Intelligence

The overwhelming importance of enemy situation appropriate assessement.

Excerpted from recent military history

The General Field Marshall Count Schlieffen wrote ones, fatalist and
in the sarcastic tone of his own :
"But it is misleading to believe that in War, the information
retrieval of the Cavalry bears any importance and even that anyone
wishes to know about it. Usually, the superior Officer build
pictures of enemie and allies, mainly inspired by his personal
desires. If the incoming data seems to confirm that image, its filed
with satisfaction. Otherwise, it is rejected as totally false and
lead to the conclusion that, one s more, the Cavalry was wrong"

Count Schlieffen was himself a Horseman. Furthermore, by his

functions in peace time at the General Headquarter as Alderman to
the Military Attachee in Paris from 1866 and as Chief of the third
Division of the General Headquarter from 1884 to 1888 ( action
fields : France and England), knew very well the Intelligence
Service mecanism and its meaning for the upper hierarchy. During the
four months Loire s winter campaign He assisted, as Second Officer
of the Duke of Meklembourg-Schwerin s General Staff, to numerous
conflicts between the Army Staff General Chief, General Helmuth
Count of Moltke and the three succesive Chiefs of the Division
General Headquarter. We propose ourself, in the following text, to
verify, with the help of a few examples token in "The History of
German War in the XIX° and XX° Centuries" . If data delivered by
Intelligence Services had influenced the Command decision making and
what was the nature of this influence. In the XIX°, this Command
departement founded his issues on informations from the Cavalry, on
exploitation of ceased documants and the questioning of prisoners.
To this was added informations gived par agents and sometimes by the
means of the press. In the XX° century, with the traditional way of
being informed, came along incomparably more efficient technics as
the aeroplane and radio links. Until after the middle of the XIX°
century, transmission of all the tactic and operational Information
messages, still depended on horse rides and abilities of the rider.
Besides the fact that the message could reach successefully his goal
within at lEast a few hours, and a few more hours would pass before
it could finally be readed by the hierarchy. It was only at the
beginning of the fight that the communication paths shortened
drastically : so, in 1870, still, the Army Corp with its two
Divisions extended on a field barely larger than a contemporary
Brigade. The Army High Command and even the Staff could see tactical
operations on a naked eye. The same with the always even speeds of
infantry ensembles displacements who eased, until the second world
War also, computing and assessement of both camps movements. The
French Command in 1940 and the German Army in the last years of the
War experienced such surprises caused by armoured and motorised
troups. It happened for the first time in summer 1918, on the West
front during the Allies armoured offensives. It is because, in the
XX° century, information transmission had acquired a all different
rythm. Hours became minutes. Peculiarly, exploration of radio waves,
beloved method of Intelligence Services, permitted sometimes to know
directly the decisions of the enemy, from, so to speak, his own
mouth. In the hour of the discovery of this chatty device of
information, one could distinguish where it remained, who own it and
soon, what it had to say. Let s now examine if Count Schlieffen was
right with his bitter description. In any case, he felt the
forecoming lot of the 1e german service through the second world
War, from 1942. To follow the troups movements described here, any
large scale map will do.

I-- Iena and Auerstedt 1806.

Beginning of october, the Prussian Intelligence Service signaled

correctly the gathering of french troups in the triangle Bamberg,
Bayreuth, Wurtzbourg. And so, Napoleon s journey to the West of the
Rhön in the Cassel s area, still considered as possible , became
seldom. The reckoning Cavalry party sended by the Thuringe s forest
in the Werra s valley on its way to Coburg and Bayreuth, disclosed,
mid-october the probability that the Frenchs could advance in the
forest of Thuringe by the Werra s valley. Prussian Command thought
was to untertake an offensive, displaced itself in the Thuringe s
forest. The first news regarding the eventual advance of the Frenchs
leaded to a decision, at the War Council of October fourth, that the
troups would be displayed along the Saal s West bank, on the field
defined by Stadtilm Eisenach Langensalza Erfurt; nobody knew
clearly on which bank the battle would be fight. On the move, one
renounced to wait for Napoleon East of the Saal, on the road to
Berlin and to attack his left column with superior strengh to
obtain, at least, a partial result by engaging 128.000 Prussians and
Saxons against the 160.000 Frenchs. On the 8th. of october, the
Cavalry announced that the Frenchs marched in three columns in the
directions:
.Bayreuth, Hof, Plauen, Gera
.Bamberg, Kronach, Lobenstein, Schleiz;
.Bamberg, Coburg, Saalfeld.
