GADAMER

107

VI
Gadamerand

the Universeof
Hermeneutics

unknownto Heidegger.Inlargepart,'hisfamiliaritywithit camebywayof

Diltheyandhisownneo-Kantianteachers.Yetbeginningwithhisfirstproject, grounded infacticity, hehadfirmly reduced understanding inthehuman
sciencesto a secondaryorderivativestatus. Elevatingunderstandingto the
royal road of method ultimately struck him as merely an expression ofthe
befuddlement in whichhistoridsm found itself. The attempt to methodolo-

gizeunderstandingheconsideredfundamentallya desperateattempttodiscover a "firm foothold, " even though that seemed precluded bythe historic-

itythathadbecomepervasiveinthenineteenthcentury.Basically,Heidegger
problematized the ideaofsucha fixedArchimedean point byexposingits
metaphysical presuppositions. Theideaof a timeless, ultimate basisoriginatedin humanity's flight from its owntemporality. 1 Thenotion that there is

anabsolutetruththusgrowsoutoftherepressionorforgettingofone'stemporality. Insteadofinvokingyet againthe phantomofan ultimate foundation, Heideggerproposedradicallysituatingoneselfwithinthelevel-offini-

tude andworiungthrough^estructi%cfpre}u<&
characteristicof-understahcling in order to perceive our genuine possibilities in ourverysituatedness. Thus Heidegger oygrgame historicism's episte-

mological wayofputting thequestion. Whatisat issuein understanding is

notthephantomofanabsolutefoundation-thatchildofpositivismand
ultimately ofmetaphysics -but Dasein's increased awareness ofthepossibilitiesatitsdisposal.Thequestforuniversallyvalidtruthundeniablythreatenstoconcealtherealityofunderstandingandorientit towarda cognitive
idealthat it canneverin fact realize.
1.Backtothe Human Sciences

Inmakinglanguagetheessenceofhermeneutics Gadamerclearlyfollowsthe

laterHeidegger'sradicalizationofhistoricalthrownness. Hisaim,however,
istoreconcilethisradicalizationwiththeyoungHeidegger'shermeneutical
startingpoint, namely, understanding. Specifically, giventhatwearesituated

in a history articulated in linguistic tradition, what arethe consequences for

humanunderstanding andself-knowledge? Theseconsequences areelaboratedin"TheOntologicalShiftofHenneneutics GuidedbyLanguage," the

title of the last third of GadameA magnum^ opus;Truth ami Method. To

understandwhatthisontplogicaloryniyersal shiftinhermeneutics implies,

weneedtoreturntotheunderlyingprobleinthisworkaddresses:thequestion ofthe human sciences or ofa hermeneutics commensurate with them.

To be sure, the problem ofmethodologyin the human scienceswasnot

Theprocessofworkingouthisown,hermeneuticallymoreradicalposition allowed Heidegger, asit were, to getbeyond theproblem ofhistoricism

and its corollary, the methodology of the human sciences, as well. When

Gadamerreopensa dialoguewiththehumansciences,thepoint isnot to

develop its "methodology, " asmight seemtobethecase,giventheimplicationsofthe term henneneuucs in thewakeofDilthey. Rather, theexample
ofthe interpretive sciencesismeant to demonstrate theuntenabilitypf the
idea of universally valid knowledge, and thereby to.sidestep %e historicist
wayofputting the question. The conflict with historicism, of only marginal
interest for Heidegger, becomes for Gadamer the main task.

Seventimesbetween 1936and1959Gadamerheldlectureswiththetitle
'Introductiontothe-HumanSciences," whereheelaborateda hermeneutics

thatcoulddojusticetothesesciences.Hefirstpresentedhisconclusionsto|
thepublic duringthe fiftiesin important essaysonthe question oftruth ini

108 GADAMER
GADAMER

thehumansciences,intheLouvainlectures(1957)ontheproblemofhis.

torical consciousness, andtheninhisbookTruthandMethod (1960'LHis

workwassparkedbythequestionofhowthehumansciencesshouldunder.

standthemselvesws^.visthenaturalsciences^Gadamertherearguedagainst
theidea,fosteredbyhistoricismandpositivism.'thatthehumansciencS

toworkoutpropermethodsforthemselvesbeforetheycouldattaintothe

st^ ofscience.Thehopeofdoingso,howevei,hadbeenthefocalpoint
. allthemethodological effortsofDilthey, Droysen, andneo. &ntumism'

GadamerplacesthisfocusfundamentaUyin doubtbyaskingwhetherThe

demandformethod,consideredtobethesoleguaranteeof^itx'is^aUy

109

inthesecondhalfofthenineteenthcenturynothingelsewaspossible-neverthelessin 1862herightlygraspedtheuniquenessofthehumansciences,
inGadamer's view.Weought notoverlook howprovocative isGadamer's sol

idaritywithjlelmholt?: ingoingbackto lS62, 1mTmSeeStoanatwslscten-

ttst, Ga3amei skips overtheentire discussion about themethpdpfogical

uniqussessofthehumansciencesthathadsopreoccupiedneo-Kantianism
aswellassuchauthors asDilthexMisch, Rothakei, andWxr atthe endof

thenineteenthandbeginningofthetwentiethcentury.Thepointisthatthis
endlessly drawn-but debate wasperhaps fartoo obsessed with the ideathat

appropriatewithregardtothehumansciences.Gadamertakeshis'firstonl

the human scienceshadto produce somekind ofmethod that could be

calledtheirowninordertobecomesciences.ToGadamerit seemedmuch

'naturalandhumansciences.Accordingtotespeech, stiUworthreac^
ingtoday,thenaturalsciencesderiverulesandlawsfromthecoUectedmate.

