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of living beings
with regard
Federal Ethics
to plants
Committee on Non-Human
Biotechnology (ECNH)
Moral consideration
3 Conclusions on handling
plants 20
1 Starting point of the
discussion
the collective counts the species counts the individual living being counts
Yes No A living being counts A living being counts A living being counts if God counts for his own
step II
because it has a good because it is sen- it has reason sake. A living being
of its own, something tient, because it has counts because of its
can be «in its inter- its own interests relationship to God.
for its own sake instrumentally ests»
(assumes the
real existence
of species) species is an abstract
concept of classification
Do we need justi- Yes, plants are We do not know No, plants are not
step III
No, it is morally neutral We do not know Yes Not knowing is Not knowing is
step IV
Who has a good of its own? *Bold: Ways to consider plants morally for their
step V
own sake
Inherent worth, good of its own The decision tree only traces the ethi- lar value for an observer, because it
and own interests cal positions which assume a plant’s was planted in memory of a person
inherent worth, and which therefore who has died. An aesthetic value is
The terms inherent worth, good of its permit the moral consideration of also a relational value.
own and own interests are frequently plants for their own sake. In addition – Inherent worth: Plants possess in-
used in the report. If something has in- to ethical positions that consider or- herent worth. This inherent worth
herent worth, this means it has some- ganisms for their own sake, there are means they should be protected for
thing, which we also call «dignity». A further positions that could justify the their own sake.
being that has inherent worth there- protection of plants. These justifica-
fore counts morally for its own sake. tions however are not linked to the These three concepts of value can
A being has a «good of its own» if one plants themselves, but follow from be illustrated using the example of a
can do good or bad things to it, i.e. the person who is assigning value to rosebush:
if the being can be injured. The term the plants.
«own interests» is used synonymously – The rosebush has an instrumental
with good of its own in this report. The ECNH’s discussion differentiated value, because a rose hedge pro-
three concepts of value: tects against undesired intrusions.
– The rosebush has a relational value,
– Instrumental value: Plants should because its beautiful flowers remind
not be protected for their own sake, you of your dead grandmother.
but because and as long as they are – The rosebush has inherent worth,
of benefit to humans (or other or- independently of whether it is use-
ganisms), e.g. as crops or as part of ful or whether someone ascribes a
biodiversity. value to it.
– Relational value: Plants should
not be protected for their own sake, All organisms, not only plants, can
but because someone considers also always have an instrumental or
them to be worthy of protection. relational value, since all organisms
Their protection-worthiness is in always have a mutual relationship
relation to a value ascribed to them with others. Human beings, as carri-
because of particular properties. For ers of human dignity, are also seen as
example, a tree may have a particu- members of society in various func-
tions that have instrumental value, e.g. 2.1 What counts morally for
as members of families or as workers. its own sake: the collective, the
This does not necessarily entail a fail- species or the individual?
ure to respect their dignity. What is
decisive for the respect of dignity is Decision tree step I
that an entity is not treated solely as
a means to an end. The instrumental First, it is important to clarify which
value of plants does not exclude a moral objects count in the considera-
possible inherent worth. Equally, as- tion of plants: the plant collective, the
signing them a relational value is also plant species or the individual organ-
compatible with the possibility of hav- isms, i.e. the individual plant.
ing their own inherent worth.
2.1.1 Plant collectives
14
Note to c. We do not know if many processes and reactions that do
plants have sentience not differ fundamentally at the cellular
level. Plants can choose between vari-
Decision tree step III ous ways of behaving and can change
their behaviour. For example, plants
For animals, we are in possession of undergo complex interactions with
clear indications that they are sentient. their environment, just as animals
For vertebrates, decapods and cepha- do. While animals move and respond
lopods there is even a socially broadly to external stimuli e.g. with flight or
supported agreement that they are fight, plants react by modifying their
sentient. This has been embedded in developmental processes and adapt-
the Animal Protection Act. These ani- ing their growth. They thus express
mals are protected from pain, suffer- great plasticity of behaviour. Plants
ing, fear and stress, and interventions also have a differentiated hormonal
that cause such kinds of harm to the system for internal communication.
