Sentiment and Ideology

in the Nationalism of the

Independence Club (1896-1898)

Vipan Chandra

The development of nationalism in Korea received its greatest impetus during the
latter part of the nineteenth century through the activities of the Independence
Club. The Club sought both to foster a new nationalistic consciousness in the
Korean population, by invoking among the citizenry a strong emotional attachment to the state, and to create an ideology befitting Korea's new nation-state
status. Due, perhaps, to the Club's relatively brief existence, its emotional impact
was greater and more lasting than its ideological one. However, the sentiment of
patriotism which the Club was instrumental in nurturing played a vital role in the
development of Korean nationalism in the twentieth century.
1. The Nature of Patriotism and National Identity

Historians of Korea generally share the notion that late nineteenth

century Korean nationalism found its most thoughtful and articulate
expression in the ideology and activities of the Independence Club (18961898). Led by So Chae-p'il (Philip Jaisohn) and Yun Ch'i-ho, two modernminded Koreans who had obtained their higher education in the United
States, and supported by many native-educated Korean nationalists, the
short-lived Club played a decisive role in shaping the early contours of
modern Korean nationalism. The story of the Club, its leadership, and its
reform campaign has been told in detail elsewhere.1 My purpose here is to
examine some salient aspects of the Club's ideology with a view to elucidating their significance for modern Korean history.
It need scarcely be stressed that the sentiment of patriotism is an
almost universal phenomenon. A cursory look at the national anthems
and other accolades that patriots all over the world and throughout the
ages have paid their countries easily bears this out. Of course those who
have found the sentiment harmful or execrable have been just as universal

14CHANDRA

and vociferous. Everywhere it seems the sentiment of patriotism has stood

at the core of the ideology of nationalism. Whether or not patriotism and

nationalism are interchangeable terms, it is undeniable that without the

former the latter cannot exist. More than anything else, nationalism is at

bottom a feeling, an emotion. It could be persuasively argued that in all

its dimensionsmilitary, political, economic, social, and cultural

nationalism represents the more concrete ramifications of an essentially
affective or psychological trait of human behavior.
Very simply stated, this affective or psychological trait springs from
a human need to seek identifiable, comforting patterns amid the bewildering and confusing variety of experience and to use those patterns
for personal identity and security, both material and emotional. Thus
patriotism may be seen as the last circle in a series of concentric circles,
beginning with the smallest onethat of the child's quest for security,
attachment, and identity. As the child grows, he or she progressively learns

of the host of concrete and diffuse factors which are shared with many other

human beings: language, myths and history, hopes and aspirations, religious and secular rituals, territory, and even perhaps physical traits.
This consciousness encourages both positive and negative behavioral
traits. Those who share, among other factors, an ecological, social, and
cultural heritage gradually are recognized as belonging to a shared abstraction called fatherland or motherland. This entity is then perceived
as essential to the survival and well-being of all its members. Thus loyalties
that one at first feels toward one's parents and family become applied to
this abstraction, through a chain of links moving from neighborhood and
village to town or city and province or state, to the country at large.
Concomitantly, those who do not share this heritage come to be
looked upon as foreign, alien, strange. At a benign level of patriotism this
is merely an awareness of difference, a feeling of "we" and "they." But
there is always a potentially hostile feeling lurking behind such a classification, and in a crisis, real or imagined, the "we" and "they" equation
threatens to escalate and explode into "we" versus "they." Both peaceful
competition and war among nations manifest this hostility, the former
often in subtle, subconscious forms, the latter in overt forms.2
This is of necessity a summary statement of the psychology of
nationalism, but it should nevertheless serve as an illuminating search-

light on the patriotic sentiment and ideology of the Independence Club.

2. Toward a New National Identity: The Club's Accent on Korea

The protection of Korean independence and sovereignty was the first

and overriding objective of the Independence Club. Its primary goal was

to instill in the minds of all Koreans a lasting awareness of and attachment to Korean independence and sovereignty. It saw as its first task the

SENTIMENT AND IDEOLOGY1 5

creation of a new nationalistic consciousness throughout the country.

The dimensions of its endeavor were psychic and emotional, and cultural
and historical, as well as solidly economic, political, and military. I will,
however, focus my observations here largely on the psychic and emotional,
and historical and cultural dimensions, for it is in these areas that the
Club first urgently saw the need for a new way of thinking.
A. THE PSYCHIC AND EMOTIONAL DIMENSION

Both So and his chief colleague Yun strongly believed that, though
Korea had in the past produced patriotic heroes, Koreans in general
lacked an active patriotic sentiment. They found little expression among
Koreans of a positive love for their country, if by such love is meant a
desire and effort for the advancement of the national interest in a spirit
of competition with other nations. The Club's informal organ, the Tongnip
sinmun, and its English version, The Independent, frequently deplored the
lack of this trait in the Korean national character. As one editorial puts
it, "Loving one's nation is the highest [form of] love. But Koreans love
their own life more than their country's."3 Another editorial elaborated
upon this theme:

All people on this earth [work] for their country, but our people, unaware of

the weakness of humiliation that befalls our nation and the stripping of her
rights by foreigners, merely seek the well-being of their own selves. This is lower

than beastly behavior. If we exerted ourselves [on behalf of our nation] it

could become an enlightened, strong, and prosperous nation [munmyng

kaehwa Ui puguk kangpyng], but since we have chosen to stay inert how can

[our nation] become [so]? If from today, the people [of this country], joining

hands together, work to preserve its independence forever, then their

descendants can perform their functions as the people of a worthy nation.4

This editorial was attacking both unscrupulous state officials who

abetted foreign schemes in Korea and the general populace which was
alienated from and indifferent to the government's larger actions.5 Indeed,
the editorial was putting forward the notion that government officials
were able to get away with their antinational deeds only because the general public was not sufficiently aroused, a situation demanding strong
corrective action.

The Club leadership did not wash its hands of the matter by merely
lamenting the absence of concern on the part of the people for the fate of
their nation. They took corrective steps through a series of imaginative
actions. The very genesis of the Club was the desire to achieve this aim, at
first by using highly affective symbols. As is well known, the Club's origin
sprang from the desire of So Chae-p'il and his progressive colleagues to
erect a new gate, called Tongnip-mun (Independence Gate), roughly on the
spot where another symbol had stood for centuries, the Mohwagwan (Hall
for Cherishing China)a symbol designating the subservient status of

16

CHANDRA

Korea vis--vis the Celestial Empire. The Club directed the focus of both
government and public emotion to the idea of independence by constructing in addition a meeting hall called Tongnip-gwan (Independence Hall),
and by calling its informal mouthpiece Tongnip sinmun (The Independent).
Its formal organ, a monthly magazine, was called Tae Chosn tongnip
hyophoe hoebo (Report of the Korea Independence Club). The import of
the Club's own name scarcely needs comment.

