THE STRUGGLE OF SERBDOM

SERBIAN FOREIGN POLICY

DURING THE GREAT EASTERN CRISIS

1868 - 1881

H. R. KERN

!"#$%&'()%*#+&,&!"#$"%&'()*+,&#&#,(-.*+#&-./0#1"2&3456

06 - 28 - 2012

studentnumber: 0830615
e-mail: harm.kern@gmail.com

Universiteit Leiden

Bachelor thesis in Modern History

under the supervision of
Prof. Mag. Dr. Marija Wakounig
and Dr. Patrick Dassen

THE STRUGGLE

OF

SERBDOM

SERBIAN FOREIGN POLICY

DURING THE

GREAT EASTERN CRISIS

1868 1881

BACHELOR THESIS BY

HARM RUDOLF KERN

0830615
harm.kern@gmail.com
Van Vollenhovenplein 75
2313 ED Leiden

UNDER SUPERVISION OF

PROF. MAG. DR. MARIJA WAKOUNIG

AND

DR. PATRICK DASSEN

06-28-2012 LEIDEN UNIVERSITY

Special thanks to

PROF. MAG. DR. MARIJA WAKOUNIG

for introducing me to the world of diplomatic games in the Balkans

DR. PATRICK DASSEN

for guiding me in the process of historical research

DRS. RADOVAN LU!I"

for teaching me Serbian

STUDENTSKI KULTURNI CENTAR NI#

for providing me with original Serbian sources and documents from 1878

MY

MOTHER

AND

FATHER

for supporting me at the home front

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION

1. S E R B I A S R O A D

3!

TO

WAR!

1868-1875

7!

Domestic political crisis

10

International isolation

14

Bosnian turmoil

20

On the brink of war

25

2. S E R B I A

AT

WAR!

1875-1878

26!

Failure of international mediation

29

Serbian military disaster

33

Serbian diplomatic disaster

40

3. S E R B I A

AND THE

CONGRESS

OF

BERLIN

1878-1881

47!

The Serbian memorandum

50

The Berlin settlement of the Serbian question

52

The integration of the new territories

56

The commercial treaty with Austria-Hungary

57

The secret political convention with Austria-Hungary

60

The creation of the powder keg of Europe

61

CONCLUSION

65!

BIBLIOGRAPHY

68!

INTRODUCTION
The Great Eastern Crisis was a peripheral conflict in Southeastern Europe that disrupted
European diplomacy between 1875 and 1878. Rebellious disturbances in the Balkans
had great repercussions on the geopolitical balance between the European Great Powers.
Balkan turmoil threatened the strategic interests of several Great Powers and thus was
an obscure dispute in Southeastern Europe inclined to provoke international crisis. The
most interested Great Powers sought exclusive influence in Southeastern Europe and
their governments were prepared to use force whenever rival states threatened to
predominate the Balkan region. During the nineteenth century this intense rivalry was
especially apparent between Russia, Austria-Hungary and Great Britain. Their mutual
jealousy and distrust in Balkan affairs complicated incidents in the southeast. Such was
the case with the Bosnian uprising in 1875. Through the armed intervention of the
neighboring Serbian principality did a local agrarian rebellion in Bosnia assume
international proportions. Russia interfered in 1877 and thereafter warfare in the
Balkans destabilized the European balance of power to such an extent that general war
seemed imminent. Balkan controversies aroused enormous tension in Europe.
The diplomatic history of the rivalries between the European Great Powers during
the Great Eastern Crisis has become a well-researched theme in the science of history.
The international crisis between 1875 and 1878 is unanimously considered as a most
significant prelude to the World War of 1914.1 The international struggle for supremacy
in the Balkans raised the question of European predominance at the end of the
nineteenth century. This fateful period of disruption in European diplomacy drove the
Great Powers to seek international alignments that divided Europe into two hostile
camps. The Great Eastern Crisis thus shaped many central issues that defined the tense
plight of Europe on the eve of the Great War. In current research on the Great Eastern
Crisis general emphasis has therefore been placed on the disruptive divergence between
the Great Powers in Balkan affairs.2 A broad academic consensus has been drawn on the
main questions of European conflict and realignment between 1875 and 1878. The
1

Immanuel Geiss, The Congress of Berlin 1878: an Assessment of its Place in History in: Bela Kiraly

and Gale Stokes ed., Insurrection, Wars and the Eastern Crisis in the 1870s (New York 1985) 343-357.
2

W. N. Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and After: a diplomatic history of the Near Eastern Settlement

1878-1880 (London 1963); Mihailo D. Stojanovi$, The Great Powers and the Balkans, 1875-1878
(Cambridge 1939); Benedict H. Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880 (Oxford 1937).

research for this essay has not been undertaken in the illusion that the general consensus
on these main issues should be changed. That would have been troublesome vanity
since in fact no new conclusions are to be expected in this field of historical science.
This essay does aim to shed new light on the established historical understanding of the
Great Eastern Crisis by raising a new question.
Historical research on the Great Eastern Crisis did not reserve as much attention for
internal developments in the Balkans as it did for the external role of the Great Powers.
Historians have dealt with the Balkans as an arena of European diplomatic games where
regional states and peoples played a subordinate role to the achievements of the Great
Powers. This traditional approach is understandable since it adequately reflects the
unequal reality of past relations between the Great Powers and the Balkan states. At the
same time this approach is extremely liable to produce historical misunderstanding of
Southeastern Europe due to the simplification of complexities in this region. The
historiographical marginalization of Balkan developments in the Great Eastern Crisis
does in a way repeat the detrimental chauvinist attitudes of the Great Powers in the past
event that is subject to present research. The historian has the duty to stand above the
bias of any party involved in historical conflicts. It should thus be prevented that
historical research on the Great Eastern Crisis commits the same flaws as did the Great
Powers that produced the conflict. This essay therefore studies the development of the
Great Eastern Crisis in the Balkans from the perspective of one of the Balkan
participants in the conflict. The principality of Serbia has been chosen as the subject for
this historical quest because of the central role that Serbian foreign policy played in the
Great Eastern Crisis. Serbia stood at the heart of the Balkan disturbances that disrupted
European diplomacy between 1875 and 1878. It can thus become a fascinating exercise
to explain the role of Serbia in the Great Eastern Crisis. This essay seeks to provide an
answer to the following question. What was the conduct of Serbian foreign policy
during the Great Eastern Crisis and how can this conduct be explained?
This essay thus covers an analytical history of Serbian objectives and diplomatic
strategies in the Great Eastern Crisis. The interpretation of Serbian foreign policy serves
to explain the dynamics behind the Serbian role within this significant event in modern
European history. The first chapter will explain how, from 1868 onwards, a dangerous
interplay of domestic crisis and international isolation involved Serbia into a military
conflict. In this context there will be paid considerable attention to the influence of
Serbian nationalism on the Bosnian uprising of 1875. The elaboration of Serbian
4

nationalism thereafter provides an insight in the Serbian war aims. The second chapter
concerns itself with the performance of Serbia at war. Serbian strategic endeavors on the
battlefields compose the factual core of this chapter but these military events are
provided within a broad context of detailed diplomatic analysis. This method reveals the
international scope of the Great Eastern Crisis from the Balkan point of view. The
chapter ends in military and diplomatic disaster for Serbia. The ensuing third chapter
thereafter discusses a postwar peak in Serbian diplomatic activity. In 1878 international
intervention ended warfare in the Balkans. At the Congress of Berlin the European
Great Powers sought to enforce a peace settlement on Southeastern Europe. Serbia was
excluded from participation and Serbian statesmen thus sought other ways to defend the
interests of the Serbs. The third chapter explains this difficult diplomatic struggle in the
final phase of the Great Eastern Crisis. The final conclusion of this essay interprets the
true meaning of Serbian foreign policy in the Great Eastern Crisis. This historical
approach reveals how the conduct of Serbian foreign policy affected the international
position of Serbia and significantly influenced the spirit of Serbian nationalism.
This academic effort is the fruit of fascination. Travels through the present Balkans
have seduced me to commence a journey into the turbulent history of this region. The
deepening of our insight in the history of Southeastern Europe can open original
perspectives on events in modern and contemporary European history. The study of
Serbian foreign policy in the Great Eastern Crisis without doubt opens a new
perspective on the diplomatic struggles of this period. An original focus runs through
this essay to reveal the Serbian experience of the Great Eastern Crisis. That Serbian
perspective allowed me to use Serbian sources and materials that have been excluded
from consideration in current research on the Great Eastern Crisis. The most interesting
document to be considered in this essay is the memorandum that the Serbs addressed to
the Congress of Berlin as their only formal representation.3 Through the pursuit of the
Serbian experience it will become furthermore evident that the Great Eastern Crisis has
a special place in the modern history of Serbia. The events between 1875 and 1878
changed Serbia and its Balkan surroundings beyond recognition. Some of our present
problems in Southeastern Europe surfaced in this turbulent period. The historical study
of the Balkan complexities in the Great Eastern Crisis may reveal the roots of certain
questions that are yet to be faced in the present Balkans.
3

Slobodanka Stoji%i$ and Neboj&a Ran'elovi$ ed., Berlinski Kongres i Srpsko Pitanje (Ni& 1998).

Southeastern Europe between 1868 and 1881

1. SERBIAS ROAD TO WAR

1868-1875

During the first half of the nineteenth century Serbia emerged as a small autonomous
principality in the Balkan borderlands of the Ottoman Empire. Decades of armed
struggle and diplomatic negotiation gained Serbia the right to manage its own affairs
under a native prince. The Serbian Obrenovi$ dynasty obtained absolutist control of the
principality and dominated the process of organizing the administration of the country.
Political concepts form Western and Central Europe heavily influenced the development
of Serbian government. The greater part of Serbias political elite was educated abroad
and through foreign educated statesmen, European ideas were imported into the Serbian
principality. Especially the progressive notion of popular sovereignty posed important
new challenges to the Serbian state-building process. The idea that the Serbian people
composed the supreme source of political legitimacy was to determine the course of
Serbias domestic and foreign policy during the second half of the nineteenth century.4
In domestic affairs the notion of popular sovereignty tended to drastically alter the
political balance within the Serbian principality. The supreme sovereignty of the
Serbian people stood in contradiction to the absolutist ways of the Serbian Obrenovi$
princes. Princely powers were in no way bound to a modern constitution and not any
Obrenovi$ had allowed the establishment of a representative assembly to check his
authorities. Among Serbias foreign educated statesmen a growing group of political
dissidents demanded wider political participation and constitutional government. The
Obrenovi$ princes excluded these progressive dissidents from power and thereby
created a dissatisfied intelligentsia of educated men without real influence. In response
to the absolutist repression of progressive thought, the Serbian intelligentsia
transformed into an oppositional movement with a mature political agenda. Their ideas
originated from modern liberalism and their movement formed the rudiment of the
Serbian liberal political fraction. Until 1868 the conflict between Serbias absolutist
princes and the liberal intelligentsia lingered on without resulting in fundamental
changes. The Obrenovi$ princes innitialy neutralised demands for representative
government and opposed any changes to the domestic political balance. After 1868 the
liberal movement, however, would become the cataclyst of change in Serbia.5
4

Holm Sundhaussen, Geschichte Serbiens 19.-21. Jahrhundert (Vienna 2007) 65-126.

Gale Stokes, Politics as Development: the Emergence of Political Parties in Nineteenth-Century Serbia

(Durham 1990) 1-10 and 177-179.

In foreign affairs the impact of the idea of popular sovereignty was more immediate
than in domestic affairs. While the Obrenovi$ princes fought the implementation of
popular sovereignty in domestic politics, they on the contrary embraced the idea in
foreign affairs. The princely interpretation of popular sovereignty avoided the liberal
connotations of the idea and centered on its nationalist dimension. Nationalism and
liberalism were both based on the same concept of popular sovereignty but while liberal
thought focused on the legitimacy of rule, nationalism was concerned with the territorial
integrity of the people. The nationalist dimension of popular sovereignty was thus an
issue of foreign affairs. It called for strong leadership in defense of the nation abroad
instead of fair representation of the nation at home. The Obrenovi$ princes preferred
this nationalist interpretation of popular sovereignty. They perceived it was in the
national interest of the sovereign Serbian people that their princes firmly led and
defended the Serbian nation as a whole. The birth of this Serbian nationalism
immediately involved irredentist aspirations. The Serbian principality contained only a
minority of the Serbian people and the liberation of Serbs in surrounding regions
became the nationalist objective for future expansion. The Obrenovi$ princes were
convinced that they were the best representatives of the Serbian people since they would
most effectively lead the struggle of Serbdom. To the greater part of Serbias patriarchal
peasant society this thought was fully natural. The Obrenovi$ princes embodied popular
sovereignty as the fatherly defenders of Serbdom and legitimized this patriarchal role
with a nationalist course in Serbian foreign policy.6
During the short reign of Serbian prince Mihailo Obrenovi$ between 1860 and 1868
the territorial expansion of the Serbian principality enjoyed the greatest priority of the
Serbian government. Mihailo intentionally exalted unification of all Serbs as the historic
mission of Serbia to distract the Serbian society from the question of domestic political
balance. He fiercely repressed the liberal intelligentsia and ruled the Serbian principality
as an enlightened despot. The Serbian state was centralized and strengthened to prepare
Serbia for a military conflict that would expand Serbia into Serb-inhabited regions.
Prince Mihailo, however, failed to conquer any new territories for Serbia. His greatest
victory was the removal of Ottoman garrisons from the Serbian principality. The
domestic opposition to Mihailos absolutism steadily grew and the repression of
6

John K. Cox, The History of Serbia (Westport 2002) 39-47; Charles and Barbara Jelavich, The

Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920 (London 1977) 53-67.

liberalism demanded more and more efforts from the Serbian government. During his
lifetime prince Mihailo succeeded in neutralizing liberal demands for political reform
by propagating glorious nationalist expansion under a strong prince. His sudden death in
1868, however, disrupted the uneasy separation between nationalist popular sovereignty
in foreign affairs and the domestic political sovereignty of the Serbian people.7
It was during the summer of 1868 that the Serbian principality was struck by great
confusion. On June 10 two conspirators ambushed and brutally assassinated prince
Mihailo near his suburban residence in Belgrade. Since Mihailo died childless, the
matter of succession caused a great deal of uncertainty. Confusion erupted furthermore
because Mihailos death roughly interrupted the princely nationalist foreign policy and
immediately brought the question of domestic political balance to the fore. With the
throne temporarily vacant, the dynastys firm hold on Serbias political structure
lessened. The political tide turned in favor of the liberal intelligentsia and reform
became unavoidable. Under these circumstances the very survival of the Obrenovi$
dynasty was at risk. 8 An immediate overthrow of the dynasty was prevented by
Mihailos conservative minister of war, Milivoje Blaznavac (1824-1873). As soon as he
received word of the assassination he took matters into his own hands. Supported by the
Belgrade garrison, Blaznavac carried out a military coup in which he proclaimed
Mihailos fourteen-year-old cousin, Milan Obrenovi$ (1854-1901) as the legitimate heir
to the Serbian throne. The Serbian intelligentsia was confronted with a fait accompli.
Blaznavac had saved the Obrenovi$ dynasty from downfall and was in control of the
Serbian government. Nevertheless Blaznavac thereafter had to consider cooperate with
the eager liberals in order avoid the escalation of unrest in the principality.9
Due to prince Milans minority a regency had to be appointed. Though Blaznavac
was temporarily in full control of the principality, he did not possess the political
standing to effectively rule Serbia as the sole regent of the boy prince. The Serbian
intelligentsia was eager to use the opportunity of the assassination to finally introduce
the reforms that reflected their liberal ideas. Blaznavac was unpopular among the
intelligentsia because of his conservative attitude. Furthermore, he was too
inexperienced in the diplomatic field to represent the principality abroad. The only man

Michael Boro Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia 1804-1918 (New York 1976) 295-330.

Vladimir "orovi$, Istorija Srba (Belgrade 2009) 621-626.

Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 361-372.

able to provide the regency with the needed political standing was the moderate liberal
Jovan Risti$ (1831-1899). During his career in Serbian administration Risti$ had
become a renowned and respected diplomat abroad. Of even greater importance was his
broad base of support among the Serbian intelligentsia. Conceding to the pressure of
Serbias ambitious liberal movement Blaznavac had no choice but to appoint the liberal
Risti$ as his second man in the regency. As this regency took over control of the
principality, Serbia was ready to embark on thorough domestic reform.10
With Risti$ coordinating domestic policy and Blaznavac watching over a
conservative and passive foreign policy, the regency carried a promise of rest and peace
to the Balkan Peninsula. Serbia was expected to abandon the princely nationalist
expansionism of Mihailo and focus on domestic reform. These expectations would
prove to be far from the eventual course of Serbian history during the 1870s. Domestic
reform had a thorough impact on Serbian foreign policy. As this chapter will show, after
1868 the question of foreign policy became deeply embedded in the domestic political
balance. Continuous political crisis blended with the international isolation of Serbia
into a dual process that heavily harmed the Serbian principality. In 1875 the eventual
eruption of revolt among Serbs in neighboring regions pushed this dual process to a
climax and brought the Serbian principality on the brink of war with the Ottoman
Empire in 1875.11 The interplay of domestic crisis, international isolation and revolt in
the period before the outbreak of war in 1876 will be discussed in this chapter.
DOMESTIC

POLITICAL CRISIS

After the regency obtained control of Serbian state affairs in 1868 it convened an
advisory committee to formulate a constitution for the principality. Within the
committee Jovan Risti$ acted as the main author of constitutional clauses. Risti$ forced
restraint upon the ambitious liberal reformers. Though the constitution in many ways
realized their progressive objectives, it was essentially moderate in its liberalization. At
its core, the new constitution declared Serbia a hereditary constitutional monarchy with
popular representation. Serbia was provided with a legislative National Assembly that
would convene in annual sessions. Three-fourths of the Assembly was elected by
10

Slobodan Jovanovi$, Vlada Milana Obrenovi!a I (Belgrade 1934) 1-51; Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Serbia:

the History behind the Name (London 2002) 56-59.

11

Pavlowitch, Serbia, 56-64; Jelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 141-142.