more appropriate-and herehefollows Hehnholtz-to tracethehuman sd-

CTtationfromH^lmholtzsHeidelber&lectureofl862^n therelationship^of

riakofexpenencebymeansoflogicalinduction.Thehumans7iences"pro-

c!ld.m a ,differcnt manner;Theyarrive at knowledge by"empToSdn"g

encesbackto something liketactoranunmethodizable "jenesaisquoi"

Helmholtz, notDilthey, 3 thusbecomesthesilentpartnerofhermeneutics
becausehedoesfliorejustice tothehumansciences' speGificwayofknow-

something likea psychological senseoftact. Inthisconnection Helmholtz

speaksofan"artisticinduction" stemming fromaninstinctive senseo'rtact"

ing. In this senseTruth andMethod canbe apdydescribed asa fundamental

saythatinthefirstpanofTruthandMethodHelmholtz''is Gadamer;smam

It is therefore Gadamer's initial thesisthat the scientificcharacter ofthe

forwhichtherearenodefinablerules.Exaggeratingonlyslightly,onecould
interlocutor.Ifa bookcanbeunderstoodonlybyframingthequestions
wmcn it is an answer, we can sayit was Helmholtz's simple question about
of

kno

wing proper to thehuman sciences that provided the

impetus for Truth and Method. Thus at the
beginning of Truth and
,

as follows:

original

Met hod

Thehumanscienceshavenomethodoftheirown.Yetonemightwell
ask, withHelmholtz, towhatextent method issignificant'm'tUscase

anawnethertheotherlogicalpresuppositionsofthehumansciencesare

perhaps notfarmore important thaninductive logic. Helmholtz had

1 this correctly when, inorder to dojustice to thehuman sci-

ences heemphasizedmemoryandauthority, andspokeofthepsycholo^caltactthatherereplacedtheconsciousdrawingofinferences.What

isthebasisofthistact?Howisitacquired? Doesnotwhatisscientific

critiqueoftheobsessionwithmethodthattypifiedthoseconcernedwiththe
scienufidtyofthe humansciences.

humansciences"canbeunderstoodmoreeasilyfromthetraditionofthe
concqrt of BUdung than firom the modem idea ofscientific method"" This

expIamrwliyGacrameTre^:to'Sl!umama^^^^

Truth'andMethod.Itwasov^rthecourseofthistraditionthattheconcepts

wereformedwhichmakepossiblea justassessmentofthecognitiveclaims
proper to thehuman sciences. According to Gadamer, thistradition wasstill

verymuch alivebefore Kant, though afterward it wasrepressed anddominatedbya conceptionofmethodaUentoit.ThusGadamermustaddressthe

question "howthis tradition became soimpoverished and howthe human

sciences'claimtoknowledgecametobemeasuredbya standardforeignto
it-namely themethodicalthinkingofmodemscience"5Howdidit hap.
pen,then thatthehumanistic tradition sodeclinedastobedisplacedbythe
increasingly dominant natural sciences and their idea ofmethod? Gadamer

GadamerconcurswithHelmholtz thatatbottomthehumanscienceshave

answersthroughthefatefulaestheticizadonofhumanism'sbasicconcepts,
especiaUyjudgment andtaste,whichhadpreviouslypossesseda cogmtive j
function. ^ wasKa&t'sCritiqueofJudgmentthatinitselforthroughitssue- !'

todowtlubBracnce^ftact^han^^applying. any.kbdofmeth^

cessors(Gadamervacillatessomewhatonthisquestion) subjectivizedand j

aboutthehumanscienceslieratherherethanintheirmethodology^

aestheticizedtasteand.(whatamountstothesamething)denieditanycog- I

nitivevalue.Whateverdidnotmeasureuptothestandardsoftheobjective !

GADAMER

110 GAOAMER

111

I andmethodicalnaturalscienceswasthereafterconsideredmerely "subjeci tive" and "aesthetic"-that is, excommunicated from the realm of hard

knowledge. "Indiscreditinganykindof theoretical knowledge exceptthat of

naturalscience,[Kant'ssubjectivizationoftaste] conapeUedthehumanscienees to rely on the methodology ofthe natural sciences in conceptualizing
themselves,"6It wasinthiswaythat the humanistictraditioninwhichthe
human sciences could recognize themselves wassun'endered and the way
pavedfor the aesth^ticizationandsubjectivizationofjudgment. Asfor the
lossto thehuman sciences, "the importance ofthis cannot be easilyoverestimated, forwhatwashere surrendered wasthe element inwhichphilological andhistorical studies lived, andwhenthey sought to ground themselves

methodologicallyunderthenameof'humansciences'sidebysidewiththe
naturalsciences,it wastfaeonlypossiblesourceoftheirfullself-knowledge."7
Forunderstandingthe compositionofTruth'andMethod, too, the importanceofthishistorical process ca&not beeasilyoverestimated. Forit ishere,
withKiint and hissuccessors,that the artwork and aesthetics in general are
subsumed intotheobservation oifthework. Thatisto say,intheverydescription of how the humanistic tradition's fundamentalgrounds were subjectivizedandaestheticized,thebssicissueoftheself-conceptionofthehuman
sciences never entirely dropped out of sight, Gadamer keeps a firm grip on

this issuewhenhe submits the process that produceda completely new,

specifically aesthetical consciowness to a devastating critique. The heart of
the initial section of Truth and Method thus consists in a "Critique of the
AbstractionInherentinAestheticConsciousness."8ForTruthandMethod,the
path through aesthetics amounts to a detour, asit were. For all the positive
insightsinto artthatTruthandMethodoffers,itsopeningchaptersofferless
an aestheticthanan anti-aesthetic.The creationof an autonomousaesthet-