Recognizing the need for cultivating young minds, the Club organized a debating society as an intellectual forum. Through this society,
the Club hammered home to its audiences such themes as the meaning and
value of independence. It also constantly tried to reinforce the psychological acceptance of the accomplished fact of national independence,
gained as a result of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. For this psychic
transition the Club chose to focus the Korean people's attention on the
royal house, national history and language, and patriotic songs as symbolic embodiments of independence.
The value of political symbols in cultivating a sense of national
identity and loyalty to one's country has long been evident to both the
practitioners and students of political psychology and mobilization. To
the leaders of the Independence Club there was no better living focus for
the Korean people's loyalty to their nation than the Yi royal house.
If the royal house could be visibly identified with the change in Korea's
international status, the Club leaders seem to have reasoned, that should

lead to a palpable change in the Korean people's perception of the rights

accruing to their nation as a free state. Any onslaught on these rights would
thus be viewed as an attack on the royal house itself and hence unacceptable. Not only should this be sound psychological preparation against any
possible foreign designs upon Korea, but it should also isolate and neutralize those within Korea who were still clinging to the traditional attitude
of subservience to China or were otherwise wary of national independence.
This strategy worked well and accounted for a relatively smooth
launching of the Club and easy sailing in its initial stages. The Club sought
and obtained, for example, a donation of 1 ,000 won from the crown prince
for the Independence Hall and had him write the signboard for the building. These were small but significant acts. So adroitly interpreted them as
expressions of royal favor for the concept of independence and for the
Club, and he forcefully conveyed this interpretation to his audiences. He
also decided to broaden and deepen the national impact of the Club's
royal endorsement by holding public celebrations commemorating King
Kojong's birthday and the founding of the Yi Dynasty, and by backing
those who were promoting the idea of elevating Korea's title to an empire.
On September 2, 1896, in order to celebrate Kojong's forty-fifth
birthday, nearly 2,000 people, under the auspices of Korean and foreign

SENTIMENT AND IDEOLOGY17

Christians, gathered at the site where the Independence Hall was to be

constructed. The festivities were simple. There were speeches by Rev. (Dr.)
Horace Underwood, a Christian missionary, So, and Yi Chae-sun, a viceminister of the government, and there were patriotic songs composed for
the occasion by several Korean members of the congregation. The event
moved So so much that he spoke in contradiction to his own indictment
of Koreans for not being patriotic enough, an indictment which we have
seen he vented so unsparingly elsewhere. With unconcealed contempt for
China, and mixing Christian evangelism with political rhetoric to explain
the significance of such a public celebrationperhaps the first ever of its
kind in KoreaSo editorialized:

The Koreans are quite unlike Chinamen in the matter of patriotism. They are
truly loyal to His Majesty and patriotic to their native land, but they have never
been taught to show their feelings in public demonstration .... This meeting shows
two important facts. First, that they have a desire to meet together in a public
place and join their hearts and voices in praying for their King and their country
to the King of Kings. They realize the mightiness of God and believe their
supplications will be answered. Secondly, the officials, merchants, artisans, and
coolies [are] united together under one tent for the purpose of demonstrating
their patriotic feelings and sentiments, forgetting all about their differences and
castes. What makes Korea so weak as a nation is that the people are not united
in their sentiments. The Government may change once every day and the people
look at them with indifference and apathy. The same feeling exists with the
officials. How much the common man may suffer does not concern them. A
nation cannot become a power with such a state of sentiments. The cause of
this is that they do not appreciate the common fate in which they are bound
together. But when they begin to realize that they are parts of one fabric and
one nation, they will stand when their hearts are united in the common cause

of patriotism, and they will fall when divided. That is not all; if they should
understand that they are the children of the same Heavenly Father, and
believers in the same Savior, mutual love and sympathy will naturally spring
up. Yesterday's meeting was a sign of the gradual implanting of these ideas
in Koreans and we consider it an anchor of hope for Korea's future.6

The following year's celebration, again organized in the name of

"Christian citizens of the city of Seoul," featured speeches by Yun Ch'iho and Rev. Henry Appenzeller, another missionary. Yun, referring to
citizenship, loyalty, and nation said:
Citizenship means the supporting column of the whole fabric [of the nation]
and it must not be defiled or disgraced by slavish sentiment or despicable acts ....
True love for King and country lies in the faithful performance of our duties
whatever they may be. Nation signifies the King, the Government, the people,
and the territory. The Koreans must understand that His Majesty whose
birthday they [are] celebrating is their own King and ruler. The Council of State
and other Departments are part of their own Government, the inhabitants [of]
this land are their own fellow countrymen and the three hundred [sic] Ii of the
length and breadth of Chosun is their own native land.7

18

CHANDRA

To both S and Yun it was a matter of anguish that for an entire

twelve month periodfrom February 1896 to February 1897the Korean monarch had to live under the protection of the Russian envoy
in Seoul. Fearing Japanese machinations against his life, Kojong had
sought and obtained temporary asylum in the Russian legation. It was
So who spoke on this question. He was not yet fearful of any sinister plots
by Russia against Korean independence. Russia was not yet making its
weight felt in Korea. The amiable Carl Waeber, the Russian envoy, appeared to be concerned primarily with the safety and well-being of Kojong,
and this had forestalled any immediate fears about Russian intentions. It
was rather the symbolism of the monarch to all appearances fleeing from
his own subjects to the security of what was legally foreign territory in
the midst of his own kingdom that disturbed So. He was apprehensive of
the international disdain that this episode could generate and the damaging impact it could have on the newly popular psychology of independence
that he was so assiduously cultivating. In an audience with Kojong soon
after the latter's flight to the Russian legation, So claimed to have told him:
Please return to the palace. This country is Your Majesty's land and its people
are your own people. Abandoning this land and these people is not proper [for
Your Majesty]. If you leave the people and the land, will the result not be the
extinction of the country? ... As the ruler of a country, if you don't reside in [your
own] palace but stay in a foreign country's legation not only will this be a slur
on our face but will make foreigners hold us in ridicule.8

Later So would moderate his stand and endorse the situation as necessary
in view of the potentially greater danger to Korean sovereignty and the
king's safety posed by possible Japanese plots.
Meanwhile, the Club's efforts to promote independence on an emotional level received a big boost from a successful campaign by progressives, within the government and without, to elevate Korea to an empire
and Kojong to an emperor. The idea was not new. In 1895, soon after the
assassination of Queen Min, the cabinet had memorialized Kojong, urging
him to assume the title of emperor. The gist of their plea was that the traditional title of wang, or king, connoted a status inferior to that of the Chinese
emperor, and only the assumption by the Korean ruler of the title of hwangje, or emperor, would convince the people that their country was independent of all and inferior to none. Their watchword, in the words of
The Korean Repository, was "No emperor, no independence."9
Though the majority of the cabinet had approved the proposal, and
though October 26 had been designated for the coronation ceremony,
the event never materialized, "through the intervention of certain influences."10 It is very likely that these influences were the opposition of the
die-hard Koreans still loyal to China and the timid personality of Kojong

SENTIMENT AND IDEOLOGY19

himself, who had at the time only an uncertain grasp of the full implications

of Korea's newly gained freedom from the stern hand of China.

