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Author Reply: On the Frontiers of Appraisal Theory

Ira J. Roseman
Emotion Review 2013 5: 187
DOI: 10.1177/1754073912469592
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469592
2013

EMR5210.1177/1754073912469592Emotion ReviewRoseman On the Frontiers of Appraisal Theory

Author Reply

Author Reply: On the Frontiers of Appraisal Theory

Emotion Review
Vol. 5, No. 2 (April 2013) 187188
The Author(s) 2013
ISSN 1754-0739
DOI: 10.1177/1754073912469592
er.sagepub.com

Ira J. Roseman

Department of Psychology, Rutgers University, USA

Abstract
The special section commentators take us to the frontiers of appraisal
theory. Following their lead, I discuss cross-cultural commonalities, domainspecific appraisals, individual differences, nonappraisal determinants, and
a blueprint for the appraising brain.

Keywords
cognitive appraisal, coping behavior, emotional responses, emotions,
individual differences

Real contributions have been made by the commentators in this

special section. Among their points: (a) Several questions about
appraisalemotion relationships are in need of answers, such as
why cross-cultural commonalities exist, and what happens
when appraisals conflict (de Sousa, 2013); (b) not all appraisals
in existing theories need play a role in every instance of emotions, and some appraisals not on theorists lists may have an
influence (Frijda, 2013); (c) there may be individual differences
in relationships between appraisals, emotions, and action tendencies (Kuppens, 2013); (d) there may be nonappraisal causes
of emotions (Parkinson, 2013); (e) neuroscience and appraisal
theory, brought together, may each shed light upon the other
(Brosch & Sander, 2013).
I find myself agreeing with most of these points, and also
wanting to elaborate and qualify. Cross-cultural commonalities
(de Sousa, 2013) might be explained in terms of (a) universals
in the general requirements for coping with crises and timelimited opportunities (such as the need to allocate limited coping resources to tractable problems); (b) the coping strategies
that have evolved to deal with them (e.g., contacting distancing, attack); and (c) the appraisals (e.g., motive-consistency,
control potential) thatin combinationpredict which strategy is most likely to be effective in any given situation
(Roseman, 2013). As for conflicting appraisals, it may be
informative to consider whether they produce new emergent
states or rather mixtures of recognizable emotions (e.g., distress about suffering a punishment, and happiness if it is perceived as just). We can, of course, give names to simultaneous

or successive combinations of emotions (e.g., disappointment

as a name for hope followed by sadness that the hope was
unfulfilled), whether or not they are distinct states.
Frijda (2013) contends that when an attractive person turns
away from our approach, we need not check numerous appraisals (e.g., whether this was unexpected, or who caused it) in
order to feel negative emotion. Perhaps that is the case because
some appraisals (e.g., agency) are not necessary for some emotions (sadness); and because there may be default appraisal
values (e.g., absence of un expectedness) built into the emotion
system or acquired from experience, which are assumed unless
there is contrary evidence. It is also possible that some appraisal
values (e.g., self-agency or low control potential) from prior
appraisal-making may remain active in emotion generation over
short or long periods of time (even chronically) without having
to be continually recomputed (cf. Burns & Seligman, 1989;
Clore & Centerbar, 2004).
Frijda further observes that domain-specific appraisals
(I will use the example of appraising an opponent in a fight as
inexperienced) and affordances (as when an opponents hesitation affords one time to act) can also affect emotions (e.g.,
decreasing fear and increasing the likelihood of anger). Note
that the effects of these appraisals and affordances may be mediated by appraisal theory variables (e.g., coping power; Frijda,
2013, p. 170).
Regarding individual differences in emotional behavior
(Kuppens, 2013), I have suggested frameworks for understanding variability (Roseman, 2013), including differences in
motives (e.g., for emotion regulation) and cognitions (e.g.,
about what is done in particular situations). These may cooccur with emotions and compete for influence on behavior
(the concept of emotions as whole body responses may have
led us to forget that other biological and psychological processes go on while emotions are experienced). We can account
for many individual and other differences if we move away
from the conception of emotional behavior as only impulsive
(though impulsive action tendencies may be prominent, particularly in high-intensity emotions) to the idea that in most
emotion episodes, emotivational goals are engendered that
energize and direct instrumental action (Roseman, 2013). Thus