basicamongthemconsistsinthefactthathistoridsm,whilerecognizingthe
universalhistoricityofallhumanknowledge,neverthelessaimsatsomething
like absolute knowledge. Dilthey, inparticular, foundit impossible to recon-

diehisdiscoveryofthehistoricityofalllife^yithhisepistemologicalefforts
to groundthe humansciencesmethodologically. Not until afterHusseri
revaluated the life-world and Heidegger developed the more fundamental
hermeneuticsoffacticitydid it becomepossibleto overcomehistoricism's
obsession with epistemological foundations. Starting with the ground they

hadprepared,Gadamerelaboratesthe"Elementsofa TheoryofHermeneutie Experience" in thesystematic second partofhismagnum opus.

HebeginswithHeidegger'sdiscoveryoftheontologicalstructureofthe
henneneuticcircle.Ontplogicalheremeans,as,sooftenwithGadamer, universal. The circle is universal because every act of understanding is condi-

tionedbyits motivationor prejudices.Prejudicesor fore-understandings,

Gadamer writes, should be considered almost like transcendental "condi-

donsofunderstanding." Ourhistoricityisnota restrictionbuttheveryprin-

cipleofunderstanding.Weunderstandandstrivefortruthbecauseweare
led onToy expectations of meaning. Thus Gadamer provocatively titles the
firstsectwn^ofTruthandMethod'ssystematjcsecondpart "TheElevationof

theHistoricityofUnderstandingto theStatusofa HermeneuticPrinciple."

Accordingto Gadamer,historicism'sdelusionconsistedin tryingto displace
our prejudices with methods in order to makesomething like certainty and

objectivitypossibleinthehumansdepces.DerivingfromtheEnlightenment,
thisstrugglewasitselfmotivated bya nineteenth-centuiy prejudice, thebelief
that objectivity could be achieved only by precluding the operation of situated subjectivity in understanding. Historicism was overcome by applying it
to itself, asit were, since historicism itselfhad taught that every doctrine can

icsis therefore nothing but anabstraction which-to use the earlyHeidegger'sterms-needsto bedestroyedor relativizedin orderfor us to better
understandthekindofknowingthatoccursinthehumansciences.

be understoodonlyagainstthebackdropofitstime. Thisinsightcouldbe;
applied reflexively to historicism itself. As soon as the scientific ideal of
knowledgewasrevealed,withHeidegger'shelp, to be dependenton metaphysics,a moreappropriateunderstandingbecamepossible-onethattakes
into accounttheontologicalfore-structureofunderstandingin definingthe

2.TheOvercomingofHistoricistHermeneutia

objectivity proper to the human sciences.

The second part ofTruth andMethoddealswithrecuperating the hermeneutie specificity of the human sciences, and it is here that Gadamer's

"henneneuticsofthehumansciences," ashesystematicallytermsit,9 istobe

found.Thefirst sectionconsidersthe historyofhernaeneuticsduringthe

nineteenthcenturyin orderto reviewthe aporiasofhistoricism.Themost

There can be no question of merely setting aside one's prejudices; the

object is, rather, to recognize and work them out interpretively. Thus
GadainerallieshispositionwithHeidegger'sideathat thevery first taskof
interpretation consists in self-critique; working out one's own fore-projecsothatthe subjectmatterto beunderstoodcanaffirmitsownvalidity

GAOAMER

112 GADAMER

inregardtothem. Sincetheunderstandingcanoftenbemisledbyerroneous
fore-eonceptions, and since this danger cannever bewholly avoided, interpreters must endeavorto develop appropriateinterpretive initiativesfrom
withintheirownsituation: "Workingout appropriateprojections, antidpatoryinnature,tobeconfirmed'bythethings'themselves,istheconstanttask
of understanding."" This "quotation does not fit the typical picture of
Gadamer. His hermeneutic position is usuallytaken to be somethingfor
whichthereseemstobeplentifulevidence:namely,thatgiventheprejudice
structure of understanding, there can never be any "confirmationby the
thingsthemselves." Butit is easyto showthathishermeneuticsisquitemisunderstoodwhentakenthus. EvenifGadamer'sutterancesarenot always
perfecdy consistent, his"rehabilitation" ofprejudices stillwarnsusto becritically "awareofone'sownbias, sothat thetext canpresent itselfin aUitsothemessandthus assertits owntruth againstone'sownfore-meanings."11On
the other hand, Gadamer does not fall into the positivist extreme of calling
for a negation ofthe prejudice structure ofunderstanding in order to let the
thing speak for itselfwithout being obfuscated by subjectivity. A reflexively
critical understanding of the kind contended for wUl be concerned "not

merelytoformantidpatoryideas,buttomakethemconscious,soastoman"
itorthemandthusacquirerightunderstandingfromthethingsthemselves."12
ThisiswhatGadamerfindsin Heidegger:themeanbetweenthe positivist

113

tance. In 1960Gadameridentifiedthisproductivityasthe solutionto the

"critical"taskofhermeneutics: "It is onlytemporal distancethat cansolve

thequestionofcritiqueinhermeneutlcs,namelyTlowtodistinguishthetrue
prejudices,bywhichweunderstand,fromthefalseones,bywhichwemisunderstand."u

