Case Digest

1
SUCCESSION JUSTICE HOFILENA
USON v. DEL ROSARIO
FACTS

Maria USON (petitioner) is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who died in
1945.

Nebreda left 5 parcels of land in Labrador Pangasinan, which lands

are thesubject of an action for recovery of possession and ownership filed
by USONagainst Maria DEL ROSARIO.

DEL ROSARIO is the common law wife of Nebreda to whom he

begotten 4illegitimate children.

USON contends that DEL

R O S A R I O d e p r i v e d h e r o f t h e p o s s e s s i o n a n d enjoyment of the
lands in question. The latter, meanwhile, argues that Uson andNebreda
executed a public document whereby they agreed to separate
ashusband and wife. USON was given an alimony in consideration of which
shegave up her rights to inherit any property from Nebreda.

The CFI ruled in favor of USON.

ISSUE:
WON USON is the rightful heir?
HELD:
YES!When Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the fi ve parcels of land
passed from themoment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson
(Article 657, old CivilCode). As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to
the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely
as if the ancestor had executed anddelivered to them a deed for the
same before his death" (Ilustre
vs
. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of
inheritance of Maria Usonover the lands in question became vested. The
claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right
over thelands in question because she expressly renounced to inherit any
future propertythat her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the
deed of separationthey had entered into on February 21, 1931, cannot be
entertained for the simplereason that future inheritance cannot be the
subject of a contract nor can it berenounced.
Additional Facts and Ratio:
DEL ROSARIO contends that the 4 illegitimate children she had with Nebreda
areentitled to successional rights by virtue of the new civil code promulgated
on 1950.HOWEVER, the court ruled that while it is true that rights first
declared in the newcivil code are to be given retroactive effect, the same is
subject to the condition thatthe said rights will not prejudice vested or
acquired rights. Hence, given thebackground of the case, the children
cannot have successional rights since USONsrights would be prejudiced.

Case Digests for Articles 1-10 of Civil CodePersons and Family RelationsElmer Rabuya
Filoteo, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan263 SCRA 222 (1996)G.R. No. 79543Facts:
Petitioner Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. was a police investigator of the Western Police District
inMetro Manila, an old hand at dealing with suspected criminals. A recipient of
variousawards and commendations attesting to his competence and performance as a
policeofficer, he could not therefore imagine that one day he would be sitting on the other sideof the
investigation table as the suspected mastermind of the armed hijacking of
apostal delivery van.Filoteo admitted involvement in the crime and pointed to three other
soldiers,
namely,E d d i e S a g u i n d e l , B e r n a r d o R e l a t o r a n d J a c k M i r a v a l l e s ( w h o t
u r n e d o u t t o b e a discharged soldier), as his confederates. At 1:45 in the
afternoon of May 30, 1982,petitioner executed a sworn statement in Tagalog before
M/Sgt. Arsenio C. Carlos andSgt. Romeo P. Espero.Peitioner however sought later that his
confession be inadmissible evidence, saying thatthe law should favour him as an accused.
Issue:
Whether or not Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution
s h a l l b e g i v e n a retroactive effect and petitioners extrajudicial confession
be held as inadmissibleevidence
Held:
No, since what he did was not a penal offense. Under the penal law, a person guilty
of felony who is not a habitual criminal may be given favour by the law.

Ladera vs. Hodges

Ladera vs. Hodges
No. 8027-R. September 23, 1952.
Reyes, J.B.L., J.
Doctrine: Article 315 of the Civil Code (now Article 415, New Civil Code) makes no
distinction as to whether the owner of the land is or is not the owner of the building.
Facts: Ladera entered into a contract with Hodges whereby the latter promised to sell a
lot subject to certain terms and conditions. In case of failure of the purchaser to make a
monthly payment within 60 days after it fell due, this contract may be taken and
considered as rescinded and annulled, in which case all sums of money paid would be
considered rentals and the vendor shall be at liberty to dispose of the parcel of land with
all the improvements theron to any other person in a manner as if this contract had
never been made. After the execution of the contract, Ladera built on a lot a house of
mixed materials assessed at P4500.
Unfortunately, Ladera failed to pay the agreed installments, whereupon the appellant
rescinded the contract and filed an action for ejectment. The MTC rendered a decision
upon agreement of the parties- Ladera to vacate and surrender possession of the lot
and pay P10 a month until delivery of the premises. The court issued an alias writ of
execution and pursuant thereto the sheriff levied upon all rights, interests, and
participation over your house standing on the lot. The sheriff posted the notices of the
sale but did not publish the same in a newspaper of general circulation.
At the auction sale Ladera did not attend because she had gone to Manila and the
sheriff sold the property to Avelina Magno as the highest bidder. On July 6, 1948,
Hodges sold the lot to Manuel Villa and on the same day the latter purchased the house
from Magno for P200 but this last transaction was not recorded.
Ladera returned to Iloilo after the sale and learned of its results. She went to see the
sheriff and upon the latters representation that she could redeem the property, she
paid him P230 and the sheriff issued a receipt. It does not appear, however, that this
money was turned over to Hodges. Thereupon, Ladera spouses filed an action against
Hodges, the sheriff, and the judgment sale purchasers, Magno and Villa to set aside the
sale and recover the house. The lower court ruled in favor of Ladera. Hodges et al
contend that the house being built on land owned by another person should be
regarded in law as movable or personal property.

