness, hyperemia can be caused by the insertion of a hard object like penis and
finger.[48] The presence of sperm cells in the vaginal canal and urine of LIZETTE is also a mute
testimony of the sexual contact that further strengthens LIZETTEs claim of rape.
This Court is not oblivious of the finding that no laceration was found in LIZETTEs organ
despite the fact that she was examined immediately after she was raped. We have already
ruled, however, that the absence of fresh lacerations does not preclude the finding of rape,
[49]
especially when the victim is of tender age. [50] Well- settled is the rule that rape is
consummated by the slightest penile penetration of the labia or pudendum of the female.
[51]
The presence of hyperemia in LIZETTEs vaginal opening and the existence of sperm cells in
her vaginal canal and urine are clear indications that PRUNAs organ indeed touched the labia
or pudendum of LIZETTE.
In a nutshell, the following overwhelmingly establish the truth of the charge of rape: (a)
the spontaneity of the identification by LIZETTE of PRUNA as the rapist; (b) her immediate
revelation to her mother of the dastard act committed against her; (c) her act of leading her
mother to appellants house right after the incident; (d) the prompt filing of the complaint
before the authorities; (e) LIZETTEs submission to medical examination; (f) the hyperemia in
her private part; and (g) the presence of sperm cells in her vaginal canal and urine.
The trial court correctly disregarded the defense of alibi raised by the accused. We have
consistently held that for alibi to prosper, it must be proved that during the commission of the
crime, the accused was in another place and that it was physically impossible for him to be at
the crime scene. Just like denial, alibi is an inherently weak defense; and unless supported by
clear and convincing evidence, the same cannot prevail over the positive declaration of the
victim.[52] We have also held that when alibi is established only by the accused, his relatives,
or close friends, the same should be treated with strictest scrutiny. [53]
Carlito, who was admittedly a close friend of appellants parents, corroborated PRUNAs
testimony that he (PRUNA) was in his house during the time that LIZETTE was raped. It is,
however, an established fact that the place where the rape occurred was just a few meters
away from the house of PRUNA. Thus, there was no physical impossibility for PRUNA to be in
the grassy area to consummate the crime of rape.
The defense, through Carlito, attempted to impute motive to Jacqueline in filing against
PRUNA the charge of rape. According to him, LIZETTEs grandparents, the Sulits, wanted to buy
the place of the PRUNA family, but the latter refused. [54]Aside from the fact that such
testimony was not corroborated, said motive, if at all, is too flimsy to be even considered. No
mother in her right mind would use her offspring as an engine of malice. She would not
subject her child to the humiliation, disgrace, and even the stigma attendant to a prosecution
for rape unless she is motivated by the desire to bring to justice the person responsible for her
childs defilement.[55]

V. Sufficiency of Evidence of LIZETTEs Minority and Propriety of the Imposition of

the Death Penalty
The commission of the crime of rape by PRUNA having been duly established by the
prosecution, we now come to the question of the penalty to be meted upon him.
Article 335, seventh paragraph, no. 4, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659, provides that the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed against a child below seven (7) years old. We have held that in such a case the
minority of the victim must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself.
The failure to sufficiently establish the victims age is fatal and consequently bars conviction
for rape in its qualified form.[56]

A persons age is best proved by the birth certificate. But is the presentation of the victims
birth certificate a sine qua nonrequirement to prove her age for the appreciation of minority
either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance? Recent jurisprudence has
conflicting pronouncements.
In the following cases, no birth certificate was presented and this Court ruled that the age
of the victim was not duly proved by the prosecution:
1. In People v. Vargas,[57] the testimonies of the victim and her aunt that the former was 10
years old at the time of the rape were not considered proof of her age for being hearsay. This
Court also observed that the victim could easily be mistaken for a child below 12 years of age,
and hence it was not correct to judge the victims age by her appearance. We held: The
difference of two or three years in age may not always be readily apparent by mere physical
manifestations or appearance.
2. In People v. Javier,[58] the victim was alleged to be 16 years old, and the accused did not
contest her age. Ratiocinating that in this age of modernism, there is hardly any difference
between a 16-year-old girl and an 18-year-old one insofar as physical features and attributes
are concerned, this Court held that an independent proof of the actual age of a rape victim is
vital and essential so as to remove an iota of doubt that the victim is indeed under 18 years of
age as to fall under the qualifying circumstances enumerated in R.A. No. 7659.
3. In People v. Brigildo,[59] aside from the failure of the prosecution to present the offended
partys birth certificate or other equally acceptable official document concerning her age, the
testimonies on record were not clear as to her exact age. The victim declared that she was 11
years old when she testified in court a year after the incident, while her mother claimed that
she was around 15 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. The informations
even alleged a different age. Hence, this Court refused to appreciate the qualifying
circumstance of minority because of the uncertainty regarding her age.
4. In People v. Tipay,[60] the offended party was alleged in the information to be under 16
years of age. No independent evidence was presented to prove it. This Court recognized that
the minority of a victim who may be below the age of 10 is quite manifest and may be taken
judicial notice of by the court. But when the victim is between the crucial years of 15 and 17
where minority may seem to be dubitable due to one's physical appearance, the prosecution
should prove the fact of minority with certainty. The lack of objection on the part of the
accused concerning the victims age does not excuse the prosecution from discharging its
burden.
5. In People v. Cula,[61] the victim was alleged in the complaint to be 16 years old when the
rape was committed, but no evidence at all was presented to prove her age. We held that the
failure of the accused to deny such allegation cannot make up for the failure of the
prosecution to prove with certainty the victims minority. Because of the lacuna in the
prosecutions evidence, coupled with the trial courts failure to make a categorical finding of
minority of the victim, we declined to consider the qualifying circumstance of minority.
6. In People v. Veloso,[62] the victim was alleged to be 9 years of age when she was
raped. Citing People v. Vargas,[63] this Court refused to consider the testimonies of the victim
and her father as sufficient proof of her age.
7. In People v. Pecayo,[64] the victim simply stated during the beginning of her direct
examination that she was 14 years old and that she was born on 13 January 1983. We held
that the victims casual testimony as to her age is not enough, and that the lack of denial on
the part of the accused does not excuse the prosecution from proving her age through
competent evidence such as a duly certified certificate of live birth, baptismal certificate, or
some other authentic document showing her age.
8. In People v. Tundag,[65] the victim testified that she was 13 years of age when she was
raped, but she did not know exactly when she was born. Unable to secure a copy of her birth

certificate, the prosecution moved that judicial notice be taken of the fact that she was below
18 years old at the time of the rape. Despite the admission by the defense of such fact, this
Court held that the age of the victim is not a matter of judicial notice, whether mandatory or
discretionary. Under Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence, a hearing is required before
such fact can be taken judicial notice of by courts.
9. In People v. Geraban,[66] the victims testimony was categorical in declaring that she was 15,
but her mothers testimony regarding her age was not clear. We thus declared that the
prosecution failed to discharge the burden of proving minority.
10. In People v. Liban[67] and People v. Llandelar,[68] the only evidence adduced to prove the
minority of the victims was the victims bare testimony that they were 10 and 16 years old,
respectively. This Court held that while the declaration of a victim as to her age, being an
exception to the hearsay proscription, would be admissible under the rule on pedigree, the
question on the relative weight that may be accorded to it is another matter. The prosecution
should present the victims birth certificate or, in lieu thereof, any other documentary
evidence, like a baptismal certificate, school records, and documents of similar nature, or
credible testimonial evidence that can help establish the age of the victim. Neither the
obvious minority of the victim nor the absence any contrary assertion from the defense can
exonerate the prosecution from its burden. Judicial notice of the issue of age without the
requisite hearing under Section 3 of Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence would not be sufficient
compliance with the law.
11. In People v. Alvarado,[69] the victim testified that she was 14 years old at the time of the
rape, and this was confirmed by the accused, who was victims father. The victims mother,
however, testified as to her date of birth which showed that she was 13 years of age at the
time of the commission of the crime. For this doubt as to the victims age, the accused was
held guilty of simple rape only and meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and not death
penalty.
On the other hand, in the following cases, we ruled that the age of the rape victim was
sufficiently established despite the failure of the prosecution to present the birth certificate of
the offended party to prove her age:
1. In People v. Rafales,[70] the testimony of the victim and her mother that the former was only
10 years old when she was raped, which was not denied by the accused, was deemed
sufficient to prove her age for the purpose of determining whether the accused could be held
guilty of statutory rape, which is carnal knowledge of a woman below 12 years of age.
2. In People v. De la Cruz,[71] the testimony of the mother alone that her two daughters were
both 14 years old at the time of the rape incidents was deemed sufficient because there was
no reason to doubt the testimony of the mother, who had personal knowledge of the ages of
her children. Moreover, said testimony was never challenged by the accused and stood
unrebutted by any other evidence.
3. In People v. Bali-balita,[72] the victims testimony as to her age, which was corroborated by
her half-sister, was deemed sufficient. We noted that the victim testified in court four months
after the rape, and hence it was not difficult for the trial court to take judicial notice that she
was under 18 years of age.
4. In People v. Velasco,[73] the minority of the victim was deemed established by (a) the
complainant herself, who was held to be competent to testify on her age, as it constituted
family tradition; (b) the open admission of the accused that the victim was a 12-year-old
minor; and (c) the categorical finding of the trial court that she was a minor of a little over
twelve years.
5. In People v. Remudo,[74] the trial court appreciated the qualifying circumstance of minority
on the strength of (a) the offended partystestimony as to the date of her birth, which showed

that she was 13 years old at the time of the rape, and (b) the admission of said date of birth
by the accused who was the victims brother.
6. In People v. LLanita[75] the only evidence presented by the prosecution to establish that the
victim was below 7 years old at the time of the alleged rape was the victims own
testimony. Although hearsay because she could not have personal knowledge of the date of
her birth but could only acquire knowledge thereof from her parents or relatives, said
testimony was held admissible for being an assertion of family tradition regarding
pedigree. Her testimony and the accuseds admission that she was 5 years old during the
commission of the crime were held sufficient to establish her age.
7. In People v. Agustin,[76] the victims testimony that she was 14 years old at the time of the
rape incidents, coupled with the express admission of her age by the accused who was her
father, sufficiently proved her minority.
8. In People v. Esuela,[77] the testimony of the victims mother that the victim was 13 years of
age at the time of the rape was held sufficient to establish minority for the reason that as a
mother she was in the best position to know when she delivered her child. Also considered
were the victims own testimony regarding her age, as well as the observation of the trial court
that she could not have been more than 18 years old when she testified.
In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by the foregoing cases, we
hereby set the following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or
as a qualifying circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true
copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as
baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would
suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims mother
or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on
matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party
pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the
following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the
victims mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the complainants testimony will
suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. [78]
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The
failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken
against him.
The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.
In the present case, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document, such as a
baptismal certificate of LIZETTE, was presented to prove her age. In imposing the death
penalty, the trial court ratiocinated in this wise:

In the instant case, the victim, Lizette Arabelle Gonzales, was a 3-year-old minor girl as
alleged in the information and the defense did not contest her age and as a matter of fact was
questioning her qualification to testify because of her tender age when she testified two (2)
years later in Court. The victims Medico-Legal Certificate date[d] January 3, 1995 established
the fact that at the time of the commission of the rape on January 3, 1995, the child was only
3 years old.[79]
It thus appears that the trial courts finding that LIZETTE was 3 years old when she was
raped was based on the Medico-Legal Report prepared by Dr. Quiroz, as well as on the fact
that the defense did not contest her age and even questioned her qualification to testify
because of her tender age.
However, the Medico-Legal Report relied upon by the trial court does not in any way prove
the age of LIZETTE, for there is nothing therein which even mentions her age. Only testimonial
evidence was presented to establish LIZETTEs age. Her mother, Jacqueline, testified on 17
October 1995 as follows:
Q. Now, on January 3, 1995 at about 9:30 in the morning, do you still recall where you
were?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where were you at that particular date and time?
A. I was fetching water from an artesian well beside the house of my neighbor, sir.
Q. Where was this daughter of yours then when you were fetching water?
A. My daughter was discharging her bowel who was then at the back of the house of
our neighbor, sir.
How old is your daughter Lizette Arabelle Gonzales?
A. Three years old, sir.
Q. At the time that she was discharging her bowel, how old [was] she?
A. Three years old, sir. She is four years old now.
Q. When was her last birthday?
A. April 19, 1995, sir.[80]
Likewise, LIZETTE testified on 20 November 1996, or almost two years after the incident,
that she was 5 years old.[81]However, when the defense counsel asked her how old she was on
3 January 1995, or at the time of the rape, she replied that she was 5 years old. Upon further
question as to the date she was born, she could not answer. [82]
For PRUNA to be convicted of rape in its qualified form and meted the supreme penalty of
death, it must be established with certainty that LIZETTE was below 7 years old at the time of
the commission of the crime. It must be stressed that the severity of the death penalty,
especially its irreversible and final nature once carried out, makes the decision-making
process in capital offenses aptly subject to the most exacting rules of procedure and
evidence.[83]
In view of the uncertainty of LIZETTEs exact age, corroborative evidence such as her birth
certificate, baptismal certificate or any other authentic document should be introduced in
evidence[84] in order that the qualifying circumstance of below seven (7) years old is
appreciated against the appellant. The lack of objection on the part of the defense as to her
age did not excuse the prosecution from discharging its burden. That the defense invoked
LIZETTEs tender age for purposes of questioning her competency to testify is not necessarily
an admission that she was below 7 years of age when PRUNA raped her on 3 January
1995. Such being the case, PRUNA cannot be convicted of qualified rape, and hence the death
penalty cannot be imposed on him.
However, conformably with no. 3(b) of the foregoing guidelines, the testimony of LIZETTEs
mother that she was 3 years old at the time of the commission of the crime is sufficient for

purposes of holding PRUNA liable for statutory rape, or rape of a girl below 12 years of
age. Under the second paragraph of Article 335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, in relation to
no. 3 of the first paragraph thereof, having carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of
age is punishable by reclusion perpetua.Thus, the penalty to be imposed on PRUNA should
be reclusion perpetua, and not death penalty.
As regards the civil liability of PRUNA, the indemnity in the amount of P50,000 awarded by
the trial court is not sufficient. In accordance with recent jurisprudence, LIZETTE should also
be awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000 without need of pleading or proof
because the mental, physical and psychological trauma suffered by her is too obvious. [85]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Balanga, Bataan, in
Criminal Case No. 6044 is herebyAFFIRMED with the modification that accused Manuel Pruna
y Ramirez or Erman Pruna y Ramirez is held guilty beyond reasonable doubt of statutory rape,
and not qualified rape, and is sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim
Lizette Arabelle Gonzales the sum of P50,000 as moral damages in addition to the indemnity
of P50,000.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Callejo, Sr.,
JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Ynarez-Santiago, Carpio, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., on
official leave.

JOEL M. SANVICENTE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner was charged with homicide for the killing of one Dennis Wong y Chua. On June
11, 1995, at around 5:30 p.m., petitioner fatally shot the victim outside the Far East Bank
along Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City after the latter allegedly attempted to
rob him of a large amount of cash which he had just withdrawn from the automatic teller
machine.[1]
Responding policemen found the lifeless body of the victim at the parking space in front of
the Far East Bank and Trust Company Branch along Katipunan Road, Loyola Heights, Quezon
City. Recovered at the scene were five empty caliber .45 shells, two live caliber .45 bullets and
an ATM card in the name of Violeta Sanvicente. [2]
On June 13, 1995, police authorities located petitioners car in Barrio Malapit, San Isidro,
Nueva Ecija and took custody thereof.
Petitioners counsel, Atty. Leonardo A. Valmonte, turned over to Police Station 9
petitioners .45 caliber Mark IV pistol bearing Serial No. 5504095. He also wrote a letter
addressed to P/Major Antonio Diaz, Station Commander of PNP Station 9, CPDC, Anonas Road,
Quezon City which reads as follows:
This is in connection with the alleged death of one Dennis Wong that occurred in Katipunan
Ave., Q.C., in the afternoon of June 11, 1995.
According to my client, Joel Sanvicente, on said date, place and hour above he just withdrew
from the Far East Bank and Trust Co., Katipunan branch a large amount of cash. On his way
out of the bank, said victim immediately attacked him to grab the money he has just withdrew
(sic). My said client pulled out his gun (duly licensed with Permit to Carry) and fired a warning
shot upwards. Still the deceased continued his attack and grabbed his gun. After a brief
struggle, my client was forced to shoot the deceased in the defense of his person and
money. My client will submit a formal statement during the proper preliminary investigation, if
needed.
On June 13, 1995, my clients car (Mercedes Benz with plate no. TFU 736) was taken by your
operatives led by Capt. Alejandro Casanova and [is] now in your custody.
In view of the untoward incident, my client suffered serious anxiety and depression and was
advised to undergo medical treatment and confinement at the Delos Santos Hospital in
Rodriguez Ave., Q. C. My client would have no objection if you assigned police escort/guard
under your supervision pending his confinement.
For all intense (sic) & purposes, this letter shall serve as a voluntary surrender, without
admission of guilt on the part of my client. [3]
At his arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. [4]
During the trial, the prosecution presented Ballistics Report No. B-046-95, stating that
slugs recovered from the crime scene, on the one hand, and cartridge cases fired from
petitioners caliber .45 Mark IV pistol, on the other hand, were fired from the same firearm.
[5]
The Medico-Legal Officer who conducted the autopsy on the deceased failed to appear at
the trial. In order to dispense with her testimony, petitioner admitted the due execution and
genuineness of the medico-legal report. After trial, the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of
Exhibits,[6] which included the above-quoted letter of petitioners counsel to P/Maj. Antonio
Diaz, marked as Exhibit LL. The trial court admitted all the prosecutions exhibits in its Order
dated August 27, 1996.[7]

Meanwhile, petitioner begged leave to file a demurrer to evidence, which was granted by
the trial court.[8] Hence, on August 29, 1996, petitioner filed a Motion To Dismiss (On Demurrer
to Evidence),[9] based on the following grounds: (1) the lack of positive identification of the
accused is a fatal omission warranting dismissal; (2) prosecutions evidence are totally
hearsay/incompetent, hence, inadmissible and the guilt of the accused was not proven by
positive evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
On October 7, 1996, the trial court issued an Order dismissing the case together with the
civil aspect thereof for insufficiency of evidence. [10]
The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration, [11] which was denied on the ground,
among others, that with the dismissal of the case double jeopardy had set in. [12]
The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 43697. In a Decision dated July 25, 1997,[13] the appellate court nullified the
October 7, 1996 Order of the trial court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration [14] was likewise
denied in a Resolution dated January 2, 1998. [15]
Hence, the instant petition.
In reversing the trial courts Order dismissing the criminal case against petitioner, the
Court of Appeals found that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in preventing
the prosecution from establishing the due execution and authenticity of Exhibit LL which, it
claimed, positively identified petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime charged. [16]
Under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, the
trial court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence upon a demurrer
to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court. In resolving accuseds
demurrer to evidence, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or
sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or support a verdict of guilt. [17]
The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial
court and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of
discretion.[18] Significantly, once the court grants the demurrer, such order amounts to an
acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy.[19] This constitutes an exception to the rule that the dismissal
of a criminal case made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion bars
a plea of double jeopardy.[20] The finality-of-acquittal rule was stressed thus in People v.
Velasco:[21]
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts
deep into the humanity of the laws and in jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizens,
when brought in unequal contest with the State xxx. [22] Thus Green expressed the concern
that (t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system
of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to
make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense thereby subjecting him
to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of
anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may
be found guilty.[23]
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is
entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The
philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is part of the
paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent
against wrongful conviction.[24] The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined
exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for repose, a desire to
know the exact extent of ones liability. [25] With this right of repose, the criminal justice system
has built in a protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a
jurys leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding. [26]
Given the far-reaching scope of an accuseds right against double jeopardy, even an
appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of evidence will not lie. [27] The only instance when

double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the
opportunity to present its case,[28] or where the trial was a sham.[29] However, while certiorari
may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary
proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a
point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. [30]
In the instant case, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence after the prosecution adduced
its evidence and rested its case.The trial court subsequently dismissed the case after finding
that the evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to support the charge against
petitioner. The prosecution, which relied primarily on Exhibit LL as the basis for the indictment
against petitioner, however, contested the dismissal of the case allegedly because the trial
court prevented it from further identifying the genuineness and due execution of said
document in the manner that it wanted.[31]
The crux of the problem lies in the confusion between the due execution of a piece of
documentary evidence vis--vis thetruth of its contents. Likewise at the core of the dilemma
is the fundamental distinction between an admission and aconfession. The prosecution
maintains that the letter, Exhibit LL, constituted a confession and argues thus: What better
evidence is there to positively identify the perpetrator of the crime than the confession of the
petitioner himself, freely and voluntarily given, assisted by counsel? [32] According to the
prosecution, this extrajudicial confession constitutes the strongest evidence of guilt. [33]
An admission is defined under Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court as the act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact. A confession, on the other hand, under
Rule 130, Section 33 is the declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged or any offense necessarily included therein.
More particularly, a confession is a declaration made at any time by a person, voluntarily
and without compulsion or inducement stating or acknowledging that he had committed or
participated in the commission of a crime. The term admission, on the other hand, is usually
applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an
acknowledgment of the guilt of the accused or of criminal intent to commit the offense with
which he is charged.[34]
In short, in a confession, an accused acknowledges his guilt; while there is no such
acknowledgment of guilt in an admission.[35] Only recently in People v. Licayan,[36] the Court
distinguished confession and admission in this wise:
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of
his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct
or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue, and tending, in connection with proof
of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an admission is something less than
a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is
insufficient to authorize a conviction, and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of
guilt. (Emphasis ours) [37]
There is no question that the letter dated June 14, 1995 is an admission, not a confession,
because of the unmistakable qualification in its last paragraph that
For all intense (sic) & purposes, this letter shall serve as a voluntary surrender, without
admission of guilt on the part of my client. . .(Emphasis and italics supplied).
With the foregoing distinctions in mind, the trial court correctly rejected the prosecutions
motion to have Exhibit LL furtheridentified in the manner that it wanted,[38] i.e., through the
proposed testimony of petitioners counsel, Atty. Valmonte, who incidentally refused to
testify. Aside from covering a subject which squarely falls within the scope of privileged
communication, it would, more importantly, be tantamount to converting the admission into a
confession.
It can not be denied that the contents of Exhibit LL, particularly with regard to the details
of the shooting communicated by petitioner to Atty. Valmonte, is privileged because it is

connected with the business for which petitioner retained the services of the latter. [39] More
specifically, said communication was relayed by petitioner to Atty. Valmonte in order to seek
his professional advice or assistance in relation to the subject matter of the employment, or to
explain something in connection with it, so as to enable him to better advice his client or
manage the litigation.[40]
Pertinent to this is Section 24 (b) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons cannot
testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxxxxxxxx
(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with
a view to, professional employment nor can an attorneys secretary, stenographer, or clerk be
examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the
knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity; x x x.
It is worthy to note that the prosecution did not summon petitioner himself to testify
although he too was a signatory of Exhibit LL. Apparently, it was aware that petitioner could
well invoke his right against self-incrimination and refuse to answer its questions. The
prosecution then attempted to draw out what it could not constitutionally extract from his
lawyer. Yet, and as stated previously, said Exhibit LL had earlier been admitted in evidence by
the trial court in its Order dated August 27, 1996.What was objectionable was the
prosecutions sole reliance on the document without proof of other facts to establish its case
against petitioner because of its mistaken assumption that the same was a confession.
Significantly, the prosecution was neither barred nor prevented by the trial court from
establishing the genuineness and due execution of the document through other means. Rule
132, Section 20of the Rules of Court provides the following means of authenticating the
document:
SEC. 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
Thus, the due execution of a document can be proved through the testimony of: (1) the
person/s who executed it; (2) the person before whom its execution was acknowledged; or (3)
any person who was present and saw it executed and delivered or who, after its execution and
delivery, saw it and recognized the signatures therein or by a person to whom the parties to
the instrument previously confirmed the execution thereof. [41]
Thus, respondent could have called to the witness stand P/Maj. Antonio Diaz, the
addressee of Exhibit LL, to identify the said document since it was supposedly delivered to
him personally. Samples of the signatures appearing on the document which can be readily
obtained or witnesses who are familiar with them could have also been presented. The
prosecution did not. Neither did it subpoena P/Senior Inspector Alejandro M. Casanova, who
prepared the detailed Police Report of the incident used as the basis of the inquest
proceedings, nor were any eyewitnesses presented, notwithstanding that there appeared to
be at least two eyewitnesses to the incident.
It must be borne in mind that in a criminal trial, it is the prosecution that determines the
charges to be filed and how the legal and factual elements in the case shall be utilized as
components of the information. [42] Stated differently, the determination of what evidence to
adduce to bolster a successful prosecution of a criminal offense is the exclusive domain of

prosecutorial discretion. Indeed, courts generally can not interfere with the prosecutors
discretion as to control over criminal prosecutions. [43] However, it is the court which ultimately
determines whether such evidence is sufficient to sustain an indictment, thus, the care with
which the prosecution must build up its case against the accused can not be gainsaid
because, as has been stated time and again, in any criminal prosecution, the State must rely
on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the defense.
[44]

Viewed vis-a-vis the foregoing lapses detailed above, the prosecutions insistence to have
Exhibit LL admitted in the manner it wanted shows only too clearly a subtle but shrewd
scheme to cover up for the foregoing procedural missteps and to cut evidentiary corners to
build its case at the expense of the defense. This cannot be countenanced. An accused should
not be prejudiced for the failure of the prosecution to discharge its burden of overcoming the
constitutional presumption of innocence and to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.[45] Indeed, if the prosecution fails to discharge the burden, then it is not only
the accuseds right to be freed, it is even more the courts constitutional duty to acquit him. [46]
If at all, the foregoing acts of the prosecution underscores just how careless and
haphazard it had been in building up a case against the petitioner. For such, it has nothing but
itself to blame if the trial court in assaying the proof it adduced found the same wanting. It will
neither be allowed to sweep its procedural miscues under the rug, so to speak, on the pretext
that it was denied due process when the trial court supposedly prevented it from presenting
Exhibit LL. To be more precise, the trial court had admitted Exhibit LL in evidence but rejected
the further admission of the document in the manner that it wanted.Verily, the prosecution
can not have its cake and eat it too.
Moreover, we agree with the trial court that the letter marked as Exhibit LL is hearsay
inasmuch as its probative force depends in whole or in part on the competency and credibility
of some person other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce it. [47] The term as used
in the law of evidence signifies all evidence which is not founded upon the personal
knowledge of the witness from whom it is elicited, and which consequently does not depend
wholly for its credibility and weight upon the confidence which the court may have in him. Its
value, if any, is measured by the credit to be given to some third persons not sworn as
witnesses to that fact and consequently not subject to cross-examination. [48] In short, it is the
evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others.
[49]
Thus, in one case we stated that [w]hen evidence is based on what was
supposedly told the witness, the same is without any evidentiary weight being patently
hearsay.[50] In the case at bar, it is noteworthy that the statements in the letter were made by
petitioners counsel, who even began his narration of the events with the phrase: According to
my client.[51]
In holding that petitioner was identified as the person who committed the offense, the
appellate court relied on the following circumstances: (1) he admitted responsibility therefor
through Exhibit LL, which was signed by him and his counsel; (2) he surrendered even before
the issuance of the warrant of arrest; (3) his gun was also surrendered to the police
authorities by his counsel; (4) empty shells recovered at the scene of the crime matched his
gun; and (5) the letter-referral of P/Senior Inspector Alejandro Casanova to Quezon City
Prosecutor indicated that petitioner was under the custody of the policeman on detail
supposedly to guard him at the hospital. [52]
With regard to the first circumstance, suffice it to state that, as has lengthily been
discussed earlier, Exhibit LL is merely an admission and not a confession. In fact, petitioner
specifically denied criminal intent therein. By and of itself it is insufficient to support a
conviction unless it is considered in connection with other proof to establish the ultimate fact
of guilt.
The second and third incidents actually support petitioners innocence because were he
indeed guilty of the felony, he would not likely have surrendered even before the warrant was
issued for his arrest. Courts go by the biblical truism that the the wicked flee when no man
pursueth but the righteous are as bold as a lion. [53]

The fourth event merely proves the fact that the empty shells recovered from the crime
scene were fired from the surrendered gun. It, however, does not answer the penultimate
question of who actually pulled the trigger of the firearm.
Lastly, the appellate courts reading of the letter-referral, [54] mentioning that petitioner had
been placed under the custody of a policeman, was inaccurate. As explained by Atty.
Valmonte in Exhibit LL, the policeman was actually requested for petitioners personal
safety owing to the untoward incident which caused petitioner serious anxiety and
depression, and for which he had to undergo treatment and confinement. [55]
All told, we find no grave abuse on the part of the trial court in dismissing the charges
against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals dated July 25, 1997 and the Resolution dated January 2, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 43697 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Acting Chairman), Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), on official leave.

STATE PROSECUTORS, complainants,

vs.
JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Manila, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
In assaying the requisite norms for qualifications and eminence of a magistrate, legal
authorities place a premium on how he has complied with his continuing duty to know the law.
A quality thus considered essential to the judicial character is that of "a man of learning who
spends tirelessly the weary hours after midnight acquainting himself with the great body of
traditions and the learning of the law; is profoundly learned in all the learning of the law; and
knows how to use that learning." 1
Obviously, it is the primary duty of a judge, which he owes to the public and to the legal
profession, to know the very law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called
upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules.
Party litigants will have great faith in the administration of justice if judges cannot justly be
accused of apparent deficiency in their grasp of the legal principles. For, service in the
judiciary means a continuous study and research on the law from beginning to end. 2
In a letter-complaint 3 dated August 19, 1992, respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 54, was charged by State Prosecutors Nilo C.
Mariano, George C. Dee and Paterno V. Tac-an with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct
and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, committed as
follows:
1. That on August 13, 1992, respondent judge issued an Order dismissing eleven
(11) cases (docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92- 101969, inclusive)
filed by the undersigned complainant prosecutors (members of the DOJ Panel of
Prosecutors) against the accused Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, for Violation of
Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions, as consolidated in CB Circular No.
960, in relation to the penal provisions of Sec. 34 of R.A. 265, as amended, . . .;
2. That respondent Judge issued his Order solely on the basis of newspaper
reports (August 11, 1992 issues of the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Daily
Globe) concerning the announcement on August 10, 1992 by the President of the
Philippines of the lifting by the government of all foreign exchange restrictions
and the arrival at such decision by the Monetary Board as per statement of
Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia;
3. That claiming that the reported announcement of the Executive Department
on the lifting of foreign exchange restrictions by two newspapers which are
reputable and of national circulation had the effect of repealing Central Bank
Circular No. 960, as allegedly supported by Supreme Court decisions . . ., the
Court contended that it was deprived of jurisdiction, and, therefore, motu,
prop(r)io had to dismiss all the eleven cases aforementioned "for not to do so
opens this Court to charges of trying cases over which it has no more
jurisdiction;"
4. That in dismissing aforecited cases on August 13, 1992 on the basis of a
Central Bank Circular or Monetary Board Resolution which as of date hereof, has
not even been officially issued, and basing his Order/decision on a mere
newspaper account of the advance announcement made by the President of the
said fact of lifting or liberalizing foreign exchange controls, respondent judge
acted prematurely and in indecent haste, as he had no way of determining the

full intent of the new CB Circular or Monetary Board resolution, and whether the
same provided for exception, as in the case of persons who had pending criminal
cases before the courts for violations of Central Bank Circulars and/or regulations
previously issued on the matter;
5. That respondent Judge's arrogant and cavalier posture in taking judicial notice
purportedly as a matter of public knowledge a mere newspaper account that the
President had announced the lifting of foreign exchange restrictions as basis for
his assailed order of dismissal is highly irregular, erroneous and misplaced. For
the respondent judge to take judicial notice thereof even before it is officially
released by the Central Bank and its full text published as required by law to be
effective shows his precipitate action in utter disregard of the fundamental
precept of due process which the People is also entitled to and exposes his gross
ignorance of the law, thereby tarnishing public confidence in the integrity of the
judiciary. How can the Honorable Judge take judicial notice of something which
has not yet come into force and the contents, shape and tenor of which have not
yet been published and ascertained to be the basis of judicial action? The
Honorable Judge had miserably failed to "endeavor diligently to ascertain the
facts" in the case at bar contrary to Rule 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
constituting Grave Misconduct;
6. That respondent Judge did not even ha(ve) the prudence of requiring first the
comment of the prosecution on the effect of aforesaid Central Bank
Circular/Monetary Board resolution on the pending cases before dismissing the
same, thereby denying the Government of its right to due process;
7. That the lightning speed with which respondent Judge acted to dismiss the
cases may be gleaned from the fact that such precipitate action was undertaken
despite already scheduled continuation of trial dates set in the order of the court
(the prosecution having started presenting its evidence . . .) dated August 11,
1992 to wit: August 31, September 3, 10, 21, & 23 and October 1, 1992, all at
9:30 o'clock in the morning, in brazen disregard of all notions of fair play, thereby
depriving the Government of its right to be heard, and clearly exposing his bias
and partiality; and
8. That, in fact, the motive of respondent Judge in dismissing the case without
even waiting for a motion to quash filed by the counsel for accused has even
placed his dismissal Order suspect.
Pursuant to a resolution of this Court dated September 8, 1992, respondent judge filed his
comment, 4 contending,inter alia, that there was no need to await publication of the Central
Bank (CB) circular repealing the existing law on foreign exchange controls for the simple
reason that the public announcement made by the President in several newspapers of general
circulation lifting foreign exchange controls was total, absolute, without qualification, and was
immediately effective; that having acted only on the basis of such announcement, he cannot
be blamed for relying on the erroneous statement of the President that the new foreign
exchange rules rendered moot and academic the cases filed against Mrs. Marcos, and which
was corrected only on August 17, 1992 but published in the newspapers on August 18, 1992,
and only after respondent judge had issued his order of dismissal dated August 13, 1992; that
the President was ill-advised by his advisers and, instead of rescuing the Chief Executive from
embarrassment by assuming responsibility for errors in the latter's announcement, they chose
to toss the blame for the consequence of their failures to respondent judge who merely acted
on the basis of the announcements of the President which had become of public knowledge;
that the "saving clause" under CB Circular No. 1353 specifically refers only to pending actions
or investigations involving violations of CB Circular No. 1318, whereas the eleven cases
dismissed involved charges for violations of CB Circular No. 960, hence the accused cannot be
tried and convicted under a law different from that under which she was charged; that
assuming that respondent judge erred in issuing the order of dismissal, the proper remedy
should have been an appeal therefrom but definitely not an administrative complaint for his

dismissal; that a mistake committed by a judge should not necessarily be imputed as

ignorance of the law; and that a "court can reverse or modify a doctrine but it does not show
ignorance of the justices or judges whose decisions were reversed or modified" because "even
doctrines initiated by the Supreme Court are later reversed, so how much more for the lower
courts?"
He further argued that no hearing was necessary since the prosecution had nothing to explain
because, as he theorized, "What explanation could have been given? That the President was
talking 'through his hat' (to use a colloquialism) and should not be believed? That I should
wait for the publication (as now alleged by complainants), of a still then non-existent CB
circular? . . . As it turned out, CB Circular No. 3153 (sic) does not affect my dismissal order
because the said circular's so-called saving clause does not refer to CB Circular 960 under
which the charges in the dismissed cases were based;" that it was discretionary on him to
take judicial notice of the facts which are of public knowledge, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule
129; that the contention of complainants that he acted prematurely and in indecent haste for
basing his order of dismissal on a mere newspaper account is contrary to the wordings of the
newspaper report wherein the President announced the lifting of controls as an accomplished
fact, not as an intention to be effected in the future, because of the use of the present perfect
tense or past tense "has lifted," not that he "intends to lift," foreign exchange controls.
Finally, respondent judge asseverates that complainants who are officers of the Department of
Justice, violated Section 6, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court which provides that "proceedings
against judges of first instance shall be private and confidential" when they caused to be
published in the newspapers the filing of the present administrative case against him; and he
emphasizes the fact that he had to immediately resolve a simple and pure legal matter in
consonance with the admonition of the Supreme Court for speedy disposition of cases.
In their reply 5 and supplemental reply, 6 complainants aver that although the saving clause
under Section 16 of CB Circular No. 1353 made specific reference to CB Circular No. 1318, it
will be noted that Section 111 of Circular No. 1318, which contains a saving clause
substantially similar to that of the new circular, in turn refers to and includes Circular No. 960.
Hence, whether under Circular No. 1318 or Circular No. 1353, pending cases involving
violations of Circular No. 960 are excepted from the coverage thereof. Further, it is alleged
that the precipitate dismissal of the eleven cases, without according the prosecution the
opportunity to file a motion to quash or a comment, or even to show cause why the cases
against accused Imelda R. Marcos should not be dismissed, is clearly reflective of
respondent's partiality and bad faith. In effect, respondent judge acted as if he were the
advocate of the accused.
On December 9, 1993, this Court issued a resolution referring the complaint to the Office of
the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation, pursuant to Section 7,
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as revised, there being no factual issues involved. The
corresponding report and recommendation, 7 dated February 14, 1994, was submitted by
Deputy Court Administrator Juanito A. Bernad, with the approval of Court Administrator Ernani
Cruz-Pao.
The questioned order

of respondent judge reads as follows:

These eleven (11) cases are for Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange
Restrictions as consolidated in CB Circular No. 960 in relation to the penal
provision of Sec. 34 of R.A. 265, as amended.
The accused Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos pleaded not guilty to all these cases;
apparently the other accused in some of these cases, Roberto S. Benedicto, was
not arrested and therefore the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person;
trial was commenced as against Mrs. Marcos.
His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, announced on August 10, 1992
that the government has lifted all foreign exchange restrictions and it is also

reported that Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia said that the Monetary Board
arrived at such decision (issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 11, 1992
and issue of the Daily Globe of the same date). The Court has to give full
confidence and credit to the reported announcement of the Executive
Department, specially from the highest official of that department; the Courts are
charged with judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, without
introduction of proof, the announcement published in at least the two
newspapers cited above which are reputable and of national circulation.
Per several cases decided by the Supreme Court (People vs. Alcaras, 56 Phil. 520,
People vs. Francisco, 56 Phil. 572, People vs. Pastor, 77 Phil. 1000, People vs.
Crisanto Tamayo, 61 Phil. 225), among others, it was held that the repeal of a
penal law without re-enactment extinguishes the right to prosecute or punish the
offense committed under the old law and if the law repealing the prior penal law
fails to penalize the acts which constituted the offense defined and penalized in
the repealed law, the repealed law carries with it the deprivation of the courts of
jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence persons charged with violations of the
old law prior to its repeal. Under the aforecited decisions this doctrine applies to
special laws and not only to the crimes punishable in the Revised Penal Code,
such as the Import Control Law. The Central Bank Circular No. 960 under which
the accused Mrs. Marcos is charged is considered as a penal law because
violation thereof is penalized with specific reference to the provision of Section
34 of Republic Act 265, which penalizes violations of Central Bank Circular No.
960, produces the effect cited in the Supreme Court decisions and since
according to the decisions that repeal deprives the Court of jurisdiction, this
Court motu proprio dismisses all the eleven (11) cases as a forestated in the
caption, for not to do so opens this Court to charges of trying cases over which it
has no more jurisdiction.
This order was subsequently assailed in a petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals,
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Manuel T. Muro, Judge, RTC of Manila, Br. 54 and
Imelda R. Marcos," docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 29349. When required to file her comment,
private respondent Marcos failed to file any. Likewise, after the appellate court gave due
course to the petition, private respondent was ordered, but again failed despite notice, to file
an answer to the petition and to show cause why no writ of preliminary injunction should
issue. Eventually, on April 29, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 9 setting aside
the order of August 13, 1992, and reinstating Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969.
In finding that respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the order of dismissal, the appellate court held that:
The order was issued motu proprio, i.e., without any motion to dismiss filed by
counsel for the accused, without giving an opportunity for the prosecution to be
heard, and solely on the basis of newspaper reports announcing that the
President has lifted all foreign exchange restrictions.
The newspaper report is not the publication required by law in order that the
enactment can become effective and binding. Laws take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation unless it is otherwise provided (Section 1,
Executive Order No. 200). The full text of CB Circular 1353, series of 1992,
entitled "Further Liberalizing Foreign Exchange Regulation" was published in the
August 27, 1992 issue of the Manila Chronicle, the Philippine Star and the Manila
Bulletin. Per certification of the CB Corporate Affairs Office, CB Circular No. 1353
took effect on September 2 . . . .
Considering that respondent judge admittedly had not seen the official text of CB
Circular No. 1353, he was in no position to rule judiciously on whether CB Circular

No. 960, under which the accused Mrs. Marcos is charged, was already repealed
by CB Circular No. 1353. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
A cursory reading of the . . . provision would have readily shown that the repeal
of the regulations on non-trade foreign exchange transactions is not absolute, as
there is a provision that with respect to violations of former regulations that are
the subject of pending actions or investigations, they shall be governed by the
regulations existing at the time the cause of action (arose). Thus his conclusion
that he has lost jurisdiction over the criminal cases is precipitate and hasty. Had
he awaited the filing of a motion to dismiss by the accused, and given
opportunity for the prosecution to comment/oppose the same, his resolution
would have been the result of deliberation, not speculation.
I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to
take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the
requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly
resolved in the negative. 10
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter
must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively
settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the
jurisdiction of the court. 11 The provincial guide in determining what facts may be assumed to
be judicially known is that of notoriety. 12 Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to
facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. 13
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the
usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise
acquired. 14 This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not
be disputed. 15 But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of
the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his
individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action.
Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are "commonly" known. 16
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming
to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they
may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready
and unquestioned demonstration. 17 Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may
be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided
they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded
as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. 18
Respondent judge, in the guise of exercising discretion and on the basis of a mere newspaper
account which is sometimes even referred to as hearsay evidence twice removed, took
judicial notice of the supposed lifting of foreign exchange controls, a matter which was not
and cannot be considered of common knowledge or of general notoriety. Worse, he took
cognizance of an administrative regulation which was not yet in force when the order of
dismissal was issued. Jurisprudence dictates that judicial notice cannot be taken of a statute
before it becomes effective. 19 The reason is simple. A law which is not yet in force and hence,
still inexistent, cannot be of common knowledge capable of ready and unquestionable
demonstration, which is one of the requirements before a court can take judicial notice of a
fact.
Evidently, it was impossible for respondent judge, and it was definitely not proper for him, to
have taken cognizance of CB Circular No. 1353, when the same was not yet in force at the
time the improvident order of dismissal was issued.

II. Central Bank Circular No. 1353, which took effect on September 1, 1992, further liberalized
the foreign exchange regulations on receipts and disbursements of residents arising from nontrade and trade transactions. Section 16 thereof provides for a saving clause, thus:
Sec. 16. Final Provisions of CB Circular No. 1318. - All the provisions in Chapter X
of CB Circular No. 1318 insofar as they are not inconsistent with, or contrary to
the provisions of this Circular, shall remain in full force and effect: Provided,
however, that any regulation on non-trade foreign exchange transactions which
has been repealed, amended or modified by this Circular, violations of which are
the subject of pending actions or investigations, shall not be considered repealed
insofar as such pending actions or investigations are concerned, it being
understood that as to such pending actions or investigations, the regulations
existing at the time the cause of action accrued shall govern.
Respondent judge contends that the saving clause refers only to the provisions of Circular No.
1318, whereas the eleven criminal cases he dismissed involve a violation of CB Circular No.
960. Hence, he insists, Circular No. 960 is deemed repealed by the new circular and since the
former is not covered by the saving clause in the latter, there is no more basis for the charges
involved in the criminal cases which therefore warrant a dismissal of the same. The
contention is patently unmeritorious.
Firstly, the second part of the saving clause in Circular No. 1353 explicitly provides that
"any regulation on non-trade foreign transactions which has been repealed, amended or
modified by this Circular, violations of which are the subject of pending actions or
investigations, shall not be considered repealed insofar as such pending actions or
investigations are concerned, it being understood that as to such pending actions or
investigations, the regulations existing at the time the cause of action accrued shall govern."
The terms of the circular are clear and unambiguous and leave no room for interpretation. In
the case at bar, the accused in the eleven cases had already been arraigned, had pleaded not
guilty to the charges of violations of Circular No. 960, and said cases had already been set for
trial when Circular No. 1353 took effect. Consequently, the trial court was and is supposed to
proceed with the hearing of the cases in spite of the existence of Circular No. 1353.
Secondly, had respondent judge only bothered to read a little more carefully the texts of the
circulars involved, he would have readily perceived and known that Circular No. 1318 also
contains a substantially similar saving clause as that found in Circular No. 1353, since Section
111 of the former provides:
Sec. 111. Repealing clause. - All existing provisions of Circulars 365, 960 and
1028, including amendments thereto, with the exception of the second
paragraph of Section 68 of Circular 1028, as well as all other existing Central
Bank rules and regulations or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with or
contrary to the provisions of this Circular, are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly: Provided, however, that regulations, violations of which are the
subject of pending actions or investigations, shall be considered repealed insofar
as such pending actions or investigations are concerned, it being understood
that as to such pending actions or investigations, the regulations existing at the
time the cause of action accrued shall govern.
It unequivocally appears from the section above quoted that although Circular No. 1318
repealed Circular No. 960, the former specifically excepted from its purview all cases covered
by the old regulations which were then pending at the time of the passage of the new
regulations. Thus, any reference made to Circular No. 1318 necessarily involves and affects
Circular No. 960.
III. It has been said that next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is
that of doing it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the
judge. 20 This means that a judge should not only render a just, correct and impartial decision
but should do so in such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to its fairness and

impartiality and as to his integrity. While a judge should possess proficiency in law in order
that he can competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important that he should act
and behave in such a manner that the parties before him should have confidence in his
impartiality. Thus, it is not enough that he decides cases without bias and favoritism. Nor is it
sufficient that he in fact rids himself of prepossessions. His actuations should moreover inspire
that belief. Like Caesar's wife, a judge must not only be pure but beyond suspicion. 21
Moreover, it has always heretofore been the rule that in disposing of controverted cases,
judges should show their full understanding of the case, avoid the suspicion of arbitrary
conclusion, promote confidence in their intellectual integrity and contribute useful precedents
to the growth of the law. 22 A judge should be mindful that his duty is the application of
general law to particular instances, that ours is a government of laws and not of men, and
that he violates his duty as a minister of justice under such a system if he seeks to do what he
may personally consider substantial justice in a particular case and disregards the general law
as he knows it to be binding on him. Such action may have detrimental consequences beyond
the immediate controversy. He should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of
the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a
judge under the sanction of the law. 23 These are immutable principles that go into the very
essence of the task of dispensing justice and we see no reason why they should not be duly
considered in the present case.
The assertion of respondent judge that there was no need to await publication of Circular No.
1353 for the reason that the public announcement made by the President in several
newspapers of general circulation lifting foreign exchange controls is total, absolute, without
qualification, and immediately effective, is beyond comprehension. As a judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, respondent is supposed to be well-versed in the elementary legal
mandates on the publication of laws before they take effect. It is inconceivable that
respondent should insist on an altogether different and illogical interpretation of an
established and well-entrenched rule if only to suit his own personal opinion and, as it were, to
defend his indefensible action. It was not for him to indulge or even to give the appearance of
catering to the at-times human failing of yielding to first impressions. 24 He having done so, in
the face of the foregoing premises, this Court is hard put to believe that he indeed acted in
good faith.
IV. This is not a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous interpretation of the law. The
very act of respondent judge in altogether dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases
without even a motion to quash having been filed by the accused, and without at least giving
the prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a written comment
or on oral argument, is not only a blatant denial of elementary due process to the
Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality.
The avowed desire of respondent judge to speedily dispose of the cases as early as possible is
no license for abuse of judicial power and discretion, 25 nor does such professed objective,
even if true, justify a deprivation of the prosecution's right to be heard and a violation of its
right to due process of
law. 26
The lightning speed, to borrow the words of complainants, with which respondent judge
resolved to dismiss the cases without the benefit of a hearing and without reasonable notice
to the prosecution inevitably opened him to suspicion of having acted out of partiality for the
accused. Regardless of how carefully he may have evaluated changes in the factual situation
and legal standing of the cases, as a result of the newspaper report, the fact remains that he
gave the prosecution no chance whatsoever to show or prove that it had strong evidence of
the guilt of the accused. To repeat, he thereby effectively deprived the prosecution of its right
to due process. 27 More importantly, notwithstanding the fact that respondent was not sure of
the effects and implications of the President's announcement, as by his own admission he was
in doubt whether or not he should dismiss the cases, 28 he nonetheless deliberately refrained
from requiring the prosecution to comment thereon. In a puerile defense of his action,
respondent judge can but rhetorically ask: "What explanation could have been given? That

the President was talking 'through his hat' and should not be believed? That I should wait for
the publication of a still then non- existent CB Circular?" The pretended cogency of this
ratiocination cannot stand even the minutest legal scrutiny.
In order that bias may not be imputed to a judge, he should have the patience and
circumspection to give the opposing party a chance to present his evidence even if he thinks
that the oppositor's proofs might not be adequate to overthrow the case for the other party. A
display of petulance and impatience in the conduct of the trial is a norm of conduct which is
inconsistent with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge." 29 At the very least, respondent
judge acted injudiciously and with unjustified haste in the outright dismissal of the eleven
cases, and thereby rendered his actuation highly dubious.
V. It bears stressing that the questioned order of respondent judge could have seriously and
substantially affected the rights of the prosecution had the accused invoked the defense of
double jeopardy, considering that the dismissal was ordered after arraignment and without
the consent of said accused. This could have spawned legal complications and inevitable
delay in the criminal proceedings, were it not for the holding of the Court of Appeals that
respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. This
saved the day for the People since in the absence of jurisdiction, double jeopardy will not set
in. To stress this point, and as a caveatto trial courts against falling into the same judicial
error, we reiterate what we have heretofore declared:
It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's
setting aside of the trial court's judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the
prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied
due process. . . . .
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove
its case, its right to due process is thereby violated.
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional
rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's
right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue . . . which cannot be
glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of
due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for
lack of jurisdiction . . . . 30
It is also significant that accused Marcos, despite due notice, never submitted either her
comment on or an answer to the petition for certiorari as required by the Court of Appeals,
nor was double jeopardy invoked in her defense. This serves to further underscore the fact
that the order of dismissal was clearly unjustified and erroneous. Furthermore, considering
that the accused is a prominent public figure with a record of influence and power, it is not
easy to allay public skepticism and suspicions on how said dismissal order came to be, to the
consequent although undeserved discredit of the entire judiciary.
VI. To hold a judge liable for rendering a manifestly unjust order through inexcusable
negligence or ignorance, it must be clearly shown that although he has acted without malice,
he failed to observe in the performance of his duty that diligence, prudence and care which
the law is entitled to exact in the rendering of any public service. Negligence and ignorance
are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable
interpretation, and even though there is a misunderstanding or error of the law applied, it
nevertheless results logically and reasonably, and in a very clear and indisputable manner, in
the notorious violation of the legal precept. 31
In the present case, a cursory perusal of the comment filed by respondent judge reveals that
no substantial argument has been advanced in plausible justification of his act. He utterly
failed to show any legal, factual, or even equitable justification for the dismissal of the eleven
criminal cases. The explanation given is no explanation at all. The strained and fallacious
submissions therein do not speak well of respondent and cannot but further depreciate his

probity as a judge. On this point, it is best that pertinent unedited excerpts from his
comment 32 be quoted by way of graphic illustration and emphasis:
On the alleged ignorance of the law imputed to me, it is said that I issued the
Order dismissing the eleven (11) cases against Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos on the
basis of newspaper reports referred to in paragraph 2 of the letter complaint
without awaiting the official publication of the Central Bank Circular. Ordinarily a
Central Bank Circular/Resolution must be published in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation, but the lifting of "all foreign exchange controls"
was announced by the President of the Philippines WITHOUT QUALIFICATIONS; as
published in the Daily Globe, August 11, 1992" the government has lifted ALL
foreign exchange controls," and in the words of the Philippine Daily Inquirer
report of the same date "The government yesterday LIFTED the LAST remaining
restrictions on foreign exchange transactions, . . ." (emphasis in both quotations
supplied) not only the President made the announcement but also the Central
Bank Governor Jose Cuisia joined in the announcement by saying that "the
Monetary Board arrived at the decision after noting how the "partial
liberalization" initiated early this year worked."
Therefore, because of the ABSOLUTE lifting of ALL restrictions on foreign
exchange transactions, there was no need to await the publication of the
repealing circular of the Central Bank. The purpose of requiring publication of
laws and administrative rules affecting the public is to inform the latter as to how
they will conduct their affairs and how they will conform to the laws or the rules.
In this particular case, with the total lifting of the controls, there is no need to
await publication. It would have been different if the circular that in effect
repealed Central Bank Circular No. 960, under which the accused was charged in
the cases dismissed by me, had provided for penalties and/or modified the
provisions of said Circular No. 960.
The Complainants state that the lifting of controls was not yet in force when I
dismissed the cases but it should be noted that in the report of the two (2)
newspapers aforequoted, the President's announcement of the lifting of controls
was stated in the present perfect tense (Globe) or past tense (Inquirer). In other
words, it has already been lifted; the announcement did not say that the
government INTENDS to lift all foreign exchange restrictions but instead says
that the government "has LIFTED all foreign exchange controls," and in the other
newspaper cited above, that "The government yesterday lifted the last remaining
restrictions on foreign exchange transactions". The lifting of the last remaining
exchange regulations effectively cancelled or repealed Circular No. 960.
The President, who is the Chief Executive, publicly announced the lifting of all
foreign exchange regulations. The President has within his control directly or
indirectly the Central Bank of the Philippines, the Secretary of Finance being the
Chairman of the Monetary Board which decides the policies of the Central Bank.
No official bothered to correct or qualify the President's announcement of August
10, published the following day, nor made an announcement that the lifting of
the controls do not apply to cases already pending, not until August 17 (the
fourth day after my Order, and the third day after report of said order was
published) and after the President said on August 17, reported in the INQUIRER's
issue of August 18, 1992, that the "new foreign exchange rules have nullified
government cases against Imelda R. Marcos, telling reporters that the charges
against the widow of former President Marcos "have become moot and
academic" because of new ruling(s) which allow free flow of currency in and out
of the country" (Note, parenthetically, the reference to "new rules" not to "rules
still to be drafted"). The INQUIRER report continues: "A few hours later,
presidential spokeswoman Annabelle Abaya said, RAMOS (sic) had "corrected
himself'." "He had been belatedly advised by the Central Bank Governor Jose

Cuisia and Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon that the Monetary Board Regulation
excluded from its coverage all criminal cases pending in court and such a
position shall stand legal scrutiny', Mrs. Abaya, said."
I will elaborate on two points:
1. If the President was wrong in making the August 10 announcement (published
in August 11, 1992, newspapers) and in the August 17 announcement, SUPRA,
and thus I should have relied on the Presidential announcements, and there is
basis to conclude that the President was at the very least ILL-SERVED by his
financial and legal advisers, because no one bothered to advise the President to
correct his announcements, not until August 17, 1992, a few hours after the
President had made another announcement as to the charges against Imelda
Marcos having been rendered moot and academic. The President has a lot of
work to do, and is not, to my knowledge, a financier, economist, banker or
lawyer. It therefore behooved his subalterns to give him timely (not "belated")
advice, and brief him on matters of immediate and far-reaching concerns (such
as the lifting of foreign exchange controls, designed, among others to encourage
the entry of foreign investments). Instead of rescuing the Chief Executive from
embarrassment by assuming responsibility for errors in the latter's
announcement, these advisers have chosen to toss the blame for the
consequence of their failing to me, who only acted on the basis of
announcements of their Chief, which had become of public knowledge.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court strongly feels that it has every right to assume and expect that respondent judge is
possessed with more than ordinary credentials and qualifications to merit his appointment as
a presiding judge in the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, stationed
in the City of Manila itself. It is, accordingly, disheartening and regrettable to note the nature
of the arguments and the kind of logic that respondent judge would want to impose on this
Court notwithstanding the manifest lack of cogency thereof. This calls to mind similar
scenarios and how this Court reacted thereto.
In one case, an RTC Judge was administratively charged for acquitting the accused of a
violation of CB Circular No. 960 despite the fact that the accused was apprehended with
US$355,349.00 while boarding a plane for Hongkong, erroneously ruling that the State must
first prove criminal intent to violate the law and benefit from the illegal act, and further
ordering the return of US$3,000.00 out of the total amount seized, on the mistaken
interpretation that the CB circular exempts such amount from seizure. Respondent judge
therein was ordered dismissed from the government service for gross incompetence and
ignorance of the law. 33
Subsequently, the Court dismissed another RTC judge, with forfeiture of retirement benefits,
for gross ignorance of the law and for knowingly rendering an unjust order or judgment when
he granted bail to an accused charged with raping an 11-year old girl, despite the contrary
recommendation of the investigating judge, and thereafter granted the motion to dismiss the
case allegedly executed by the complainant. 34
Similarly, an RTC judge who was described by this Court as one "who is ignorant of fairly
elementary and quite familiar legal principles and administrative regulations, has a marked
penchant for applying unorthodox, even strange theories and concepts in the adjudication of
controversies, exhibits indifference to and even disdain for due process and the rule of law,
applies the law whimsically, capriciously and oppressively, and displays bias and impartiality,"
was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to
reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities. 35
Still in another administrative case, an RTJ judge was also dismissed by this Court for gross
ignorance of the law after she ordered, in a probate proceeding, the cancellation of the

certificates of title issued in the name of the complainant, without affording due process to
the latter and other interested parties. 36
Only recently, an RTC judge who had been reinstated in the service was dismissed after he
acquitted all the accused in four criminal cases for illegal possession of firearms, on the
ground that there was no proof of malice or deliberate intent on the part of the accused to
violate the law. The Court found him guilty of gross ignorance of the law, his error of judgment
being almost deliberate and tantamount to knowingly rendering an incorrect and unjust
judgment. 37
ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises and considerations, the Court finds respondent
Judge Manuel T. Muro guilty of gross ignorance of the law. He is hereby DISMISSED from the
service, such dismissal to carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and
retirement benefits, and disqualification from reemployment in the government service. 38
Respondent is hereby ordered to CEASE and DESIST immediately from rendering any
judgment or order, or continuing any judicial action or proceeding whatsoever, effective upon
receipt of this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Bidin, is on official leave.

Separate Opinions

DISSENTING OPINION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
In other jurisdictions, it is generally accepted that judges are not accountable by way of either
civil suit or discipline for their official acts, even if clearly erroneous. Thus, open disregard of
statutes, rules, and cases has been held to be protected official activity. Although a decision
may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts concerning a judge's integrity or physiological
condition, absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself is insufficient to establish a case
against the judge. The rule is consistent with the concept of judicial independence. An honest
judge, if he were denied the protection of the extrinsic evidence requirement, might become
unduly cautious in his work, since he would be subject to discipline based merely upon the
inferences to be drawn from an erroneous decision. 1
In our jurisdiction, the law is no different. Thus, this Court has repeatedly held that . . . it is a fundamental rule of long standing that a judicial officer when required
to exercise his judgment or discretion is not criminally liable for any error he
commits provided he acts in good faith, that in the absence of malice or any
wrongful conduct . . . the judge cannot be held administratively responsible . . .
for no one, called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment, and to hold a judge
administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he
renders . . . would be nothing short of harassment or would make his position
unbearable. 2

A judge cannot be subjected to liability - civil, criminal, or

administrative - for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in
good faith. 3 He cannot be held to account or answer, criminally, civilly, or administratively,
for an erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith. 4 As a matter of public policy, in the
absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. 5 It is a general principle
of the highest importance to proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in
exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without
apprehension of personal consequences to himself. This concept of judicial immunity rests
upon consideration of public policy, its purpose being to preserve the integrity and
independence of the judiciary." 6 This being settled doctrine, there is no choice but to apply it
to the instant case.
The facts: Respondent Manuel T. Muro, a native of Masbate, Masbate, was appointed on 6
November 1986 as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 54, by then
President Corazon C. Aquino. A product of the College of Law, Far Easter University, he
graduated valedictorian in 1955, magna cum laude, and placed sixth in the Bar examinations.
Now he is being charged with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violations of Rules
2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct 7 for dismissing motu proprio the eleven
(11) cases filed by the Department of Justice Panel of Prosecutors against Ms. Imelda
Romualdez Marcos for Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions after President
Fidel V. Ramos had announced, which was published in newspaper reports, the lifting of all
foreign exchange restrictions.
The majority opinion finds respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law and imposes
upon him the supreme penalty of dismissal from the service, forfeiture of leave credits and
retirement benefits, and disqualification from reemployment in the government service.
With all due respect to my esteemed colleagues, particularly to the ponente who is a
recognized authority on various fields of law, I cannot help viewing the circumstances in a
different light.
There is no dispute that the order issued by respondent judge has been reversed by the
appellate court, which reversal has now become final for failure of the accused to appeal
therefrom; hence, no damage has been caused except that complainants had to avail of a
judicial remedy to correct the mistake. But, as adverted to, the overturned order alone does
not necessarily make respondent judge liable administratively, much more civilly or criminally.
To be answerable, the fault of the judge, if any, must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate
or done in bad faith. 8Plainly said, fault in this regard may exist only when the error appears to
be deliberate or in bad faith. 9
Thus, bad faith is imputed against respondent judge, first, for insisting that "there was no
need to await publication of Circular No. 1353 for the reason that the public announcement
made by the President in several newspapers of general circulation lifting foreign exchange
controls is total, absolute, without qualification, and immediately effective," 10 and, second,
for "dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a motion to quash having
been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the prosecution the basic opportunity to
be heard on the matter." 11
But, bad faith is the neglect or refusal to fulfill a duty, not prompted by an honest mistake, but
by some interested or sinister motive. 12 It implies breach of faith and willful failure to respond
to plain and well understood obligation. 13 It does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of
wrong; it means breach of a known duty through some motive or interest or ill will. 14
Hence, I cannot ascribe bad faith to respondent judge for I see no insidious intentions on his
part. If he insists that there really is no need to await the publication of Circular No. 1353, as
he does here, it merely shows that he sincerely believes that there is indeed no necessity to
await publication. Whether his belief is erroneous or not is thus irrelevant. Further,

dismissing motu proprio the eleven criminal cases without affording the prosecution the
opportunity to be heard on the matter, erroneous though it may be, is not inescapably
indicative of bad faith. The immediate dismissal of the charges is a necessary consequence of
the belief that since the restrictions were lifted, no law was then being violated. It is an
elementary principle in procedural law and statutory construction that the repeal of a penal
law deprives the court of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old law
prior to its repeal. Thus, where the crime no longer exists, prosecution of the person charged
under the old law cannot be had and the action should be dismissed. 15
On the contrary, there is no reason why good faith should not be attributed to respondent
judge. Good faith means that the motive that actuated the conduct in question was in fact
what the actor ascribes to it, that is, that what he gives as his motive was in truth his
motive. 16 Hence, if he honestly believes that the bases for the criminal charges against
accused have been eliminated and thus strikes down the information and consequently
dismisses the charges, respondent judge cannot be criminally, civilly, or even
administratively, held liable.
Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration are sufficient
defenses protecting a judicial officer charged with ignorance of the law and promulgation of
an unjust decision from being held accountable for errors of judgment. This, on the premise
that no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the administration of justice can
be infallible. 17
Respondent judge could not have seriously jeopardized the rights of the prosecution, even if
the accused invoked the defense of double jeopardy, since the remedy of certiorari is very
much available. Precisely, as has been pointed out in the majority opinion, the defense of
double jeopardy is unavailing when the prosecution is denied due process. This is in fact the
office of the prevailing doctrine - to correct indiscretions of lower court judges - which does
not necessarily make them personally liable. In fact, if respondent judge was indeed in bad
faith, he should have given the prosecution an opportunity to be heard, and after a full-blown
trial, acquitted the accused. Then, the defense of double jeopardy would have been proper
and the accused would have gone scot-free. Thus, in Negado v. Judge Autajay, 18 this Court
affirmed the conclusions of the Investigating Justice of the Court of Appeals that "[w]hen a
person seeks administrative sanction against a judge simply because he has committed an
error in deciding the case against such person, when such error can be elevated to a higher
court for review and correction, the action of such person can only be suspect."
To equate the failure of accused Marcos to comment on the petition before the appellate
court, and consequently invoke the defense of double jeopardy, with the errancy of the
assailed order, 19 may be indulging in needless speculation. And to imply that the influence of
the accused who is a prominent public figure brought about the dismissal order is simply not
borne out by the records.
Besides, the challenged order of respondent judge can hardly be considered as grossly
erroneous to merit his dismissal. For, while his reasoning may be erroneous, as it turned out
when the reversal of his decision by the appellate court became final, it is not at all illogical as
even the President of the Republic, with his learned legal advisers, after learning of the
dismissal of the cases filed by his administration against the accused, was quoted as saying
that Mrs. Marcos was an "accidental" beneficiary of the foreign exchange deregulation policy
of his administration. 20 Thus, President Fidel V. Ramos further said that "[t]he forex
deregulation applies to everybody . . . . Now the cases filed by the government against Mrs.
Marcos, numbering about 11 out of 90 have become moot and academic because of the new
regulations that have come out of the Monetary Board, but that is to her advantage." 21 Where
the conclusions of the judge in his decision are not without logic or reason, it cannot be said
that he is incompetent or grossly ignorant. 22
It has been said that a judge, like Caesar's wife, must not only be pure but beyond
suspicion. 23 Ideally so. But the cold fact is that every overturned decision provokes suspicion
especially from the successful appellant who feels certain that the lower court indeed erred.

It is settled that "[a] judge should be mindful that his duty is the application of general law to
a particular instance, that ours is a government of laws and not of men, and that he violates
his duty as a minister of justice under such system if he seeks to do what he may personally
consider substantial justice in a particular case and disregards the general law as he knows it
to be binding on him. Such action may have detrimental consequences beyond the immediate
controversy. He should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of
the law itself, remembering that he is not a depositary of arbitrary power, but a judge under
the sanction of law." 24 As it has been said, he must interpret the books, and not unload his
ideas.
But while a judge must decide in accordance with existing laws and established jurisprudence,
his own personality, character, convictions, values, experiences and prejudices are only
sublimely insignificant and unconsciously dispensable. In every decision he makes, he is no
more and no less human, his own beliefs, perceptions and imperfections, as well as the laws
he is bound to apply, all having profound influence on his eventual choice. Thus, Mr. Justice
Cardozo of the Supreme Court of the United States once wrote of judges: "We may try to see
things as objectively as we please. None the less, we can never see them with any eyes
except our own." 25 Hence, time and again, lower court judges, if not reversed by the Court of
Appeals and this Court, have continued to set new trails in jurisprudence without exactly
conforming with what has been settled. yet, whether reversed or merely unregarded, they do
not receive displeasure from this Court; on the contrary, they remain to be effective
dispensers of everyday justice.
In fine, there is no substantial proof, nay proof beyond reasonable doubt, that respondent
judge issued the assailed order in bad faith or with conscious and deliberate intent to
perpetrate an injustice.
Mr. Justice Malcolm, speaking for this Court In re Horilleno, 26 said that "[i]mpeachment
proceedings before courts have been said, in other jurisdictions, to be in their nature highly
penal in character and to be governed by the rules of law applicable to criminal cases." Mr.
Chief Justice Fernando, then Associate Justice of this Court, reiterated the doctrine inSuerte v.
Judge Ugbinar 27 where he said that "[t]his is to defer the basic concept first announced in
1922 in this jurisdiction . . . in . . . In re Horilleno that proceedings of this character being in
their nature highly penal, the charge must, therefore, be proved beyond reasonable doubt. To
paraphrase the opinion further, there is no showing of the alleged incompetence and gross
ignorance of the law by a preponderance of the evidence, much less beyond a reasonable
doubt. Such an exacting standard has been adhered to by this Court in subsequent
decisions." 28
The law always imputes good faith to judicial action, and the burden is on the one challenging
the same to prove want of it. Contraposed with the "exacting standard" required,
complainant-prosecutors in the instant case failed to prove the absence of good faith on the
part of the respondent judge. Consequently, the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed stands.
I find it difficult to compare the instant case with those cited in the majority opinion. In Padilla
v. Judge Dizon, 29respondent not only allowed the accused to go scot-free, leaving the
Commissioner of Customs without any relief against the accused, the former likewise ordered
the release of US$3,000.00 to the accused. Thus, respondent judge was found guilty not only
of gross ignorance of the law, but also of gross incompetence, and grave and serious
misconduct affecting his integrity and efficiency, and was consequently dismissed from the
service. And, failing to learn a lesson from his earlier administrative case, respondent judge,
after his reinstatement, this time erroneously acquitted the defendants in four (4) different
cases of illegal possession of firearms. Finally the Court said, "[w]hen it has been clearly
demonstrated, as in this case, not only once but four (4) times, that the judge is either grossly
incompetent or grossly ignorant of the penal laws . . . . he becomes unfit to discharge his
judicial office." 30 Unlike former Judge Dizon, this is the first time respondent Judge Muro is
being administratively charged.

In Buenavista v. Judge Garcia, 31 the Court found respondent guilty of "serious misconduct,
gross ignorance of the law, and knowingly rendering an unjust order of judgment" for granting
bail to an accused who was charged with statutory rape, for "improper and immoral
intervention in brokering a compromise of the criminal cases" against the accused, and
thereafter for granting the motion to dismiss the rape case on the basis of an Affidavit of
Desistance allegedly executed by the victim who was then a minor. Certainly, the actuations
of the respondent judge in the cited case are far worse than the complained indiscretions of
herein respondent Judge.
In the proceedings instituted against Judge Jocson, 32 he was charged with a litany of
administrative cases, six (6) in all,i.e., from gross misconduct to gross ignorance of the law, to
incompetence, to partiality. While not all the charges were sufficiently proved, respondent
judge was found to be "ignorant of fairly elementary and quite familiar legal principles and
administrative regulations, (with) . . . a marked penchant for applying unorthodox, even
strange theories and concepts in the adjudication of controversies, (and) exhibits indifference
to, and even disdain for due process and the rule of law, applies the law whimsically,
capriciously and oppressively, and displays bias and partiality." The Court thus observed,
"[t]he different acts of misconduct proven against respondent judge demonstrate his unfitness
to remain in office and to continue to discharge the functions and duties of a judge, and
warrant the imposition on him of the extreme sanction of dismissal from the service." There is
nothing in the records of the instant case which shows that respondent
Judge Muro, like former Judge Jocson, exhibits a pattern for applying pecant and unaccepted
theories which breed manifest and irreversible injustice.
And, in Uy v. Judge Dizon-Capulong, 33 respondent aggravated her ignorance of the law by her
refusal to abide by the Decision of the appellate court and later of this Court, showing utter
disrespect for and open defiance of higher courts. Consequently, she was not only found
guilty of gross ignorance of the law, but also of grave and serious misconduct prejudicial to
the interest of the judicial service.
Contrastingly, in a fairly recent case, 34 this Court merely imposed a fine of P10,000.00 on
respondent judge who entertained the petition for bail filed by the suspects prior to their
actual arrest, notwithstanding unrefuted allegations that the accused were allegedly relatives
of the congressman who "sponsored" the appointment of respondent to the Judiciary. In other
case, 35 this Court imposed a fine of P5,000.00 on respondent judge for ignorance of the law
and grave abuse of authority after he improperly issued a warrant of arrest and set the case
for arraignment, in disregard of proper procedure. And, still in
another, 36 this Court in dismissing the complaint filed against respondent ruled that a judge
cannot be condemned unless his error is so gross and patent as to produce an inference of
ignorance and bad faith or that he knowingly rendered an unjust decision.
In sum, there is no extrinsic evidence which shows that the assailed order of respondent Judge
Manuel T. Muro was inspired by a conscious and corrupt intent to do a disservice and commit
an atrocity, and thus his dismissal is uncalled for. Where there is no clear indication from the
records that the respondent's assailed decision was inspired by corrupt motives or a
reprehensible purpose, and while there may be a misjudgment, but not a deliberate twisting
of facts to justify the assailed order, dismissal of respondent judge from the service is not
proper. 37
Holding respondent judge liable for issuing the challenged order may curtail the independence
of judges and send the wrong signals to them who are supposed to exercise their office
without fear of reprisal, merely for expressing their uncorrupted views. Regretfully, litigants
may suffer and gain eventual justice only after costly and long-drawn-out appeals from
erroneous decisions, but these are necessary evils which must be endured to some extent lest
judicial independence and the growth of the law be stifled.
Unlike collegial courts which afford their members the luxury of a deliberation, a trial judge in
handing down his decisions must brave the loneliness of his solitude and independence. And,
while this Court may slightly bend backwards if only to avoid suspicion of partiality and

cliquism to a brother in the profession, it must also step forward and take the lead to defend
him against unsubstantiated tirades which put to shame and disgrace not only the magistrate
on trial but the entire judicial system as well. As champion at other times tormentor of
trial and appellate judges, this Court must be unrelenting in weeding the judiciary of
unscrupulous judges, but it must also be quick in dismissing administrative complaints which
serve no other purpose than to harass them. In dismissing judges from the service, the Court
must be circumspect and deliberate, lest it penalizes them for exercising their independent
judgments handed down in good faith.
Respondent judge has impressive academic and professional credentials which, experience
shows, are no longer easy to recruit for the judicial service. Above all, he has served the
judiciary with creditable distinction. It is unfeeling, if not unfair, to purge him without extrinsic
evidence of bad faith and then shatter his hopes of ascending someday the judicial hierarchy
which, after all, is the ultimate dream of every sacrificing trial judge.
I VOTE FOR THE EXONERATION OF RESPONDENT JUDGE.
# Separate Opinions
BELLOSILLO, J.:
In other jurisdictions, it is generally accepted that judges are not accountable by way of either
civil suit or discipline for their official acts, even if clearly erroneous. Thus, open disregard of
statutes, rules, and cases has been held to be protected official activity. Although a decision
may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts concerning a judge's integrity or physiological
condition, absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself is insufficient to establish a case
against the judge. The rule is consistent with the concept of judicial independence. An honest
judge, if he were denied the protection of the extrinsic evidence requirement, might become
unduly cautious in his work, since he would be subject to discipline based merely upon the
inferences to be drawn from an erroneous decision. 1
In our jurisdiction, the law is no different. Thus, this Court has repeatedly held that . . . it is a fundamental rule of long standing that a judicial officer when required
to exercise his judgment or discretion is not criminally liable for any error he
commits provided he acts in good faith, that in the absence of malice or any
wrongful conduct . . . the judge cannot be held administratively responsible . . .
for no one, called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment, and to hold a judge
administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he
renders . . . would be nothing short of harassment or would make his position
unbearable. 2
A judge cannot be subjected to liability - civil, criminal, or
administrative - for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in
good faith. 3 He cannot be held to account or answer, criminally, civilly, or administratively,
for an erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith. 4 As a matter of public policy, in the
absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. 5 It is a general principle
of the highest importance to proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in
exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without
apprehension of personal consequences to himself. This concept of judicial immunity rests
upon consideration of public policy, its purpose being to preserve the integrity and
independence of the judiciary." 6 This being settled doctrine, there is no choice but to apply it
to the instant case.
The facts: Respondent Manuel T. Muro, a native of Masbate, Masbate, was appointed on 6
November 1986 as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 54, by then
President Corazon C. Aquino. A product of the College of Law, Far Easter University, he

graduated valedictorian in 1955, magna cum laude, and placed sixth in the Bar examinations.
Now he is being charged with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violations of Rules
2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct 7 for dismissing motu proprio the eleven
(11) cases filed by the Department of Justice Panel of Prosecutors against Ms. Imelda
Romualdez Marcos for Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions after President
Fidel V. Ramos had announced, which was published in newspaper reports, the lifting of all
foreign exchange restrictions.
The majority opinion finds respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law and imposes
upon him the supreme penalty of dismissal from the service, forfeiture of leave credits and
retirement benefits, and disqualification from reemployment in the government service.
With all due respect to my esteemed colleagues, particularly to the ponente who is a
recognized authority on various fields of law, I cannot help viewing the circumstances in a
different light.
There is no dispute that the order issued by respondent judge has been reversed by the
appellate court, which reversal has now become final for failure of the accused to appeal
therefrom; hence, no damage has been caused except that complainants had to avail of a
judicial remedy to correct the mistake. But, as adverted to, the overturned order alone does
not necessarily make respondent judge liable administratively, much more civilly or criminally.
To be answerable, the fault of the judge, if any, must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate
or done in bad faith. 8Plainly said, fault in this regard may exist only when the error appears to
be deliberate or in bad faith. 9
Thus, bad faith is imputed against respondent judge, first, for insisting that "there was no
need to await publication of Circular No. 1353 for the reason that the public announcement
made by the President in several newspapers of general circulation lifting foreign exchange
controls is total, absolute, without qualification, and immediately effective," 10 and, second,
for "dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a motion to quash having
been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the prosecution the basic opportunity to
be heard on the matter." 11
But, bad faith is the neglect or refusal to fulfill a duty, not prompted by an honest mistake, but
by some interested or sinister motive. 12 It implies breach of faith and willful failure to respond
to plain and well understood obligation. 13 It does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of
wrong; it means breach of a known duty through some motive or interest or ill will. 14
Hence, I cannot ascribe bad faith to respondent judge for I see no insidious intentions on his
part. If he insists that there really is no need to await the publication of Circular No. 1353, as
he does here, it merely shows that he sincerely believes that there is indeed no necessity to
await publication. Whether his belief is erroneous or not is thus irrelevant. Further,
dismissing motu proprio the eleven criminal cases without affording the prosecution the
opportunity to be heard on the matter, erroneous though it may be, is not inescapably
indicative of bad faith. The immediate dismissal of the charges is a necessary consequence of
the belief that since the restrictions were lifted, no law was then being violated. It is an
elementary principle in procedural law and statutory construction that the repeal of a penal
law deprives the court of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old law
prior to its repeal. Thus, where the crime no longer exists, prosecution of the person charged
under the old law cannot be had and the action should be dismissed. 15
On the contrary, there is no reason why good faith should not be attributed to respondent
judge. Good faith means that the motive that actuated the conduct in question was in fact
what the actor ascribes to it, that is, that what he gives as his motive was in truth his
motive. 16 Hence, if he honestly believes that the bases for the criminal charges against
accused have been eliminated and thus strikes down the information and consequently
dismisses the charges, respondent judge cannot be criminally, civilly, or even
administratively, held liable.

Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration are sufficient
defenses protecting a judicial officer charged with ignorance of the law and promulgation of
an unjust decision from being held accountable for errors of judgment. This, on the premise
that no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the administration of justice can
be infallible. 17
Respondent judge could not have seriously jeopardized the rights of the prosecution, even if
the accused invoked the defense of double jeopardy, since the remedy of certiorari is very
much available. Precisely, as has been pointed out in the majority opinion, the defense of
double jeopardy is unavailing when the prosecution is denied due process. This is in fact the
office of the prevailing doctrine - to correct indiscretions of lower court judges - which does
not necessarily make them personally liable. In fact, if respondent judge was indeed in bad
faith, he should have given the prosecution an opportunity to be heard, and after a full-blown
trial, acquitted the accused. Then, the defense of double jeopardy would have been proper
and the accused would have gone scot-free. Thus, in Negado v. Judge Autajay, 18 this Court
affirmed the conclusions of the Investigating Justice of the Court of Appeals that "[w]hen a
person seeks administrative sanction against a judge simply because he has committed an
error in deciding the case against such person, when such error can be elevated to a higher
court for review and correction, the action of such person can only be suspect."
To equate the failure of accused Marcos to comment on the petition before the appellate
court, and consequently invoke the defense of double jeopardy, with the errancy of the
assailed order, 19 may be indulging in needless speculation. And to imply that the influence of
the accused who is a prominent public figure brought about the dismissal order is simply not
borne out by the records.
Besides, the challenged order of respondent judge can hardly be considered as grossly
erroneous to merit his dismissal. For, while his reasoning may be erroneous, as it turned out
when the reversal of his decision by the appellate court became final, it is not at all illogical as
even the President of the Republic, with his learned legal advisers, after learning of the
dismissal of the cases filed by his administration against the accused, was quoted as saying
that Mrs. Marcos was an "accidental" beneficiary of the foreign exchange deregulation policy
of his administration. 20 Thus, President Fidel V. Ramos further said that "[t]he forex
deregulation applies to everybody . . . . Now the cases filed by the government against Mrs.
Marcos, numbering about 11 out of 90 have become moot and academic because of the new
regulations that have come out of the Monetary Board, but that is to her advantage." 21 Where
the conclusions of the judge in his decision are not without logic or reason, it cannot be said
that he is incompetent or grossly ignorant. 22
It has been said that a judge, like Caesar's wife, must not only be pure but beyond
suspicion. 23 Ideally so. But the cold fact is that every overturned decision provokes suspicion
especially from the successful appellant who feels certain that the lower court indeed erred.
It is settled that "[a] judge should be mindful that his duty is the application of general law to
a particular instance, that ours is a government of laws and not of men, and that he violates
his duty as a minister of justice under such system if he seeks to do what he may personally
consider substantial justice in a particular case and disregards the general law as he knows it
to be binding on him. Such action may have detrimental consequences beyond the immediate
controversy. He should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of
the law itself, remembering that he is not a depositary of arbitrary power, but a judge under
the sanction of law." 24 As it has been said, he must interpret the books, and not unload his
ideas.
But while a judge must decide in accordance with existing laws and established jurisprudence,
his own personality, character, convictions, values, experiences and prejudices are only
sublimely insignificant and unconsciously dispensable. In every decision he makes, he is no
more and no less human, his own beliefs, perceptions and imperfections, as well as the laws
he is bound to apply, all having profound influence on his eventual choice. Thus, Mr. Justice
Cardozo of the Supreme Court of the United States once wrote of judges: "We may try to see

things as objectively as we please. None the less, we can never see them with any eyes
except our own." 25 Hence, time and again, lower court judges, if not reversed by the Court of
Appeals and this Court, have continued to set new trails in jurisprudence without exactly
conforming with what has been settled. yet, whether reversed or merely unregarded, they do
not receive displeasure from this Court; on the contrary, they remain to be effective
dispensers of everyday justice.
In fine, there is no substantial proof, nay proof beyond reasonable doubt, that respondent
judge issued the assailed order in bad faith or with conscious and deliberate intent to
perpetrate an injustice.
Mr. Justice Malcolm, speaking for this Court In re Horilleno, 26 said that "[i]mpeachment
proceedings before courts have been said, in other jurisdictions, to be in their nature highly
penal in character and to be governed by the rules of law applicable to criminal cases." Mr.
Chief Justice Fernando, then Associate Justice of this Court, reiterated the doctrine inSuerte v.
Judge Ugbinar 27 where he said that "[t]his is to defer the basic concept first announced in
1922 in this jurisdiction . . . in . . . In re Horilleno that proceedings of this character being in
their nature highly penal, the charge must, therefore, be proved beyond reasonable doubt. To
paraphrase the opinion further, there is no showing of the alleged incompetence and gross
ignorance of the law by a preponderance of the evidence, much less beyond a reasonable
doubt. Such an exacting standard has been adhered to by this Court in subsequent
decisions." 28
The law always imputes good faith to judicial action, and the burden is on the one challenging
the same to prove want of it. Contraposed with the "exacting standard" required,
complainant-prosecutors in the instant case failed to prove the absence of good faith on the
part of the respondent judge. Consequently, the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed stands.
I find it difficult to compare the instant case with those cited in the majority opinion. In Padilla
v. Judge Dizon, 29respondent not only allowed the accused to go scot-free, leaving the
Commissioner of Customs without any relief against the accused, the former likewise ordered
the release of US$3,000.00 to the accused. Thus, respondent judge was found guilty not only
of gross ignorance of the law, but also of gross incompetence, and grave and serious
misconduct affecting his integrity and efficiency, and was consequently dismissed from the
service. And, failing to learn a lesson from his earlier administrative case, respondent judge,
after his reinstatement, this time erroneously acquitted the defendants in four (4) different
cases of illegal possession of firearms. Finally the Court said, "[w]hen it has been clearly
demonstrated, as in this case, not only once but four (4) times, that the judge is either grossly
incompetent or grossly ignorant of the penal laws . . . . he becomes unfit to discharge his
judicial office." 30 Unlike former Judge Dizon, this is the first time respondent Judge Muro is
being administratively charged.
In Buenavista v. Judge Garcia, 31 the Court found respondent guilty of "serious misconduct,
gross ignorance of the law, and knowingly rendering an unjust order of judgment" for granting
bail to an accused who was charged with statutory rape, for "improper and immoral
intervention in brokering a compromise of the criminal cases" against the accused, and
thereafter for granting the motion to dismiss the rape case on the basis of an Affidavit of
Desistance allegedly executed by the victim who was then a minor. Certainly, the actuations
of the respondent judge in the cited case are far worse than the complained indiscretions of
herein respondent Judge.
In the proceedings instituted against Judge Jocson, 32 he was charged with a litany of
administrative cases, six (6) in all,i.e., from gross misconduct to gross ignorance of the law, to
incompetence, to partiality. While not all the charges were sufficiently proved, respondent
judge was found to be "ignorant of fairly elementary and quite familiar legal principles and
administrative regulations, (with) . . . a marked penchant for applying unorthodox, even
strange theories and concepts in the adjudication of controversies, (and) exhibits indifference
to, and even disdain for due process and the rule of law, applies the law whimsically,

capriciously and oppressively, and displays bias and partiality." The Court thus observed,
"[t]he different acts of misconduct proven against respondent judge demonstrate his unfitness
to remain in office and to continue to discharge the functions and duties of a judge, and
warrant the imposition on him of the extreme sanction of dismissal from the service." There is
nothing in the records of the instant case which shows that respondent
Judge Muro, like former Judge Jocson, exhibits a pattern for applying pecant and unaccepted
theories which breed manifest and irreversible injustice.
And, in Uy v. Judge Dizon-Capulong, 33 respondent aggravated her ignorance of the law by her
refusal to abide by the Decision of the appellate court and later of this Court, showing utter
disrespect for and open defiance of higher courts. Consequently, she was not only found
guilty of gross ignorance of the law, but also of grave and serious misconduct prejudicial to
the interest of the judicial service.
Contrastingly, in a fairly recent case, 34 this Court merely imposed a fine of P10,000.00 on
respondent judge who entertained the petition for bail filed by the suspects prior to their
actual arrest, notwithstanding unrefuted allegations that the accused were allegedly relatives
of the congressman who "sponsored" the appointment of respondent to the Judiciary. In other
case, 35 this Court imposed a fine of P5,000.00 on respondent judge for ignorance of the law
and grave abuse of authority after he improperly issued a warrant of arrest and set the case
for arraignment, in disregard of proper procedure. And, still in
another, 36 this Court in dismissing the complaint filed against respondent ruled that a judge
cannot be condemned unless his error is so gross and patent as to produce an inference of
ignorance and bad faith or that he knowingly rendered an unjust decision.
In sum, there is no extrinsic evidence which shows that the assailed order of respondent Judge
Manuel T. Muro was inspired by a conscious and corrupt intent to do a disservice and commit
an atrocity, and thus his dismissal is uncalled for. Where there is no clear indication from the
records that the respondent's assailed decision was inspired by corrupt motives or a
reprehensible purpose, and while there may be a misjudgment, but not a deliberate twisting
of facts to justify the assailed order, dismissal of respondent judge from the service is not
proper. 37
Holding respondent judge liable for issuing the challenged order may curtail the independence
of judges and send the wrong signals to them who are supposed to exercise their office
without fear of reprisal, merely for expressing their uncorrupted views. Regretfully, litigants
may suffer and gain eventual justice only after costly and long-drawn-out appeals from
erroneous decisions, but these are necessary evils which must be endured to some extent lest
judicial independence and the growth of the law be stifled.
Unlike collegial courts which afford their members the luxury of a deliberation, a trial judge in
handing down his decisions must brave the loneliness of his solitude and independence. And,
while this Court may slightly bend backwards if only to avoid suspicion of partiality and
cliquism to a brother in the profession, it must also step forward and take the lead to defend
him against unsubstantiated tirades which put to shame and disgrace not only the magistrate
on trial but the entire judicial system as well. As champion at other times tormentor of
trial and appellate judges, this Court must be unrelenting in weeding the judiciary of
unscrupulous judges, but it must also be quick in dismissing administrative complaints which
serve no other purpose than to harass them. In dismissing judges from the service, the Court
must be circumspect and deliberate, lest it penalizes them for exercising their independent
judgments handed down in good faith.
Respondent judge has impressive academic and professional credentials which, experience
shows, are no longer easy to recruit for the judicial service. Above all, he has served the
judiciary with creditable distinction. It is unfeeling, if not unfair, to purge him without extrinsic
evidence of bad faith and then shatter his hopes of ascending someday the judicial hierarchy
which, after all, is the ultimate dream of every sacrificing trial judge.
I VOTE FOR THE EXONERATION OF RESPONDENT JUDGE.

LBC EXPRESS, INC. and, G.R. No. 161760

LBC INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Petitioners,
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairman,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
SPOUSES EUBERTO and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
SISINIA ADO,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
August 25, 2005
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 73732 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naval, Biliran, Branch
16, holding LBC International, Inc. and LBC Express, Inc. solidarily liable for damages.
The factual backdrop of the case, as found by the CA, is as follows:
Euberto Ado was an overseas contract worker, employed as a mechanic in the Marine
Workshop of Al Meroouge Group in Bahrain.[2] He was the holder of Passport No. L067892.
Al-Mulla Cargo & Packing (AMCP) of Manama, Bahrain was an agent of LBC
International, Inc. and LBC Express, Inc. (hereinafter collectively referred to as LBC). [3]
When his two-year contract of employment expired, Euberto, together with his wife
Sisinia, decided to take a three-month vacation to the Philippines. They secured a re-entry
visa to Bahrain.
Before flying to the Philippines, on August 8, 1995, Euberto transported five (5) boxes,
each weighing 168 kilograms, through AMCP, [4] with himself as the consignee of the packages.
AMCP issued House Air Waybill (HAWB) No. 004467 covering Eubertos packages. Under the
waybill, Zachary Furagganan, the LBCs import manager and the representative of AMCP in the
Philippines with office at LBC International, Inc., LBC Aviation Center, Domestic Road, Pasay
City,[5] was the party to notify upon Eubertos arrival in Manila. [6]
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, the spouses Ado proceeded to LBCs Customer
Service Department located at the LBC Aviation Center, Domestic Road, Pasay City, to take
delivery of the boxes from Furagganan. Myrna Mendoza, an employee of LBC, suggested that
Euberto avail of the custom duty exemptions for his packages, and entrust his passport to her
for submission to the Customs Office. Euberto hesitated because it contained his re-entry visa
to Bahrain, which he needed to get another two-year contract with Al Meroouge. He was
concerned that his passport might get lost. However, after being assured that his passport,
together with his boxes, would be forwarded to him, he acquiesced. He turned over his
passport to LBC, for which he was issued a receipt. [7]
Eubertos boxes were delivered to him via the LBC-Ormoc City Branch on different
dates: three boxes on September 7, 1995; [8] one box on September 14, 1995 [9] and one box on
September 16, 1995.[10] He inquired about his passport, but the Ormoc City LBC Manager told
him that his passport was not in their office. He advised Euberto to wait for a few days, as it
might arrive on a later date. Euberto made several follow-ups, to no avail. [11] Furagganan sent

letter-inquiries to the managers of the LBC-Cebu Branch and LBC-Catbalogan Branch,

[12]
informing them that Eubertos passport was attached to HAWB No. 004467, together with
the waybills and bill of lading of shipments. However, the passport of Euberto could not be
located.
Euberto then engaged the services of counsel who, on January 8, 1996, sent a demand
letter[13] to LBC. Still,LBC did not act on the demand and failed to return his passport. Euberto
was not able to return to Bahrain and report back for work.
On September 22, 1997, Euberto filed a Complaint [14] for damages against LBC Express,
Inc. and LBCInternational, Inc. with the RTC of Naval, Biliran. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. B-1024 and raffled to Branch 16, and was later amended [15] to implead Eubertos wife
Sisinia. The complaint alleged that because of the loss of Eubertos passport through the gross
negligence of the defendants, he failed to report back for work in Bahrain. The spouses Ado
prayed that damages for Eubertos unearned income be awarded to them and that after due
proceedings, the court render judgment in their favor, as follows:
1. Condemning and ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay
the plaintiff the following sums:
a.
b.
c.

P300,000.00 as moral damages;

P200,000.00 as exemplary damages;
Actual and compensatory damages of P20,000.00 a month from
October 10, 1995 with interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum until
fully paid;
d.
P30,000.00 as attorneys fees;
e.
P20,000.00 as litigation expenses;
f.
To pay the costs of the suit.
2. Plaintiffs further pray for such other reliefs and remedies as [the]
Honorable Court may deem just and equitable in the premises. [16]
In their answer with counterclaim, [17] LBC alleged that their delivery van carrying
Eubertos
packages
was
forcibly
opened
and
pilfered
by

unidentified person/s at its Pasay City office, and surmised that the said passport was
probably one of the items stolen. The spouses Ado had only themselves to blame for the
damages they sustained, as Euberto failed to secure a replacement passport from the
Department of Foreign Affairs, and a visa from the Embassy of Bahrain.
To prove their claim for actual damages, spouses Ado offered in evidence a certification
from Eubertos employer, which reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that Mr. Euberto Ado holder of Passport Number L 067892
was working as a Mechanic at our Marine Workshop. He left Bahrain on
08.08.1995 to Manila on holiday for the period of three months. He was getting
the basic salary of BD 280.000 (Two hundred & Eighty) only monthly.
He was holding the return visa for coming back to after having his leave.
Mr. Euberto Ado could not return back to Bahrain [as] his passport was
misplace[d] in Manila.
Yours (sic) Sincerely,
Praful V. Birje (Manager)[18]
On August 14, 2001, the spouses Ado filed their formal offer of documentary evidence. [19] The
defendants were given ten (10) days from August 30, 2001 within which to file their
comments thereon. Meanwhile, trial was set at 8:30 a.m. of October 10, 2001 and on
November 8 and 9, 2001 for the defendants to adduce their evidence. [20] However, the
defendants failed to file their respective comments and on October 4, 2001, the court issued
an Order[21] admitting all the documentary evidence of the plaintiffs. On October 10, 2001, the
case was called for hearing. There was no appearance for the defendants, and the court
issued an order declaring that the defendants were deemed to have waived their right to
adduce their evidence, and that the case was considered submitted for decision. [22]
On October 22, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment [23] in favor of the spouses Ado.
The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds in favor of the plaintiffs
and renders judgment against the defendants making them liable solidarily to
pay the plaintiffs:
(a) P480,000.00 in compensatory damages plus legal interest from the
filing of this complaint until fully paid;
(b) P300,000.00 in moral damages;
(c) P30,000.00 in attorneys fees; and
(d) to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[24]
The trial court declared that Eubertos passport was lost because of the defendants
gross negligence.
On November 5, 2001, LBC filed a Motion dated October 31, 2001, for the
reconsideration of the trial courts Order dated October 10, 2001, praying that trial proceed as
scheduled on November 8, 2001. The defendants also filed their comments on the plaintiffs
formal offer of evidence. Before the trial court could resolve the motion, the defendants
received a copy of the decision on November 9, 2001.

On November 14, 2001, LBC appealed the decision to the CA. In their Brief, LBC, as
appellants, alleged that:
1. The lower court erred in declaring that plaintiff-appellee Euberto Ado
lost a renewed contract at a basic salary of 280 Bahrain Dinar that entitles the
plaintiffs-appellees for the award of actual and moral damages as well as
attorneys fees.
2. The lower court erred in declaring that the defendants-appellants
waived its (sic) right to present the necessary evidence. [25]
LBC questioned the trial courts ruling that due to the loss of his passport, Euberto lost
the opportunity for the renewal of his two-year contract, at the basic salary of
about P20,000.00 a month in Bahrain, or for the total peso equivalent of P480,000.00 for two
years. They argued that such ruling of the court was based on mere speculations. Moreover,
the certification issued by Eubertos employer does not indicate that he had an existing
contract, or that he would be given another two-year contract. LBC argued that Euberto failed
to lessen the damages he suffered by filing an application for the issuance of another
passport and or application for a two-year contract before the Bahrain Embassy in the
Philippines; hence, the spouses Ado were not entitled to any damages, much less moral
damages as they failed to adduce evidence that LBC acted in bad faith in failing to return
Eubertos passport.
On the second assignment of error, LBC averred that the trial court erred in declaring
the case submitted for decision for their failure to appear for the trial on October 10, 2001. If
they had been allowed to adduce their evidence, they would have presented Jimwell Morales,
who would testify that the shipments and Eubertos passport were properly handled. When the
shipments and cargoes were brought to the LBC Express, Inc., Head Office at Pasay City for
sorting and forwarding to their final destination, the delivery van carrying various shipments,
including those of the spouses Ado and the passport attached to the shipments air waybill,
was forcibly opened by robbers along 14 th Street, Port Area, South Harbor, Manila. [26]
On July 10, 2003, the CA rendered judgment affirming the assailed decision.
LBC, now the petitioners, filed their petition for review on certiorari claiming that the CA
erred
A. IN FINDING THAT RESPONDENT EUBERTO ADO HAD A TWO-YEAR
CONTRACT WITH HIS FORMER EMPLOYER ABROAD THAT ALLEGEDLY JUSTIFIES
THE AWARD TO HIM OF EXORBITAN (SIC) ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
OF FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND PESOS (P480,000.00);
B. IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
BASED ON SPECULATION/OR GUESSWORK, IN VIOLATION OF THE BEST EVIDENCE
OBTAINABLE RULE;
C. IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P300,000.00) MORAL DAMAGES, FOR PETITIONER COMMITTED NO BAD FAITH
AND THERE IS NO SUFFICIENT PROOF ON RESPONDENTS ALLEGED MORAL
SUFFERING;
D. IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF SUCH MORAL DAMAGES, BECAUSE THE
SAME HAS BECOME PUNITIVE FOR PETITIONER OR HAS BECOME A MEASURE FOR
RESPONDENTS ENRICHMENT AT PETITIONERS EXPENSE;
E. IN AFFIRMING [THE] AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES, PETITIONER NOT
BEING IN BAD FAITH, AND TO PUT A PREMIUM TO LITIGATE NOT BEING A SOUND
PUBLIC POLICY.[27]

The petitioners reiterate their submissions in the appellate court in support of their
petition.
The petition is partially granted.
One is entitled to actual or compensatory damages in the form of an adequate
compensation for such pecuniary losses suffered as has been duly proved. In contracts, the
damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith shall be those that are the natural and
probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen
or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted. In the case
where the obligor acted in bad faith, the obligor shall be responsible for all the damages which
may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. [28]
The Court agrees with the petitioners contention that the respondents failed to adduce
preponderant evidence to prove that upon his return to Bahrain, he would be automatically
employed by his former employer for a period of two years and that he will be given the same
job with the same compensation as provided for in his expired employment contract.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that actual or compensatory damages is not
presumed, but must be duly proved with reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely
on speculation, conjecture or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but must
depend upon competent proof that they have suffered and on evidence of the actual amount
thereof.[29] Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation
is not evidence.[30]
In this case, the only evidence adduced by the respondents to prove that Euberto had
been granted a two-year re-entry visa and that upon his return to Bahrain he would be
automatically given a two-year employment contract is Eubertos own testimony and his
employers certification. The CA found the same to be sufficient, and affirmed the award for
actual/compensatory damages, thus:
We do not agree. It is worthy to note that appellants reproduction of
appellee Eubertos testimony is, to say the least, incomplete. A more judicious
scrutiny of the records, however, reveal that while the two-year contract has not
actually been executed between appellee Euberto and his employer, his
employment is assured by the fact that he was issued a re-entry visa by the
embassy. The portion of the cross-examination left out by the appellant reads:
Q-Is a re-entry visa an assurance of contract (sic)?
A-Yes, automatically.
Q-On what basis?
A-If I could go back to place (sic) of work before the expiration of my
re-entry visa, automatically, another contract will be issued.
Q-Is that so?
A-Yes, Sir.
Contrary, therefore, to appellants assertion, the re-entry visa may be
considered as sufficient proof of the continuation of his contract with Al
Meroouge for a period of another two years, since he will not be issued the same
by Bahrains embassy, absent any showing that he has a valid reason to return to
the same country.
Moreover, the Certification (Exhibit A, Records, p. 193) issued by appellee
Eubertos employer, Al Meroouge, explicitly stated that, when said appellee left
Bahrain on August 1995, he was merely on holiday, or simply on leave, for a
period of three months, indicating that he was in fact expected to return to work
after the said period. The last portion of said Certification even recognized the
reason for his failure to return after his leave, stating thus:

He was holding the return visa for coming back to (sic)

after having his leave. Mr. Euberto Ado could not return to Bahrain has
(sic) his passport was misplace (sic) in Manila. (Emphasis and
underscoring [sic] supplied)[31]
The appellate courts conclusion based on respondent Eubertos testimony and the
certification of his former employer is a non sequitur. The entirety of the relevant portions of
respondent Eubertos testimony on cross-examination reads:
ATTY. MAYOL:
Q For the period of two (2) years for how long have you been working?
A Two (2) years finished contract.
Q And another contract should be made whenever you return?
A Yes, Sir.
Q In 1995, you were in Al Meroouge, you were able to perform your job on the
period of your contract. Supposedly, you go back to Bahrain you will be
under the same company?
A Yes, Sir.
Q But you have no contract yet?
A I have re-entry visa. Whenever I will assume work in Bahrain automatically
another contract will be issued.
Q At that time, there was no contract yet?
A Not yet.
Q Is a re-entry visa an assurance of contract?
A Yes, automatically.
Q On what basis?
A If I could go back to place of work before the expiration of my re-entry visa,
automatically, another contract will be issued.
Q Is that so?
A Yes, Sir.
Q In support of your testimony, you presented a certification from your alleged
employer?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Who secured that certification?
A I requested one of my compadre because he was there.

Q You were not the one who secured that certification?

A Yes, of course, because I am here and I could not go back because my passport
was lost.
Q How close are you with your manager?
A Very close because I was even entrusted to maintain the yatch owned by the
manager.
Q The fact that you were not in Bahrain, you have no personal knowledge about
the issuance of certification?
A Yes, I have no personal knowledge.
COURT: What is that certification?
ATTY. SABITSANA:
Certification of employment and salary.
COURT: The past employment?
ATTY. SABITSANA:
Yes, Your Honor.[32]
Thus, Eubertos two-year contract of employment had already expired before leaving
Bahrain for his three-month vacation in the Philippines. Whether or not respondent Eubertos
employer would automatically employ him upon his return to Bahrain after his sojourn in the
Philippines would depend entirely upon his employer. The respondents failed to adduce any
evidence that Eubertos employer would give him his former position under the same terms
and conditions stipulated in his previous employment contract. Euberto even failed to prove,
by preponderant evidence, other than his self-serving testimony, that the re-entry visa issued
to him was at his employers behest, with an assurance that upon his return to Bahrain, he
would automatically be re-employed. The respondents could very well have secured an
undertaking or an authenticated certification from Eubertos employer that upon his return to
Bahrain, he would be automatically employed for a period of two years under the same terms
and conditions of the first contract. While they adduced in evidence a certification from
Eubertos employer that he had been issued a re-entry visa, there was no undertaking to
automatically re-employ respondent Euberto for another two years upon his return to Bahrain
for a monthly salary of 280 Bahrain Dinars. The CA, thus, erred in affirming the award of
actual or compensatory damages of P480,000.00 to the respondent spouses.
There is preponderant evidence that the respondents indeed suffered some pecuniary
loss due to the loss of Eubertos passport. However, the respondents failed to adduce
preponderant evidence of the passports value. Nevertheless, they are entitled to temperate
damages of P10,000.00 under Article 2224 of the New Civil Code which provides: [t]emperate
or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages,
may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.[33]
The CA affirmed the award of moral damages in favor of the respondents as follows:
Considering the foregoing and the fact that appellants had in fact been
negligent in handling appellee Eubertos passport, the trial court could not be
said to have erred in awarding both actual and moral damages to the appellees,
the latter being justified further by the fact that the appellees entire family
suffered, having lost much-needed source of their income, which also resulted in
their failure to complete the construction of the house they were building. [34]
Case law has it that moral damages may be awarded for breach of contract where the
breach thereof by the obligor is wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppressive or

abusive,[35] or where the obligor is guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith. [36] In the
case of Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. Court of Appeals, [37] the Court had laid
the requisites for awarding moral damages, thus: first, evidence of besmirched reputation or
physical, mental or psychological suffering sustained by the claimant; second, a culpable act
or omission factually established; third, proof that the wrongful act or omission of the
defendant is the proximate cause of the damages sustained by the claimant; and fourth, that
the case is predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Article 2219 and
Article 2220 of the Civil Code.
Article 2220 of the Civil Code states that breach of contract may be a legal ground for
awarding moral damages if the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
The rulings of the trial and appellate courts that the respondent spouses are entitled to
moral damages are correct. While the failure to deliver Eubertos passport does not per
se amount to willful misconduct [38] or bad faith,the evidence on record shows that the
petitioners indeed acted in bad faith and in wanton disregard of their contractual obligation to
the respondents.
The respondents made numerous inquiries from the petitioners on the whereabouts of
Eubertos passport, and repeatedly made requests for its return; the petitioners dilly-dallied
and gave various excuses. The petitioners told the respondents that the passport may have
been inadvertently transported to their other branches. Exasperated, the respondents had to
secure the services of counsel. Their demands for the production of the passport (made
through counsel) were ignored by the petitioners. Worse still, the petitioners alleged in their
answer to the complaint that the van carrying Eubertos passport, while parked somewhere
along 14th Street, Port Area, South Harbor, Manila, was forcibly opened by unidentified
person/s who pilfered its contents, probably including the said passport. [39] The trial court
found the allegation of pilferage to be baseless and declared as follows:
The defendants LBC failed to notify Euberto Ado at the earliest possible
time that his passport was lost. It was only in the second week of October 1996
that he was informed through the letters of Atty. Florencio C. Lameyra, dated
October 9, 1996, to the Chief, Legal and Enforcement Division of the Civil
Aeronautics Board, and the letter of Atty. Generoso Santos that his passport was
lost and not stolen by thieves as asserted in their answer. [40]
Thus, with the attendant circumstances, there is ample basis for an award of moral
damages to the respondents. There is, to be sure, no hard and fast rule for determining what
would
be
a
fair
amount
of
moral
damages.

Each case has to be resolved based on the attendant particulars. The Court finds that
an award of P50,000.00 as moral damages in favor of the respondents is commensurate in
this case.
Considering that the petitioners were guilty of bad faith and the private respondents
were compelled to litigate,[41] the latter are entitled to the amount of P15,000.00 as attorneys
fees.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No.
73732 isAFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The award for actual/compensatory damages is
deleted. In lieu thereof, the respondents, spouses Euberto and Sisinia Ado, are awarded
temperate damages in the amount of P10,000.00. The awards for moral damages and
attorneys fees are reduced to P50,000.00 and P15,000.00, respectively. No costs.

THE CONSOLIDATED BANK AND

TRUST
CORPORATION
(SOLIDBANK),
P e t i t i o n e r,

- versus

G.R. No. 143338

Present:
PUNO,
Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

DEL MONTE MOTOR WORKS, INC.,

NARCISO
G.
MORALES,[1] AND
Promulgated:
SPOUSE,
R e s p o n d e n t s.
July 29, 2005
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 16886 entitled, The Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation (SOLIDBANK) v. Del Monte
Motor Works, Inc., Narciso O. Morales and Spouse promulgated on 25 November 1999 and of
the Resolution of the appellate court dated 11 May 2000 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration. Said decision and resolution affirmed the order dated 28 December 1987 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, Manila.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On 13 June 1984, petitioner filed before the RTC of Manila a complaint [3] for recovery of sum of
money against respondents, impleading the spouse of respondent Narciso O. Morales
(respondent Morales) in order to bind their conjugal partnership of gains. Petitioner, a
domestic banking and trust corporation, alleges therein that on 23 April 1982, it extended in
favor of respondents a loan in the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as evidenced
by a promissory note executed by respondents on the same date. Under the promissory note,
respondents Del Monte Motor Works, Inc. (respondent corporation) and Morales bound
themselves jointly and severally to pay petitioner the full amount of the loan through twentyfive monthly installments of P40,000.00 a month with interest pegged at 23% per annum. The
note was to be paid in full by 23 May 1984. As respondents defaulted on their monthly
installments, the full amount of the loan became due and demandable pursuant to the terms
of the promissory note. Petitioner likewise alleges that it made oral and written demands upon
respondents to settle their obligation but notwithstanding these demands, respondents still
failed to pay their indebtedness which, as of 09 March 1984, stood at P1,332,474.55.
Petitioner attached to its complaint as Annexes A, B, and C, respectively, a photocopy of the
promissory note supposedly executed by respondents, a copy of the demand letter it sent
respondents dated 20 January 1983, and statement of account pertaining to respondents
loan.
On 31 October 1984, petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Declare the Defendants in Default
which was opposed by the defendants upon the ground that they were never served with
copies of the summons and of petitioners complaint.
On 23 November 1984, respondent corporation filed before the trial court a manifestation
attaching thereto its answer to petitioners complaint which states the following:

2- That it denies generally and specifically the allegations contained in

paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 thereof for lack of knowledge and information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the matters therein alleged, the truth
being those alleged in the Special and Affirmative Defenses hereinbelow
contained;
3- ANSWERING FURTHER, and by way of a first special and affirmative defense,
defendant herein states that the promissory note in question is void for want of
valid consideration and/or there was no valuable consideration involved as
defendant herein did not receive any consideration at all;
4- ANSWERING FURTHER, and by way of a second special affirmative defense,
defendant herein alleges that no demand has ever been sent to nor received by
herein defendant and if ever demands were made, denies any liability as averred
therein.
5- ANSWERING FURTHER, and by way of a third special and affirmative defense,
defendant herein avers that the complaint states no cause of action and has no
basis either in fact or in law;
VERIFICATION
I, JEANETTE D. TOLENTINO, of legal age, after having been duly sworn to in
accordance with law, depose and state:
That I am the Controller of Del Monte Motor Works, Inc., one of the defendants in
this case.
That for and in behalf of the defendant corporation, I caused the preparation of
the above-narrated answer.
That I have read the contents thereof and they are true of my own knowledge.
(SGD) JEANNETTE D. TOLENTINO[4]

On 06 December 1984, respondent Morales filed his manifestation together with his answer
wherein he likewise renounced any liability on the promissory note, thus:
1. He ADMIT[S] paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the complaint with a qualification in
paragraph 3 thereof that he has long been separated from his wife and the
system governing their property relations is that of complete separation of
property and not that of conjugal partnership of gain[s];
2. He [DENIES], generally and specifically, the allegations contained in
paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 thereof, for lack of knowledge and information
sufficient to form a belief and as to the truth of the matter therein averred, the
truth being those alleged in the Special And Affirmative Defenses hereinbelow
pleaded;
SPECIAL AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
4. He has never signed the promissory note attached to the complaint in his
personal and/or individual capacity as such;
5. That the said promissory note is ineffective, unenforceable and void for lack of
valid consideration;

6. That even admitting, argumenti gratia, the validity and execution of the
questioned promissory note, still, defendant herein cannot be bound personally
and individually to the said obligations as banking procedures requires, it being a
standard operating procedure of all known banking institution, that to hold a
borrower jointly and severally liable in his official as well as personal capacity,
the borrower must sign a Suretyship Agreement or at least, a continuing
guarranty with that of the corporation he represent(s) but which in this case is
wanting;
7. That transaction/obligation in question did not, in any way, redound/inure to
the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gain, as there is no conjugal
partnership of gain to speak with, defendant having long been separated from
his wife and their property relation is governed by the system of complete
separation of property, and more importantly, he has never signed the said
promissory note in his personal and individual capacity as such;
VERIFICATION
That I, NARCISO MORALES, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with
law, hereby depose and declare that:
I am one of the named defendant[s] in the above-entitled case;
I have cause[d] the preparation of the foregoing Answer upon facts and figures
supplied by me to my retained counsel; have read each and every allegations
contained therein and hereby certify that the same are true and correct of my
own knowledge and information.
(SGD) NARCISO MORALES
Affiant[5]
On 26 December 1984, the trial court denied petitioners motion to declare respondents in
default and admitted their respective answers. [6]
During the trial on the merits of this case, petitioner presented as its sole witness, Liberato A.
Lavarino (Lavarino), then the manager of its Collection Department. Substantially, Lavarino
stated that respondents obtained the loan, subject of this case, from petitioner and due to
respondents failure to pay a single monthly installment on this loan, petitioner was
constrained to send a demand letter to respondents; that as a result of this demand letter,
Jeannette Tolentino (Tolentino), respondent corporations controller, wrote a letter to petitioner
requesting for some consideration because of the unfavorable business atmosphere then
buffeting their business operation; that Tolentino enclosed to said letter a check with a face
value of P220,020.00 to be discounted by petitioner with the proceeds being applied as partial
payment to their companys obligation to petitioner; that after receipt of this partial payment,
respondents obligation again became stagnant prompting petitioner to serve respondents
with another demand letter which, unfortunately, was unheeded by respondents. Lavarino
also identified the following exhibits for petitioner: photocopy of the duplicate original of the
promissory note attached to the complaint as Exhibit A; [7] petitioners 20 January 1983 demand
letter marked as Exhibit B; [8] Tolentinos letter to petitioner dated 10 February 1983 and
marked as Exhibit C;[9] and the 09 March 1984 statement of account sent to respondents
marked as Exhibit D.[10]
On 26 September 1985, petitioner made its formal offer of evidence. However, as the
original copy of Exhibit A could no longer be found, petitioner instead sought the admission of
the duplicate original of the promissory note which was identified and marked as Exhibit E.