However, this solution was somewhat one-sided, for the question arises

whether'tempbraldlstancealways proves to be soproductive. A HeideggerianiilceGadamerknowsfullwell that historyvery often has a concealing

effect, andinterpretive approaches oftenblock accessto theverythingsthey
meanto reveal. At times it is preciselygettingover andbeyondhistorically
influential interpretations thatproves to behermeneutically fruitful. " Moreover, temporal distance offersvirtually nohelpwhenit comes to overcoming
the provincial temporality ofthe present. In anycase, Gadamer hashimself
recently discernedthe one-sidedness ofhisviewsin this respect. WhenTruth
andMethod appeared in the fifth, Gesammelte Werke edition of 1986, he
revisedtheabovepassageandreplaced"^isonly"witl?"often.".Thetextnow
reads: "Often temporal distance can solve tKe question of genuine critique
in hermeneutics." Evenif the problempersistsunresolved, Gadamer'srevisionnicelyillustrates a distinctive characteristic ofhermeneuucs, namely, that
it remains continually ready to alter its opinion when better insight comes
along.

dissolution ofthe selfand Nietzsche's universal perspectivism. The question

isonlyhowoneisto comebythe "appropriate"fore-projectionsthatpermit

the "thing itself" to speak.

3, Effective History asPrinciple

Thus everything comes down to the "question of genuine critique in

hermeneutics."13How,insofaraswecanbecomeconsciousofthem,canwe
distinguish the right prejudices froin the wrong ones, the fore-conceptions
that lead to misunderstanding? Is therea criterion for doing so?According
to Gadamer, this yearning for a criterion that would certify objectivity once

Gadamer's far-reaching demand for a new kind of understanding in the

humansciences,onethatconcernsitselfwithsubjectmatter, iselucidatedin
his elaboration of historically effected consciousness. Since the nineteenth

and for all is at best a vestige ofhistoricism . Even if there is no such criterion

century, history of effect or influence has referred to the study of a given

work'sinterpretations-thatIs,the historyofitsreception, Suchstudyhas
shown that works call forth different interpretations at different times, and
must do so. We can say, then, that developing a consciousness of historical

at hand, however, there are indicators. In this regard, Truth andMethod

emphasizesthe productivityoftemporaldistance.In investigatingthe past,
we are often able to recognizeinterpretive approachesthat have proved

effectparallelsbecomingawareofones ownhermeneuticsituationandthe
productivity of temporal distance. By historically effected consciousness,

themselves. The inability to discern them, for instance, is what makes for

however, Gadamer means something much more basic. For him it has the

problemsin evaluatingcontemporaryart. It is almostimpossiblefor critics

statusofa "principle"16fromwhichvirtuallyhiswholehermeneuticscanbe

to distinguish the really valuable artistic efforts oftheir own time. Thanks to

deduced.

historicaldistancesuchjudgmentsbecomesomewhatmorecertain,andthis

Beyond itsrelevance to conceptualizing thediscipline ofliterary criticism,

the principle of effective history expresses the mandate that one's own situ-

is what accounts for what might be called the fruitfulness of historical dis-

114 GADAMER

atedness be raised to consciousness in order to "monitor" the way it deals

with texts or traditions. This is the interpretation of one's own fore-ynderstandingthat Heideggercallsfor. Perhapseveninore emphaticaHy thanHeidegger, however, Gadamer recognizes that thistaskcanneverbecompleted
orfulfilled. 17Effectivehistoryisneverentirelyunderourpoweroratourdisposal.Wearemore subjecttohistorythanit canbe subjectedto consciousness. Whenever we understand, history effects the horizon, never suscepti-

bleofultimateclarification,ofeverythingthatcanappearmeaningfuland
worthinquiringinto. Tlius effectivehistoryacquiresthefunctionofauthorizingandaffectingeachindividualactofunderstanding-even,ofcourse,
whereitseffectsaredenied.SubsequenttoTruthandMethodGadamerformulated theprinciple inthismemorable aphorisin: "wirkungsgeschichtliches
Bewufitsein istmehrSeinalsBewufitsein"-historically effected consciousnessis more beingthanconsciousness.18Historymterpenetrates our "substance"insucha waythatwecannotultimatelyclarifyit ordistanceourselves
from it.

Thisinsightinto thefactthatweareconditioned byeffective historyfinds

immediateapplicationin Gadamer'sdisputewithhistoricismandmodern
I i
methodological consciousness. ^listoricismfeoped to escape historical conditionedness by distanemg itselffrQWthe determining effects of history.
According to historicism, the historian needs to develop a sense ofhistory
emancipated from its conditionedness, thereby making objective historiographypossible.Gadamershows,bycontrast,thatthepowerofeffectivehistory is not diminished by the recognition of it. 19Historicalconsciousness as
it emerged in the nineteenth century was not such a radical innovation that

it precluded history's subterranean effection all understanding. History is at

work even whereweimagine ourselves superior to it (so much sothat even

historicismwasoblivioustoitsownpositivistroots).It ishistorythatdeterminesthebackgroundofourvalues,cognitioitt,andevenourcriticaljudgments. "Thatiswhy," saysGadamer, "the prejudicesofthe individual,far

morethanhisjudgments,constitutethehistoricalrealityofhisbeing."20
Thus the concept ofhistorically effected consciousness proves to be subdyambiguous. Ononehand, it meansthatpresent-day consciousness isitself
shaped-indeed, constituted-by history Our consciousness is thus

"effected"byhistory.21Ontheotherhand,theconceptsuggeststhatbecomingconsciousofbeingsoeffectedisa taskalwaysstilltobeundertakerFur ther,theconsciousnessofbeingeffecteditselfhastwomeanings:first,itis a

call for the elucidation of our historicity in thesense of working out our

GAOAMER

115

hermeneutic situation, but also and more fundamentally it involves the

awarenessofthelimitsplacedonanysuchenlightenment.Inthelatterform,
historically effected consciousness is the most unequivocal philosophical
expressionofthe consciousnessof one'sownfinitude.The recognitionof
humanlimits, however,doesnotparalyzereflectjpn,De,ffieContrary,what
wasactuallyrestrictivewashistoricism'sattemptto alignunderstandingwith
a metaphysicallyconditionedidealofknowledge.Historicallyeffectedconsdousness promises, rather, a heightening ofreflection. Gadamer's hermeneu-

tiesoffininuteisdesignedtoprovidethisreflection-thatis,todemonstrate

theuniversalandspecificallyhermeneuticalcharacterofourexperienceofthe
world.

