G.R. No.

L-7593

March 27, 1913

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSE M. IGPUARA, defendant-appellant.
W. A. Kincaid, Thos. L. Hartigan, and Jose Robles Lahesa for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for appellee.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
The defendant therein is charged with the crime of estafa, for having swindled Juana Montilla
and Eugenio Veraguth out of P2,498 Philippine currency, which he had take on deposit from the
former to be at the latter's disposal. The document setting forth the obligation reads:
We hold at the disposal of Eugenio Veraguth the sum of two thousand four hundred and ninetyeight pesos (P2,498), the balance from Juana Montilla's sugar. Iloilo, June 26, 1911, Jose
Igpuara, for Ramirez and Co.
The Court of First Instance of Iloilo sentenced the defendant to two years of presidio
correccional, to pay Juana Montilla P2,498 Philippine currency, and in case of insolvency to
subsidiary imprisonment at P2.50 per day, not to exceed one-third of the principal penalty, and
the costs.
The defendant appealed, alleging as errors: (1) Holding that the document executed by him was
a certificate of deposit; (2) holding the existence of a deposit, without precedent transfer or
delivery of the P2,498; and (3) classifying the facts in the case as the crime of estafa.
A deposit is constituted from the time a person receives a thing belonging to another
with the obligation of keeping and returning it. (Art. 1758, Civil Code.)
That the defendant received P2,498 is a fact proven. The defendant drew up a document
declaring that they remained in his possession, which he could not have said had he not
received them. They remained in his possession, surely in no other sense than to take care of
them, for they remained has no other purpose. They remained in the defendant's possession at
the disposal of Veraguth; but on August 23 of the same year Veraguth demanded for him
through a notarial instrument restitution of them, and to date he has not restored them.

drawn up in the form of a deposit certificate could be indorsed or negotiated like any other
commercial instrument; and the other, that the sum of P2,498 remained in defendant's
possession as a loan.
It is erroneous to assert that the certificate of deposit in question is negotiable like any other
commercial instrument: First, because every commercial instrument is not negotiable; and
second, because only instruments payable to order are negotiable. Hence, this instrument not
being to order but to bearer, it is not negotiable.
It is also erroneous to assert that sum of money set forth in said certificate is, according to it, in
the defendant's possession as a loan. In a loan the lender transmits to the borrower the use of
the thing lent, while in a deposit the use of the thing is not transmitted, but merely possession for
its custody or safe-keeping.
In order that the depositary may use or dispose oft he things deposited, the depositor's consent
is required, and then:
The rights and obligations of the depositary and of the depositor shall cease, and the
rules and provisions applicable to commercial loans, commission, or contract which
took the place of the deposit shall be observed. (Art. 309, Code of Commerce.)
The defendant has shown no authorization whatsoever or the consent of the depositary for using
or disposing of the P2,498, which the certificate acknowledges, or any contract entered into with
the depositor to convert the deposit into a loan, commission, or other contract.
That demand was not made for restitution of the sum deposited, which could have been claimed
on the same or the next day after the certificate was signed, does not operate against the
depositor, or signify anything except the intention not to press it. Failure to claim at once or delay
for sometime in demanding restitution of the things deposited, which was immediately due, does
not imply such permission to use the thing deposited as would convert the deposit into a loan.
Article 408 of the Code of Commerce of 1829, previous to the one now in force, provided:
The depositary of an amount of money cannot use the amount, and if he makes use of
it, he shall be responsible for all damages that may accrue and shall respond to the
depositor for the legal interest on the amount.
Whereupon the commentators say:

The appellant says: "Juana Montilla's agent voluntarily accepted the sum of P2,498 in an
instrument payable on demand, and as no attempt was made to cash it until August 23, 1911, he
could indorse and negotiate it like any other commercial instrument. There is no doubt that if
Veraguth accepted the receipt for P2,498 it was because at that time he agreed with the
defendant to consider the operation of sale on commission closed, leaving the collection of said
sum until later, which sum remained as a loan payable upon presentation of the receipt." (Brief,
3 and 4.)
Then, after averring the true facts: (1) that a sales commission was precedent; (2) that this
commission was settled with a balance of P2,498 in favor of the principal, Juana Montilla; and
(3) that this balance remained in the possession of the defendant, who drew up an instrument
payable on demand, he has drawn two conclusions, both erroneous: One, that the instrument

In this case the deposit becomes in fact a loan, as a just punishment imposed upon
him who abuses the sacred nature of a deposit and as a means of preventing the
desire of gain from leading him into speculations that may be disastrous to the
depositor, who is much better secured while the deposit exists when he only has a
personal action for recovery.
According to article 548, No. 5, of the Penal Code, those who to the prejudice of
another appropriate or abstract for their own use money, goods, or other personal
property which they may have received as a deposit, on commission, or for
administration, or for any other purpose which produces the obligation of delivering it
or returning it, and deny having received it, shall suffer the penalty of the preceding