The trial court initially admitted into evidence Exhibit E and granted respondents motion that
they be allowed to amend their respective answers to conform with this new evidence. [11]
On 30 September 1985, respondent corporation filed a manifestation and motion for
reconsideration[12] of the trial courts order admitting into evidence petitioners Exhibit E.
Respondent corporation claims that Exhibit E should not have been admitted as it was
immaterial, irrelevant, was not properly identified and hearsay evidence. Respondent
corporation insists that Exhibit E was not properly identified by Lavarino who testified that he
had nothing to do in the preparation and execution of petitioners exhibits, one of which was
Exhibit E. Further, as there were markings in Exhibit A which were not contained in Exhibit E,
the latter could not possibly be considered an original copy of Exhibit A. Lastly, respondent
corporation claims that the exhibit in question had no bearing on the complaint as Lavarino
admitted that Exhibit E was not the original of Exhibit A which was the foundation of the
complaint and upon which respondent corporation based its own answer.
Respondent Morales similarly filed a manifestation with motion to reconsider order admitting
as evidence Exhibit E[13] which, other than insisting that the due execution and genuineness of
the promissory note were not established as far as he was concerned, essentially raised the
same arguments contained in respondent corporations manifestation with motion for
reconsideration referred to above.
On 06 December 1985, the trial court granted respondents motions for reconsideration.
[14]
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of this order which was denied by the court a
quo on 20 December 1985.[15]
On 26 December 1985, respondents separately filed their motions to dismiss on the similar
ground that with the exclusion of Exhibits A and E, petitioner no longer possessed any proof of
respondents alleged indebtedness. [16]
On 08 April 1986, petitioner filed a motion [17] praying that the presiding judge, Judge Ricardo
D. Diaz, of the court a quo inhibit himself from this case maintaining that the latter rushed
into resolving its motion for reconsideration of the trial courts order of 06 December 1985
thereby depriving it the opportunity of presenting proof that the original of Exhibit A was
delivered to respondents as early as 02 April 1983. Such haste on the part of the presiding
judge, according to petitioner, cast doubt on his objectivity and fairness. This motion to inhibit
was denied by the trial court on 06 August 1987. [18]
In an order dated 28 December 1987,[19] the case before the trial court was dismissed, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant case against defendants Del Monte Motor Works, Inc.
and Narciso O. Morales and spouse, is hereby DISMISSED, with costs against the
plaintiff.

The trial courts finding was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in the assailed decision now
before us. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Manila, Branch 27, dated December 28, 1987 dismissing plaintiff-appellant['s]
complaint is hereby AFFIRMED. Cost against the plaintiff-appellant. [20]

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration dated 14 December 1999 which was
denied for lack of merit in a resolution of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 11 May 2000.
[21]

Aggrieved by the appellate courts ruling, petitioner now seeks redress from this Court
imputing the following errors on the Court of Appeals:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DENIED THE MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS OF PETITIONER
SOLIDBANKS COMPLAINT, DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF INDUBITABLE FACTS
CLEARLY POINTING TO THE FACT THAT SAID PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ADMITTED
THE GENUINENESS AND DUE EXECUTION OF THE SUBJECT PROMISSORY NOTE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT UPHELD THE
EXCLUSION OF EXHIBIT E, THE SECOND ORIGINAL OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE,
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ORIGINAL OF EXHIBIT A (XEROX COPY OF THE
DUPLICATE ORIGINAL OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE) WAS ACTUALLY IN THE
POSSESSION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS, THUS WARRANTING THE ADMISSION OF
SECONDARY EVIDENCE.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
THE TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED HIMSELF FROM TAKING COGNIZANCE
OF AND FROM TRYING AND DECIDING THE INSTANT CASE CONSIDERING HIS
PERCEIVED AND MANIFEST BIAS AND PARTIALITY IN FAVOR OF THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS TO THE GRAVE PREJUDICE OF PETITIONER SOLIDBANK. [22]

The petition is meritorious.

In resolving the case against petitioner, the appellate court held that contrary to petitioners
stance, respondents were able to generally and specifically deny under oath the genuineness
and due execution of the promissory note, thus:
There can be no dispute to the fact that the allegations in the answer (Record, p.
20, 26-27), of both defendants, they denied generally and specifically under oath
the genuineness and due execution of the promissory note and by way of special
and affirmative defenses herein states that he (MORALES) never signed the
promissory note attached to the complaint (Exh. A) in his personal and/or
individual capacity. Moreover, what appears in the record (Record, p. 20) was an
admission of paragraphs 1 & 2 but they deny generally and specifically the rest
of the allegations. It would be considered that there is a sufficient compliance of
the requirement of the law for specific denial. [23]

We hold otherwise.
The pertinent portion of the Rules of Court on the matter provides:
SEC. 8. How to contest such documents. When an action or defense is founded
upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading
as provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the
instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath,
specifically denies them and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but the
requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear
to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for an
inspection of the original instrument is refused. [24]

In the case of Permanent Savings and Loan Bank v. Mariano Velarde,[25] this Court held that
. . . Respondent also denied any liability on the promissory note as he allegedly
did not receive the amount stated therein, and the loan documents do not
express the true intention of the parties. Respondent reiterated these allegations
in his denial under oath, stating that the promissory note sued upon, assuming
that it exists and bears the genuine signature of herein defendant, the same
does not bind him and that it did not truly express the real intention of the
parties as stated in the defenses
Respondents denials do not constitute an effective specific denial as
contemplated by law. In the early case ofSongco vs. Sellner,[26] the Court
expounded on how to deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable
document, viz.:
. . . This means that the defendant must declare under oath that he
did not sign the document or that it is otherwise false or fabricated.
Neither does the statement of the answer to the effect that the
instrument was procured by fraudulent representation raise any
issue as to its genuineness or due execution. On the contrary such a
plea is an admission both of the genuineness and due execution
thereof, since it seeks to avoid the instrument upon a ground not
affecting either.[27]

In this case, both the court a quo and the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents
were able to specifically deny the allegations in petitioners complaint in the manner
specifically required by the rules. In effect, respondents had, to all intents and purposes,
admitted the genuineness and due execution of the subject promissory note and recognized
their obligation to petitioner.
The appellate court likewise sustained the ruling of the trial court that the best evidence rule
or primary evidence must be applied as the purpose of the proof is to establish the terms of
the writing meaning the alleged promissory note as it is the basis of the recovery of the
money allegedly loaned to the defendants (respondents herein). [28]
The best evidence rule is encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3, of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure which provides:
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than
the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.

The best evidence rule, according to Professor Thayer, first appeared in the year 16991700 when in one case involving a goldsmith, Holt, C. J., was quoted as stating that they
should take into consideration the usages of trade and that the best proof that the nature of
the thing will afford is only required. [29] Over the years, the phrase was used to describe rules
which were already existing such as the rule that the terms of a document must be proved by
the production of the document itself, in preference to evidence about the document; it was
also utilized to designate the hearsay rule or the rule excluding assertions made out of court
and not subject to the rigors of cross-examination; and the phrase was likewise used to
designate the group of rules by which testimony of particular classes of witnesses was
preferred to that of others.[30]
According to McCormick, an authority on the rules of evidence, the only actual rule that
the best evidence phrase denotes today is the rule requiring the production of the original
writing[31] the rationale being:
(1) that precision in presenting to the court the exact words of the writing is of
more than average importance, particularly as respects operative or dispositive
instruments, such as deeds, wills and contracts, since a slight variation in words
may mean a great difference in rights, (2) that there is a substantial hazard of
inaccuracy in the human process of making a copy by handwriting or typewriting,
and (3) as respects oral testimony purporting to give from memory the terms of
a writing, there is a special risk of error, greater than in the case of attempts at
describing other situations generally. In the light of these dangers of
mistransmission, accompanying the use of written copies or of recollection,
largely avoided through proving the terms by presenting the writing itself, the
preference for the original writing is justified. [32]

Bearing in mind that the risk of mistransmission of the contents of a writing is the justification
for the best evidence rule, we declare that this rule finds no application to this case. It should
be noted that respondents never disputed the terms and conditions of the promissory note
thus leaving us to conclude that as far as the parties herein are concerned, the wording or
content of said note is clear enough and leaves no room for disagreement. In their responsive
pleadings, respondents principal defense rests on the alleged lack of consideration of the
promissory note. In addition, respondent Morales also claims that he did not sign the note in
his personal capacity. These contentions clearly do not question the precise wording [33] of the
promissory note which should have paved the way for the application of the best evidence
rule. It was, therefore, an error for the Court of Appeals to sustain the decision of the trial
court on this point.
Besides, the best evidence rule as stated in our Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is not
absolute. As quoted earlier, the rule accepts of exceptions one of which is when the original of
the subject document is in the possession of the adverse party. As pointed out by petitioner in
its motion to inhibit, had it been given the opportunity by the court a quo, it would have
sufficiently established that the original of Exhibit A was in the possession of respondents
which would have called into application one of the exceptions to the best evidence rule.
Significantly, and as discussed earlier, respondents failed to deny specifically the execution of
the promissory note. This being the case, there was no need for petitioner to present the
original of the promissory note in question. Their judicial admission with respect to the
genuineness and execution of the promissory note sufficiently established their liability to
petitioner regardless of the fact that petitioner failed to present the original of said note. [34]
Indeed, when the defendant fails to deny specifically and under oath the due execution and
genuineness of a document copied in a complaint, the plaintiff need not prove that fact as it is
considered admitted by the defendant. [35] In the case of Asia Banking Corporation v. Walter E.
Olsen & Co.,[36] this Court held that

Another error assigned by the appellant is the fact that the lower court took into
consideration the documents attached to the complaint as a part thereof,
without having been expressly introduced in evidence. This was no error. In the
answer of the defendants there was no denial under oath of the authenticity of
these documents. Under Section 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the
authenticity and due execution of these documents must, in that case, be
deemed admitted. The effect of this is to relieve the plaintiff from the duty of
expressly presenting such documents as evidence. The court, for the proper
decision of the case, may and should consider, without the introduction of
evidence, the facts admitted by the parties. [37]

Anent petitioners allegation that the presiding judge of the court a quo should have inhibited
himself from this case, we resolve this issue against petitioner.
In order for this Court to sustain a charge of partiality and prejudice brought against a judge,
there must be convincing proof to show that he or she is, indeed, biased and partial. Bare
allegations are not enough. Bias and prejudice are serious charges which cannot be presumed
particularly if weighed against a judges sacred obligation under his oath of office to
administer justice without respect to person and do equal right to the poor and the rich.
[38]
There must be a showing of bias and prejudice stemming from an extrajudicial source
resulting in an opinion in the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his
participation in the case.[39]
In this case, as petitioner failed to proffer any evidence indicating that Judge Diaz was guilty
of bias and prejudice, we affirm the Court of Appeals holding that there was no cogent reason
for him to disqualify himself from this case.
Finally, Rule 33, Section 1, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure states the rule on the effect
of judgment on demurrer to evidence. It reads:
SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.- After the plaintiff has completed the
presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the
ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If
his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is
granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to
have waived the right to present evidence.

A demurrer to evidence abbreviates judicial proceedings, it being an instrument for the

expeditious termination of an action. Caution, however, must be exercised by the party
seeking the dismissal of a case upon this ground as under the rules, if the movants plea for
the dismissal on demurrer to evidence is granted and the order of dismissal is reversed on
appeal, he loses his right to adduce evidence. If the defendants motion for judgment on
demurrer to evidence is granted and the order is subsequently reversed on appeal, judgment
is rendered in favor of the adverse party because the movant loses his right to present
evidence.[40] The reviewing court cannot remand the case for further proceedings; rather, it
should render judgment on the basis of the evidence presented by the plaintiff. [41]
Under the promissory note executed by respondents in this case, they are obligated to
petitioner in the amount of One Million Pesos, this being the amount of loan they obtained on
23 April 1982. In addition, they also bound themselves to pay the 23% interest per annum on
the loan; and a penalty charge of 3% per annum on the amount due until fully paid.
Respondents likewise agreed to pay attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the total amount due,
but in no case less than P200.00, plus costs of suit with both these amounts bearing a 1%
interest per month until paid. Costs against respondents.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals decision dated 25 November 1999 as
well as its Resolution of 11 May 2000, affirming the order of the Regional Trial Court, Manila,
Branch 27, dated 28 December 1987, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents
are ordered to pay One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) plus 23% interest per annum, penalty

charge of 3% interest per annum, and 10% of the amount due as attorneys fees together with
a 1% interest per month until fully paid. The sum of P220,020.00 which was the value of the
postdated check given
by respondents to petitioner as partial payment should be deducted from the amount due
from respondents.

SALUN-AT MARQUEZ and NESTOR

DELA CRUZ,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 168387

Present:
- versus CORONA, C. J., Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, J.

ELOISA ESPEJO, ELENITA ESPEJO,

EMERITA ESPEJO, OPHIRRO ESPEJO,
OTHNIEL
ESPEJO,
ORLANDO ESPEJO,
OSMUNDO
ESPEJO, ODELEJO ESPEJO and NEMI
FERNANDEZ,
Promulgated:
Respondents.
August 25, 2010
x--------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.
When the parties admit the contents of written documents but put in issue whether these documents
adequately and correctly express the true intention of the parties, the deciding body is authorized to
look beyond these instruments and into the contemporaneous and subsequent actions of the parties
in order to determine such intent.
Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is the intention of the contracting parties that prevails,
for the intention is the soul of a contract, not its wording which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or
ambiguities. To hold otherwise would give life, validity, and precedence to mere typographical errors
and defeat the very purpose of agreements.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assails the October 7, 2003 Decision,[2] as well as the May 11,
2005 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 69981. The dispositive portion of the
appellate courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding reversible error committed by the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board, the instant petition for review is GRANTED. The assailed Decision,
dated 17 January 2001, rendered by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board of Bayombong[,] Nueva Vizcaya, dated 17 March 1998, is
REINSTATED. Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.[4]
The reinstated Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, in turn, contained the following dispositive portion:
Accordingly, judgment is rendered:
1.

Finding [respondents] to be the owner by re-purchase from RBBI [of] the

Murong property covered by TCT No. [T-]62096 (formerly TCT No. 43258);

2.

Ordering the cancellation of TCT with CLOA Nos. 395 and 396 in the
name[s] of Salun-at Marquez and Nestor de la Cruz respectively, as they are
disqualified to become tenants of the Lantap property;

3.

Directing RBBI to sell through VOS the Lantap property to its rightful
beneficiary, herein tenant-farmer Nemi Fernandez under reasonable terms and
conditions;

4.

Ordering RBBI to return the amount paid to it by Nestor and Salun-at;

and ordering the latter to pay 20 cavans of palay per hectare at 46 kilos per cavan
unto [respondents] plus such accrued and unpaid rentals for the past years as may
be duly accounted for with the assistance of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
of Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya who is also hereby instructed to assist the parties
execute their leasehold contracts and;

5.

The order to supervise harvest dated March 11, 1998 shall be observed
until otherwise modified or dissolved by the appellate body.

SO ORDERED.[5]
Factual Antecedents
Respondents Espejos were the original registered owners of two parcels of agricultural land, with an
area of two hectares each.One is located at Barangay Lantap, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya (the Lantap
property) while the other is located in BarangayMurong, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya (the Murong
property). There is no dispute among the parties that the Lantap property is tenanted by respondent
Nemi Fernandez (Nemi)[6] (who is the husband[7] of respondent Elenita Espejo (Elenita), while the
Murong property is tenanted by petitioners Salun-at Marquez (Marquez) and Nestor Dela Cruz (Dela
Cruz).[8]
The respondents mortgaged both parcels of land to Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc. (RBBI) to secure
certain loans. Upon their failure to pay the loans, the mortgaged properties were foreclosed and sold
to RBBI. RBBI eventually consolidated title to the properties and transfer certificates of title (TCTs)
were issued in the name of RBBI. TCT No. T-62096 dated January 14, 1985 was issued for the Murong
property. It contained the following description:
Beginning at a point marked I on plan H-176292, S. 44034 W. 1656.31 m. more or less
from B.L.L.M. No 1, Bagabag Townsite, K-27,
thence N. 28 deg. 20 E., 200.00 m. to point 2;
thence S. 61 deg. 40 E., 100.00 m. to point 3;
thence S. 28 deg. 20 W., 200.00 m. to point 4;
thence N. 61 deg. 40 W., 100.00 m. to point 1; point of beginning;
Containing an area of 2.000 hectares. Bounded on the northeast, by Road; on the
southeast, and southwest by public land; and on the northwest by Public Land,
properties claimed by Hilario Gaudia and Santos Navarrete. Bearings true. Declination
0131 E. Points referred to are marked on plan H-176292. Surveyed under authority of
sections 12-22 Act No. 2874 and in accordance with existing regulations of the Bureau
of Lands by H.O. Bauman Public Land Surveyor, [in] December 1912-March
1913. Note: All corners are Conc. Mons. 15x15x60 cm. This is Lot No. 79-A=Lot No.
159 of Bagabag Townsite, K-27.[9]
Subsequently, TCT No. T-62836 dated June 4, 1985 was issued for the Lantap property and contained
the following description:
Beginning at a point marked 1 on plan H-105520, N. 80 deg. 32 W., 1150.21 m. from
BLLM No. 122, Irrigation project,
thence N. 61 deg. 40E., 200.00 m. to point 2;
thence N. 28 deg. 20E, 100.00 m. to point 3;
thence S. 61 deg. 40E, 200.00 m. to point 4;

thence S. 28 deg. 20W, 100.00 m. to point 1; point of beginning; containing an area of

2.0000 hectares. Bounded on the northeast, southeast, and southwest by Public land;
and on the northwest by Road and public land. Bearings true. Declination 0 deg. 31E.,
points referred to are marked on plan H-105520. Surveyed under authority of Section
12-22, Act No. 2874 and in accordance with existing regulations of the Bureau of Lands,
by H.O. Bauman Public Land Surveyor, [in] Dec. 1912-Mar. 1913 and approved on
January 6, 1932. Note: This is Lot No. 119-A Lot No. 225 of Bagabag Townsite K-27. All
corners are B.I. Conc. Mons. 15x60 cm.[10]
Both TCTs describe their respective subjects as located in Bagabag Townsite, K-27, without any
reference to either BarangayLantap or Barangay Murong.
On February 26, 1985, respondents Espejos bought back one of their lots from RBBI. The Deed of
Sale[11] described the property sold as follows:
x x x do hereby SELL, TRANSFER, and CONVEY, absolutely and unconditionally x x x
that certain parcel of land, situated in the Municipality of Bagabag, Province of Nueva
Vizcaya, and more particularly bounded and described as follows, to wit:
Beginning at a point marked 1 on plan x x x x Containing an area of
2.000 hectares. Bounded on the NE., by Road; on the SE., and SW by
Public Land; and on the NW., by Public Land, properties claimed by Hilario
Gaudia and Santos Navarrete.Bearing true. Declination 013 B. Points
referred to are marked on plan H-176292.
of which the Rural Bank of Bayombong (NV) Inc., is the registered owner in fee simple
in accordance with the Land Registration Act, its title thereto being evidenced by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-62096 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Nueva
Vizcaya.
As may be seen from the foregoing, the Deed of Sale did not mention the barangay where the
property was located but mentioned the title of the property (TCT No. T-62096), which title
corresponds to the Murong property. There is no evidence, however, that respondents took
possession of the Murong property, or demanded lease rentals from the petitioners (who continued
to be the tenants of the Murong property), or otherwise exercised acts of ownership over the Murong
property. On the other hand, respondent Nemi (husband of respondent Elenita and brother-in-law of
the other respondents), continued working on the other property -- the Lantap property -- without any
evidence that he ever paid rentals to RBBI or to any landowner. The Deed of Sale was annotated on
TCT No. T-62096 almost a decade later, on July 1, 1994.[12]
Meanwhile, on June 20, 1990, RBBI, pursuant to Sections 20[13] and 21[14] of Republic Act (RA) No.
6657,[15] executed separate Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer (VLTs) in favor of petitioners Marquez
and Dela Cruz, the tenants of the Murong property. Both VLTs described the subject thereof as an
agricultural land located in Barangay Murong and covered by TCT No. T-62836 (which, however, is
the title corresponding to the Lantap property).[16]
After the petitioners completed the payment of the purchase price of P90,000.00 to RBBI, the DAR
issued the corresponding Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to petitioners
Marquez[17] and Dela Cruz[18] on September 5, 1991. Both CLOAs stated that their subjects were
parcels of agricultural land situated in Barangay Murong.[19] The CLOAs were registered in the
Registry of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya on September 5, 1991.
On February 10, 1997 (more than 10 years after the Deed of Sale in favor of the respondents and
almost seven years after the execution of VLTs in favor of the petitioners), respondents filed a
Complaint[20] before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya for the cancellation of petitioners CLOAs, the deposit of leasehold rentals by petitioners in
favor of respondents, and the execution of a deed of voluntary land transfer by RBBI in favor of
respondent Nemi. The complaint was based on respondents theory that the Murong property,

occupied by the petitioners, was owned by the respondents by virtue of the 1985 buy-back, as
documented in the Deed of Sale. They based their claim on the fact that their Deed of Sale refers to
TCT No. 62096, which pertains to the Murong property.
Petitioners filed their Answer[21] and insisted that they bought the Murong property as farmerbeneficiaries thereof. They maintained that they have always displayed good faith, paid lease rentals
to RBBI when it became the owner of the Murong property, bought the same from RBBI upon the
honest belief that they were buying the Murong property, and occupied and exercised acts of
ownership over the Murong property. Petitioners also argued that what respondents Espejos
repurchased from RBBI in 1985 was actually the Lantap property, as evidenced by their continued
occupation and possession of the Lantap property through respondent Nemi.
RBBI answered[22] that it was the Lantap property which was the subject of the buy-back transaction
with respondents Espejos. It denied committing a grave mistake in the transaction and maintained its
good faith in the disposition of its acquired assets in conformity with the rural banking rules and
regulations.
OIC-RARAD Decision[23]
The OIC-RARAD gave precedence to the TCT numbers appearing on the Deed of Sale and the
VLTs. Since TCT No. T-62096 appeared on respondents Deed of Sale and the said title refers to the
Murong property, the OIC-RARAD concluded that the subject of sale was indeed the Murong
property. On the other hand, since the petitioners VLTs referred to TCT No. T-62836, which
corresponds to the Lantap property, the OIC-RARAD ruled that petitioners CLOAs necessarily refer to
the Lantap property. As for the particular description contained in the VLTs that the subject thereof is
the Murong property, the OIC-RARAD ruled that it was a mere typographical error.
Further, since the VLTs covered the Lantap property and petitioners are not the actual tillers thereof,
the OIC-RARAD declared that they were disqualified to become tenants of the Lantap property and
ordered the cancellation of their CLOAs. It then ordered RBBI to execute a leasehold contract with the
real tenant of the Lantap property, Nemi.
The OIC-RARAD recognized that petitioners only right as the actual tillers of the Murong property is to
remain as the tenants thereof after the execution of leasehold contracts with and payment of rentals
in arrears to respondents.
DARAB Decision[24]
Upon appeal filed by petitioners, the DARAB reversed the OIC-RARAD Decision. It ruled that in
assailing the validity of the CLOAs issued to petitioners as bona fide tenant-farmers, the burden of
proof rests on the respondents. There being no evidence that the DAR field personnel were remiss in
the performance of their official duties when they issued the corresponding CLOAs in favor of
petitioners, the presumption of regular performance of duty prevails. This conclusion is made more
imperative by the respondents admission that petitioners are the actual tillers of the Murong
property, hence qualified beneficiaries thereof.
As for respondents allegation that they bought back the Murong property from RBBI, the DARAB ruled
that they failed to support their allegation with substantial evidence. It gave more credence to RBBIs
claim that respondents repurchased the Lantap property, not the Murong property. Respondents, as
owners of the Lantap property, were ordered to enter into an agricultural leasehold contract with
their brother-in-law Nemi, who is the actual tenant of the Lantap property.
The DARAB ended its January 17, 2001 Decision in this wise:
We find no basis or justification to question the authenticity and validity of the CLOAs
issued to appellants as they are by operation of law qualified beneficiaries over the
landholdings; there is nothing to quiet as these titles were awarded in conformity with
the CARP program implementation; and finally, the Board declares that all controverted
claims to or against the subject landholding must be completely and finally laid to rest.

WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding reversible errors[,] the assailed decision
is ANNULLED and a new judgment is hereby rendered, declaring:
1.
Appellants Salun-at Marquez and Nestor Dela Cruz as the bona fide
tenant-tillers over the Murong property and therefore they are the qualified
beneficiaries thereof;
2.
Declaring Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 395 and 396 issued
in the name of [farmer-beneficiaries] Salun-at Marquez and Nestor Dela Cruz
respectively, covered formerly by TCT No. 62096 (TCT No. 43258) of the Murong
property as valid and legal;
3.
Ordering the co-[respondents] to firm-up an
contract with bona fide tenant-tiller Nemi Fernandez over the
latter] being the subject matter of the buy back arrangement
[respondents] and Rural Bank of Bayombong, Incorporated,
matters are deemed resolved.

agricultural leasehold
Lantap property, [the
entered into between
and other incidental

SO ORDERED.[25]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In appealing to the CA, the respondents insisted that the DARAB erred in ruling that they repurchased
the Lantap property, while the petitioners were awarded the Murong property. They were adamant
that the title numbers indicated in their respective deeds of conveyance should control in
determining the subjects thereof. Since respondents Deed of Sale expressed that its subject is the
property with TCT No. T-62096, then what was sold to them was the Murong property. On the other
hand, petitioners VLTs and CLOAs say that they cover the property with TCT No. T-62836; thus it
should be understood that they were awarded the Lantap property. Respondents added that since
petitioners are not the actual tillers of the Lantap property, their CLOAs should be cancelled due to
their lack of qualification.
The CA agreed with the respondents. Using the Best Evidence Rule embodied in Rule 130, Section 3,
the CA held that the Deed of Sale is the best evidence as to its contents, particularly the description
of the land which was the object of the sale.Since the Deed of Sale expressed that its subject is the
land covered by TCT No. T-62096 the Murong property then that is the property that the respondents
repurchased.
The CA further ruled that as for petitioners VLTs, the same refer to the property with TCT No. T-62836;
thus, the subject of their CLOAs is the Lantap property. The additional description in the VLTs that the
subject thereof is located in BarangayMurong was considered to be a mere typographical error. The
CA ruled that the technical description contained in the TCT is more accurate in identifying the
subject property since the same particularly describes the properties metes and bounds.
Both the RBBI[26] and petitioners[27] filed their respective motions for reconsideration, which were
separately denied.[28]
On June 22, 2004, RBBI filed a separate Petition for Review on Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
163320, with this Court.[29]RBBI raised the issue that the CA failed to appreciate that respondents did
not come to court with clean hands because they misled RBBI to believe at the time of the sale that
the two lots were not tenanted. RBBI also asked that they be declared free from any liability to the
parties as it did not enrich itself at anyones expense. RBBIs petition was dismissed on July 26, 2004
for lack of merit. The said Resolution reads:
Considering the allegations, issues[,] and arguments adduced in the petition for review
on certiorari, the Court Resolves to DENY the petition for lack of sufficient showing that
the Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment to
warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case.
[30]

Their Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied with finality. [31] Entry of judgment was made in
that case on December 15, 2004.[32]
On July 27, 2005,[33] petitioners filed the instant petition.
Issues
Rephrased and consolidated, the parties present the following issues for the Courts determination:
I
What is the effect of the final judgment dismissing RBBIs Petition for Review on Certiorari, which
assailed the same CA Decision
II
Whether the CA erred in utilizing the Best Evidence Rule to determine the subject of the contracts
III
What are the subject properties of the parties respective contracts with RBBI
Our Ruling
Propriety of the Petition
Respondents maintain that the instant petition for review raises factual issues which are beyond the
province of Rule 45.[34]
The issues involved herein are not entirely factual. Petitioners assail the appellate courts rejection of
their evidence (as to the contractual intent) as inadmissible under the Best Evidence Rule. The
question involving the admissibility of evidence is a legal question that is within the Courts authority
to review.[35]
Besides, even if it were a factual question, the Court is not precluded to review the same. The rule
that a petition for review should raise only questions of law admits of exceptions, among which are
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of
fact areconflicting; (6) when, in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.[36]
In the instant case, we find sufficient basis to apply the exceptions to the general rule because the
appellate court misappreciated the facts of the case through its erroneous application of the Best
Evidence Rule, as will be discussed below. Moreover, the disparate rulings of the three reviewing
bodies below are sufficient for the Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Rule 45.
First Issue
Dismissal of RBBIs appeal
Respondents maintain that the Courts earlier dismissal of RBBIs petition
for review of the same CA Decision is eloquent proof that there is no reversible error in the appellate
courts decision in favor of the respondents.[37]
We are not persuaded. This Court dismissed RBBIs earlier petition in G.R. No. 163320 because it
failed to convincingly demonstrate the alleged errors in the CA Decision. The bank did not point out

the inadequacies and errors in the appellate courts decision but simply placed the responsibility for
the confusion on the respondents for allegedly misleading the bank as to the identity of the
properties and for misrepresenting that the two lots were not tenanted. Thus, RBBI argued that
respondents did not come to court with clean hands.
These arguments were ineffectual in convincing the Court to review the appellate courts Decision. It
is the appellants responsibility to point out the perceived errors in the appealed decision. When a
party merely raises equitable considerations such as the clean hands doctrine without a clear-cut
legal basis and cogent arguments to support his claim, there should be no surprise if the Court is not
swayed to exercise its appellate jurisdiction and the appeal is dismissed outright. The dismissal of an
appeal does not always and necessarily mean that the appealed decision is correct, for it could
simply be the result of the appellants inadequate discussion, ineffectual arguments, or even
procedural lapses.
RBBIs failure to convince the Court of the merits of its appeal should not prejudice petitioners who
were not parties to RBBIs appeal, especially because petitioners duly filed a separate appeal and
were able to articulately and effectively present their arguments. A party cannot be deprived of his
right to appeal an adverse decision just because another party had already appealed ahead of him,
[38]
or just because the other partys separate appeal had already been dismissed.[39]
There is another reason not to bind the petitioners to the final judgment against RBBI. RBBI executed
the transfer (VLTs) in favor of petitioners prior to the commencement of the action. Thus, when the
action for cancellation of CLOA was filed, RBBI had already divested itself of its title to the two
properties involved. Under the rule on res judicata, a judgment (in personam) is conclusive only
between the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of
the action.[40]Thus, when the vendor (in this case RBBI) has already transferred his title to third
persons (petitioners), the said transferees are not bound by any judgment which may be rendered
against the vendor.[41]
Second Issue
Is it correct to apply the Best Evidence Rule?
Citing the Best Evidence Rule in Rule 130, Section 3, the CA held that the Deed of Sale between
respondents and RBBI is the best evidence as to the property that was sold by RBBI to the
respondents. Since the Deed of Sale stated that its subject is the land covered by TCT No. T-62096
the title for the Murong property then the property repurchased by the respondents was the Murong
property. Likewise, the CA held that since the VLTs between petitioners and RBBI refer to TCT No. T62836 the title for the Lantap property then the property transferred to petitioners was the Lantap
property.
Petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in using the best evidence rule to determine the
subject of the Deed of Sale and the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer. They maintain that the issue in
the case is not the contents of the contracts but the intention of the parties that was not adequately
expressed in their contracts. Petitioners then argue that it is the Parol Evidence Rule that should be
applied in order to adequately resolve the dispute.
Indeed, the appellate court erred in its application of the Best Evidence Rule. The Best Evidence Rule
states that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, the best evidence is
the original document itself and no other evidence (such as a reproduction, photocopy or oral
evidence) is admissible as a general rule. The original is preferred because it reduces the chance of
undetected tampering with the document.[42]
In the instant case, there is no room for the application of the Best Evidence Rule because there is no
dispute regarding thecontents of the documents. It is admitted by the parties that the respondents
Deed of Sale referred to TCT No. T-62096 as its subject; while the petitioners Deeds of Voluntary Land
Transfer referred to TCT No. T-62836 as its subject, which is further described as located
in Barangay Murong.

The real issue is whether the admitted contents of these documents adequately and correctly
express the true intention of the parties. As to the Deed of Sale, petitioners (and RBBI) maintain
that while it refers to TCT No. T-62096, the parties actually intended the sale of the Lantap property
(covered by TCT No. T-62836).
As to the VLTs, respondents contend that the reference to TCT No. T-62836 (corresponding to the
Lantap property) reflects the true intention of RBBI and the petitioners, and the reference
to Barangay Murong was a typographical error. On the other hand, petitioners claim that the
reference to Barangay Murong reflects their true intention, while the reference to TCT No. T-62836
was a mere error. This dispute reflects an intrinsic ambiguity in the contracts, arising from an
apparent failure of the instruments to adequately express the true intention of the parties. To resolve
the ambiguity, resort must be had to evidence outside of the instruments.
The CA, however, refused to look beyond the literal wording of the documents and rejected any
other evidence that could shed light on the actual intention of the contracting parties. Though the CA
cited the Best Evidence Rule, it appears that what it actually applied was the Parol Evidence Rule
instead, which provides:
When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.[43]
The Parol Evidence Rule excludes parol or extrinsic evidence by which a party seeks to contradict,
vary, add to or subtract from the terms of a valid agreement or instrument. Thus, it appears that
what the CA actually applied in its assailed Decision when it refused to look beyond the words of the
contracts was the Parol Evidence Rule, not the Best Evidence Rule. The appellate court gave primacy
to the literal terms of the two contracts and refused to admit any other evidence that would
contradict such terms.
However, even the application of the Parol Evidence Rule is improper in the case at bar. In the first
place, respondents are notparties to the VLTs executed between RBBI and petitioners; they are
strangers to the written contracts. Rule 130, Section 9 specifically provides that parol evidence rule is
exclusive only as between the parties and their successors-in-interest. The parol evidence rule may
not be invoked where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the
written document in question, and does not base his claim on the instrument or assert a right
originating in the instrument.[44]
Moreover, the instant case falls under the exceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule, as provided in the
second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9:
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the
written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(1)

An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written

agreement;

(2)

The failure of the written agreement to express the true

intent and agreement of the parties thereto;

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Here, the petitioners VLTs suffer from intrinsic ambiguity. The VLTs described the subject property as
covered by TCT No. T-62836 (Lantap property), but they also describe the subject property as being
located in Barangay Murong. Even the respondents Deed of Sale falls under the exception to the
Parol Evidence Rule. It refers to TCT No. T-62096 (Murong property), but RBBI contended that the true
intent was to sell the Lantap property. In short, it was squarely put in issue that the written
agreement failed to express the true intent of the parties.