4. Understanding asQuestioning andTherefore

Afterestablishing the principle ofeffective history, TruthandMethod takes

on the task ofrecovering the "basic phenomenon ofhermeneurics" that had

gottenlostinthenineteenth-cennuydetourintomethod.Themainimpetus
ofthisrecovery comes from theproblem ofapplication. 22Pre-Heideggerian
hermeneutics hadviewedapplication assomethmg<subsequent tohermeneutie understanding. The proper goal of understandingwas thought to be
purelyepistemic, evennoetic.Theobjectwasto understandanunfamiliar
meaning assuch. The application ofwhatwasso understood occurred at best

expost facto in such disciplines asjurisprudence, where a lawis appHed to

anindividualcase,ortheology,forexamplein thehomileticelucidationof a
particular passageofScripture. Accordingto Gadamer, however, application

isanythingbutafter-the-fact. He follows Heidegger's intuition that understanding always includes self-uhderstancling-indeed, self-encounter.
Understanding, theR,involxes something like applying a meaningto our situation;T6"thequestions wewant answered. It is not the casethat there is first

a pure, oBJective understanding ofmeaning, to which specialsignificance

accrueswhenit issubsequendy applied to ourquestions. VCfealwaystakeourselves alongwhenever we understand, somuchso that for Gadamer under-

standingandapplication arcindivisiblyfused.Thiscanbestbeseenbymeans
ofa negative example, non-understanding. Wheneverwecannot understand
a text, the reason isthat it saysnothing tous or hasnothing to say. Sothere
isnothing to be surprised orcomplain about ifunderstanding occurs differently from one period to another, or even from one individual to another.

116

GADAMER

117

Motivated by the particular questions of the moment, understanding is not

determine in advance the sight lines ofunderstanding, A text is given voice

just reproductivebut, becauseitinvolves application,alwaysalsoa producrive activity.23So muchis understandingco-determinedby the individual
effective-historicalsituationthatit seemsinappropriateto speakofprogress

onlybyreasonofthequestionsthatareputtoit today.Thereisnointerpretation,nounderstanding,thatdoesnot answerspecificquestionsthatpre-

in mterpretation or (with Scyeiermacher) of understanding better over the

course of history. If we acknowledge the productive element of application
in every successful interpretation, it is enough to say, in Gadamer's wellknown dictum, that we "'understand differendy" if we understand at aU. 24
Applicationdoesnot needto beundertakenconsciouslyin orderto occur.
It, too, is impelled by effectivehistory. Understandingor, whatis the same,

applicationislessanactionofautonomoussubjectivitythan"participatingin
anevent oftradition, a process oftransmission in whichpast andpresent are
constantly mediated. "25 To understand a text from the past means to trans-

scribe a specific orientation. Unmotivated questions of the kind that positivism desiderates would pertain to no one and consequently be of no
cognitive interest. The point is not to exclude the anticipations ofmeaning
implicitinourquestionsbuttoforegroundthemsothatthetextsthatweare
tryingto understandcananswerthem all themore clearly. Thussuccessful
understandingcanbe describedas the effective-historicalconcretionofthe

dialecticofquestionandanswer,Itispreciselyherethatwecanseethephilosophical import ofhistorically effected consciousness. Gadamer himself calls

attention to it at the end of the second part of Truth andMethod, before he

goeson to extendthe significanceofhermeneuticsbeyondthe boundaries

lateit intooursituation,toHearmit ananswertothequestionsofburtime.

Historicism'serrorwasto havemadeobjectivitydependenton eliminating
theinterpretingsubjectandits situatedness,for truth-here understoodas

ofthehuman sciences; "Thedialectlc ofquestion andanswer... nowpermitsustostatemoreexactlywhatkindofconsciousnesshistoricalty-effected-

the disclosure ofmeaning (aletheia)-occurs only in the process ofeffective-

strated makes understanding appear to be a reciprocal relationship of the

historicalapplication..
f

GADAMER

Gadamer's depiction of understanding as participating in an occurrence

consciousness is. For the dialectic of question and answer that we demon-

samekindasconversation." Understandingisheredefinedasa relationship

oftraditionmeansthat subjectivityis not completelyin control ofwhatin

and,more exactly, asdialogue. Interms ofitsform, understandmg islesslike

grasping a content, a noetic meaning, thanIjke engagingin a dialogue-the

particular strikes it as being sense or nonsense. As the young Heidegger

observed, we discern the interpretive dispositions of our time more as cus-

'dialogue that we are," Gadamer adds, in an allusion to Holderlin, 27

Significantly, it ishistorically effected consciousness that occurs in the form

torn andhabitthanassomethingweperformintentionally.Effectivehistory
is "mehr Seinals BewuBtsein, " more being than consciousness-or, in
Hegelian terms, more substance than subjectivity. Thus we belong to history
more than it belongs to us. This historicity of application precludes talk of a
zeropointwhenunderstandinghasnotyetbegun. Understandingisthecon-

tinuarion of a dialogue that precedes, ys.andkas3S5yiaIrea3y Begun. 26

ofdialogue. Consciousness losesthe autonomy andself-possession accorded

it bythetraditionofidealismandreflectivephilosophyfromwhichGadamer
heredistanceshimself. ThetaskofthefinalsectionofTruthandMethodisto

demonstratethatourverbalexperienceoftheworlduniversallytakesthe
formnot ofisolatedconsciousnessbutofhermeneuticdialogueasrealized
in the dialecticofquestion andanswer.

