Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
The need for limitations as such did not provide a complete case for authoritarianism, as
any effective constraints including voluntary or democratically-imposed ones would
suffice to prevent ecological catastrophe. Thus the second intuition motivating early
Eco- Authoritarians was that societies of free individuals would be unable to
successfully impose limits on their own behavior through voluntary or democratic channels.
Although a variety of reasons were offered in support of this claim, two themes were recurrent. First, the
citizens of democratic countries were expected to be too incompetent , myopic, and
downright recalcitrant to willingly set aside their narrow short-term interests in order to take
necessary collective actions to avoid the crisis.1" Second, it was expected that since
avoiding the crisis would require a slowing of economic growth, an explosion of
internal conflict would emerge over the way that remaining rights and benefits were to
be distributed, and these conflicts would be too messy for democracy to handle .13 These
unfortunate dynamics implied that even when it was clear to intelligent, informed onlookers that action was
required in order to prevent disaster, it would nevertheless be difficult within a democratic system for effective
the third intuition motivating early EcoAuthoritarians was that the best way forward would be to put the power of
unilateral decision-making into the hands of expert public officials who would then be
able to implement and enforce the changes that would be needed to mitigate the
environmental crisis. As Heilbroner put it, "the passage through the gauntlet ahead may be possible only
action to be taken. With this recognition in mind,
under governments capable of rallying obedience far more effectively than would be possible in a democratic
setting. If the issue for mankind is survival, such governments may be unavoidable, even necessary."14 Ophuls was
even less equivocal: To sum up, scarcity in general erodes the material basis for the relatively benign individualistic
and democratic politics characteristic of the modern industrial era; ecological scarcity in particular seems to
engender overwhelming pressures toward political systems that are frankly authoritarian by current standards, for
there seems to be no other way to check competitive overexploitation of resources and to assure competent
direction of a complex society's affairs in accord with steady-state imperatives. Leviathan may be mitigated, but not
evaded.15 The governance structures envisioned by Heilbroner and Ophuls would be ones in which governments
were given unlimited control over whatever aspects of social life were implicated in producing the ecological
crisis.16 As Ophuls put it. the task of charting the future of global society would likely have to fall into the hands of
"a class of ecological mandarins who possess the esoteric knowledge needed to run it well."17 It should be noted
justice, and public participation were ultimately regarded as luxuries that might not be affordable to societies facing
ecological disaster. Given the stakes, Heilbroner and Ophuls argued that even our most cherished rights and values
would need to be reexamined in order to ensure survival." In its own way,
position made a certain amount of sense: if it were true that an ecological crisis was being caused
by excessive autonomy, that democratic market liberal societies would systematically fail to generate the
constraints necessary to avoid the crisis, and that authoritarian governments would be able to keep societies away
from catastrophe through enlightened central planning, then the relative appeal of authoritarianism would be
The problem with this position, however, was its crucial assumption that
authoritarian governments would actually be able to generate better outcomes
through central planning. This premise was quickly challenged in the academic literature by
critics who argued that authoritarian governments would be hard-pressed to cope
successfully with their vastly increased size and complexity while also navigating
difficult ecological challenges, but the biggest blows to early Eco-Authoritarianism came
from the failure of real-world experiments with centralized authoritarianism around
the world. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and thoroughgoing economic
reform of the Peoples Republic of China, it became increasingly untenable in any area of
discourse to advocate centralized authoritarianism as a solution to any problem, never
clear.21
mind one requiring highly complex, efficient, and coordinated actions by public agents. Within a few years,
pessimism about the prospects for comprehensive central planning entered into
discussions of Eco-Authoritarianism through the work of critics like John Dryzek, Robert Paehlke,
and Doulas Torgerson,23 as well as that of some of the former Eco-Authoritarians themselves. In a
1991 update to his Inquiry into the Human Prospect, Robert Heilbroner admitted to his and others
failure to appreciate fully the difficulties of running a centrally planned economy ,24
and suggested that any feasible way forward would probably have to include some form of
market organization.25 William Ophuls also distanced himself from his earlier
authoritarian claims, writing in 1992 that: given the appalling record of the administrative state in this
century, the better solution is to be found in the other direction . We need a form of
government that is effective in obliging humankind to live with its ecological means
but that does not require us to erect an ecological Leviathan (which, as many of my critics rightly pointed out,
past the simplistic draconian authoritarianism of the 1970s survivalists.27 Meanwhile, Andrew Dobson shrugged
If
the ecological crisis were to admit of a solution, it would apparently have to come from
some other source than the one identified by Heilbroner and Ophuls.
off the view as primarily an aberration from the early days of the contemporary environmental movement. 28
weather patterns, and ecosystem services. 218 Similarly, the loss of large numbers of species undoubtedly
But it is
difficult to translate these insights into convincing arguments against any one of
the small local decisions that contribute to the problems of global warming or
biodiversity loss. 220 It is easy to argue that the material impact of any individual
decision to increase carbon emissions slightly or to destroy a small amount
of habitat will be small. It is difficult to identify the specific straw that will
break the camel's back. Furthermore, no unilateral action at the local or
even national level can solve these global problems. Local decisionmakers may feel
reduces the genetic library from which we might in the future draw useful resources. n219
paralyzed by the scope of the problems, or may conclude that any sacrifices they might make will go
unrewarded if others do not restrain their actions. In sum, at the local level at which most decisions affecting
nature are made, the material discourse provides little reason to save nature. Short of the ultimate catastrophe,
the material benefits of destructive decisions frequently will exceed their identifiable material costs.
When one factors in the growth of the proportion of GDP of services, the picture becomes even less foreboding.
Services have become the major drivers of global economic growth. They constitute over 63% of global GDP and
well over 70% of GDP in the developed world,6 and the proportion is increasing. While services such as
translation, consulting, planning, accounting, massage therapy, legal advice, etc., also consume some natural
resources, the quantity is infinitesimal in relation to the economic value produced. If I manufacture a car for
$10,000 I have consumed a huge amount of natural resources and energy. But if I translate a 100,000-word book
for $10,000 I have consumed merely the electricity necessary to run my computer, and the electricity used to