Review: Skinner Again

Author(s): George C. Homans

Source: The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 86, No. 2 (Sep., 1980), pp. 389-393
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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Review Essay: Skinner Again

on Behaviorismand Society.By B. F. Skinner.
Reflections
EnglewoodCliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1978. Pp. xii+209. $15.95.
GeorgeC. Homans
HarvardUniversity
Unlikehis previousbook on behaviorism,
Beyond Freedomand Dignity
(1971), Skinner'spresentone does not offera connectedargument.Instead,Reflectionson Behaviorismand Societyconsistsof a collectionof
papershe has publishedover thepast 10 years,someof whichhave little
for
to do witheitherbehaviorism
or societybut are not theless interesting
that.One is an analysisof a sonnetof Shakespeare's,whichattackslinand incidentallysuggeststhat Shakespearedeliberguisticstructuralism
ately curbedhis tendencytowardalliteration,a tendencybuilt into the
(instinctive)beEnglishlanguage.Anotheris a studyof thephylogenetic
haviorof certainsea-creatures.
It has longbeenknownthatall NorthAtlanticeels, fromboth Europe and America,come togetherat the appropriateage in a commonspawninggroundin the SargassoSea, traveling
thousandsof milesto get there.How is one to explainsuch extraordinary
afterall. If
behavior?Skinnerargues that it may not be extraordinary
Europe and Americawereonce muchcloserto each otherthan theyare
nowand have beenseparatingthrough
plate tectonicsformillionsof years
unitedbodyof eels
but at a rateof less thanan incha year,theoriginally
could easily,by geneticallyevolvingbehavior,have separatedyet preserveda commonspawningground.
But mostof the papersare concernedin one way or anotherwithbehaviorismand society,and here I confessthat Skinnerdrivesme to despair.He is at once a greatpsychologist
and a naivesocial psychologistor at least soundslike one to me. I considermyselfa behaviorist,
though
to Skinner'snarrower
versionof thesubjectI wouldadd theworkof such
menas Bandura,especiallyhis PrinciplesofBehaviorModification
(1969),
and Herrnstein,
especiallyhis discussionof the"matchinglaw" in "QuantitativeHedonism"(1971). I suspectthatSkinnertoo wouldacceptthese,
thoughhe does not mentionthem.Human actionand thatof otherhigher
animalsare shaped by theirenvironments.
If a person'sactionhas been
rewarded(reinforced)by the environment,
whetherhumanor "natural,"
he is likelyto perform
it moreoften;if it has been punished,less often,
at least temporarily-allin relationto alternativeactionsopen to him.
Moreover,the higherthe degreeof reward(value) his actiongets from
it moreoften,unlessthe
theenvironment,
themorelikelyhe is to perform
rate of rewardbecomesso highthatsatiationbeginsto set in. If the cir?

1980 by The Universityof Chicago. 0002-9602/81/8602-0008$01.50

389

AmericanJournalof Sociology
cumstances(stimuli) attendinga previouslyrewardedaction recuron a
newoccasion,thepersonis likelyto repeattheaction.Thereare also some
important
propositions
about emotionalbehavior.But I obviouslycannot
here,nordo I need to.
writea treatiseon behaviorism
What is important
It is
is its generalcharacteristics.
aboutbehaviorism
a highlyhistorical-thatis, causal-science, since its explanationsof human behaviordependheavilyon a person'spast historyof actionon the
environment:
his successesand theirattendantstimuli.Its propositions
and behavior.
relatetheperson'spast historyto his presentcircuinstances
to his actionon his
Moreover,it jumpsdirectlyfromhis past environment
presentenvironment,
whichfeedsback to affecthis futurebehavior.
neglectsa person'sinternalmentalstates,or
By so doing,behaviorism
to them.Such a wordis purpose,as
ratherthewordswe use in referring
whenwe say thathumanbehavioris purposiveor goal directed.It is just
who feel
this featureof behaviorismthat infuriatesthe nonbehaviorists,
that theycertainlyhave purposes.But let
theyknowfromintrospection
thembe fairto Skinner.Not forone minutedoes he denythat the brain
and nervoussystemexist.Nor are theyuselessappendages:theyare there
to do something.
whichtakes
They constitutea verycomplexcomputer,
combinesthemwith
currentinputsto the personfromthe environment,
and comesout withactionon
his past experiencewiththe environment,
theenvironment.
All Skinnerarguesis thatwe stillknowverylittle,though
we are alwayslearningmore,about how thiscomputerworks,especially
what is represented
in the action of the computerby words denoting
"highermentalfunctions,"
such as "purpose."Untilwe do, we had better
avoid mentalisticexplanations.Indeed, for Skinnerthe programfor the
the
of the nervoussystemis to demonstrate
anatomistsand physiologists
and behavior.
exact mechanismsthat fill the gap betweenenvironment
thatjump the
Meanwhile,behaviorism
possessesmanytestedpropositions
gap and relatethetwodirectlyto one another.
To speak of humanbehaviorwithoutmore ado as purposiveor goal
directedis to explainpresentbehaviorby a presumedfuturestate; thatis,
the explanationis teleological.But purposesdo not springindependently
and fullyarmedinto a person's"mind."An actorlearnspurposesjust as
he learnsotherbehavior;he learnsthemby thesame processes,and these
To take a homelyexample,it does notwithout
are causal,not teleological.
antecedentoccurto me to go to a postboxto post a letter(my purpose).
Someonemustfirsthave toldme thatif I droppeda letterintoa postbox
abouttheU.S. Postal Serviceis certain-reach
it wouldprobably-nothing
its destination
and thatthisresultwouldrewardme. The probabilitythat
I would take this actionwould increaseif the personwho told me were
someoneI trusted,that is, a personwhoseotherpieces of advice I had
MoreoverI should
acted on in thepast and foundthe resultsrewarding.
be likelyto repeattheaction (my purpose)if I discoveredthattheletter
had actuallyreachedits addressee.There is nothingin this explanation
thatbringsin anythingbut past and contemporary
events,and therefore
it is causal,not teleological.
390