animal require justification. For plants, The action potential of cellular com-
on the other hand, we lack compara- munication also shows similarities to
ble evidence that would indicate some the signals of nerve fibres in animals.
kind of inner experience. For us (and, Plants react to touch and stress, or
we believe, for the animals that the defend themselves against predators
Animal Protection Act protects) the and pathogens, in highly differenti-
internal experience is linked to a kind ated ways.
of consciousness. For plants, we do
not have any evidence that they pos- Based on the results of such investiga-
sess such a consciousness. tions, we may ask whether the moral
consideration of plants can be discard-
But it could be that plants neverthe- ed with the argument that plants lack
less fulfil the necessary conditions for the conditions of negative or positive
a kind of sentience. Although plants experience. It is not clear that plants
do not have a central nervous sys- have sentience, but neither is it clear
tem, the question arises of whether that this is not the case. It cannot
sentience necessarily depends on a therefore be argued that the reasons
central nervous system, and whether for excluding plants from the circle of
disturbances have to be perceived beings that must be morally consid-
consciously. Since we do not have the ered, have been eliminated.
kind of access to plants that would en-
able us to answer this, we simply do
not know. It is nevertheless imaginable
that plants have other possibilities for
experiencing harm or benefit. Studies
in cell biology show that plants and
animals, which share a developmen- Jürg Stöcklin, Die Pflanze. Moderne Konzepte der
tal history lasting 3 billion years, have Biologie, Bern, 2007. 15
Is it morally relevant that we entities are sentient. To assume this
do not know whether plants are would, in the view of Position c, be
sentient? too speculative. Position d categori-
cally rules out the possibility of plants
Decision tree step IV having some kind of sentience.
Where we do not know whether plants The majority of the committee mem-
are sentient, we must decide what con- bers at least do not rule out the possi-
sequences this has. If it is morally irrel- bility that plants are sentient, and that
evant that we do not know, plants can this is morally relevant. A minority
be excluded from the moral commu- of these members considers it prob-
nity. If, on the other hand, it is morally able that plants are sentient. Another
relevant, the consideration of plants minority assumes that the necessary
for their own sake is not excluded. conditions for the possibility of sen-
tience are present in plants. The pres-
In this situation of not-knowing, the ence of these necessary conditions for
following positions are possible: sentience is considered to be morally
relevant.
a Based on the evidence we consider
it probable that plants are sentient, Finally, a minority of the members
and they must therefore be given excludes the possibility of plants hav-
moral consideration. ing sentience, because in their view
b We do not rule out the possibility there are no good grounds for such
that plants are sentient. The fact an assumption.
that this cannot be ruled out is mor-
ally relevant.
c We assume that the potential for
sentience is present in plants – un-
like e.g. stones – in terms of the
transmission and processing of in-
formation. The presence of the nec-
essary conditions for sentience is
considered to be morally relevant.
d We rule out the possibility of plants
being sentient, as there are no good
grounds for assuming that they are.
20
Relationship between Social-ethical limits
conclusion 1 and 3
Social ethics is not primarily con-
Conclusion 3 expresses the different cerned with individual human actions,
moral stances according to which it is but with the social structures and in-
unanimously held that plants may not stitutions that permit and encourage
be arbitrarily destroyed, in accordance possible individual actions and pre-
with Conclusion 1. As 3 shows, the ma- vent or limit others. However, social
jority considers this morally impermis- structures do not exist for their own
sible because something bad is being sake, and should be examined con-
done to the plant itself without rational tinuously in terms of how they affect
reason and thus without justification. the interplay of the various actors and
A minority considers this treatment to what impacts this has on the actions
be impermissible as well, but for an- of individuals and communities. The
other reason: because this destructive application of gene technology in
treatment of a wild flower expresses a agriculture, for example, is one such
morally reprehensible stance. social structure that affects farmers’
room for manoeuvre. If the application
of gene technology in plants leads to
injustice within a community, social-
ethical limits on the applicability of this
technology might be appropriate.
21
April 2008
Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft
Confédération suisse
Confederazione Svizzera
Confederaziun svizra
Swiss Confederation