Issue: Whether the house being built on land owned by another should be regarded as
movable property.
Held: According to Article 334 of the Civil Code (now 415), Immovable property are the
following: Lands, building, roads, and constructions of all kinds adhering to the soil;
Applying the principle Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemu, the law makes
no distinction as to whether the owner of the land is or is not the owner of the building.
In view of the plain terms of the statute, the only possible doubt could arise in the case
of a house sold for demolition.
In the case of immovables by destination, the code requires that they be placed by the
owner of the tenement, in order to acquire the same nature or consideration of real
property. In cases of immovable by incorporation, the code nowhere requires that the
attachment or incorporation be made by the owner of the land. The only criterion is
union or incorporation with the soil.
Ladera did not declare his house to be a chattel mortgage. The object of the levy or sale
was real property. The publication in a newspaper of general circulation was
indispensible. It being admitted that no publication was ever made, the execution sale
was void and conferred no title on the purchaser.
The alleged purchaser at the auction sale, Magno, is a mere employee of the creditor
Hodges and the low bid made by her as well as the fact that she sold the house to Villa
on the same day that Hodges sold him the land, proves that she was merely acting for
and in behalf of Hodges.
It should be noted that in sales of immovables, the lack of title of the vendor taints the
rights of subsequent purchasers. Unlike in sales of chattels and personalty, in
transactions covering real property, possession in good faith is not equivalent to title.
Caveat: Anyone who claims this digest as his own without proper authority
shall be held liable under the law of Karma.

TAADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued
that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as
to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.
HELD:
The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature
may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous
publication.
Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any
bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires
act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly
applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the
content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not

elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the
wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.
J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their
dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding
unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure
and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or
cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

Manuel Lara vs Petronilo Del

Rosario, Jr.
Manuel Lara et al were former taxi drivers of Petronilo Del Rosario, Jr. In September 1950,
Del Rosario sold some of his vehicles which led to Lara et al not being needed anymore.
Eventually, their services were terminated. Because their employer did not give them their
one months salary in lieu of the notice required in Article 302 of the Code of Commerce,
Lara et al sued Del Rosario.
However, Del Rosario contended that the Code of Commerce was already repealed hence
Lara et al have no legal basis. Del Rosario contends that the New Civil Code took effect in
August 1950 or a year after release for publication.
ISSUE: When did the New Civil Code took effect?
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that Lara et al has no legal basis for their claims since the
provision of the COde of Commerce they are relying on was already repealed by the New
Civil Code. Their alleged dismissal from service without notice took place in September
1950 after the New Civil Code took effect.
The Supreme Court also clarified that, in an obiter dictum, that the new Civil Code of the
Philippines took effect on August 30, 1950. This date is exactly one year after the Official
Gazette publishing the Code was released for circulation, the said release having been
made on August 30, 1949.

D.M. Consunji vs. CA and Juego

TITLE: D.M. Consunji Inc. v Court of Appeals and Maria J. Juego

CITATION: GR No. 137873, April 20, 2001 | 357 SCRA 249

FACTS:
Around 1:30PM of November 2, 1990, Jose Juergo, a construction worker of D.M.
Consunji Inc. fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City. He was
immediately rushed to Rizal Medical Center in Pasig City. The attending physician, Dr.
Errol de Yzo, pronounce Jose dead on arrival (DOA) at around 2:15PM.

Jose Juergo, together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo, performing their work as
carpenter at the elevator core of the 14th floor of Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building
were on board a platform. Jose was crushed to death when the platform fell due to
removal or looseness of the pin, which was merely inserted to the connecting points of
the chain block and platform but without a safety lock. Luckily, Jessie and Delso
jumped out of safety.

PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed
report dated Nov. 25, 1990. Maria Juergo, Joses widow filed a complaint on May 9,

1991 for damages in the RTC and was rendered a favorable decision to receive support
from DM Consunji amounting to P644,000.

DM Consunji seeks reversal of the CA decision.

ISSUE: Whether Maria Juergo can still claim damages with D.M. Consunji apart from
the death benefits she claimed in the State Insurance Fund.