10

suffrage restricted to taxpaying male citizens. The other fourth of the Assembly was
appointed by the prince, who retained a strong position in the state. The prince shared
the right of legislative initiative with the Assembly and enjoyed the opportunity of
vetoing the Assembly in budgetary matters. However, the strongest position was
ascribed to the constitutional government. Outfitted with superior authorities, the
Serbian government was enabled to convene and dismiss the Assembly at will and in
case of emergency a cabinet could govern for a year without Assemblys consent. Risti$
defended his moderation with the patriarchal argument that the underdeveloped agrarian
Serbian society was not yet ready for a truly parliamentary regime. The government was
to keep a firm grip on the Assembly and would gradually allow further liberalization.12
The promulgation of the new constitution in 1869 had a profound impact on Serbian
state and society. By establishing the elected Assembly as a true constitutional factor,
the constitution offered Serbias immature political fractions an arena in which they
could compete. This initiated the development of political life in Serbia. Thus far,
political deliberations had been confined to a rather small circle of men around the
prince. The diverse liberal intelligentsia entered Serbian politics and new fractions
emerged. Though politics still did not become a matter of mass concern it gradually
involved a bigger portion of the Serbian population. Political fractions energetically
plunged into heated discussions, which initially focused on internal political
controversies and would later involve the issues of foreign policy. Constant
confrontation between different political fractions was to destabilize the principality
during the decade following 1869, pushing Serbia into domestic political crisis.13
During the regencys rule political strife centered on the issue of the constitution
itself. Some liberals were disappointed by its moderate nature while the conservatives
opposed it for being too radical. Initially, none of these political fractions was able to
develop active opposition to the government. The liberal majority of the Assembly
remained supportive of the regency and the conservatives enjoyed too little support to
effectively address their objections. Furthermore, interior minister and regent Jovan
Risti$ firmly maintained domestic order. Assembly elections were controlled by police
repression and Serbian press was strictly censored. Risti$s repressive policies however
alienated his liberal supporters. At the end of the regency a major portion of the liberal
12

Sundhaussen, Geschichte Serbiens, 126-131.

13

Stokes, Politics as development, 10-13 and 41; Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 369-375.

11

fraction had turned away from Risti$. This severely weakened his political position in
the face of events to come. As the regency came to an end with the coming of age of
prince Milan, disunity among the liberals allowed a conservative take-over.14
In August 1872 prince Milan reached majority. The prince had developed a strong
personal animosity towards his haughty regents. He cherished absolutist ambitions and
despised Risti$s constitution as an unlawful document forced upon him during his
youth. He wished to reestablish the absolutism of his Obrenovi$ predecessors and was
therefore inclined to cooperate with the conservatives. Following his official accession
in 1872 Milan sought to install a conservative cabinet. After securing international
support for his plans on a tour to the main European capitals prince Milan in October
1873 ousted Risti$ and called upon his favorite Jovan Marinovi$ (1821-1893) to form a
conservative government. During the following three years a succession of conservative
cabinets depending on strong princely support tried to govern against the will of the
Assembly that was dominated by a liberal majority.15
Jovan Marinovi$ rightly appreciated the difficulty of ruling Serbia without control of
the Assembly and tried to induce the liberal fraction to support his government by
introducing popular progressive measures. Freedom of speech was granted, education
was improved and peasants rural property became protected by a homestead law. These
measures however didnt strengthen the conservatives political position. The
conservative fraction had only a small base of support among rich merchants and
landowners while the liberals enjoyed much wider support among Serbias peasants,
lesser merchants, professionals and bureaucrats. Freedom of speech encouraged liberal
opposition and Marinovi$s lack of political temperament allowed the liberal-dominated
Assembly to obstruct governmental policies as if it had truly parliamentary authorities.
Active liberal opposition frustrated Marinovi$s attempts to push political rivalry to the
background. In 1874 the liberals won the Assembly elections with a crushing victory
over the conservatives. Marinovi$ resigned and refused Milans request to form another
conservative minority government.16 Prince Milan would under no circumstances allow
14

Vladimir Stojan%evi$ ed., Istorija Srpskog Naroda, volume V: Od Prvog Ustanka do Berlinskog

Kongresa (Belgrade 2000) 332-340.

15

!edomir Popov, Knez/Kralj Milan i Jovan Risti$ in: Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju 75-76 (Novi

Sad 2007) 157-166.

16

David MacKenzie, Jovan Marinovi$, Serbias Outstanding European Diplomat, 1821-93 in: Journal

of the North American Society for Serbian Studies 20:1 (Bloomington 2006) 15-31.

12

a liberal cabinet to take over. Marinovi$s former interior minister A$im !umi$ headed
the next conservative cabinet and tried to shut the opposition up with violent speeches
before the Assembly. !umi$s reactionary performances deepened the political impasse
in Serbia. Despite Milans support, the conservative cabinets could not maintain
domestic order without solid Assembly backing. The Assembly did not evolve into a
forum of orderly deliberation on state affairs but instead became a gladiator arena of
destabilizing political strife. The new constitutional system functioned badly.17
After Marinovi$s resignation, domestic political ciris further deepened. In December
1874 A$im !umi$ for the first time since the promulgation of the constitution appealed
to the governments constitutional right to dissolve the Assembly. For a month !umi$
seemed to obtain control of the principality but new elections in 1875 again confronted
the government with a liberal victory. Management of Serbian state affaires came to a
complete standstill and prince Milan decided to appoint a nonpolitical caretaker regime
of technocrats until the next Assembly elections in august 1875. It was during the
preparations for these elections that events outside Serbia caused a radical shift in the
main subjects of political strife between liberals and conservatives in Serbia.18
In the summer of 1875 Serbian peasants in Bosnia and Herzegovina rose in revolt
against their Ottoman oppressors as a result of dreadful socioeconomic conditions,
which will be analyzed later on in this chapter. The uprising in Bosnia placed Serbian
leadership before the dilemma of either supporting Serbias fighting brethren, or
remaining neutral. The conservatives considered Serbia to be both diplomatically and
militarily unprepared for a full-scale war with the Ottoman Empire. Although they
stressed their sympathies for the Bosnian insurgents, they perceived involvement into
the conflict inimical to Serbian national interests. The liberal opposition on the other
hand attacked conservative passivity and urged support of the insurgents. Risti$
succeeded in reuniting the divided liberal fraction behind a highly nationalist agenda of
Serbian intervention in the insurgent provinces. The nationalist dimension of popular
sovereignty once again surfaced in Serbian politics. Liberals realized the risks that
Serbia would run in a war with the Ottoman Empire but considered the Bosnian
insurrection as a decisive historic moment that the Serbian nation had to exploit. As the
rival political fractions commenced campaigning in the Serbian countryside and main
17

David MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 1875-1878 (New York 1967) 15-25.

18

Stojan%evi$, Istorija Srpskog Naroda V, 341-343; Stokes, Politics as Development, 62-66.

13

towns, the issue of intervention in Bosnia became fully entangled in the domestic
political crisis. This started a dangerous process of fusion between domestic and foreign
problems. Serbias domestic crisis was paralleled by difficulties in Serbias international
position. This dual developments was extremely disruptive to the Serbian principality.19
INTERNATIONAL

ISOLATION

Until 1878 Serbias legal international position was determined by articles 28 and 29 of
the Treaty of Paris of 1856. These articles declared Serbia a vassal state under Ottoman
suzerainty with certain autonomy in internal affairs and trade. Serbias vassal status
denied the principality the right to any official dealings with other states. Formally
Serbia was neither allowed to open diplomatic representation in foreign capitals nor to
conclude any treaties or alliances with other states. The Serbian prince was even
explicitly forbidden to declare war. The signatory Great Powers had jointly assumed the
duty of guardians over the Serbian principality. This implied that any future adjustment
of the Serbian status or boundaries was formally subject to Great Power agreement.20
Though Serbias legal position left little room for an assertive foreign policy, other
circumstances allowed Serbia to circumvent some of its formal limitations. Regardless
of its size and status, the small principality of Serbia often played a crucial role in
Balkan events during the nineteenth century. Serbia had inspired other Balkan
Christians as a forerunner in the struggle for national liberation and cultivated an
important relationship with the Serbs in regions outside the principality. Furthermore,
small Serbia covered a territory of great strategic importance. On its northern frontier
Serbia enjoyed the potential of controlling the Danube and in the south it controlled the
Morava valley, which was of crucial importance to contacts with the Macedonian lands
and the Aegean coast. These geopolitical factors made Serbia a central element in Great
Power rivalry for predominance in Southeastern Europe. Especially Russia, AustriaHungary and Great Britain were intensely jealous of each other, not allowing any of
them to establish a predominant position in the Balkans. During the nineteenth century
their jealousy greatly affected the course of Balkan history and their struggle for control

19

Jelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 67 and 141-144; MacKenzie, The Serbs and

Russian Pan-Slavism, 32 and 43-50.

20

Stojan%evi$, Istorija Srpskog Naroda V, 343; Jelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan National

States, 25, 107-108 and 142.

14

of the peninsula became known as the Eastern Question. It was through the Eastern
Question that the principality of Serbia could play a role in European diplomacy that
was disproportionate to its size and legal position. The rivalry among Great Powers and
the special interest they took in Serbian affairs allowed Serbia more diplomatic latitude
than international treaties had provided for.21
Serbian diplomacy was fully adapted to exploitation of the opportunities offered by
mutual distrust and competition between Great Powers. Serbian foreign ministers
between 1868 and 1875 all favored successes by diplomatic means. Diplomatic
missions to Vienna and St. Petersburg tried to play Austria and Russia off against one
another in order to advance Serbian interests. Serbian diplomats were inclined to link
Serbian goals with the objectives of Austria or Russia and thereby sought to win Great
Power support for the principality. This diplomatic strategy however carried the risk of
making Serbia a mere pawn on the chessboard of international politics. Rapprochement
to the Great Powers often placed heavy obligations on the principality while these Great
Powers could sacrifice Serbian interests without much problems. This unequal reality
complicated Serbias diplomatic dealings. The Great Powers were usually ambiguous
towards the Serbs and made agreements with Serbian leadership that were often
contradictory to the powers policies in Western Europe. Especially during the decades
before the outbreak of the Bosnian insurrection in 1875 Austrian and Russian ambiguity
was in full swing. Western European dtente between Vienna and St. Petersburg
coexisted with covert rivalry and entanglement in the Balkans. Which of these policies
would gain the upper hand was left to last-minute consideration. The constant ambiguity
of the Great Powers in Balkan affairs made it difficult for Serbian statesmen to form a
stable and secure foreign policy.22
During the 1860s Serbo-Russian relations had been more intimate than at any other
moment in Serbias modern history. After Russias disastrous defeat in the Crimean
War (1853-1856) Russia had withdrawn from European affairs and focused on internal
reforms. In contrast to this policy of withdrawal from Western and Central Europe,
Russia increased its activities in the Balkans. The Russian ministry of foreign affairs
was anxious to restore Russian influence in Southeastern Europe. Serbia became the
center of Russian Balkan policy. Prince Mihailo received strong diplomatic support and
21

Sundhaussen, Geschichte Serbiens, 131-136; Stojan%evi$, Istorija Srpskog Naroda V, 343-344.

22

Stojanovi$, The Great Powers and the Balkans, vii-x.

15

Russian military supplies poured into the principality.23 Serbo-Russian intimacy came to
an end as Mihailo was assassinated in 1868. Already before Mihailos death Russian
dissatisfaction with Serbia had increased. In 1867 a Russian military mission to Serbia
had been disillusioned by the weakness of the Serbian militia and later that year Russia
was alienated by the unannounced dismissal of a Russophile foreign minister. The
major cause for the deterioration of relations between Russia and Serbia was not
Mihailos death but the improvement of Serbo-Austrian relations.24
The official policy of the Austria-Hungary towards Serbia during the nineteenth
century was governed by distrust and suspicion. The Habsburg Monarchy feared
Serbian attraction of the South-Slav people of Habsburg lands, as well as Serbias
potential as an outpost of Russian influence. Both the Habsburg emperor Franz Joseph
(1830-1916) and his military advisors perceived the Serbian nationalist aspirations in
Serb-inhabited regions outside the principality threatening to the very existence of
Austria-Hungary. Aggrandizement of the Serbian principality could only be carried out
at the expense of its Ottoman and Habsburg neighbors. The emperor and his military
staff therefore wished to keep Serbia and other Balkan states small, divided and
depended. They favored a hardline policy of active opposition to Serbia.25
Parallel to this official policy, the Hungarian statesman Gyula Andrssy (1823-1890)
initially applied a rather different strategy to the Serbian question after his accession to
Hungarian premiership in 1867. Alarmed by Serbo-Russian intimacy, Andrssy sought
to increase Habsburg control over the Serbian government by making friendly
diplomatic overtures to the Serbs. In 1869 the Hungarian premier actively supported
Serbia in securing Ottoman approval of the new Serbian constitution. Andrssy hoped
this move would induce Austrophile sentiments among the Serbian regents and
furthermore anticipated that domestic reform in Serbia would distract the regency from
programs of territorial expansion.26 In unofficial contacts with the regency Andrssy
even offered to Serbia the administration of Ottoman Bosnia in exchange for
23

Barabara Jelavich, Russias Balkan Entanglements, 1806-1914 (Cambridge 1991) 143-154; Stojanovi$,

The Great Powers and the Balkans, 6-8.

24

MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 7-17; David MacKenzie, Jovan Risti$ and Russia,

1868-1880, I in: East European Quarterly 36:4 (2003) 385-415, there 387-388.
25

Horst Haselsteiner, Bosnien-Hercegovina: Orientkrise und Sdslavische Frage (Vienna 1996) 15-30.

26

Ian D. Armour, Killing Nationalism with Liberalism? Austria-Hungary and the Serbian Constitution of

1869 in: Diplomacy and Statecraft 21 (2010) 343-367.

16

unequivocal adherence of Serbia to the Monarchys wishes. This unorthodox scheme for
the partition of Ottoman territory between Serbia and the Monarchy required Serbian
leadership to renounce its nationalist aspirations and its affinity with Habsburg Serbs.
Andrssy was prepared to support Serbian annexation of Bosnia because he believed
this would bind Serbia to Austria-Hungary and counter Russian influence. Deliberations
on this Bosnian scheme between Andrssy and the Serbian regency continued into late
1870 but failed to result in any solid agreement. The main reason for this failure was
that key figures in Vienna opposed the plan. Without the official support of the emperor,
the military and the foreign ministry in Vienna, Andrssys overtures were nothing but
empty promises. These dealings of Andrssy do reveal the persistent intention of
Habsburg statesmen to suppress Serbian nationalism in the nineteenth century.27
After Andrssy in 1871 was promoted foreign minister of Austria-Hungary a
substantial change occurred in his policy towards Serbia. Andrssy abandoned his
policy of rapprochement with the Serbian government and swung back to a more
conservative and more Habsburg foreign policy. As the Monarchys official foreign
minister, Andrssy enjoyed a lot more authority in his diplomatic dealings but he was
also more bound to the wishes of the emperor and his clique of military advisors.
Austria-Hungary fully returned to its traditional policy of obstructing any Serbian
nationalist advances. Andrssy now stated the Monarchy would never tolerate Serbian
presence in Bosnia and under the influence of the military elite he started considering
the strategic and political benefits of a Habsburg annexation these Bosnian territories.
Serbo-Austrian relations thereafter quickly deteriorated.28
The sudden deterioration of Serbo-Austrian relations after 1871 had severe
consequences for the Serbian principality. The hardening of the Austrian attitude was
especially troublesome since Serbia was already opposed by Russia. Serbian
negotiations with Andrssy during the late 1860s had alienated the Russians from
Serbia. Former intimacy had made place for outright Russian animosity towards
Belgrade. Russian foreign minister Gor%akov (1798-1883) shifted his support to
Montenegro and provided financial aid to the political opposition of the Serbian
regency. The rift between Russia and Serbia became fully apparent when in 1871 Russia

27

Ian D. Armour, Apple of Discord: Austria-Hungary, Serbia and the Bosnian Question 1867-1871 in:

The Slavonic and East European Review 87:4 (2009) 629-680.

28

Haselsteiner, Bosnien-Hercegovina, 10-20; Stojan%evi$, Istorija Srpskog Naroda V, 358-360.

17

supported Bulgarian aspirations for a separate ecclesiastical exarchate that included

Serb-claimed territories. As in that same year Austria-Hungary also reverted to a policy
of opposing Serbia, the principality plunged into international isolation. The regencys
policy of balancing between Russia and Austria-Hungary had failed completely. In this
situation of international isolation the Serbian principality lost any perspective on
advances in foreign affairs.29
Serbias relations with the Great Powers were allowed to normalize somewhat after
the regency was replaced with the conservative Marinovi$ cabinet in 1873. The
conservative take-over of Serbian government caused a notable change in Serbian
foreign policy. Whereas the regents had assertively entered negotiations with the Great
Powers, the conservatives now favored a more modest policy of passive compliance to
the Great Powers wishes. Premier and foreign minister Jovan Marinovi$ showed a
readiness to follow advice from Vienna and St. Petersburg and he even reassured
Serbias loyalty to the Ottoman suzerain. Although tensions between Serbia and the
Great Powers immediately eased as a result of this new policy, Marinovi$ could not end
the international isolation of Serbia.30
Developments in European diplomacy made the improvement of Serbias
international position impossible. In 1873 Austria-Hungary and Russia came to a
mutual understanding to put down their rivalry in the Balkans and abandon unilateral
dealings with Serbia and other Balkan states. Both empires joined together with
Germany in the Dreikaiserbund and within this association they agreed to freeze the
status quo on the Balkans. For the sake of the European balance of power the
Dreikaiserbund would not allow any changes to the present constellation of boundaries
in Southeastern Europe. Diplomatic contacts with Serbia were reduced to a minimum
and became fully subordinated to the maintenance of the Austro-Russian dtente. Until
1875 the Serbian conservative governments saw no other option than to accept the
isolation of Serbia. Serbian diplomacy came to a complete standstill as the
conservatives committed themselves to the status quo on the Balkans in correspondence
with the policies of the Dreikaiserbund.31
29

MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 16-20; MacKenzie, Jovan Risti$ and Russia, I, 388.

30

Stojan%evi$, Istorija Srpskog Naroda V, 345-348 and 365-368; David MacKenzie, Jovan Marinovi$,

Serbias Outstanding European Diplomat, 24-31.

31

Stojanovi$, The Great Powers and the Balkans, 10-11; Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 380;

MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 16, 20 and 29.