ReviewEssay
Havinggonethusfar,I wouldwaffle
a littleaboutmentalistic
concepts.
In myteachingand writing,
afterfirstgivinga carefulbehavioralaccount
of wordslike "purpose,"I woulduse themthereafter,
simplybecausethey
save timein exposition.A simon-pure
is apt to
languageof behaviorism
be long-winded
becausefullof circumlocutions.
Skinneris also sound on the way geneticsinteractswithlearning(see
themostimportant
kindsof hupp. 33, 124). Geneticsdoes not influence
man behaviordirectly.Human beingsmay be genetically
programmed
to
findcertainkindsof resultsof theiractionsmorerewarding
than others.
But theiractionsmustactuallymeetwiththeserewardsbeforethe latter
can affecttheirfuturebehavior,and the meetingis alwaysproblematical.
This interaction
providesthe essentiallinkbetweenpsychology,
sociology,
and sociobiology(see Wilson 1978, pp. 60-70). The principlesof behavioral psychologythemselvesevolved genetically:they helped organisms
survive.

we have now.None
Skinneryearnsto apply the behavioralpsychology
of us can escape behavingaccordingto behavioralprinciplesat everymomentof our lives.That is not in question.But we do so unsystematically.
to get us to behave
Skinnerwantsto apply the principlessystematically
better,by his standards,than we do now. He reallyis a social engineer
is correct,theproblemis not thatof changingthe
manque. If behaviorism
behaviorof personsdirectly,
but of changingtheenvironmental
conditions
thatstimulateand rewardthem.As he writes(pp. 54-55), "The age-old
mistakeis to look forsalvationin the characterof autonomousmen and
womenratherthanthesocial environments
thathave appearedin theevolutionof culturesand thatcan nowbe explicitly
designed."
Again and again Skinnerreturnsto thispoint,and it is just the one
at whichI beginto leave him.Not that I disagreewithall of his ideals
forthe social behaviorof mankind-thoughI do withsome-but that I
thinkhe is utterlynaive about the practicalproblemsof designinga culture,especiallya cultureas a whole,and of puttingthedesignintoeffect.
Indeed,he hardlyaddressestheproblemat all. So far,deliberateattempts
at "behavioralmodification"
have been successfulwhen,first,thepersons
who are doingthe modifying
have a clear and widelyacceptedcriterion
of what kind of changewould be forthe betterand, second,theyhave
powerto controlthe environmental
contingencies
underwhichthepersons
whosebehaviortheywould changemustact: the latterhave littlepower
of countercontrol.
Thus it is both acceptableand possibleto use behavioral principlesto get autisticchildrento talk,and to use themin other
of the same kind. This sortof workrepresents
circumstances
a real advance overtraditional
methodsand shouldbe pursuedvigorously.
Though
thereare personswho wouldoutlawall behavioralmodification,
theyare
usually thinkingof the use of aversivemethods,whichSkinnerhimself
wouldlike to minimize.But theirgeneralpositionis silly,as we all spend
muchof our time trying,oftensuccessfully,
to modifythe behaviorof
others.
But Skinner'shopes go farbeyondsuch piecemealadvances.He wants
391