article," which punishes such act as the crime of estafa. The corresponding article of
the Penal Code of the Philippines in 535, No. 5.
In a decision of an appeal, September 28, 1895, the principle was laid down that: "Since he
commits the crime ofestafa under article 548 of the Penal Code of Spain who to another's
detriment appropriates to himself or abstracts money or goods received on commission for
delivery, the court rightly applied this article to the appellant, who, to the manifest detriment of
the owner or owners of the securities, since he has not restored them, willfully and wrongfully
disposed of them by appropriating them to himself or at least diverting them from the purpose to
which he was charged to devote them."
It is unquestionable that in no sense did the P2,498 which he willfully and wrongfully disposed of
to the detriments of his principal, Juana Montilla, and of the depositor, Eugenio Veraguth, belong
to the defendant.
Likewise erroneous is the construction apparently at tempted to be given to two decisions of this
Supreme Court (U. S. vs. Dominguez, 2 Phil. Rep., 580, and U. S. vs. Morales and Morco, 15
Phil. Rep., 236) as implying that what constitutes estafa is not the disposal of money deposited,
but denial of having received same. In the first of said cases there was no evidence that the
defendant had appropriated the grain deposited in his possession.
On the contrary, it is entirely probable that, after the departure of the defendant from
Libmanan on September 20, 1898, two days after the uprising of the civil guard in
Nueva Caceres, the rice was seized by the revolutionalists and appropriated to their
own uses.
In this connection it was held that failure to return the thing deposited was not sufficient, but that
it was necessary to prove that the depositary had appropriated it to himself or diverted the
deposit to his own or another's benefit. He was accused or refusing to restore, and it was held
that the code does not penalize refusal to restore but denial of having received. So much for the
crime of omission; now with reference to the crime of commission, it was not held in that
decision that appropriation or diversion of the thing deposited would not constitute the crime
of estafa.
In the second of said decisions, the accused "kept none of the proceeds of the sales. Those,
such as they were, he turned over to the owner;" and there being no proof of the appropriation,
the agent could not be found guilty of the crime of estafa.

G.R. No. L-66826 August 19, 1988

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ZSHORNACK respondents.
Pacis & Reyes Law Office for petitioner.
Ernesto T. Zshornack, Jr. for private respondent.

CORTES, J.:
The original parties to this case were Rizaldy T. Zshornack and the Commercial Bank and Trust
Company of the Philippines [hereafter referred to as "COMTRUST."] In 1980, the Bank of the
Philippine Islands (hereafter referred to as BPI absorbed COMTRUST through a corporate
merger, and was substituted as party to the case.
Rizaldy Zshornack initiated proceedings on June 28,1976 by filing in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal Caloocan City a complaint against COMTRUST alleging four causes of action.
Except for the third cause of action, the CFI ruled in favor of Zshornack. The bank appealed to
the Intermediate Appellate Court which modified the CFI decision absolving the bank from
liability on the fourth cause of action. The pertinent portions of the judgment, as modified, read:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court renders judgment as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant COMTRUST to restore to the dollar savings
account of plaintiff (No. 25-4109) the amount of U.S $1,000.00 as of
October 27, 1975 to earn interest together with the remaining balance of the
said account at the rate fixed by the bank for dollar deposits under Central
Bank Circular 343;

Being in accord and the merits of the case, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
2. Ordering defendant COMTRUST to return to the plaintiff the amount of
U.S. $3,000.00 immediately upon the finality of this decision, without interest
for the reason that the said amount was merely held in custody for
safekeeping, but was not actually deposited with the defendant COMTRUST
because being cash currency, it cannot by law be deposited with plaintiffs
dollar account and defendant's only obligation is to return the same to
plaintiff upon demand;
xxx xxx xxx
5. Ordering defendant COMTRUST to pay plaintiff in the amount of
P8,000.00 as damages in the concept of litigation expenses and attorney's

fees suffered by plaintiff as a result of the failure of the defendant bank to

restore to his (plaintiffs) account the amount of U.S. $1,000.00 and to return
to him (plaintiff) the U.S. $3,000.00 cash left for safekeeping.
Costs against defendant COMTRUST.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, pp. 47-48.]
Undaunted, the bank comes to this Court praying that it be totally absolved from any liability to
Zshornack. The latter not having appealed the Court of Appeals decision, the issues facing this
Court are limited to the bank's liability with regard to the first and second causes of action and its
liability for damages.
1. We first consider the first cause of action, On the dates material to this case, Rizaldy
Zshornack and his wife, Shirley Gorospe, maintained in COMTRUST, Quezon City Branch, a
dollar savings account and a peso current account.
On October 27, 1975, an application for a dollar draft was accomplished by Virgilio V. Garcia,
Assistant Branch Manager of COMTRUST Quezon City, payable to a certain Leovigilda D. Dizon
in the amount of $1,000.00. In the application, Garcia indicated that the amount was to be
charged to Dollar Savings Acct. No. 25-4109, the savings account of the Zshornacks; the
charges for commission, documentary stamp tax and others totalling P17.46 were to be charged
to Current Acct. No. 210465-29, again, the current account of the Zshornacks. There was no
indication of the name of the purchaser of the dollar draft.

At any rate, both explanations are unavailing. With regard to the first explanation, petitioner bank
has not shown how the transaction involving the cashier's check is related to the transaction
involving the dollar draft in favor of Dizon financed by the withdrawal from Rizaldy's dollar
account. The two transactions appear entirely independent of each other. Moreover, Ernesto
Zshornack, Jr., possesses a personality distinct and separate from Rizaldy Zshornack. Payment
made to Ernesto cannot be considered payment to Rizaldy.
As to the second explanation, even if we assume that there was such an agreement, the
evidence do not show that the withdrawal was made pursuant to it. Instead, the record reveals
that the amount withdrawn was used to finance a dollar draft in favor of Leovigilda D. Dizon, and
not to fund the current account of the Zshornacks. There is no proof whatsoever that peso
Current Account No. 210-465-29 was ever credited with the peso equivalent of the US$1,000.00
withdrawn on October 27, 1975 from Dollar Savings Account No. 25-4109.
2. As for the second cause of action, the complaint filed with the trial court alleged that on
December 8, 1975, Zshornack entrusted to COMTRUST, thru Garcia, US
$3,000.00 cash (popularly known as greenbacks) forsafekeeping, and that the agreement was
embodied in a document, a copy of which was attached to and made part of the complaint. The
document reads:
Makati Cable Address:
Philippines "COMTRUST"
COMMERCIAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY

On the same date, October 27,1975, COMTRUST, under the signature of Virgilio V. Garcia,
issued a check payable to the order of Leovigilda D. Dizon in the sum of US $1,000 drawn on
the Chase Manhattan Bank, New York, with an indication that it was to be charged to Dollar
Savings Acct. No. 25-4109.
When Zshornack noticed the withdrawal of US$1,000.00 from his account, he demanded an
explanation from the bank. In answer, COMTRUST claimed that the peso value of the
withdrawal was given to Atty. Ernesto Zshornack, Jr., brother of Rizaldy, on October 27, 1975
when he (Ernesto) encashed with COMTRUST a cashier's check for P8,450.00 issued by the
Manila Banking Corporation payable to Ernesto.
Upon consideration of the foregoing facts, this Court finds no reason to disturb the ruling of both
the trial court and the Appellate Court on the first cause of action. Petitioner must be held liable
for the unauthorized withdrawal of US$1,000.00 from private respondent's dollar account.
In its desperate attempt to justify its act of withdrawing from its depositor's savings account, the
bank has adopted inconsistent theories. First, it still maintains that the peso value of the amount
withdrawn was given to Atty. Ernesto Zshornack, Jr. when the latter encashed the Manilabank
Cashier's Check. At the same time, the bank claims that the withdrawal was made pursuant to
an agreement where Zshornack allegedly authorized the bank to withdraw from his dollar
savings account such amount which, when converted to pesos, would be needed to fund his
peso current account. If indeed the peso equivalent of the amount withdrawn from the dollar
account was credited to the peso current account, why did the bank still have to pay Ernesto?

of the Philippines
Quezon City BrancMR. RIZALDY T. ZSHORNACK
&/OR MRS SHIRLEY E. ZSHORNACK
Sir/Madam:
We acknowledged (sic) having received from you today
the sum of US DOLLARS: THREE THOUSAND ONLY
(US$3,000.00) for safekeeping.
In its answer, COMTRUST averred that the US$3,000 was credited to Zshornack's peso current
account at prevailing conversion rates.
It must be emphasized that COMTRUST did not deny specifically under oath the authenticity
and due execution of the above instrument.

During trial, it was established that on December 8, 1975 Zshornack indeed delivered to the
bank US $3,000 for safekeeping. When he requested the return of the money on May 10, 1976,
COMTRUST explained that the sum was disposed of in this manner: US$2,000.00 was sold on
December 29, 1975 and the peso proceeds amounting to P14,920.00 were deposited to
Zshornack's current account per deposit slip accomplished by Garcia; the remaining
US$1,000.00 was sold on February 3, 1976 and the peso proceeds amounting to P8,350.00
were deposited to his current account per deposit slip also accomplished by Garcia.
Aside from asserting that the US$3,000.00 was properly credited to Zshornack's current account
at prevailing conversion rates, BPI now posits another ground to defeat private respondent's
claim. It now argues that the contract embodied in the document is the contract of depositum (as
defined in Article 1962, New Civil Code), which banks do not enter into. The bank alleges that
Garcia exceeded his powers when he entered into the transaction. Hence, it is claimed, the bank
cannot be liable under the contract, and the obligation is purely personal to Garcia.
Before we go into the nature of the contract entered into, an important point which arises on the
pleadings, must be considered.
The second cause of action is based on a document purporting to be signed by COMTRUST, a
copy of which document was attached to the complaint. In short, the second cause of action was
based on an actionable document. It was therefore incumbent upon the bank to specifically deny
under oath the due execution of the document, as prescribed under Rule 8, Section 8, if it
desired: (1) to question the authority of Garcia to bind the corporation; and (2) to deny its
capacity to enter into such contract. [See, E.B. Merchant v. International Banking Corporation, 6
Phil. 314 (1906).] No sworn answer denying the due execution of the document in question, or
questioning the authority of Garcia to bind the bank, or denying the bank's capacity to enter into
the contract, was ever filed. Hence, the bank is deemed to have admitted not only Garcia's
authority, but also the bank's power, to enter into the contract in question.
In the past, this Court had occasion to explain the reason behind this procedural requirement.
The reason for the rule enunciated in the foregoing authorities will, we think,
be readily appreciated. In dealing with corporations the public at large is
bound to rely to a large extent upon outward appearances. If a man is found
acting for a corporation with the external indicia of authority, any person, not
having notice of want of authority, may usually rely upon those
appearances; and if it be found that the directors had permitted the agent to
exercise that authority and thereby held him out as a person competent to
bind the corporation, or had acquiesced in a contract and retained the
benefit supposed to have been conferred by it, the corporation will be
bound, notwithstanding the actual authority may never have been granted
... Whether a particular officer actually possesses the authority which he
assumes to exercise is frequently known to very few, and the proof of it
usually is not readily accessible to the stranger who deals with the
corporation on the faith of the ostensible authority exercised by some of the
corporate officers. It is therefore reasonable, in a case where an officer of a
corporation has made a contract in its name, that the corporation should be
required, if it denies his authority, to state such defense in its answer. By this
means the plaintiff is apprised of the fact that the agent's authority is
contested; and he is given an opportunity to adduce evidence showing
either that the authority existed or that the contract was ratified and