The subject remained unmentioned until the spring of 1897 when,

according to The Independent, "a number of patriotic people" memorialized the throne and revived the proposal. Kojong rejected the proposal
but the petitioners persisted. Slowly the matter gained momentum and
petitions from the general public as well as government officials inundated
the palace. Finally Kojong yielded when, on October 3, the prime minister
himself led the entire government in memorializing the king for the ninth
time to accept the proposal. The China loyalists had been isolated and
overcome due, perhaps, in no small measure to the campaign of the Independence Club. Kojong could thus now assert himself.
So, as the one unquestioned spokesman of the Club at this time,
commended the government for thus "upholding the dignity of the nation
as an independent state." To those foreigners who might be struck by the
apparent "absurd" nature of the change in title, he pointed to its symbolic
significance and urged the treaty powers to accord recognition to it. 1 1
Kojong was crowned emperor of Korea on October 12, 1897, amid
proper sacrifices to Heaven. An imperial edict announced the renaming
of Korea from Chosn wangguk (The Kingdom of Korea) to Taehan cheguk
(The Empire of Taehan), and the use of kwangmu (Bright Valiance) as the
new reign title. The royal red gave way to dragon yellow. The altars of
the god of earth and god of grains were raised from plain sa and chik to
t'aesa and t'aejik. Queen Min's rank was posthumously raised to hwanghu
(empress) and the wangt'aeja (crown prince) became hwangt'aeja (imperial
prince).12 Korea's independence was now supposed to be loud and clear to
all, at home and abroad.

How much of this Korean symbolism was inspired by the Japanese

example of a transcendental emperor, demanding and receiving the unswerving and undivided obedience of his subjects, cannot be ascertained.
It must be mentioned here, though, that both So and Yun had in their
early youth been educated in Japan and could not have failed to see the
impact of an autonomous imperial throne on the minds and hearts of the
Japanese people. Shrouded in the myth of divinity and an unbroken
lineage, and accountable to no one, the Japanese emperor must have
appeared to them endowed with extraordinary powers, in comparison to
which the Korean ruler had a very weak and meek stature.
S's own pursuit of the conquest and conversion of minds through
the judicious use of symbolism is also seen in his quest for patriotic songs.
"Independence arches and patriotic songs," he wrote, "cannot make a
country independent but it is exactly these things which appeal to the
public and give them a taste for independence."13 Stressing the need to
"catch'em young," So called upon schools to teach students patriotic

20CHANDRA

songs which they should "sing in concert every day or two. They must have
respect for the country before they can love her and they must love her
before they will be willing to make sacrifices for her."14 He asked all

Koreans to compose patriotic songs and submit them to the Tongnip

sinmun. Many responded and some of the compositions were, as noted
earlier, sung at the ground-breaking ceremony for the Independence Gate
and at the royal birthday celebrations. Others were printed in the Tongnip
sinmun for the benefit of the general public. x 5
The words "loyalty and patriotism" became the Club's official
slogan. In March 1898 it issued a silver-lined badge to its members, with
the phrase tongnip hyphoe: ch'ung-gun aeguk (The Independence Club:
Loyalty to the Ruler, Love for the Country) inscribed against a background of Korea's national flag.16

B. THE CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS

So, Yun, and other core leaders of the Club also wanted symbols
of national independence to serve as stimulants to the people to reflect on
their history and culture. It was necessary, in their judgment, to focus the
interest thus generated on the purely indigenous elements of Korean
culture and history, and to foster a progressive view of history among the
people. This was the substance of the cultural and historical dimensions of
the Club's nationalism. How did they explore these dimensions?
According to Chu Si-gyng, the Club's leading scholar of the Korean
language, the key element in a nation's independence was its possession
of a distinct language. He called Korea's reliance on classical Chinese as
its official language a sign of "cultural slavery." Language to Chu was
the "essence of independence" [tongnip i song].11 It was with this consciousness that he undertook the study of Korean. His mentor So, while
refraining from making such a sweeping statement, nevertheless also
considered the possession of a unified language for speaking and writing
one of the categorical imperatives of an independent national culture. So
was convinced that the use by all classes of people of a common language, idiom, and script would lead to national solidarity, strength and
prosperity. The Tongnip sinmun tried to elevate the ordinary citizen's
estimation of the Korean language and script throughout the land and establish them as mediums of expression for all, "the high and the low,

the noble and the despised" [sangha kwich'n].

S's efforts, aided by Club scholars such as Chu and Chi Sk-yong
(1855-1935), were largely responsible for removing the unwarranted but
traditional stigma of lowliness from the use of han 'gl. To them, the term
nmun (vulgar script) traditionally applied to the script obviously had an
odious meaning. The Club therefore popularized the terms kug' (national
language), kungmun (national script), and han'gl.

SENTIMENT AND IDEOLOGY21

The Tongnip sinmun described han'gl as the "best [script] in the

world and with scholarly merit."18 It reasoned further that the abolition of
the complex and hard-to-learn Chinese script, hanmun, and the exclusive
use of the simple and easily-learned han gi, "designed for our sake by the

great sage [King Sejong]," would prevent the waste of "precious and ur-

gent time" by facilitating the spread of literacy and learning. If the time
thus saved were spent on studying such things as "[the role of] legislative
assemblies in government, interior affairs, foreign affairs, financial affairs,
law, navy and army, sea navigation, hygiene, economics, handicrafts,
trade, agriculture, and various other businesses" the way would be opened
not only for individuals to become wealthy but ultimately also for the
whole nation to attain the goal of "enlightenment, prosperity, and power"

[munmyng pugang].

