Koha Digest # 142

Front Page: L'AMERICA, L'EUROPA

Date: 26 March 1997

EDITORIAL

AS MANY ALBANIANS, THAT MANY CRISES

by VETON SURROI

A question that has become a cliche, and that is being passed on from person to person,
especially by the foreigners that visit Kosova these days is: how do the events in Albania and
Serbia reflect in Kosova?

After eliminating a historical justification, that shows that Kosova has had an independent
development from the regimes in Albania, and then the practical that it is not Kosova that is
dealing with Serbia, but unfortunately, Serbia is dealing with Kosova, herewith are presented
some of the key words that help the explanation:

STABILITY: Living in a sandwich between anarchy in Albania and autocracy in Serbia

would be worrying even for a strong state of Western Europe, for example. Then imagine
Kosova.

The concern about instability in Kosova is reasonable, taking into account two essentially
simple factors. One, there is no political movement towards the solution of Kosova's problem
(the agreement on education was a serious discredit). Second: Kosova is near a weapons'
market. Not that arms couldn't be bought earlier, but now, in order to arm 200 thousand
people, only 1 million of dollars is needed.

DEMOCRACY: The cliche stating that Albania has proven to have entered an undemocratic
path, whereas Serbia, with the latest victories of the opposition has highlighted it's marching
ahead, is a cliche and nothing more than that. Albania's march towards democracy was
stormy, especially taking into account the fifty years' old Stalinist past. The actual anarchic
crisis is grounded on the consequences of this past, as well as the slowing down of the
democratic rhythm. Anyhow, despite the terrible consequences of the present crisis, a way out
from anarchy is tried to be found in a new political consensus with European support. In
Serbia, on the other side, consensus is a filthy word, except in the case of the consensus on
Greater Serbia. The victories of the opposition are not meaningful for substantial changes in
Serbia. For the country that has initiated war, that is responsible of the violations of human
rights of people, the most serious since World War II, victory of the Serbian opposition in
some municipalities is still far away from the democratic ideal. And, some opposition
municipalities in Serbia have no relevance whatsoever over the situation in Kosova.

The weekly Koha (The Times) was published in Prishtina (Kosovo) between 1994 and 1997. Edited by Veton
Surroi, a young Kosovar journalist and one of the pioneers of democratisation in former Yugoslavia, Koha
soon became a symbol of quality among the region's media. In 1997 it started to be published daily under the
name of Koha Ditorë. W ith the kind permission of Mr. Surroi, Koha digests were originally posted on
http://koha.estudiosbalcanicos.org.
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DOMESTIC SCENE: Supporting one side in Albania has been and will be a mistake. This is
a lesson Kosovars learn from time to time, and have been drastically learining in the past
days, when one of the sides was supported in the created anarchy. It was a huge mistake to
say that one act or the other in these conditions will be victory of democracy: in these
conditions in Albania, there is no victory of the democracy, it can't be saved because all
institutions were ruined. The only thing that can win is the conviction that democratic
institutions should be built. This lesson costs: Demaçi, who supported President Berisha has
experienced a halt in his increasing popularity, which was reaching its peak in the past couple
of months thanks to his objective criticism about the situation in Kosova.

THE WORLD: Albanians cause the crisis in Brindisi, what to do with the clandestine
Albanians in Greece, Albanians from southern Albania get armed and so do those from the
North, Albanians in Tetovë and Gostivar ask for their University, and the Kosovars ask for
self-determination...

How many Albanians are there that create so many crises? Are Albanians biologically
problematic, or is the problem broader? The genetic explanation of the problematic nature is
racism. Therefore, it must be the second reason: somewhere along the way, all of them that
compose different crises were not settled down by History.

ALBANIA

HOW TO STOP WAR

by RIFAT BUZUKU / Vienna

Imagine a dying patient in the reanimation room, a surgeon that

rushes to save his life and relatives of the patient waiting
outside in the aisles. A similar political image was seen last
week in Vienna. We are referring to Albania, and maybe the worst
day in the life of mediator Franz Vranitzky and many journalists
and diplomats that were waiting to hear the news on whether
Albania would survive or die. Over 24 hours had passed since the
news that Albania was passing away in anarchy, and after all its
airports were closed, it lost all contact with the outside world.
The news broadcast by international networks made one believe
that the whole country was under fire. All had the impression
that a people in the south of Europe was being suffocated by an
unprecedented anarchy. And, before washing their hands, they were
only awaiting to hear what their envoy Vranitzky had to tell
them, after meeting all Albanian leaders on a navy ship somewhere
on the Adriatic.