18

Serbias international isolation and diplomatic impasse had an undermining effect on

Serbias central position in Balkan affairs. Serbia traditionally stood at the head of
national liberation movements in the Balkans and aspired to become the center for the
unification of all Serbs in one state. Thereby the principality assumed a role among the
Serbs like Piedmont had fulfilled among the Italians during the Italian unification.
Contemporary proponents of Serbias central role in the unification of Serbdom often
referred to Serbia as the Piedmont of the Balkans. 32 The acceptance of Serbias
Piedmontese standing among Serbs and other Balkan peoples depended on the success
of Serbian leadership in guiding the struggle for national liberation. The Great Powers
hostility towards the Serbian principality therefore reduced Serbias potential as the
Piedmont of the Balkans. Locked in international isolation, Serbia had no perspective on
advances in Balkan affairs. Balkan states turned away from Serbia and were often
supported to do so by the Great Powers that wished to obstruct Serbian irredentist
aspirations. Isolated Serbia seemed unable to provide ambitious national leadership.33
The decline of Serbias Piedmontese standing was intensely regretted by the Serbian
public. Serbian politicians, journalists and students grew increasingly dissatisfied with
Serbias international position and feared Serbian future would be lost as a result of its
governments inactivity. Although these educated Serbs were only a minority within
Serbian society, their speeches, newspapers and pamphlets defined the public opinion of
the principality. The conservative governments that ruled Serbia between 1873 and
1875 were reproached for their obedient policy towards the Great Powers. Serbian
public opinion blamed prince Milan for neglecting Serbian contacts with other Balkan
states and portrayed Jovan Marinovi$ and A$im !umi$ as traitors of Serbias historic
national mission.34 In 1875 these public concerns escalated into widespread popular
anxiety as a result of the outbreak of revolt in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The uprising of
Bosnian Serbs aroused nationalist sentiments and imposed additional urgency on the
matter of Serbias eroded international standing. The Serbian public became inflamed
with the thought that Serbia would forever sacrifice its national future if it remained a
passive spectator of the events in Bosnia. Newspapers and pamphlets stated it was
32

David MacKenzie, Serbia as Piedmont and the Yugoslav Idea, 1804-1914 in: East European

Quarterly, 28:2 (1994) 153-182, there 155-165; Dimitrije Djordjevi$ and Stephen Fischer-Galati, The
Balkan Revolutionary Tradition (New York 1981) 113-141.
33

Stojan%evi$, Istorija Srpskog Naroda V, 348-354; MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 16-25.

34

MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 25 and 31-35.

19

Serbias duty to come to the aid of its Bosnian brethren. Patriotic demonstrations took
the streets of Belgrade, urging the Serbian government to reclaim Serbias leadership in
the struggle national liberation. Serbia was set aflame with a popular desire to recover
Serbias lost prestige by intervention in Bosnia. In the face of these passions the
conservatives foreign policy of commitment to the status quo was untenable.35
It will be remembered that Serbian domestic politics were in a state of permanent
crisis when the Serbian government received word of the Bosnian revolt. Political strife
between the liberal-dominated Assembly and the conservative minority governments
had paralyzed the orderly administration of the country. It has been shown that the
question of intervention in Bosnia became entangled in this domestic political crisis
during the elections of a new Serbian Assembly in august 1875. Popular enthusiasm for
the insurrection in Bosnia blended with the liberal opposition against the conservative
government. In their election campaign the liberals benefitted form the nationalist
sentiments and obtained a massive Assembly majority that prince Milan could no longer
ignore. The prince grudgingly approved a liberal cabinet dominated by Jovan Risti$ as
its minister of foreign affairs. This bellicose cabinet became known as the action
ministry. The return of Jovan Risti$ channeled Serbias dual problems in domestic and
foreign affairs into one single direction. The action ministry promised to break Serbias
domestic and diplomatic impasse by undertaking action for the sake of Serbdom. Under
the assertive leadership of Jovan Risti$, Serbia would come to the aid of its Bosnian
brethren and prepare for a war of national liberation.36
BOSNIAN

TURMOIL

The outbreak of the Bosnian revolt in 1875 was preceded by several decades of intimate
contacts between the Serbian principality and Bosnian Serbs. Of Bosnias total
population of 1.2 million, some 500.000 Bosnians were Orthodox by religion and Serb
by nationality. The remainder of Bosnias population consisted of approximately
450.000 Muslims and 210.000 Catholics.37 The liberation of Bosnian Serbs was among
the main objectives of Serbian nationalism. Serbian annexation of Bosnia would unify

35

Stokes, Politics as Development, 32-33 and 75-80; MacKenzie, Serbia as Piedmont 165-166;

Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 381-386.

36

Stojan%evi$, Istorija Srpskog Naroda V, 369-373.

37

Lsl Bencze, The Occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878 (New York 2005) 77.

20

Bosnian Serbs with their brethren in Serbia and would at the same time double Serbias
size and resources. Serbia therefore took special interest in the developments among its
fellow nationals in Bosnia. Agents in service of the Serbian government were active on
Bosnian soil since halfway the nineteenth century. They spread Serbian nationalist
propaganda, established ties with local leaders and gathered military intelligence on the
Ottoman forces in the region. The aim of these highly secretive activities was to prepare
Bosnia for a popular insurrection and eventual liberation by the Serbian principality.38
The question of Serbian influence upon the events in Bosnia between 1875 and 1878
remains highly complicated. Although Serbia was not immediately involved in the
outbreak of disturbances in 1875, the legacy of Serbian contacts with Bosnia became of
crucial importance in a later stage of the insurrection. The activities of Serbia in Bosnia
prior to the revolt therefore demand particular attention. Under the regency, Serbias
network of agents in Bosnia was directed by Jovan Risti$. He was in charge of several
conspiratorial cells located in towns throughout Bosnia. This organization functioned
chiefly through Bosnian Serb merchants that received financial compensation in return
for their activities in service of the Serbian government. Bosnian Serb merchants were
ideal agents because of their great mobility, their frequent business visits to Belgrade
and their solid familiarity with Serbian nationalism. In Serbia the agents were trained to
lead guerrilla bands and back in Bosnia they recruited a loyal retinue among Bosnian
peasants. Risti$ maintained firm personal contact with the personnel of his organization
in order to assure that every agent would follow Belgrades directions in the event of
war with the Ottoman Empire.39 This organization, however, failed to survive until the
1875 insurrection. When the conservative leader Jovan Marinovi$ took over Serbian
government in 1873, he closed down Serbias secret network in Bosnia. The agents
were no longer paid and the nationalist organization was permitted to collapse in
conformity with the conservatives passive foreign policy. This means the Serbian
government did not operate any agents in Bosnia at the time that the insurrection
erupted. Although the revival of Serbian contacts with Bosnia would play a crucial role
in a later stage of the insurrection, it should be explicitly noted that they had no active
part in the outbreak of disturbances.40
38

David MacKenzie, Serbian Nationalist and Military Oranisations and the Piedmont Idea 1844-1914

in: East European Quarterly 16:3 (1982) 323-344; David MacKenzie, Serbs and Russians (1996) 87-110.
39

Milorad Ekme%i$, Ustanak u Bosni 1875-1878 (Sarajevo 1973) 40-51.

40

Ekme%i$, Ustanak u Bosni, 52-54; MacKenzie, Serbian Nationalist and Military Oranisations, 332.

21

The insurrection in Bosnia started as a genuine agrarian rebellion of Bosnian

Christian peasants against extortionate feudal exploitation. Bosnian society had
remained agrarian and backward under Ottoman rule. The absolute majority of Bosnias
Christians worked as peasant sharecroppers on the estates of a Muslim landowning elite.
Bosnias landowners were of the same national background as the peasants that worked
their lands but formed a separate privileged class that had fully assimilated into the
Ottoman ruling strata. The grievous burden that these Muslim landowners placed on
Bosnian peasants had troubled the agrarian relations in Bosnia for centuries. Peasants
were obliged to pay one third to one half of their crop to the landowner and sometimes
also performed labor obligations on his private estate. The Bosnian peasantry was
furthermore injured by the state taxes that usually rose far above the formal 10 percent
as a result of abusive tax farming.41 During the second half of the nineteenth century
peasant conditions deteriorated to an unbearable level as a result of increased tensions
between the Ottoman authorities and Bosnian landowners. The Ottoman government
attempted to impose a more centralized administration on Bosnia and thereby infringed
on the privileges of Bosnias landowning elite. Bosnian landowners fiercely resisted
Ottoman reforming measures. They clung to their power over the Bosnian peasantry and
abused their feudal privileges to preserve their position within Bosnian society. The
misery of Bosnian peasants increased as the embittered landlords tried to squeeze as
much as possible out of the already impoverished peasantry. The intensification of the
socioeconomic antagonism between Muslim landowners and Christian peasants led to
an uprising across the entire province of Bosnia in 1875.42
The immediate cause of the Bosnian uprising was the arbitrary collection of taxes
during the summer of 1875. Muslim tax farmers took no account of the peasants
increased misery and confiscated their demands without mercy. After several villages
resisted to deliver the extortionate tax rates, the Ottoman authorities and Bosnian
landowners provided armed support to the collection of taxes. Soon entire villages left
their lands on the run from violent outrages by gendarmes and armed landlords. Peasant
unrest spread from the southern region of Herzegovina to the north. In the Bosnian
interior, peasants fled into the mountains while along Bosnias borders they sought
refuge on Austrian or Serbian territory. Especially in Bosnias northern borderlands the
41

L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453 (London 1958) 396-399.

42

Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (New York 1996) 119-135.

22

flight of the peasantry was accompanied by armed resistance. Bands of rebellious

peasants ambushed tax collectors, erected barricades and ravaged the manors of their
landlords. The Ottoman governor of Bosnia deployed all regular troops to Herzegovina
and left the repression of disturbances in northern Bosnia to local landlords and
irregulars. The use of extreme violence was especially common among the latter. They
plundered farms, molested peasant families and burned down entire villages. These
atrocities only encouraged flight and embittered the armed resistance. The number of
insurgents rapidly increased over ten thousand. The main grievances of the rebels
remained the dreadful feudal exploitation and the uprising bore the characteristics of a
classical uncoordinated peasant rebellion.43
The spontaneous agrarian rebellion of Bosnian Serb peasants caught the Serbian
principality by surprise. While former covert activities of Serbia in Bosnia had always
aimed to carefully coordinate an eventual Bosnian revolt, it now seemed that Serbia did
not govern the events in Bosnia but was rather governed by them. Only after Jovan
Risti$ took over Serbian government at the end of August, Serbia attempted to reclaim
leadership over the events in the region. In Belgrade the Committee to Aid the
Insurgents was established with governmental funds. It sought to provide direction to
the insurgents and sent money, arms and volunteers into Bosnia.44 Through the Belgrade
Committee, foreign minister Jovan Risti$ reestablished contacts with the former agents
of Serbias collapsed nationalist organization in Bosnia. Risti$ encouraged them to take
the lead over the insurgent operations. Thereafter the control over the rebellious
peasants gradually moved into the hands of these former agents. They provided the
rebellion with a centralized command that stood in close contact with the Serbian
government. This drastically changed the nature of the Bosnian revolt. The rebellion
lost its uncoordinated appearance and acquired the characteristics of an organized
movement.45
The emergence of former agents as the leaders of the rebellion also fundamentally
changed the objectives of the Bosnian revolt. While the improvement of agrarian
conditions was the main concern of the rebellious peasants, their leadership of former
agents now supplemented these economic grievances with a strong political dimension.

43

Ekme%i$, Ustanak u Bosni, 74-88 and 331-332; "orovi$, Istorija Srba, 633.

44

Djordjevi$ and Fischer-Galati, The Balkan Revolutionary Tradition, 141-154.

45

MacKenzie, Serbian Nationalist and Military Oranisations, 332.

23

The agents were fiercely nationalistic and through them Serbian nationalist ideology
infiltrated into the insurrectionary movement. The unification of Bosnia and Serbia soon
emerged as the main objective of the Bosnian revolt. In this development lies the
historical importance of Serbias former nationalist organization in Bosnia. The legacy
of Serbias earlier involvement in Bosnia allowed Serbia in 1875 to reclaim leadership
over the events in the region and transform the localized agrarian rebellion into a wider
nationalist revolution.46
Serbian entanglement in the Bosnian revolt had a significant impact on the Serbian
principality itself. The Serbian government assumed control over a revolution in
neighboring Ottoman lands while Serbia officially was not yet at war with the Ottoman
Empire. This situation required the governments outmost caution since Serbia was still
largely unprepared for a military conflict. To avoid the premature outbreak of war, the
Serbian coordination of Bosnian rebel forces was exercised in complete secrecy. The
main line of communication and supply ran through the river Sava from Belgrade to the
center of the rebellion in northern Bosnia. In the night of September 6 1875 the Bosnian
Serb former agent Vaso Vidovi$ arrived from Belgrade on the Bosnian banks of the
river Sava with a boat full of arms and ammunition. There he established the main
headquarters for the direction of guerilla operations in northern and western Bosnia. The
Serbian government maintained intimate contacts with Vaso Vidovi$ but made serious
efforts not to reveal these ties to the Ottoman authorities. Rebellious endeavors in
eastern Bosnia were coordinated directly from the adjacent Serbian territory along the
river Drina. Serbian General Ranko Alimpi$ was sent to the Drina valley to organize
bands of volunteers from Bosnia and Serbia. The volunteers were armed with Serbian
weapons and deployed across the Drina into Bosnia under the supervision of General
Alimpi$. In this way Serbia was covertly in charge at two fronts in the Bosnian conflict
without operating its own armed forces against the Ottomans. It was, however, obvious
that the success of the nationalist revolution in Bosnia fully depended on the eventual
mobilization of Serbias own militia. The unification of Bosnia and Serbia could only
be carried out if Serbian troops would intervene. By entangling Serbia into the Bosnian
turmoil, the Risti$ government had made war between Serbia and the Ottoman Empire
inevitable. In 1875 the Serbian principality balanced on the brink of war.47
46

Ekme%i$, Ustanak u Bosni, 88-95.

47

MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 30-60; Ekme%i$, Ustanak u Bosni, 74-109.

24

ON

THE BRINK OF WAR

The dual process of parallel stagnation in domestic and foreign affairs between 1868
and 1875 made Serbia vulnerable for the disruption of unrest in the Balkans. In 1875 the
Serbian principality was in no way prepared for war. Serbian domestic politics were in a
permanent state of crisis. Such an unstable situation at the home front would be hardly
favorable in the event of war with the Ottoman Empire. The international isolation of
Serbia further diminished Serbias chances of victory in a military conflict. All the
Great Powers would oppose Serbian aggressive moves against the Ottoman Empire.
Paradoxically it were exactly these shortcomings that brought Serbia on the brink of
war. The outbreak of revolt in Bosnia caused the entanglement of Serbias domestic
crisis and international decay. Nationalist sentiments resurfaced and popular anxiety
could be easily manipulated by an assertive leader. Jovan Risti$ and his liberal fraction
presented a successful war for Serbian aggrandizement as the ideal solution for Serbias
domestic and diplomatic problems. They promised that a Serbian victory would unite
Serbias divided political life and liberate the country out of its diplomatic isolation. The
integration of popular sovereignty into Serbian domestic politics displayed its
mobilizing potential in a nationalist discourse. Since the Serbian people were more
involved with Serbian politics the countrys goals could more effectively be expressed
in nationalist terms. Jovan Risti$ embraced a fiercely nationalist programme of Serbian
intervention in Bosnia for the sake of Serbdom. The liberals reclaimed leadership within
Serbia and would in turn allow Serbia to reclaim leadership over the Serbian nation as a
whole. Serbia was prepared to embark on war of national liberation in order to restore
the prestige of Serbia as the Piedmont of the Balkans.48

48

MacKenzie, Jovan Risti$ and Russia, I, 393-396.

25

2. SERBIA AT WAR

1875-1878

By the autumn of 1875 the Serbian government had taken full control of the rebellious
movement in Bosnia. Serbian agents led bands of armed peasants in skirmishes against
the Ottoman forces and the Serbian delivery of arms and money kept the Bosnian
revolution alive. At this moment Serbia itself, however, was officially not at war with
the Ottoman Empire. The vital decision on the mobilization of the Serbian militia had
still to be made by the Serbian government in Belgrade. Serbian foreign minister Jovan
Risti$ was determined to start a Serbian war against the Ottoman Empire, but delayed
immediate aggressive action to win time for necessary diplomatic and military
preparations. Before Serbia would commence the war of national liberation, Risti$
sought to resolve Serbias most urgent shortcomings. The international isolation of the
principality had to be broken and Serbias domestic political disunity had to be
appeased. At the same time Serbias primitive armed forces were to be rapidly prepared
for a large-scale offensive against the modernized Ottoman army. In short, the Serbian
government faced a tremendous challenge as it attempted to embark on a war for which
the small Serbian principality was largely unprepared.49
The Serbian national militia was more a group of armed peasants than a modern
standing army. In 1875 Serbia could field about 125.000 conscripts that had been
trained in communal drills on Sundays and holidays. There was no organized supply of
the troops and many soldiers had to provide their own clothing, food and weapons. With
only about nineteen educated doctors the medical support of the Serbian militia could
impossibly take care of the wounded in an average offensive. Another persistent
weakness of the militia was the lack of officers. By 1875 the Serbian military academy
had delivered only 460 graduated officers to cover the enormous organizational
structure of the Serbian peasant army.50 These remarkable shortcomings of the Serbian
armed forces on the eve of war with the Ottoman Empire reflect the conscious core of
Serbias nineteenth-century military doctrine. This doctrine held that the Serbian
peasant possessed a strong warrior tradition of spontaneous fighting against the
Ottoman oppressors. The Serbian military strategy was therefore based on the myth that
49

Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 382; MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 43-50.

50

Milorad Ekme%i$, The Serbian Army in the Wars of 1876-78: National Liability or National Asset?

in: Bela Kiraly and Gale Stokes ed., Insurrection, Wars and the Eastern Crisis in the 1870s (New York
1985) 276-304, there 276-284.