It was this kind of learning that the Tongnip sinmun saw as the
material for forging the "cornerstones and pillars of our nation's independence," for making "our nation's prosperous and strong dignity and
enlightened honor shine in the world."19 The supporters of hanmun and
detractors of han 'gl were seen by the paper as impediments to this process. These detractors were termed an elitist group unconcerned about
the nation and interested only in maintaining their privileged status and
"oppression over the entire nation."20
The Tongnip sinmurs successful use of han'gl as a medium for
communication was certainly good evidence to the average Korean reader
that the claims made on behalf of the script were, though a bit hyperbolic,
not mere empty boasts. Yet the age-old disdain and neglect of han'gl by
the government and literati had made a certain clumsiness about the use
of the script equally evident. Today's readers of the Tongnip sinmun and
other contemporaneous han'gl writings cannot but be struck by, for
instance, their quaint orthography, or better, orthographies. There were
no reliable books of Korean grammar or dictionaries to aid the spelling
or usage of school teachers or young writers, and the extensive currency
of Chinese-based vocabulary in all written expression caused difficulties
in switching over to purely han g/-based communication. Even the progressive Confucianists in the Club, men who were in principle sympathetic
to the idea of linguistic nationalism and the eventual nationwide use of
the Korean script, appear to have found it galling and impractical to jump

immediately on the han'gl-ory bandwagon. Namgung k's Hwang-

song sinmun, therefore, used the mixed Chinese-Korean script, and

Chng Kyo's two-volume history of the declining years of Yi Korea was
written exclusively in hanmun. The Club's Hoebo likewise carried articles
in han 'gl, hanmun, and the mixed script.

It fell to Chu Si-gyng to start the process of laying a sounder and

more enduring foundation for the emergence of a truly national Korean

22CHANDRA

language written in han 'gl. Chu realized that without a proper grammar
and guidelines for standardized usage a genuine and rich national literary
tradition would be difficult to develop. In 1898 he wrote the text of the
first major grammar for modern Korean, later published under the title
Kugmunpp.21 To wean Koreans away from Chinese culture and to create
in them a sense of modern national cultural identity, the nurturing of the
Korean language thus became a matter of great importance to the Club.
Its effectiveness was perceived as limited, however, as long as it lacked
harnessing to another potential force for identity: national history. Here
again the Club's views found forceful expression through the pens of So
and Yun.

To both So and Yun it was reprehensible that Koreans often showed

a better awareness of the history of China than of their own country. To

them this was unquestionably another reason why Koreans seemed to hold

their own nation in poor regard. This ignorance was not only useless and
unprofitable but positively harmful to the nation. Under the S-Yun
stewardship, the Tongnip sinmun frequently deplored this situation and
vigorously called for its correction. As one issue of the paper wrote under
S's editorship:
The people of Taehan scarcely think of Taehan as their own country, and there
are many [in this country] who indulge in dastardly conduct towards the land

and the people of Taehan, and believe that it is difficult [for this country] to
receive a treatment of equality [in the world]. [So] the idea that only with

absolute dependence on another country and only under the control of that
country can [this country] sustain itself is due not to the lack of foreign learning
here but to the fact that the people of Taehan, not being aware of their own
country's history, treat their compatriots with scorn, and believe that the task
of [national] restoration cannot be accomplished by these people. However, if
one looks into the history of Taehan there is no absence of sagacious and great
figures .... What we hope is that the people of Taehan will closely study the
famous loyal heroes in the history of Taehan, and, like them, carry out their

work dauntlessly. Then doubtlessly Taehan too will receive [respectful]

treatment from the world. Learning about the historic exploits of such famous
loyal subjects as Ch'ungmugong Yi Sun-sin, Cho Chungbong, and Im
Kyng-p . . . and revering and emulating [our own] history's truly
lionhearted and royal heroes rather than the famous figures of Han, T'ang, and
Ming will be in accord with the principles of righteousness.22

Earlier, Yun had expressed a similar view in a speech given at a

function celebrating the founding of the Yi Dynasty. "The reason," he
said, "why the Korean people have come to such a pass is nothing but that
instead of studying, as [people in] other countries do, their own famous
persons and the condition and situation of their own country, we merely
learn about things Chinese .... We are totally unaware of the things in our

country that evoke honor and pride, and all we have is this evil [Chinese]
learning. I hope that Koreans will have a system of learning that will make

SENTIMENT AND IDEOLOGY23

them study not merely things foreign but the history of their own country
as well, so that they can know that Chosn is their country."23 The SoYun objection to the study of Chinese history at the expense of Korean
history was thus twofold: the spirit of national self-denigration and subservience to China that had bred in Korea, and the enervating and reac-

tionary effect on Korea caused by the reverence for Confucianism which

inevitably accompanied it.

Sin Ki-sn (1851-1909), the minister of education in early 1896,
seemed to personify for So the obscurantism that he associated with subservience to China and her Confucian culture. Originally a member of
Kim Ok-kyun's Enlightenment Party, by the mid- 1890s Sin had changed
his colors and joined the ranks of the conservatives. In the summer of
1 896 he addressed a memorial to the throne attacking the cutting off of
hair and the wearing of Western uniforms by soldiers, police, and students,
and the use of han 'gl and the adoption of the Western calendar as expressions of ungratefulness to China and as "barbarian" practices. He went
further and called the use of han'gl a "beastly" practice. Such innovations, he claimed, would lead not only to the destruction of the venerable
Chinese classics but also of government itself.24
To So it was intolerable for the nation's education to be under the

direction of a man like Sin. He wrote a scathing rejoinder to Sin, attacking

his affront to the memory of the great King Sejong, and advising him that
since he valued the Chinese calendar so much he ought to relinquish his
Korean citizenship and migrate to China. So suggested to Sin that if he
cared to look at China closely he would see that she was "tottering to her
fall" and that "the boasted classics which have striven for three thousand

years to elevate Korea have only plunged her deeper and deeper into the
mire."25

Elaborating this theme two months later, So sharpened his attack

on what he called the Confucian system. "What advantage has this study,
this worship of Confucius, this attachment to this doctrine, this elevation
into a fetish of his words been to Korea? Here as in China the bubble burst

at the first prick of the spear. The utter collapse of these two Confucian-

ridden states [as] Japan delivered her attacks exposed the delusiveness,

the worthlessness of [the] so-called Confucian education."26

Sin retaliated against So and his supporters by editing and publishing at government expense a scurrilously anti-Christian and anti-Western
book, entitled Yuhak Kyngwi (The Warp and Woof of Confucianism).
In it he referred to Europeans as "birds and beasts" and their languages
as "the chirping of fowls." He called Christianity "vulgar, shallow, and
erroneous," and "a type of Barbarian vileness." China was praised as
"grand and glorious and the largest and richest" empire in the world, and
as "the center of civilization."