Vranitzky reported: "It was 21:55 when a military plane of the

Italian air forces landed in Vienna. I and other diplomats were
being transported in from Brindisi. We entered one of the rooms
in the airport to meet the journalists. In very difficult
conditions, on board of an Italian navy ship we held talks with

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the Albanian government as well as the 15 representatives of 11
towns, the so called "People's (Salvation) Committees". I broke
the hopeful news that Albania could live, and I added: `I must
stress, ladies and gentlemen, that there is no civil war in
Albania, and based on what we could ascertain, there is no fear
from a war between the North and the South; this is actually an
escalation of an emotional unrest by determined structures of the
largest part of the Albanian population against the ruling
political regime. I must stress that a big turn was made with the
appointment of the new government, which has the support of the
people and the "People's Committees". This is where a realistic
hope has been created'."

Vranitzky continues: "The second conversations were the

continuation of the first talks the OSCE delegation that I headed
had with the Albanian representatives of 8 March. Then, in
cooperation with President Berisha, the OSCE delegation
elaborated a plan of 5 points, which I presented to the Danish
foreign Minister, Petersen, on 12 March. One day later, the
report (with the included suggestions) was presented to the
Permanent Council of the OSCE and it was well accepted. In the
meantime, the OSCE mediating delegation, continued the
preparations in the working groups in order to work on some
changes together with the Albanian authorities. Thus, those who
wished to work in cooperation with the international
organizations for the solution of open issues, i.e.,
democratization, the protection of human rights and economic
cooperation. the whole program was prepared: however, the
situation in Albania deteriorated substantially. The chaotic and
anarchic circumstances became harsher. Facing such a situation,
the OSCE delegation was forced to postpone its announced visit
by 13 March.

The recapitulation of the contents of the meeting with

representatives of the government and Albanian rebels again gave
me optimism. The new premier, Fino, the foreign minister and the
representative of the Albanian army agreed to some of the issues
that OSCE had suggested already. This included the creation of
a new government, formed in the meantime; to celebrate new
elections within the current year; extend amnesty to all those
who have taken weapons. These were the main issues and the main
preconditions to establish cooperation with international
monetary institutions, including the adoption of a new
constitution and the new changes in the sphere of political
organization.

In today's meeting, another important issue was added to the

list: the Albanian government was decisive in requesting external
police and military assistance. They informed us about the total
anarchy and chaos; the disintegration of the police, the army,

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the judiciary and all public order bodies. In other words, the
dimensions were so big, that the Albanian state itself is
incapable of controlling the situation on its own. They
concretely asked for police and military forces to be stationed
in Albania".

He said that the Albanian government asked for some 4,000 people
from abroad that would help reestablish order. But, Vranitzky was
rather pessimistic about this, stressing that the majority of the
European states was not willing to positively reply to this
request. But, this remains an open issue, stressing that other
countries could volunteer to send troops and help reestablish
order in Albania.

He also said that on the same day, his delegation met with 15
representatives of 11 towns from the south, the so called
"People's (Salvation) Committees".

"These are people that had previously been named as rebels and
who have joined these Committees. The latter full support the
Fino government, but they also ask from the international
community some guarantees and assistance to solve the issues that
remain open. Berisha is also very supportive of the new
Government", said Vranitzky.

Following this introduction, the ex-chancellor was often asked

about the requests for Berisha's resignation. The reply was the
following: "The criticism against the President is harsh, for
many reasons. I will mention two of the most important: he is
accused of manipulating the May elections and also of using
violence against those who protested against this manipulation.
Second, is the truth that hundreds of thousands of citizens have
lost their money in the pyramidal schemes. The insurgents claim
that there is no more space for him in politics and second, they
ask for their money back. But, it is not in the competence of the
OSCE or myself to decide about the president of one country. This
is an issue that regards Albanian politicians who should analyze
their roles in the society where they work, implying that Berisha
himself should decide whether he deserves the right to be still
called "president of the Albanians".

Vranitzky continues: "The Albanian government deserves the urgent

support of the international community".

He was clear once again when stating that Albania is living an

extremely difficult situation. However, he expressed his optimism
saying that his delegation shared the conviction of the
government that the situation would be solved step-by-step.
In the meantime, the cellular phones of the delegation keep on
ringing. Vranitzky told us that his obligation was to inform the

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governments of the 54 member states about the conclusions
regarding the morning meetings.

"One day later, the OSCE Permanent Council met to discuss about
the situation, as well as my suggestions. At the end of the
meeting, the Danish ambassador to the OSCE said that the
participants fully agreed with the three points of my report
- the reestablishment of the order by a (foreign) stabilizing
force;

- the need for international financial assistance;

- the need to establish OSCE missions in Albania to help the

reconstruction of the democratic institutions and the preparation
of anticipated elections.