AmericanJournalof Sociology
wholeculturesto be morebenignin theireffecton behaviorand believes
that theycan now be explicitlydesigned.But what shall the designbe?
I myselfshouldhate to live in Skinner'sown designdescribedin Walden
Two ([1948] 1962). He wouldhave peopledirectlycontrolone another's
behavior,a practicethatimpliesa densesocial environment,
such as that
of a smallishand isolatedgroup.I shouldhave moreto say in favorof
citiesthanhe does, forin themI can choosewhetheror not I am to controlor be controlledby otherpeople; that is, I can determine
whenmy
behaviorand thatof otherstowardme can be impersonal.His attemptto
stressthe similarity
betweenhis ownWaldenTwo and Thoreau'soriginal
not a member
Waldenis misleading.Thoreauwantedto be independent,
of a community.
Even if peoplecould agreeon a design,the questionhow to put it into
effectstillremains.Skinneris inclinedto use thepassivevoice: a culture
"can now be explicitlydesigned."Or he writesthat "we" can put it into
effect.But who are "we"? He proposesan elite in a democraticsociety,
and saysof them(p. 15): "Theirtaskis notto controlpeoplebut to bring
peopleunderthecontrolofmoreeffective
physicaland socialenvironments.
They operateupontheenvironment,
notuponpeople." But if theenvironmentis social-and the mostimportantpart of the humanenvironment
is just that-the elitewill have to controlpeople afterall! This does not
solve theproblemof Quis custodietipsos custodes?Againand again Skindid
ner distinguishes
betweeninstitutions
and persons,as if institutions
not consistpreciselyof personsand theirbehavior.It is thistendencyof
Skinner's-quiteunconscious,I am sure-to appear to say thingsthathe
is notsayingwhichinfuriates
me mostabouthis writings.
The only explicitcriterionhe sets up for the designof his cultureis
thatit shall ensurethe culture'sown survival.I have elsewhere(Homans
it is to specify
1972) discussedin connectionwithSkinnerhow difficult
theconditionsforthesurvivalof a cultureat any levelabove theprimitive
thatof a seriesof WaldenTwos.
huntingband or,muchmoredoubtfully,
Someonewho is so insistentthat "we" not only can but mustdesign
and put into operationa morebenignculturehas a duty to tell us more
about how,in accordancewithbehavioralprinciples,"we" can get from
hereto there.
What is worse,Skinnerseemsready to forgoexistinginstitutions
that
mighthelp him attainhis goal. Parts of culturehave alreadybeen explicitlydesigned,and designedaccordingto behavioralprinciples,
although
thedesignerswerenot awareof the fact.That is, theyhave beendesigned
to coordinatepersons'actionsand theirincentives.They are not always
well designed,because theydo not take into accounta sufficient
rangeof
actionsand incentives.Yet theyare amongthe mostpowerfulorgansof
culturalchange.Sociologistsoftencall themformalorganizations.
Perhaps
behavior.ProgSkinnershouldbeginby tryingto improveorganizational
ress herewill at best be piecemeal,but that perhapsis the mostwe can
hope for.
In the end Skinnerwould even get rid of "contrived"reinforcers
in
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ReviewEssay
favorof "natural"ones (p. 11). The mostobviouscontrivedreinforcer
is
money.He writes(p. 11): "The behaviorof the productionline worker
whichhas no important
in comconsequenceexcepta weeklywage suffers
parisonwith the behaviorof the craftsmanwhichis reinforced
by the
is also
that the craftsman
thingsproduced."True enough,but remember
reinforced
by moneyand could not remaina craftsmanif he were not.
Rememberalso that,compared
Skinneris a masterof thefalsedichotomy.
withbarteras a meansof gettingnaturalreinforcers,
moneygetsthemin
featureof a
a muchshortertime,and savingtimeis a not unimportant
well-designed
society.In general,Skinnerdoes not considerthe coststhatis, the rewardsforgone-ofmovingtowardhis kindof good society.
Not all thatSkinnerhas to say in the more"applied" part of his work
is naiveor mixedup. Perhapsthebest of thepapersin thisbook is "The
Ethicsof HelpingPeople." He makesthepoint (pp. 43-44): "Verylittle
has everbeen achievedsimplyby supplyinggoods and services.Governmentsdo nothelp theirpeopleby givingthemorderand security-thatis
the claim of the police state; theyhelp themby arrangingenvironments
in whichtheybehavein orderlyand mutuallysupportive
ways."Note that
intohis argument.Or again
Skinnerdoes occasionallybringgovernments
(p. 27), "Welfarepaymentsshoulddependon usefulwork."What arrant
conservativecould say more? The point is that when a personreceives
on
moneyand othergoodsas an entitlement
and notas a resultcontingent
his actions,the effectmay be simplyto demoralizehim. Some welfare
statesmay be reachingthispoint (see Logue 1979). This does not mean
we are notboundto helppeoplewho cannothelp themselves.
Yet even here Skinnerdoes not give his argumentenoughnuance and
is led to say (p. 47): "Neitherhappinessnor the survivalof the group
dependson the satisfaction
derivedfromhavingthings."Maybe not,but
it helps. Having money,even if it is deteriorating
in value, gives me a
feelingof security,
a feelingthatmyfamilyand myselfmaynotbe undone
by futurecontingencies.
Making moneyis morefun than havingit, but
havingit is notwithoutits compensations.
This book bothrewardsme and infuriates
me. Yet alwaysand on both
countsit interests
me. Accordingly
I recommend
it.
REFERENCES
Bandura, Albert. 1969. Principlesof Behavior Modification.New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
Herrnstein,R. J. 1971. "Quantitative Hedonism." Journal of PsychiatricResearch
8:399-412.
Homans, George C. 1972. Review of Beyond Freedom and Dignity by B. F. Skinner.
AmericanJournalof Sociology 78 (November): 696-702.
Logue, John. 1979. "The WelfareState: Victim of Its Success." Daedalus 108 (Fall):
69-87.
Skinner,B. F. (1948) 1962. Walden Two. New York: Macmillan.
. 1971. Beyond Freedom and Dignity.New York: Knopf.
Wilson, Edward 0. 1978. On Human Nature. Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University
Press.

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