24CHANDRA

S's response appeared in the form of another editorial, confronting

Sin with unrebuttable facts cited with unrelenting sarcasm. He wrote:

Mr. Sin has a fine contempt for Europe and Europeans but let us see how
it would work practically. He wears cotton pants which were probably woven
in Manchester. The watch he wears was perhaps made in Switzerland. He lights
his pipe with matches from Vienna unless he prefers the cheaper Japanese
product. He reads by the light of American kerosene oil, he probably wears
a piece of amber from the Baltic in his top knot; if it were not for European
glass he would not be able to look out of his windows in winter; his friends, the

insurgents in the country [the Righteous Army remnants of the Tonghak], are

armed with weapons made in Europe and his sovereign is the guest of one of
these "low down, bird chirping" Europeans.
This man is a good representative of the Hermit Kingdom. We had
supposed that Korea had cast off its ancient asceticism but here we have a man
who wants Korea to crawl back into her shell and sleep another 1,000 years.
We are on the whole pleased at his ravings for he is overdoing it and hastening
to his fall.27

It is unlikely that the So-Yun censure of Confucianism was shared

wholeheartedly by the other core leaders of the Club. However, if they
found that attitude extreme and felt any ambivalence towards it, they never
appear to have openly expressed it. It caused no visible fissures in the unity
of the core leaders. In the matter of the study of Korean history this unity
appeared clearly and unmistakably in their shared notion of the necessity
for a critical reconstruction of the nation's past. They aimed at fostering
a view of Korean history that would generate pride in the accomplishments of the nation's past and at the same time point out its failings. The
Tongnip sinmun cautioned against the established East Asian tradition of
glorifying the past at the expense of the present, and encouraged its readers
to think of the future as holding progress in store. It also urged the people
to look at Korean history as a segment of world history and to study the
latter too, in order to learn appropriate lessons and plan for the future.
Again it was So who gave eloquent expression to this theme. He wrote:
Without a knowledge of national history, a youngster's love for his
country . . . will hang merely upon selfish interests. He knows nothing about his
country's struggles, her successes, her failures. He knows nothing about her

needs or her natural advantages. Native land means to him little beyond a field
for personal and selfish aggrandizement. His native land has in his mind no
personality so to speak. There is no La Belle France, no John Bull, no
Columbia ....

Now the youth must be taught the history of their own country. They
must get a glimpse of the centuries of development. They must be first in a position

to compare the past with the present ... Let a history of his country be put into the

hands of every Korean youth and he will find in it much to be proud of and
enough of error and wrong to give him an ambition to do his part toward making
the future better than the past.28

SENTIMENT AND IDEOLOGY25

The need for a new book reevaluating Korean history was obvious.
The Club stepped forward to try to fulfill this need. Core leaders Chng

Kyo and Namgung Ok, and men from the subleadership group, such as

Han Ch'i-u and Yi Mu-yong, with the aid of scholar-patriots Hyn Ch'ae

(1856-1925), Pak n-sik (1859-1926), Chang Chi-yn (1864-1921), Ch'oe

Pyong-hn (1858-1927), and Ch'oe Kyng-hwan (181 1 -1999), worked on

a Korean history project. The result was the production in 1896 of the
five volume Taedong yksa (History of the Great Eastern State), formally
authored by Ch'oe Kyng-hwan and edited by Chng Kyo.
The Taedong yksa was not designed as a popular history text.
It dealt entirely with the mythical and ancient phases of Korean history and was written in hanmun. It was a scholarly, rational attempt at
arousing nationalistic pride among the conservative China-worshipping
Confucianistslike Sin Ki-snwho still overwhelmingly composed the
Korean elite. It squarely took issue with the traditional China-centered
view of Korean history by focussing attention on the Tan'gun myth in
explaining the origin of the Korean nation, by describing Kija simply as
a "sage of culture," and referring to China simply as "China" (sina) in-

stead of as Chunghwa [The Elegant Middle (Kingdom)], the reverential

appellation favored by the general body of Confucian literati in China and

Korea. The manuscript also upheld the theory of the political and cultural
independence of the "Three Han" period of Korean history.
In his preface, Chng Kyo attributes the writing of this text to the
influence of the nationalistic spirit of the Independence Club. Under Hyn
Ch'ae, who was then an official of the compilation bureau {p'ynjipkuk) in
the education ministry, it was planned to print 2,000 copies of the text for
nationwide distribution. However, the opposition of the education minister, Sin, is said to have put an end to the project, and it was not until 1905
that the book saw the light of day.29
To strengthen the psychology of patriotism and foster a new concept
of nationalism among all Koreans, the Club also proposed many concrete
reformist ideas and schemes in the military, political, and economic areas,
and conducted a vigorous campaign against the Korean collaborators of
the Russian envoy. This campaign became quite strident and achieved
much success, but it is outside the scope of this article to dwell upon it.
One point, however, needs mention here. In none of the proposals of the
Club does one find even a trace of traditional xenophobia. On the contrary, one is impressed by the Club's open-minded and cosmopolitan
approach to nationalism. The attitude of the Club's leaders is one of respectful curiosity toward the outside world generally and of categorical
enthusiasm about learning from the rich scientific, technological, and
political heritage of the West. The praise that So and Yun sometimes
showered on the West on occasion even sounds rather fulsome. Under

26CHANDRA

S's leadership, for example, The Independent once wrote:

History tells us that wherever Western civilization has made its appearance,
the place was transformed into a new country altogether .... We hope the
time will come when Western civilization will penetrate every corner of the
continent of Asia and make use of the Creator's beautiful soil for the good of
His people the world over.30

Yun later echoed this theme:

What we want is the rich, nay revolutionizing, ideas of the West introduced

and naturalized, as it were, in Korea .... [We need] the epoch-making and

world-moving thoughts of the Occidental races.31

Unlike in Japan, where some champions of bummei kaika (Civilization and Enlightenment) in the 1870s and early 1880s had advocated
a wholesale remaking of the nation after the Western models, and in China,
where some enthusiasts in the May 4th era of modernization showed a
thoroughgoing rejectionist attitude toward their own culture,32 the Club
retained a balanced and wholesome attitude on the question of foreign
borrowing. Despite its unreserved praise for Western civilization, the Club
did not want Koreans to distance themselves from their own tradition

as such, only from the debilitating elements ofthat tradition. For the most
part the Club saw these as stemming from Chinese and Confucian aspects of Korea's culture. Hence arose the unsparing harshness of its attack
on China and Confucianism. The Club saw the material and intellectual

gifts of the West as welcome aids for Korea's advancement, and the

"powerful sentiment" of patriotism that So and his colleagues sought to

cultivate in the country was thus meant first to make "resistance to encroachment possible" and then to enhance the power and prosperity of
the nation.33

There was, however, no suggestion whatever in the Club's activism

of a quest for the enhancement of national power through aggression and
expansionism. The ultrachauvinism and shrill jingoism of a Saigo Takamori or even of a Fukuzawa Yukichi, or the calculated expansionism of

the Meiji oligarchs were conspicuously absent from the Club leadership.34

Their brand of patriotism and nationalism came close to the ideal espoused
by Ernest Renanpeaceful, constructive, warmly cosmopolitan, and ardently friendly toward the West.
4. Assessment of the Club's Ideology of Nationalism

The preceding account of the Independence Club's thinking on

patriotism and nationalism reveals several distinctive features of the

political consciousness of the newly emerging, forward-looking elite in late

nineteenth century Korea, an elite that was both small and at irrecon-

SENTIMENT AND IDEOLOGY27

cilable odds with the traditional conservative elite. The political consciousness of both groups was largely shaped by the crisis that they saw

facing Korea, a crisis stemming from Korea's forced "opening" by Japan

in 1876 and its gradual participation in a system of modern international

relations under unequal treaties. This new situation placed onerous burdens on the small, resource-poor, inexperienced, and distraught leadership
of the vulnerable Korean peninsula. The arch conservatives among the
leaders of the Korean society wanted the country to beat an impossible
retreat into the pre- 1876 political and cultural system. The progressives,
best represented by the Independence Club, took the new order as a given
and wanted to exploit it to Korea's advantage by creating and fostering
the framework of a new nationalism, a framework they hoped would help
launch their country on what they perceived was the only desirable course
open to the nation: modernization.