The Danish ambassador said that if the international community

didn't make this commitment now, will have to do it tomorrow, but
that by then the price to pay would be much higher than now.

"Despite this conclusion, Europe continues keeping its pockets

fastened", said Vranitzky. Moreover, "...a delegation visited
Albania on 19 March to ascertain the urgent needs of the country
- and it ascertained that there are no conditions to activate the
institutions of the EU. At the same time, the delegation told the
Albanians that they should help themselves before we could do
anything for them".

In the meantime, things have moved ahead. "The Albanian crisis

has not surpassed yet its dramatic borders. On 19 March, Fino
gave up on his visit to the South. He said that he accepted no
ultimatum on Berisha's resignation, stressing that the government
that he leads represents the whole country.

The insurgents have set a deadline for his resignation: 20 March.

If their request is not fulfilled, they have warned that they
would march towards Tirana. Berisha's supporters have on the
other hand said that they would protect him with arms.
If this prophecy becomes true, there is no doubt that Albania
will be inundated in blood before splitting in two and it will
finally die.

"It is the last moment for people to come back to their senses.
To hear the call for coexistence and understanding, freedom and
wellbeing that we will create, also with the help of the
continent we belong to and friends we have and we find along the
way", concluded Vranitzky.

Coming out from the crisis is never late as long as we are alive.
Once we die, we're dead and no one from abroad can save us!

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ALBANIA

STAR WARS IN ALBANIA

by ANA BOLINI / Tirana

The once charismatic and energetic Albanian president Berisha has

since some days fallen into a kind of political coma. It just
remains to be seen whether he or the others will cut the oxygen
tube that is still keeping him alive. In fact, just a couple of
days ago when the whole of Albania was captivated by uncontrolled
shooting, Berisha wrote a letter of resignation, which he,
nevertheless, stored in a drawer. And, instead of his letter of
resignation, he offered the journalists another letter in which
he stated that "...he will leave the post only if his DP loses
the next elections".

The request for Berisha's resignation, strongly supported not

only by the peaceful protesters but also by the armed insurgents,
comprises the Gordian knot of the actual Albanian politics.
Nevertheless, if the knot is undo, the consequences are
unforeseeable. An opinion that has found support among some
western governments considers Berisha's retreat as a step that
would help the solution of the Albanian crisis. Another opinion,
initiated by Berisha proper, foresees the further destabilization
of the country if he is forced to resign. Regardless of whether
Berisha remains in power another couple of days or months, his
departure seems inevitable. Moreover, with the ousting of the
head of the secret police and the takeover of the control over
the state TV by the Government of National Reconciliation, it can
be said that only one third of Berisha is in power.

The 52-years-old leader lost a lot in the eyes of his followers

when some of the foreign media informed that his two sons fled
to Bari accompanied by their bodyguards in times when a lot of
shooting was going on in Tirana. The immediate disintegration of
the army which ended with the escape of former defense minister
Zhulali, proved that the card of the army that the President
could have used as last resort, was only an illusion. The so
called Northern support for Berisha became evidently non-
existent. There are very few chances for a clash between the
North and the South that would lead to a civil war so often
speculated by the foreign media. This situation has weakened the
position of the president who seems to have less support.
Without the army, the North that is supposed to be his support,
with a half-empty parliament, because a determined number of MPs
have fled the country, with a divided party, his position looks
dramatic. "What we have seen so far in Albania is not civil war,
but total anarchy", says a political analyst in Tirana. This is
a bloody operetta, a military operetta. The people took the arms,

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but soon they saw that there was no enemy. Then they started
shooting in the air. This was really some "Star Wars".

Nevertheless, there is fear from provocations, that could lead

towards a war of all against all, as there is fear that the
conflict could spread to the neighboring countries. The first
attempts to sell weapons in Greece and Macedonia have already
been noticed, while the danger of their smuggling into Kosova is
even bigger. The role of the Stability Man in the region that the
Albanian president had till recently, and which had given him a
privileged status in the European chancelleries, seems to have
been lost forever. Destabilized Albania is actually a threat to
the whole region and the presence of a foreign police or military
force looks indispensable. The Peacekeeping forces in Macedonia
could seem senseless, if on the other side of the Albanian border
there is chaos and arms move freely. On the other hand, it would
be much more reasonable to have Italy's police or military forces
in Durrës or Vlorë, instead of them waiting for refugees in Bari
or Brindisi.