HELD:
The respondent is not precluded from recovering damages under the civil code. Maria
Juergo was unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for death
benefits from the State Insurance Fund. She filed the civil complaint for damages after
she received a copy of the police investigation report and the Prosecutors
Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against petitioners personnel.
Supreme Court remanded to the RTC of Pasig City to determine whether the award
decreed in its decision is more than that of the Employees Compensation Commission
(ECC). Should the award decreed by the trial court be greater than that awarded by the
ECC, payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall
be deducted therefrom.
PILAPIL VS IBAY-SOMERA
March 28, 2013 ~ vbdiaz

PILAPIL vs. HON IBAY-SOMERA, VICTOR AND GEILING et al

G.R. No. 80116
June 30, 1989
FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a
German national, were married in Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, such
connubial disharmony eventuated in Geiling initiating a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in
Germany. The Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on
the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for
adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging in one that, while still married to said Geiling,
Pilapil had an affair with a certain William Chia. The Assistant Fiscal, after the corresponding
investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal Victor approved a resolution
directing the filing of 2 complaint for adultery against the petitioner. The case entitled PP

Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia was assigned to the court presided by the respondent judge
Ibay-Somera.
A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was denied by the respondent. Pilapil filed
this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO, seeking the
annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.
As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.
ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the complaint for adultery,
considering that it was done after obtaining a divorce decree?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioners MTQ is SET ASIDE and
another one entered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The TRO issued in
this case is hereby made permanent.
NO
Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn
written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with
unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a
formal, requirement.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it
necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do
so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a logical consequence since the raison
detre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to
be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case.
Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a
criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be
unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized
in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle
in our civil law on the matter of status of persons Under the same considerations and rationale,
private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he
filed suit.

SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC
July 14, 2012 Leave a comment
Silverio v. Republic

October 22, 2007 (GR. No. 174689)

PARTIES:
petitioner: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio
respondent: Republic of the Philippines
FACTS:
On November 26, 2002, Silverio field a petition for the change of his first name Rommel
Jacinto to Mely and his sex from male to female in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila,
Branch 8, for reason of his sex reassignment. He alleged that he is a male transsexual, he is
anatomically male but thinks and acts like a female. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of
him, explaining that it is consonance with the principle of justice and equality.
The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleging
that there is no law allowing change of name by reason of sex alteration. Petitioner filed a
reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
WON change in name and sex in birth certificate are allowed by reason of sex reassignment.
HELD:
No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may be allowed in cases where the name is
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or difficult to pronounce or write; a nickname is habitually
used; or if the change will avoid confusion. The petitioners basis of the change of his name is
that he intends his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into thru
surgery. The Court says that his true name does not prejudice him at all, and no law allows the
change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment. The Court
denied the petition.
ANCHETA V. GUERSEY-DALAYGON (Succession)
Binding Effect of Judgments
490 SCRA 140
June 8, 2006
Facts: Spouses Audrey ONeill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American
citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle
Guersey Hill (Kyle). Audrey died in 1979. She left a will wherein she bequeathed her entire
estate to Richard consisting of Audreys conjugal share in real estate improvements at Forbes

Park, current account with cash balance and shares of stock in A/G Interiors. Two years after
her death, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon. Four years thereafter, Richard died
and left a will wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except for his shares in
A/G, which he left to his adopted daughter.
Petitioner, as ancillary administrator in the court where Audreys will was admitted to probate,
filed a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey and a project of partition of
Audreys estate. The motion and project of partition were granted. Meanwhile, the ancillary
administrator with regards to Richards will also filed a project of partition, leaving 2/5 of
Richards undivided interest in the Forbes property was allocated to respondent Candelaria,
while 3/5 thereof was allocated to their three children. Respondent opposed on the ground that
under the law of the State of Maryland, where Richard was a native of, a legacy passes to the
legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject to the legacy.
Issue: Whether or not the decree of distribution may still be annulled under the circumstances.
Held: A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the
estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it
becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem.
However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for
lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Further, in Ramon vs. Ortuzar, the Court ruled that a party interested
in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of
circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to
negligence.
Petitioners failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audreys estate according to the
terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the
CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be
upheld.

TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN vs. HELEN CHRISTENSEN

GARCIA, G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased,
Executor and
Heir-appellees, VS. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant
January 31, 1963
FACTS:
Edward E. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California, where he
resided and consequently was considered a California citizen. In 1913, he came to
the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his death. However, during the
entire period of his residence in this country he had always considered himself a
citizen of California. In his will executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an

acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir, but left a
legacy of sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who was rendered to
have been declared acknowledged natural daughter. Counsel for appellant claims
that California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is
referred back to the law of the domicile; that therefore Philippine law is ultimately
applicable; that finally, the share of Helen must be increased in view of the success
ional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine law. On the other hand, counsel
for the heir of Christensen contends that inasmuch as it is clear that under Article
16 of our Civil Code, the national law of the deceased must apply, our courts must
immediately apply the internal law of California on the matter; that under California
law there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator could dispose of any
property possessed by him in absolute dominion and that finally, illegitimate
children not being entitled to anything and his will remain undisturbed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law should prevail in administering the estate of
Christensen?
RULING:
The court in deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that
there are two rules in California on the matter: the internal law which should apply
to Californians domiciled in California; and the conflict rule which should apply to
Californians domiciled outside of California. The California conflict rule says: If
there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, is
deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the law of his
domicile. Christensen being domiciled outside California, the law of his domicile,
the Philippines, ought to be followed. Where it is referred back to California, it will
form a circular pattern referring to both country back and forth.

GARCIA vs. RECIO G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, VS. RODERICK A. RECIO,
respondent
October 2, 2001

FACTS:
The respondent, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in
Rizal in 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the
Australian family court issued a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the
marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired Australian citizenship. In 1994, he married
Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, in Cabanatuan City. In their application for
marriage license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino. Since October
1995, they lived separately; and in 1996 while in Autralia, their conjugal assets were
divided. In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on
the ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned of the respondents former
marriage only in November. On the other hand, respondent claims that he told
petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993, before they were married. Respondent also
contended that his first marriage was dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in
Australia in 1989 and hence, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
The trial court declared that the first marriage was dissolved on the ground of the
divorce issued in Australia as valid and recognized in the Philippines. Hence, this
petition was forwarded before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven.
2. Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Garcia.
RULING:
The Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot
grant it. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the
Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by two aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective laws. Therefore, before our
courts can recognize a foreign divorce, the party pleading it must prove the divorce
as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and Samson appears to be
authentic, issued by an Australian family court. Although, appearance is not
sufficient; and compliance with the rules on evidence regarding alleged foreign laws
must be demonstrated, the decree was admitted on account of petitioners failure
to object properly because he objected to the fact that it was not registered in the
Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City, not to its admissibility.
Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted
as evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian
law. However, there are two types of divorce, absolute divorce terminating the
marriage and limited divorce merely suspending the marriage. In this case, it is not
known which type of divorce the respondent procured.
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign
statutes, still restrict remarriage. Under the Australian divorce decree a party to a
marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute commits the
offense of bigamy. This shows that the divorce obtained by the respondent might
have been restricted. Respondent also failed to produce sufficient evidence showing
the foreign law governing his status. Together with other evidences submitted, they
dont absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to the alleged

foreign law.
Case remanded to the court a quo. The marriage between the petitioner and
respondent can not be declared null and void based on lack of evidence
conclusively showing the respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner. With the
lack of such evidence, the court a quo may declare nullity of the parties marriage
based on two existing marriage certificates.
FIRST DIVISION
PEPSI-COLA
PRODUCTSPHILIPPINES,
INCORPORATED, and PEPSICO,
INCORPORATED,
Petitioners,

- versus -

G. R. No. 167866
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

PEPE B. PAGDANGANAN, and

Promulgated:
PEPITO A. LUMAJAN,
Respondents.
October 12, 2006
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The Case
For review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is the 13
February 2004 Decision[1] and 26 June 2005 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 68290, reversing and setting aside the 3 August 2000 [3] Decision and
23 August 2000[4] Order of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163, [5] in
Civil Case No. 62726.
The Facts
This case stemmed from a Complaint[6] filed by herein respondents Pepe B.
Pagdanganan (Pagdanganan) and Pepito A. Lumahan (Lumahan) against herein
petitioners Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Incorporated (PCPPI) and PEPSICO,
Incorporated (PEPSICO) on 22 December 1992, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasig City, Branch 163, for Sum of Money and Damages.
The facts are beyond dispute. As culled from the records of the case, they are
as follows:

Petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO launched a Department of Trade and Industry

(DTI) approved and supervised under-the-crown promotional campaign entitled
Number Fever sometime in 1992. With said marketing strategy, it undertook to give
away cash prizes to holders of specially marked crowns and resealable caps of
PEPSI-COLA softdrink products, i.e., Pepsi, 7-Up, Mirinda and Mountain Dew.
Specially marked crowns and resealable caps were said to contain a) a three-digit
number, b) a seven-digit alpha-numeric security code, and c) the amount of the
cash

prize

in

any

of

the

following

denominations P1,000.00; P10,000.00; P50,000.00;P100,000.00;

and P1,000,000.00.

Petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO engaged the services of D.G. Consultores, a

Mexican consultancy firm with experience in handling similar promotion in other
countries, to randomly pre-select 60 winning three-digit numbers with their
matching security codes out of 1000 three-digit numbers seeded in the market, as
well as the corresponding artworks appearing on a winning crown and/or resealable
cap.

The mechanics of the Number Fever promo was simple From Monday to
Friday, starting 17 February 1992 to 8 May 1992, petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO will
announce, on national and local broadcast and print media, a randomly preselected[7] winning three-digit number. All holders of specially marked crowns
bearing the winning three-digit number will win the corresponding amount printed
on said crowns and/or resealable caps.

On account of the success of the promotional campaign, petitioners PCPPI

and PEPSICO extended or stretched out the duration of the Number Fever for
another five weeks or until 12 June 1992.

For the extended period, petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO again sought the
services of D.G. Consultores to pre-select 25 winning three-digit numbers with their
matching security codes as well as the corresponding artworks to appear on a
winning crown and/or resealable cap.

On 25 May 1992, petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO announced the notorious

three-digit combination 349 as the winning number for the next day, 26 May 1992.
On the same night of the announcement, however, petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO
learned of reports that numerous people were trying to redeem 349 bearing crowns
and/or resealable caps with incorrect security codes L-2560-FQ and L-3560-FQ. Upon
verification from the list of the 25 pre-selected [8] winning three-digit numbers,
petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO and the DTI learned that the three-digit combination
349 was indeed the winning combination for 26 May 1992 but the security codes L2560-FQ and L-3560-FQ do not correspond to that assigned to the winning number
349.

Subsequently, petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO issued a statement stating in

part that:
DEAR VALUED CUSTOMERS
xxxx
Some 349 crowns have winning security codes as per the list
held in a bank vault by the Department of Trade and Industry and will
be redeemed at full value like all other authenticated winning crowns.
Some other 349 crowns which have security codes L-2560-FQ
and L-3560-FQ are not winning crowns.
However, as an act of goodwill to our customers, we will redeem
the non-winning 349 crowns for P500.00 each until June 12, 1992 at all
Pepsi plants & warehouses.
xxxx
Sincerely,
ROD SALAZAR
President
PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS PHILS., INC.

Despite

the

foregoing

announcement,

on

July

1992,

respondent

Pagdanganan demanded from petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO and the DTI the
payment of the corresponding cash prize of each of his 349 bearing crown,
specifically, four 7-Up[9] crowns and two Mirinda[10] crowns, each displaying the cash

prize ofP1,000,000.00 in addition to one 7-Up[11] crown showing the cash prize
of P100,000.00. Notably, all seven crowns bore the security code L-2560-FQ.

For his part, respondent Lumahan similarly insisted that petitioners PCPPI and
PEPSICO pay him the cash value of his two winning crowns, that is, two 7-Up crowns
with one exhibiting the cash value of P1,000,000.00 and the other the amount
of P100,000.00.

Petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO refused to take heed of the aforementioned

demands.
Affronted by the seeming injustice, respondents Pagdanganan and Lumahan
filed a collective complaint[12] for Sum of Money and Damages before the RTC of
Pasig City, Branch 163, against petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO.

After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its decision on 3 August 2000, the
dispositive part of which states that:
WHEREFORE, for failure of the plaintiffs to establish a cause of
action against defendants, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED.
The defendants are hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs
Pagdanganan and Lumahan the amounts of P3,500.00 and P1,000.00,
respectively.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
In dismissing the complaint, the RTC ratiocinated that:
The preponderance of evidence now on record does not appear
to support the assertion of the plaintiffs that number 349 with security
code number L-2560-FQ won the Pepsicos sales promotion game
for May 26, 1992. While it is true that number 349 was used both as a
winning and non-winning number, still the winning 349 must tally with
the corresponding security code contained in the master list of winning
crowns.
xxxx
x x x [a]mong the 349s enumerated in the list of winning crowns
(citation omitted) as winning numbers were 349 V-2421-JC; 349 A7963-IS; 349 B-4860-IG; 349 C-3984-RP; 349 D-5863-CO; 349 E-3800EL; 349 U-3501-MN (sic) and 349 U-3246-NP. Nowhere to be found were