Patriotism, as I said before, is the nucleus of all expressions of nationalism. If patriotism means love for one's country, and if one expression

of this love is a readiness to fight to defend one's country against external

aggression or internal subversion, then patriotism was certainly not unknown to Koreans as an admirable quality. Students of Korean history
and culture know well that during its long existence as a nation it has
produced its fair share of patriotic heroes, in both fact and legend. What
then is meant by the term "new nationalism?"
At least three characteristics of traditional Korean nationalism, es-

pecially during most of the Yi dynasty, set it apart from modern nationalism. First, though traditional Korean nationalism projected Korea as a
distinct territorial, political, and cultural entity, or nation, it did not embrace the idea of the legal equality of all states in international relations,
an idea central to modern concepts of nationalism. In the limited international arenaEast Asiain which Korea essentially conducted her foreign relations she was separate but unequal. China was Korea's suzerain
and Korea was its vassal. Or, using the more appropriate Confucian terminology, the former was the elder brother and Korea the younger.
This status had Korea's own voluntary, often enthusiastic, endorsement. Stemming both from a feeling of indebtedness to China's great culture, whence Korea drew its own intellectual and cultural nourishment,

and from the political wisdom or rationality of obtaining the friendship,

patronage, and protection of a big power looming over her own small and

vulnerable state, this attitude over time had become hardened into a

cardinal and sacrosanct principle of state policy. The phrases sadaejui

(Philosophy of Serving the Great) and mohwa chngch'aek (Treasuring the
Flower Policy), so often used in describing this principle in Yi Korea, are
pithy statements of the degree to which Koreans had internalized the concept of subordination to and veneration of China.

28CHANDRA

This attitude had not undergone much radical change among either
the elite or the populace at large even after the formal opening of Korea
by Japan in 1 876. Structurally and attitudinally, because of the continued
domination of the country by China until 1895, Korea remained very
much in the old framework. The settlement of the Sino-Japanese War of
1894-95 for the first time legally elevated Korea to unambiguous independence. That this independence was soon to be grossly misused by
Japan is beside the point here.
National pride, dignity, self-reliance, and self-assertiveness, the natural concomitants of the concept of the equality of nations, were thus
lacking in Korea's posture toward other states. When, therefore, legal and
political independence from China was thrust upon it in 1 895, the immediate effect was to leave the court, bureaucracy, and people of the country
all confused. Both as an idea and as a value, independence became difficult to handle. It did notand could notinstantly create new emo-

tional moorings for Koreans, moorings whose source of strength would be

internal rather than external. The result was a helter-skelter search by
Korea's ruling circles for substitute "elder brothers" abroad. Thus the
tendency of the various political factions of the country to seek foreign
alignments, especially involving neighboring powers, seems to have issued
as much from an emotional necessity to have a strong nation assume the
role of Korea's benevolent protector as from a desire to aggrandize their
own power.35 This tendency had to be fought and overcome. Koreans had
to be awakened to their nation's new international status as a cherishable

value before they could be expected to stand up, unassisted, to any challenge to their country's integrity. It was this task that the Independence
Club sought first and foremost to accomplish and it was in this sense above
all that its nationalism was new and modern.

Secondand this necessarily stemmed from the sadae attitude

traditional Korean nationalism had been one of withdrawal and seclusion

from the non-East Asian world. Barring intimate relations with China and
a tightly restricted trade and ritualistic intercourse with Japan, Korea had
kept itself aloof from the rest of the world until the late nineteenth century.
Again, what had begun perhaps as a rational, self-protective policy designed to insulate Korea from the dangers of unnecessary foreign entanglements, eventually became fossilized as a rigid and irrational stance against
all things alien, which clearly meant Western. The more stubborn of the
Korean Confucianists saw China as the source of all virtue and the rest

of the world, especially the West, as the source of all evil. They refused to
see the dangers inherent in such a simplistic attitude, even in a world that

was fast changing around them. The telltale evidence of a weak China's

tragic humiliations at the hands of a strong and aggressive West and, later,

SENTIMENT AND IDEOLOGY29

Japan, failed to have any salutary impact on their adherence to an outmoded philosophy and way of life. Those few Confucianists who kept their
minds open and tried to prod their government into heeding the warnings
of the times were often ostracized and frustrated.

The champions of an isolationist policy were not defeated until 1876.

Yet even in defeat they remained defiant, as seen in the continued vehemence of the wijng ch'ksa school during the 1880s and 1890s. There was
always a lurking danger that unless such obscurantist elements were continuously battled and kept at bay, if not overcome, they might attempt
to regain their strength, and even with the best of intentions lead the
nation on a path of self-destruction. The Korean people had to be fully
awakened to the lack of vision and the pitfalls in the brand of nationalism
espoused by the obdurate Confucian literati.36 This was the second important objective of the Independence Club's nationalism. Its philosophy of
nationalism was marked by the modern qualities of openness and cosmopolitanism. Openness also implied humility and a willingness to learn from
the more advanced nations. The Club's core leaders depicted the entire
world, but especially the Western world, as a vast school where Korea
should be a diligent pupil, learning and imbibing the best. By rejecting
parochialism and fostering openness, they sought to cultivate a positive
desire in Koreans to participate actively in the affairs of the world, and
to work for the enhancement of the power and status of their country in
the international community.37
Third, traditional Korean nationalism did not rest on a natural soli-

darity between the government and the people. So Chae-p'il, the Club's
foremost spokesman, saw the nation divided between the "squeezers" and
"squeezed": he and his associates saw that to the man in the street the
government was something remote, oppressive, and often cruel. The authority of the rulers and the obligations of the ruled constituted the sole,
relentless theme of the relationship between the government and the
people. There was no concept of popular or civil rights to soften the harshness of this equation and make the average person view the government as
an instrument to be used in achieving personal security and well-being.
Nor did the ordinary citizen have any role whatever in determining what
was good for the nation. This, too, naturally was the exclusive preserve of
the privileged few who governed. Consequently, the attitude of the people
towards the government was one of suspicion, distrust, and hostility,
rather than empathy.38
Modern nationalism takes as one of its basic tenets a feeling of solidarity between the government and the people. It also presupposes that
without a feeling of participation, or at least involvement, on the part of
the people in the affairs of the state, this solidarity cannot be achieved.