approved. [Ramirez v. Orientalist Co. and Fernandez, 38 Phil. 634, 645- 646
(1918).]
Petitioner's argument must also be rejected for another reason. The practical effect of absolving
a corporation from liability every time an officer enters into a contract which is beyond corporate
powers, even without the proper allegation or proof that the corporation has not authorized nor
ratified the officer's act, is to cast corporations in so perfect a mold that transgressions and
wrongs by such artificial beings become impossible [Bissell v. Michigan Southern and N.I.R. Cos
22 N.Y 258 (1860).] "To say that a corporation has no right to do unauthorized acts is only to put
forth a very plain truism but to say that such bodies have no power or capacity to err is to impute
to them an excellence which does not belong to any created existence with which we are
acquainted. The distinction between power and right is no more to be lost sight of in respect to
artificial than in respect to natural persons." [Ibid.]
Having determined that Garcia's act of entering into the contract binds the corporation, we now
determine the correct nature of the contract, and its legal consequences, including its
enforceability.
The document which embodies the contract states that the US$3,000.00 was received by the
bank for safekeeping. The subsequent acts of the parties also show that the intent of the parties
was really for the bank to safely keep the dollars and to return it to Zshornack at a later time,
Thus, Zshornack demanded the return of the money on May 10, 1976, or over five months later.
The above arrangement is that contract defined under Article 1962, New Civil Code, which
reads:
Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a
thing belonging to another, with the obligation of safely keeping it and of
returning the same. If the safekeeping of the thing delivered is not the
principal purpose of the contract, there is no deposit but some other
contract.
Note that the object of the contract between Zshornack and COMTRUST was foreign exchange.
Hence, the transaction was covered by Central Bank Circular No. 20, Restrictions on Gold and
Foreign Exchange Transactions, promulgated on December 9, 1949, which was in force at the
time the parties entered into the transaction involved in this case. The circular provides:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Transactions in the assets described below and all dealings in them of
whatever nature, including, where applicable their exportation and
importation, shall NOT be effected, except with respect to deposit accounts
included in sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of this paragraph, when such deposit
accounts are owned by and in the name of, banks.
(a) Any and all assets, provided they are held through,
in, or with banks or banking institutions located in the
Philippines, including money, checks, drafts, bullions
bank drafts, deposit accounts (demand, time and
savings), all debts, indebtedness or obligations,
financial brokers and investment houses, notes,

debentures, stocks, bonds, coupons, bank

acceptances, mortgages, pledges, liens or other rights
in the nature of security, expressed in foreign
currencies, or if payable abroad, irrespective of the
currency in which they are expressed, and belonging to
any person, firm, partnership, association, branch
office, agency, company or other unincorporated body
or corporation residing or located within the Philippines;
(b) Any and all assets of the kinds included and/or
described in subparagraph (a) above, whether or not
held through, in, or with banks or banking institutions,
and existent within the Philippines, which belong to any
person, firm, partnership, association, branch office,
agency, company or other unincorporated body or
corporation not residing or located within the
Philippines;
(c) Any and all assets existent within the Philippines
including money, checks, drafts, bullions, bank drafts,
all debts, indebtedness or obligations, financial
securities commonly dealt in by bankers, brokers and
investment houses, notes, debentures, stock, bonds,
coupons, bank acceptances, mortgages, pledges, liens
or other rights in the nature of security expressed in
foreign currencies, or if payable abroad, irrespective of
the currency in which they are expressed, and
belonging to any person, firm, partnership, association,
branch office, agency, company or other unincorporated
body or corporation residing or located within the
Philippines.
xxx xxx xxx
4. (a) All receipts of foreign exchange shall be sold daily to the Central
Bank by those authorized to deal in foreign exchange. All receipts of foreign
exchange by any person, firm, partnership, association, branch office,
agency, company or other unincorporated body or corporation shall be sold
to the authorized agents of the Central Bank by the recipients within one
business day following the receipt of such foreign exchange. Any person,
firm, partnership, association, branch office, agency, company or other
unincorporated body or corporation, residing or located within the
Philippines, who acquires on and after the date of this Circular foreign
exchange shall not, unless licensed by the Central Bank, dispose of such
foreign exchange in whole or in part, nor receive less than its full value, nor
delay taking ownership thereof except as such delay is customary;
Provided, further, That within one day upon taking ownership, or receiving
payment, of foreign exchange the aforementioned persons and entities shall
sell such foreign exchange to designated agents of the Central Bank.
xxx xxx xxx

8. Strict observance of the provisions of this Circular is enjoined; and any

person, firm or corporation, foreign or domestic, who being bound to the
observance thereof, or of such other rules, regulations or directives as may
hereafter be issued in implementation of this Circular, shall fail or refuse to
comply with, or abide by, or shall violate the same, shall be subject to the
penal sanctions provided in the Central Bank Act.
xxx xxx xxx
Paragraph 4 (a) above was modified by Section 6 of Central Bank Circular No. 281, Regulations
on Foreign Exchange, promulgated on November 26, 1969 by limiting its coverage to Philippine
residents only. Section 6 provides:
SEC. 6. All receipts of foreign exchange by any resident person, firm,
company or corporation shall be sold to authorized agents of the Central
Bank by the recipients within one business day following the receipt of such
foreign exchange. Any resident person, firm, company or
corporation residing or located within the Philippines, who acquires foreign
exchange shall not, unless authorized by the Central Bank, dispose of such
foreign exchange in whole or in part, nor receive less than its full value, nor
delay taking ownership thereof except as such delay is customary;
Provided, That, within one business day upon taking ownership or receiving
payment of foreign exchange the aforementioned persons and entities shall
sell such foreign exchange to the authorized agents of the Central Bank.
As earlier stated, the document and the subsequent acts of the parties show that they intended
the bank to safekeep the foreign exchange, and return it later to Zshornack, who alleged in his
complaint that he is a Philippine resident. The parties did not intended to sell the US dollars to
the Central Bank within one business day from receipt. Otherwise, the contract
of depositum would never have been entered into at all.
Since the mere safekeeping of the greenbacks, without selling them to the Central Bank within
one business day from receipt, is a transaction which is not authorized by CB Circular No. 20, it
must be considered as one which falls under the general class of prohibited transactions.
Hence, pursuant to Article 5 of the Civil Code, it is void, having been executed against the
provisions of a mandatory/prohibitory law. More importantly, it affords neither of the parties a
cause of action against the other. "When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or
object of the contract, and the act constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in pari
delicto, they shall have no cause of action against each other. . ." [Art. 1411, New Civil Code.]
The only remedy is one on behalf of the State to prosecute the parties for violating the law.
We thus rule that Zshornack cannot recover under the second cause of action.
3. Lastly, we find the P8,000.00 awarded by the courts a quo as damages in the concept of
litigation expenses and attorney's fees to be reasonable. The award is sustained.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner is ordered to restore
to the dollar savings account of private respondent the amount of US$1,000.00 as of October
27, 1975 to earn interest at the rate fixed by the bank for dollar savings deposits. Petitioner is
further ordered to pay private respondent the amount of P8,000.00 as damages. The other
causes of action of private respondent are ordered dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