nos. 349 L-2560-FQ and L-3560-FQ. This means that it was not possible
for both defendants to have won during the entire extended period of
the sales promotion of Pepsi Cola because the number did not appear
in the master list. It was made clear in the advertisements and posters
put up by defendants that to win, the 3-digit number must be matched
with the proper security code. The Department of Trade and Industry
had been duly informed of the mechanics of the Pepsi Cola sales
promotion for the protection of the interest of the public.
Anent the award of P3,500.00 and P1,000.00 to respondents Pagdanganan
and Lumahan, respectively, the RTC justified such grant, by stating to wit:
x x x since the defendants have voluntarily announced their
desire to pay holders of caps or crowns of their products bearing nonwinning number 349 as a sign of goodwill, the Court feels that this
privilege should also be extended to the plaintiffs despite the
institution of the instant case.
Their Partial Motion for Reconsideration[13] having been denied in
an Order[14] dated 23 August 2000, respondents Pagdanganan and Lumahan
appealed their case to the Court of Appeals.
In a Decision[15] promulgated on 13 February 2004, the Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 163, in Civil Case No. 62726 is
REVERSED. Defendants-appellants are hereby ORDERED to pay
plaintiffs-appellants Pepe Pagdanganan the sum of P5 million and
Pepito Lumahan the sum of P1.2 million.

In a Resolution dated 26 April 2005, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners

PCPPI and PEPSICOs Motion for Reconsideration.
The Issues
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, predicated on the following issues: [16]
I.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS ARE ESTOPPED FROM RAISING STARE
DECISIS;
II.

WHETHER OR NOT RODRIGO, MENDOZA, PATAN AND DE MESA ARE BINDING

ALTHOUGH RESPONDENTS WERE NOT PARTIES THEREIN;
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENTS RAISE ANY ISSUE THAT HAS NOT BEEN
PREVIOUSLY RESOLVED IN RODRIGO, MENDOZA, PATAN OR DE MESA;
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE SENATE AND DTI TASK FORCE REPORTS ARE EVEN
RELEVANT, OR CONTROLLING; and
V.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS MAY SEEK AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF WITHOUT
HAVING APPEALED.

In essence, the present petition raises as fundamental issue for resolution by

the Court the question of whether or not the instant case is already barred by our
rulings in the cases of Rodrigo,[17] Mendoza,[18] Patan[19] and, the most recent, De
Mesa.

[20]

The Courts Ruling

In ordering petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO to pay respondents Pagdanganan
and Lumahan the amounts of P5,000,000.00 and P1,200,000.00, the appellate court
articulated that:
x x x [w]e fully agree with the contention of plaintiffs-appellants that
such deviation or additional requirement, that is the winning crown
must have a corresponding winning security code, imposed by PEPSI
was a deviation from the rules approved by DTI.
xxxx
x x x [i]t appeared that the matching winning security with code
is not an express requirement in order to win. Taken together with
printed promo mechanics, this means that one is a winner as long as
he has in his possession the crown with the winning number. The
matching winning security code is not required.
With the promo mechanics as the guide, it is undisputable that
plaintiffs-appellants are very well entitled to the cash prizes indicated
on their crowns. To deny their claim despite their compliance with the
unequivocal requirements of the promotion is contrary to the principle
of good faith.

xxxx
It is highly inequitable for PEPSI to impose an additional
requirement in order to win as a way to evade the unusually large
number of 349 winner-claimants. x x x.

Petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO fault the appellate court for disregarding this
Courts

pronouncements

in

four

other

Pepsi/349

cases i.e., Mendoza, Rodrigo,Patan and De Mesa that the 349 bearing crowns and/or
resealable caps with security codes L-2560-FQ and L-3560-FQ, like those held by
respondents Pagdanganan and Lumahan, are non-winning crowns under the terms
of the Number Fever promo. They reckon that, by virtue of the principle of stare
decisis, the aforementioned cases have already settled the issue of whether or not
petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO are liable to holders of non-winning 349 bearing
crowns and/or resealable caps. Simply put, the principle of stare decisis should have
been

determinative

of

the

outcome

of

the

case

at

bar. Rodrigo, Mendoza, Patan and De Mesa cases having ruled on the very same
issues raised in the case at bar, they constitute binding judicial precedents on how
Pepsi/"349" litigations must be disposed of.
On the other hand, respondents Pagdanganan and Lumahan justify the nonapplication of the principle of stare decisis by stating that it is required that the
legal rights and relations of the parties, and the facts, and the applicable laws, the
issue and evidence are exactly the same, (sic) as those decided in the cases
of Rodrigo,Mendoza and later the de Mesa x x x.[21] They contend, however, that a
comparison of the subject cases show that they are not the same nor identical x x x
as evident in the different questions of law, the findings of facts and evidence and
issues involved in said cases x x x. [22] In fact, respondents Pagdanganan and
Lumahan particularly argue that the basis of their action is Breach of Contract while
that

of

the Rodrigo and Mendoza cases

involved

complaints

for Specific

Performance.
The petition is meritorious.
There is no question that the cases of Mendoza, Rodrigo, Patan and De Mesa,
including the case at bar, arose from the same set of facts concerning the Number
Fever promo debacle of petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO. Mendoza, Rodrigo, Patan, De
Mesa, Pagdanganan and Lumahan are among those holding supposedly winning 349
Pepsi/7-Up/Mirinda/Mountain Dew soft drink crowns and/or resealable caps. Said