30CHANDRA

It rests further on the belief that without such solidarity no nation can
achieve the true recognition and esteem of other nations. Channels
concrete, psychic, and symbolicmust therefore be devised to gratify the
people's irrepressible desire for a say in the affairs of state. The Independence Club sensed this innate urge in the Korean people and sought to
give articulate expression to it. To the Club the exercise of civil liberties
by a nation's citizens was the fundamental source of national power and
prosperity.
The nationalism of the Independence Club was thus a forward looking, progressive ideology, designed in the long run to facilitate the creation of a national citizenry out of a body of abject subjects and foster
popular participation in the affairs of the nation.
It is true that the Club's ideology was not a particularly rich or
sophisticated worldview. Ideas were expressed disjointedly, tersely, and at
different times, without regard to whether or not they formed a coherent
philosophy. This, however, is to be expected when the primary breeding
ground of ideas is the editorial page of a newspaper. Another reason
for this may be that the Club, after all, was a short-lived organization,
engaged mostly in a national consciousness-raising endeavor. The first
stage of any such enterprise is inevitably focused on the affective approaches. The cognitive levelthe level where study, intellectual exploration, and reflection are criticalhad barely been investigated, mostly by
the Club's debating society, when the Club was suppressed by the government in late 1898. Only upon the completion of this second, reflective
stage could there have been any serious effort at evaluation which might
have led to a coherent, balanced stock-taking of Korea's heritage, a
weighing of its strengths and weaknesses, and the presentation of a truly
workable vision and plan for its future construction.
Few of the Club's ideas for Western-type reform saw the light of day,
due to reasons we cannot go into here.39 One wonders, however, what
would have happened if Korea had undergone the kind of rapid and
multisided Westernization that Japan went through in the Meiji era under
the goading power of patriotism. Basil Hall Chamberlain, an English
observer who came to Japan in 1873, noted twenty years later that the
swift pace of change "makes a man feel preternaturally old; for here he
is in modern times . . . and yet he can distinctly remember the Middle
Ages .... Thus does it come about that ... we ourselves feel well-nigh
four hundred years old."40 Lafcadio Hearn, then serving as a teacher in
Japan, spoke of the "forced mental expansion" and the resultant psychic
strain that accompanied the modernization of Meiji Japan due to the
relentless sentiment of patriotism that fueled it.41 Natsume Sseki, in his
novels Kokoro (The Heart of Things) and Kjin (Passersby), addressed the
questions of "historical dislocation," split personalities, distrust, unease,

SENTIMENT AND IDEOLOGY31

and loneliness that the heedless pursuit of modernity and "scientific progress" had brought to Japan.42 Would Koreans have experienced similar
mental anguish if the Club's patriotic sentiment had found the course it
was seeking? I pose the question but have no answer to offer, as yet.
When patriotism and nationalism become the prime movers of
change and thus come to exercise the role of a transcendental yardstick
for evaluating ideas and actions, another danger lurks round the corner.
Benjamin Schwartz, in his study of the Chinese reformist intellectual
Yen Fu, has aptly called it the Faustian dimension of statism.43 Like
Goethe's Faust, who sold his soul to Mephistopheles in order to gain
access to knowledge, power, and immortality, those who keep their focus
on patriotism and nationalism, without any vagueness or ambivalence,
run the risk of unwittingly distorting the meaning of concepts critical to
preserving the integrity of the individual. Thus, as I have described elsewhere, the Club's patriotic sentiment was so overriding and powerful that
its leaders defended even civil liberties and individual rights from a statist
perspective, as indeed did many patriots in both China and Japan.44 Civil
liberties, individual rights, women's rightsall became in their reckoning
ideas worth fighting for not so much because they were sound in themselves, but because they would strengthen the state. As the experience of
Japan demonstrates, this kind of emphasis ultimately renders the individual's conscience quite precarious and can prove highly inimical to the
growth and preservation of personal integrity.45 In the Club's sentiment of
patriotism there existed considerable potential for harm of this nature.
Be that as it may, the Club's intentions were noble and humane. The
flame of patriotism and nationalism that it carried aloft and helped spread
in Korea remained very much alive in subsequent decades, despite ceaseless efforts by Japan to extinguish it, and continued to spread even wider.
Twentieth century Korean nationalism owes much in this respect to the
legacy of the Independence Club.

NOTES

Author's Note: The author acknowledges with gratitude the help received from the

Committee on Korean Studies of the Social Science Research Council-American Council

of Learned Societies in the preparation of this article. Comments by Michael Robinson,

Anthony Namkung, and Dennis McNamara were also very helpful in improving this paper
for publication.
Editor's Note: This article originated as a paper presented at a conference on "The
Roots of Modern Korean Nationalism, 1876-1920," sponsored by the Center for Korean
Studies at the University of California at Berkeley in April of 1984.
1. See, for example, Shin Yong-ha, Tongnip hyphoe yn'gu (A study of the Independence Club) (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1976); and Vipan Chandra, "Nationalism and Popular Participation in Government in Late 19th-century Korea: The Contribution of the Independence
Club," Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1977.

32CHANDRA

2.For good treatments of patriotism and nationalism see the following works: Louis
Snyder, The Meaning of Nationalism (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968); Hans Kohn,
Nationalism: Its Meaning and History (Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1958); Hans
Kohn, The Idea ofNationalism (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961); Elie Kedourie,
Nationalism (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1971); Boyd C. Shafer, Faces of Nationalism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972); Boyd C. Shafer, Nationalism: Myth
and Reality (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1955); Boyd C. Shafer, Nationalism:
Interpreters and Interpretations (Washington, D.C: Service Center for Teachers of History,
1959); Anthony D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism (New York: Harper and Row, 1971);
and Delmer M. Brown, Nationalism in Japan (New York: Russell and Russell, 1955), especially Chapter I.
3.Tongnip sinmun (hereafter TS), May 11, 1897.
4.TS, June 8, 1897. See also the issue of October 21, 1897.

5.For rich details on the economic exploitation of Korea by foreigners and the role
played by Korean officials in that exploitation, see Shin Yong-ha, Tongnip hyphoe yn'gu,
pp. 276-331. For what follows I am much indebted to Shin's work, though the results of
my own research are also included.
6.The Independent, September 3, 1896. See also the Korean Repository (hereafter
KR), vol. 111(1896), p. 371.
7.The Independent, August 26, 1897. The Club also sponsored events in the late
summers of 1897 and 1898 celebrating the 505th and 506th anniversaries of the founding
of the Yi dynasty. See TS, August 14, 1897 and September 2, 1898; and The Independent,
September 3, 1898. See also Yun's ligi (Diary) vol. V (August 13, 1897), (Seoul: National
History Compilation Committee, 1975), p. 81.
8.Kim To-t'ae, So Chae-p'ilpaksa chasjn (The Autobiography of Dr. So Chae-p'il)
(Seoul: Susnsa, 1948), p. 211.