26

armed Serbian peasants held military capabilities that could bring about a Serbian
victory over the Ottoman forces. According to Serbias military thinkers the loosely
organized peasant militia offered the best deployment of the Serbian warrior spirit. They
saw no need for a fully organized professional Serbian army. Spontaneous peasant
uprisings in the Balkans would be turned into a victorious war for the unification of
Serbdom as a result of the mobilization of the Serbian peasant militia.51
The preparation of the Serbian militia for war with the Ottoman Empire was a costly
effort. During the autumn of 1875 it became clear to the Serbian government that it was
impossible to expect the Serbian troops to arm themselves. Lack of weaponry was
therefore perceived a major problem for which no epic mythology could compensate.
The Serbian Assembly permitted a large state loan for the rapid rearmament of Serbian
troops and measures were taken to secure the supply of the battlefronts. The
governments military advisor Colonel Ore&kovi$ believed that the Serbian militia could
not be ready for action before December. The Serbian government thereafter decided
that war would be postponed until spring 1876. In the mean time the Bosnian insurgents
would be supported through the winter with money and supplies.52
Foreign minister Jovan Risti$ recognized that Serbias military preparations had to be
accompanied by an improvement of Serbias diplomatic situation before the principality
could commence a war. Completely isolated Serbia could stand no chance against the
Ottoman Empire that enjoyed a certain level of protection from the Great Powers. Jovan
Risti$ sought to win Austrian and Russian support for his government, but failed to get
through the Dreikaiserbunds agreed-upon isolation of the Serbian principality. The
Great Powers were quickly getting anxious about the increasing tensions on the Balkans
and were careful not to encourage Serbia into war. Risti$ also had a little success in
reviving traditional loyalties on the Balkans. Both Greece and Romania refused to enter
a war at the side of the Serbs. Their interests were not directly involved in Bosnia and
they actually feared that a successful Serbian war could be harmful to their own plans of
expansion. The only Balkan state that was interested in cooperation with the Serbs was
Serbias closest neighbor, Montenegro.53
51

Gale Stokes, Serbian Military Doctrine and the Crisis of 1875-78 in: Bela Kiraly and Gale Stokes ed.,

Insurrection, Wars and the Eastern Crisis in the 1870s (New York 1985) 261-273.
52

MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 50-53; Ekme%i$, The Serbian Army in the Wars of

1876-78 266, 268 and 282.

53

Stojan%evi$, Istorija Srpskog Naroda V, 371-376; Stavrianos, The Balkans, 402-403.

27

Serbo-Montenegrin relations were traditionally close because of their common

Serbian nationality and mutual interest in liberating the Serbs. Prince Nikola Petrovi$ of
Montenegro (1841-1921) was heavily involved in the Bosnian uprising and held
preeminence over the insurgents the southern region of Herzegovina. Soon after the
Risti$ government had resolved on war preperations, Serbia and Montenegro entered
diplomatic negotiations. From autumn 1875 until spring 1876 Serbian diplomats were in
permanent contact with Montenegrin prince Nikola to conclude an official treaty of
alliance and a military convention between the two Serbian states. These negotiations
took about half a year because a great deal of latent rivalry existed between the two
states. After it had been clarified that Montenegro wished to annex Herzegovina and
that Serbia reserved Bosnia as its main objective, the bases were laid for an alliance.
The Montenegrins commitment to wage war at the side of the Serbs was essential to
Serbia from a military point of view. Without the support of Montenegro it would have
been doubtful if Serbia could survive a war against the huge Ottoman army.54
The Ottoman war office reacted fiercely to the Serbian military and diplomatic
preparations for war. The Ottoman minister of war started massing troops at the Serbian
frontier and the Ottoman government pressured Serbia to stop its assistance to the
Bosnian insurgents. From the outset, the Ottoman government blamed Serbian agitation
for the uprising in Bosnia. The Ottoman war office considered that the real danger of the
Bosnian uprising came from Serbia. Its priority was therefore not the suppression of
disturbances in Bosnia but the mobilization of Ottoman troops at the Serbian borders.
According to the Ottoman minister of war the Bosnian uprising could be most
effectively brought to an end by destroying the Serbian militia and ending the hated
Serbian autonomy. These Ottoman reactions caused anxiety in Serbia. The Serbian
government began accelerating its military preparations and also started positioning
equipped Serbian troops at the borders. During this escalating military buildup at the
Serbo-Ottoman borders, the tension between Serbia and the Ottoman Empire ran high.
Frequent violations of the frontier from both sides led to mutual accusations of
offensive aggression. Both Serbia and the Ottoman Empire presented their own
measures as preventive and defensive while in fact both sides were waiting for the right
moment to commence an offensive.55
54

MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 35-37, 47-48, 64 and 79-81.

55

Jovanovi$, Vlada Milana Obrenovi!a I, 442-443; Stojanovi$, The Great Powers and the Balkans, 20.

28

FAILURE

OF INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION

The increasing concentrations of Serbian and Ottoman troops at each side of the border
caused a great deal of distress among the Great Powers. Balkan disturbances could
easily lead to a European crisis of much greater proportions since many of the Great
Powers had contradicting aspirations on the Balkan Peninsula. Especially the entente
between Austria-Hungary and Russia was vulnerable to the re-opening of the Eastern
Question. For this reason the Dreikaiserbund had strictly agreed to maintain the status
quo on the Balkans. During the autumn of 1875 danger of conflict between Serbia and
the Ottoman Empire induced the Dreikaiserbund to intervene in Balkan affairs. A
consular mission was sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina to investigate the situation and
calm the insurgents. This attempt to accommodate with the Bosnian insurgents was
accompanied by collective pressure on the Ottoman Sultan to carry through progressive
reforms. The insurgents were to be informed about the Ottoman promises of reform
through the consular mission and thereby the Balkan Crisis would be resolved at its
roots. This first initiative of the Dreikaiserbund to mediate collectively in Balkan
affairs, nevertheless failed because Austria-Hungary and Russia could not agree on the
amount of pressure to be exerted on the Ottoman Empire. Without clear signals from
Constantinople the consular commission in Bosnia was not able to formulate a clear
agenda towards the insurgents. The effectiveness of collective mediation was reduced
by divergence between its main participants.56
The divergence between Austria-Hungary and Russia was best portrayed in the
personal feud between the two of their main diplomats at the time. The Austrian
minister of foreign affairs Gyula Andrssy supported the collective pacificatory
endeavors of the Dreikaiserbund but suspected every Russian proposal in this direction.
Andrssy feared that Russia wished to restore its traditional role as the sole protector of
all Christians under Ottoman rule. Such a Russian protectorate would be extremely
harmful to the Austrian interests in the Balkans and Andrssy therefore sought to
control every initiative of the Dreikaiserbund.57 His effort to establish Vienna as the
center of action for the Dreikaiserbund was, however, opposed by Count Nikolaj
Ignatev (1832-1908), the Russian ambassador in Constantinople. Count Ignatev
56

Stojanovi$, The Great Powers and the Balkans, 21-27.

57

Franz-Josef Kos, Die Politik sterreich-Ungarns Whrend der Orientkrise 1874/75-1879: Zum

Verhltnis von politischer und militrischer Fhrung (Vienna 1984) 93-97.

29

considered it contrary to Russian interests to follow Austria-Hungary in its designs on

the Balkans and therefore attempted to use his personal influence in Constantinople to
conclude a separate understanding with the Ottoman ministers. Ignatev calculated that
the Ottoman Empire could be made dependent on Russia if Russia succeeded in
unilaterally forcing reform upon the Ottoman government. In fact, both Andrssy and
Ignatev were trying to draw the initiative in the international mediation exclusively
towards themselves for the purpose of dominating the eventual solution of the Eastern
Question. This rivalry continued to be present in the background of the
Dreikaiserbunds dealings and undermined the Great Powers attempts to come to a
peaceful settlement of the Balkan Crisis.58
In December 1875 Andrssy found support for his pacificatory designs within the
Russian foreign office. Russian foreign minister Gor%akov had returned from a lengthy
summer retreat in Switzerland and redirected Russian diplomacy to a more
accommodative course in concert with Austria-Hungary and Germany. Gor%akov
ignored Ignatevs proposals for unilateral dealings with the Ottoman government and
was determined not to let the Balkan Crisis disrupt the Russian alliance with Vienna and
Berlin. According to Gor%akov the coming winter was to be fully utilized for joint
action in concert with Andrssy since otherwise it would be impossible to restrain
Serbia and Montenegro from war in spring.59 On December 30 the Dreikaiserbund
presented the Andrssy Note to the Ottoman Empire. The note contained a reform
program that the Ottoman government accepted with some minor reservations. The
Ottoman promise of certain liberties and land reforms was then publicly proclaimed in
Bosnia and Herzegovina but dramatically failed to calm the population. The Andrssy
Note was void of guarantees and the empty promises of the Ottoman government no
longer made any impression upon the insurgents. The public proclamation of reforms
only worsened the situation in Bosnia since the conservative Muslim population
opposed the reforms with violent reprisals upon the Bosnian Serbs. Also within
Constantinople the imposed reforms of the Andrssy Note provoked great discontent
and fanaticism among Muslim patriots.60 This internal unrest brought the Ottoman
58

Marija Wakounig, Dissens versus Konsens: das sterreichbild in Russland whrend der Franzisko-

Josephinischen ra in: Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch ed., Die Habsburgermonarchie 18481918 VI (Vienna 1993) 436-490, there 463; Stojanovi$, The Great Powers and the Balkans, 37-40.
59

Sumner, Russia and the Balkans, 148-155.

60

Stojanovi$, The Great Powers and the Balkans, 51-55.

30

Empire only closer to war since the government was now passionately pressured to
undertake action against the rebellious Christians and their dangerous European
protectors. The massing of Ottoman troops at the Serbian borders continued and the
Andrssy Note did not improve the situation in Bosnia. Though the Andrssy Note
reunited the Russian and Austrian Balkan policies it failed to address the most urgent
issues of the escalating Balkan Crisis.61
Apart from their mediation between the Bosnian insurgents and Constantinople, the
Great Powers also put the strongest pressure on Serbia to restrain the principality from
war. Both Austria-Hungary and Russia intensely disapproved of the bellicose Serbian
government and their consuls in Belgrade encouraged prince Milan to remove Risti$
and his liberal entourage from power. The Dreikaiserbund collectively anounced that
any passage of armed bands from Serbia into Ottoman territory would be considered as
an act of agression. No further violations of the Serbo-Ottoman frontier would be
allowed. The Russian tsar Alexander II even personally warned prince Milan that Serbia
would enjoy no protection from Russia if it comenced a war against the Ottoman
Empire. It was made clear to the Serbs that neither Russia nor Austria-Hungary would
prevent an Ottoman occupation of Serbia if the outbreak of war resulted from Serbian
agression against the Ottoman Empire.62
The Dreikaiserbund's strong collective stand against Serbian aggression was
seriously weakened by a dangerous duality in Russian foreign policy. Within the
Russian foreign ministry secret feelings of sympathy for the Serbian cause undermined
the official message of Russian opposition to war. These feelings of sympathy
originated from a populist ideology that was called Pan-Slavism. A considerable
proportion of Russias diplomatic staff embraced Pan-Slavism as a program that could
revive the Russian Empires leading position in the Slav world. Pan-Slavism called for
active intervention in Balkan affairs and aimed at the liberation of Balkan Slavs under
superior Russian guidance. Pan-Slavs considered a Serbian war against the Ottoman
Empire as an ideal opportunity for the realization these aims.63 The most influential
Pan-Slav diplomat was none other than Ignatev. From his embassy in Constantinople
he instructed the Russian consuls throughout the Balkans to apply a policy in the Balkan
61

Stavrianos, The Balkans, 400-401.

62

MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 34, 49, 55-60.

63

Wakounig, Dissens versus Konsens: das sterreichbild in Russland, 439-444, 454-456 and 461-463;

Jelavich, Russias Balkan Entanglements, 157-159.

31

Crisis that contradicted the official Russian policy of neutral cooperation with Austria
and Germany. At crucial moments during the Dreikaiserbunds pacifying efforts,
Ignatev encouraged Serbia into war through official Russian diplomats that stood in
contact with the Belgrade government. As a result, Serbian prince Milan and foreign
minister Risti$ received inconsistent and contradictory messages from the Russian
consulate in Belgrade. Russian consul Kartsov combined every official warning that
Serbia would enjoy no support in the event of war with semi-official encouragement of
military and diplomatic preparations for war. These bellicose encouragements severely
undermined the authority of Russias official pressure for peace.64 Foreign minister
Gor%akov failed to counter the Pan-Slav agitation among his subordinates with clear
official instructions and thereby allowed the Serbian leadership to speculate about
Russias real objectives in the Balkan Crisis. Jovan Risti$ and his ministers doubted the
sincerity of Russias opposition to war and hoped that they could trust the Pan-Slav
promise of eventual Russian support in case of an armed conflict. The Dreikaiserbund's
pressure on Serbia did not halt Serbias drift towards conflict because Pan-Slav agitation
from within the Russian foreign ministry encouraged Serbia into war.65
During the early spring of 1876 the Dreikaiserbund made its final attempt to enforce
peace upon the Balkans. This last mediatory effort again failed. Pan-Slav agitation had
done a lot to undermine pacification in the Balkans and the final breakdown of the
international mediation was caused by diplomatic divergence between the European
Great Powers. Russian foreign minister Gor%akov considered it of crucial importance to
provide the Bosnian insurgents with solid guarantees for the improvement of their
situation. He therefore proposed to Andrssy to put more pressure on the Ottoman
government and involve the other European Great Powers in taking measures to pacify
the Balkans.66 As usual, Andrssy resisted these Russian proposals. He continued to
consider the uprising as an internal matter of the Ottoman Empire and refused to allow a
broader European interference in the Balkan Crisis. Andrssy was, of course, most
concerned that the involvement of other European powers would undermine his leading
position in the crisis management. His alternative memorandum was again void of
guarantees for the insurgents and merely consisted of suggesting an improbable

64

Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 383-384; MacKenzie, Jovan Risti$ and Russia, I, 393-396.

65

MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 49-55 and 66-73.

66

Stojanovi$, The Great Powers and the Balkans, 58-60.

32

armistice between the Ottoman forces and the insurgent bands. Andrssy opposed
pressuring the Ottoman Empire more and instead made strong threats against Serbia for
continuing its war preparations. To preserve the Dreikaiserbund, Gor%akov grudgingly
supported Andrssys designs.67
Austria-Hungary thus again succeeded in dictating the international mediation but
this highhanded policy proved to be a grave misstep for two reasons. First, the
enforcement of Andrssys designs upon the Dreikaiserbund caused great reluctance
within the Russian foreign ministry. Even Russian diplomats that had no Pan-Slav
sympathies disapproved of the measures taken. This dissatisfaction was felt in Serbia
and increased Serbian doubts about Russias commitment to peace. Second, Andrssys
refusal to involve other European Great Powers caused Great Britain to oppose the
Dreikaiserbunds last mediatory effort. The British government objected the exclusive
Dreikaiserbund dealings in Southeastern Europe without prior consultation with the
other Great Powers. The rejection of international mediation on the part of Great Britain
ended the possibility of an early peaceful settlement. This was a decisive turning point
in the escalation of the Great Eastern Crisis. The divergence between the Great Powers
in Balkan affairs prevented strong successful pacification. International mediation had
failed and actual events in the Balkans overtook the diplomatic talks in Europe.68

SERBIAN

MILITARY DISASTER

While the diplomatic quarrel between Austria, Russia and Britain dragged on without
any results, the situation on the Balkans changed far beyond the control of the Great
Powers. As soon as the first snow melted down in the Bosnian mountains, the
insurgents resumed their guerilla fight with full fury. Ottoman reprisals became more
savage and by March 1876, approximately 156.000 refugees from Bosnia and
Herzegovina had crossed the borders into Serbia and Austria-Hungary.69 The failure of
international mediation encouraged other Balkan Christians to join the resistance against
the Ottoman oppressor. In April a Bulgarian uprising broke out and unrest spread into
Macedonia and Albania. These events were followed by a coup dtat in Constantinople
during the last days of May. Under these circumstances the Serbian principality
67

MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 87-100.

68

Stojanovi$, The Great Powers and the Balkans, 61-73; Sumner, Russia and the Balkans, 180-184.

69

Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, 132; Stavrianos, The Balkans, 400.

33

accelerated its war preparations and quickly concluded the military convention with
Montenegro. The intervention of the Serbian states was to escalate the regional Balkan
disturbances into an enormous international crisis. The Great Eastern Crisis assumed its
true scope and began to transform the Balkans beyond recognition.70
The continuation of the Bosnian rising and the spread of revolt into Bulgaria
increased the pressure upon Serbia to support the insurgents and exploit the apparent
weakness of the Ottoman Empire. The Serbian military leadership favored an offensive
strike before summer and pressured prince Milan to support the bellicose determination
of his people. The Serbian prince was opposed to war and had tried to preserve Serbian
neutrality in concert with the Great Powers efforts for pacification. This peaceful
course clashed with the warlike enthusiasm of both the Serbian people and the Risti$
government. Milan stood alone and feared his dynasty would be overthrown if he
continued to resist the Serbian national aspirations. Furthermore, he proved to be very
susceptible to the pressure from the military and during the spring of 1876 the Serbian
prince gradually shifted into the war party.71
While within Serbia the last obstacles to warlike action disappeared, the Russian
Pan-Slav movement launched an initiative that deeply affected Serbias determination to
proclaim war against the Ottoman Empire. Pan-Slav excitement in Russia had reached
unprecedented levels and the recruitment of volunteers resulted in the creation of a
complete volunteer army that was ready to be deployed in the upcoming war for the
liberation of the Balkan Slavs. The Moscow Slav Committee placed the famous Russian
general Mihail !ernjajev (1828-1898) at the head of this volunteer venture and
dispatched him to Belgrade in late April. 72 For the Serbs, the arrival of general
!ernjajev in the Serbian capital was an irresistible impulse for war. !ernjajev offered
his services to the Serbian prince and made courageous statements calling for Serbian
political independence. The Russian general immediately received Serbian citizenship
and was placed in command of the main section of Serbias militia. The Serbian
government mistakenly perceived !ernjajevs commitment to the Serbian cause as a
sign that Russia secretly supported Serbian war preparations. General !ernjajev
confirmed this erroneous belief by boasting about his intimate ties with the Russian
70

Misha Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 1804-1999 (New York 1999) 73,

105-110 and 126-131; Stojan%evi$, Istorija Srpskog Naroda V, 377-378.

71

MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 22, 62 and 66.

72

David MacKenzie, The Lion of Tashkent: The Career of General M. G. Cherniaev (Georgia 1974) 122-131.