Throwninto certaininterpretive dispositions,wecarryontheconversation.

Thusineachnewencounterwithmeaningwetakeoverandmodifytheviews
of what makes sense that have been passed down from tradition and are

5. LanguageasDialogue

present m us.

In thiswaythe hermeneutics ofapplication belongs, asGadamer indicates,

to the dialecticofquestionandanswer.To understandsomethingmeansto

have related it to ourselves in such a way that we discover in it an answer to
our own questions-but "our own" in a way that these questions, too, are

assimilatedinto a traditionandmetamorphosedby it. Everyactof understanding,evenself-understanding,ismotivated,stimulatedbyquestionsthat

Weareendeavoringtoapproachthe
mystery oflanguage by beginningwith
the conversation that we are.
Gadamer, Tmth and Method

Gadamer's hermeneutics oflanguage isthe most misunderstood aspect of

hisphilosophy.Theaphorism"Beingthatcanbeunderstood islanguage"has

118

GAMMER

GADAMER

seemed to justify accusing hisphilosophy of-or, according to another school

ofthought,celebratingit for-reducingallbeingtolanguage.Readershave
alsoobjectedto theoccasionalmomentsofvaguedictioninthefinalsection
of Truth andMethod, which is sometimes lacking in precise conceptual dis-

tinctions.Thuswedetect a certainresignationwhendistinguishedstudents
of Gadamer such as Walter Schulz believe they have discovered that for

Gadamereverythingcollapsesintoanall-embracingsynonymy:"Histoiy,language, dialogue, and game-all of these, and this is the decisive thing, are
interchangeable quantities. "28The question, then, iswhy language and dialogue can become so. Against whom is Gadamer's foregrounding of the @ia-

^natureoflanguagedirected?Clearlyit isdirectedagainstthepropo\ sittenal logic that dominates Western philosophy. The poinus to call into

questionphilosophy'straditionalfixationon the theoreticallogosapophantikos-that is, the demonstrative proposition, which is "theoretical in that

it abstractsfromeverythingthatisnotexplicitlyexpressed.'129Torestrictlangua]ge to what is thus theoretically explicit narrows it artificially. Like Heideggqr, Gadamer considers the "construction of logic on the basis of the
proposition" to be one of the "most fateful decisions of Western culture. "30
To reverse this decision is the primary intent ofGadamer's hermeneutics of
dialogue. 'Its simplest insight canbe expressed thus: "Language is most itself

not in propqsitionsbut in dialogue."31Againstpropositionallogic,inwhich

the sentence .consists in a self-sufficient unity of meaning, hermeneutics
reminds us that a proposition can never be prescinded from the context of
motivation-that is, the dialogue-in whichit isembedded andwhichis the
only plaee it hasany meaning. Ultimately a proposition is just an abstraction
thatisneverreallyencounteredin a livinglanguage.ThusGadamerasks,"Are
there such things as pure propositions? When and where?"32
The privileging ofmethod is clearly connected to the privileging ofpropositions in Western and especially modern consciousness, for the idea of

methoddrawsitspowerfromthefactthatcertainobjectsandprocessescan
be experimentally isolated and thereby controlled. 33 Suchisolation doesviolence tolanguage, however. Specifically, understanding what is said cannot
be reduced to a cognizing subject's intellectual comprehension of an objectivizable, isolable content; understanding results just as much from belonging to an ongoing, changing tradition-that is, to a dialogue in the context
ofwhich everything that is saidbecomes meaningful and logical for us. In his

119

context of the human sciences. This privilege is perfecdy obvious because

method promises the domination ofthings that it hasisolated, made repeatable and reusable, and thus put at our disposal. It is anopen question, however, whether such isolation ever succeeds in the case oflanguage or ofone's

ownunderstanding. Doweunderstand ifandto theextent thatwecontrol?

Isn'tthisa caseoffinitudeexplainingitselfaway?Thehermeneutanswers
thatweunderstand,rather,becausesomethingspeaksto usfroma tradition
to whichwe-more orless loosely-belong.

Againstthe primacyofpropositionallogic,whichconceives-or,rather,
nusconceives-understanding as something at our disposal, Gadamer elab-

oratesa logicofquestionandanswerthatunderstandsunderstandingaspartidpation-participationin meaning,a tradition,andultimatelya dialogue.