Berisha is in no position to play the Kosova card now, because

it has escaped from his hands, anyways. His attempts to incite
Rugova to play active protest politics and the support of a more
radical wing of the Albanian political movement in Kosova led
towards an established distance between official Tirana and
Prishtinë. The Kosovar leader, forced to unwillingly choose
between Tirana and Washington, otherwise in bad mutual relations,
chose the latter. When the crisis in Albania reached critical
levels, Rugova came in public with the American option on new
elections. Actually, one can say that the road to Prishtinë
doesn't pass thru Tirana, but rather through Washington. Last,
but not least, Berisha's position is complicated even more
because his main political rival, Fatos Nano, is not in prison
any longer. Nano could easily become the hero the revolted
Albanians have been missing. In his first public statements, the
Socialist leader, amnestied by Berisha, asked the latter to
retire from politics. Nano implied that the opposition will not
ask for his resignation, but morally, this is Berisha's
obligation. And, while the armed insurgents have made it clear
that they will not hand in the weapons until he resigns, the
opposition in Albania as well as the European chancelleries are
facing a dilemma. Insisting on his resignation can be understood
by his party and himself as a breach of the agreement on national
reconciliation, which could cause the appearance of chaos inside
the chaos.

On the other hand, the fear is that the southerners will give up
supporting Fino and his government if Berisha stays. Anyhow,
there is a strong conviction both inside and out that with
Berisha in power, organizing free elections will be impossible.

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The Berisha phenomenon can be characterized as the conversion of
whom was considered as the Balkans' Havel into a new Lukaschenko.
Former cardiologist who came to 5 years ago was considered a very
popular and charismatic figure. He was also considered as the
star of the post-communist East, gaining the support of the whole
West, especially the USA. Fluent in several languages, of broad
culture, it seemed initially that Berisha was far from a typical
Balkan leader. But soon the observers noticed that Berisha bore
the contradiction between the democratic aspirations and the
authoritarian methods of rule. He came to power as leader of the
anti-communist opposition, Berisha continued ruling as if he were
leader of the opposition. His speeches, even five years after he
came to power, resembled more those of the opposition than of the
head of the state. The close-down of any dissidence inside his
Party, the arrest of Nano and several journalists brought up many
question-marks in regard to the President. The manipulations in
the May elections meant the end of the honeymoon of Berisha and
the USA. This is where the fall of the man who ousted communism
in Albania started. Maybe the 52-years-old Berisha will become
the most contradictory figure in Albanian history: as the man who
ruined communism and at the same time as the man who destroyed
democracy. In the most paradoxical way, isolated and almost
abandoned, he is facing Hamlet's dilemma: to be or not to be!

KOSOVA

BREZOVIC·: EVEN POLITICIANS SLIDE HERE

by DUKAGJIN GORANI / Prishtinë

"It has not failed, but it has only been postponed - or let's
say, it has been provisionally undermined", says Bexhet Shala,
Secretary of the CDHRF, about the meeting organized by the
Council, the Serbian Helsinki Committee and intended to take
place in Brezovicë. And, it was the first preliminary meeting of
the Albanian delegation that ended the organizing engagement of
these two non-political institutions for organizing an Albanian-
Serbian political meeting.

The organization of the meeting had an unpleasant chronology.

Over three months earlier, the meeting was arranged by Adem
Demaçi (then chairman of the CDHRF) and Miladin Zivotic (one of
the leaders of the Belgrade Circle), with and understandable aim:
to start the Albanian-Serb conversations, between experts in
different areas starting from judiciary and going up to the
media, and who were not directly engaged in the political scene.
At least not the leading scene.

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In the meantime, Zivotic passed away, whereas Demaçi abandoned
the CDHRF and became chairman of the Parliamentarian Party of
Kosova. Despite these movements, both sides confirmed the
willingness to go on with the initiative. Further on, after the
almost final solution of the Belgrade crisis - whose changing
course could also have influenced the fate of the meeting - an
incredible crisis bursts in Albania.

And we stop here.

The political crisis in Albania and its serious reflection on

Kosova Albanians was the formal explanation communicated to the
Serbian side, on why the meeting in Brezovicë was postponed. But,
how much of this justification is true, and how true is it that
the meeting was not held because of the political disagreements
of the participants, which have almost become traditional?

To Mahmut Bakalli, one of the participants of the Prishtinë

meeting that buried this first initiative to have an "non-
governmental" meeting in Brezovicë, the actual situation in
Albania was a real reason. He says that as long as the political
agony of Albania goes on, "any meeting that would aim at
discussing Kosova's independence, the position of the Albanians
and the actual repression, would make no sense".