34

tsarist court. As a result of the arrival of !ernjajev and other Russian Pan-Slav
volunteers in Serbia, the Serbian leadership became confident that official Russia would
support the Serbian principality in the upcoming war.73
The Pan-Slav suggestion that official Russia would eventually side with Serbia was
of vital importance to the Serbian decision to start an offensive in June 1876. Serbian
foreign minister Risti$ was fully aware of the real possibility of defeat against the strong
Ottoman forces and therefore sought the guarantee that an Ottoman occupation of
Serbia would be prevented in case of military disaster. Risti$ heavily relied on Pan-Slav
promises in concluding that the combination of pro-Serbian sympathies and Russian
strategic interests in the Balkans would eventually force the tsar to wage war on the
Ottoman Empire if the survival of Serbia would be at stake. The open reluctance of
Gor%akov in certain Dreikaiserbund dealings and the absence of clear instructions from
the Russian consulate in Belgrade confirmed Risti$ in his assessment of the military and
political situation. Risti$ was actually right in calculating that Russia would not allow
the Ottomans to recapture Serbia but he fully overlooked the diplomatic difficulties that
Russia would have to face before being allowed to take up arms against the Ottoman
Empire. As we will see a Serbian military disaster was inextricably bound up with a
Serbian diplomatic disaster. This insight, however, was not apparent to the Serbian
leadership in 1876. At that time, the combination of Pan-Slav agitation and ambiguities
in Russias official policy provided enough confidence for bellicose optimism.74 It
should be clear that without the Serbian leaderships belief in Russias secret support,
the outbreak of the First Serbo-Ottoman War would probably not have occurred.
At the end of June 1876, the Serbian principality finally declared war on the Ottoman
Empire. Serbias primary strategic objective was to destroy the main Ottoman army in
the well-fortified Ni& region to the south of Serbia. This objective was set in accordance
to the European military conviction that the complete elimination of the enemys main
force would consequently lead to the victorious enforcement of all other territorial and
political objectives. The Serbian proclamation of war clarified as its political war aim
the annexation of Serb-inhabited territories to accomplish the unification and liberation
of the Serbian people on the Balkan Peninsula.75 These military considerations split the
73

David MacKenzie, Panslavism in Practice: Cherniaev in Serbia (1876) in: The Journal of Modern

History 36:3 (Chicago 1964) 279-297.

74

Stojanovi$, The Great Powers and the Balkans, 86-87; MacKenzie, Jovan Risti$ and Russia 391-396.

75

Stokes, Serbian Military Doctrine and the Crisis of 1875-78, 266; Ekme%i$, Ustanak u Bosni, 217-218.

35

Serbian war effort into two separate fronts. The greater part of the Serbian militia was
deployed in a southeastward offensive under the command of general Mihail !ernjajev.
With an army of 68.000 troops !ernjajev planned to attack towards Ni& through the
Morava valley and capture the important citadel there. This southern front had to be
permanently secured against Ottoman counter-attacks, since an Ottoman breakthrough
in the Morava valley could leave the road to Belgrade open for conquest. The strategic
preoccupation with the southeastward offensive, however, did not alter Serbias strong
engagement with Bosnia as its main political objective. The Serbian main offensive
towards the southeast was combined with a smaller advance into Bosnia.76
The Serbian proclamation of war immediately intensified the Bosnian rising. Under
the command of General Ranko Alimpi$ an army of 20.000 troops crossed the Drina
into Bosnia. The Serbian army reinforced the insurgents in Eastern Bosnia and
attempted to unite the scattered fronts of the rebellion. The intervention of the Serbian
militia in Bosnia created the necessary atmosphere for the declaration of union between
Bosnia and Serbia. Under the supervision of several Serbian agents this declaration was
carefully formulated and signed by most insurgent leaders on July 2 1876:
We, as the only lawful representatives of the Serbian lands of Bosnia, after
so much waiting without hope for any help, from now on and forever
resolve to break with the unchristian Ottoman government. We wish to
77
share our fate with our Serbian brothers, whatever this fate may be.

Exactly as this declaration desired, the fate of the Bosnian insurgents became entangled
with that of their Serbian brothers. The first Serbian advance into Bosnia collapsed
within two days. The Serbian militia was greatly outnumbered by the Ottoman forces on
the Bosnian front and the military cooperation with Montenegro failed to support the
Serbian efforts. The Montenegrin offensive into Herzegovina was faced with little
Ottoman resistance since the Ottoman army was fully concentrated in Bosnia. After
marching into Herzegovina, Montenegrin prince Nikola refused to advance further in
concert with the Serbian operations and instead focused on securing the achieved
territorial gains. Recurrent rivalry between the Serbia and Montenegro during the war
frustrated a successful joint offensive into Bosnia and Herzegovina. After a brief
advance toward Sarajevo, the Serbian militia withdrew in haste and disorder.78
76

Ekme%i$, The Serbian Army in the Wars of 1876-78, 287-288

77

Ekme%i$, Ustanak u Bosni, 213.

78

Stavrianos, The Balkans, 403; Ekme%i$, The Serbian Army in the Wars of 1876-78, 285 and 294.

36

After these initial Serbian military setbacks in Bosnia, the Serbian ministry of war
sought to strategically integrate the Bosnian uprising into the Serbian war effort. This
undertaking was not directed at the immediate conquest of Bosnia but merely at placing
Serbian military leadership in control of the Bosnian rebels. In August 1876 the Serbian
ministry of war sent Colonel Mileta Despotovi$ to Bosnia with the task of obtaining the
supreme command of the insurgent movement. Despotovi$ forced discipline upon the
insurgent leaders and established a firm chain of command to coordinate combined
assaults. These military improvements were an absolute necessity to compose one
serious military undertaking out of the scattered rebellious units. The arrival of Mileta
Despotovi$ furthermore significantly reinforced the proclamation of union between
Bosnia and Serbia since the Colonel was invested with the title of official deputy of the
Serbian prince in Bosnia. Among the Bosnian insurgents the unification was celebrated
as a natural result of their struggle for emancipation. The implementation of military
discipline and obedience upon the insurgents, however, also led to friction with the
peasant fighters. The insurgents were devoted to their local loyalties and could not
always recognize their own interests in the orders of the Serbian supreme command.
Another major disadvantage of the strategic integration of the Bosnian uprising into the
greater Serbian war effort was that the fate of the insurgents became depended upon the
Serbian fortunes at the faraway southeastern front in the Ni& region.79
The Serbian southeastward offensive commenced with a successful attack on the first
fortified Ottoman camp on the road to Ni&. The defeated Ottoman garrison retreated to
Pirot but another Ottoman unit infringed the Serbian eastern border. Hesitation and
indecision on the part of General !ernjajev prevented the Serbian militia from
exploiting its initial success. The initial operations of the militia moreover exposed the
weaknesses of the Serbian peasant fighters. Inexperience and frequent disobedience
made the militia hard to manage. The Serbian armed forces proved unable to implement
the offensive strategy. The Ottoman army deeply penetrated eastern Serbia and the
Serbian offensive went in reverse after only two weeks.80 Several frontier towns were
lost to the powerful Ottoman counter-offensive but General !ernjajev quickly
established a new line of defense before the town of Aleksinac. The Serbian staff
introduced daily drills at the front and restored order among disobedient troops. Forced
79

Ekme%i$, Ustanak u Bosni, 212-223, 238-250 and 335.

80

MacKenzie, The Lion of Tashkent, 132-139.

37

into the defense of their own homes, the Serbian peasant fighters performed a lot better.
Under firm leadership the Serbian militia could sustain defensive operations. Fierce
Serbian resistance around the town of Aleksinac prevented an Ottoman breakthrough.
Aleksinac became the most crucial position in the defense of the Morava valley that led
to the Serbian interior. The Ottoman counter-offensive was brought to a standstill and
the Serbian militia adequately protected Serbia from an invasion.81
After the Serbian line of defense in the Morava valley was secured in August 1876, a
perilous period began for the Serbian war effort. The Ottomans reinforced their Morava
front with about 25.000 reserves from Thrace and gradually built up a numerical
superiority over the Serbian forces. Villages around Aleksinac fell prey to outrageous
Ottoman reprisals and thousands of homeless Serbs fled from the invaded territories to
the Serbian interior. These developments caused great distress within Serbia. Foreign
minister Jovan Risti$ feared that Serbia did not have enough resources to endure another
Ottoman offensive. He considered negotiating an armistice with the Ottomans while the
Serbian militia still held the crucial Morava positions. According to Risti$ continuation
of war would probably bring defeat while timely negotiation could restore Serbias
prewar status and territories.82 General !ernjajev protested against an armistice and
intrigued with Prince Milan to undermine the Risti$ government. The General attempted
to enhance his personal influence in Serbia and caused a serious crisis by engineering a
military coup in September 1876. Although he publicly claimed to act in the interest of
Serbia, personally he telegraphed to the Slav Committee in Moscow that his real
intentions were to make Serbia a de facto province of Russia under his dictatorship.
This curious incident provides many clues to the true nature of Russian Pan-Slavism.
The Pan-Slav sympathies always camouflaged the aggressive aim of expanding Russian
influence. Prince Milan prevented General !ernjajev from becoming the dictator of
Serbia but permitted !ernjajevs assessments of the military situation to prevail over the
advise of the Serbian government. !ernjajev overestimated Serbias military might and
persuaded Prince Milan and the government to continue the fight. According to
historian David MacKenzie this manipulation to pursue a hopeless war made General
!ernjajev largely responsible for Serbias crushing defeat in October 1876.83
81

Stokes, Serbian Military Doctrine and the Crisis of 1875-78, 267-269; MacKenzie, The Lion of

Tashkent, 139-145; Ekme%i$, The Serbian Army in the Wars of 1876-78, 284 and 293-294.
82

MacKenzie, Jovan Risti$ and Russia, I, 394-404.

83

MacKenzie, The Lion of Tashkent, 146-155; MacKenzie, Cherniaev in Serbia, 285-297.

38

While General !ernjajev was occupied with his machinations in Serbias internal
affairs the Ottoman army made an unexpected move. The Ottoman offensive positions
before Aleksinac on the east bank of the Morava were evacuated. The Ottoman troops
retreated and then regrouped on the west bank of the river to prepare an assault on the
fortified Serbian position at (unis. The Serbian supreme command had neglected its
troops on this well-fortified west flank. After ten days of October rain in the trenches
without any reinforcement, the (unis garrison could not hold a single day against the
thirty-five battalions of Ottoman regulars that advanced upon the flank. On October 29
the Ottomans broke through the last Serbian line of defense. The Serbian front collapsed
and the road to Belgrade lay open for Ottoman conquest. The peasant militia reacted to
this final defeat with massive flight in complete panic. Crowds of uprooted people,
whose houses were set afire by the Ottoman troops, joined the Serbian soldiers in
retreat.84 Military failure increased the mutual distrust and friction between the Serbs
and the Russian volunteers. During the last battles, General !ernjajev removed his staff
from the front and ordered all Russian officers to abandon the Serbian troops to their
fate. These orders completely crushed what little morale was left among the ranks of the
militia. In the face of military disaster Pan-Slavism abandoned the Serbian cause. After
the Serbian defeat at (unis on October 29, only the intervention of official Russia could
save the Serbian principality from complete destruction.85
The Serbian peasant militia had been clearly incapable of conducting a serious war
against the better-organized, better-equipped and better-led forces of the Ottoman army.
Serbias resources were completely exhausted by the maintenance of the positions in the
Morava valley and one powerful Ottoman assault at (unis had crushed the Serbian
defense at once. The Russian government was immediately warned about the imminent
disaster in the Balkans and anxiously intervened to prevent the Ottoman conquest of the
unfortunate Serbian principality. Within two days after the Serbian defeat, Russia issued
an ultimatum to the Ottoman Empire to halt the hostilities against Serbia. The Ottoman
Sultan directly accepted a two-month armistice and thereafter signed a peace treaty with
the Serbian principality. The ultimatum reasserted official Russias leadership in Balkan
affairs and relegated the Pan-Slav movement to relative obscurity. 86 The Serbian
84

Dimitrije Djordjevi$, The Serbian Peasant in the 1876 War in: Bela Kiraly and Gale Stokes ed.,

Insurrection, Wars and the Eastern Crisis in the 1870s (New York 1985) 305-316.
85

Ekme%i$, The Serbian Army in the Wars of 1876-78, MacKenzie, The Lion of Tashkent, 165-166.

86

MacKenzie, Jovan Risti$ and Russia I, 405-411; MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 153.

39

principality was saved from destruction by the intervention of official Russia. Thanks to
diplomatic pressure from St. Petersburg, the peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire
restored Serbias prewar borders and status. The Serbian situation at the end of 1876
was, however, hardly favorable. The invaded regions in southeastern Serbia were
devastated and the Serbian militia had suffered heavy losses. The principality was
economically exhausted and could hardly provide enough support for the 200.000
homeless refuges that had fled to the Serbian interior. After the First Serbo-Ottoman
War of 1876, the demoralized Serbian principality literally lay in shambles.87
SERBIAN

DIPLOMATIC DISASTER

The Russian ultimatum ended the fighting between Serbia and the Ottoman Empire but
left the Great Eastern Crisis largely unsolved. The fighting in Bosnia continued and the
relieved Ottoman forces at the Serbian front were repositioned against Montenegro.
Russia partly mobilized its army to enforce a ceasefire upon the Ottomans but these
unilateral Russian actions in Balkan affairs caused great suspicion among the other
European Great Powers. Especially Great Britain and Austria-Hungary feared that
Russian pressure upon the Ottoman Empire camouflaged Russian imperialist intentions
to capture Ottoman territories. In order to avoid an anti-Russian coalition, Russia agreed
to assemble a European Conference in Constantinople to negotiate a peaceful settlement
of the Great Eastern Crisis. These negotiations dragged on until January 1877 and then
failed due to intense rivalry between Russia and Great Britain. 88 The Russian
government had anticipated the failure of the Constantinople Conference and entered
separate negotiations with Austria-Hungary in Budapest to prepare the way for action
against the Ottoman Empire. Russia required Austrian neutrality in the Russo-Ottoman
conflict because otherwise Vienna could inflict a disastrous defeat upon the Russians by
siding with the Ottomans. Austria-Hungary and Russia gradually compromised their
differences to provide a Balkan settlement that would satisfy both Austrian and Russian
interests. The Budapest Convention of January 1877 divided the Balkans in separate
spheres of influence. The two Great Powers agreed upon a territorial division that took
no account of the aspirations of the people who actually inhabited the region.89
87

Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 389; MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 159.

88

Stojanovi$, The Great Powers and the Balkans, 95-144; Stavrianos, The Balkans, 403-406.

89

Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 127-132.

40

The complete exhaustion of Serbia after the disastrous war of 1876 reduced the
principalitys diplomatic leverage to nihility during this significant phase of the Great
Eastern Crisis. The domestic recovery of the principality consumed all energies and
funds of the Serbian government. It therefore was impossible for Serbia to effectively
address its aspirations and interests to the Great Powers. Serbia could only remain a
passive spectator to the Austro-Russian dealings that determined the future of the
Serbian nation.90 The Budapest Convention proved most fatal to Serbias main political
aspiration of union with Bosnia. Austria-Hungary was anxiously opposed to any big
Slavic state at its southern borders and succeeded in obstructing the union between
Serbia and Bosnia during the negotiations with Russia in Budapest. Russia was forced
to agree to the eventual Austrian occupation Bosnia and Herzegovina in return for the
necessary Austrian neutrality in the Russo-Ottoman War. While Russia would do the
fighting, Austria-Hungary would receive Bosnia and thereby prevent the creation of a
large Serbia. Russia secured for itself the permission of Vienna to establish a
predominant position in Romania and Bulgaria during the offensive against the Ottoman
Empire. The Russo-Ottoman War would thus enforce a certain balance of power on the
Balkans in which the western regions were to succumb to Austrian influence while the
eastern half of the peninsula came under Russian control. The Austro-Russian
agreement placed both Bosnia and Serbia outside Russias future sphere of influence
and thus made the Serbian question a secondary matter to Russia.91
On April 24 1877 Russia began its war against the Ottoman Empire. The Russian
forces invaded Romania and made spectacular progress across the Danube into
Bulgaria. The Serbian government reacted with eager enthusiasm to the Russian
invasion of the Balkans. Foreign minister Jovan Risti$ hoped that Serbian assistance to
the Russian war effort could secure some territorial gains for Serbia. In June minister
Risti$ and prince Milan met with the Russian tsar at his headquarters in Romania to
state that the Serbian militia was ready to enter the Russo-Ottoman War if Russia would
financially support Serbia. The tsar initially showed little interest in the Serbian offer. A
Russian military mission to Serbia had estimated that the demoralized Serbian militia
could make little contributions on the battlefield. The Russian tsar furthermore feared
that military cooperation with the Serbs would antagonize Austria-Hungary. Serbian
90

MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 159-179 and 184-187.

91

"orovi$, Istorija Srba, 639; Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 390-391.

41

inquiries about the Russian intentions for a territorial settlement were avoided for the
same reason. The Russian diplomats were reluctant to make any territorial commitments
to the Serbs because the Serbian aspirations were irreconcilable with the Austro-Russian
agreement. The detached and reluctant attitude of Russia towards Serbia raised
suspicions among the Serbian leadership. Although the details of the Budapest
Convention remained unknown to the Serbs, it became clear that the agreement had
compromised the Serbian question. The participation of the Serbian militia in the
Russo-Ottoman War was deliberately discouraged so that the Serbian aspirations would
be of no concern during the eventual peace settlement on the Balkans.92
In July 1877 the Russian attitude towards Serbian participation completely changed
as a result of unexpected Russian reverses on the battlefield in Bulgaria. The Russian
forces were defeated in an attempt to capture the Ottoman fortress of Plevna. From July
until December the Russian advance was stalled at this point and reinforcement was
desperately needed. The Serbian government was suddenly put under great pressure to
immediately attack the Ottoman flanks in an attempt to reduce the Ottoman
concentrations at Plevna. The Russian tsar sent a personal messenger to prince Milan
with instructions that clearly reflect the changing situation on the Balkan front:
Tell his Highness that I love him like a son, that he can count on my
protection in every instance, and that upon Serbias participation depends
its national future. Dont forget to tell the Prince that if Serbia doesnt cross
the frontier within twelve days, she will be lost and her national future will
93
be forever compromised.

The Russian tsar desired Serbia to resume warfare but refused to make any statements
on what territories the Serbs would receive in return for their sacrifices. The absence of
definite territorial guarantees delayed Serbias decision to join the fight. The Serbian
government first demanded maximum financial aid to reorganize the militia and then
awaited a favorable outcome of the siege of Plevna. Serbia would not attack the
Ottomans before it became certain that the war would be won. Jovan Risti$ wanted to be
absolutely sure that the Serbian militia could secure considerable territorial gains on the
battlefield because these gains were not to be expected from Russian agreement.94
92

MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 193 and 198-209.