Inthisdialoguetherearenostatements,onlyquestionsandanswersthatcall
forthnewquestionsinturn. "Therearenopropositionswhichcanbeunderstoodexclusivelywithrespectto thecontentthattheypresent,if onewants
to understand them in their truth.... Every proposition haspresuppositions
that it doesnot express. Onlythose whothink with these presuppositions can

reallyassessthetruthofa proposition.I maintain,then,thattheultimatelogical form of the presuppositions that motivate every proposition is the question. "3AHere we come to the heart of hermeneutic philosophy-namely, as
Gadamer expresses it, "the hermeneutic ur-phenomenon, that there is no

possiblestatementthat cannotbeunderstoodasthe answerto a question,

and canonly be understood thus."35
A3.;
To formulate this phenomenon we have frequently referred to the ancient
and perhaps antiquated doctrine of the verbum interius: the "inner word"
that is never spokenbut nevertheless resoundsin everythingthat is said. In
the third pan of Truth andMethod, Gadamer takes this Stoic and Augustiniandoctrine asthe single piece ofevidence that Western forgetfulness oflan-

guageneverquitebecametotal.36His seldomnoticedrehabilitationofthis
doctrine cannot be constructed asa regression into naive mentalism; instead,
it is a hermeneutic critique ofpropositional logic and its corollary, the domin-

ionofmethod.Tobesure,thisdoctrinesuggests,bluntlyput,thatthewords
weusecaimpttheins.elyesexhaustwKat'weKave inmind"-thatis, thedialogue that we arc. The inner word 'behind"what is saidrefers to none other

thanQusdialogue,thisrootednessoflanguageinourquestioningandto us

observationsonlanguage,Gadamerbringsto a climaxtheobjectionsagainst

quesrionable existence, a dialogue whichno propositions canwholly capture:

"What is stated is not everything. The unsaid is what first makes what is

modernity s privileging of method which he had first problematized in the

stated into a word that can reach us."?7

120

GADAMER

It must be emphasized once again, however, that this is intended to be a

hermeneutic theoryof language, not some mysticism ofineffability. Precisely

inordertoviewlanguagerightly,ratherthanoverlookit orpeerbehindilLye
needto acknowledgewhat.ne.v.eris.but-alwaysremains-tQ,be.said,thejnnej
dialogue;Toaffirm this means that the hermeneutics oflanguage takes Ac

endpoint oflanguage (or, better, ofpropositions) asits starting point: "Of

course,theideathatunderstandingisinprinciplelinguisticcannotbetaken
to meanthat all ourexperienceoftheworldoccursonlyaslanguageandin
language,"38This statement shouldwarnus once and for all againsthasty
interpretations that saddle Gadamerwith the basic thesis oflanguage ontol-

ogy:everythingthatismustbeexpressibleinpropositionalform.
If, however, Gadamer can maintain that undststandmg ismfnnctpk lin'
guiStic,it isbecauselanguageembodiesthe solemeansfor carryingout the
conversatio.n thatweareandthatwehopeto conveyto eachother. It is for
thisreason thathermeneutics permits itselfanaphorismsuch as"Beingthat

GADAMER

121

title of the book's lastsection refers to a "universal aspect ofhermeneutics,"

leavingit openwhetherhenneneuticsherereferstophilosophicalhermeneuties (say, that of Gadamer), or understanding, or else language viewed

hermeneutically. All three possibilities are genuinely possible and defensible.
Gadamer speaksde facto ofthe "universality" ofthe"linguisticality ofunderstanding,"49of a "universalhermeneutic" concernedwith the general relationship of man to the world, 41 aswell as of broadening hermeneutics into a

"universalinquiry"42Oftenwemeetwithgeneraltideslike thatofhis 1966

essay, "The Universality of the Hermeneutic Problem, " or the "hermeneutic
dimension. "43 It would be hard to contend that the wide-ranging controversies about universality have shedmuch light on the question. Gadamer noto-

riously does not put much stock in clarifyinghis concepts precisely, thus
refusing to pay tribute to the trend toward propositional logic that parcels
out language in fixed units of meaning.
A few guideposts are necessary to trace out the universality ofthe dimen-

canbeunderstood islanguage. The emphasis should be on the can." Under-

sion that Gadamer has in mind. At the outset we need to remark that what

standing, itselfalwayslinguistically formed and dealing with things verbal,

mustbecapableofengagingthewholecontentoflanguageinorderto arrive
at thebeingthatlanguagehelpsbringto expression.Theessentiallinguisti-

is at issue is more the universality of a "dimension" than of a philosophynamely, Gadamer's-as Habermas's talk of the "universal claim of

cality Gf-ynderstanding expresses itself lessja our statements^ than in our

search for the languageto saywhatwe have on our minds and hearts. For

hermeneutics"seemsto suggest. NeverhasGadamerhimselfclaimeduni-

hermeneutics,it is less constitutivethat understancBrigisexpressedin language-whichistruebuttrivial-thanthatit livesin theunendingprocess

versal validity for his position: " 'hermeneutic' philosophy.. . does not understand itself to be an 'absolute' position. "44In fact, precisely in the name of
insuperable historicity, Gadamer characterizes transcendental philosophy's
claim to be absolute, for example, as philosophy's misunderstanding of

of "summoning the word" and the search for a sharable language. Indeed,

itself.45It is not for nothingthat the finalparagraphsofTruthandMethod

understandingisto be.conceived<?.? this.process, for thisprocess-thecorespondingrealizationoftheinnerword-iswhatgroundsthe universality

aUude to the maximof Plato's Symposium: None of the gods philosophizes.

We philosophize not because we possess the absolute truth but because we
do not. Itself a function offinitude, philosophy has to be mindful ofits own
finitude. It is just whenwe think we have acquired definitive knowledge that
we most need to keep our universal finitude in mind. 46
Within the framework of Truth and Method, the "universal aspect" of

of hermeneutics. 39

6.TheUniversalityoftheHermeneutic Universe

Theclaimcharacteristic ofhermeneutics, that understanding isuniversal, has

occasioneda gooddealofdiscussionanddebate.Isit tobeunderstoodas a
claimfortheuniversalvalidityofGadamer'sphilosophy?Ifso,howcanit be
reconciledwiththe fundamentalthesisofhermeneutics:the historicityof
all understanding?