Based on the foregoing, the resolution of the instant case necessitates an examination of the parties
respective parol evidence, in order to determine the true intent of the parties. Well-settled is the rule
that in case of doubt, it is the intention of the contracting parties that prevails, for the intention is the
soul of a contract,[45] not its wording which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold
otherwise would give life, validity, and precedence to mere typographical errors and defeat the very
purpose of agreements.
In this regard, guidance is provided by the following articles of the Civil Code involving the
interpretation of contracts:
Article 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention
of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.
If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall
prevail over the former.
Article 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.
Rule 130, Section 13 which provides for the rules on the interpretation of documents is likewise
enlightening:
Section 13. Interpretation according to circumstances. For the proper construction of
an instrument, the circumstances under which it was made, including the situation of
the subject thereof and of the parties to it, may be shown, so that the judge may be
placed in the position of those whose language he is to interpret.
Applying the foregoing guiding rules, it is clear that the Deed of Sale was intended to transfer the
Lantap property to the respondents, while the VLTs were intended to convey the Murong property to
the petitioners. This may be seen from thecontemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties.
Third issue
Determining the intention of the parties
regarding the subjects of their contracts
We are convinced that the subject of the Deed of Sale between RBBI and the respondents was
the Lantap property, and not the Murong property. After the execution in 1985 of the Deed of Sale,
the respondents did not exercise acts of ownership that could show that they indeed knew and
believed that they repurchased the Murong property. They did not take possession of the Murong
property. As admitted by the parties, the Murong property was in the possession of the petitioners,
who occupied and tilled the same without any objection from the respondents. Moreover, petitioners
paid leasehold rentals for using the Murong property to RBBI, not to the respondents.
Aside from respondents neglect of their alleged ownership rights over the Murong property, there is
one other circumstance that convinces us that what respondents really repurchased was the Lantap
property. Respondent Nemi (husband of respondent Elenita) is the farmer actually tilling the Lantap
property, without turning over the supposed landowners share to RBBI. This strongly indicates that
the respondents considered themselves (and not RBBI) as the owners of the Lantap property. For if
respondents (particularly spouses Elenita and Nemi) truly believed that RBBI retained ownership of
the Lantap property, how come they never complied with their obligations as supposed tenants of
RBBIs land? The factual circumstances of the case simply do not support the theory propounded by
the respondents.
We are likewise convinced that the subject of the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer (VLTs) in favor of
petitioners was theMurong property, and not the Lantap property. When the VLTs were executed in
1990, petitioners were already the tenant-farmers of the Murong property, and had been paying
rentals to RBBI accordingly. It is therefore natural that the Murong property and no other was the one
that they had intended to acquire from RBBI with the execution of the VLTs. Moreover, after the

execution of the VLTs, petitioners remained in possession of the Murong property, enjoying and tilling
it without any opposition from anybody. Subsequently, after the petitioners completed their payment
of the total purchase price of P90,000.00 to RBBI, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) officials
conducted their investigation of the Murong property which, with the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty, did not reveal any anomaly. Petitioners were found to be in actual
possession of the Murong property and were the qualified beneficiaries thereof. Thus, the DAR
officials issued CLOAs in petitioners favor; and these CLOAs explicitly refer to the land
in Barangay Murong. All this time, petitioners were in possession of the Murong property,
undisturbed by anyone for several long years, until respondents started the controversy in 1997.
All of these contemporaneous and subsequent actions of RBBI and petitioners support their position
that the subject of their contract (VLTs) is the Murong property, not the Lantap property. Conversely,
there has been no contrary evidence of the parties actuations to indicate that they intended the sale
of the Lantap property. Thus, it appears that the reference in their VLT to TCT No. T-62836 (Lantap
property) was due to their honest but mistaken belief that the said title covers the Murong
property. Such a mistake is not farfetched considering that TCT No. T-62836 only refers to the
Municipality of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, and does not indicate the particular barangay where the
property is located. Moreover, both properties are bounded by a road and public land. Hence, were it
not for the detailed technical description, the titles for the two properties are very similar.
The respondents attempt to discredit petitioners argument that their VLTs were intrinsically
ambiguous and failed to express their true intention by asking why petitioners never filed an action
for the reformation of their contract.[46] A cause of action for the reformation of a contract only arises
when one of the contracting parties manifests an intention, by overt acts, not to abide by the true
agreement of the parties.[47] It seems fairly obvious that petitioners had no cause to reform their VLTs
because the parties thereto (RBBI and petitioners) never had any dispute as to the interpretation and
application thereof. They both understood the VLTs to cover the Murong property (and not the Lantap
property). It was only much later, when strangers to the contracts argued for a different
interpretation, that the issue became relevant for the first time.
All told, we rule that the Deed of Sale dated February 26, 1985 between respondents and RBBI
covers the Lantap propertyunder TCT No. T-62836, while the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer and
TCT Nos. CLOA-395 and CLOA-396 of the petitioners cover the Murong property under TCT No. T62096. In consequence, the CAs ruling against RBBI should not be executed as such execution would
be inconsistent with our ruling herein. Although the CAs decision had already become final and
executory as against RBBI with the dismissal of RBBIs petition in G.R. No. 163320, our ruling herein in
favor of petitioners is a supervening cause which renders the execution of the CA decision against
RBBI unjust and inequitable.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed October 7, 2003
Decision, as well as the May 11, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69981
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The January 17, 2001 Decision of the DARAB Central Office
is REINSTATED. The Deed of Sale dated February 26, 1985 between respondents and Rural Bank of
Bayombong, Inc. covers the Lantap property under TCT No. T-62836, while the Deeds of Voluntary
Land Transfer and TCT Nos. CLOA-395 and CLOA-396 of the petitioners cover the Murong property
under TCT No. T-62096. The Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya is directed to make the necessary
corrections to the titles of the said properties in accordance with this Decision. Costs against
respondents.
SO ORDERED.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. RAMON G. CODILLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC of Cebu, Br. 19, BANGPAI
SHIPPING COMPANY, and WALLEM SHIPPING, INCORPORATED, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 00848, dated 9
November 2005, which dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by the National Power
Corporation seeking to set aside the Order 2 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu,
Branch 19 dated 16 November 2004, denying admission and excluding from the records
plaintiffs (herein petitioner) Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its sub-markings, "I", "J", and
its sub-markings, "K", "L", "M" and its sub-markings, "N" and its sub-markings, "O", "P" and its
sub-markings, "Q" and its sub-markings, "R" and "S" and its sub-markings.
On 20 April 1996, M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry owned and operated by private
respondent Bangpai Shipping, Co., allegedly bumped and damaged petitioners Power Barge
209 which was then moored at the Cebu International Port. Thus, on 26 April 1996, petitioner
filed before the Cebu RTC a complaint for damages against private respondent Bangpai
Shipping Co., for the alleged damages caused on petitioners power barges.
Thereafter, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint dated 8 July 1996 impleading herein
private respondent Wallem Shipping, Inc., as additional defendant, contending that the latter
is a ship agent of Bangpai Shipping Co. On 18 September 1996, Wallem Shipping, Inc. filed a
Motion to Dismiss which was subsequently denied by public respondent Judge in an Order
dated 20 October 1998. Bangpai Shipping Co. likewise filed a Motion to Dismiss which was
also denied by public respondent Judge in an Order issued on 24 January 2003.
Petitioner, after adducing evidence during the trial of the case, filed a formal offer of evidence
before the lower court on 2 February 2004 consisting of Exhibits "A" to "V" together with the
sub-marked portions thereof. Consequently, private respondents Bangpai Shipping Co. and
Wallem Shipping, Inc. filed their respective objections to petitioners formal offer of evidence.
On 16 November 2004, public respondent judge issued the assailed order denying the
admission and excluding from the records petitioners Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its
sub-markings, "I", "J" and its sub-markings, "K", "L", "M" and its sub-markings, "N" and its submarkings, "O", "P" and its sub-markings, "Q" and its sub-markings, "R" and "S" and its submarkings. According to the court a quo:
The Court finds merit in the objections raised and the motion to strike out filed respectively by
the defendants. The record shows that the plaintiff has been given every opportunity to
present the originals of the Xerox or photocopies of the documents it offered. It never
produced the originals. The plaintiff attempted to justify the admission of the photocopies by
contending that "the photocopies offered are equivalent to the original of the document" on
the basis of the Electronic Evidence (Comment to Defendant Wallem Philippines Objections
and Motion to Strike). But as rightly pointed out in defendant Wallems Reply to the Comment
of Plaintiff, the Xerox copies do not constitute the electronic evidence defined in Section 1 of
Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence as follows:
"(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data,
figures, symbols or other models of written expression, described or however represented, by
which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved
and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or
produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by

sight or other means which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic
document. For the purpose of these Rules, the term "electronic document" may be used
interchangeably with "electronic data message".
The information in those Xerox or photocopies was not received, recorded, retrieved or
produced electronically. Moreover, such electronic evidence must be authenticated (Sections
1 and 2, Rule 5, Rules on Electronic Evidence), which the plaintiff failed to do. Finally, the
required Affidavit to prove the admissibility and evidentiary weight of the alleged electronic
evidence (Sec. 1, Rule 9, Ibid) was not executed, much less presented in evidence.
The Xerox or photocopies offered should, therefore, be stricken off the record. Aside from their
being not properly identified by any competent witness, the loss of the principals thereof was
not established by any competent proof.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its sub-markings, "I", "J", and its
sub-markings, "K", "L", "M" and its sub-markings, "N" and its sub-markings, "O", "P" and its
sub-markings, "Q" and its sub-markings, and "R" are hereby DENIED admission and excluded
from the records. However, these excluded evidence should be attached to the records of this
case to enable the appellate court to pass upon them should an appeal be taken from the
decision on the merits to be rendered upon the termination of the trial of this case.
Exhibits "S" and its sub-markings are also DENIED admission for lack of proper identification
since the witness who brought these pictures expressly admitted that he was not present
when the photos were taken and had not knowledge when the same where taken. 3
Upon denial of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated 20 April 2005,
petitioner filed a Petition forCertiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure before the
Court of Appeals maintaining that public respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the admission of its Exhibits
"A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its sub-markings, "I", "J" and its sub-markings, "K", "L", "M" and its
sub-markings, "N" and its sub-markings, "O", "P" and its sub-markings, "Q" and its submarkings, "R", and "S" and its sub-markings.
On 9 November 2005, the appellate court issued a Decision dismissing petitioners petition for
certiorari, the pertinent portions of which elucidate:
After a judicious scrutiny of the record of the case on hand, together with the rules and
jurisprudence which are applicable in the premises, we have come up with a finding that the
petition for certiorari filed in this case is not meritorious.
It appears that there is no sufficient showing by the petitioner that the respondent judge
acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed orders in Civil Case No. CEB18662. As what our jurisprudence tells us, grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as would be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction x x x.
In the case at bench, what has been shown to the contrary by the totality of the record on
hand is that the respondent judge acted correctly and within the pale of his sound discretion
in issuing the assailed order, dated November 16, 2004, in Civil Case No. CEB-18662.
Indeed, it appears that the pieces of petitioners documentary evidence which were denied
admission by the respondent judge were not properly identified by any competent witness. As
pointed out by the respondent Bangpai Shipping Company in its comment on the petition filed
in this case which reproduces some excerpts of the testimonies in the court a quo of Atty.
Marianito De Los Santos, Engr. Nestor Enriquez, Jr. and Mr. Rodulfo I. Pagaling, the said
witnesses did not have personal knowledge of and participation in the preparation and
making of the pieces of documentary evidence denied admission by respondent judge x x x.

In other words, there was lack of proper identification of said pieces of documentary evidence.
x x x.
Then another ground for denying admission of petitioners Exhibits A, C, D, E, H, I, J, K, L, M, N,
O, P, Q, R, and S by the respondent judge is that said pieces of documentary evidence were
merely photocopies of purported documents or papers. There is no gainsaying the fact that
the respondent judge acted within the pale of his discretion when he denied admission of said
documentary evidence. Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines is very
explicit in providing that, when the subject of inquiry are the contents of documents, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original documents themselves, except in certain
cases specifically so enumerated therein, and the petitioner has not shown that the nonpresentation or non-production of its original documentary pieces of evidence falls under such
exceptions. As aptly pointed out by the respondent judge in the order issued by him on
November 16, 2004:
"x x x The record shows that the plaintiff (petitioner herein) has been given every opportunity
to present the originals of the Xerox or photocopies of the documents it offered. It never
produced said originals."
So, the petitioner has only itself to blame for the respondent judges denial of admission of its
aforementioned documentary evidence.
Of course, the petitioner tries to contend that the photocopies of documents offered by it are
equivalent to the original documents that it sought to offer in evidence, based on the Rules on
Electronic Evidence which were in force and effect since August 1, 2001. However, such a
contention is devoid of merit. The pieces of documentary evidence offered by the petitioner in
Civil Case CEB-18662 which were denied admission by the respondent judge do not actually
constitute as electronic evidence as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence. The
informations therein were not received, retrieved or produced electronically. The petitioner
has not adequately established that its documentary evidence were electronic evidence. it
has not properly authenticated such evidence as electronic documents,
assuming arguendo that they are. Lastly, the petitioner has not properly established by
affidavit pursuant to Rule 9 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence the admissibility and
evidentiary weight of said documentary evidence.
Thus, by any legal yardstick, it is manifest that the respondent judge did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in denying admission of the aforementioned documentary evidence of
petitioner.
But even if it be granted just for the sake of argument that the respondent judge committed
an error in denying the aforementioned documentary evidence of the petitioner, still the
petition for certiorari filed in this case must fail. Such error would at most be only an error of
law and not an error of jurisdiction. In Lee vs. People, 393 SCRA 397, the Supreme Court of
the Philippines said that certiorari will not lie in case of an error of law. x x x.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us
DISMISSING the petition filed in this case and AFFIRMING the assailed orders issued by
respondent judge in Civil Case No. CEB-18662. 4
Aggrieved by the aforequoted decision, petitioner filed the instant petition.
The focal point of this entire controversy is petitioners obstinate contention that the
photocopies it offered as formal evidence before the trial court are the functional equivalent
of their original based on its inimitable interpretation of the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
Petitioner insists that, contrary to the rulings of both the trial court and the appellate court,
the photocopies it presented as documentary evidence actually constitute electronic evidence
based on its own premise that an "electronic document" as defined under Section 1(h), Rule 2
of the Rules on Electronic Evidence is not limited to information that is received, recorded,

retrieved or produced electronically. Rather, petitioner maintains that an "electronic

document" can also refer to other modes of written expression that is produced electronically,
such as photocopies, as included in the sections catch-all proviso: "any print-out or output,
readable by sight or other means".
We do not agree.
In order to shed light to the issue of whether or not the photocopies are indeed electronic
documents as contemplated in Republic Act No. 8792 or the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Electronic Commerce Act, as well as the Rules on Electronic Evidence, we
shall enumerate the following documents offered as evidence by the petitioner, to wit:
1. Exhibit "A" is a photocopy of a letter manually signed by a certain Jose C. Troyo, with
"RECEIVED" stamped thereon, together with a handwritten date;
2. Exhibit "C" is a photocopy of a list of estimated cost of damages of petitioners power
barges 207 and 209 prepared by Hopewell Mobile Power Systems Corporation and
manually signed by Messrs. Rex Malaluan and Virgilio Asprer;
3. Exhibit "D" is a photocopy of a letter manually signed by a certain Nestor G.
Enriquez, Jr., with "RECEIVED" stamped thereon, together with a handwritten notation
of the date it was received;
4. Exhibit "E" is a photocopy of a Standard Marine Protest Form which was filled up and
accomplished by Rex Joel C. Malaluan in his own handwriting and signed by him.
Portions of the Jurat were handwritten, and manually signed by the Notary Public;
5. Exhibit "H" is a photocopy of a letter manually signed by Mr. Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr.
with "RECEIVED" stamped thereon, together with a handwritten notation of the date it
was received;
6. Exhibit "I" is a photocopy of a computation of the estimated energy loss allegedly
suffered by petitioner which was manually signed by Mr. Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr.;
7. Exhibit "J" is a photocopy of a letter containing the breakdown of the cost estimate,
manually signed by Mr. Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr., with "RECEIVED" stamped thereon,
together with a handwritten notation of the date it was received, and other handwritten
notations;
8. Exhibit "K" is a photocopy of the Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum written
using a manual typewriter, signed manually by Atty. Ofelia Polo-De Los Reyes, with a
handwritten notation when it was received by the party;
9. Exhibit "L" is a photocopy of a portion of the electricity supply and operation and
maintenance agreement between petitioner and Hopewell, containing handwritten
notations and every page containing three unidentified manually placed signatures;
10. Exhibit "M" is a photocopy of the Notice of Termination with attachments addressed
to Rex Joel C. Malaluan, manually signed by Jaime S. Patinio, with a handwritten
notation of the date it was received. The sub-markings also contain manual signatures
and/or handwritten notations;
11. Exhibit "N" is a photocopy of a letter of termination with attachments addressed to
VIrgilio Asprer and manually signed by Jaime S. Patino. The sub-markings contain
manual signatures and/or handwritten notations;
12. Exhibit "O" is the same photocopied document marked as Annex C;

13. Exhibit "P" is a photocopy of an incident report manually signed by Messrs.

Malaluan and Bautista and by the Notary Public, with other handwritten notations;
14. Exhibit "Q" is a photocopy of a letter manually signed by Virgilio Asprer and by a
Notary Public, together with other handwritten notations.
On the other hand, an "electronic document" refers to information or the representation of
information, data, figures, symbols or other models of written expression, described or
however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by
which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced electronically. 5 It includes digitally signed documents and
any printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects the electronic data
message or electronic document.6
The rules use the word "information" to define an electronic document received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. This would suggest that
an electronic document is relevant only in terms of the information contained therein, similar
to any other document which is presented in evidence as proof of its contents. 7 However,
what differentiates an electronic document from a paper-based document is the manner by
which the information is processed; clearly, the information contained in an electronic
document is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically.
A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal
that not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly
signed the documents, may be recorded or produced electronically. By no stretch of the
imagination can a persons signature affixed manually be considered as information
electronically received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced.
Hence, the argument of petitioner that since these paper printouts were produced through an
electronic process, then these photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules
on Electronic Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of the
law. Having thus declared that the offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic
documents, it is consequential that the same may not be considered as the functional
equivalent of their original as decreed in the law.
Furthermore, no error can be ascribed to the court a quo in denying admission and excluding
from the records petitioners Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its sub-markings, "I", "J" and
its sub-markings, "K", "L", "M" and its sub-markings, "N" and its sub-markings, "O", "P" and its
sub-markings, "Q" and its sub-markings, and "R". The trial court was correct in rejecting these
photocopies as they violate the best evidence rule and are therefore of no probative value
being incompetent pieces of evidence. Before the onset of liberal rules of discovery, and
modern technique of electronic copying, the best evidence rule was designed to guard against
incomplete or fraudulent proof and the introduction of altered copies and the withholding of
the originals.8 But the modern justification for the rule has expanded from the prevention of
fraud to a recognition that writings occupy a central position in the law. 9The importance of the
precise terms of writings in the world of legal relations, the fallibility of the human memory as
reliable evidence of the terms, and the hazards of inaccurate or incomplete duplicate are the
concerns addressed by the best evidence rule. 10
Moreover, as mandated under Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
"SECTION 2. Original writing must be produced; exceptions. There can be no evidence of a
writing the contents of which is the subject of inquiry, other than the original writing itself,
except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court;
(b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original is a record or other document in the custody of a public officer;
(d) When the original has been recorded in an existing record a certified copy of which
is made evidence by law;
(e) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot
be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established
from them is only the general result of the whole."
When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad
faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. 11 The offeror of
secondary evidence is burdened to prove the predicates thereof: (a) the loss or destruction of
the original without bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror which can be shown by
circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction of documents; 12 (b) the proponent
must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss
or destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown that a diligent and bona fide but
unsuccessful search has been made for the document in the proper place or
places.13 However, in the case at bar, though petitioner insisted in offering the photocopies as
documentary evidence, it failed to establish that such offer was made in accordance with the
exceptions as enumerated under the abovequoted rule. Accordingly, we find no error in the
Order of the court a quo denying admissibility of the photocopies offered by petitioner as
documentary evidence.
Finally, it perplexes this Court why petitioner continued to obdurately disregard the
opportunities given by the trial court for it to present the originals of the photocopies it
presented yet comes before us now praying that it be allowed to present the originals of the
exhibits that were denied admission or in case the same are lost, to lay the predicate for the
admission of secondary evidence. Had petitioner presented the originals of the documents to
the court instead of the photocopies it obstinately offered as evidence, or at the very least
laid the predicate for the admission of said photocopies, this controversy would not have
unnecessarily been brought before the appellate court and finally to this Court for
adjudication. Had it not been for petitioners intransigence, the merits of petitioners
complaint for damages would have been decided upon by the trial court long ago. As aptly
articulated by the Court of Appeals, petitioner has only itself to blame for the respondent
judges denial of admission of its aforementioned documentary evidence and consequently,
the denial of its prayer to be given another opportunity to present the originals of the
documents that were denied admission nor to lay the predicate for the admission of
secondary evidence in case the same has been lost.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 00848, dated 9 November 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
BENEDICTUS, accused-appellant.

vs.

ROWENA

HERMOSO

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In an information[1]
1 filed on 20 October 1993 before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, and
assigned to Branch 76 thereof, the accused-appellant was charged with the crime of illegal
recruitment under Article 38 in relation to Articles 34 and 39 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, as amended, allegedly committed as follows:
That in or about the month of December, 1992, in the municipality of Malolos, province
of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, a non-licensee or non-holder of authority from the Department of
Labor and Employment to recruit and/or place workers under local or overseas
employment, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with false
pretenses, undertake illegal recruitment activities, placement or deployment for a fee
of Napoleon dela Cruz, Ernesto Vasquez, Evangeline Magpayo, Crisanta Vasquez,
Evelyn de Dios and Mercy Magpayo for overseas employment.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment, the appellant entered a plea of not guilty.
At the trial on the merits, the prosecution presented as witnesses the complaining
victims Napoleon de la Cruz, Crisanta Vasquez, Evelyn de Dios, Mercy Magpayo, and
Evangeline Magpayo, as well as Barangay Captain Emerlito Calara. The defense had only the
appellant as its witness.
The Office of the Solicitor General summarized in the Appellees Brief [2] the evidence for
the prosecution as follows:
On December 15, 1992, complainants Napoleon de la Cruz, Crisanta Vasquez, Evelyn
de Dios, Mercy [Magpayo] and Evangeline Magpayo met appellant in the house of
Crisanta Vasquez located at Bambang, Bulacan. There, appellant told them that she
was recruiting workers for deployment in Taiwan. She promised them that they would
be sent to Taiwan on January 15, 1993. Napoleon dela Cruz gave the amount of
P2,700.00 as placement fees. He also submitted the requirements like marriage
contract, employment certificate and six (6) copies of 2x2 ID pictures (TSN, August 4,
1994, pp. 2-11). Crisanta Vasquez gave the amount of P1,500.00 as processing fee
since she already had a passport (TSN, November 29, 1994, p. 6). Evelyn de Dios gave
the total amount of P4,400.00 representing P3,000.00 as her and her husbands
placement fees and P1,400.00 for their passports (TSN, November 29, 1994, pp. 2021). Mercy [Magpayo] gave P2,600.00 representing placement fee, passport and
others (TSN, November 29, 1994, pp. 29-30). Evangeline Magpayo gave P2,350 (Ibid.
p. 37). When appellant failed to send complainants to Taiwan on the promised date,
January 15, 1993, complainants, together with appellant, went to the Barangay Hall
and in front of the Barangay Captain, appellant signed a document (Exhs. C and 1) and
promised to return the money to them.
Complainants, on March 29, 1993, signed a Magkakasamang Salaysay (Exhs. B to B-2)
and filed a complaint before the Fiscals office (TSN, August 11, 1994, p. 3). In support
of their complaint, they submitted a certification from the POEA dated July 21, 1994
(Exh. A) to the effect that appellant, in her personal capacity, was neither licensed nor
authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment (TSN, August 4, 1997, pp. 1112).[3]

We adopt this summary as our own, as it is fully supported by the transcripts of the
stenographic notes of the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution.
Upon the other hand, the appellant denied having recruited the complainants. She
claimed that she had only borrowed money from them. In support of her claim, she presented
the Affidavit of Desistance [4] executed by the complainants when she and her sister had paid
them her debt.
The trial court gave full credit to the version of the prosecution and found unmeritorious
appellants defense. It noted that in appellants statement before Barangay Captain Emerlito
Calara,[5] she had promised to return to the complainants the money she had taken from
them. There was nothing in said statement that showed that such money was a debt. As to
the Affidavit of Desistance, the trial court rejected the same, for it was signed by the
complainants after all of them testified in court and were paid by the appellant.
The trial court likewise observed that the appellant had failed to refute the statement in
the certification issued by the POEA that she was not licensed to recruit workers for overseas
employment, and that she had even admitted in open court that she was not licensed to do
so.
Accordingly, in its decision of 7 February 1996, [6] the trial court convicted the appellant of
the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale and sentenced her to suffer life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P100,000.
The appellant seasonably filed her notice of appeal. In her Appellants Brief,[7] she imputes
upon the trial court the commission of this single error, to wit:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING [HER] GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL
RECRUITMENT IN A LARGE SCALE DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE HER GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
She anchors her appeal chiefly on the Affidavit of Desistance executed by the
complainants. She claims that it creates serious doubts as to her liability and proves that she
was not engaged in recruitment activities. Finally, she alleges that the POEA certification is a
mere fabrication and should not have been given any probative value; and, in any event, the
prosecution failed to prove that she had no license or authority to recruit workers.
The Office of the Solicitor General supports the trial courts decision and prays that the
assailed decision be affirmed in toto.
The appeal is without merit.
The Affidavit of Desistance deserves scant consideration. In the first place, it was
executed after the complainants testified under oath and in open court that they were offered
job placements abroad and were made to pay placement or processing fees. In the second
place, the affidavit did not expressly repudiate their testimony in court on the recruitment
activities of the appellant. In fact, the appellant admitted that the complaining witnesses
executed it after she had paid them back the amounts they had given her. [8] The affidavit was
more of an afterthought arising from personal consideration of pity.
We have said before that courts should not attach persuasive value to affidavits of
desistance, especially when executed as an afterthought. [9] Moreover, it would be a dangerous
rule for courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken before the courts of justice simply because
the witnesses who had given them later on changed their mind for one reason or another, for
such rule would make solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation of truth at the mercy
of unscrupulous witnesses. [10] It must always be remembered that a criminal offense is an
outrage to the sovereign State. To the State belongs the power to prosecute and punish
crimes. While there may be a compromise upon the civil liability arising from an offense, such
compromise shall not extinguish the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty. [11]
Finally, the appellant failed to refute the testimony of Barangay Captain Calara that the
complainants filed the case against her because she recruited them and later reneged on her
assurances.

The challenge against the POEA certification (Exh. A) that the appellant was neither
licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment must likewise fail. The
trial court correctly ruled that the said certification is a public document issued by a public
officer in the performance of an official duty; hence, it is a prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated pursuant to Section 23 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. In any event, as said
court noted, the appellant admitted in open court that she was not licensed or authorized to
recruit workers.[12]
Recruitment is defined in Article 13(b) of the Labor Code as follows:
Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit
or not: Provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for
a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment
and placement.
Illegal recruitment is defined in Article 38 of the Labor Code as follows:
ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment. -- (a) Any recruitment activities including the prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees
or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of
this Code. The Ministry of Labor and Employment or any law enforcement officers may
initiate complaints under this Article.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be
considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in
accordance with Article 39 hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of
three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying
out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first
paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed
against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.
It can be gleaned from the foregoing that there is illegal recruitment in large scale when a
person (a) undertakes any recruitment activity defined under Article 13(b) or any prohibited
practice enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (b) does not have a license or
authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (c) commits
the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group. [13] Paragraph (b) of Article
38, explicitly provides that illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale
shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage.Under Article 39 of the Labor
Code the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P100,000 shall be imposed if illegal
recruitment constitutes economic sabotage.
The appellant promised the five complainants that there were jobs available for them in
Taiwan. She exacted money from them for alleged passports, as well as for placement fees.
There was a certification from the POEA that the appellant was not licensed to recruit workers
for overseas job placements, which she likewise admitted in her testimony. All these point to
the inescapable conclusion that she was engaged in illegal recruitment in large scale. Thus,
the trial court correctly found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
illegal recruitment in large scale. The penalty imposed upon her is in accordance with Article
39 of the Labor Code.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 76, in Criminal Case No. 3363-M-93 is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

RAFAEL S. ORTAEZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, OSCAR INOCENTES, AND
ASUNCION LLANES INOCENTES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:
On September 30, 1982, private respondents sold to petitioner two (2) parcels of
registered land in Quezon City for a consideration of P35,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively.
The first deed of absolute sale covering Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 258628 provides
in part:
"That for and in consideration of the sum of THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND (P35,000.00) PESOS,
receipt of which in full is hereby acknowledged, we have sold, transferred and conveyed, as
we hereby sell, transfer and convey, that subdivided portion of the property covered by TCT
No. 258628 known as Lot No. 684-G-1-B-2 in favor of RAFAEL S. ORTANEZ, of legal age,
Filipino. whose marriage is under a regime of complete separation of property, and a resident
of 942 Aurora Blvd., Quezon City, his heirs or assigns." [1]
while the second deed of absolute sale covering TCT No. 243273 provides:
"That for and in consideration of the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS receipt
of which in full is hereby acknowledged, we have sold, transferred and conveyed, as we
hereby sell, transfer and convey, that consolidated-subdivided portion of the property covered
by TCT No. 243273 known as Lot No. 5 in favor of RAFAEL S. ORTANEZ, of legal age, Filipino,
whose marriage is under a regime of complete separation of property, and a resident of 942
Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City his heirs or assigns. [2]
Private respondents received the payments for the above-mentioned lots, but failed to
deliver the titles to petitioner. On April 9, 1990 the latter demanded from the former the
delivery of said titles.[3] Private respondents, however, refused on the ground that the title of
the first lot is in the possession of another person, [4] and petitioner's acquisition of the title of
the other lot is subject to certain conditions.
Offshoot, petitioner sued private respondents for specific performance before the RTC. In
their answer with counterclaim private respondents merely alleged the existence of the
following oral conditions[5] which were never reflected in the deeds of sale: [6]
"3.3.2 Title to the other property (TCT No. 243273) remains with the defendants (private
respondents) until plaintiff (petitioner) shows proof that all the following requirements have
been met:
(i) Plaintiff will cause the segregation of his right of way amounting to 398 sq. m.;
(ii) Plaintiff will submit to the defendants the approved plan for the segregation;
(iii) Plaintiff will put up a strong wall between his property and that of defendants' lot to
segregate his right of way;
(iv) Plaintiff will pay the capital gains tax and all other expenses that may be incurred by
reason of sale. x x x."
During trial, private respondent Oscar Inocentes, a former judge, orally testified that the
sale was subject to the above conditions, [7] although such conditions were not incorporated in
the deeds of sale. Despite petitioner's timely objections on the ground that the introduction of
said oral conditions was barred by the parol evidence rule, the lower court nonetheless,
admitted them and eventually dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the court a quo. Hence, this petition.

We are tasked to resolve the issue on the admissibility of parol evidence to establish the
alleged oral conditions-precedent to a contract of sale, when the deeds of sale are silent on
such conditions.
The parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible. First, private respondents' oral
testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome
of the case, depending exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or
documentary evidence.[8] Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable unlike a written
contract which speaks of a uniform language. [9] Thus, under the general rule in Section 9 of
Rule 130[10] of the Rules of Court, when the terms of an agreement were reduced to writing, as
in this case, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms
can be admitted other than the contents thereof. [11] Considering that the written deeds of sale
were the only repository of the truth, whatever is not found in said instruments must have
been waived and abandoned by the parties. [12] Examining the deeds of sale, we cannot even
make an inference that the sale was subject to any condition. As a contract, it is the law
between the parties.[13]
Secondly, to buttress their argument, private respondents rely on the case of Land
Settlement Development, Co. vs. Garcia Plantation[14] where the Court ruled that a condition
precedent to a contract may be established by parol evidence. However, the material facts of
that case are different from this case. In the former, the contract sought to be
enforced[15]expressly stated that it is subject to an agreement containing the conditionsprecedent which were proven through parol evidence. Whereas, the deeds of sale in this case,
made no reference to any pre- conditions or other agreement. In fact, the sale is denominated
as absolute in its own terms.
Third, the parol evidence herein sought to be introduced would vary, contradict or defeat
the operation of a valid instrument,[16] hence, contrary to the rule that:
The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to x x x the terms of a written instrument by
testimony purporting to show that, at or before the signing of the document, other or different
terms were orally agreed upon by the parties. [17]
Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, "it cannot serve
the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which
are not mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or mistake." [18] No such
fraud or mistake exists in this case.
Fourth, we disagree with private respondents' argument that their parol evidence is
admissible under the exceptions provided by the Rules, specifically, the alleged failure of the
agreement to express the true intent of the parties. Such exception obtains only in the
following instance:
"[W]here the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual
intention of the parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of the instrument. In such
a case, extrinsic evidence of the subject matter of the contract, of the relations of the parties
to each other, and of the facts and circumstances surrounding them when they entered into
the contract may be received to enable the court to make a proper interpretation of the
instrument." [19]
In this case, the deeds of sale are clear, without any ambiguity, mistake or imperfection, much
less obscurity or doubt in the terms thereof.
Fifth, we are not persuaded by private respondents contention that they "put in issue by
the pleadings" the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent of the parties.
Record shows[20] that private respondents did not expressly plead that the deeds of sale were
incomplete or that it did not reflect the intention [21] of the buyer (petitioner) and the seller
(private respondents). Such issue must be "squarely presented." [22] Private respondents
merely alleged that the sale was subject to four (4) conditions which they tried to prove
during trial by parol evidence.[23] Obviously, this cannot be done, because they did not plead
any of the exceptions mentioned in the parol evidence rule. [24] Their case is covered by the

general rule that the contents of the writing are the only repository of the terms of the
agreement. Considering that private respondent Oscar Inocentes is a lawyer (and former
judge) he was "supposed to be steeped in legal knowledge and practices" and was "expected
to know the consequences" [25] of his signing a deed of absolute sale. Had he given an iota's
attention to scrutinize the deeds, he would have incorporated important stipulations that the
transfer of title to said lots were conditional. [26]
One last thing, assuming arguendo that the parol evidence is admissible, it should
nonetheless be disbelieved as no other evidence appears from the record to sustain the
existence of the alleged conditions. Not even the other seller, Asuncion Inocentes, was
presented to testify on such conditions.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the records of this case
REMANDED to the trial court for proper disposition in accordance with this ruling.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

MAXIMO ALVAREZ,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 143439

Present:
PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES, and
GARCIA, JJ.

- versus -

SUSAN RAMIREZ,
Respondent.