crowns and/or resealable caps were not honored or allowed to be cashed in by

petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO for failing to contain the correct security code
assigned to such winning combination. As a result, the rejected crown and/or
resealable cap holders filed separate complaints for specific performance/ sum of
money/ breach of contract, with damages, all against petitioners PCPPI and
PEPSICO.
A survey of said cases is imperative in order to determine whether or not the
principle of stare decisis will, indeed, bar the relitigation of the instant case.
In 2001, in the case of Mendoza v. Pepsi-Cola Products Phils., Inc. and
Pepsico, Inc.,[23] the RTC dismissed the complaint for specific performance and
damages against herein petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO. On appeal [24] with the Court
of Appeals, the latter dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the
dismissal of the complaint. It rationalized that:
The mechanics for the Number Fever promo, both in the original period
and for the extension period, was duly approved by the DTI. Television,
radio and print advertisements for the promo passed through and were
by the DTI. Posters explaining the promo mechanics were posted all
over the country and warning ads in newspapers highlighted the
importance of the security code. Plaintiff-appellant admitted to have
read and understood the mechanics of the promo. His different
interpretation of the security codes function should not mean that
PEPSI was grossly negligent. The mechanics were clear. A winning
number had its own unique, matching security code which must be
authenticated by PEPSI against its official list. The importance of a
matching security code had been adequately emphasized in the
Warning Ads (citation omitted) and in the new campaign posters
(citation omitted) during the extension period both of which were duly
approved by DTI.
xxxx
The function of the security code is not limited to the determination of
whether or not a crown is tampered with or fake. It also serves to
authenticate the winning number combination whether it had the
correct alpha-numeric security code uniquely assigned to each crown
as appearing in PEPSIs official list. The campaign posters for the promo
period February 17, 1992 to May 10, 1992 as well as for the extension
period from May 11, 1992 to June 12, 1992 uniformly enumerated
three (3) essential elements of a participating winning crown, to wit:
(1) 3-digit winning number; (2) prize denomination; and (3) 7-digit
alpha-numeric security code. x x x The promo mechanics stressed that
the 3-digit winning number combination must have an authenticated
security code, which security code was unique to every crown. Thus,
plaintiff-appellants 349 crown must also be measured against the

essential elements of a winning participating crown pursuant to the

promos mechanics.
xxxx
Thus, PEPSIs obligation to redeem plaintiff-appellants 349 crown did
not arise as his crown did not bear the correct security code, a
condition precedent to winning the proffered prize.
A Petition for Review on Certiorari was then filed with this Court. In a Resolution
dated 24 July 2002, we denied Mendozas petition for review for failing to show that
the Court of Appeals committed reversible error.[25]
Similarly, in 2002, in Rodrigo v. Pepsi Cola Products (Phils.), Inc. and Pepsico,
Inc., the RTC therein dismissed the complaint for Specific Performance and Damages
filed against herein petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO. The Court of Appeals then
affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, stating that:
To resolve the pivotal issue of whether the appellants are the
real winners of the promo, the various advertisements must be read
together to give effect to all. From the start of the promotion, Pepsi had
highlighted the security code as a major component of each and every
crown. In subsequent posters, the companies clarified its role as a
measure against tampering or faking crowns. (sic), and emphasized
the important role of the security code in identifying and verifying the
real winning crown. In its Warning Cheaters posters, the third
paragraph succinctly provides that:
Thus if a supposed winning crown is presented to
us where the security code does not match the real
security code of the winning number as verified with our
master list (known only to authorized personnel of Pepsi
and DTI), then we know that the Crown is either fake or
tampered with. (Citation omitted.)
Also (sic) the companies published that:
Every crown/cap with a winning number and
Authenticated security wins the amount printed on the
crown/cap. (Citation omitted.)
Given said advertisements, the impression an ordinary
consumer gets is that the security code distinguishes the real or
genuine from the fake winning crown, especially considering the
conditions surrounding their issuance i.e., that as early as March 1992,
various complaints of tampered crowns had reached the DTI. This
construction is bolstered by the subsequent release of the NUMBER
FEVER MORE CHANCES TO WIN posters during the extension period
wherein the security code is defined as a measure against tampering
or faking of crowns (citation omitted) and in the subsequent
advertisements which warned the consuming public that the appellee