9.KR, vol. IV (1897), p. 385.

10.The Independent, October 5, 1897.

11.The Independent, October 5, 1897.

12.KR, vol. IV (1897), p. 389; and Kojong sidae-sa, vol. IV (Seoul: National History
Compilation Committee, 1970), pp. 422-428.
13.The Independent, August 3, 1897.
14.The Independent, September 19, 1896. It is noteworthy here that the present
national anthem of Korea is attributed to Yun Ch'i-ho; see the Korea Times, October 17,

1897. Yun is said to have composed the lyric in 1907.

15.See TS, May 9, July 4, 7, 16, and 23, August 1, and September 3, 5, 8, 15, and
17, 1896.
16.TS, March 15, 1898.

17.TS, April 24, 1897. See also Michael E. Robinson in this volume. For this and
the following section, my debt to Shin Yong-ha is more than any note can acknowledge.
18.TS, April 24, 1897. See also the issue of September 5, 1897.

19.TS, April 24, 1897.

20.TS, April 24, 1897.

Club.

21.Further details on Chu's work are available in Shin's many publications on the

22.TS, March 8, 1898. See also The Independent, September 19, 1896. Of the three
men mentioned in the TS editorial, Yi Sun-sin (1545-1598) was the naval general famous
for his exploits against the Japanese during the Hideyoshi invasions of the late sixteenth
century; Chung-bong is the penname of Cho ?d? (1544-1592), who heroically was martyred

while leading a Righteous Army [ibyng~\ group into battle against the same invaders;

and Im Kyng-p (1594-1646) was a military figure who earned fame in a number of operations against internal rebellion and external invasions, notably the Manchu invasion of
1636. See Han'guk inmyng taesajn (Encyclopedia of Korean Notables), pp. 664, 775, 905.
23.TS, August 17, 1897. See also Yun's speech at Kojong's birth anniversary, as
reported in The Independent and TS of August 25, 1897.
24.TS, June 4, 1896, and The Independent, June 6, 1896. See also KR, vol. 3 (1896),
pp. 170-171.

SENTIMENT AND IDEOLOGY33

25.The Independent, June 6, 1896. Also see TS, June 4, 1896.

26.The Independent, August 6, 1896. See also the issue of July 13, 1897, for a similar
critique of Confucianism.

27.The Independent, September 29, 1896. Foreign envoys lodged a strong protest
with the government against Sin and the book. The book was immediately withdrawn from
the market and Sin soon tendered his resignation. Min Sang-ho, a charter member of the

Club, was appointed acting minister of education. See The Independent, October 3 and

October 8, 1896. See also Kojong sidae-sa, vol. 4: 275-276; and Homer B. Hulbert, The
Passing of Korea (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1969), p. 154.
28.The Independent, September 19, 1896. See also editorials in TS on July 25, Sep-

tember 22, December 26, and December 31, 1896; August 16, 1897; and January 13, April
2, and September 19, 1898.

29.See Chng Kyo, Taehan Kyenynsa, vol. 2, p. 8; and Shin, Tongnip hyphoe Hi

sahoe sasang yn'gu(Seoul: Han'guk munhwa yn'gu-sa, 1973), pp. 93-94. After SinKi-sn's
departure, the education ministry did publish a book of its own, with an open and tolerant
view of the world and with patriotic content. Meant to be used as a school text, this general
reader, entitled Kungmin shak tokbon (A Reader in Primary Studies for the People), dealt
with such subjects as "The Land of the Great Chosn," "The Story of His Majesty Sejong,"

"The Treaty Powers," "London," "The Life of lchi Mundok," "[President] Garfield,"

and "The Independence of America." See KR, vol. IV (1897), pp. 356-357.
30.The Independent, November 14, 1896.
31.The Independent, July 13, 1898.
32.For a good discussion of those Japanese who advocated wholesale westernization,
see Kenneth B. PyIe, The New Generation in Meiji Japan: Problems of Cultural Identity,
1885-1895 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969). For a representative example of
those Chinese who advocated a rejectionist position toward their own past, see Jerome
Ch'en, China and the West (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1979), p. 89.
33.The Independent, August 3, 1897. See also Yun's ligi of February 20, 1898.
34.From a champion of "civilization and enlightenment," Fukuzawa, by the mid1880s, had become quite a chauvinistic advocate of Japanese expansionism in Korea and
China. See PyIe, The New Generation in Meiji Japan, p. 173. For the jingoism of Saigo and
others, and for the calculated aggressiveness of the Meiji oligarchs, see William Theodore
de Bary, Sources of the Japanese Tradition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958),
vol. II, chapters 25-27.
35.This attitude was displayed by many Korean reformistsfrom Kim Ok-kyun
and others, to leading officials during and after 1894-95, to those who were active collaborators with the Japanese between 1905 and 1910, especially the leaders of the Ilchin-hoe.
Commenting on this tendency, Yun Ch'i-ho noted in his diary:
Long centuries of dependence on China have made Coreans think and feel that Corea
can never be anything but a dependency of some great power. A Corean takes to
national vassalage as naturally as a duck takes to water.
See Yun's ligi, vol. V (1897), p. 114.
36.Numerous editorials and comments in the TS and The Independent carried this
theme. For a representative example, see The Independent, January 8, 1898.
37.Again both papers frequently expressed this view. They and the Club enthusiastically endorsed the idea of sending students to Japan and the West to acquire modern
education. The Club also initiated a fundraising drive for supporting such students. See TS,
January 20 and April 5, 1897; and The Independent, January 14, 1897, and January 13, June
21, and June 25, 1898.

38.On this theme see S's essay, "What Korea Needs Most," in KR, vol. Ill (1896),
pp. 108-110. For further discussion consult the works cited in note 1.
39.Further discussion may be found in the works cited in note 1.
40.See PyIe, The New Generation in Meiji Japan, pp. 1-3.
41.Ibid.

42.See John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, East Asia:
The Modern Transformation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), pp. 539-544.

34CHANDRA

43.Benjamin Schwartz, In Search of Wealth and Power (Cambridge, Massachusetts:

Harvard University Press, 1893), pp. 237-247.
44.See my article, "The Korean Enlightenment: A Reexamination," Korea Journal
22, no. 5 (May 1982).

45.On this question see Maruyama Masao, Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. xi-xvii, 1-24; see also Ienaga
Saburo, The Pacific War: World War II and the Japanese (New York: Pantheon Books,
1978), especially chapters 2 and 10.