Promulgated:

October 14, 2005

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals
dated
May
31,
2000
in
CA-G.R.
SP
No.
56154,
entitled SUSAN
RAMIREZ, petitioner, versus, HON. BENJAMIN M. AQUINO, JR., as JUDGE RTC, MALABON, MM,
BR. 72, and MAXIMO ALVAREZ, respondents.
Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN
for arson[3]pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Malabon City. The accused
is Maximo Alvarez, herein petitioner. He is the husband of Esperanza G. Alvarez, sister of
respondent.
On June 21, 1999, the private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness stand as the
first witness against petitioner, her husband. Petitioner and his counsel raised no objection.
Esperanza testified as follows:
ATTY. ALCANTARA:
We are calling Mrs. Esperanza Alvarez, the wife of the accused, Your
Honor.
COURT:
Swear in the witness.
xxx
ATTY. MESIAH: (sic)
Your Honor, we are offering the testimony of this witness for the purpose
of proving that the accused Maximo Alvarez committed all the elements of the
crime being charged particularly that accused Maximo Alvarez pour on May 29,
1998 gasoline in the house located at Blk. 5, Lot 9, Phase 1-C, Dagat-dagatan,
Navotas, Metro Manila, the house owned by his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez; that
accused Maximo Alvarez after pouring the gasoline on the door of the house of
Susan Ramirez ignited and set it on fire; that the accused at the time he

successfully set the house on fire (sic) of Susan Ramirez knew that it was
occupied by Susan Ramirez, the members of the family as well as Esperanza
Alvarez, the estranged wife of the accused; that as a consequence of the
accused in successfully setting the fire to the house of Susan Ramirez, the door
of said house was burned and together with several articles of the house,
including shoes, chairs and others.
COURT:
You may proceed.
xxx
DIRECT EXAMINATION
ATTY. ALCANTARA:
xxx
Q: When you were able to find the source, incidentally what was the source of
that scent?
A: When I stand by the window, sir, I saw a man pouring the gasoline in the
house of my sister (and witness pointing to the person of the accused
inside the court room).
Q: For the record, Mrs. Witness, can you state the name of that person, if you
know?
A: He is my husband, sir, Maximo Alvarez.
Q: If that Maximo Alvarez you were able to see, can you identify him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: If you can see him inside the Court room, can you please point him?
A: Witness pointing to a person and when asked to stand and asked his name, he
gave his name as Maximo Alvarez.[4]
In the course of Esperanzas direct testimony against petitioner, the latter showed
uncontrolled emotions, prompting the trial judge to suspend the proceedings.
On June 30, 1999, petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion [5] to disqualify Esperanza from
testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital
disqualification.
Respondent filed an opposition [6] to the motion. Pending resolution of the motion, the trial
court directed the prosecution to proceed with the presentation of the other witnesses.
On September 2, 1999, the trial court issued the questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza
Alvarez from further testifying and deleting her testimony from the records. [7] The prosecution
filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in the other assailed Order dated October
19, 1999.[8]
This prompted respondent Susan Ramirez, the complaining witness in Criminal Case No.
19933-MN, to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari[9] with application for
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. [10]
On May 31, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision nullifying and setting aside the
assailed Orders issued by the trial court.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

The issue for our resolution is whether Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her
husband in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN.
Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. During their marriage,
neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or
in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latters
direct descendants or ascendants.
The reasons given for the rule are:
1.
2.

There is identity of interests between husband and wife;

If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of
perjury;
3.
The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even
at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and
unhappiness; and
4.
Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one
spouse through the hostile testimony of the other. [11]
But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions,
both in civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one
against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in
the excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule. For instance, where the
marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved
nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and
tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of
perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and
confidences of private life, which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which
through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. [12]

In Ordoo vs. Daquigan,[13] this Court held:

We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this jurisdiction, is
that laid down in Cargil vs. State, 35 ALR 133, 220 Pac. 64, 25 Okl. 314, wherein
the court said:
The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong
upon the person is too narrow; and the rule that any offense
remotely or indirectly affecting domestic harmony comes within the
exception is too broad. The better rule is that, when an offense
directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation,
it comes within the exception to the statute that one shall not be a
witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a
crime committee (by) one against the other.
Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal
relation between him and his wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the Information for
arson filed against him, eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such as trust,

confidence, respect and love by which virtues the conjugal relationship survives and
flourishes.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:
The act of private respondent in setting fire to the house of his sister-inlaw Susan Ramirez, knowing fully well that his wife was there, and in fact with
the alleged intent of injuring the latter, is an act totally alien to the harmony and
confidences of marital relation which the disqualification primarily seeks to
protect. The criminal act complained of had the effect of directly and vitally
impairing the conjugal relation. It underscored the fact that the marital and
domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have become so
strained that there is no more harmony, peace or tranquility to be preserved. The
Supreme Court has held that in such a case, identity is non-existent. In such a
situation, the security and confidences of private life which the law aims to
protect are nothing but ideals which through their absence, merely leave a void
in the unhappy home. (People v. Castaeda, 271 SCRA 504). Thus, there is no
longer any reason to apply the Marital Disqualification Rule.

It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the commission of the
offense, the relationship between petitioner and his wife was already strained. In fact, they
were separated de facto almost six months before the incident. Indeed, the evidence and
facts presented reveal that the preservation of the marriage between petitioner and
Esperanza is no longer an interest the State aims to protect.
At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being interested in laying the truth
before the courts so that the guilty may be punished and the innocent exonerated, must have
the right to offer the direct testimony of Esperanza, even against the objection of the accused,
because (as stated by this Court in Francisco[14]), it was the latter himself who gave rise to its
necessity.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The trial court, RTC, Branch
72, Malabon City, is ordered to allow Esperanza Alvarez to testify against petitioner, her
husband, in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

ARTURO ALANO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ENRICO
A. LANZANAS, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, Manila, Branch 37, and ROBERTO CARLOS, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Petitioner Arturo Alano has filed this petition for review of the decision [1] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28150 which affirmed in toto the order of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 37[2] denying petitioners motion for the suspension of proceeding of Criminal
Case No. 90-84933, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Arturo Alano as well as his motion for
reconsideration.
Criminal Case No. 90-84933 is a prosecution for the crime of estafa. The information[3] alleges:
That on or about June 10, 1986, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Roberto S. Carlos in the following
manner, to wit: the said accused, pretending to be still the owner of a parcel of land with an
area of 1,172 square meters, more or less, located at Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila, covered
by Tax Declaration No. 120-004-00398, well knowing that he had previously sold the same to
the said Roberto S. Carlos for P30,000.00, sold the aforesaid property for the second time to
one Erlinda B. Dandoy for P87,900.00, thereby depriving the said Roberto S. Carlos of his
rightful ownership/possession of the said parcel of land, to the damage and prejudice of the
said Roberto S. Carlos in the aforesaid amount of P30,000.00, Philippine currency.
Contrary to law.
Petitioner moved for the suspension of the criminal case on the ground that there was a
prejudicial question pending resolution in another case being tried in the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Region, Pasig, Branch 68. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 55103 and
entitled Roberto Carlos and Trinidad M. Carlos v. Arturo Alano, et al., concerns the nullity of
the sale and recovery of possession and damages. In the aforementioned Civil Case, private
respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner seeking the annulment of the second sale
of said parcel of land made by the petitioner to a certain Erlinda Dandoy on the premise that
the said land was previously sold to them. In his answer, petitioner contends that he never
sold the property to the private respondents and that his signature appearing in the deed of
absolute sale in favor of the latter was a forgery, hence, the alleged sale was fictitious and
inexistent. At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that the civil case was filed on March 1,
1985, five years before June 19, 1990 when the criminal case for estafa was instituted.
On October 3, 1991, the trial court denied the petitioners motion as well as a subsequent
motion for reconsideration.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of
Appeals seeking the nullification of the assailed order.
On July 26, 1993,[4] the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit, the decretal
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding no merit to the petition, the same is hereby DISMISSED, with cost
against petitioner.
Hence, this petition.
The only issue in this petition is whether the pendency of Civil Case No. 55103, is a
prejudicial question justifying the suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 9084933 filed against the petitioner.

Petitioner alleges that his signature appearing in the first deed of absolute sale in favor of
private respondent was a forgery, such that there was no second sale covering the said parcel
of land. Otherwise stated, if the Court in the said Civil Case rules that the first sale to herein
private respondent was null and void, due to the forgery of petitioners signature in the first
deed of sale, it follows that the criminal case for estafa would not prosper.
While at first blush there seems to be merit in petitioners claim, we are compelled to
affirm the Court of Appeals findings.
The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play in a situation where a civil action and
a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue
raised in the civil action is resolved such resolution would be determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal action. [5] In other words, if both civil and criminal
cases have similar issues or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised in the
other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element or
characteristic is satisfied.[6]
On the basis of the foregoing and a perusal of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, the
disposition of the issue raised need not unduly detain us. We have already ruled that a
criminal action for estafa (for alleged double sale of property) is a prejudicial question to a
civil action for nullity of the alleged deed of sale and the defense of the alleged vendor is the
forgery of his signature in the deed.[7]
Notwithstanding the apparent prejudicial question involved, the Court of Appeals still
affirmed the Order of the trial court denying petitioners motion for the suspension of the
proceeding on the ground that petitioner, in the stipulation of facts, had already admitted
during the pre-trial order dated October 5, 1990 of the criminal case the validity of his
signature in the first deed of sale between him and the private respondent, as well as his
subsequent acknowledgment of his signature in twenty-three (23) cash vouchers evidencing
the payments made by the private respondent. [8] Moreover, it was also noted by the Court of
Appeals that petitioner even wrote to the private respondent offering to refund whatever sum
the latter had paid.[9]
In this regard, the pre-trial provision on criminal procedure found in Rule 118 of the Rules
of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects. x x x. The pre-trial conference shall consider the
following:
(a) Plea bargaining
(b)Stipulation of facts
From the foregoing, there is no question that a stipulation of facts by the parties in a
criminal case is recognized as declarations constituting judicial admissions, hence, binding
upon the parties[10] and by virtue of which the prosecution dispensed with the introduction of
additional evidence and the defense waived the right to contest or dispute the veracity of the
statement contained in the exhibit.[11]
Accordingly, the stipulation of facts stated in the pre-trial order amounts to an admission
by the petitioner resulting in the waiver of his right to present evidence on his behalf. While it
is true that the right to present evidence is guaranteed under the Constitution, [12] this right
may be waived expressly or impliedly.[13]
Since the suspension of the criminal case due to a prejudicial question is only a procedural
matter, the same is subject to a waiver by virtue of the prior acts of the accused. After all, the
doctrine of waiver is made solely for the benefit and protectionof the individual in his private
capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right
and without detriment to the community at large. [14]
Accordingly, petitioners admission in the stipulation of facts during the pre-trial of the
criminal amounts to a waiver of his defense of forgery in the civil case. Hence, we have no

reason to nullify such waiver, it being not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or
good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. [15] Furthermore, it
must be emphasized that the pre-trial order was signed by the petitioner himself. As such, the
rule that no proof need be offered as to any facts admitted at a pre-trial hearing applies. [16]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals
dated July 26, 1993 is AFFIRMED.Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

BOSTON BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, (formerly BANK OF COMMERCE), Petitioner,

vs.
PERLA P. MANALO and CARLOS MANALO, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 47458 affirming, on appeal, the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 98, in Civil Case No. Q-89-3905.
The Antecedents
The Xavierville Estate, Inc. (XEI) was the owner of parcels of land in Quezon City, known as
the Xavierville Estate Subdivision, with an area of 42 hectares. XEI caused the subdivision of
the property into residential lots, which was then offered for sale to individual lot buyers. 3
On September 8, 1967, XEI, through its General Manager, Antonio Ramos, as vendor, and The
Overseas Bank of Manila (OBM), as vendee, executed a "Deed of Sale of Real Estate" over
some residential lots in the subdivision, including Lot 1, Block 2, with an area of 907.5 square
meters, and Lot 2, Block 2, with an area of 832.80 square meters. The transaction was subject
to the approval of the Board of Directors of OBM, and was covered by real estate mortgages in
favor of the Philippine National Bank as security for its account amounting to P5,187,000.00,
and the Central Bank of the Philippines as security for advances amounting
to P22,185,193.74.4 Nevertheless, XEI continued selling the residential lots in the subdivision
as agent of OBM.5
Sometime in 1972, then XEI president Emerito Ramos, Jr. contracted the services of Engr.
Carlos Manalo, Jr. who was in business of drilling deep water wells and installing pumps under
the business name Hurricane Commercial, Inc. For P34,887.66, Manalo, Jr. installed a water
pump at Ramos residence at the corner of Aurora Boulevard and Katipunan Avenue, Quezon
City. Manalo, Jr. then proposed to XEI, through Ramos, to purchase a lot in the Xavierville
subdivision, and offered as part of the downpayment the P34,887.66 Ramos owed him. XEI,
through Ramos, agreed. In a letter dated February 8, 1972, Ramos requested Manalo, Jr. to
choose which lots he wanted to buy so that the price of the lots and the terms of payment
could be fixed and incorporated in the conditional sale. 6Manalo, Jr. met with Ramos and
informed him that he and his wife Perla had chosen Lots 1 and 2 of Block 2 with a total area of
1,740.3 square meters.
In a letter dated August 22, 1972 to Perla Manalo, Ramos confirmed the reservation of the
lots. He also pegged the price of the lots at P200.00 per square meter, or a total
of P348,060.00, with a 20% down payment of the purchase price amounting to P69,612.00
less the P34,887.66 owing from Ramos, payable on or before December 31, 1972; the
corresponding Contract of Conditional Sale would then be signed on or before the same date,
but if the selling operations of XEI resumed after December 31, 1972, the balance of the
downpayment would fall due then, and the spouses would sign the aforesaid contract within
five (5) days from receipt of the notice of resumption of such selling operations. It was also
stated in the letter that, in the meantime, the spouses may introduce improvements thereon
subject to the rules and regulations imposed by XEI in the subdivision. Perla Manalo
conformed to the letter agreement. 7
The spouses Manalo took possession of the property on September 2, 1972, constructed a
house thereon, and installed a fence around the perimeter of the lots.
In the meantime, many of the lot buyers refused to pay their monthly installments until they
were assured that they would be issued Torrens titles over the lots they had purchased. 8 The

spouses Manalo were notified of the resumption of the selling operations of XEI. 9 However,
they did not pay the balance of the downpayment on the lots because Ramos failed to
prepare a contract of conditional sale and transmit the same to Manalo for their signature. On
August 14, 1973, Perla Manalo went to the XEI office and requested that the payment of the
amount representing the balance of the downpayment be deferred, which, however, XEI
rejected. On August 10, 1973, XEI furnished her with a statement of their account as of July
31, 1973, showing that they had a balance of P34,724.34 on the downpayment of the two lots
after deducting the account of Ramos, plus P3,819.6810 interest thereon from September 1,
1972 to July 31, 1973, and that the interests on the unpaid balance of the purchase price
ofP278,448.00 from September 1, 1972 to July 31, 1973 amounted to P30,629.28.11 The
spouses were informed that they were being billed for said unpaid interests. 12
On January 25, 1974, the spouses Manalo received another statement of account from XEI,
inclusive of interests on the purchase price of the lots. 13 In a letter dated April 6, 1974 to XEI,
Manalo, Jr. stated they had not yet received the notice of resumption of Leis selling
operations, and that there had been no arrangement on the payment of interests; hence, they
should not be charged with interest on the balance of the downpayment on the
property.14Further, they demanded that a deed of conditional sale over the two lots be
transmitted to them for their signatures. However, XEI ignored the demands. Consequently,
the spouses refused to pay the balance of the downpayment of the purchase price. 15
Sometime in June 1976, Manalo, Jr. constructed a business sign in the sidewalk near his
house. In a letter dated June 17, 1976, XEI informed Manalo, Jr. that business signs were not
allowed along the sidewalk. It demanded that he remove the same, on the ground, among
others, that the sidewalk was not part of the land which he had purchased on installment
basis from XEI.16 Manalo, Jr. did not respond. XEI reiterated its demand on September 15,
1977.17
Subsequently, XEI turned over its selling operations to OBM, including the receivables for lots
already contracted and those yet to be sold. 18 On December 8, 1977, OBM warned Manalo, Jr.,
that "putting up of a business sign is specifically prohibited by their contract of conditional
sale" and that his failure to comply with its demand would impel it to avail of the remedies as
provided in their contract of conditional sale. 19
Meanwhile, on December 5, 1979, the Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-265822 over Lot 1, Block 2, and TCT No. T-265823 over Lot 2, Block 2, in favor of
the OBM.20 The lien in favor of the Central Bank of the Philippines was annotated at the dorsal
portion of said title, which was later cancelled on August 4, 1980. 21
Subsequently, the Commercial Bank of Manila (CBM) acquired the Xavierville Estate from
OBM. CBM wrote Edilberto Ng, the president of Xavierville Homeowners Association that, as of
January 31, 1983, Manalo, Jr. was one of the lot buyers in the subdivision. 22 CBM reiterated in
its letter to Ng that, as of January 24, 1984, Manalo was a homeowner in the subdivision. 23
In a letter dated August 5, 1986, the CBM requested Perla Manalo to stop any on-going
construction on the property since it (CBM) was the owner of the lot and she had no
permission for such construction.24 She agreed to have a conference meeting with CBM
officers where she informed them that her husband had a contract with OBM, through XEI, to
purchase the property. When asked to prove her claim, she promised to send the documents
to CBM. However, she failed to do so. 25 On September 5, 1986, CBM reiterated its demand
that it be furnished with the documents promised, 26 but Perla Manalo did not respond.
On July 27, 1987, CBM filed a complaint27 for unlawful detainer against the spouses with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 51618. CBM
claimed that the spouses had been unlawfully occupying the property without its consent and
that despite its demands, they refused to vacate the property. The latter alleged that they, as
vendors, and XEI, as vendee, had a contract of sale over the lots which had not yet been
rescinded.28

While the case was pending, the spouses Manalo wrote CBM to offer an amicable settlement,
promising to abide by the purchase price of the property (P313,172.34), per agreement with
XEI, through Ramos. However, on July 28, 1988, CBM wrote the spouses, through counsel,
proposing that the price of P1,500.00 per square meter of the property was a reasonable
starting point for negotiation of the settlement. 29 The spouses rejected the counter
proposal,30 emphasizing that they would abide by their original agreement with XEI. CBM
moved to withdraw its complaint31 because of the issues raised.32
In the meantime, the CBM was renamed the Boston Bank of the Philippines. After CBM filed its
complaint against the spouses Manalo, the latter filed a complaint for specific performance
and damages against the bank before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City on
October 31, 1989.
The plaintiffs alleged therein that they had always been ready, able and willing to pay the
installments on the lots sold to them by the defendants remote predecessor-in-interest, as
might be or stipulated in the contract of sale, but no contract was forthcoming; they
constructed their house worth P2,000,000.00 on the property in good faith; Manalo, Jr.,
informed the defendant, through its counsel, on October 15, 1988 that he would abide by the
terms and conditions of his original agreement with the defendants predecessor-in-interest;
during the hearing of the ejectment case on October 16, 1988, they offered to
pay P313,172.34 representing the balance on the purchase price of said lots; such tender of
payment was rejected, so that the subject lots could be sold at considerably higher prices to
third parties.
Plaintiffs further alleged that upon payment of the P313,172.34, they were entitled to the
execution and delivery of a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the subject lots, sufficient in form
and substance to transfer title thereto free and clear of any and all liens and encumbrances of
whatever kind and nature.33 The plaintiffs prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be
rendered in their favor, to wit:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after due hearing:
(a) The defendant should be ordered to execute and deliver a Deed of Absolute Sale
over subject lots in favor of the plaintiffs after payment of the sum of P313,172.34,
sufficient in form and substance to transfer to them titles thereto free and clear of any
and all liens and encumbrances of whatever kind or nature;
(b) The defendant should be held liable for moral and exemplary damages in the
amounts of P300,000.00 and P30,000.00, respectively, for not promptly executing and
delivering to plaintiff the necessary Contract of Sale, notwithstanding repeated
demands therefor and for having been constrained to engage the services of
undersigned counsel for which they agreed to pay attorneys fees in the sum
of P50,000.00 to enforce their rights in the premises and appearance fee of P500.00;
(c) And for such other and further relief as may be just and equitable in the premises. 34
In its Answer to the complaint, the defendant interposed the following affirmative defenses:
(a) plaintiffs had no cause of action against it because the August 22, 1972 letter agreement
between XEI and the plaintiffs was not binding on it; and (b) "it had no record of any contract
to sell executed by it or its predecessor, or of any statement of accounts from its
predecessors, or records of payments of the plaintiffs or of any documents which entitled
them to the possession of the lots."35 The defendant, likewise, interposed counterclaims for
damages and attorneys fees and prayed for the eviction of the plaintiffs from the property. 36
Meanwhile, in a letter dated January 25, 1993, plaintiffs, through counsel, proposed an
amicable settlement of the case by paying P942,648.70, representing the balance of the
purchase price of the two lots based on the current market value. 37 However, the defendant
rejected the same and insisted that for the smaller lot, they payP4,500,000.00, the current

market value of the property.38 The defendant insisted that it owned the property since there
was no contract or agreement between it and the plaintiffs relative thereto.
During the trial, the plaintiffs adduced in evidence the separate Contracts of Conditional Sale
executed between XEI and Alberto Soller; 39 Alfredo Aguila,40 and Dra. Elena Santos-Roque41 to
prove that XEI continued selling residential lots in the subdivision as agent of OBM after the
latter had acquired the said lots.
For its part, defendant presented in evidence the letter dated August 22, 1972, where XEI
proposed to sell the two lots subject to two suspensive conditions: the payment of the balance
of the downpayment of the property, and the execution of the corresponding contract of
conditional sale. Since plaintiffs failed to pay, OBM consequently refused to execute the
corresponding contract of conditional sale and forfeited the P34,877.66 downpayment for the
two lots, but did not notify them of said forfeiture. 42 It alleged that OBM considered the lots
unsold because the titles thereto bore no annotation that they had been sold under a contract
of conditional sale, and the plaintiffs were not notified of XEIs resumption of its selling
operations.
On May 2, 1994, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendant. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant

(a) Ordering the latter to execute and deliver a Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot 1 and 2,
Block 2 of the Xavierville Estate Subdivision after payment of the sum of P942,978.70
sufficient in form and substance to transfer to them titles thereto free from any and all
liens and encumbrances of whatever kind and nature.
(b) Ordering the defendant to pay moral and exemplary damages in the amount
of P150,000.00; and
(c) To pay attorneys fees in the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.43
The trial court ruled that under the August 22, 1972 letter agreement of XEI and the plaintiffs,
the parties had a "complete contract to sell" over the lots, and that they had already partially
consummated the same. It declared that the failure of the defendant to notify the plaintiffs of
the resumption of its selling operations and to execute a deed of conditional sale did not
prevent the defendants obligation to convey titles to the lots from acquiring binding effect.
Consequently, the plaintiffs had a cause of action to compel the defendant to execute a deed
of sale over the lots in their favor.
Boston Bank appealed the decision to the CA, alleging that the lower court erred in (a) not
concluding that the letter of XEI to the spouses Manalo, was at most a mere contract to sell
subject to suspensive conditions, i.e., the payment of the balance of the downpayment on the
property and the execution of a deed of conditional sale (which were not complied with); and
(b) in awarding moral and exemplary damages to the spouses Manalo despite the absence of
testimony providing facts to justify such awards. 44
On September 30, 2002, the CA rendered a decision affirming that of the RTC with
modification. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that (a) the figure
"P942,978.70" appearing [in] par. (a) of the dispositive portion thereof is changed to
"P313,172.34 plus interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from September 1, 1972
until fully paid" and (b) the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees in
favor of plaintiffs-appellees is DELETED.

SO ORDERED.45
The appellate court sustained the ruling of the RTC that the appellant and the appellees had
executed a Contract to Sell over the two lots but declared that the balance of the purchase
price of the property amounting to P278,448.00 was payable in fixed amounts, inclusive of
pre-computed interests, from delivery of the possession of the property to the appellees on a
monthly basis for 120 months, based on the deeds of conditional sale executed by XEI in favor
of other lot buyers.46 The CA also declared that, while XEI must have resumed its selling
operations before the end of 1972 and the downpayment on the property remained unpaid as
of December 31, 1972, absent a written notice of cancellation of the contract to sell from the
bank or notarial demand therefor as required by Republic Act No. 6552, the spouses had, at
the very least, a 60-day grace period from January 1, 1973 within which to pay the same.
Boston Bank filed a motion for the reconsideration of the decision alleging that there was no
perfected contract to sell the two lots, as there was no agreement between XEI and the
respondents on the manner of payment as well as the other terms and conditions of the sale.
It further averred that its claim for recovery of possession of the aforesaid lots in its
Memorandum dated February 28, 1994 filed before the trial court constituted a judicial
demand for rescission that satisfied the requirements of the New Civil Code. However, the
appellate court denied the motion.
Boston Bank, now petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA
rulings. It maintains that, as held by the CA, the records do not reflect any schedule of
payment of the 80% balance of the purchase price, or P278,448.00. Petitioner insists that
unless the parties had agreed on the manner of payment of the principal amount, including
the other terms and conditions of the contract, there would be no existing contract of sale or
contract to sell.47 Petitioner avers that the letter agreement to respondent spouses dated
August 22, 1972 merely confirmed their reservation for the purchase of Lot Nos. 1 and 2,
consisting of 1,740.3 square meters, more or less, at the price of P200.00 per square meter
(or P348,060.00), the amount of the downpayment thereon and the application of
the P34,887.00 due from Ramos as part of such downpayment.
Petitioner asserts that there is no factual basis for the CA ruling that the terms and conditions
relating to the payment of the balance of the purchase price of the property (as agreed upon
by XEI and other lot buyers in the same subdivision) were also applicable to the contract
entered into between the petitioner and the Respondents. It insists that such a ruling is
contrary to law, as it is tantamount to compelling the parties to agree to something that was
not even discussed, thus, violating their freedom to contract. Besides, the situation of the
respondents cannot be equated with those of the other lot buyers, as, for one thing, the
respondents made a partial payment on the downpayment for the two lots even before the
execution of any contract of conditional sale.
Petitioner posits that, even on the assumption that there was a perfected contract to sell
between the parties, nevertheless, it cannot be compelled to convey the property to the
respondents because the latter failed to pay the balance of the downpayment of the property,
as well as the balance of 80% of the purchase price, thus resulting in the extinction of its
obligation to convey title to the lots to the Respondents.
Another egregious error of the CA, petitioner avers, is the application of Republic Act No.
6552. It insists that such law applies only to a perfected agreement or perfected contract to
sell, not in this case where the downpayment on the purchase price of the property was not
completely paid, and no installment payments were made by the buyers.
Petitioner also faults the CA for declaring that petitioner failed to serve a notice on the
respondents of cancellation or rescission of the contract to sell, or notarial demand therefor.
Petitioner insists that its August 5, 1986 letter requiring respondents to vacate the property
and its complaint for ejectment in Civil Case No. 51618 filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court
amounted to the requisite demand for a rescission of the contract to sell. Moreover, the action
of the respondents below was barred by laches because despite demands, they failed to pay

the balance of the purchase price of the lots (let alone the downpayment) for a considerable
number of years.
For their part, respondents assert that as long as there is a meeting of the minds of the
parties to a contract of sale as to the price, the contract is valid despite the parties failure to
agree on the manner of payment. In such a situation, the balance of the purchase price would
be payable on demand, conformably to Article 1169 of the New Civil Code. They insist that the
law does not require a party to agree on the manner of payment of the purchase price as a
prerequisite to a valid contract to sell. The respondents cite the ruling of this Court in
Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals48 to support their submission.
They argue that even if the manner and timeline for the payment of the balance of the
purchase price of the property is an essential requisite of a contract to sell, nevertheless, as
shown by their letter agreement of August 22, 1972 with the OBM, through XEI and the other
letters to them, an agreement was reached as to the manner of payment of the balance of the
purchase price. They point out that such letters referred to the terms of the terms of the
deeds of conditional sale executed by XEI in favor of the other lot buyers in the subdivision,
which contained uniform terms of 120 equal monthly installments (excluding the
downpayment, but inclusive of pre-computed interests). The respondents assert that XEI was
a real estate broker and knew that the contracts involving residential lots in the subdivision
contained uniform terms as to the manner and timeline of the payment of the purchase price
of said lots.
Respondents further posit that the terms and conditions to be incorporated in the
"corresponding contract of conditional sale" to be executed by the parties would be the same
as those contained in the contracts of conditional sale executed by lot buyers in the
subdivision. After all, they maintain, the contents of the corresponding contract of conditional
sale referred to in the August 22, 1972 letter agreement envisaged those contained in the
contracts of conditional sale that XEI and other lot buyers executed. Respondents cite the
ruling of this Court in Mitsui Bussan Kaisha v. Manila E.R.R. & L. Co. 49
The respondents aver that the issues raised by the petitioner are factual, inappropriate in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. They assert that petitioner
adopted a theory in litigating the case in the trial court, but changed the same on appeal
before the CA, and again in this Court. They argue that the petitioner is estopped from
adopting a new theory contrary to those it had adopted in the trial and appellate courts.
Moreover, the existence of a contract of conditional sale was admitted in the letters of XEI and
OBM. They aver that they became owners of the lots upon delivery to them by XEI.
The issues for resolution are the following: (1) whether the factual issues raised by the
petitioner are proper; (2) whether petitioner or its predecessors-in-interest, the XEI or the
OBM, as seller, and the respondents, as buyers, forged a perfect contract to sell over the
property; (3) whether petitioner is estopped from contending that no such contract was forged
by the parties; and (4) whether respondents has a cause of action against the petitioner for
specific performance.
The rule is that before this Court, only legal issues may be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari. The reason is that this Court is not a trier of facts, and is not to review and calibrate
the evidence on record. Moreover, the findings of facts of the trial court, as affirmed on appeal
by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this Court unless the case falls under any of the
following exceptions:
(1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)
where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary
to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those
of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific

evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) when the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record. 50
We have reviewed the records and we find that, indeed, the ruling of the appellate court
dismissing petitioners appeal is contrary to law and is not supported by evidence. A careful
examination of the factual backdrop of the case, as well as the antecedental proceedings
constrains us to hold that petitioner is not barred from asserting that XEI or OBM, on one
hand, and the respondents, on the other, failed to forge a perfected contract to sell the
subject lots.
It must be stressed that the Court may consider an issue not raised during the trial when
there is plain error. 51Although a factual issue was not raised in the trial court, such issue may
still be considered and resolved by the Court in the interest of substantial justice, if it finds
that to do so is necessary to arrive at a just decision, 52 or when an issue is closely related to
an issue raised in the trial court and the Court of Appeals and is necessary for a just and
complete resolution of the case.53 When the trial court decides a case in favor of a party on
certain grounds, the Court may base its decision upon some other points, which the trial court
or appellate court ignored or erroneously decided in favor of a party. 54
In this case, the issue of whether XEI had agreed to allow the respondents to pay the
purchase price of the property was raised by the parties. The trial court ruled that the parties
had perfected a contract to sell, as against petitioners claim that no such contract existed.
However, in resolving the issue of whether the petitioner was obliged to sell the property to
the respondents, while the CA declared that XEI or OBM and the respondents failed to agree
on the schedule of payment of the balance of the purchase price of the property, it ruled that
XEI and the respondents had forged a contract to sell; hence, petitioner is entitled to ventilate
the issue before this Court.
We agree with petitioners contention that, for a perfected contract of sale or contract to sell
to exist in law, there must be an agreement of the parties, not only on the price of the
property sold, but also on the manner the price is to be paid by the vendee.
Under Article 1458 of the New Civil Code, in a contract of sale, whether absolute or
conditional, one of the contracting parties obliges himself to transfer the ownership of and
deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its
equivalent. A contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the minds
upon the thing which is the object of the contract and the price. From the averment of
perfection, the parties are bound, not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly
stipulated, but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in
keeping with good faith, usage and law. 55 On the other hand, when the contract of sale or to
sell is not perfected, it cannot, as an independent source of obligation, serve as a binding
juridical relation between the parties.56
A definite agreement as to the price is an essential element of a binding agreement to sell
personal or real property because it seriously affects the rights and obligations of the parties.
Price is an essential element in the formation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale.
The fixing of the price can never be left to the decision of one of the contracting parties. But a
price fixed by one of the contracting parties, if accepted by the other, gives rise to a perfected
sale.57
It is not enough for the parties to agree on the price of the property. The parties must also
agree on the manner of payment of the price of the property to give rise to a binding and
enforceable contract of sale or contract to sell. This is so because the agreement as to the
manner of payment goes into the price, such that a disagreement on the manner of payment
is tantamount to a failure to agree on the price. 58

In a contract to sell property by installments, it is not enough that the parties agree on the
price as well as the amount of downpayment. The parties must, likewise, agree on the manner
of payment of the balance of the purchase price and on the other terms and conditions
relative to the sale. Even if the buyer makes a downpayment or portion thereof, such payment
cannot be considered as sufficient proof of the perfection of any purchase and sale between
the parties. Indeed, this Court ruled in Velasco v. Court of Appeals 59 that:
It is not difficult to glean from the aforequoted averments that the petitioners themselves
admit that they and the respondent still had to meet and agree on how and when the downpayment and the installment payments were to be paid. Such being the situation, it cannot,
therefore, be said that a definite and firm sales agreement between the parties had been
perfected over the lot in question. Indeed, this Court has already ruled before that a definite
agreement on the manner of payment of the purchase price is an essential element in the
formation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale. The fact, therefore, that the
petitioners delivered to the respondent the sum ofP10,000.00 as part of the downpayment
that they had to pay cannot be considered as sufficient proof of the perfection of any
purchase and sale agreement between the parties herein under article 1482 of the New Civil
Code, as the petitioners themselves admit that some essential matter the terms of payment
still had to be mutually covenanted.60
We agree with the contention of the petitioner that, as held by the CA, there is no showing, in
the records, of the schedule of payment of the balance of the purchase price on the property
amounting to P278,448.00. We have meticulously reviewed the records, including Ramos
February 8, 1972 and August 22, 1972 letters to respondents, 61 and find that said parties
confined themselves to agreeing on the price of the property (P348,060.00), the 20%
downpayment of the purchase price (P69,612.00), and credited respondents for
theP34,887.00 owing from Ramos as part of the 20% downpayment. The timeline for the
payment of the balance of the downpayment (P34,724.34) was also agreed upon, that is, on
or before XEI resumed its selling operations, on or before December 31, 1972, or within five
(5) days from written notice of such resumption of selling operations. The parties had also
agreed to incorporate all the terms and conditions relating to the sale, inclusive of the terms
of payment of the balance of the purchase price and the other substantial terms and
conditions in the "corresponding contract of conditional sale," to be later signed by the
parties, simultaneously with respondents settlement of the balance of the downpayment.
The February 8, 1972 letter of XEI reads:
Mr. Carlos T. Manalo, Jr.
Hurricane Rotary Well Drilling
Rizal Avenue Ext.,Caloocan City
Dear Mr. Manalo:
We agree with your verbal offer to exchange the proceeds of your contract with us to form as
a down payment for a lot in our Xavierville Estate Subdivision.
Please let us know your choice lot so that we can fix the price and terms of payment in
our conditional sale.
Sincerely yours,
XAVIERVILLE ESTATE, INC.
(Signed)
EMERITO B. RAMOS, JR.
President
CONFORME:

(Signed)
CARLOS T. MANALO, JR.
Hurricane Rotary Well Drilling62
The August 22, 1972 letter agreement of XEI and the respondents reads:
Mrs. Perla P. Manalo
1548 Rizal Avenue Extensionbr>Caloocan City
Dear Mrs. Manalo:
This is to confirm your reservation of Lot Nos. 1 and 2; Block 2 of our consolidation-subdivision
plan as amended, consisting of 1,740.3 square meters more or less, at the price of P200.00
per square meter or a total price of P348,060.00.
It is agreed that as soon as we resume selling operations, you must pay a down payment of
20% of the purchase price of the said lots and sign the corresponding Contract of Conditional
Sale, on or before December 31, 1972, provided, however, that if we resume selling after
December 31, 1972, then you must pay the aforementioned down payment and sign the
aforesaid contract within five (5) days from your receipt of our notice of resumption of selling
operations.
In the meanwhile, you may introduce such improvements on the said lots as you may desire,
subject to the rules and regulations of the subdivision.
If the above terms and conditions are acceptable to you, please signify your conformity by
signing on the space herein below provided.
Thank you.
Very truly yours,
XAVIERVILLE ESTATE, INC. CONFORME:
By:
(Signed)
EMERITO B. RAMOS, JR.