companies would not honor under any circumstances any fake or

tampered crown. (Citation omitted.)
The inescapable conclusion is that the crowns held by the
appellants are not winning crowns. x x x .
Undaunted, Rodrigo went to this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari but we
subsequently denied his petition, in a Resolution dated 1 October 2001, for failure to
show that a reversible error was committed by the Court of Appeals, hence the
aforequoted disquisition was affirmed.
Promulgated in 2003, in Pepsi Cola Products (Phils.) vs. Patan, Jr., the RTC
therein dismissed two consolidated complaints for specific performance and
damages against herein petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO for lack of cause of action.
The Court of Appeals substantially affirmed the findings of the trial court that
therein respondents did not win in the petitioners Number Fever promotional
campaign as their crowns were not the winning crowns. The appellate court,
however, awarded therein respondents P500 each in the interest of justice. When
the case came to the Court by means of a Petition for Review on Certiorari, the
finding that the correct security code is an indispensable requirement to be entitled
to the cash prize is concerned, was affirmed. The award of P500 though was deleted
as it was our stance that the offer of P500 for every non-winning 349 crown had
long expired on 12 June 1992.
And, in the 2005 case of De Mesa v. Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc., the RTC
dismissed the case under the principle of stare decisis. It elucidated that the instant
case, as well as the 2001 Mendoza case, not only are the legal rights and relations
of the parties substantially the same as those passed upon in the 2002 Rodrigocase,
but the facts, the applicable laws, the causes of action, the issues, and the
testimonial and documentary evidence are identical such that a ruling in one case,
under the principle of stare decisis, is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same
issue. Subsequently, De Mesa et al., filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before
us challenging the application of the principle of stare decisis to said case. In
a Decision promulgated 19 August 2005, we denied their recourse to this court and
affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. We held that:
In the instant case, the legal rights and relations of the parties,
the facts, the applicable laws, the causes of action, the issues, and the
evidence are exactly the same as those in the decided cases
of Mendoza and Rodrigo, supra. Hence, nothing is left to be argued.
The issue has been settled and this Courts final decision in the said

cases must be respected. This Courts hands are now tied by the finality
of the said judgments. We have no recourse but to deny the instant
petition.
The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents
and not to unsettle things which are established) is well entrenched in Article 8 of
the Civil Code, to wit:[26]
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.

With the above provision of law, in tandem with the foregoing judicial
pronouncements, it is quite evident that the appellate court committed reversible
error in failing to take heed of our final, and executory decisions those decisions
considered to have attained the status of judicial precedents in so far as the
Pepsi/349 cases are concerned. For it is the better practice that when a court has
laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to
that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the
same.[27] In the case at bar, therefore, we have no alternative but to uphold the
ruling that the correct security code is an essential, nay, critical, requirement in
order to become entitled to the amount printed on a 349 bearing crown and/or
resealable cap.
Likewise, the same principle of judicial precedent will prevent respondents
Pagdanganan and Lumahan from receiving the amounts of P3,500.00 and
P1,000.00, respectively, as goodwill compensation. As we have stated on the case
of Patan:
Neither is the award of P500 to respondent Patan, Jr. in the
interest of justice and equity warranted. Respondent Patan, jr. had
consistently refused the petitioners offer of P500 for his non-winning
349 crown. Unlike the other holders of the non-winning 349 crowns, x x
x who availed themselves of the goodwill money offered by the
petitioner, respondent Patan, Jr. rejected the same.
xxxx
In this case, the petitioners offer of P500 for every non-winning
349 crown had long expired on June 12, 1992. The petitioner cannot
now be compelled to pay respondent Patan, Jr. P500 as a goodwill
gesture, since he had already rejected the same.

The doctrine of stare decisis embodies the legal maxim that a principle or
rule of law which has been established by the decision of a court of controlling
jurisdiction will be followed in other cases involving a similar situation. It is founded
on the necessity for securing certainty and stability in the law and does not require
identity of or privity of parties. [28] This is unmistakable from the wordings of Article 8
of the Civil Code. It is even said that such decisions assume the same authority as
the statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the
extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations not
only of those called upon to decide thereby but also of those in duty bound to
enforce obedience thereto.[29] Abandonment thereof must be based only on strong
and compelling reasons, otherwise, the becoming virtue of predictability which is
expected from this Court would be immeasurably affected and the publics
confidence in the stability of the solemn pronouncements diminished.
To reiterate, there is naught that is left to be brought to court. Those things
which have been so often adjudged ought to rest in peace. [30]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
assailed 13 February 2004 Decision and 26 April 2005 Resolution both of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68290, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163, in Civil Case No.
62726

dismissing

the

complaint

for

Sum

of

Money

and

Damages

is

REINSTATED. Further, respondents Pepe B. Pagdanganan and Pepito A. Lumahan,

are not entitled to the award of P3,500.00 and P1,000.00, respectively, as goodwill
compensation.
SO ORDERED.