The picture of the enemy, the morning of october 9th. showned that
the left French column in its front march reached Gräfenthal , that
the middle column disposed of Saalburg and that the rignt column had
invested Hof. This very clear pattern inspired Prince Hohenlohe,
commanding the Saxo-Prussian Army Division, who was around Hochdorf,
the decision to execute the 9th, the move to the part of the Saal
between Rudolfstadt and Kalha, ordered to him from the 10th and
cross the Saal to the South-East. On the 10th. The Chief Commander,
Duke Karl of Braunschweig, forbid the execution of this last
project, not to engage Hohenlohe alone against the superior French
strenght, on the 9th, Prince Lewis-Ferdinad of Prussia, commanding
the Front-Guards of Hohenlohe, had reached Rudolfstadt. Without any
knowledge of the new orders retaining Hohenlohe on the Saal, il
wished to protect, more southerly the flank of the Army Division and
the 10th., he attacked the head of the left French column, just
coming out of the Thuringe s forest near Saalfeld. He felt under the
number and was defeated. The retreat of Saalfeld on the 10th. and of
Schleiz the 9th. where the center French column defeated the General
Tauentzien s Division and smothered, then, any attack inclination,
from the Prussian side. Between Iena, Weimar and Erfurt one waited
if the Frenchs would keep on going, some where West of the Saal. On
the 12th. October, one had, again a clear picture of the enemy. A
French Corp pursued General Tauentzien until Lobeda, who from
Schleiz returned to Iena. From some informations, an other Corp was
followed that one. A third Corp was seen on its way from Dornburg to
Naumburg. A fourth had progressed on the 11th. from Gera to Zeitz,
Only two detachments and the Guard were nt signalised., they
obviously followed as rear guard. In the afternoom a surprising
message appeared: the Frenchs had invested Naumburg. It was repeated
so oftenly that finally, one believed it in the Prussians s General
Head Quarter. In favour of this really complete image of the enemy,
the Prussian Command could see clearly that Napoleon was en route
for Berlin and that he only had to turn a quart on his left, to
force the Prussians into battle on a reversed front. The decision
tooked by Duke Charles to attack the eneny near Naumburg-Kösen with
the main Army while Hohenlohe would cover him to the South and
would nt engage combat first, was perfecty faced with the reality.
Solely a chance: the mortal wound of the Duke at the start of
Auerstedt s armed engagement and the fact that nobody could replace
him, impeached Davout s three Divisions to be defeated by the five
Divisions of the main Army and gived him victory. Scarcely more than
half of the Prussians wend into combat. So, we can t say that the
Prussians neglected the proper data they received regarding the
enemy. Le lack of results obtained following the standing decisions
layed on this intelligence, behold to the bad ratio of strenghts, to
the operational and tactical wrong-doings of the Prussians, to the
desobedience of Hohenlohe, who, against the orders, attacked near
Iena and to unhappy chances, but not to a misestimate of the enemy.
Napoleon was very ill served by his Cavalry in 1806, him ,who in
1805, during the Danube s campain, prepared the battle of Mack, near
Ulm, by intelligence missions drove on a large scale and with
success by several Corps of Cavalry leaded by Murat. Its only on the
night from the 12th. to the 13th, the first anew, anyway already
late, that the King of Prussia was on his way from Erfurt to Weimar
that Napoleon pulled a cry of joy: "The veil is teared, the enemy
goes away". Until that time, nobody really knew the location of the
Prussians. His double crushing victory, acquiered despite the
defaillance of the Intelligence Service, reposed on appropriate
stategic considerations, numeric superiority and à better combat
technic. The 14th. at dawn, Napoleon still believed he had, in front
of him, the whole Prussian Army, not only the sixty five Hohenlohe s
sacrified bataillons that he won with nine grouped Divisions.
