September 9, 2003 Tuesday

Without a Map
BUSH ADMINISTRATION officials seem to hope that they can avoid accepting the
collapse of the latest Israeli-Palestinian peace process simply by declaring it
still alive. "The road map is still there," Secretary of State Colin L. Powell
insisted Sunday. "What are the alternatives?" Sadly, those alternatives are very
real -- and hard-liners on both sides are rushing to demonstrate them.
Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat smugly presides over the selection of a new
prime minister after forcing the resignation of Mahmoud Abbas, the leader of
Palestinian efforts to end violence and renew negotiations with Israel; Mr.
Arafat believes his coup will compel Israel and the United States to deal with
him once again. Israel, meanwhile, launches daily assassination operations
against leaders of the extremist group Hamas; if the inevitable retaliatory
suicide bombers succeed, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon will again demand that the
Bush administration agree to Israel's expulsion of Mr. Arafat, a step that could
bring about the final collapse of the Palestinian Authority. After several
months of relative calm, Israelis and Palestinians now face the prospect of
another thunderous eruption of violence, one that will further complicate the
Bush administration's effort to stabilize Iraq and build an international
coalition in the Middle East.
Could the administration have avoided this reverse? Perhaps not. Though
supported by President Bush in recent months, the "road map" may have been
doomed from the beginning by the problem of Mr. Arafat. It is obvious that he
will never renounce violence against Israel or agree to a final peace settlement
with a Jewish state. And pro-peace Palestinian leaders such as Mr. Abbas are not
yet strong enough to sideline him. Much of this summer's diplomacy was aimed at
bolstering the Palestinian moderates -- but little was done. Rather than embrace
the strategy, Mr. Sharon took only small steps, just enough to avoid trouble
with Mr. Bush; once again Mr. Sharon failed to take any significant action
against Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza.
Mr. Abbas did little to encourage Israeli confidence in him. Though he
forthrightly denounced terrorism, he shrank from the job of dismantling the
terrorist cells of Hamas and other extremist groups. Instead, he lapsed into the
familiar Palestinian strategy of demanding that Washington pressure Israel. Mr.
Bush soon found himself thrust into the role of broker between Mr. Sharon and
Mr. Abbas -- and he failed to budge either side. A U.S. monitoring team
diligently compiled a weekly report on each side's noncompliance with the road
map -- but the White House timidly declined to publicize it.
The administration seeks to salvage the situation by hinting that progress is
still possible if the next Palestinian prime minister shares Mr. Abbas's agenda
and succeeds in gaining control over Mr. Arafat's multiple security forces. The
unlikelihood of this was underscored by the unrealistic conditions Mr. Arafat's
latest choice sought to put on U.S. diplomacy yesterday. Progress could only be
made if Mr. Arafat were induced by concerted international pressure to yield the
power he just consolidated, and if Mr. Sharon were persuaded to suspend the
all-out war against Hamas he just launched. If this is not possible, the Bush
administration at least ought to draw a lesson from the summer's events: A
successful peace process will require bolder and more forceful action than any
of the parties -- including Mr. Bush -- have so far been willing to take.
Copyright 2003