WeshouldnoticefirstinthisregardthatinGadamer'susagetheworduniversality isespeciallypolysemic.IfweconfineourselvesliterallytoTruthand
Method, wefinda numberofhighlyvariouscandidatesfor universality.The

henneneuticshasatleast onemeaningthat iseasilyexplained.It indicates

that traditional hermeneutics-that ofthe human sciences- hasbeen superseded in the direction of a philosophical hermeneutics that accords the
"hermeneutic phenomenon" its ftdl breadth. For phUosophy, this universality means that hermeneutic inquiry cannot be limited to the ancillary problem ofdevising a methodology for the human sciences. The quest for under-

standing and language is not merely a methodological problem but a

fundamentalcharacteristicofhumanfacticity. Emphasizingthe "universal

GADAMER

122 GADAMER

aspect"ofhermeneutics,then,opposesconfininghenneneuticstothehuman

sciences;"HermeneuticsisinthiswaysuniversalaspectofphUosophyand
not just the methodological basis of the so-called human sciences. "47 The

123

tiesisthereforethatoftheinnerword,thedialoguefromwhicheveryexpressionreceivesitslife. Tobesure,wedofindcompletelyprecise,communicativewords,Tfetthesewordsare, asit were,nothingbut thevisibletenninus

whole of Gadamer's philosophical, emphatically speculative efforts are

signaling the interminable desire for further understanding and language.

directed toward broadeningthehorizonofhermeneutics sofarbeyond the

humansciencesnarrowlyconceived thatit becomes a central occupation of
; phUosophyIt ispreciselythisthatismeant\sy broadeninghermeneuticsto
becometheuniversalinquiryofphilosophyandbythe"OntologicalTurnof
Hermertg.yfjics^' asthetide ofthethirdsectionofTruthawiMethodphrases
it. In this final pan, Gadamer turns hermeneutic inquiry awayfrom and

What is hermeneutically significant about language in this respect is the

dimensionofinnerdialogue,the factthatwhatwe sayalwaysmeansmore
than is actually expressed: "A meaning, an intention always goes above and
beyond what is actually captured in language, in words that reach others. An

insatiableyearningfortherightword-thatiswhatconstitutesthegenuine
life and nature oflanguage."50

beyondthe hermeneutics ofthehuman sciences, the subject ofthe first two

In thisyearningourfinituderevealsitself. No ultimate self-possessionis

parts,andtowardthegreateruniversality,thatoftheontologicalor philo-

guaranteed to us, inword or concept. Welive in and from a dialogue that can
never end because no words can grasp what we are or state how we should

sophical dimension.

Howcanwespeakoftheuniversality ofa henneneutic dimensionorexperiencewithoutinvestingthisphilosophywitha claimto absoluteness?It is

easytobemisledbytheworduniversality.Consequentlyit isimportantto
followthe suggestionsinvariousofGadamer'stextsthatthe realbasisfor

the talk about universality in Truth and Method should be sought in the
semanticfieldoftheword"universe." Accordingly,wecantakethedaimthat
languageandunderstanding areuniversal to meanthat theyconstitute our
universe-that is,theelement orthetotalityinwhichweliveasfinitebeings.
Thus Gadamer alludes, apparently just in passing, to the biologist van
Uexkull's contrast between a "universe oflife" andthe "world ofphysics. "48
GadameralsoappealstoLeibniz'snotionthatthemonadisa universeinthe
sense that it can reflect the entire world within itself. In the context of Truth

understandourselves. Throughthis finitudeis expressedourhumanconsciousnessofdeath,which-speechlesslyseekingspeech-strivesagainstits

ownend.ThusGadamershowsthatthereis a closeconnectionbetweenthe
interminabaity of our search for the right word and "the fact that our own
existence is situated in time and before death."51

In the innerword,in the drive to understandingandlanguagethatconstitutestheuniverseofourfinitude,isrootedtheuniversalityofhermeneutiephilosophizing.Cantherebeanythingmoreuniversalforphilosophythan

finitude? The contemporary philosophy that concerns itselfwith the universality of the finitude revealed in our ceaseless endeavor to understand

andsaywhatweunderstand erects itsclaim to universality onthisverybasis,

Thisclaimdoesnotexpressitselfindefinitivelygroundedpropositions,how-

andMethodtheconceptionoftheuniverseortheuniversalityoflanguageand
understandingisdirectedagainstthethesisthatanygivenlanguageislimited
becausetherearemanydifferentlanguages.Infactit mayseemthatreason
itselfis limited insofar asit is circumscribed within a specific language. But

hermeneuticphilosophyadvocatestheself-interpretationoffacticityand,in
theSure knowledge that none of the gods philosophizes, tries to give full
cognizanceto finitude as the universal horizonwithinwhicheverything

thatisnot thecase,Gadamercounters,becauseit is a distinctivecharacter-

makes sense for us.

isticoflanguagethat it cangiveexpressiontoeverything, It isin this sphere

thatwecanbestunderstandthe"universalityoflanguage," thatis,thefact
thatlanguagecankeeppacewiththeboundlessnessofreason.""
Thisdimension oflanguage isuniversal and forms theuniverse in that all

understandingandhumanexistenceoccurwithinit. Thisdoesnotmean,of
course,thatanexpressionforeverythingalreadyesdstsinlanguage.Theuniversalityoflanguageconsistsnotincreatingwhatistobesaidbutratherin
thatlanguagecanalwaysbesoaght.Theuniversaldimensionofhermeneu-

ever. For a philosbphy of finitude, that would be a contradiction. Instead,

\j