Maybe Bakalli's posture could be the justification, but Shala

says something else.

At the beginning of the consultative meeting, Mark Krasniqi, as

representative of the Christian-Democrats insisted on the
presence of the LDK representatives, more precisely, Fehmi Agani.
And the explanation he gave was that any conversation that would
observe this topic, can't have any societal relevance without the
participation of the largest party, LDK, and the Presidency.
Later, Krasniqi left the meeting.

A similar posture - that the meeting couldn't be held without

LDK's representatives was also that of the "other wing of the
LDK" as Shala qualifies Gjergj Dedaj's Liberal Party. Finally,
the wrong timing, the crisis in Albania and the deficient list
of participants seem to have been the most energetic approaches
of the participants in the preliminary meeting.

So, what is now the fate of this meeting? In stagnation. If this

is some consolation, then we shall say that this is not the first
nor the last time in which a negotiating Albanian-Serb enterprise
is wrapped with the fog of conceptual incongruence and which will
be soon forgotten. In this case, one of the most illustrating
examples is the almost forgotten agreement on education signed
last September.

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Nevertheless, the Albanian organizer of the meeting insists on
its celebration. The date and place are not commented, but one
thing is expected: the list of participants shall change,
substantially. Why? - It would be too much to ask.

As regards those that were sure of the celebration of this

meeting, we'll stop at Adem Demaçi, chairman of the PPK and
seemingly one of the capital reasons for the unexpected
opposition to this meeting.

Almost an exact understanding of two concepts can be made: Demaçi

substantially changed his position from a non-political
personage, at the beginning of the initiative, to the leader of
the second largest political party in Kosova now - always sure
of his rating and which in the context of the meeting in
Brezovicë would be understood as a conviction in his self-
confidence on undertaking complicated steps in Albanian-Serb
conversations. Maybe the strong opposition he faced in Prishtinë,
has convinced him of the opposite.

Further on, the rebelling situation in Albania could be evaluated

as the main reason why the meeting is postponed even in the
context of Demaçi's position, however looked from a totally
different aspect. If Bakalli considers the crisis in Albania as
a very difficult moment for all Albanians, in the case of Demaçi,
this was also a serious stroke to his political rating in Kosova.
Berisha's political agony ruins Demaçi's wall of authority.
Moreover, Demaçi's letter of support to Berisha and which was
published a couple of days ago - in very bad timing and totally
uncontrolled, only increased his negative political gap.

What could have expected Demaçi from the "political wings of the
LDK", present at the consultation meeting in Prishtinë, the media
close to the Presidency, KIC and BUJKU, who alarmed the public
against this meeting - when he built up good part of his rating
thanks to the strong criticism against these mechanisms?

Understanding?

Maybe. Otherwise it is very hard to explain his surprise that

replaced his strong conviction that the meeting would take place
by all means. Moreover, rumors are that Demaçi has no intention
of going to New York unless he is escorted by another member of
his PPK leadership.

And, this is not the end of the analyses on the postponed meeting
of "non-governmental" experts in Brezovicë. A determined number
of analysts in Kosova stated that this meeting was doomed to fail
because of the almost overlapping and long expected meeting in
New York, organized by Project on Ethnic Relations. Why?

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First, because any similar enterprise to the one to be held in
New York - regardless of the formal proclamation that this is
only an exchange of experts' opinions - could affect negatively
the political importance that the meeting in New York should
have, a meeting that has increased the interest of the US
government that is still studying the possibility of sending an
observer to (and the speculations are that this could be Rudolph
Perina).

Second, according to our observers, the Brezovicë meeting could

create a rule and a precedent: the rule of optative meetings
despite the posture of the Kosovar leadership that these meeting
shouldn't take place neither in Kosova or Serbia, but rather on
a neutral terrain, that no meeting can be held without their
presence and that such an organization is nil if there is no
international mediating presence.

Reasons or justifications? In political Prishtinë, it is very

hard to find a politically engaged personality that would admit
the first option - but the second one has the chance to gain its
rhetoric confirmation in the Prishtinë consultation.

Finally, going back to the formal justification, addressed to the

Serbian party on the postponement of the meeting. Albania and its
chaos. It could be maybe valid, but what Dusan Janjic (one of the
initiators of the meeting in Brezovicë) declared is also very
true: "If we agree that the situation in Albania will be as
serious in the next couple of years - then this means that we
will never sit down and talk!"

Such Brezovicë initiatives confirm one more thing: this is a very

slidy place.