In the year 1898 the books Father De la Pea, as trustee, showed that he had on hand as such
trustee the sum of P6,641, collected by him for the charitable purposes aforesaid. In the same
year he deposited in his personal account P19,000 in the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank at
Iloilo. Shortly thereafter and during the war of the revolution, Father De la Pea was arrested by
the military authorities as a political prisoner, and while thus detained made an order on said
bank in favor of the United States Army officer under whose charge he then was for the sum
thus deposited in said bank. The arrest of Father De la Pea and the confiscation of the funds in
the bank were the result of the claim of the military authorities that he was an insurgent and that
the funds thus deposited had been collected by him for revolutionary purposes. The money was
taken from the bank by the military authorities by virtue of such order, was confiscated and
turned over to the Government.
While there is considerable dispute in the case over the question whether the P6,641 of trust
funds was included in the P19,000 deposited as aforesaid, nevertheless, a careful examination
of the case leads us to the conclusion that said trust funds were a part of the funds deposited
and which were removed and confiscated by the military authorities of the United States.
That branch of the law known in England and America as the law of trusts had no exact
counterpart in the Roman law and has none under the Spanish law. In this jurisdiction, therefore,
Father De la Pea's liability is determined by those portions of the Civil Code which relate to
obligations. (Book 4, Title 1.)

G.R. No. L-6913

November 21, 1913

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF JARO, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GREGORIO DE LA PEA, administrator of the estate of Father Agustin de la
Pea, defendant-appellant.
J. Lopez Vito, for appellant.
Arroyo and Horrilleno, for appellee.

MORELAND, J.:
This is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo,
awarding to the plaintiff the sum of P6,641, with interest at the legal rate from the beginning of
the action.
It is established in this case that the plaintiff is the trustee of a charitable bequest made for the
construction of a leper hospital and that father Agustin de la Pea was the duly authorized
representative of the plaintiff to receive the legacy. The defendant is the administrator of the
estate of Father De la Pea.

Although the Civil Code states that "a person obliged to give something is also bound to
preserve it with the diligence pertaining to a good father of a family" (art. 1094), it also provides,
following the principle of the Roman law, major casus est, cui humana infirmitas resistere non
potest, that "no one shall be liable for events which could not be foreseen, or which having been
foreseen were inevitable, with the exception of the cases expressly mentioned in the law or
those in which the obligation so declares." (Art. 1105.)
By placing the money in the bank and mixing it with his personal funds De la Pea did not
thereby assume an obligation different from that under which he would have lain if such deposit
had not been made, nor did he thereby make himself liable to repay the money at all hazards. If
the had been forcibly taken from his pocket or from his house by the military forces of one of the
combatants during a state of war, it is clear that under the provisions of the Civil Code he would
have been exempt from responsibility. The fact that he placed the trust fund in the bank in his
personal account does not add to his responsibility. Such deposit did not make him a debtor who
must respond at all hazards.
We do not enter into a discussion for the purpose of determining whether he acted more or less
negligently by depositing the money in the bank than he would if he had left it in his home; or
whether he was more or less negligent by depositing the money in his personal account than he
would have been if he had deposited it in a separate account as trustee. We regard such
discussion as substantially fruitless, inasmuch as the precise question is not one of negligence.
There was no law prohibiting him from depositing it as he did and there was no law which
changed his responsibility be reason of the deposit. While it may be true that one who is under
obligation to do or give a thing is in duty bound, when he sees events approaching the results of
which will be dangerous to his trust, to take all reasonable means and measures to escape or, if
unavoidable, to temper the effects of those events, we do not feel constrained to hold that, in
choosing between two means equally legal, he is culpably negligent in selecting one whereas he
would not have been if he had selected the other.