(Signed)
PERLA P. MANALO

President Buyer63
Based on these two letters, the determination of the terms of payment of the P278,448.00
had yet to be agreed upon on or before December 31, 1972, or even afterwards, when the
parties sign the corresponding contract of conditional sale.
Jurisprudence is that if a material element of a contemplated contract is left for future
negotiations, the same is too indefinite to be enforceable. 64 And when an essential element of
a contract is reserved for future agreement of the parties, no legal obligation arises until such
future agreement is concluded.65
So long as an essential element entering into the proposed obligation of either of the parties
remains to be determined by an agreement which they are to make, the contract is
incomplete and unenforceable. 66 The reason is that such a contract is lacking in the necessary
qualities of definiteness, certainty and mutuality. 67
There is no evidence on record to prove that XEI or OBM and the respondents had agreed,
after December 31, 1972, on the terms of payment of the balance of the purchase price of the
property and the other substantial terms and conditions relative to the sale. Indeed, the

parties are in agreement that there had been no contract of conditional sale ever executed by
XEI, OBM or petitioner, as vendor, and the respondents, as vendees. 68
The ruling of this Court in Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals has no bearing in this case
because the issue of the manner of payment of the purchase price of the property was not
raised therein.
We reject the submission of respondents that they and Ramos had intended to incorporate the
terms of payment contained in the three contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and
other lot buyers in the "corresponding contract of conditional sale," which would later be
signed by them.69 We have meticulously reviewed the respondents complaint and find no
such allegation therein.70 Indeed, respondents merely alleged in their complaint that they
were bound to pay the balance of the purchase price of the property "in installments." When
respondent Manalo, Jr. testified, he was never asked, on direct examination or even on crossexamination, whether the terms of payment of the balance of the purchase price of the lots
under the contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and other lot buyers would form part
of the "corresponding contract of conditional sale" to be signed by them simultaneously with
the payment of the balance of the downpayment on the purchase price.
We note that, in its letter to the respondents dated June 17, 1976, or almost three years from
the execution by the parties of their August 22, 1972 letter agreement, XEI stated, in part,
that respondents had purchased the property "on installment basis." 71 However, in the said
letter, XEI failed to state a specific amount for each installment, and whether such payments
were to be made monthly, semi-annually, or annually. Also, respondents, as plaintiffs below,
failed to adduce a shred of evidence to prove that they were obliged to pay the P278,448.00
monthly, semi-annually or annually. The allegation that the payment of the P278,448.00 was
to be paid in installments is, thus, vague and indefinite. Case law is that, for a contract to be
enforceable, its terms must be certain and explicit, not vague or indefinite. 72
There is no factual and legal basis for the CA ruling that, based on the terms of payment of
the balance of the purchase price of the lots under the contracts of conditional sale executed
by XEI and the other lot buyers, respondents were obliged to pay the P278,448.00 with precomputed interest of 12% per annum in 120-month installments. As gleaned from the ruling
of the appellate court, it failed to justify its use of the terms of payment under the three
"contracts of conditional sale" as basis for such ruling, to wit:
On the other hand, the records do not disclose the schedule of payment of the purchase price,
net of the downpayment. Considering, however, the Contracts of Conditional Sale (Exhs. "N,"
"O" and "P") entered into by XEI with other lot buyers, it would appear that the subdivision
lots sold by XEI, under contracts to sell, were payable in 120 equal monthly installments
(exclusive of the downpayment but including pre-computed interests) commencing on
delivery of the lot to the buyer. 73
By its ruling, the CA unilaterally supplied an essential element to the letter agreement of XEI
and the Respondents. Courts should not undertake to make a contract for the parties, nor can
it enforce one, the terms of which are in doubt. 74 Indeed, the Court emphasized in Chua v.
Court of Appeals75 that it is not the province of a court to alter a contract by construction or to
make a new contract for the parties; its duty is confined to the interpretation of the one which
they have made for themselves, without regard to its wisdom or folly, as the court cannot
supply material stipulations or read into contract words which it does not contain.
Respondents, as plaintiffs below, failed to allege in their complaint that the terms of payment
of the P278,448.00 to be incorporated in the "corresponding contract of conditional sale" were
those contained in the contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and Soller, Aguila and
Roque.76 They likewise failed to prove such allegation in this Court.
The bare fact that other lot buyers were allowed to pay the balance of the purchase price of
lots purchased by them in 120 or 180 monthly installments does not constitute evidence that

XEI also agreed to give the respondents the same mode and timeline of payment of
the P278,448.00.
Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, evidence that one did a certain
thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did the same or similar thing at another
time, although such evidence may be received to prove habit, usage, pattern of conduct or
the intent of the parties.
Similar acts as evidence. Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is
not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another time;
but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme,
habit, custom or usage, and the like.
However, respondents failed to allege and prove, in the trial court, that, as a matter of
business usage, habit or pattern of conduct, XEI granted all lot buyers the right to pay the
balance of the purchase price in installments of 120 months of fixed amounts with precomputed interests, and that XEI and the respondents had intended to adopt such terms of
payment relative to the sale of the two lots in question. Indeed, respondents adduced in
evidence the three contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and other lot buyers merely
to prove that XEI continued to sell lots in the subdivision as sales agent of OBM after it
acquired said lots, not to prove usage, habit or pattern of conduct on the part of XEI to require
all lot buyers in the subdivision to pay the balance of the purchase price of said lots in 120
months. It further failed to prive that the trial court admitted the said deeds 77 as part of the
testimony of respondent Manalo, Jr. 78
Habit, custom, usage or pattern of conduct must be proved like any other facts. Courts must
contend with the caveat that, before they admit evidence of usage, of habit or pattern of
conduct, the offering party must establish the degree of specificity and frequency of uniform
response that ensures more than a mere tendency to act in a given manner but rather,
conduct that is semi-automatic in nature. The offering party must allege and prove specific,
repetitive conduct that might constitute evidence of habit. The examples offered in evidence
to prove habit, or pattern of evidence must be numerous enough to base on inference of
systematic conduct. Mere similarity of contracts does not present the kind of sufficiently
similar circumstances to outweigh the danger of prejudice and confusion.
In determining whether the examples are numerous enough, and sufficiently regular, the key
criteria are adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response. After all, habit means a course
of behavior of a person regularly represented in like circumstances. 79 It is only when examples
offered to establish pattern of conduct or habit are numerous enough to lose an inference of
systematic conduct that examples are admissible. The key criteria are adequacy of sampling
and uniformity of response or ratio of reaction to situations. 80
There are cases where the course of dealings to be followed is defined by the usage of a
particular trade or market or profession. As expostulated by Justice Benjamin Cardozo of the
United States Supreme Court: "Life casts the moulds of conduct, which will someday become
fixed as law. Law preserves the moulds which have taken form and shape from life." 81 Usage
furnishes a standard for the measurement of many of the rights and acts of men. 82 It is also
well-settled that parties who contract on a subject matter concerning which known usage
prevail, incorporate such usage by implication into their agreement, if nothing is said to be
contrary.83
However, the respondents inexplicably failed to adduce sufficient competent evidence to
prove usage, habit or pattern of conduct of XEI to justify the use of the terms of payment in
the contracts of the other lot buyers, and thus grant respondents the right to pay
the P278,448.00 in 120 months, presumably because of respondents belief that the manner
of payment of the said amount is not an essential element of a contract to sell. There is no
evidence that XEI or OBM and all the lot buyers in the subdivision, including lot buyers who
pay part of the downpayment of the property purchased by them in the form of service, had
executed contracts of conditional sale containing uniform terms and conditions. Moreover,

under the terms of the contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and three lot buyers in
the subdivision, XEI agreed to grant 120 months within which to pay the balance of the
purchase price to two of them, but granted one 180 months to do so. 84 There is no evidence
on record that XEI granted the same right to buyers of two or more lots.
Irrefragably, under Article 1469 of the New Civil Code, the price of the property sold may be
considered certain if it be so with reference to another thing certain. It is sufficient if it can be
determined by the stipulations of the contract made by the parties thereto 85 or by reference to
an agreement incorporated in the contract of sale or contract to sell or if it is capable of being
ascertained with certainty in said contract; 86 or if the contract contains express or implied
provisions by which it may be rendered certain; 87 or if it provides some method or criterion by
which it can be definitely ascertained.88 As this Court held in Villaraza v. Court of
Appeals,89 the price is considered certain if, by its terms, the contract furnishes a basis or
measure for ascertaining the amount agreed upon.
We have carefully reviewed the August 22, 1972 letter agreement of the parties and find no
direct or implied reference to the manner and schedule of payment of the balance of the
purchase price of the lots covered by the deeds of conditional sale executed by XEI and that
of the other lot buyers90 as basis for or mode of determination of the schedule of the payment
by the respondents of the P278,448.00.
The ruling of this Court in Mitsui Bussan Kaisha v. Manila Electric Railroad and Light
Company91 is not applicable in this case because the basic price fixed in the contract
was P9.45 per long ton, but it was stipulated that the price was subject to modification "in
proportion to variations in calories and ash content, and not otherwise." In this case, the
parties did not fix in their letters-agreement, any method or mode of determining the terms of
payment of the balance of the purchase price of the property amounting to P278,448.00.
It bears stressing that the respondents failed and refused to pay the balance of the
downpayment and of the purchase price of the property amounting to P278,448.00 despite
notice to them of the resumption by XEI of its selling operations. The respondents enjoyed
possession of the property without paying a centavo. On the other hand, XEI and OBM failed
and refused to transmit a contract of conditional sale to the Respondents. The respondents
could have at least consigned the balance of the downpayment after notice of the resumption
of the selling operations of XEI and filed an action to compel XEI or OBM to transmit to them
the said contract; however, they failed to do so.
As a consequence, respondents and XEI (or OBM for that matter) failed to forge a perfected
contract to sell the two lots; hence, respondents have no cause of action for specific
performance against petitioner. Republic Act No. 6552 applies only to a perfected contract to
sell and not to a contract with no binding and enforceable effect.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47458 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 98 is ordered to dismiss the complaint. Costs against the Respondents.
SO ORDERED.

LEA MER INDUSTRIES, INC., G.R. No. 161745

Petitioner,
Present
Panganiban, J.,
Chairman,
- versus - Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Corona,
Carpio Morales, and
Garcia, JJ
Promulgated:
MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC.,*
Respondent. September 30, 2005
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
C ommon carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in their vigilance over the
goods entrusted to them, as required by the nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy. Consequently, the law presumes that common carriers are at fault or negligent for any
loss or damage to the goods that they transport. In the present case, the evidence submitted
by petitioner to overcome this presumption was sorely insufficient.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
October 9, 2002 Decision[2] and the December 29, 2003 Resolution [3] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-GR CV No. 66028. The challenged Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The December 7, 1999 decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42 in Civil Case No. 92-63159 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. [Petitioner] is ordered to pay the [herein
respondent] the value of the lost cargo in the amount ofP565,000.00. Costs
against the [herein petitioner].[4]
The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration.

The Facts
Ilian Silica Mining entered into a contract of carriage with Lea Mer Industries, Inc., for
the shipment of 900 metric tons of silica sand valued at P565,000.[5] Consigned to Vulcan
Industrial and Mining Corporation, the cargo was to be transported from Palawan to Manila.
On October 25, 1991, the silica sand was placed on board Judy VII, a barge leased by Lea Mer.
[6]
During the voyage, the vessel sank, resulting in the loss of the cargo. [7]
Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., as insurer, paid Vulcan the value of the lost cargo. [8] To
recover the amount paid and in the exercise of its right of subrogation, Malayan demanded
reimbursement from Lea Mer, which refused to comply. Consequently, Malayan instituted a
Complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila on September 4, 1992, for the
collection of P565,000 representing the amount that respondent had paid Vulcan. [9]
On October 7, 1999, the trial court dismissed the Complaint, upon finding that the
cause of the loss was a fortuitous event. [10] The RTC noted that the vessel had sunk because of
the bad weather condition brought about by Typhoon Trining. The court ruled that petitioner
had no advance knowledge of the incoming typhoon, and that the vessel had been cleared by
the Philippine Coast Guard to travel from Palawan to Manila. [11]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the trial court, the CA held that the vessel was not seaworthy when it sailed for
Manila. Thus, the loss of the cargo was occasioned by petitioners fault, not by a fortuitous
event.[12]
Hence, this recourse.[13]
The Issues
Petitioner states the issues in this wise:
A. Whether or not the survey report of the cargo surveyor, Jesus Cortez, who had
not been presented as a witness of the said report during the trial of this case
before the lower court can be admitted in evidence to prove the alleged facts
cited in the said report.
B. Whether or not the respondent, Court of Appeals, had validly or legally
reversed the finding of fact of the Regional Trial Court which clearly and
unequivocally held that the loss of the cargo subject of this case was caused by
fortuitous event for which herein petitioner could not be held liable.
C. Whether or not the respondent, Court of Appeals, had committed serious error
and grave abuse of discretion in disregarding the testimony of the witness from
the MARINA, Engr. Jacinto Lazo y Villegal, to the effect that the vessel Judy VII
was seaworthy at the time of incident and further in disregarding the testimony
of the PAG-ASA weather specialist, Ms. Rosa Barba y Saliente, to the effect that
typhoon Trining did not hit Metro Manila or Palawan. [14]

In the main, the issues are as follows: (1) whether petitioner is liable for the loss of the cargo,
and (2) whether the survey report of Jesus Cortez is admissible in evidence.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Liability for Loss of Cargo
Question of Fact

The resolution of the present case hinges on whether the loss of the cargo was due to a
fortuitous event. This issue involves primarily a question of fact, notwithstanding petitioners
claim that it pertains only to a question of law. As a general rule, questions of fact may not be
raised in a petition for review. [15] The present case serves as an exception to this rule, because
the factual findings of the appellate and the trial courts vary. [16] This Court meticulously
reviewed the records, but found no reason to reverse the CA.
Rule on Common Carriers
Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of
carrying or transporting passengers or goods, or both -- by land, water, or air -- when this
service is offered to the public for compensation. [17] Petitioner is clearly a common carrier,
because it offers to the public its business of transporting goods through its vessels. [18]
Thus, the Court corrects the trial courts finding that petitioner became a private carrier when
Vulcan chartered it.[19] Charter parties are classified as contracts of demise (or bareboat) and
affreightment, which are distinguished as follows:
Under the demise or bareboat charter of the vessel, the charterer will
generally be considered as owner for the voyage or service stipulated. The
charterer mans the vessel with his own people and becomes, in effect, the
owner pro hac vice, subject to liability to others for damages caused by
negligence. To create a demise, the owner of a vessel must completely and
exclusively relinquish possession, command and navigation thereof to the
charterer; anything short of such a complete transfer is a contract of
affreightment (time or voyage charter party) or not a charter party at all. [20]
The distinction is significant, because a demise or bareboat charter indicates a business
undertaking that is private in character. [21] Consequently, the rights and obligations of the
parties to a contract of private carriage are governed principally by their stipulations, not by
the law on common carriers.[22]
The Contract in the present case was one of affreightment, as shown by the fact that it
was petitioners crew that manned the tugboat M/V Ayalit and controlled the barge Judy VII.
[23]
Necessarily, petitioner was a common carrier, and the pertinent law governs the present
factual circumstances.
Extraordinary Diligence Required
Common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in their vigilance over the
goods and the safety of the passengers they transport, as required by the nature of their
business and for reasons of public policy. [24] Extraordinary diligence requires rendering service
with the greatest skill and foresight to avoid damage and destruction to the goods entrusted
for carriage and delivery.[25]
Common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently for
loss or damage to the goods that they have transported. [26] This presumption can be rebutted
only by proof that they observed extraordinary diligence, or that the loss or damage was
occasioned by any of the following causes: [27]
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;

Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers;
Order or act of competent public authority. [28]

Rule on Fortuitous Events

Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides that no person shall be responsible for a fortuitous
event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. Thus, if the loss
or damage was due to such an event, a common carrier is exempted from liability.
Jurisprudence defines the elements of a fortuitous event as follows: (a) the cause of the
unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the debtors to comply with their
obligations, must have been independent of human will; (b) the event that constituted
the caso fortuito must have been impossible to foresee or, if foreseeable, impossible to avoid;
(c) the occurrence must have been such as to render it impossible for the debtors to fulfill
their obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the obligor must have been free from any
participation in the aggravation of the resulting injury to the creditor. [29]
To excuse the common carrier fully of any liability, the fortuitous event must have been
the proximate and only cause of the loss. [30] Moreover, it should have exercised due diligence
to prevent or minimize the loss before, during and after the occurrence of the fortuitous
event.[31]
Loss in the Instant Case
There is no controversy regarding the loss of the cargo in the present case. As the common
carrier, petitioner bore the burden of proving that it had exercised extraordinary diligence to
avoid the loss, or that the loss had been occasioned by a fortuitous event -- an exempting
circumstance.
It was precisely this circumstance that petitioner cited to escape liability. Lea Mer
claimed that the loss of the cargo was due to the bad weather condition brought about by
Typhoon Trining.[32] Evidence was presented to show that petitioner had not been informed of
the incoming typhoon, and that the Philippine Coast Guard had given it clearance to begin the
voyage.[33] On October 25, 1991, the date on which the voyage commenced and the barge
sank, Typhoon Trining was allegedly far from Palawan, where the storm warning was only
Signal No. 1.[34]
The evidence presented by petitioner in support of its defense of fortuitous event was
sorely insufficient. As required by the pertinent law, it was not enough for the common carrier
to show that there was an unforeseen or unexpected occurrence. It had to show that it was
free from any fault -- a fact it miserably failed to prove.
First, petitioner presented no evidence that it had attempted to minimize or prevent the
loss before, during or after the alleged fortuitous event. [35] Its witness, Joey A. Draper, testified
that he could no longer remember whether anything had been done to minimize loss when
water started entering the barge.[36]This fact was confirmed during his cross-examination, as
shown by the following brief exchange:
Atty. Baldovino, Jr.:
Other than be[a]ching the barge Judy VII, were there other precautionary
measure[s] exercised by you and the crew of Judy VII so as to prevent the
los[s] or sinking of barge Judy VII?
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Baldovino, Jr.:
Your Honor, what I am asking [relates to the] action taken by the officers
and crew of tugboat Ayalit and barge Judy VII x x x to prevent the sinking
of barge Judy VII?
xxxxxxxxx
Court:
Mr. witness, did the captain of that tugboat give any instruction on how to
save the barge Judy VII?

Joey Draper:
I can no longer remember sir, because that happened [a] long time ago. [37]
Second, the alleged fortuitous event was not the sole and proximate cause of the loss.
There is a preponderance of evidence that the barge was not seaworthy when it sailed for
Manila.[38] Respondent was able to prove that, in the hull of the barge, there were holes that
might have caused or aggravated the sinking. [39] Because the presumption of negligence or
fault applied to petitioner, it was incumbent upon it to show that there were no holes; or, if
there were, that they did not aggravate the sinking.
Petitioner offered no evidence to rebut the existence of the holes. Its witness, Domingo
A. Luna, testified that the barge was in tip-top or excellent condition, [40] but that he had not
personally inspected it when it left Palawan. [41]
The submission of the Philippine Coast Guards Certificate of Inspection of Judy VII,
dated July 31, 1991, did not conclusively prove that the barge was seaworthy. [42] The regularity
of the issuance of the Certificate is disputably presumed. [43] It could be contradicted by
competent evidence, which respondent offered. Moreover, this evidence did not necessarily
take into account the actual condition of

the vessel at the time of the commencement of the voyage. [44]

Second Issue:
Admissibility of the Survey Report

Petitioner claims that the Survey Report [45] prepared by Jesus Cortez, the cargo surveyor,
should not have been admitted in evidence. The Court partly agrees. Because he did not
testify during the trial,[46] then the Report that he had prepared was hearsay and therefore
inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of its contents.
The Survey Report Not the Sole Evidence
The facts reveal that Cortezs Survey Report was used in the testimonies of respondents
witnesses -- Charlie M. Soriano; and Federico S. Manlapig, a cargo marine surveyor and the
vice-president of Toplis and Harding Company.[47] Soriano testified that the Survey Report had
been used in preparing the final Adjustment Report conducted by their company. [48] The final
Report showed that the barge was not seaworthy because of the existence of the holes.
Manlapig testified that he had prepared that Report after taking into account the findings of
the surveyor, as well as the pictures and the sketches of the place where the sinking occurred.
[49]
Evidently, the existence of the holes was proved by the testimonies of the witnesses, not
merely by Cortez Survey Report.
Rule on Independently
Relevant Statement
That witnesses must be examined and presented during the trial, [50] and that their testimonies
must be confined to personal knowledge is required by the rules on evidence, from which we
quote:
Section 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay
excluded. A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his
personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except
as otherwise provided in these rules.[51]

On this basis, the trial court correctly refused to admit Jesus Cortezs Affidavit, which
respondent had offered as evidence. [52] Well-settled is the rule that, unless the affiant is
presented as a witness, an affidavit is considered hearsay. [53]
An exception to the foregoing rule is that on independently relevant statements. A
report made by a person is admissible if it is intended to prove the tenor, not the truth, of the
statements.[54] Independent of the truth or the falsity of the statement given in the report, the
fact that it has been made is relevant. Here, the hearsay rule does not apply. [55]
In the instant case, the challenged Survey Report prepared by Cortez was admitted only as
part of the testimonies of respondents witnesses. The referral to Cortezs Report was in
relation to Manlapigs final Adjustment Report. Evidently, it was the existence of the Survey
Report that was testified to. The admissibility of that Report as part of the testimonies of the
witnesses was correctly ruled upon by the trial court.
At any rate, even without the Survey Report, petitioner has already failed to overcome the
presumption of fault that applies to common carriers.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

GONDESA,accused-appellant.

vs. FERNANDO

VIOVICENTE

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
In an information dated August 8, 1991 accused-appellant Fernando Viovicente y
Gondesa, together with John Doe, Peter Doe, and Mike Doe, was charged with murder, as
follows:[1]
That on or about the 21st day of July, 1991, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bolo and an
icepick, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, did, then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation and by taking advantage of superior strength, attack, assault and employ
personal violence upon the person of FERNANDO HOYOHOY Y VENTURA, by then and there,
stabbing him on the chest with the use of said bolo and icepick, thereby inflicting upon him
serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death,
to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Fernando Hoyohoy y Ventura, in such amount
as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Fernando Flores testified that while he was on his way to work at 6 a.m. on July 21, 1991, he
saw his co-worker Fernando Hoyohoy attacked by four men. Hoyohoy was buying cigarettes at
a store located in an alley of Tatalon Street, Quezon City when, according to Flores, two
persons emerged from behind the store. Flores identified the two as accused-appellant
Fernando Viovicente, alias Macoy, and one Balweg. The two approached the victim and seized
him by the shoulders (accused-appellant held the victims right shoulder, while Balweg held
him by the left). Then, Flores said, two other persons, whom he identified as Maning and
Duras, came up to the victim and stabbed him in the left side of the chest. The victim was
struck first by Maning with a bolo, followed by Duras who stabbed Hoyohoy with an icepick.
[2]
The four then fled from the scene.
During the whole incident, Fernando Flores was ten steps away from the victim. [3] Flores
testified that he knew accused-appellant because both of them had worked in a department
store in Sta. Mesa.[4] He said that two weeks after the incident, his sister saw accusedappellant in their neighborhood and told him. The two of them then informed the victims
brother who then tried to apprehend accused-appellant. Accused-appellant resisted and drew
his knife, but neighbors joined in subduing him. Later, they turned him over to the barangay
captain.[5] On August 6, 1991, Flores gave a statement regarding the incident to the police. [6]
Tomas Hoyohoy, the victims brother, testified [7] that after Fernando had been stabbed he
ran to their house and identified Maning Viovicente, Duras Viovicente, accused-appellant
Fernando Macoy Viovicente, and Romero Balweg Obando as his assailants. The four were
neighbors of theirs in Tatalon.
Fernando Hoyohoy was taken to the National Orthopedic Hospital where he died at 11
a.m. of the same day (July 21, 1991). A death certificate [8] and certificate of postmortem
examination[9] were later issued. For the victims funeral, the family incurred P9,000.00 in
expenses.[10]
Cpl. Iluminado Combalicer of the Galas Police Sub-Station 4 testified [11] that, upon receipt
of the report of the incident, he went to the National Orthopedic Hospital where he was able
to talk to the victim. This was at 8 a.m. of July 21, 1991. Hoyohoy told him that he had been
stabbed by Maning. Cpl. Combalicer took down the victims statement and made him sign it.
[12]
The pertinent portion of the statement reads:
Tanong: Anong pangalan mo?

Sagot: Fernando Hoyohoy y Ventura, 25 taong gulang, binata, empleyado, tubo sa Manila,
nakatira sa No. 11, Bicol Brigade, Tatalon, Q.C.
02 T: Bakit ka narito sa hospital?
S: Sinaksak po ako ni Maning at Duras roon ring nakatira sa may likod ng bahay
namin.
03 T: Anong dahilan at ikaw ay sinaksak?
S: Hindi ko po alam.
Accused-appellants defense was alibi.[13] He claimed that on July 21, 1991, the day of the
incident, he was in Bataan.According to him, two weeks later he returned to Manila because
he did not like his job in Bataan. He went to his mothers house and, after eating, went to the
house of his cousins, Maning and Duras. It was there where he was arrested. Accusedappellants mother, Filomena Canlas, corroborated his alibi. [14]
The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 92) [15] convicted accused-appellant of
murder and sentenced him to 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as
minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered him to pay the
heirs P9,000.00 as burial expenses, P50,000.00 moral damages, and the costs. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals[16] thought the penalty should be increased to reclusion perpetua because of
the absence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances and, in accordance with Rule 124,
13, certified the case to this Court for final review. The Court gave accused-appellant the
opportunity of filing an additional appellants brief but he found it unnecessary to do so. The
case was therefore submitted for resolution on the basis of the briefs of the parties in the
Court of Appeals and the record of the trial court.
Accused-appellants brief contains the following assignment of errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND IN DISREGARDING THE THEORY OF THE DEFENSE.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FERNANDO VIOVICENTE GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE OF THE FAILURE OF THE
VICTIM FERNANDO HOYOHOY TO IDENTIFY ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS ONE OF THE ASSAILANTS
IN HIS ANTE-MORTEM STATEMENT HE HAD GIVEN TO THE POLICE INVESTIGATOR AT THE
HOSPITAL.
First. Accused-appellant contends that it was error for the trial court to rely on the ante
mortem statement of the deceased which he gave to his brother Tomas, in which the
deceased pointed to accused-appellant and Balweg as his assailants. He argues that the
alleged declaration cannot be considered a dying declaration under Rule 130, 37 of the Rules
on Evidence because it was not in writing and it was not immediately reported by Tomas
Hoyohoy to the authorities. Instead, according to accused-appellant, the trial court should
have considered the statement (Exh. F) given by the victim to Cpl. Combalicer also on the day
of the incident, July 21, 1991. In that statement, the victim pointed to the brothers Maning
Viovicente and Duras Viovicente as his assailants. This contention is without merit. The
Revised Rules on Evidence do not require that a dying declaration must be made in writing to
be admissible. Indeed, to impose such a requirement would be to exclude many a statement
from a victim in extremis for want of paper and pen at the critical moment. Instead Rule 130,
37[17] simply requires for admissibility of an ante mortem statement that (a) it must concern
the crime and the surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; (b) at the time it was
made, the declarant was under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant was
competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration was offered in a criminal case for homicide,
murder, or parricide in which the decedent was the victim. [18] These requisites have been met
in this case. First, Fernando Hoyohoys statement to his brother Tomas concerns his death as
the same refers to the identity of his assailants. Second, he made the declaration under

consciousness of an impending death considering the gravity of his wounds which in fact
caused his death several hours later. Third, Fernando Hoyohoy was competent to testify in
court. And fourth, his dying declaration was offered in a criminal prosecution for murder where
he himself was the victim.
Nor is there merit in the contention that because Tomas Hoyohoy, to whom the
alleged ante mortem statement was given, reported it to the police on August 5, 1991, after
accused-appellant had been arrested, it should be treated as suspect. Delay in making a
criminal accusation however does not necessarily impair a witness credibility if such delay is
satisfactorily explained.[19] Tomas testified that he knew Cpl. Combalicer had talked to his
brother Fernando at the hospital[20] implying that he did not then make a statement because
the matter was under investigation.
Second. Actually, the trial courts decision is anchored mainly on the testimony of
Fernando Flores. Flores was an eyewitness to the killing of Fernando Hoyohoy. This witness
pointed to accused-appellant and to three others (Balweg, Maning Viovicente, and Duras
Viovicente) as the assailants, describing the part each played in the slaying of Fernando
Hoyohoy. Flores testified:
FISCAL REYES:
Q While you were along that Alley at Tatalon, Quezon City, what happened if any, Mr.
Witness?
A I saw Fernando Hoyohoy buying cigarette.
Q What happened while he was buying cigarette?
A Four (4) persons went near him while he was buying cigarette and two (2) held him by
the hand.
Q Mr. witness you said that Fernando Hoyohoy at the time was buying cigarette where was
he facing at the time?
A He was facing the store.
Q How far were you from Fernando Hoyohoy?
A Ten (10) steps away.
Q You said that four (4) persons appeared and two (2) held Fernando Hoyohoy by the
shoulder, from where did these two (2) come from?
A The two (2) persons came behind the store.
Q Who held Hoyohoy by the right shoulder if you know, Mr. witness?
A Fernando Viovicente and Alias Balweg.
Q Only the right shoulder?
A Yes, Maam.
Q I am asking you the right shoulder?
A Fernando Viovicente.
Q And who held Hoyohoys left shoulder?
A Alias Balweg.
Q Do you know the complete name of Alias Balweg?
A No, Maam, I do not know.
Q How about the other two (2) what did these two (2) persons do to Fernando Hoyohoy at
the time?
A They were the ones who stabbed Fernando Hoyohoy.
Q What were the names of the two (2) persons who stabbed Fernando Hoyohoy?

A Maning and Duras.

Q Do you know the full name of these two (2) persons?
A No, Maam.
Q What was Maning holding at the time?
A A bolo, Maam.
Q What was Duras holding?
A Icepick.
Q Where did Maning stab the victim Fernando Hoyohoy?
A At the left chest.
Q Who stabbed first, Mr. witness?
A Maning.
Q And what did Duras do?
A He helped stabbed Fernando Hoyohoy.
Q With what weapon?
A Icepick.
Q You said that Fernando Viovicente was the one who held Fernando Hoyohoy by the right
shoulder is that correct?
A Yes, Maam.
Q Is that Viovicente the same Viovicente who is now the accused in this Court?
A Yes, Maam.
Q Will you please look around and if he is around please point at him, Mr. witness?
A Witness pointing to a person who identified himself as Fernando Viovicente.
Q Mr. witness you mentioned that these Duras and Maning were brothers, is it not?
A Yes, Maam.
Q Do you know at least their family name?
A Viovicente.
Q Where are they residing if you know, Mr. witness?
A They are living with their sisters.
Q Is Fernando Viovicente the one whom you pointed in this courtroom a brother of Maning
and Duras?
A No Maam.
Q How many stabs did Fernando Hoyohoy receive from these two persons?
A Two (2) stab wounds.
Q How many from Maning?
A One (1) stab.
Q How about from Duras?
A One, Maam.
Q What happened after these two (2) persons Maning and Duras stabbed Fernando
Hoyohoy?

A They ran away.20

Accused-appellant claims that Flores was biased, being a neighbor of the deceased. But so
were the Viovicentes and Romero Obando his neighbors. No ill motive on his part that would
impel Flores to testify falsely against accused-appellant has been shown. Consequently, the
trial courts finding as to his testimony is entitled to great respect. Indeed unless the trial
judge plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, might
affect the result of the case, his assessment of the credibility of witnesses must be respected.
[21]
Flores positive identification of accused-appellant should be given greater credence than
the latters bare and self-serving denials. [22]
Third. The foregoing evidence unequivocally showing accused-appellant as among those
who conspired to kill Fernando Hoyohoy is dispositive of his defense that he was in Bataan on
the day of the crime. It is settled that alibi cannot prevail against positive identification of the
accused. In addition, accused-appellants defense is weakened by the inconsistencies between
his testimony and his mothers. Accused-appellant testified that he departed for Bataan on a
Sunday (July 21, 1991) at past 8:00 in the morning with his cousin Lucring, taking a ride in the
car of his employer. [23] But his mother testified that accused-appellant and Lucring left for
Bataan at noontime on July 18, 1991 and they left by bus. [24]
The Court of Appeals correctly held accused-appellant guilty of murder and since there
was neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be reclusion
perpetua. No reason was really given by the trial court for meting out on accused-appellant
the penalty of 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 20 years
ofreclusion temporal, as maximum. However, the award of the damages made by the trial
court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, must be revised. In addition to the amount of
P9,000.00 for burial expenses, which should be treated as actual damages, and the amount
of P50,000.00 as moral damages, accused-appellant must be made to pay indemnity in the
amount of P50,000.00.[25]
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the modification that
accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay
to the heirs of Fernando Hoyohoy the sum of P9,000.00, as actual damages, P50,000.00, as
moral damages, and P50,000.00, as civil indemnity for the death of Fernando Hoyohoy.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Melo, Puno and Martinez, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 75028 November 8, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PIOQUINTO DE JOYA y CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Rodolfo P. Liwanag for accused-appellant.

FELICIANO, J.:p
In an Information dated 5 May 1978, appellant Pioquinto de Joya y Cruz was charged before
the Regional Trial Court, 3rd Judicial Region, Branch 14, Malolos, Bulacan with the crime of
robbery with homicide committed as follows:
That on or about the 31st day of January, 1978, in the municipality of Baliuag,
province of Bulacan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused Pioquinto de Joya y Cruz, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of (sic) gain and without the knowledge
and consent of the owner and, by means of violence and intimidation, take, carry
and cart away two (2) rings, one (1) necklace, one (1) piece of earring, belonging
to Arnedo Valencia y Angeles and Eulalia Diamse Vda. de Salac, to their damage
and prejudice in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P550.00); and that on
the occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of enabling him to take the
said properties, the accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with treachery, evident premeditation and great advantage of
superior strength, with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal violence
upon the person of Eulalia Diamse Vda. de Salac by stabbing and hitting the
latter on her neck and other parts of her body with pointed instrument causing
injuries which directly caused the death of the said Eulalia Diamse Vda. de Salac.
That in the commission of the offense, the following aggravating circumstances
were present (1) abuse of superior strength; (2) committed in the dwelling of the
offended party; (3) disregard of age and sex; (4) abuse of confidence.
Contrary to law. 1
At arraignment, appellant De Joya pleaded not guilty. After trial, the court a quo rendered a
decision dated 16 May 1986 convicting De Joya of the crime charged. The dispositive portion
of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, committed with the
aggravating circumstances of: abuse of superior strength, old age, disregard of
sex the victim a woman 88 years old, the crime was committed in the dwelling of
the victim. The accused being 72 years old death penalty cannot be imposed
against him as provided in Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Court therefore, sentences the accused to LIFE IMPRISONMENT; to indemnify
the heirs of the victim in the amount of P20,000.00 and to pay damages in the
amount of P550.00.