II---The eves of Waterloo s campain
The fifteen weeks preceeding operations extending from Napoleon s
return out the island of Elba, on the first of March until the
crossing of the Belgian border, by the French Army on the 15th. of
June, presents from the point of view of intelligence various
similarities with the waiting period before the operations in 1940.
The British Intelligence Service in France, with a twenty years
experience, worked well. The Prussian Service was only in its youth
and suffered of a money shortage. The penetration remained shallow
and near the borders. After 13th. March when the allied powers
pronunced Napoleon s impeachement. One feared, at the British High
Command and at the Prussian Command in Holland, the Napoleon s
offensive since march before. Allied troups were nt ready for
operations and widely dispersed, in conformity with peace time
criterions. Missing any useable data about the enemy, one indulged
theoric considerations about the probable place where the battle
could be accepted and one decided, the Tirlemont s area as meeting
plain for the British, Dutch and Prussian Armies. Such fears to see
Napoleon attacking quickly haunted the weak Bavarians and Austrians
dispersed from the Moselle until Basel. It was just in the beginning
of April that Marshall Berthier, Napoleon s former Chief of Staff,
remained faithfull to the Bourbons he served in 1789, did
communicate to General von Müffling Prussian Army General Chief of
Staff in southern Belgium that "The Emperor do not dispose of an
adequate Army and his offensive is, by so, least probable, by now.
But if one leave him the time to equip, he would, for sure, advance
again with considerable masses.". News from the frontier told that
no French field Army stood around Valenciennes. An information of
such an important source confirmed by inner intelligence service,
changed the evaluation of the enemy. Wellington, took in hands the
Supreme Command of the Army composed of British, Hanovrian,
Braunchweig, Nassau and Duch elements, arrived on the 10th., to the
assumption that the Frenchs would not risk any attack. An exchange
of letters between Gneisenau, who replaced temporarly, Blücher as
head of the Prussian Army ,strenghened his conviction.. But the
Prussian had given data on the retreats to the hinterland, of troups
investing forts along the Belgian border and the Paris s troups
engagement against the Bourbonian uprising in the South of France.
Starting from the 10th April, Wellington adressed several times the
Holy Alliance in Vienna, and suggested a quick offensive, the only
obtained result was the promise to see operations begin due first of
june. On the june 15th, Welligton possessed acertained intelligence
data saying that the two eneny Army Corps were in front of him,
between the Sambre and the coast, composed of nine infantery
Divisions and six of Cavalry. By the end of April, the enemy picture
fitted the frame and so a French attack against the allied in
Belgium became very probable. In this perspectice, Wellington
concentrated his troups a little so they could meet in less than two
days and be close to the Prussians on their left flank. By the first
of May, he knew precisely the French Army configuration, Numerous
troups were walking from Cambrai to the border, a part of the
imperial luggage was seen in Senlis. Napoleon himself was on the
verge to leave Paris. On the data base and from personal
informations which confirm it, the Prussian Army concentrated
between Fleurus,Namur, Arlon and Malmédy. And if it was some data
about new french concentrations near the Samber, coming in the 4th
an the 7th, From the 8th. one seems to enter in a period of
stillness. Several times one received the information that Napoleon
had nt leave Paris. Wellington, Blücher and Gneisenau, doubted again
then, of the offensive intentions of the Frenchs and wished their
own offensive. But one and another were tightend by the instructions
of the Allied Commander in Chief: the Prince Schwarzenberg who, at
that time had postpone to the 16th june the beginning of operations
and who pulled it even further, finally, to the 27th. From
Wellington s letters and orders, it appears he kept his Avril s
conviction that a French offensive was seldom, He still wrote a
letter to the Tsar, 15th june in the morning and suggest him to
bring the Russian Army on the Aisne, where, for sure, the Frenchs
will take their positions. From the other hand, since the 6th june,
he aknowledged much informations all talking of french troups
crowding close to the Belgian frontier, of cars requisitions, of
offensive intention and Napoleon s arrival. Wellington s Prussian
liaison Officer, Müffling, transmitted these informations to Blücher
on the 15th, opined that the enemy want "to mislead us and mask his
front to better hide the movements that he intents to operate." Its
the sole way explaining that until th 15th of june, at noon, the
Wellington s Army always kept his considerably dispersed
disposition. The result was that on the 16th, the day of Ligny and
Quatre-Bras, Welligton could nt fullfill his promise to Blücher; "At
four o clock, I ll be here!" . What he should have known while