The court, therefore, finds and declares that the money which is the subject matter of this action
was deposited by Father De la Pea in the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation of
Iloilo; that said money was forcibly taken from the bank by the armed forces of the United States
during the war of the insurrection; and that said Father De la Pea was not responsible for its
loss.
The judgment is therefore reversed, and it is decreed that the plaintiff shall take nothing by his
complaint.
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Carson, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
TRENT, J., dissenting:
I dissent. Technically speaking, whether Father De la Pea was a trustee or an agent of the
plaintiff his books showed that in 1898 he had in his possession as trustee or agent the sum of
P6,641 belonging to the plaintiff as the head of the church. This money was then clothed with all
the immunities and protection with which the law seeks to invest trust funds. But when De la
Pea mixed this trust fund with his own and deposited the whole in the bank to
his personal account or credit, he by this act stamped on the said fund his own private marks
and unclothed it of all the protection it had. If this money had been deposited in the name of De
la Pea as trustee or agent of the plaintiff, I think that it may be presumed that the military
authorities would not have confiscated it for the reason that they were looking for insurgent
funds only. Again, the plaintiff had no reason to suppose that De la Pea would attempt to strip
the fund of its identity, nor had he said or done anything which tended to relieve De la Pea from
the legal reponsibility which pertains to the care and custody of trust funds.
The Supreme Court of the United States in the United State vs. Thomas (82 U. S., 337), at page
343, said: "Trustees are only bound to exercise the same care and solicitude with regard to the
trust property which they would exercise with regard to their own. Equity will not exact more of
them. They are not liable for a loss by theft without their fault. But this exemption ceases when
they mix the trust-money with their own, whereby it loses its identity, and they become mere
debtors."
If this proposition is sound and is applicable to cases arising in this jurisdiction, and I entertain
no doubt on this point, the liability of the estate of De la Pea cannot be doubted. But this court
in the majority opinion says: "The fact that he (Agustin de la Pea) placed the trust fund in the
bank in his personal account does not add to his responsibility. Such deposit did not make him a
debtor who must respond at all hazards. . . . There was no law prohibiting him from depositing it
as he did, and there was no law which changed his responsibility, by reason of the deposit."
I assume that the court in using the language which appears in the latter part of the above
quotation meant to say that there was no statutory law regulating the question. Questions of this
character are not usually governed by statutory law. The law is to be found in the very nature of
the trust itself, and, as a general rule, the courts say what facts are necessary to hold the trustee
as a debtor.
If De la Pea, after depositing the trust fund in his personal account, had used this money for
speculative purposes, such as the buying and selling of sugar or other products of the country,
thereby becoming a debtor, there would have been no doubt as to the liability of his estate.

Whether he used this money for that purpose the record is silent, but it will be noted that a
considerable length of time intervened from the time of the deposit until the funds were
confiscated by the military authorities. In fact the record shows that De la Pea deposited on
June 27, 1898, P5,259, on June 28 of that year P3,280, and on August 5 of the same year
P6,000. The record also shows that these funds were withdrawn and again deposited all
together on the 29th of May, 1900, this last deposit amounting to P18,970. These facts strongly
indicate that De la Pea had as a matter of fact been using the money in violation of the trust
imposed in him. lawph!1.net
If the doctrine announced in the majority opinion be followed in cases hereafter arising in this
jurisdiction trust funds will be placed in precarious condition. The position of the trustee will
cease to be one of trust.
G.R. No. 90027 March 3, 1993
CA AGRO-INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORP., petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and SECURITY BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY, respondents.
Dolorfino & Dominguez Law Offices for petitioner.
Danilo B. Banares for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Is the contractual relation between a commercial bank and another party in a contract of rent of
a safety deposit box with respect to its contents placed by the latter one of bailor and bailee or
one of lessor and lessee?
This is the crux of the present controversy.
On 3 July 1979, petitioner (through its President, Sergio Aguirre) and the spouses Ramon and
Paula Pugao entered into an agreement whereby the former purchased from the latter two (2)
parcels of land for a consideration of P350,625.00. Of this amount, P75,725.00 was paid as
downpayment while the balance was covered by three (3) postdated checks. Among the terms
and conditions of the agreement embodied in a Memorandum of True and Actual Agreement of
Sale of Land were that the titles to the lots shall be transferred to the petitioner upon full
payment of the purchase price and that the owner's copies of the certificates of titles thereto,
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 284655 and 292434, shall be deposited in a safety
deposit box of any bank. The same could be withdrawn only upon the joint signatures of a
representative of the petitioner and the Pugaos upon full payment of the purchase price.
Petitioner, through Sergio Aguirre, and the Pugaos then rented Safety Deposit Box No. 1448 of
private respondent Security Bank and Trust Company, a domestic banking corporation
hereinafter referred to as the respondent Bank. For this purpose, both signed a contract of lease
(Exhibit "2") which contains, inter alia, the following conditions:

13. The bank is not a depositary of the contents of the safe and it has
neither the possession nor control of the same.
14. The bank has no interest whatsoever in said contents, except herein
expressly provided, and it assumes absolutely no liability in connection
therewith. 1
After the execution of the contract, two (2) renter's keys were given to the renters one to
Aguirre (for the petitioner) and the other to the Pugaos. A guard key remained in the possession
of the respondent Bank. The safety deposit box has two (2) keyholes, one for the guard key and
the other for the renter's key, and can be opened only with the use of both keys. Petitioner
claims that the certificates of title were placed inside the said box.
Thereafter, a certain Mrs. Margarita Ramos offered to buy from the petitioner the two (2) lots at a
price of P225.00 per square meter which, as petitioner alleged in its complaint, translates to a
profit of P100.00 per square meter or a total of P280,500.00 for the entire property. Mrs. Ramos
demanded the execution of a deed of sale which necessarily entailed the production of the
certificates of title. In view thereof, Aguirre, accompanied by the Pugaos, then proceeded to the
respondent Bank on 4 October 1979 to open the safety deposit box and get the certificates of
title. However, when opened in the presence of the Bank's representative, the box yielded no
such certificates. Because of the delay in the reconstitution of the title, Mrs. Ramos withdrew her
earlier offer to purchase the lots; as a consequence thereof, the petitioner allegedly failed to
realize the expected profit of P280,500.00. Hence, the latter filed on 1 September 1980 a
complaint 2 for damages against the respondent Bank with the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Pasig, Metro Manila which docketed the same as Civil Case No. 38382.

