Adam Roke

Phil. 1, Fall
Midterm 2
Greenberg

On the Distinction between Kants First and Second Derivations of the Categorical
Imperative
Adam Roke
11/21/14

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I. INTRODUCTION
In Groundwork, disputably one of his most influential philosophical publications, Kant sets out
to achieve nothing less than the identification and corroboration of the supreme principle of
morality (4:392). In other words, Kant attempts to give a philosophical grounding to the
common viewpoint of the good will, which he says every rational being has the ability to realize.
In establishing such a foundation for the good will, it is then argued that there are three
propositions of morality that determine an actions moral worth. And, particularly relevant to a
discussion of the ethics of action, the second propositionthis being that the value of an action
depends on the maxim according to which it was performedwill be a main concept of this
paper. Within this same framework, Kant presents readers with a standard for evaluating the
moral worth of maxims (and therefore of actions), which is split up into three formulations and
collectively referenced as the Categorical Imperative. Along with a normative discussion of
evaluating maxims through the lens of the Categorical Imperative in general, I will also address
another topic: this being how the first and second formulations are fundamentally distinct. This
will be (partly) a response to one popular philosophers idea of the distinction, which is that in
the first formulation, we look at a moral situation from an agents point of view, and in the
second, the categorical imperative directs us to view ourselves and other persons affected by our
proposed action, which is a distinction I disagree with. With these concepts thoroughly explored
these being the idea of evaluating maxims moral worth as well as the idea of the categorical
imperative in a general senseI will illuminate and conclude with a clear distinction between
the first and second derivations of the Categorical Imperative.

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II. MAXIMS
Here, I will briefly discuss Kants idea of maxims. In 4:399, Kant arguesin his second
proposition of moralitythat an action from duty has its moral worth not in the purpose that is
to be attained by it, but in the maxim according to which it is resolved upon. He further clarifies
what he means, contending that a maxim is simply the principle of willing according to which
[] the action is done (4:400). In other words, a maxim is simply a principle of the will that is
what one does in a general sense. For example, if in a specific situation a person were to not tell
the truth about something, such an actor would be willing the general maxim of lying when it is
convenient.

Now, I want to explain the reasoning behind why maxims are relevant in terms of a discussion of
morality. Since all actions made by rational beings can be simplified to willing certain general
maxims, nothing other than the maxims willed are the determining ground of the will, [ and]
therefore constitute the pre-eminent good that we call moral (4:403). Essentially, maxims are
the general principles willed by rational beings with which we can determine moral worth.
Therefore, the morality of actions lies in rationally determining what we ought and ought not do,
and this is where the Categorical Imperative becomes important (4:413).

III. THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE

Now, we are at a place to answer the question of how we really determine if maximsand
therefore actionsare moral or immoral ones. The Categorical Imperative is split up into three
necessary but insufficient formulations, that each have different implications that contribute
towards the obligations and prohibitions on individual maxims. In the first formulationand

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arguably the most importantKant argues that an actor ought to act only according to that
maxim through which [one] can at the same time will that it become a universal maxim (4:421).
In this formulation, maxims are morally judged based upon whether they could be willed by
every rational actor at the same time. For such a maxim to be deemed non-universal, it would
need to fail what Kant refers to as the contradiction test: actors would rationally determine that it
is impossible to will [that certain] maxims be elevated to the universality of a law of nature,
because such a will would contradict itself (4:424). Briefly, an example of this can be
envisioned with the lying maxim example: if every rational being were to lie, the concept of truth
would be meaningless, making lying (a deviation of the truth) nonsensical and therefore a
contradiction. Thus, a maxim is only a moral one if it can be universalized without leading to a
contradiction.

In the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative, Kant argues that all rational beings are
ends in themselves, and therefore cannot be treated as a means to an end. He elaborates,
contending that a rational nature exists as an end in itself (4:429). With this same line of
reasoning, the argument goes that rationality is the center point of the categorical imperative, and
so the ability to will maxims and reason independently requires a respect for all persons
rationality as principle; actions that use others as a means to an end (rather than treat all persons
as ends) do not respect the principle of rationalityi.e. the very ability to willand thus, are
immoral.

In the final formulation of the Categorical Imperative, Kant argues that rational agents ought to
only act on maxims which are in accordance with the Kingdom of Ends; this means that we ought

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to view our maxims both as a member if it is universally legislating in it, but also itself subject
to these laws (4:433). It requires rational beings to be completely impartial in evaluating
maxims and acts like a standard of reciprocity; actors ought to view their actions from all
perspectives.

IV. ON THE DISCINTION BETWEEN FIRST AND SECOND FORMULATIONS &

CONCLUSION
As referenced in the introduction, one popular philosopher has argued that the first and second
derivations of the Categorical Imperative are distinct because the first requires us to look at the
maxim in question from the agents point of view, an argument I disagree with. Kant actually
argues that the first formulation asks rational beings to consider their action from all points of
view; maxims should hold as a universal law (for myself as well as others), (4:403). The first
formulation also deals with the effects of our proposed maxim, as we must rationally determine
what would happen if all persons acted on the maxim together at once; therefore, this distinction
made is not accurate.

It seems clear that both formulations actually consider all points of view for the proposed maxim,
however the distinction lies in the fact that with the first formulation, maxims are evaluated in
terms of a hypothetical, while in the second, they are evaluated in terms of the actual situation.
The universalizability test is hypothetical in that we must rationally determine what would
happen if everyone willed the same maxim, whereas the end state testthe second formulation
deals with how persons are treated (as a means or end) by the actual maxim.