pronuncing these words at the Ligny s mill. On the Prussian side,
equally, the Ziehen s advanced Corp neglected to gather in time
despite the fact that "the skyline was illuminated by a vast number
of Frenchs fires, "notwithstanding advanced frontier posts. Numerous
informations concerning a imminent French attack fot the 15th june,
They soon payed this negligence a very high price. Gneisenau who,
facing Wellington, must have been impressed by this conception,
gived, nevertheless, on the 14th in the morning, the first
preparatory orders for a tighter concentration of the Army near
Fleurus, Namur and Hannut. That was the indications of two French
deserters solely, which in the night of the 14-15th. , fired the
execution orders. In the same time, the British liaison Officer
communicated to Wellington : "The prevailing opinion, here, is that
Napoleon is about to begin offensive operations." So, on the last
moment, after a correct appreciation of the enemy situation, but
with a large delay, the Prussians yet succeeded to be ready for
combat. But Wellington s scorn overlooking intelligence reports,
costed to the Prussians, the Ligny s defeat.
III---Mars-la-Tour and Saint-Privat, 1870.
The activity ( rather the idleness) of German Cavalry scouts when
begun the 1870 s campain had brought up many bitter critics. Also
from Molke himself: "Amongst the Cavalry Commanders, true talents
were scarce, it lacked a Murat". From the 6th. of august, contact
with Mac-Mahon s Army defeated near Wörth, was lost, one was obliged
to say to the third Army; "Cavalry first". The first Army also
receive such recommandation. The 15th, day after the battle of
Colombey-Nouilly, East of Metz, the Army Command was convinced, due
to troup informations and its owns, that the Rhine s french Army,
from now on, followed Verdun s bearing, its retreat interrupted for
twenty-four hours by the battle. According to that, the second Army,
the strongest, on the center ( Commanded by Prince Karl Friderich of
Prussia) engaged on the Moselle above Metz to, from there, "pick the
fruits of victory" by A vigourous offensive against the road from
Metz to Verdun, from Fresnes and as well by Etain. "The ultimate
victory is ours if we push back to the North the mainest French
forces, who recede from Metz. "The 15th august, the 2th Army crossed
the Moselle between Corny, South of Metz, and Marbache, North of
Frouard, against the instructions of the Army Command, engaged heavy
Cavalry (the 5th,6th, 12th Cavalry Divisions, the Division and the
Cavalry of the Guard), scouting almost exactly West bound around the
line Buzy (on the road Metz-Etain-Verdun)- Meuse s heights-Toul.
Before, either, the Army did not take in consideration Army Command
instructions. Only two of its seven Corps kept the Moselle s
directions on their way leading from Metz to Verdun. The 15th, the
5th Divisions of Cavalry, engaged northerlier, crashed into heavely
equiped French troups of all arms Near Rezonville, West of Metz,
where they obviously interrupted their march to Verdun. The scouts
could nt penetrate. The 1th Army with its Northern wing, still
facing East of Metz, had neglect to envoy scouts on the other side
of the Moselle, below Metz. The 2th Army Suprem Command still
believed that the opponent was on its way back to Verdun and had to
act to reach it. Its sight tuned to the Meuse. The tenth Army Chief
of Staff, engaged with the third Army Corp on the road Metz-Verdun,
Leutenant-Colonel von Caprifit ( futur Bismarck s successor as
Imperial Chancellor) who had advance, on the morning of the 15th to
reach the 5th Division of Cavalry end up this time by balancing:
"One have to do something to know if it s the Cavalry who is right
pretenting the French is in Rezonville or the Supreme Command who
says he is already near the Meuse". What s left of the events are
knowned: fire of the wheeled batteries of the 5th Division attacking
the Frenchs near Rezonville, alerting the Bazaine s Army which, as a
whole, recessed from Metz to Gravelotte to engage onthe crossroad,
due to Verdun,Mars-la-Tour or Doncourt, Conflans, Etain. This Army
advanced in good order to clear its way fighting. On top of this,
attack of the third Brandenburger s Corp commanded by Alvensleben,
following the statement that the 2th Army Supreme Command had
wrongly assessed the enemy situation and that now was the time, at
any price, to stop the Frenchs near Metz "( He can beat me but not
get rid of me "). Solely the help brought on purpose to the III°
Corp by the X° permitted to avoid defeat and to contain Bazaine s
Army at thr expanse of barely acceptable losses. The 2th Army s
Chief Commander could not do anything about it, besides to take a
journey from his Head Quarter in Pont-à-Mousson, on a 15 milles ride
to the battle field, which remained famous. From August seventien,
the aims of the marchs became more adequated to the Army General
Direction instructions and the issue. Enemy assessement made by the
Frenchs is equally interesting. During the day of the 16th, Bazaine
counted on finding, in front of him, on the Verdun s road, le whole
of the 2th Army. If he had guessed they just came out of battle that
same day at dawn, it was over for the III° and of the X° Corps.