93

Jovan Risti$, Diplomatska Istorije Srbije za Vreme Srpskih Ratova za Oslobo"enje i Nezavisnost, 1875-

1878, II (Beograd 1898) 62.

94

David MacKenzie, Jovan Risti$ and Russia 1868-1880, II in: East European Quarterly 38:1 (2004) 1-

40, there 5; Jelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 148-151.

42

The Second Serbo-Ottoman War (1877-1878) was thus fought as a sideshow to an

overwhelming Russian breakthrough in Bulgaria. A few days after the Russians finally
captured Plevna in early December, Serbia declared war on the Ottoman Empire. While
the Russian army advanced towards Constantinople, the Serbian militia again invaded
the Ni& region and secured a Serbian victory against the weakened Ottoman flanks. The
Serbian militia functioned a lot better in this war. Within a month of campaigning the
Serbs seized the city of Ni& and captured the two southern towns of Pirot and Vranje.
The main reason for the Serbian success was the depletion of the Ottoman forces in this
region. The Serbian militia was not facing the complete regular army but instead
confronted the irregular reserves that consisted mainly of local Albanians. The
Albanians, nevertheless, offered hard village-to-village resistance and often resorted to
savage reprisals upon local Serb civilians. This violence complicated the interethnic
relations in the new regions that Serbia conquered.95 The Serbian success in the second
war was also due to a much better organization of the offensive operations. This time
the Serbian officer corps did not rely on Russian volunteers and it adequately
commanded the troops with a purely Serbian staff. Although the Serbian offensive was
only a sideshow to the much larger Russian advance, the historian David MacKenzie
notes that the Serbian operations contributed significantly to the Russian successes. The
Serbian offensive drew off a considerable number of Ottoman troops and succeeded in
breaking the communications between the Ottoman forces in the western Balkans and
Bulgaria. The most important result of the Second Serbo-Ottoman War was that Serbia
liberated the region between Ni&, Pirot and Vranje. These actual territorial gains were
vital in the face of Russian machinations for a peace settlement.96
On January 31 1878 a Russian armistice with the Ottoman Empire enforced an
immediate ceasefire upon the Serbian front. The preliminary terms of the armistice
foreshadowed Russian intentions in the Balkans and caused great concern among the
Serbian ministers. Provisions concerning the settlement of the Serbian question were
purposefully vague. The armistice agreement stated that Serbia would merely receive a
correction of frontiers while the creation of a great Bulgarian state would be at the heart
of the Russian peace program. The Russian preference for Bulgaria antagonized Serbia.
95

Milo& Jagodi$, The Emigration of Muslims from the New Serbian Regions, 1871-1878 in:

Balkanologie 2 (1998) 99-122.

96

MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 235-247; Stokes, Serbian Military Doctrine and the

Crisis of 1875-78, 270-271.

43

It was clear to Belgrade that Russia threatened to compromise Serbian objectives in

order to establish a large Russian puppet state in Bulgaria. The government protested
against the unequal treatment of the Serbs but this was to no avail. Serbia was excluded
from participation in the peace negotiations that were to conclude a settlement between
Russia and the Ottoman Empire. In 1878 Serbian diplomatic disaster was inevitable,
regardless of the Serbian sacrifices and achievements on the battlefield.97
The entire Russian peace program was dictated upon the Ottomans during the peace
negotiations in San Stefano just outside Constantinople. The Ottoman Empire was
forced to agree to the creation of an autonomous Bulgarian state that by its size and
situation would dominate the entire Balkans. The Russians ensured themselves of
superior control over the Bulgarian state. Russian officials were to supervise the
organization of a Bulgarian administration and the Russian army would remain in
Bulgaria for a period of two years.98 The Serbian question was treated as a secondary
matter at the negotiation table. Serbia and Montenegro would receive independence but
their territorial aspirations were largely ignored. Russian disregard for Serbian interests
resulted from Austria-Hungarys strong objections to Serbian aggrandizement. During
this particular phase of the Great Eastern Crisis, Austrian benevolence was vital to
Russia since international relations quickly deteriorated as a result of the San Stefano
negotiations. Great Britain undertook warlike moves to protect Constantinople and the
Turkish Straits and Austria-Hungary anxiously pressured Russia to honor the Budapest
Convention. Russia made concessions to Vienna in order to achieve its main aims in the
Balkans.99 Serbian territorial increases were reduced to provide for a large Bulgaria. The
proximity of Bulgaria to the Aegean and the Black Sea made Bulgaria a strategic
priority to Russia. The Russians moreover favored the Bulgarians over the Serbs out of
resentment for the independent and liberal tendencies within Serbia. It was calculated
that an autonomous Bulgaria under Russian occupation would be easier to control than
an enlarged independent Serbia. Russian interest had shifted to Bulgaria out of necessity
to compromise Austria-Hungary in a way that would not eradicate Russian influence in
the Balkans. Bulgaria was regarded as the key to achievement of Russian aims and
therefore the Russians made concessions in San Stefano at the expense of Serbdom.100
97

MacKenzie, Jovan Risti$ and Russia, II, 11-18.

98

Jelavich, Russias Balkan Entanglements, 175.

99

MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 248-263.

100

Stojanovi$, The Great Powers and the Balkans, 209-233; ; "orovi$, Istorija Srba, 640-641.

44

The Treaty of San Stefano was announced on March 3 1878 and immediately
provoked immense indignation among the Serbian public. For Serbia the Treaty of San
Stefano was an unmatched diplomatic disaster. Almost all territories that Serbian forces
had liberated during the war were ascribed to Bulgaria. To the great astonishment of the
Serbian government, the Russians demanded the Serbian militia to withdraw from the
entire conquered region between Pirot and Vranje. This area was inhabited by Serbs but
would become an integral part of large Bulgaria according to Russian designs.101 After
receiving the stipulations of the treaty, prince Milan addressed a letter to the Russian
tsar with his complaints about the great injustice that was done to the Serbian nation:
Bosnia and Herzegovina are separated from their motherland. Old Serbia
[the Ni& region] is mutilated and even our status quo militaire in Old
Serbia is destined to serve Bulgarian interests. That, Your Excellency, is
the sad prospect that opens before the Serbian nation despite its heroic
102
struggle, despite unparalleled sacrifices.

The Serbian government decided to preserve the status quo militaire at all costs. The
Serbian militia would not evacuate Pirot and Vranje and prince Milan stated that the
liberated Serbian regions would be defended even against a Russian attack. The
conquered area was perceived indispensable to the Serbian southeastern defenses and its
annexation was required for the economical development of the principality. Serbia
sought to prevent the implementation of the Treaty of San Stefano.103
The provisions of San Stefano began the alienation of Serbia from Russia during the
final phase of the Great Eastern Crisis. Serbian foreign minister Jovan Risti$ started
considering a rapprochement with Austria-Hungary to secure for Serbia at least the
regions that were already in hands of the militia. Vienna was equally dismayed at the
San Stefano Treaty and made a strong voice for international revision of the Balkan
settlement. Jovan Risti$ calculated that Austrian dissatisfaction with the treaty could
provide Serbia with a chance to escape complete diplomatic disaster. Alignment with
Austria against Russian Balkan policy seemed unnatural but in fact it was the only real
alternative for the Serbs after the Russians had abandoned Serbia for Bulgaria.104 The
troublesome interaction between Serbia and Russia during the Great Eastern Crisis
101

Hristo Hristov, Retrospect and Analysis of the San Stefano Treaty in: Bela Kiraly and Gale Stokes

ed., Insurrection, Wars and the Eastern Crisis in the 1870s (New York 1985) 330-342.
102

Risti$, Diplomatska Istorije Srbije, 118.

103

Stojan%evi$, Istorija Srpskog Naroda V, 408; Sundhaussen, Geschichte Serbiens, 137.

104

MacKenzie, Jovan Risti$ and Russia, II, 18-22.

45

paved the way for a radical divorce in 1878. The independent behavior of Serbia during
the crisis had antagonized Russia and the Russian intervention thereafter produced a
settlement that was injurious to Serbian interests. Serbia contemplated a tactical
maneuver towards Austria-Hungary while Austrian pressure had been primarily
responsible for the Russian reduction of Serbian territorial increases. During the spring
months of 1878, the Serbian principality prepared for serious diplomatic reorientation
towards Austria-Hungary as a result of deep disappointment with Russias betrayal of
Serbian interests during the final phase of the Great Eastern Crisis.105

105

Slobodan Jovanovi$, Vlada Milana Obrenovi!a II (Belgrade 1934) 207-210; Stojan%evi$, Istorija

Srpskog Naroda V, 409-410.

46

3. SERBIA AND THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN 1878-1881

The Russian occupation of the eastern half of the Balkan Peninsula caused immediate
international conflict between the European Great Powers. The interests of several states
were threatened by the presence of Russian troops in Bulgaria on the shores of the
Turkish Straits. If the Russians were permitted to consolidate their position in this
critical region the Russian Empire would at once establish exclusive dominance over the
Ottoman capital, the Black Sea and the eastern Balkans. The Russian sphere of
influence would be expanded beyond Constantinople and Russia would emerge as a
mighty Mediterranean power. The naval consequences of these serious eventualities
were unacceptable to Great Britain. The British position as superior sea power would be
undermined and Russia would pose a threat to the Suez Canal that was vital to Britains
colonial trade. Great Britain therefore heavily opposed the Treaty of San Stefano and
sent British warships into the Straits to enforce revision of the treaty upon the Russians.
A large-scale European war seemed a real possibility since the British warlike pressure
was supported by Austria-Hungary.106 The Russian treaty had thoroughly violated the
Budapest Convention of 1877 by establishing exclusive Russian dominance on the
Balkans instead of a balanced division in spheres of influence between Austria and
Russia. The creation of a large Bulgaria and the denial of Austrian rights in Bosnia
infuriated Vienna. Great Britain and Austria-Hungary pressured for a European
conference to revise the settlement of the Great Eastern Crisis in concert with the
European Great Powers. Russia refused to negotiate revisions in Vienna but accepted
the offer of German Chancellor Bismarck to convene a European congress in Berlin.
The European Great Powers were to provide a collective settlement to the Great Eastern
Crisis at the Congress of Berlin in June and July 1878.107
Each of the seven European delegations in Berlin assumed another attitude towards
the Serbian question but certainly none of them considered the fate of Serbia a priority.
The main aim of the Congress of Berlin was to ease the extreme international tension
with the establishment of a stable balance of power on the Balkan Peninsula. For the
success of the Congress the interests of the involved Great Powers would thus weigh a
lot more than the aspirations of the individual Balkan nations. The German first delegate
106

Immanuel Geiss ed., Der Berliner Kongre 1878: Protokolle und Matrialien (Boppard 1978) xi-xvii.

107

Friedrich Benninghoven and Iselin Gundermann, Der Berliner Kongre 1878: Ausstellung des Geheimen

Staatsarchivs Preuischer Kulturbesitz (Berlin 1978) 35-42.

47

Chancellor Bismarck most explicitly stated that his country did not have any affinity
with the small Balkan peoples that came from places of which no one ever heard before
this war. The Congress of Berlin would enforce a territorial settlement on the Balkans
regardless of the complicated ethnic composition of the region. Bismarck functioned as
the Chairman of the Congress and he was determined not to allow secondary matters as
the Serbian question slow down the progress towards a durable European peace. The
balanced advancement of Great Power interests served as the only one immutable
principle of the Congress. The settlement of the Serbian question consequently
depended on diplomatic bargains between the European Great Powers.108
The Serbian government showed deep concern for the unfavorable diplomatic
situation of Serbia in the face of arbitrary Great Power dealings in Berlin. In San
Stefano the Serbs had learned that the Russians were prepared to sacrifice Serbian
territory in order to secure Russian interests in the eastern Balkans. Serbian reliance on
the Russian delegation was therefore impossible. Great Britain generally opposed
territorial expansion of Serbia out of concern for the Ottoman integrity. The British
delegation sought to reduce the size of the Bulgarian state and supported the Austrian
claims on the western Balkans in order to counter the Russian position in the east.
Austria-Hungary had put together an unusually capable delegation under the leadership
of foreign minister Andrssy. The Austrian delegation primarily aimed at the extension
and consolidation of Austrian influence in the western Balkans. Andrssy pleaded for
international approval of an Austrian occupation of Bosnia and sought additional
military presence in the Sand)ak region between Serbia and Montenegro. The Austrian
preoccupation with the western Balkans assured that Austria-Hungary was the
predominant power in the affairs that were vital to the Serbian question. The Austrian
attitude towards the Serbs would thus be decisive to the political future of Serbia. 109
The Serbian foreign ministry recognized its dependence on Austria before the
Congress and drew its conclusions in favor of serious diplomatic reorientation.
Rapprochement to Vienna in order to improve the Austrian attitude towards Serbia at
the Congress of Berlin was perceived the most reasonable strategy. Serbian foreign
minister Jovan Risti$ undertook a crucial diplomatic mission to Vienna. He met with his
Austrian counterpart Andrssy and presented to him a letter from the Serbian prince that
108

Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 135-144.

109

MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 299-305.

48

exposed the Austrophile reorientation of the Serbian principality. The princely letter
stressed Serbias desire for good relations with Austria-Hungary and expressed hope for
Austrian support at the Congress. Andrssy replied favorably to Serbias diplomatic
overture and immediately proposed to negotiate a general agreement with Serbia.
Within two hours of intensive negotiation, Risti$ and Andrssy established the
foundations for the Serbo-Austrian cooperation during the final phase of the Great
Eastern Crisis. The Austrian delegation would support Serbian independence and
territorial increase at the Congress of Berlin in exchange for Serbian adherence to
several Austrian conditions of economic and geopolitical nature.110
The obvious intent of the Austrian benevolence towards Serbia in 1878 was to
include Serbia into the Austrian sphere of influence on the Balkans. Austria-Hungary
supported Serbian independence in Berlin but at the same time established mechanisms
to control independent Serbia. The Austrian conditions for cooperation at the Congress
required Serbia to conclude a commercial agreement with Austria-Hungary. This
agreement would integrate the Serbian market into the Austrian economic sphere by
establishing favorable custom regulations. The economic integration was to be further
facilitated by the obligation for Serbia to construct railway connections between the
Austrian borders and the Serbian interior. These conditions could benefit the Serbian
economy to a certain extend but economic integration camouflaged the establishment of
Serbian economic dependence upon Austria-Hungary. Jovan Risti$ was aware of these
intentions but reported to the Serbian government that Serbia had no choice:
If we agree to Austria-Hungarys proposals, well have its support with
prospects of territorial increases beyond San Stefanos frontiers. If we
dont agree, then everything comes into question, even San Stefanos
111
frontiers and Ni&. I was clearly informed of that.

Serbia needed the support of Austria-Hungary in the face of the diplomatic complexities
of the Congress. Risti$ thus concluded a general agreement in Vienna and proposed to
negotiate the more detailed conditions for Austrian support later on in Berlin. He sought
to postpone Serbian commitment to Austrian demands until the most favorable moment.
Risti$ pursued a thoughtful diplomatic strategy that could soften the Austrian conditions
and secure the interests of Serbia without fully succumbing to the Austrian sphere.112
110

Jovanovi$, Vlada Milana Obrenovi!a II, 208-211; Risti$, Diplomatska Istorije Srbije, 173-180.

111

Risti$, Diplomatska Istorije Srbije, 180-181.

112

MacKenzie, Jovan Risti$ and Russia, II, 22-27.

49

THE SERBIAN

MEMORANDUM

Serbia was excluded from any form of representation in the plenary sessions of the
Congress of Berlin. The Serbian foreign ministry therefore recognized that the interests
of Serbia had to be defended outside the formal sessions in the corridors of the
Congress. On June 11 1878, Jovan Risti$ traveled to Berlin with the delicate task of
representing Serbia through unofficial consultations with the individual delegates of the
Great Powers. This mission to Berlin required sophisticated diplomatic skill and modest
patience. Risti$ gently encountered the different delegations and eloquently told each
delegate what he whished to hear. Some delegates were passionately informed about the
brave struggle of Serbdom while others received a more rational analysis of the Serbian
question. The general tendency of the Serbian plea claimed that a reasonable settlement
of the Serbian question was essential to the pacification of the Balkans. The Serbian
government demanded a settlement that would guarantee Serbian independence and
considerable territorial increase of Serbia in the liberated region between Ni&, Pirot and
Vranje. Jovan Risti$ avoided extreme territorial demands but remained stubborn in his
assessment that the Great Eastern Crisis could be solved only if the Serbian principality
obtained a satisfying political and territorial settlement.113
The clearest manifestation of Serbias diplomatic strategy at the Congress of Berlin
is the memorandum that Risti$ submitted to the Congress on June 24. This document
contained a written proclamation of the Serbian interests and was in fact the only formal
representation that the Serbs were allowed to make at the Congress. The Serbian
memorandum provides the historian with a rare insight in the diplomatic considerations
of Serbia during the final phase of the Great Eastern Crisis. Jovan Risti$ opens the
memorandum with a historical account of the suffering of Serbs under Ottoman rule.
Ottoman misrule justified the Serbian demand for independence. The memorandum
thereafter continues with an interesting justification of the Serbian territorial claims:
With her actions the principality has liberated almost the entire territory of
Old Serbia. How could it retreat without abandoning the inhabitants of this
region to the revenge of the Muslims and bringing the country in a violent
position that nobody could bear? The best remedy is to secure the blessings
of permanent peace in this region by satisfying the legitimate whishes of
114
the population for liberation and union with the motherland.
113

Sundhaussen, Geschichte Serbiens, 138-139; MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 306;

MacKenzie, Jovan Risti$ and Russia, II, 12 and 33.

114

Srpski Memorandum in: Stoji%i$ and Ran'elovi$, Berlinski Kongres i Srpsko Pitanje, 107.