Corresponding author: Ira J. Roseman, Department of Psychology, Rutgers University, 311 N. Fifth St, Camden, NJ 08102, USA. Email: roseman@crab.rutgers.edu

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188 Emotion Review Vol. 5 No. 2

there can be differences (e.g., based on personality, culture, and

learning) in how to seek safety when feeling fear, revenge
when feeling anger, and connectedness when feeling love.
Actions governed by emotivational goals are also likely to be
generated and modified based in part on situational features
(such as the presence of obstacles) that affect the probability of
goal-attainment.
Are there nonappraisal causes of emotions? Why not simply
accept Parkinsons (2013, p. 183) proposal that both appraisal
and other processes can generate emotions? If appraisals or
appraisal processes (Moors, 2013) truly cause emotions, then
emotions must exist apart from their appraisal determinants.
This is true even if one part of the resulting emotion is what
Moors (2013) calls an appraisal output (one might think of
this as awareness of appraisal, part of the phenomenological
component of emotion). If emotions exist apart from the appraisals that can elicit them, why should they not have other (nonappraisal) determinants? There can be more than one cause for a
given effect. Psychology recognizes many instances of multiple
sufficient causes. Motivations (such as hunger) can be intensified by external stimuli (e.g., the sight of food) as well as internal stimuli (low blood sugar); aggressive behavior can be
instrumental (motivated by rewarding consequences) or hostile
(caused by anger); depression can be produced by pessimism,
lack of social skills, or neurotransmitter dysfunction. Izard
(1993) described various ways in which emotions might be
induced noncognitively, including via psychoactive drugs (e.g.,
amphetamines), electrical stimulation of the brain, and contagion (e.g., through feedback from expression imitation and
motor mimicry).
Accepting the existence of nonappraisal determinants does
not invalidate appraisal theories. Appraisal may still cause emotions in many or most instancesthe frequently adaptive nature
of emotional responses suggests that they are often elicited
based on appraisal of behaviorally relevant features of the environments and situations in which they occur.

Finally, the blueprint of the appraising brain drawn up by

Brosch and Sander (2013) offers interesting possibilities for testing appraisal hypotheses. If it is possible to specify where particular appraisals are processed, then we might measure activity
at those sites, along with emotion outcomes (using self-report,
expressive, and behavioral measures), to see if particular appraisals are involved in causing particular emotions. For example,
researchers might test whether novelty appraisals are necessary
to experience any emotions, or other person agency to experience anger. It might also be possible to assess whether combinations of appraisals are required to produce emotions, as proposed
in the Emotion System model (Roseman, 2013) and other theories. The vast majority of existing studies fail to test this aspect
of appraisal theories insofar as they examine isolated appraisals,
when theories claim appraisals interact to generate emotions.

References
Brosch, T., & Sander, D. (2013). Comment: The appraising brain: Towards
a neuro-cognitive model of appraisal processes in emotion. Emotion
Review, 5, 163168.
Burns, M. O., & Seligman, M. E. P. (1989). Explanatory style across the life
span: Evidence for stability over 52 years. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 56, 471477.
Clore, G. L., & Centerbar, D. B. (2004). Analyzing anger: How to make
people mad. Emotion, 4, 139144.
de Sousa, R. (2013). Comment: Language and dimensionality in appraisal
theory. Emotion Review, 5, 171175.
Frijda, N. H. (2013). Comment: The why, when, and how of appraisal.
Emotion Review, 5, 169170.
Izard, C. E. (1993). Four systems for emotion activation: Cognitive and
noncognitive processes. Psychological Review, 100, 6890.
Kuppens, P. (2013). Comment: Appraisal affords flexibility to emotion in
more ways than one. Emotion Review, 5, 176179.
Moors, A. (2013). On the causal role of appraisal in emotion. Emotion
Review, 5, 132140.
Parkinson, B. (2013). Comment: Journeys to the center of emotion. Emotion
Review, 5, 180184.
Roseman, I. J. (2013). Appraisal in the emotion system: Coherence in
strategies for coping. Emotion Review, 5, 141149.

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