Their ceaseless charges and finally the famous Cavalry attacks
hidden to Bazaine the weakness of his adversary. The
Gravelotte-Saint-Privat s battle onthe 18th was carcterised, too by
the failure of intelligence services. Molke regnonized that on the
17th The scouts of the Cavalry faulted. At dawn, on the 17th, the
first Army wirh elements of the 2th, attacked a French position West
of Metz, believing that one has seen the North-West wing near
Amanweiler. It s only what happened during the remain of the day
which made appear that this position extended itself by Saint-Privat
until Roncourt and even Jaumont. At 9 o clock, a Saxon Staff
Officer, leaved Briey to scout, denote, from the Labry area, where
he believed to have seen, west of Valleroy, enemy artillery and
infantery and other infantery columns North of Doncourt. He
completed this information by describing correctly the enemy front.
By a second data as correct, coming from Valleroy, Orne s North
bank,telling that tha all area si free of Frenchs. The XIIth Saxon
Corp General Command transmits the two informations, underlining, by
mistake, that the first one was an error Spontaneously, we wonder
how could have been the Saint-Privat s day if the Staff Officer had
the possibility to communicate his first information by wire
directly to the Supreme Command, and then turn from Labry, by the
Southern bank against, Roncourt! By its neglect or its activity
boil-down, the Intelligence Service fired up the frontal attack of
the Guards and the Saxons against Saint-Privat, driven with
isufficient artillery preparation and at the expanses of enormous
losses. Averagely, the Guard Infantery lost half of its Officers and
a third of the men. Odd thing; King Willem s Cabinet Order, dated on
the 19th writen in a reserved manner, honouring the gallant troups,
contains only a blame for the tactical command, but none what so
ever against intelligences services.
IV.---From the Argonnes to Sedan, the 1870 German Army s right
quarter turn.
The German army, for being blocked by the surrouding of Metz, August
23th marched on the Châlons-sur-Marne s bearing with eight and a
half Army Corps and six Cavalry Divisions. About the Frenchs, one
knew that the Mac-Mahon s army defeated near Wörth, gathered and
fortified in the Châlons s area. Nobody knew exactly if they would
intercept the Germans on the Paris s road, slow their advance by
attacking their flanks or go on to help the Bazaine s army,
surrounded in Metz. The German Command wished, mainly to overturn
Mac-Mahon to the North and to push him against the Belgian border.
The ratio of forces( 240.000 Germans vs. 150.000 Frenchs) was
significant in off. This time, cavalry was pushed ahead in deep
scouting, pushed is the litteral term , meaning that still on th
23th a recall of the IIIth Army Supreme Command was necessary, to
decide it. The 24th one annunce that the Frenchs had already leaved
Châlons s area. Documents incercepted on the fleeing troups
indicated that in Metz ones waited outside forces to break the
blockade and that Mac-Mahon was retranching near Reims. Parisian
newspapers confirmed this last issue. On the 25th, the Germans
reached the line Saint-Ménehould Vitry-le-François and one wants
to keep on going until the 28th, the march on Suippes Châlons
Coole, therefore westbound. Late in the evening, a telegram sended
from Paris the 23th at night by London, reached the German General
Command: "Mac-Mahon s Army gather around Reims. The Emperor Napoleon
and the Heir reach the Army. Mac-Mahon seek to join Bazaine." The
sender ( initiates know his name ) was, as we would say today, an
"Anti-Bonapartist Resistant". Besides the fact that the German
Command received with scepticism the data of such Mac-Mahon s move.