50

The Serbian memorandum appealed to principles of European political theory in order

to defend the Serbian interests before the concert of European Great Powers. According
to this fragment the population of the liberated regions had the legitimate right to whish
for union with the Serbian motherland because they were part of the Serbian nation. The
memorandum thereby appealed to the European principle of national self-determination
that accredited every nation with the right to decide its own sovereignty without
external compulsion. The opening of the memorandum referred to the right of resistance
to tyrannical oppression in order to justify the Serbian struggle for independence. This
right of resistance had played a fundamental role in the French revolution and was
integrated into British political thought as the social contract. The sophisticated appeals
reveal the rational and European character of Serbian diplomacy in 1878.115
The Italian and the French delegations reacted favorably to the Serbian appeals. Italy
recognized the similarities with the Italian national unification and adopted a friendly
attitude towards the Serbs at the Congress. The French delegates also sympathized with
the Serbian national revolution and supported the Serbian appeal to progressive political
doctrines. France and Italy, however, occupied secondary positions at the Congress and
were thus limited in their possibilities to support Serbian interests. The French
delegation advised Risti$ to secure immediate Austrian support. Austria-Hungary
occupied the strongest position at the Congress and every delegation avoided opposing
Austrian interests. The French envoy warned Risti$ that Serbia can only succeed to the
extent it agrees with Austria.116 Jovan Risti$ recognized the essential position of the
Habsburg Monarchy at the Congress and negotiated with the Austrian delegates on the
basis of the general agreement he had concluded before the Congress in Vienna. The
Austrian delegation could not be impressed with enlightened political appeals but
demanded definite geopolitical and economic commitments from the Serbs.117
Careful reading of the Serbian memorandum reveals that Jovan Risti$ yielded to the
Austrian geopolitical demands out of concern for the attitude of Austria-Hungary. The
memorandum defends the Serbian claims on the southern liberated regions into the
greatest detail but on the other hand makes a rather nuanced statement about Bosnia.
The Serbian government was aware of the Austrian plans for the occupation of Bosnia
115

Srpski Memorandum, Stoji%i$ and Ran'elovi$, Berlinski Kongres i Srpsko Pitanje, 103-109; Stokes,

Politics as development, 136.

116

Risti$, Diplomatska Istorije Srbije, 188.

117

Geiss, Der Berliner Kongre 1878, xiv.

51

and sought to avoid displeasing the Austrian delegation by expressing the Serbian
interests in Bosnia. Risti$ refused to renounce Serbian claims on Bosnia but did assume
a very passive stance towards the Bosnian question in the Serbian memorandum:
Regarding the regions on the other side of the Drina, we dare to claim that
peace cannot be established there without radical changes. But the Serbian
government doesnt think that it is up to her to decide in advance about the
settlement of a question that the Great Powers have already taken into their
hands. Serbia restricts herself to a expression of confidence that the Powers
in their wisdom will find a solution that will end the unfortunate cries of
118
our brethren that live on the other side of the Drina.

The Serbian memorandum spoke of Bosnia without even mentioning its Slavic
provincial name and literally stated that the Serbian government would agree to any
settlement that the Great Powers perceived to be adequate. Union between Bosnia and
Serbia had been the main political objective during the Serbian campaign but after the
war the Serbian government had to acknowledge that Bosnia was lost. Austria-Hungary
would occupy Bosnia to secure Austrian hegemony in the western Balkans. The Serbian
memorandum accepted the unavoidable prospect of losing Bosnia without resistance in
order to secure the other political and territorial Serbian aims with Austrian support.119

THE BERLIN

SETTLEMENT OF THE

SERBIAN

QUESTION

The Serbian question came before the Congress on June 28 during the eighth plenary
session in the official residence of Chancellor Bismarck on the Wilhelmstrae in central
Berlin. Bismarck himself led the negotiations as the chairman and dominated the entire
session with his authoritarian diplomatic style. One particular feature of this style was
that delegates were forbidden to slow down the Congress with unnecessary details.
Matters of detail were immediately entrusted to special commissions outside the plenary
sessions. Bismarck furthermore ensured that the most controversial issues were handled
first. The difficult Bulgarian question had thus been provided with a solution in the
seven sessions before the session that decided the fate of the Serbs.120 The settlement of
the Serbian question began with revision of the San Stefano stipulations on Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The Austrian foreign minister Andrssy read a long paper emphasizing
that the special interests of the Habsburg Monarchy in Bosnia and Herzegovina gave it
118

Srpski Memorandum, Stoji%i$ and Ran'elovi$, Berlinski Kongres i Srpsko Pitanje, 107.

119

Stojan%evi$, Istorija Srpskog Naroda V, 410-415; Risti$, Diplomatska Istorije Srbije, 188-194.

120

Geiss, Der Berliner Kongre 1878, xx-xxi.

52

the right to demand an adequate solution for the grave problems in these Ottoman
provinces. According to Andrssy autonomy could not restore order among the divided
Bosnian population and he called for another proposal. Great Britain reacted to this hint
and suggested that the Congress should decide that Bosnia and Herzegovina should be
occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary. These diplomatic moves were carefully
prepared before the Congress and with British support the Austrian occupation of
Bosnia was swiftly ratified in article 25 of the official peace treaty.121
After the fate of Bosnia had been decided, the Congress centered on the Serbian
principality. The French delegate Monsieur Waddington made a firm statement in favor
of granting Serbia independence, under the sole condition that Serbia would guarantee
the liberty and equality to all religions in the principality. Waddington referred to the
enlightened desires of the Serbian memorandum in his speech before the Congress:
Monsieur Waddington believes that it is important for the European
delegates to observe this grand moment to reaffirm the principle of
religious freedom. Serbia desires to entre the European community on an
equal basis with all other states and therefore must from the outset
recognize the principles that constitute the foundations of society in all
European states. This is a necessary condition in return for the favors that
122
Serbia desires.

Russian foreign minister Gor%akov made some anti-Semitic objections to the French
proposal but soon thereafter yielded to the conditional linkage of Serbian independence
to the religious guarantees. The other European delegations supported the French
proposal without opposition. Chancellor Bismarck concluded that the Congress granted
Serbia independence under the condition that she would guarantee religious liberty and
equality to all citizens of the Serbian principality.123
The Congress of Berlin encountered the greatest difficulties in formulating a
straightforward delimitation of the new Serbian boundaries. The Ottoman Empire and
Great Britain were opposed to Serbian aggrandizement and Russia claimed part of the
Serbian territorial aspirations for Bulgaria. Serbian appeals to the principle of national
self-determination did impress Russian diplomats and consequently the second Russian
delegate #uvalov decided to cede Vranje to Serbia before the eighth session convened.
121

Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and After, 82-86; Benninghoven and Gundermann, Der Berliner

Kongre 1878, 60-61; Protokoll Nr. 8, Geiss, Der Berliner Kongre 1878, 238-249.
122

Protokoll Nr. 8, Geiss, Der Berliner Kongre 1878, 238-258.

123

Serge Maiwald, Der Berliner Kongre 1878 und das Vlkerrecht (Stuttgart 1948) 60-63.

53

The Russian delegation, however, refused to support Serbias claim on Pirot. The
surroundings of Pirot featured a strategic line of natural defenses and the Russians
therefore ascribed the town to Bulgaria. Chancellor Bismarck prevented a long and
complex argument about these issues and resolutely banned further discussion of the
Serbian frontiers from the plenary session. A special boundary commission was
composed of representatives from each delegation. Austria-Hungary was prepared to
support the Serbian position within this boundary commission after the prompt
conclusion of a definite agreement with Serbia.124
For Jovan Risti$ the most favorable moment arrived to agree with the Austrian
conditions in return for immediate approval of clearly defined territorial gains. The
boundary commission convened on a daily basis between June 29 and July 8. During
these crucial days the formal agreement between Austria-Hungary and Serbia came into
existence. Andrssy appointed the trade specialist of his foreign office to inform Jovan
Risti$ about the exact Austrian conditions. The first provision compelled Serbia to
construct a railway from Belgrade into the new southeastern territories within three
years. The Serbian railway would be integrated in a large and strategic trajectory that
connected Vienna to the Aegean port of Salonika. Serbian commitment was required
right away and the railway obligation was included in article 38 of the Berlin treaty. The
second provision obliged the Serbian government to conclude a commercial treaty with
Austria-Hungary immediately after the Congress. This obligation left Serbia some
latitude for further negotiation but nevertheless secured the Austrian aim of establishing
economic influence in Serbia. The agreement furthermore ensured the de facto consent
of Serbia to the Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Austrian
obligations were onerous but offered Serbia reasonable benefits. The loss of Bosnia had
been inevitable anyway and the economic integration of Serbia on an equal basis could
generate an impulse for the Serbian market. The most important reason for concluding
the Austrian agreement was of course that it was the only chance for Serbia to assure a
favorable settlement of the Serbian frontiers at the Congress of Berlin.125
On July 8, the boundary commission ascribed considerably more territory to Serbia
than had been promised to her at San Stefano. The proposed delimitation of frontiers
124

Protokoll Nr. 8, Geiss, Der Berliner Kongre 1878, 238-258; MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian

Pan-Slavism, 308-311; Risti$, Diplomatska Istorije Srbije, 212-218.

125

Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and After, 78-79, 94-95 and 100-101; Stojanovi$, The Great Powers

and the Balkans, 276-280; Risti$, Diplomatska Istorije Srbije, 218-231.

54

allowed Serbia to annex the entire liberated region between Ni&, Pirot and Vranje. These
territorial increases were largely due to the strong support of Austria-Hungary within
the commission. The conclusion of the agreement between Austria and Serbia enabled
the Austrian delegates to defend the interests of Serbia at the Congress. Andrssy
assured general support for Serbias claim to Vranje and his proposal to leave Pirot to
Serbia blocked the pro-Bulgarian designs of the Russian delegation. The alignment of
Serbia to Austria occurred against a background of deteriorating relations between
Serbia and Russia. The compromising attitude of Russia towards the Serbs so took its
toll during the final phase of the Great Eastern Crisis.126 Jovan Risti$ aligned Serbia to
the Austrian sphere of influence in order to secure at least some territorial
aggrandizement. This diplomatic strategy worked out relatively well for the Serbian
foreign minister. His mission to Berlin achieved unanticipated success without formal
participation at the Congress. After a full month of intensive negotiations the Great
Powers ratified the final peace treaty on July 13 1878. The treaty brought Serbia
independence and territorial expansion beyond the delimitations of San Stefano. The
achievement of these significant Serbian aspirations at the Congress of Berlin resulted
from the alignment of Serbia to Austria-Hungary in the corridors of the Congress.127
The effects of the Congress of Berlin on the Serbian principality went far beyond the
sole articles and stipulations that formally dealt with the Serbian question. The Serbian
government could implement these formalities without much effort. Within a month
after the Congress prince Milan proclaimed Serbian independence in a festive ceremony
and religious liberty was guaranteed to all Serbian citizens. The real challenge for
Serbia was thereafter to substantialize its position as an independent state in the new
international environment of the Balkans. The Congress of Berlin transformed the
constellation of states in the Balkans beyond recognition and the Serbian position within
the settlement was to be consolidated. An autonomous Bulgarian principality arose at
the eastern borders of Serbia. Bulgaria was reduced in size at the Congress and
Bulgarian resentment about this reduction poisoned its relations with Serbia from the
outset. Potential rivalry in the eastern territories negatively affected the Serbian
position.128 To the west of Serbia developments were even worse. Austria-Hungary
126

Du&ko M. Kova%evi$, Srbija i Rusija 1878-1889: od Berlinskog kongresa do abdikacije kralja Milana

(Beograd 2003) 47-58 and 71-76; MacKenzie, Jovan Risti$ and Russia, II, 29-36.
127

Stojan%evi$, Istorija Srpskog Naroda V, 415-421; Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 398-400.

128

Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 145-151.

55

advanced into Bosnia and Herzegovina and crushed the armed resistance of Bosnian
Serb peasants. The Serbian principality was forced into passive nonintervention as a
consequence of its advantageous alignment to Vienna.129 Both the Austrian pressure
from the west and the Bulgarian hostility from the east had a destabilizing effect on
Serbia. The Serbian government opposed these pressures with a foreign policy that
sought to consolidate a strong Serbian position in the new settlement. The results of the
Congress of Berlin were to be secured against foreign threats. The new territories in the
southeast were integrated and Serbian statesmen sought to conclude an agreement with
the Austrians that would preserve the precious independence of Serbia. These
developments during the aftermath of the Congress of Berlin would define the true
historical meaning of the struggle of Serbdom in the Great Eastern Crisis.130

THE

INTEGRATION OF THE NEW TERRITORIES

The first challenge that the independent Serbian government faced after the Congress
was the integration of the new southeastern territories into the Serbian state. The right to
annex these territories had been the most important material result of the Congress.
Serbian statesmen urged the immediate establishment of orderly administration in the
liberated regions to safeguard the Serbian territorial gains from possible revisionist
incursions by the Bulgarians or the Ottomans. The new territories were politically
backward and the enforcement of law and order was a great effort. The city of Ni& was
the strategic and economic stronghold of the region and became the base for the
administrative integration of its direct surroundings. Additional administrative centers
were established in the towns of Pirot and Vranje. The Serbian government appointed
judges and a police apparatus to the region with the instructions to respect traditional
customs at first before gradually introducing the Serbian state law. The project of
integration was felt as a civilizing mission that would bring national enlightenment to
the liberated Serbs after 500 years of primitive Ottoman despotism.131
The Serbian civilizing mission in the southeast consisted an aggressive component
that would chronically trouble the interethnic relations in the southern border zone of
Serbia. During the integration of the new territories, Serbian militia and government
129

Bencze, The Occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 293-302.

130

Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and After, xiii-xxii and 126-136; Stavrianos, The Balkans, 410-412.

131

Stokes, Politics as development, 165-169; Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 402-403.

56

officials encountered a large Muslim minority of about 70.000 peasants, townspeople

and landlords. The Muslim peasants were mainly Albanians that had violently resisted
the advance of Serbian troops as Ottoman irregulars during the last war. With harsh
reprisals the Serbian authorities now encouraged these Albanians to leave. In the
immediate postwar wilderness the Serbian militia plundered Muslim property in the
countryside and tore down mosques in the liberated towns.132 Serbia was bound by the
Congress of Berlin to respect the property rights of the local Muslims and the Serbian
government intervened on the issue in order to prevent international interference. The
ministry of finance institutionalized the dispossession and expulsion of Muslims.
Landlords were forced to sell their estates to Serbs for inflated prices that were often not
paid at all. The dispossessed lands and farms were ascribed to local peasants and
Serbian refugees from the regions in eastern Serbia that had been ravaged by the
Ottomans in 1876. The aftermath of the Congress of Berlin hereby provided Balkan
history with a dangerous precedent for forced ethnic resettlement and commenced a
tradition of mutual ethnic intolerance between Serbs and Albanians.133

THE

COMMERCIAL TREATY WITH

A U S T R I A -H U N G A R Y

Before Serbia concluded the obligatory commercial treaty with Austria-Hungary an

attempt was made to remedy the depressed Serbian economy. Serbian state finances
were depleted after the expensive wars. The Serbian state debt was enormous and the
economy had stagnated as a result of wartime requisitions in the countryside. The
mobilization of all able-bodied men to the battlefronts had furthermore reduced the
Serbian agricultural production. These economic problems were hardly favorable at a
time that the government seemed to need more funds than ever. The transition to
independence was costly and a lot of funds were invested in the integration of the south.
To make things worse the Serbian government was obliged to construct an extensive
railway for the Austrians. The Serbian government raised new taxes in an attempt to
cover these expenditures. Fiscal measures placed the main burden on the Serbian middle
class of merchants and professionals. Peasants were spared intentionally because they

132

Jagodi$, The Emigration of Muslims from the New Serbian Regions, 1871-1878, 99-122.

133

(jor'e Stefanovi$ Seeing the Albanians through Serbian Eyes: the Inventors of the Tradition of

Intolerance and Their Critics, 1804-1939 in: European History Quarterly 35 (Toronto 2005) 465-492;
Sundhaussen, Geschichte Serbiens, 141-142.

57

had suffered most during the war. This unequal taxation of the Serbian middle class
struck the most influential segment of Serbian society and was thus bound to provoke
strong opposition. The war had temporarily forced domestic political disunity into the
background but in 1879 Serbian political life revived around the economic issues that
plagued Serbia. The liberal government of Jovan Risti$ was faced with strong
opposition from moderate conservatives that organized themselves as the progressive
movement. The progressives criticized the economic policies of the Risti$ government
and advocated an alternative strategy in closer cooperation with Austria-Hungary.134
The Austrian government meanwhile pressured Serbia to conclude the commercial
treaty as had been agreed upon in Berlin. Jovan Risti$ met with several Austrian
officials but the negotiations went badly. The Austrians sought to enforce unequal terms
upon the Serbian principality. The conditions that were offered would ensure
overwhelming economic advantages for Austria while the Serbian economy would be
reduced to subservience. The Austrian ministry of finance insisted on a fixed tariff
privilege for Austrian manufactured products in order to dominate the Serbian market
and cripple the development of an indigenous Serbian industry. The draft treaty
reserved the exclusive right for Austria-Hungary to limit imports from Serbia whenever
it wanted. These unequal terms sought to lock Serbia into total economic dependence on
Austria-Hungary.135 The Serbian foreign ministry refused to accept these conditions for
their negative effects on the economy and even more because they posed a serious threat
to the precious independence of Serbia. Jovan Risti$ recognized that the de facto
meaning of Serbian independence depended on the future arrangement with Austria.
The Serbian government insisted on equal treatment and tried to resist the apparent
intention of Austria-Hungary to undermine the Serbian independence.136
The Serbian principality did neither have the economic strength nor the diplomatic
latitude to defend its independence against the Austrian imperialist aspirations. The
Austrian foreign ministry was furious at the reluctance of Serbia to honor the Berlin
obligations and imposed a trade embargo on Serbian pigs and cattle. The embargo
immediately dealt a devastating blow to the weak Serbian economy since the export of
livestock to Austria was a vital component of Serbian commerce. Jovan Risti$ wished to

134

Stokes, Politics as development, 139-143; Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 403 and 406-408.

135

Jelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 185-186.

136

Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 405-406.