INTERVIEW

Dusan JANJIC, Chairman of the Forum for Inter-Ethnic Relations - Belgrade

VANCE - POSSIBLE MEDIATOR?

Interviewed by FISNIK ABRASHI & LUNDRIM ALIU / Prishtinë

KOHA: The meeting in Brezovicë has been postponed for an

undetermined period of time because of the situation in Albania,
as the organizer of the meeting has stated. What is your comment
in this regard?

JANJIC: It is hard for someone that was in the list but was not
a participant to comment on it. The situation in Albania, there

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is no doubt, changes many things in Albania proper, the Balkans
and Kosovë. It is a matter of the people, groupings or parties
to evaluate whether this favors or harms dialogue. If I were
asked, I would have decided otherwise.

KOHA: As an invitee of the New York meeting, what do you expect

from it?

JANJIC: First let me say that after the postponement of the

Brezovicë meeting, we are now facing a huge test. Now we will
discover who is in favor of the dialogue and who in favor of
confrontation. Initially I don't exclude the chances of
conditioning and stalling. But, I expect that all the invited
will appear and that our prognoses made three years ago will be
fulfilled: that all these people are ready for dialogue. The most
important thing is that the meeting in New York has been imagined
as the first open conversation between people that think
differently. It has not been imagined as a negotiation or
confrontation of positions. In the meantime, because of the
representative level of the delegations, be it by the Washington
representatives, the chances that something more can be achieved
in this meeting have increased. I believe this can be a burden
to the talks, but also something that would ease them. Anyhow,
New York's meeting will be a clear filter for all those that
declare themselves as moderate democrats, but also the others,
i.e., a clear distinction of those who will further continue with
conversations and maybe even negotiations. We must not forget
that representatives of parties, associations and groupings who
have influence in the society have been invited to this meeting,
and according to some evaluations, regardless of who will be in
power, this represents a specter that will influence the
decisions of the parliament.

This is the first level.

The second level is the presentation of several starting points

for further conversations, and maybe even negotiations, which
will come some day. It is hard to make a forecast, but I have had
the chance to see all the participants and talk to them, and I
believe these are completely acceptable things. First, human and
collective rights must be respected, including the right to self-
determination. Second, the territorial integrity must be
respected, i.e. it can't be changed in a violent way. Third,
repression must be stopped, i.e. should be excluded as a method
and it should be turned towards negotiations. In these
conversations the participants could accept some obligations.
Personally I will suggest the institutions of the round table
that would be constituted by relevant persons that have won a
considerable number of votes in the elections. This would be a
round table in which, by eventual international mediation, we

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would talk openly.

Second, I will also suggest that our NGOs expand contacts and
initiatives and increase the number of participants. This is why
I supported the idea of the meeting in Brezovicë.

I hope that the New York meeting will ease the atmosphere and
decrease the tensions, and to be honest, maybe even "soften" the
politicians a bit. There are many calculations, but there are not
very many politicians willing to take the due decision. I am
convinced that right now is the time to talk about Kosovë and
start solving the problems in Kosovë.

KOHA: Any changes in the composition of the delegations? What is

the last news you have?

JANJIC: I really have no information in this regard. If the

invitations are sent, this means that the people have agreed to
participate. This means that all parties will come, at least at
the level of vice-chairmen. I don't exclude however, the chances
of someone to withdraw in the last moment. Nevertheless, I
believe that all those that are really into real politics, will
come.

This meeting is the chance to, first, inform the American opinion
about the positions of the parties. If I were one of them, I
would take advantage of this occasion. This is also a chance for
formal and non-formal contacts with different influential people
in New York, and no serious politician would let this chance go.
It is true that the US is the strongest player in the Balkans
now.

Thirdly, people from Washington are foreseen to take part as

observers. This is a good chance.

KOHA: Any information on who will participate from official

Washington?

JANJIC: The last information I have is that Cyrus Vance will be

there, who is seen by many as the mediator in the coming
conversations. Names of Rudolph Perina and James Legger are also
mentioned. This is quite representative team.

KOHA: Some circles state that the Albanian side will be under the
pressure to agree to participate in the Serbian elections. Does
this imply a Serb-Albanian coalition against Milosevic?

JANJIC: I don't know where does this information come from. As

far as I know, there is no intention of talking about elections.
I believe there are contacts and taking pulse among parties, but

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this can't be object of conversations in New York.

The topic in New York will be how to solve the Kosova status
problem. This is the essence. The essence of the talks is to find
the methods which will lead towards the peaceful and democratic
solution of a big problem - the status. I don't think that the
third party is very much interested to know who will be
president, Lilic, Micunovic, or whoever.