Anyway, the positive assessment granted to this data, that the
orders prepared for the 26th were canceled and at the opposite, a
armies movement slight bend to the right order was given on the line
Vienne Givry-en-Argonne Changy (North-West of Vitry). While the
Paris s newspapers and a new telegram « from London » confirmed the
information, the new orders, prepared since, were launched, for a
North s bound quarter turn of the troups. On the 26th, Cavalry s
scouts reports ordered "to Vouziers and Bezancy" clearly
demonstrated that coming from Châlons and Reims, Frenchs headed to
the North. On the 27th, The Cavalry realized contact with the
adversary near Buzancy and South of Vouziers. This time, they didn
t loose it anymore and concentrate quickly on tactical data. The
result was Mac-Mahon s army surrounding, near Sedan, September s
first. Mac-Mahon only sended Cavalry s tactital scouts on his
exposed Southern side.During the march from Châlons to Sedan, his
cavalry mass was on the North side. Following Paris political
pressures. He canceled the order to walk away in the Mézières s
direction, gived on the evening of the 27th , still couldt have save
the army. The new order was, for the Army, to fraa Metz around the
Meuse s crossings in Mousson and Villiers. The Staff Officer, on his
way to deliver this order fell, with it, amongst german hands. The
contain confirmed the enemy picture established aprthe Cavelry s
scouts. Instead changing its march to Beaumont, the French Corp kept
the Stenay s track and, isolated, was defeated in the 30th. Thanks
to the correct estimate od enemy situation, the various types of
informatons coordinate use and a good part of military fortune, the
German Army General Command, just, from the August 30, didn nt have
to give anymore tactical orders. On that evening a side order was
issued in the eventuality the Frenchs transgresses the Belgian
Frontier. This time, the Cavalry didn nt faulted and its
informations were nt classified without taking any account of it.
V. ---Tannenberg 1914.
During the 1914-1918 war, aviation and telegraph, constitued for
intelligence services, better means than ever before. This appears,
at once, in the firsts combats. And if it s true that the command
chain was hardened by the increase of troups and the widening of the
front. Assessment, nevertheless, became a lot easier. Middle of
August, intercepted russian telegraphic messages revealed the
Narev s Army composition, made of five Army Corps and four Cavalry
Divisions, threathening Eastern Prussia by the South. A airborn
information transmitted to the 8th Army Supreme Command, indicated
that the Narev s Army, supposed to be between Lomsha and Ostrolenka,
in fact spreaded further til the West to Mlawa and was there to
pursue its march. This data permitted the decision of the 20th, to
interrupt the battle of Gumbinnen and to withdraw on the Weichsel s
line and this provoked the Chief Commander replacement by Hindenburg
and Ludendorff. They decided to attack the Narev s Army by à both
wings surrounding movement. General Luddendorf to who we own, by the
way, the clear definition of intelligence services to the enemy :
« exploit information on the enemy with the purpose to using it for
military decisions » wrote : « what's determined to choose battle
was what we knew about the sultriness of Russian Command. This
judgement was confirmed by a written order, on which we lay our
hands during the Gumbinnen battle, regarding the Niemen s Army
intentions coming from the East and also the Narev s Army tasks. The
behavior of the enemy on the 24th made appear that the Niemen s Army
had advance on the Angerapp a lot slowlyer that ist has been ordered
and even much more that the favourable situation required. The
informations supplied until the evening of the 24th about the
Narev s Army permitted to evaluate the number of enemy troups
advancing against the center of the 8th Army, the twentiest Corp
reinforced with four Divisions and an half ; they where about twice
more than the twentiest Corp. This one had receive the order to
« hold until the last man » while waiting for the arrival of the two
operational wings. On the 25th, at the 8th Army Staff one collected
two russian radio messages. One shown that the Niemen s army could
not reach the line Gerdauen-Allenburg-Wehlau before the 26. The
other contained the plans of the Narev s Army and the tasks for that
day grossly noted. These two informations reduced the worries
concerning the back-guard and enhanced the hope for victory.