58

defend the independence of Serbia at all costs and called for a tariff war against Austria.
Economic warfare could assert Serbian sovereignty but would most certainly cause deep
economic disaster in Serbia. The bellicose course of the Serbian government therefore
found no support among the Serbian public. Serbian peasants and merchants
experienced the disastrous consequences of the problems with Vienna and demanded an
immediate solution. The Serbian prince also insisted on appeasement to Vienna. In the
face of both popular and princely opposition Jovan Risti$ and his government resigned
in October 1880. Prince Milan called upon the progressive opposition to form a new
government and conclude an immediate agreement with Austria-Hungary.137
The fall of Jovan Risti$ in 1880 caused a major shift in Serbian foreign policy. The
new progressive government fully abandoned the cautious approach of Risti$ towards
Austria-Hungary and assumed a more Austrophile foreign policy. The progressives
were convinced that Serbia could stand no chance in a conflict with Austria-Hungary
and they maintained that harmonious relations with Vienna were in the best interest of
the Serbs. !edomilj Mijatovi$ (1848-1932) was appointed to the combined position of
foreign minister and minister of finance in order to facilitate the swift conclusion of the
commercial treaty with Austria-Hungary. The new minister resumed negotiations with
the Habsburg Monarchy and in April 1881 the commercial treaty was signed. The
Austrian terms had remained the same. The treaty secured tariff privileges for Austrian
manufactured products on the Serbian market and acknowledged similar but unequal
advantages for Serbian livestock and agricultural produce in Austria. At short term, the
Austrophile policy of the progressives was economically reasonable. The advantages for
Serbian goods on the Austrian market generated a direct impulse for Serbian
agriculture. Considering the desperate economic situation of Serbia these effects
adequately responded to the immediate needs of the Serbian economy. However, in the
longer term, the commercial treaty encouraged Serbia to become an agrarian colony for
Austrian foodstuffs. The privileges for Austrian manufactured products blocked the
development of domestic industries in Serbia. Vienna furthermore enjoyed the unequal
freedom of action to limit imports from Serbia at will. The Austrophile foreign policy of
the progressive government thus led to the signature of a commercial treaty that
established the economic dependence of Serbia on Austria-Hungary.138
137

Jovanovi$, Vlada Milana Obrenovi!a II, 294-300; Stokes, Politics as development, 155 and 169-176.

138

"orovi$, Istorija Srba, 643-644; Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 411-412.

59

THE

SECRET POLITICAL CONVENTION WITH

A U S T R I A -H U N G A R Y

Serbian foreign policy culminated into further relinquishment of Serbian independence

after the conclusion of the commercial treaty. This was largely the result of the personal
interference of prince Milan with Serbian foreign affairs. Milan extended his princely
influence over the foreign office through his friendship with minister Mijatovi$. Both
men were ardent advocates of Serbian Austrophilism. Prince Milan sought to establish
intimate personal relations with the Habsburg court. The Serbian prince made regular
visits to Vienna and spent three subsequent summers in Austrian spas. At the Habsburg
court prince Milan was received with great splendor and these visits induced the prince
to pursue his personal ambitions as the ruler of Serbia. With great jealousy Milan had
received the news from Bucharest that Romania was declared a kingdom with prince
Charles as its king. The Serbian prince envied the title of king and the flattery of his
contacts in Austria-Hungary encouraged him to arrange Habsburg support for his own
coronation. Foreign minister Mijatovi$ embraced the dealings of prince Milan since he
perceived that Serbia needed Austrian protection to counter the Russian support of
Bulgaria. Mijatovi$ calculated that the occupation of Bosnia forced the future expansion
of Serbia in a southeastward direction towards Macedonia. In these southeastern regions
the Serbs had to face Bulgarian rivalry and Serbia thus needed a strong protector. Prince
Milan and minister Mijatovi$ agreed to negotiate a convention with Austria-Hungary
that would arrange permanent cooperation between Belgrade and Vienna.139
Austria-Hungary was eagerly prepared to conclude a political convention with Serbia
because such an arrangement would serve the Habsburg aim of extending Austrian
influence in the western Balkans. The commercial treaty had established economic ties
with Serbia and a political agreement could strengthen the dimension of Serbian
dependence upon Vienna. The Austrian government furthermore calculated that a
political agreement with Serbia could facilitate the consolidation of the occupational
regime in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The official abandonment nationalism in Serbian
foreign policy was sought to pacify the reluctant Bosnian Serb population. Milan and
the Austrian negotiators concluded the general outlines of the agreement with
exceptional ease in Vienna. The Serbian foreign minister and the Austrian ambassador
thereafter signed the secret political convention in Belgrade on June 28 1881.140
139

Stokes, Politics as development, 174 and 190-191; Jovanovi$, Vlada Milana Obrenovi!a II, 334-343.

140

Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 412-413; "orovi$, Istorija Srba, 643-645.

60

The secret political convention of June 1881 provided Serbia with Habsburg support
for both the coronation of prince Milan and the future expansion of Serbia into
Macedonia. The Austrian government promised to use its influence among the Great
Powers to achieve international recognition of Serbia as a kingdom. Serbia obtained a
similar promise of diplomatic support for eventual military endeavors in the southeast.
In return for these conditional gains prince Milan and minister Mijatovi$ simply agreed
to everything that Austria-Hungary demanded. The Serbian government would no
longer allow Serbian citizens to intrigue among the Serbs of Bosnia and political
agitation against the Habsburg Monarchy was forbidden within Serbia. The most
injurious stipulation of the secret convention obliged the Serbian government to neither
negotiate nor conclude any future agreements with other governments without the
previous consent of Austria-Hungary.141 The nature of this agreement nullified the
meaning of Serbian independence and made Serbia a satellite kingdom under Austrian
supremacy. The progressive government had completely failed to preserve Serbian
independence against Austrian pressure. The Habsburg government obtained full
control over Serbian foreign affairs and Serbia was deprived of the sovereign right to
conduct its own foreign policy. The course of Serbian foreign policy was no longer
decided in Belgrade but became subjected to the hegemony of Vienna. Thereby history
itself terminated the subject of this essay. Serbian Austrophilism in the aftermath of the
Congress of Berlin brought an end to the genuine foreign policy of Serbia.142
THE

CREATION OF THE POWDER KEG OF

EUROPE

In March 1882, Serbia was proclaimed a kingdom and the Habsburg emperor Franz
Joseph was the first to congratulate his Royal Highness king Milan Obrenovi$. The
royal proclamation did not arouse much national enthusiasm among the Serbian public.
It was obvious that the formal establishment of the Serbian kingdom disguised the
actual degeneration of national independence. The Serbian government had abandoned
Serbian nationalism and Serbian sovereignty had been surrendered to the hegemony of
Austria-Hungary. 143 The abandonment of Serbian nationalism marked a significant
break with the nationalist conduct of Serbian foreign policy between 1875 and 1878.
141

Sundhaussen, Geschichte Serbiens, 199-200.

142

Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 414-415; Stavrianos, The Balkans, 515-516.

143

"orovi$, Istorija Srba, 645-648.

61

That eventful period in Serbian history had witnessed an unprecedented peak in Serbian
nationalist activity. The outbreak of the Bosnian uprising in 1875 had provoked an
upsurge of nationalism that affected the foreign policy of Serbia. The nationalist
statesman Jovan Risti$ had assumed control over the foreign ministry and throughout
his time in office Serbian nationalism was the basis of Serbian foreign policy. The
Serbian principality had embarked on a war of national liberation and unification that
came to an end after the intervention of the Great Powers. Jovan Risti$ thereafter
secured some Serbian aspirations at the Congress of Berlin in 1878.144 After 1878 the
pursuit of nationalism brought Serbia in conflict with Vienna. Both the Serbian state
and Serbian nationalism were still too underdeveloped to endure this conflict. The
nationalist regime of Jovan Risti$ resigned and a new Serbian government abandoned
nationalism. Austrophilism replaced Serbian nationalism as the guiding principle of
Serbian foreign policy. The aftermath of the Congress of Berlin revealed that Serbian
nationalism was incompatible with the actual inferior position of the Serbian kingdom
as a docile satellite of Austria-Hungary.145
The postwar abandonment of nationalism in Serbian foreign affairs stood in stark
contrast to a simultaneous development within Serbian society. The Serbian population
had been deeply affected by the hardships of war throughout the Great Eastern Crisis.
Serbia had sustained enormous sacrifices in both men and materials at various
battlefronts in the conflict. One-sixth of the Serbian population had fought in the
national militia and every peasant family in Serbia had experienced the financial
burdens of war. 146 These efforts composed an important collective experience for
Serbian society. The engagement of entire Serbian nation in the struggle of Serbdom
between 1875 and 1878 intensified the development of national consciousness among
ordinary Serbs. Through the bitter experience of warfare at the battlefront, the Serbian
peasantry became intimately acquainted with the true scope of Serbian nationalism.
Intellectual nationalist ideology transcended its urban milieu and nationalism became a
general cause to fight for.147 The full accomplishment of Serbian nationalism as a mass
phenomenon continued after the Great Eastern Crisis in a process of further warfare and
conflict but it should be noted that the intervention of Serbia in 1876 marked a turning
144

MacKenzie, Jovan Risti$ and Russia, II, 36-38; Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 406 and 414.

145

MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 335-339.

146

Stojanovi$, The Great Powers and the Balkans, 93-94.

147

Ekme%i$, The Serbian Army in the Wars of 1876-78, 299-300.

62

point in the development of Serbian national consciousness. The growth of national

spirit among Serbs between 1875 and 1878 ironically coincided with the contrary
suppression of nationalism in Serbian foreign affairs. These opponent developments
were bound to cause disruptive problems. The spirit of Serbian nationalism resented the
outcome of the Congress of Berlin and most Serbs were dissatisfied with the docile
foreign policy of Serbia. These nationalist grievances prepared the grounds for future
conflicts. The Berlin settlement suppressed Serbian nationalism but that suppression
would become untenable in the face of rising national consciousness among Serbs.148
The nationalist antagonism that Serbian society experienced in the aftermath of the
Congress of Berlin was characteristic for the other Balkan states as well. The Congress
had secured certain advantages for each of the Balkan states but the greater part of their
aspirations had been frustrated out of consideration for the divergent designs of the
Great Powers.149 The imposed fragmentation of the Balkans ignored the territorial
concerns of the population that inhabited the region. The Great Powers considered the
complicated ethnographic composition of the Balkans irrelevant to their objective of
geopolitical balance in Europe. The Berlin settlement thus satisfied the ambitions of
certain Great Powers but certainly did not contribute to peace and stability in the
Balkans. Complete disregard of ethnic and nationalist considerations exacerbated
dissension and strife among the Balkan peoples.150 The Bulgarians were embittered by
the partition of their country and feuded with the Serbs for Macedonia. The relation
between Romania and the Bulgarian state was also troubled by territorial rivalry. The
Romanians furthermore resented the loss of Bessarabia to the Russians. The Greeks did
not receive anything and the Montenegrins were separated from Serbia by the Austrian
occupation of the Sand)ak region. The Congress of Berlin in other words gave birth to a
complex entanglement of competitive nationalisms in the Balkans. The Balkans became
an irritable wasps nest of nationalist rivalry.151
The most dangerous element in the maze of disruptive Balkan entanglements was the
continuous involvement of Great Powers in Balkan affairs after 1878. The Congress of
Berlin prevented general war and established European peace for over three decades.
This relative success led to the incorrect presumption among the Great Powers that joint
148

Sundhaussen, Geschichte Serbiens, 132-136 and 205.

149

Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and After, 133-136.

150

Djordjevi$ and Fischer-Galati, The Balkan Revolutionary Tradition, 159-160.

151

Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 143-146; Stavrianos, The Balkans, 412.

63

European intervention in Balkan disputes could preserve European stability in the future
without reference to the interests of the Balkan states. This significant legacy of the
Congress of Berlin provoked a series of Great Power interventions in the numerous
Balkan conflicts and crises between 1878 and 1914.152 The Congress of Berlin had
sowed the seeds for these conflicts and the Great Powers had there created the
mechanisms by which they were drawn into these conflicts. Continuous intervention
gave birth to a disruptive linkage between the imperial interests of the Great Powers and
the aspirations of emerging Balkan states. Henceforth, obscure disputes between the
Balkan states could easily escalate into a larger conflict between the Great Powers. This
disruptive element in Balkan entanglements provided the grounds for calling the
Balkans the powder keg of Europe.153
The Serbian kingdom was the undisputed top candidate to provide the spark for the
explosion of the powder keg. Serbia stood at the heart of the Balkan maze and had a part
in almost all regional rivalries. To the south a tradition of ethnic intolerance developed
between Serbs and Albanians. To the east Bulgaria threatened Serbian aspirations in
Macedonia. One of the unfortunate results of the Serbian agreements with the Austrians
was that the Serbs were pressured to turn precisely to these southeastern regions for
future expansion. National strife with Albanians and Bulgarians was thus an inevitable
consequence. To the west Serbia did not enjoy much brighter perspectives. The Serbian
kingdom looked on in helpless embarrassment while an Austrian occupational regime
was enforced upon Bosnian Serbs and other Bosnian Slavs. The Habsburg government
treated Bosnia and Herzegovina as integral parts of Austria-Hungary and thereby
aggrieved Serbian nationalism. The Habsburg submission of Serbia to certain economic
and political controls could nullify the effects of Serbian nationalism but it could not
quench its spirit. The tense interaction of Habsburg imperialist designs and suppressed
Serbian nationalism foreshadowed the Serbo-Austrian clash in 1914 that would lead up
to the World War of 1914.154

152

John R. Lampe, Balkans into Southeastern Europe (New York 2006)15-19.

153

Vladien N. Vinogradov, 'The Berlin Congress of 1878 and the History of the Balkans' in: Bela Kiraly

and Gale Stokes ed., Insurrection, Wars and the Eastern Crisis in the 1870s (New York 1985) 319-329.
154

Geiss, The Congress of Berlin 1878: an Assessment of its Place in History 343-357.

64

CONCLUSION
What freedom is to the individual,
that is independence to the state.
Jovan Risti$ 155

Throughout the Great Eastern Crisis the significant role of Serbian foreign policy was
disproportionate to the small size and moderate might of the Serbian principality. Serbia
stood at the heart of the Balkan complexities that disrupted European diplomacy
between 1875 and 1878. Trouble in the Balkans started with the Serbian interference in
Bosnia and came to an end in the arbitrary intervention of the European Great Powers at
the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Serbias road to war had commenced a decade earlier in
1868 with the constitutional introduction of certain progressive European ideas. The
Serbian liberal intelligentsia had taken control of the country and elevated the idea of
popular sovereignty to the core principle of Serbian politics. The embrace of popular
sovereignty in Serbia sparked liberalism in domestic affairs and made nationalism the
basis of Serbian foreign policy. The liberalization of Serbian political life provoked a
destabilizing crisis in Serbian domestic affairs. Domestic stagnation was paralleled by
the international isolation of Serbia. Russia resented Serbias liberal tendencies and the
Habsburg Monarchy opposed Serbia out of intense fear for Serbian nationalist
aspirations. The uprising of Bosnian Serbs in 1875 inflamed the Serbian public opinion
with ardent nationalism. As a result, the international problems of Serbia became
entangled in the domestic political crisis. The Serbian public called for the reassertion of
Serbian leadership in the struggle for national liberation and unification of all Serbs.
Under the assertive leadership Jovan Risti$, Serbia commenced a burdensome war
against the Ottoman Empire in 1876. The struggle of Serbdom had begun.
The Serbian declaration of war caused distress among the Great Powers and gave the
Balkan disturbances international proportions. Austria-Hungary and Russia attempted
collective mediation in Bosnia but their pacificatory efforts failed as a result of jealous
divergence in their Balkan designs. Serbian foreign policy sought to benefit form the
competition between the Great Powers but this diplomatic strategy risked making Serbia
a mere pawn on the chessboard of European diplomacy. Serbian dealings with the Great
Powers were consistently unequal and ambiguous throughout the Great Eastern Crisis.
155

Risti$, Diplomatska Istorije Srbije, 206.

65

The Great Powers placed heavy obligations on Serbia while Serbian interests would be
sacrificed whenever needed. Such was the case in Serbo-Russian relations during the
wars of 1876 and 1877. Serbian military strategy relied on the ambiguous support of
Russian Pan-Slavism but foreign minister Jovan Risti$ lacked any official agreements
with Russia. This resulted in a diplomatic disaster for Serbia when Balkan warfare was
brought to a conclusion by the military intervention of official Russia. For Russian
diplomats the Serbian question was a secondary matter since Bulgaria was regarded as a
strategic priority. In the subsequent Treaty of San Stefano, Serbian interests were
sacrificed to serve the establishment of a large Russian puppet state in Bulgaria. The
Serbian diplomatic disaster of San Stefano began the alienation of Serbia from Russia.
The Congress of Berlin in 1878 marked a peak in Serbian diplomatic activity. Serbia
was excluded from participation and the Great Powers sought to enforce a settlement in
Southeastern Europe that completely disregarded the territorial concerns of the Balkan
peoples. Jovan Risti$ represented Serbia in Berlin and there pursued a thoughtful
diplomatic strategy to esnure a maximal territorial increase for Serbia. The Serbian
foreign minister sought international support through unofficial consultations with the
signatory delegations. The clearest manifestation of the Serbian diplomatic strategy was
the memorandum that Jovan Risti$ submitted to the Congress. The memorandum
apealed to several rational principles of European political thought in order to make the
Serbian plea recognizable and irresistable to the Great Powers. The most effective and
most controversial element in Serbian foreign policy at the Congress was the
rapprochement to Austria-Hungary. Serbian alignment to the Habsburg Monarchy
produced a relatively favorable formal settlement of the Serbian question. The Congress
of Berlin granted Serbia independence and unanticipated territorial aggrandizement.
The aftermath of the Congress of Berlin revealed the true historical meaning of
Serbian foreign policy during the Great Eastern Crisis. Serbia entered its formal
existence as a sovereign kingdom but Serbian independence was severely compromised
by dependence on Austria-Hungary. Submission to the Habsburg Monarchy deprived
Serbia of the sovereign right to conduct a genuine foreign policy. Serbian nationalism
was abandoned as the basis of Serbian foreign policy since nationalism was
irreconcilable with the interests of the multinational Austria-Hungary. The selfish
predominance Vienna in Serbian economic and political affairs aggrieved the spirit of
Serbian nationalism. The troublesome settlement of the Serbian question prepared the
grounds for future disturbances on the Balkans that would endanger European peace.
66

The conclusion of this essay contributes the Serbian perspective to the established
historical consensus that considers the Great Eastern Crisis as a significant prelude to
the Great War of 1914. Inherent antagonism between Serbian nationalism and Habsburg
supremacy over the western Balkans made Serbia the perilous fuse in the powder keg of
Europe after 1878. One morning in Sarajevo, the ultimate clash between Serbia and
Austria would be unleashed by two fatal shots from the gun of a Serbian nationalist
fired at the Habsburg heir to the throne. The struggle of Serbdom would be continued.

67

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