KOHA: This means that this will not be the only meeting. Is this
a mini-Dayton on Kosova?

JANJIC: Yes. PER has done it's job. Now, it's the politicians'
turn.

INTERVIEW

Momcilo TRAJKOVIC, leader of the SRM

"KOSOVA SERBS DON'T NEED KOSOVA WITH OTHER SERBS"

Interviewed by YLBER HYSA / Prishtinë

KOHA: Recently you celebrated your SABOR. In the resolution,

among others, you have denied Milosevic the right to represent
Kosova Serbs in the future negotiations.

TRAJKOVIC: Kosova Serbs not only deny this right to Milosevic but
to all those who wish to decide about their fate without asking
them. The regime has got the support of the people, but in the
past couple of years has not kept its promises, that it will
solve the problem of Kosova and the Serb-Albanian relations. We
have openly stated that Serbian national interest is being lost
under this regime and the only thing remaining is that the local
Serbs here are just about to move out from Kosova, as the last
resort. Serbs are in a sandwich made of the incapable Serbian
regime and the Albanian separatists. In this context, we believe
that such a capital issue as the Albanian-Serb relations in
Kosova, or the Kosova question as it is called, can not be solved
by one party, or one person, because we believe that this is,
first of all, a national question and not an ideological matter.
Milosevic approaches this problem as if it were a party and
ideological problem of the Socialist Party. The opposition too,
which tries to make this an ideological matter, has an acceptable
standpoint. In this sense, no one in Serbia, not even Milosevic
can solve the question without the participation of the Kosova
Serbs, Albanians, in fact all those who live here. This doesn't
mean that we wish to solve this issue alone, on the contrary we

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wish it to be solved within Serbia, in cooperation with Serbia,
because we believe that this is a problem regarding all of us
living here.

KOHA: Your meeting was celebrated in times of the protests in

Belgrade. Later came the compromise called "lex specialis". Is
this a new national reconciliation politics of the regime and how
is this reflected on Kosova?

TRAJKOVIC: I don't think that "lex specialis" is a compromise.

It was imposed and it was the only valve to escape from the
situation. This was the maximum that no one agrees to, but which
is accepted by all! I don't believe that this is the politics of
compromise also for Kosova, for I believe that there is no
serious discussion about the Serb-Albanian relations without a
prior Serb-Serb consensus which would agree upon the minimal
national interests and which could make the compromise in Kosova.
This was not achieved after the theft of votes, because no one
was struggling for compromise. Without this compromise, there is
no compromise on Kosova either.

KOHA: What is your opinion of the "Special Links with RS" law.
I would like to remind you that recently Rugova declared that if
Serbs establish special links, that Albanians would do it too.

TRAJKOVIC: This a case in which the national politics of Serbia

towards the RS has been expressed. The fact that the relations
were "put on ice" for some time was a direct consequence of the
general international approach about Dayton and the issues
established in the Serb-Croat-Muslim war. I think that there is
no space for comparison, that this agreement derived from the
Dayton Agreement. The fact that RS is not within FRY, it is again
part of what was once SFRY, i.e., Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
after all that has happened there, this special relation arises
from the Dayton Agreement. Kosova is an integral part of Serbia
and it has always been. There are no grounds for comparison.
Rugova has no grounds to ask for special links with Albania,
because the international community insists that Kosova is an
integral part of Serbia and there is no change of borders without
an agreement.

KOHA: However, Kosova used to be one of the constituents of the

former SFRY, and this is a juridical precedent. Dayton also
contains the "outer wall of sanctions" which actually disables
Serbia to integrate in international institutions.

TRAJKOVIC: The precedent was made much earlier, when Kosova was
granted competencies that the international law didn't foresee.
This was a precedent and not when the statehood of the autonomies
were suspended. This is why these two things can't be compared.

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In a political and diplomatic struggle, RS has won the right to
have its own state and it has the right to have special links.
This was recognized by the international law and Dayton
guarantees it.

Kosova has never been object of the international community. You

remember that Serbia became one with the amendments, while the
provinces were granted autonomy, which is compatible with the
international law. This is why things can't be compared here.
As far as I am informed, the "outer wall sanctions" are not
related to Kosova at all. The text only stresses some conditions
regarding human rights and it doesn't state that Albanians should
gain their republic and then have the special links with Albania.

KOHA: The Rugova-Milosevic agreement on education has given no

results. What is your opinion?