Furthermore the intelligence service could record for itself the
confirmation of the enemy picture. Until the middle of September,
such a happy hazard never reproduced again. It was the same in 1940
when on May 10th German intelligence lost the ability to decrypt
telegraphic French messages, ceased, while it has existed without
any gap since October 1939. Amongst the great number of informations
furnished by airborn and telegraphic intelligence on the 26th, very
day of the battle, the radio message of the 26th who was to show the
advance of the 2th Russian Corp from Angerburg through the
South-West must be underligned. The Corp reached Rastenburg until
the 27th. bound to the battle field at less than 25 Milles . Despide
the increasing menace on its rear, the 8th Army stout on
Tannenberg s Battle. Air intelligence also brought precisions on
these two main points : the German South wing (the 1th Corp) on its
large movement from the West, surroundind Russian troups discharged
the 26th near Mlawa and the Illowo and retreating from there to
Soldau and further on the 27th. Near Tannenberg,, the Intelligence
service to the enemy gived a substancial help to light up the heavy
8th Army task which was to destroy the Narev s Army with less
numerous troups, while the Niemen s Army would jeopardize its rear
as a restless stormy cloud. The question, here, was not anymore the
« mist of chance » which, in the old days, almost always overfled
the battle field. Let s note that for the first time, near
Tannenberg, the aeroplane was used as a liaison device, above the
enemy, between the group XVII. A.K."I.Res.K operating from the east,
and the A.O.K. For the older readers, it can be interesting to
recall that in the Ic of the 8th Army was in service a
Lieutenant-Cuirassier who, as it is, was an excellent connoisseur of
Russia his homeland. Who ll become later « German General Near the
Russian Head Quarter of the Russian Army » and who remained for many
years Military Attache in Moscou, General Köstring, without any
doubt the best Soviet Union specialist Germany had before 1941. No
need to say that under Hindenburg-Ludendorff, the data on the enemy
was evaluated properly by the Command.
VI--- Enemy situation French s assessment, May 10th1940.
As show the memoirs of the french Chief Commander General Gamelin
and his Intelligence Officer Gauché who was still Colonel at that
time, on may 10th 1940, the German Forces distribution was well
known. One evaluated a total power of 137 Divisions which was close
to the truth (136 Divisions). The division of A, B, C Army Groups
and the O.K.H. reserves also corresponded to the reality (45 against
42,5). The French Intelligence Servive (2° bureau) correctly
situated the German mass gravity center between Limburg and
Luxemburg, there were also established all the German armoured
units. And they were right when they thought as an hoax the project
of a German attack coming from Switzerland. The French General in
Chief couldn t wish better ! Its then ever more amazing that in his
memoirs, he presents in a completely different way the troups
repartition. He overestimates the divisions near the Western wall
and the upper Rhein, of 40 divisions, which makes about the double,
he only point out 20 O.K.H. reserves divisions to terminate by this
sentence : « one can say that both strategies reasoned and
articulated their forces the same way. Maybe was it a manner to
justifie the very strong Maginot liine over crowding, by 26
Divisions and thirteen fort units, each the strenght of a division..
His reserves were not less than three armoured divisions and 22
Infantry Divisions. On the 10th of May three of these divisions,
were at ones, submitted to the northen armies group. To this
exception near, they were all South-East of a line linking Longwy to
the Marne, near Meaux, widely dispersed until below Dijon, far from
the gravity center indicated by the french intelligence, not at all
grouped for a cue. "Till his death, Gamelin remained silent on this
question. In any case,, this reserves arrangement, which didn"t took
any account of the enemy estimation communicated by Général Gauché,
had, as a consequence, their out of pace, drop to drop, use. That
was the main cause of the defeat. As it is, in 1913, Count Shlieffen
wrote : « the forecoming command should have a clear ideal on the
use of its reserves, not hours, but days in advance.