The bond of the accused is ordered cancelled and the accused to be confined
immediately in the National Penitentiary pending review of his case by the
Supreme Court.
The Clerk of Court is ordered to immediately forward the record of this case to
the Supreme Court for review.
SO ORDERED. 2
In this appeal, appellant raises a number of issues all of which, however, amount to one basic
assertion: that the lower court erred in concluding that appellant was guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
The facts have been summarized in the brief of the Solicitor General in the following manner:
The spouses Arnedo Valencia and Herminia Salac-Valencia, together with their
ten (10) year old son Alvin Valencia and Herminia Valencia's 88-year old mother,
Eulalia Diamse, are residents of Balagtas St., Baliuag, Bulacan. (TSN, June 11,
1981, p. 2). Both spouses are teachers by profession.
Arnedo Valencia teaches at the Tiaong Elementary School at Barrio Tiaong,
Baliuag, Bulacan whereas Herminia Valencia teaches in an intermediate school at
Baliuag, Bulacan. (TSN, March 11, 1980, p. 7).
In the afternoon of January 31, 1978, Herminia Salac-Valencia left for school to
teach. Her mother Eulalia Diamse was then [sitting] at their sofa watching the
television set. (TSN, October 12, 1978, p. 3).
Her Son Alvin likewise left for school at 1:00 o'clock. And at 3:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, his classes were dismissed and he proceeded home. (TSN, March 11,
1980, p. 8).
At around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day, the spouses Valencia's
neighbor by the name of Gloria Capulong, together with a friend, went out of the
former's house to visit a friend. While at her yard, Gloria Capulong looked back to
the direction of the Valencia's house. She noticed appellant Pioquinto de Joya
standing and holding a bicycle at the yard of the Valencia's. (TSN, June 11, 1981,
pp. 2-4).
When Alvin reached home, he saw his grandmother Eulalia Diamse lying down
prostrate and drenched with her own blood. He immediately threw his bag and
ran towards her. He then held her hands and asked her: "Apo, Apo, what
happened?". (TSN, March 11, 1980, p. 10).
. . . [Eulalia Diamse held his hand and after which said: "Si Paqui". After saying
these words, she let go of Alvin's hand and passed away. (TSN, Ibid., pp. 14 and
17).
Alvin then called for his Nana Edeng and told her to see his lola because she was
drenched with her own blood. His Nana Edeng told him to immediately see his
mother Herminia Salac-Valencia to inform her of what happened. (TSN, Id).
Upon seeing her mother, Alvin told her: "Mommy, Mommy, apo is drenched in
her own blood." (TSN, March 11, 1980, p. 20).
Herminia immediately ran outside the school, flagged down a tricycle and went
home. Alvin followed, riding his bicycle (TSN, Id., p. 21). When she reached their
house, she found her mother lying prostrate in her own blood at their sala in

front of the television. Her mother's hands were stretched open and her feet
were wide apart. Blood was oozing out of her mother's ears. She then embraced
her mother and placed her on the sofa. She asked Alvin and the tricycle driver to
call Dr. Delfin Tolentino. (TSN, October 12,1978, pp. 25-26).
Dr. Tolentino arrived at around 4:00 o'clock that same afternoon and examined
the body of Eulalia Diamse. Said doctor declared that said Eulalia Diamse had a
heart attack which caused her death. When asked by Herminia Valencia why her
mother's ears were punctured, no reply was given by said doctor. Herminia
requested for a death certificate, but Dr. Tolentino did not issue one and instead
immediately left. (TSN, Ibid., pp. 27-29).
Herminia found out that the two (2) gold rings worn by her mother were missing.
The right earring of her mother was likewise missing. All of these were valued
[at] P300.00 (TSN, Id., p. 15).
That same afternoon, Herminia saw the room of the groundfloor ransacked. The
contents of the wardrobe closet (aparador) were taken out. Its secret
compartment/box was missing. And the lock of the aparador was destroyed.
(TSN, October 12, 1978, pp. 15-17).
When she went upstairs after putting her mother on a bed at the ground floor,
she found the two (2) rooms thereat in disarray. She then caused the rooms and
things photographed by a certain Ricardo Ileto (Exhibits "A" to "A-11"; TSN,
October 12, 1978, p. 17).
Later, Herminia went to Dr. Adela Cruz and pleaded [with] said doctor to issue a
death certificate so that her mother could be embalmed. (TSN, Id., pp. 33-34).
On the same night, Herminia found a beach walk step-in (Exhibit "B") by the side
of the cabinet near the door of their room downstairs, more or less one meter
from where the victim was lying prostrate. (TSN, October 12,1978, pp. 24-25).
Herminia was able to recognize the said step-in because of its color and size, as
the other half of the pair she bought for her husband Arnedo but which she gave
to Socorro de Joya, the wife of herein appellant, before Christmas of 1977 when
she saw the old and wornout pair of slippers of the latter. (TSN, Ibid.).
Appellant Pioquinto de Joya visited the wake only once. During the second day of
the four-day wake, Herminia saw herein appellant Pioquinto de Joya enter the
kitchen and peep under the cabinet of the (Valencia's) house. (TSN, Id.).
On February 3, 1978, a post-mortem examination was conducted by Dr. Romulo
Madrid, a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation. Per
examination, the cause of the death arrived by Dr. Madrid was "shock, secondary
to punctured wound neck" (Exhibit "D-1") situated at the right side of the neck,
just below the right ear wherein it went out thru and thru, opposite, almost in the
same location, from one side of the neck to the opposite side. (Exhibit "D-2").
In its decision, the trial court became quite clear as to the factors which led to the judgment
of conviction against appellant. These factors, as set out in the decision of the trial court, were
the following:
In the case at bar, the prosecution relied heavily on the circumstances
surrounding the death of the victim as testified to by the witnesses and proven
during the trial, also the dying statement of the deceased, which are: Herminia
testified that two weeks before the incident the accused and the deceased
quarreled over a bicycle which the former took from their house without the
consent of the latter; that Exhibit "B" (step-in beach walk type) which was found

near the cabinet one meter away from the body of the victim was identified by
Herminia as the step-in that she gave to the wife of the accused and which she
saw accused wearing on January 29, 1978 when she visited them in their house;
the testimony of Gloria Capulong that she saw the accused in the afternoon of
January 31, 1978 at around 3:00 p.m. in the yard of Herminia standing and
holding a bicycle; the accused admitted, although his wife is the sister of the
husband of Herminia he never visited the deceased during the four days that it
was lying in state without any justifiable reason and contrary to the ordinary
experience of man; last but most convincing is the dying statement of the
deceased when her grandson Alvin asked her "Apo, Apo, what happened?" and
she answered, "Si Paki", then she expired. When Alvin was asked during his
testimony who is this Paki, he identified the accused. The accused during his
testimony never denied that he is called Paki.
The foregoing circumstances established during the trial plus the dying
statement of the deceased leads only to one fair and reasonable conclusion, that
the accused is the author of the crime.
Analyzing the above portion of the decision, the elements taken into account by the court in
convicting appellant De Joya of robbery with homicide may be listed as follows:
1. The dying statement made by the deceased victim to her grandson Alvin
Valencia a 10-year old boy: "Si Paqui";
2. The quarrel, which, according to Herminia Valencia, daughter of the deceased
victim, took place two weeks before the robbery and homicide, between the
appellant and the deceased over the use of a bicycle which appellant allegedly
took from the Valencia's house without the consent of the victim;
3. The rubber slipper, one of a pair, ("step-in beach walk type") which according
to Herminia, she found near a cabinet in their house one (1) meter away from the
body of the victim, and which Herminia identified as one of the pair that she had
given to the wife of the accused the previous Christmas Season;
4. Accused was seen by one Gloria Capulong around 3:00 p.m. in the afternoon
of 31 January 1978 in the yard of the Valencias, standing and holding a bicycle
and doing nothing;
5. The statement of appellant that he did not visit the deceased during the fourday wake.
We turn first to the dying statement made by the victim when the 10-year old Alvin Valencia
asked his grandmother who was sprawled on the floor of their house drenched with blood:
"Apo, Apo, what happened?" The deceased victim said: "Si Paqui". After uttering those two
words, she expired. It is not disputed that "Paqui" is the nickname of appellant Pioquinto de
Joya. It must be noted at once, however, that the words "Si Paqui" do not constitute by
themselves a sensible sentence. Those two words could have been intended to designate
either (a) the subject of a sentence or (b) the object of a verb. If they had been intended to
designate the subject, we must note that no predicate was uttered by the deceased. If they
were designed to designate the object of a verb, we must note once more that no verb was
used by the deceased. The phrase "Si Paqui" must, moreover, be related to the question
asked by Alvin: "Apo, Apo, what happened?" Alvin's question was not: "Apo, Apo, who did this
to you?"
It has been held that a dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in itself. To be
complete in itself does not mean that the declarant must recite everything that constituted
the res gestae of the subject of his statement, but that his statement of any given fact should
be a full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his meaning in respect of such

fact. 3 The doctrine of completeness has also been expressed in the following terms in Prof.
Wigmore's classic work:
The application of the doctrine of completeness is here peculiar. The statement
as offered must not be merely apart of the whole as it was expressed by the
declarant; it must be complete as far it goes. But it is immaterial how much of
the whole affair of the death is related, provided the statement includes all that
the declarant wished or intended to include in it. Thus, if an interruption (by
death or by an intruder) cuts short a statement which thus remains clearly less
than that which the dying person wished to make, the fragmentary statement is
not receivable, because the intended whole is not there, and the whole might be
of a very different effect from that of the fragment; yet if the dying person
finishes the statement he wishes to make, it is no objection that he has told only
a portion of what he might have been able to tell. 4 (Emphasis supplied)
The reason upon which incomplete declarations are generally excluded, or if admitted,
accorded little or no weight, is that since the declarant was prevented (by death or other
circumstance) from saying all that he wished to say, what he did say might have been
qualified by the statements which he was prevented from making. That incomplete
declaration is not therefore entitled to the presumption of truthfulness which constitutes the
basis upon which dying declarations are received. 5
It is clear to the Court that the dying declaration of the deceased victim here was incomplete.
In other words, the deceased was cut off by death before she could convey a complete or
sensible communication to Alvin. The trial court simply assumed that by uttering the words
"Si Paqui", the deceased had intended to name the person who had thrust some sharp
instrument through and through her neck just below her ears. But Eulalia herself did not say
so and we cannot speculate what the rest of her communication might have been had death
not interrupted her. We are unable to regard the dying statement as a dying declaration
naming the appellant as the doer of the bloody deed.
The other elements taken into account by the trial court are purely circumstantial in nature.
When these circumstances are examined one by one, none of them can be said to lead clearly
and necessarily to the conclusion that appellant had robbed and killed the deceased Eulalia
Diamse. The quarrel over the use of the bicycle which was supposed to have taken place two
weeks before Eulalia's death does not, in our view, constitute adequate proof of a motive
capable of moving a person to slay another in such a violent and gory manner. Failure to
prove a credible motive where no identification was shown at all, certainly weakens the case
of the prosecution.
The testimony of Herminia Valencia about the single slipper that she found near or under the
cabinet in the living room where Eulalia Diamse was slain, can scarcely be regarded as
conclusive evidence that such slipper was indeed one of the very same pair of slippers that
she had given to appellant's wife, who was also the sister of Herminia's husband. Rubber or
beach, walk slippers are made in such quantities by multiple manufacturers that there must
have been dozens if not hundreds of slippers of the same color, shape and size as the pair
that Herminia gave to appellant's wife. And even if conclusive identification of the slippers
had been offered, and it is assumed that appellant (rather than his wife) had worn those very
slippers on that fatal afternoon, still the presence of that singular slipper did not clearly and
directly connect the appellant to the robbery or the slaying. At most, under that assumption,
the presence of that slipper in the house of the Valencias showed that the accused had gone
to the house of the Valencias and there mislaid that slipper. We note in this connection, that
appellant himself had testified that he did enter the house of the Valencias that afternoon,
but after the killing of Eulalia Diamse had been perpetrated, and there had found many
persons in the house viewing the body.
The testimony of Gloria Capulong that she saw the accused in the afternoon of 31 January
1978 around 3:00 p.m. in the yard of the Valencias, standing and holding a bicycle and doing
nothing is, by itself, not proof of any act or circumstance that would show that appellant had

perpetrated the slaying or the robbery. The behaviour of the appellant, as testified to by
Gloria Capulong, offers no basis for supposing that appellant, himself 72 years of age, had just
slain an 88-year old woman by skewering her through the neck and had ransacked both floors
of the Valencia house.
Appellant's failure to present himself to pay his respects to the deceased or her immediate
family during the four-day wake, does not give rise to any inference that appellant was the
slayer of Eulalia Diamse. Appellant had explained that he had been busily at work, sewing and
carrying on his trade as a tailor. Appellant, as already noted, had dropped in the Valencias'
house in the afternoon Eulalia Diamse was killed and had viewed the body (before it was lying
in state) along with several other persons. His reluctance or inability to participate in the
formal wake is not necessarily a sign of guilt. We are unable to agree with the trial judge that
such behaviour was "contrary to the ordinary experience of man" although respect for the
dead is a common cultural trait of the Filipinos.
In the Solicitor-General's brief, it is casually contended that the circumstantial evidence
against appellant included: "the attempt on the part of appellant Pioquinto de Joya through his
counsel to settle the case amicably." 6 We have examined the testimony that the Solicitor
General pointed to in referring to a supposed attempt to settle the criminal charge amicably.
That testimony, given by Arnedo Valencia, son-in-law of the deceased Eulalia Diamse and
brother-in-law of appellant Pioquinto de Joya, was as follows:
Q You also testified that before the release of the accused from the
municipal jail, you had a conversation with him, is that right?
A Yes, air.
Q What was this conversation about?
A He called for me and took me to his counsel Atty. Aguilar and
according to him if only Atty. Aguilar can talk with me, everything
will be settled.
Q Have you seen and talked to this Atty. Aguilar?
A Yes, I went with him to Manila, sir.
Q When was this?
A The time he was fetched out of jail.
Q You are referring to the municipal jail?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you and Atty. Aguilar discuss when you finally was able
to see Atty. Aguilar?
A When I went there, I was introduced to Atty. Aguilar and Atty.
Aguilar asked me as to what I liked to happen.
Q What did you say?
A I said if it will be settled, well and good.
Q Anything else that transpired?

A He even told me if I might be able to convince both my wife and

her sisters.
Q Did he tell you he can settle this?
A He was very certain that he can settle this, the very reason why
he told me because I was very certain as to what happened.
Q Was the accused Pioquinto de Joya present when you were
discussing this with his lawyer?
A Yes, sir
Q He heard what his, lawyer was telling you?
A It is possible because he is only one or two meters distance away.
Q Did the accused say anything?
A None, sir. (Emphasis supplied)
We find the above testimony quite impalpable and inconclusive so far as a supposed attempt
of appellant, through his counsel, to offer a compromise on the criminal charge is concerned.
We are aware of the provision of Section 24 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides
that
Sec. 24. Offer to compromise not admission. An offer of compromise is not an
admission that anything is due, and is not admissible in evidence against the
person making the offer. However, in criminal cases which are not allowed by law
to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in
evidence as an implied admission of guilt. (Emphasis supplied)
We do not, however, feel justified in concluding from the above testimony from a member of
the (extended) family of the deceased victim that "an offer of compromise" had been made
"by the accused" nor that "an implied admission of guilt" on the part of the appellant may be
reasonably inferred in the instant case. The trial court itself made no mention of any attempt
on the part of appellant to settle the criminal case amicably through the defense counsel; we
must assume that the trial court either did not believe that appellant had tried to compromise
the criminal case or considered that appellant could not fairly be deemed to have impliedly
admitted that he had indeed robbed and killed Eulalia Diamse. A much higher level of
explicitness and specific detail is necessary to justify a conclusion that an accused had
impliedly admitted his guilt of a crime as serious as robbery with homicide.
The totality of the case made out against appellant De Joya thus consists of an incomplete,
aborted, dying declaration and a number of circumstances which, singly or collectively, do not
necessarily give rise to a compelling inference that appellant had indeed robbed and slain
Eulalia Diamse. We consider, after prolonged scrutiny, that the sum total of the evidence in
the instant case is insufficient to induce that moral certainty of guilt which characterizes proof
beyond reasonable doubt. The conscience of the Court remains uneasy and unsettled after
considering the nature and speculative character of the evidence supporting the judgment of
conviction.
The Court must, accordingly, hold as it hereby holds that appellant's guilt of the crime of
robbery and homicide was not shown beyond reasonable doubt.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court dated 16 May 1986 is hereby REVERSED and
appellant Pioquinto de Joya is hereby ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt.

It is so ordered.
Narvasa, CJ., Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RAMIL PEA, accused-appellant.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Accused-appellant Ramil Pea was charged with murder in an Information which reads,
thus:
That on or about the 8th day of December, 1995, in the municipality of Obando, province
of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused armed with a firearm with intent to kill one Jimbo Pelagio y Ferrer, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation and treachery, attack,
assault and shoot the said JimboPelagio y Ferrer, hitting the latter on the head thereby
inflicting wound which directly caused the death of the said Jimbo Pelagio y Ferrer.[1]
In the early morning of December 8, 1995, accused-appellant hired Jimbo Pelagio, a
tricycle driver working the night shift, to take him to Paco, Obando, Bulacan. When they
reached their destination, he ordered Pelagio to get off the tricycle. Then, accused-appellant
robbed Pelagio of his money and repeatedly struck him on the head with a gun. Pelagio fell on
the ground unconscious. Accused-appellant shot him on the head and fled on board his
tricycle.
That
same
morning,
SPO1 Froilan Bautista
got
a
call
from
the Valenzuela Emergency Hospital stating that a man had been shot on the head and was in
their hospital. SPO1 Bautista and SPO1 Jose Sta. Ana rushed to the hospital and found the still
conscious Pelagio lying on a stretcher.
SPO1 Bautista took the statement of Pelagio in a question and answer method, which he
took down on two sheets of yellow paper. After his statement was taken, Pelagio affixed
his thumbmark on both sheets. In his statement, Pelagio related how accused-appellant
inflicted his injuries on him.
The owner of the tricycle, Wilfredo Lampa, after being informed that Pelagio had been
shot, proceeded to the hospital.There, Pelagio told him that it was accused-appellant who shot
him and took away his tricycle.
Francisca Pelagio, Jimbo Pelagios mother, also rushed to the hospital. Upon advice of the
doctors, Francisca brought her son to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital. On February 6,
1996, Jimbo Pelagio expired. According to Francisca, she spent P26,000.00 for his medical and
funeral expenses.
For his part, accused-appellant claimed that he was in San Isidro, San
Luis, Pampanga together with his wife on the date of the incident. He went into hiding in the
house of his uncle, Maximiano Guevarra, for nine (9) months because he allegedly killed a
certain Roger Wininsala. He came to know that he was being accused of the murder
of Pelagio, whom he did not know, only while he was in detention on a drug charge.
Accused-appellants testimony was corroborated by his uncle Maximiano Guevarra.
[2]

The trial court was not persuaded. On May

the dispositive portion of which reads:

13,

1998,

it

rendered

decision,

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, this Court hereby finds RAMIL PEA GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and
sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the victims mother,
Francisca Pelagio, the amount of P26,000.00 representing actual damages and the costs of
suit.

Hence this appeal.

Accused-appellant claims that the trial court erred in finding that accused-appellant
shot Pelagio because there is no evidence that a bullet was embedded in the skull of the
victim. More specifically, the attending physicians were not presented to testify that the
victim died of a gunshot wound in the head.
Accused-appellant next claims that the evidence relied upon by the trial court is hearsay
and inadmissible. He argues that said evidence does not constitute res gestae. Particularly, he
emphasizes that it was imperative on the part of the lower court that it should have
appreciated
the
principle
of res gestae on
the
basis
of
the
contents
of Jimbo Pelagios statement reduced in handwritten form by SPO1 Bautista, and not on the
dying
declarations
made
by Jimbo Pelagio to
SPO1
Bautista, WilfredoLampa and
Francisca Pelagio because these prosecution witnesses had all the time to contrive and
improvise on what was actually told them, allegedly by Jimbo Pelagio.[3]
The pivotal issue is whether the statement of the victim Jimbo Pelagio as well as the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on the victims declaration can be considered as part
of the res gestae, hence, an exception to the hearsay rule.
The statement or declaration made by Pelagio, taken by SPO1 Bautista, reads:
T: Alam mo ba ang dahilan kung bakit ka naririto sa Valenzuela Emergency Hospital at
kinukunan ka ng salaysay?
S: Opo, dahil pinagpapalo po ako ng baril ni RAMIL
tricycle kong minamaneho.

PEA sa ulo at kinuha and

T: Taga saan itong si Ramil Pea?

S: Sa Dulong Tangke, Valenzuela, (Malinta), M.M.
T: Saan, kailan at anong oras nangyari ito?
S: Sa Paco, Obando, Bulacan, kaninang ika-8 ng Disyembre 1995 sa ganap na ika-4:15
ng umaga.
T: Sakay mo ba itong si Ramil Pea?
S: Oho, sumakay sa may gasolinahan ng Petron sa Malinta, Valenzuela, M.M.
T: Dati mo bang kilala si Ramil Pea?
S: Opo.
T: Ano ba ang tatak ng tricycle mo?
S: Yamaha RS-100, kulay itim.
T: Sino and may-ari ng tricycle?
S: Si Rey Dagul.
T: Binaril ka ba ni Ramil?
S: Muntik na ho.
T: Bakit sa iyo ginawa ni Ramil and bagay na ito?
S: Ewan ko ho.[4]
The trial court ruled that Pelagios statement was a dying declaration since it was uttered
at the point of death and with consciousness of that fact due to the serious nature of his
wounds. Thus, it admitted Pelagios statement in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule.
The requisites for the admissibility of dying declarations have already been established in
a long line of cases. An ante-mortem statement or dying declaration is entitled to probative
weight if: (1) at the time the declaration was made, death was imminent and
the declarant was conscious of that fact; (2) the declaration refers to the cause and
surrounding circumstances of such death; (3) the declaration relates to facts which the victim

was competent to testify to; (4) the declarant thereafter died; and (5) the declaration is
offered in a criminal case wherein the declarants death is the subject of the inquiry. [5]
The first element is lacking in the case at bar. It was not established with certainty
whether Pelagio uttered his statement with consciousness of his impending death. While he
was in pain when he made his statement, he expressly stated that accused-appellant only
pistol-whipped him and almost shot him.[6]
The significance of a victims realization or consciousness that he was on the brink of
death cannot be gainsaid. Such ante mortem statement is evidence of the highest order
because at the threshold of death, all thoughts of fabricating lies are stilled.The utterance of a
victim made immediately after sustaining serious injuries may be considered the incident
speaking through the victim. It is entitled to the highest credence. [7]
Granting that Pelagio, after giving his statement, later on realized that he was dying, his
statement still can not be considered a dying declaration. The crucial factor to consider is
the contemporaneity of the moment when the statement was made and the moment of the
realization of death. The time the statement was being made must also be the time the victim
was aware that he was dying.
While it may not qualify as a dying declaration, Pelagios statement may nonetheless be
admitted in evidence as part of the res gestae. In People v. Marollano,[8] this Court held:
The requisites for the admissibility of the victims ante mortem statement as part of
the res gestae and also as a dying declaration are present in this case, hence the same should
be admitted under both exceptions to the hearsay rule. (Citation omitted) While the
admissibility thereof would naturally not be affected whether viewed under either or both
considerations, the advantage of resting the issue on the aforesaid dual bases is that its
admission would be invulnerable to a theorized absence of an element of one of said
exceptions. This is particularly important in this case, considering that the very identification
of the assailant and the accuracy thereof are essentially based on the declaration of the
victim. (Emphasis supplied)
A declaration made spontaneously after a startling occurrence is deemed as part of
the res gestae when (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the
statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the
statements concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.
[9]

In People v. Naerta,[10] this Court held that:

The term res gestae comprehends a situation which presents a startling or unusual
occurrence sufficient to produce a spontaneous and instinctive reaction, during which interval
certain statements are made under such circumstances as to show lack of forethought or
deliberate design in the formulation of their content.
Pelagios declaration is admissible as part of the res gestae since it was made shortly after
a startling occurrence and under the influence thereof. Under the circumstances, the victim
evidently had no opportunity to contrive his statement beforehand. [11]
In People v. Hernandez,[12] the infliction on a person of a gunshot wound on a vital part of
the body should qualify by any standard as a startling occurrence. And the rule is that
testimony by a person regarding statements made by another as that startling occurrence
was taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, although essentially hearsay, is
admissible exceptionally, on the theory that said statements are natural and
spontaneous, unreflected and instinctive, made before there had been opportunity to devise
or contrive anything contrary to the real fact that occurred, it being said that in these cases, it
is the event speaking through the declarant, not the latter speaking of the event.
In this case, it is clear that the pistol-whipping and the gunshot on the head
of Pelagio qualified as a startling occurrence.Notably, Pelagio constantly complained of pain in

his head while his statement was being taken by SPO1 Bautista, so much so that there was no
opportunity for him to be able to devise or contrive anything other than what really happened.
In People v. Putian,[13] the Court held that although a declaration does not appear to have
been made by the declarantunder the expectation of a sure and impending death, and, for
that reason, is not admissible as a dying declaration, yet if such declaration was made at the
time of, or immediately after, the commission of the crime, or at a time when the exciting
influence of the startling occurrence still continued in the declarants mind, it is admissible as
part of the res gestae.
Indeed the defense admitted as much when it stated, thus:
We should stress that Jimbo Pelagios handwritten statement, or his declarations therein, were
made immediately after the res gestae or the principal act took place, and he had no time to
contrive or devise, while his statements directly concerned the occurrence in question and its
immediate circumstances. We should take note further that the handwritten statements
contents are rather detailed in terms of the specifics of the circumstances before, during and
after the subject incident which elicits guarded conclusion that
notwithstanding JimboPelagios physical condition at the Valenzuela Emergency Hospital, he
was conscious and lucid enough to intelligently respond rather spontaneously on the
questions propounded to him by SPO1 Bautista. These acts and statements made
by Jimbo Pelagio definitely constitute part of res gestae and not the testimonies and/or written
statements of the three prosecution witnesses in this case. [14]
By stating, however, that the testimonies or the written statements of the three
prosecution witnesses were taken into consideration by the trial court as part of
the res gestae betrays a misapprehension of said principle. This Court agrees with the
Solicitor General when it observed thus:
Since res gestae refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants,
victims or spectators to a crime before, during or immediately after the commission of the
crime, they should necessarily be the ones who must not have the opportunity to contrive or
devise a falsehood but not the persons to whom they gave their dying declaration or
spontaneous statement. In other words, the witness who merely testifies on a res gestae is
not the declarant referred to in the second requisite whose statements had to be made before
he had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood. (citation omitted)
Thus, even if there were intervening periods between the time the victim gave his account of
the incident to the prosecution witnesses and the time the latter first disclosed what the
victim told them, the same will not affect the admissibility of the victims declaration or
statement as part of res gestae since it is sufficient that such declaration or statement was
made by the victim before he had time to contrive or devise a falsehood. [15]
In any case, there is no reason why SPO1 Bautista would contrive or devise a falsehood
especially on the matter thatPelagio was shot on the head and that it was accused-appellant
who shot him. As a police officer, he was duty-bound to investigate and unearth the facts of
the case. There is a presumption that as an officer of the law, he sought only the
truth.Besides, no motive was shown as to why he would contrive or devise a falsehood against
accused-appellant.
In his Investigation Report,[16] SPO1 Bautista gathered that accused-appellant
shot Pelagio from the Radiologic Report conducted at the Valenzuela District Hospital wherein
the presence of metallic fragments was discovered. Moreover, the results of the C.T. Scan
conducted on the victim showed the presence of metallic fragments in his
skull. In Pelagios Death Certificate,[17] the underlying cause of death was indicated as gunshot
wound to the head.
There is, therefore, no merit in accused-appellants contention that there was no evidence
that Pelagio was shot in the head. It should be noted that accused-appellant pistolwhipped Pelagio repeatedly. The Solicitor Generals following submission would, therefore,
make sense:

Given the probability that he was already unconscious or his head had become numb due to
severe head injuries when accused-appellant shot him, it is not unlikely for the victim not to
have known or felt being shot and hit by accused-appellant on the head. This was probably
the reason why in his initial declaration, the victim merely stated that he was nearly shot by
accused-appellant.[18]
Regardless, Pelagio categorically declared that it was accused-appellant who caused his
head injuries which eventually led to his death. SPO1 Bautistas testimony as well
as Wilfredo Lampas and Francisca Pelagios merely corroborated Pelagiosstatement that it was
accused-appellant who caused his head injuries.
The trial court found, thus:
The straightforward and consistent testimonies of the three vital prosecution witnesses bear
the earmarks of credibility. Further, there exists no ill motive on their part to prevaricate. This
absence of evidence as to an improper motive actuating the principal witnesses for the
prosecution strongly tends to sustain that no improper motive existed and their testimony is
worthy of full faith and credit (citation omitted), for witnesses do not generally falsely impute
to an accused a serious criminal offense were it not the untarnished truth. (Citation omitted)
Settled is the rule that in the absence of any fact or circumstance of weight and influence
which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misconstrued to impeach
the findings of the trial court, the appellate courts will not interfere with the trial courts
findings on the credibility of the witnesses or set aside its judgment, considering that the trial
court is in a better position to decide the question for it had heard the witnesses themselves
during the trial. The evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is a matter that particularly falls
within the authority of the trial court. [19]
However, this Court cannot agree with the trial court that the crime should be
murder. While evident premeditation and treachery were alleged in the information, the trial
court did not state why the killing was qualified to murder. The prosecution failed to establish
the attendance of the qualifying circumstances with concrete proof. The crime proved was
only homicide.
In accordance with Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, accused-appellant should be
sentenced to reclusion temporal. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the
penalty to be imposed shall be the medium period of reclusion temporal, ranging from
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months.Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant shall be entitled to a
minimum penalty, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree or prision mayor, in any
or its periods, ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.
As to the matter of damages, we hold that the trial court should have awarded civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence. [20] The award of
P26,000.00 as actual damages is upheld, being duly proven with receipts. [21]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision is MODIFIED. Accusedappellant Ramil Pea is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay the
heirs of the victimJimbo Pelagio the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P26,000.00
as actual damages.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DOMICIANO BERAME alias DOMING, defendant-appellant.
Jose E. Fantonial for appellant.
Solicitor Felix Q. Antonio, 1st Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Trial Attorney
Lotita C. Dumlao for appellee.

FERNANDO, J.:
Evidence both direct and circumstantial resulted in the conviction for the crime of murder of
Domiciano Berame, now appellant, for the killing of the deceased Quirico Maningo, apparently
arising from the intense partisanship generated by local politics. 1 In the original information
for murder filed, a certain Anastacio Montinola was likewise included, but he died soon
thereafter. Appellant Berame was positively Identified by a son of the deceased, who was just
a meter away at the salary of their rented house at the time of the fatal incident. In the
judgment now on appeal, the trial court likewise took into consideration the flight of the
appellant, his surrender coming only after a month, the statement at the hospital made by the
wounded co-accused Montinola that along with him, appellant participated in the act of
shooting, and the fact that a rubber shoe, found in a swampy area where assailants hid for a
while, did fit the right foot of appellant. As against such proof considered conclusive of the
trial court, the defense of alibi was unavailing. A careful study of the record persuades us of
the correctness of such a conclusion. We affirm.
According to the testimonial evidence: It was about 6:30 in the evening of April 13, 1966, that
an assailant suddenly shot Quirico Maningo, then seated on a chair facing the main door of
the sala of his rented house in Rizal Street, Suba District Danao City. 2 His adopted son Danilo
Maningo, was seated one meter away from his right side. 3 Several successive shots were
fired at Quirico Maningo. 4 He saw his father, Quirico Maningo, slump to the floor, wounded,
with blood on his neck and breast 5 He looked towards the main door where the shots came
from and saw the accused holding a .38 caliber revolver. 6 He was easily Identifiable, as there
was a "big light" at the main door of the house. 7 Appellant was standing on a bright spot as
he fired his gun several times at Quirico Maningo. 8 When the firing ceased, the witness ran
towards the main door of the house and saw two persons, one of them being the accuse
Berame scampering away. 9 Quirico Maningo, the victim, was rushed to the Danao City
General Hospital, but he was dead on arrival. 10 The appealed decision did likewise note that
later that same evening, the PC Provincial Commander of the Philippine Constabulary with a
Sergeant Armando Alfoja started the investigation of the killing of Quirico Maningo. In a
swampy area at the back of the hospital near the cemetery of Danao City, where it was
suspected one of the alleged assailants was hiding, they saw footprints and recovered a
rubber shoe. Appellant was required at the trial to put it on. It turned out that it corresponded
exactly with his right foot. 11 Moreover, appellant took flight after the killing and hid himself
He did not surrender until almost a month later, on May 8, 1966. 12 There was in addition the
statement from one of those accused in the original information, Anastacio Montinola. As one
of the suspects, he was pursued by the police authorities. When cornered, instead of
surrendering, he decided to shoot it out. He was hit, it turned out, mortally. He admitted then
and there that he was one of the killers of Quirico Maningo, and his companions were a
certain Doming and one Erning. He made the admission anew at the Southern Islands Hospital
when he was further questioned. 13
The appealed decision, both thorough and comprehensive, discussed in detail the evidence
for both the prosecution and the accused. The defense of alibi was carefully considered. It was
not, as found by the trial court, sufficiently persuasive. It is easily understandable why.
Appellant was positively identified. What is more there were compelling tell-tale

circumstances. If anything can be said to detract from the high quality of the appealed
decision, it was the assertion of the possibility "that a person could be at Danao City at about
6 to 6:30 in the evening and be in Cebu City at 7 to 8 same evening. 14 That was by way of
disposing of the claim of appellant that since he was in Cebu City at about that time, and
Danao City is about thirty-two kilometers away from Cebu City, he could not have been
responsible for the killing. Certainly, such an off hand, perhaps even possibly rash statement
of the trial court, could not be a sufficient basis for his acquittal. Witnesses are not noted for
exactitude and precision in mentioning the time. The hours mentioned were approximations.
Moreover, as to the circumstantial evidence, only the application of the res gestae rule to the
statement of Montinola was sought to be refuted. No attempt was made to explain the flight
of appellant causing the delay in his surrender for about a month and a shoe discovered near
the scene of the crime fitting his right foot. The thirteen pages appellant's brief had another
glaring deficiency. There was not even a reference to the direct testimony Identifying;
appellant as one who fired the fatal shots. That is why, as noted at the outset, there would be
no justification for the reversal of the appealed decision.
1. As is usually the case in criminal offenses, there was a direct conflict in the evidence
submitted by the prosecution and the defense. What is undeniable is that there was testimony
coming from a competent and credible eyewitness to the offense, Danilo Maningo, the son of
the deceased. He heard the shots being fired and saw who perpetrated the deed. He was only
a meter away, right at the scene of the crime. He had direct and immediate knowledge. He
Identified the accused. It was not difficult for him to do so as there was a "big light" at the
door of the house. He was subjected to an intensive cross-examination. He stood his ground.
He did not budge. His version of the incident, as a matter of fact, was reinforced. There was,
in addition, testimony from one Carmencita Trinidad, who, coming from the church, heard the
shots after which she saw two persons running away from the house of the deceased, one of
whom was slightly taller than she, an assertion verified when it was shown that appellant's
height as compared to her was precisely that. At about the same time, a certain Jorge Durano,
whose house was located at the back of the hospital near the seashore and cemetery of
Danao City, testified that he saw a person walking fast going towards a barrio in the north
near the swampy area, his attention being called to such individual wearing rubber shoes. As
against that, there was the testimony from appellant who, as noted in the decision, claimed
"that at the time of the incident, at about 6:30 in the evening of April 13, 1966, he was in
Cebu City in the house of Atty. Gabriel a neighbor, conversing with the latter and that was the
gist of the testimonies of two other witnesses, Nene Aranas and Libbi Cudilla also his
neighbors. 15 This is a case, therefore. where the trial court, after hearing and observing the
witnesses testify, and weighing what was said by them, did choose to believe the prosecution
rather than the defense. For such a finding to be overturned, there must be a showing that it
did overlook a material fact or circumstance or did misinterpret its significant. 16 What was
said in People v. Tilaon 17 comes to mind: "Finally, the rule is now firmly established to the
point of becoming elementary in this jurisdiction and elsewhere that where there is an
irreconcilable conflict in the testimony of witnesses, the appellate court will not disturb the
findings of the trial court when the evidence of the successful party, considered by itself, is
adequate to sustain the judgment appealed from. 18
2. The appealed decision, moreover, finds impressive support from circumstances that point
unerringly to appellant's guilt. They simply cannot be explained away. That could be the
reason why his counsel did not even bother to do so. As noted in the decision, a rubber shoe
left in a swampy area by someone leaving in a hurry the scene of the crime was just the right
size. It did fit appellant's right foot. That was demonstrative evidence of the most persuasive
kind. So it has been held time and time again. First there was United States. v. Tan
Teng. 19decided in 1912. Of more recent vintage is People v. Otadora, 20 promulgated in 1950.
The appealed decision was likewise based on the fact of appellant having been in hiding for
sometime with the evident purpose of evading arrest. He did not surrender until after the
lapse of a month. That again was a circumstance that could not be ignored. There is relevance
to this excerpt from the opinion of Justice Malcolm in United States v. Sarikala: 21 "Third,
Sarikala left the scene of the murder immediately thereafter. Flight, when unexplained, is a
circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn. 'The wicked flee, even when no
man pursueth but the righteous are as bold as a lion " 22

3. Then, too, there was a statement made by one of the original co-accused, Anastacio
Montinola, on his being captured after the gunplay where he was wounded, it turned out,
mortally. He admitted his participation in the killing of Maningo and pointed to appellant as
one of his companions. While not amounting to a dying declaration, the lower court
considered it as part of the res gestae, and rightly so. That was assigned as error by
appellant's counsel in view of the nine hours that had elapsed from the time of the killing
before its utterance. That is not enough to take it out of the operation of the principle. The
teaching of a host of cases from United States v. David, 23 a 1903 decision, is to the effect that
it should be given credence. As was stressed by the then Chief Justice Concepcion in People v.
Ner 24 All that is required for the admissibility of a given statement as part of the res gestae, is
that it be made under the influence of a startling event witnessed by the person who made
the declaration before he had time to think and make up a story, or to concoct or contrive a
falsehood, or to fabricate an account, and without any undue influence in obtaining it, aside
from referring to the event in question or its immediate attending circumstances" 25 As far
back as 1942, in People v. Nartea26 the marked trend of decisions, according to Justice Ozaeta,
is to extend, rather than narrow, the scope of the doctrine admitting declarations as part of
the res gestae. Whether specific statements are admissible as part of the res gestae is a
matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, the determination of which is ordinarily
conclusive upon appeal, in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. 27 Here, again, there
cannot possibly be any abuse of discretion. That much is clear.
4. The last error assigned is the alleged failure of the lower court to hold that the prosecution
was unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of appellant, and therefore he should
be entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence. 28, It requires a certain degree of
temerity to make such an assertion in the face of the competent and credible evidence of
record. This is one of those cases where the culpability of appellant was shown in a manner
that should remove any misgivings. The stage of moral certainty certainly was reached. The
defense of alibi was indisputably devoid of merit. There was positive Identification. Then there
were the circumstances that indicated conclusively his participation in the criminal act. The
alibi was therefore disproved by direct and circumstantial evidence. 29 It, is not inappropriate
to conclude with this observation by Justice Endencia in People v. Dagatan, 30 considering the
distance involved between Cebu and Danao City: "In this particular case, appellants loosely
told the court that at around eleven o'clock on the night of June 11, 1937, they were not in
Carmen when the crime was being committed because they were in Cebu. They, however,
failed to present credible and tangible evidence that it was physically impossible for them to
be at Carmen at that time. On the contrary, they themselves furnished evidence that Carmen
is only about 40 kilometers from Cebu City, with abundant means of transportation such as
buses, jeepneys and trucks plying between the two places, which would at most take an hour
to go from one place to the other, and according to Saturnino himself, it would only take him
40 minutes if he were to drive the car himself " 31 The trial court therefore correctly decided
that appellant is guilty of the crime of murder, the offense being qualified by elevosia with the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling being offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. The appropriate penalty then, as.imposed in the appealed decision, is reclusion
perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of March 8, 1967 finding the accused Domiciano
Berame alias Doming guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and imposing
the penalty of reclusion perpetua is affirmed, with the only modification that the indemnity
due the heirs of the deceased should be in the amount of P12,000.00 and not P6,000.00.
Barredo, Muoz Palma, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.
Antonio, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.