TRAJKOVIC: SRM has had its posture about this agreement since it
was signed. We said that the agreement had no political elements.
However, we said that it was a political act and that we are
actually dealing with an attempt to overcome a crisis in which
both sides found themselves. The political act was evident,
before all, in the content of the agreement which refers to an
issue that is not disputable since long ago: Albanian children
didn't leave the elementary schools, there could be some talks
about high schools... The agreement evades the concrete solution
of the problem. It refers to the global problem, but nothing is
defined. Much more has been wished than achieved.

KOHA: Going back to the Sabor, one of the participants said that
if bombing actions continue, then Kodra e Trimave (a highly
inhabited Albanian neighborhood in Prishtinë) will be blown up.
Any chances for revenging attacks?

TRAJKOVIC: I am not sure that such a threat was heard, but in

their history Serbs have never acted thus against Albanians. Our
method of struggle is not revenge. We are very much concerned
that Albanians do not protect their neighbors and do not even try
to discover the terrorist groups that have admitted the crimes.
It is evident when politics can't solve the problems, then
terrorism recruits the dissatisfied. We know that the essence of
these actions is grounded on two things: once, to pressure the
international community towards further internationalization of
Kosova's problem and second, the intimidation of Serbs is aimed
at, so they are forced to leave Kosova.

KOHA: There will soon be an Albanian-Serb meeting in New York.

You have protested because none of your representatives have been
invited. Chances are that you will be invited. What do you expect
from this meeting?

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TRAJKOVIC: We have not received an official invitation yet. But
we have told them that no solution can be found for Kosova if one
of the key factors, the Kosova Serbs don't participate. I see
that the regime is trying to avoid us by all means. The Albanian
side is not interested in having us around, because they know
that they wish to increase the level of conversations and that
they want to talk with the republican representatives and not us.
We also think that the Republic should be here, but not without
the Kosova Serbs. In this sense, we are not willing to accept any
decision made in New York without our participation. If there
were no Serbs in Kosova, maybe this situation in which we are now
wouldn't have happened.

KOHA: Have SRM's postures changed since it was established?

TRAJKOVIC: In essence they will not change, they can only be

modified. Our aim is to keep Serbs in Kosova and enable them to
have a good life in their land - in Serbia. Therefore, our aim
is to keep Kosova in Serbia. It is another issue how will these
relations be regulated in Serbia. We are not in favor of the
Albanians' status as second rated citizens, but we wish them to
be equal in democratic Serbia. But, we don't agree that Serbs be
a minority in their own country.

The most important issue now is the democratization of Serbia and

we wish to contribute. In this context, SRM became a Serbian
democratic movement that wishes to contribute in the Serb-
Albanian relations.

Serbs don't wish to have war, because Kosova Serbs don't need a
Kosova inhabited by other Serbs. We wish to live here and we have
to find a political solution to it.

This is our posture that has surprised everyone, the regime, the
opposition and the Albanians. Unfortunately, I must say that
there is also a radicalization of the other side resulting in
terrorist activities and it would be good if the Albanian side
would do all it can to democratize the relations and try to find
a solution inside of Serbia, for the time being.

KOHA: Once you declared that if Albanians continue demanding

their Republic, that the Serbs would also proclaim the Serbian
republic of Kosova. Couldn't this be a solution, have Kosova as
a constituent of the FRY?

TRAJKOVIC: Serbs will not agree to live in an Albanian state...

KOHA: This wouldn't be an Albanian state...

TRAJKOVIC: Albanians and Serbs here have their state and its name

- 17 -
is Serbia. And Albanians should only become part of the political
life in Serbia and fight for a democratic process...

KOHA: New relations in the old framework...

TRAJKOVIC: Within Serbia. All must understand that in order to

achieve the Republic of Kosova, two parties must agree on that.
Serbs don't believe there is a serious political force in Serbia
that would agree to it. And, in this context, we see no solution.
If they keep on with this demand, they have then proclaimed war -
if there is no political solution. We want no war, no conflicts.
We wish to change the relations within one democratic and free
Serbia...

But, we will never acknowledge a new state - never! And

especially after we saw what is happening in Albania. And we are
sorry for this.

KOHA: However, the republic inside or outside the FRY seems to

be a compromise between Albanian separatism and the strong
Serbian posture.

TRAJKOVIC: Democratic Serbia and not a new state is the

compromise! We wish not to agree with a new confederation state -
and this is clear. All what Albanians want, we want to. Why
should Albanians have more than we do. If we say that we want the
Serbian Republic of Kosova, where would this lead us to? I am not
in favor of the Serbian republic nor Albanian republic of Kosova,
but I am in favor of a democratic, modern Serbia which must make
all citizens equal. We must deal with real things and not
overcome issues.

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