Its motion for reconsideration 7 having been denied, petitioner appealed from the adverse
decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. CV No.
15150. Petitioner urged the respondent Court to reverse the challenged decision because the
trial court erred in (a) absolving the respondent Bank from liability from the loss, (b) not declaring
as null and void, for being contrary to law, public order and public policy, the provisions in the
contract for lease of the safety deposit box absolving the Bank from any liability for loss, (c) not
concluding that in this jurisdiction, as well as under American jurisprudence, the liability of the
Bank is settled and (d) awarding attorney's fees to the Bank and denying the petitioner's prayer
for nominal and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. 8
In its Decision promulgated on 4 July 1989, 9 respondent Court affirmed the appealed decision
principally on the theory that the contract (Exhibit "2") executed by the petitioner and respondent
Bank is in the nature of a contract of lease by virtue of which the petitioner and its co-renter were
given control over the safety deposit box and its contents while the Bank retained no right to
open the said box because it had neither the possession nor control over it and its contents. As
such, the contract is governed by Article 1643 of the Civil Code 10 which provides:
Art. 1643. In the lease of things, one of the parties binds himself to give to
another the enjoyment or use of a thing for a price certain, and for a period
which may be definite or indefinite. However, no lease for more than ninetynine years shall be valid.
It invoked Tolentino vs. Gonzales 11 which held that the owner of the property loses
his control over the property leased during the period of the contract and Article
1975 of the Civil Code which provides:

In its Answer with Counterclaim, 3 respondent Bank alleged that the petitioner has no cause of
action because of paragraphs 13 and 14 of the contract of lease (Exhibit "2"); corollarily, loss of
any of the items or articles contained in the box could not give rise to an action against it. It then
interposed a counterclaim for exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees in the amount of
P20,000.00. Petitioner subsequently filed an answer to the counterclaim. 4

Art. 1975. The depositary holding certificates, bonds, securities or

instruments which earn interest shall be bound to collect the latter when it
becomes due, and to take such steps as may be necessary in order that the
securities may preserve their value and the rights corresponding to them
according to law.

In due course, the trial court, now designated as Branch 161 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig, Metro Manila, rendered a decision 5 adverse to the petitioner on 8 December 1986, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

The above provision shall not apply to contracts for the rent of safety
deposit boxes.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered

dismissing plaintiff's complaint.
On defendant's counterclaim, judgment is hereby rendered ordering plaintiff
to pay defendant the amount of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS as
attorney's fees.
With costs against plaintiff. 6
The unfavorable verdict is based on the trial court's conclusion that under paragraphs 13 and 14
of the contract of lease, the Bank has no liability for the loss of the certificates of title. The court
declared that the said provisions are binding on the parties.

and then concluded that "[c]learly, the defendant-appellee is not under any duty to
maintain the contents of the box. The stipulation absolving the defendant-appellee
from liability is in accordance with the nature of the contract of lease and cannot be
regarded as contrary to law, public order and public policy." 12 The appellate court was
quick to add, however, that under the contract of lease of the safety deposit box,
respondent Bank is not completely free from liability as it may still be made
answerable in case unauthorized persons enter into the vault area or when the rented
box is forced open. Thus, as expressly provided for in stipulation number 8 of the
contract in question:
8. The Bank shall use due diligence that no unauthorized person shall be
admitted to any rented safe and beyond this, the Bank will not be
responsible for the contents of any safe rented from it. 13
Its motion for reconsideration 14 having been denied in the respondent Court's Resolution of 28
August 1989, 15petitioner took this recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and urges Us to

review and set aside the respondent Court's ruling. Petitioner avers that both the respondent
Court and the trial court (a) did not properly and legally apply the correct law in this case, (b)
acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction amounting to lack thereof and (c)
set a precedent that is contrary to, or is a departure from precedents adhered to and affirmed by
decisions of this Court and precepts in American jurisprudence adopted in the Philippines. It
reiterates the arguments it had raised in its motion to reconsider the trial court's decision, the
brief submitted to the respondent Court and the motion to reconsider the latter's decision. In a
nutshell, petitioner maintains that regardless of nomenclature, the contract for the rent of the
safety deposit box (Exhibit "2") is actually a contract of deposit governed by Title XII, Book IV of
the Civil Code of the
Philippines. 16 Accordingly, it is claimed that the respondent Bank is liable for the loss of the
certificates of title pursuant to Article 1972 of the said Code which provides:
Art. 1972. The depositary is obliged to keep the thing safely and to return it,
when required, to the depositor, or to his heirs and successors, or to the
person who may have been designated in the contract. His responsibility,
with regard to the safekeeping and the loss of the thing, shall be governed
by the provisions of Title I of this Book.
If the deposit is gratuitous, this fact shall be taken into account in
determining the degree of care that the depositary must observe.
Petitioner then quotes a passage from American Jurisprudence
to expound on the prevailing rule in the United States, to wit:

17

which is supposed

The prevailing rule appears to be that where a safe-deposit company leases

a safe-deposit box or safe and the lessee takes possession of the box or
safe and places therein his securities or other valuables, the relation of
bailee and bail or is created between the parties to the transaction as to
such securities or other valuables; the fact that the
safe-deposit company does not know, and that it is not expected that it shall
know, the character or description of the property which is deposited in such
safe-deposit box or safe does not change that relation. That access to the
contents of the safe-deposit box can be had only by the use of a key
retained by the lessee ( whether it is the sole key or one to be used in
connection with one retained by the lessor) does not operate to alter the
foregoing rule. The argument that there is not, in such a case, a delivery of
exclusive possession and control to the deposit company, and that therefore
the situation is entirely different from that of ordinary bailment, has been
generally rejected by the courts, usually on the ground that as possession
must be either in the depositor or in the company, it should reasonably be
considered as in the latter rather than in the former, since the company is,
by the nature of the contract, given absolute control of access to the
property, and the depositor cannot gain access thereto without the consent
and active participation of the company. . . . (citations omitted).
and a segment from Words and Phrases 18 which states that a contract for the rental
of a bank safety deposit box in consideration of a fixed amount at stated periods is a
bailment for hire.
Petitioner further argues that conditions 13 and 14 of the questioned contract are contrary to law
and public policy and should be declared null and void. In support thereof, it cites Article 1306 of

the Civil Code which provides that parties to a contract may establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
After the respondent Bank filed its comment, this Court gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to simultaneously submit their respective Memoranda.
The petition is partly meritorious.
We agree with the petitioner's contention that the contract for the rent of the safety deposit box is
not an ordinary contract of lease as defined in Article 1643 of the Civil Code. However, We do
not fully subscribe to its view that the same is a contract of deposit that is to be strictly governed
by the provisions in the Civil Code on deposit; 19the contract in the case at bar is a special kind
of deposit. It cannot be characterized as an ordinary contract of lease under Article 1643
because the full and absolute possession and control of the safety deposit box was not given to
the joint renters the petitioner and the Pugaos. The guard key of the box remained with the
respondent Bank; without this key, neither of the renters could open the box. On the other hand,
the respondent Bank could not likewise open the box without the renter's key. In this case, the
said key had a duplicate which was made so that both renters could have access to the box.
Hence, the authorities cited by the respondent Court 20 on this point do not apply. Neither could
Article 1975, also relied upon by the respondent Court, be invoked as an argument against the
deposit theory. Obviously, the first paragraph of such provision cannot apply to a depositary of
certificates, bonds, securities or instruments which earn interest if such documents are kept in a
rented safety deposit box. It is clear that the depositary cannot open the box without the renter
being present.
We observe, however, that the deposit theory itself does not altogether find unanimous support
even in American jurisprudence. We agree with the petitioner that under the latter, the prevailing
rule is that the relation between a bank renting out safe-deposit boxes and its customer with
respect to the contents of the box is that of a bail or and bailee, the bailment being for hire and
mutual benefit. 21 This is just the prevailing view because:
There is, however, some support for the view that the relationship in
question might be more properly characterized as that of landlord and
tenant, or lessor and lessee. It has also been suggested that it should be
characterized as that of licensor and licensee. The relation between a bank,
safe-deposit company, or storage company, and the renter of a safe-deposit
box therein, is often described as contractual, express or implied, oral or
written, in whole or in part. But there is apparently no jurisdiction in which
any rule other than that applicable to bailments governs questions of the
liability and rights of the parties in respect of loss of the contents of safedeposit boxes. 22 (citations omitted)
In the context of our laws which authorize banking institutions to rent out safety deposit boxes, it
is clear that in this jurisdiction, the prevailing rule in the United States has been adopted. Section
72 of the General Banking Act23 pertinently provides:
Sec. 72. In addition to the operations specifically authorized elsewhere in
this Act, banking institutions other than building and loan associations may
perform the following services:

(a) Receive in custody funds, documents, and valuable

objects, and rent safety deposit boxes for the
safeguarding of such effects.

using this guard key. Clearly then, to the extent above stated, the foregoing conditions
in the contract in question are void and ineffective. It has been said:
With respect to property deposited in a safe-deposit box by a customer of a
safe-deposit company, the parties, since the relation is a contractual one,
may by special contract define their respective duties or provide for
increasing or limiting the liability of the deposit company, provided such
contract is not in violation of law or public policy. It must clearly appear that
there actually was such a special contract, however, in order to vary the
ordinary obligations implied by law from the relationship of the parties;
liability of the deposit company will not be enlarged or restricted by words of
doubtful meaning. The company, in renting
safe-deposit boxes, cannot exempt itself from liability for loss of the contents
by its own fraud or negligence or that of its agents or servants, and if a
provision of the contract may be construed as an attempt to do so, it will be
held ineffective for the purpose. Although it has been held that the lessor of
a safe-deposit box cannot limit its liability for loss of the contents thereof
through its own negligence, the view has been taken that such a lessor may
limits its liability to some extent by agreement or stipulation. 30 (citations
omitted)

xxx xxx xxx

The banks shall perform the services permitted under subsections (a), (b)
and (c) of this section asdepositories or as agents. . . . 24 (emphasis
supplied)
Note that the primary function is still found within the parameters of a contract of deposit, i.e., the
receiving in custody of funds, documents and other valuable objects for safekeeping. The renting
out of the safety deposit boxes is not independent from, but related to or in conjunction with, this
principal function. A contract of deposit may be entered into orally or in writing 25 and, pursuant to
Article 1306 of the Civil Code, the parties thereto may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms
and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy. The depositary's responsibility for the safekeeping of
the objects deposited in the case at bar is governed by Title I, Book IV of the Civil Code.
Accordingly, the depositary would be liable if, in performing its obligation, it is found guilty of
fraud, negligence, delay or contravention of the tenor of the agreement. 26 In the absence of any
stipulation prescribing the degree of diligence required, that of a good father of a family is to be
observed. 27 Hence, any stipulation exempting the depositary from any liability arising from the
loss of the thing deposited on account of fraud, negligence or delay would be void for being
contrary to law and public policy. In the instant case, petitioner maintains that conditions 13 and
14 of the questioned contract of lease of the safety deposit box, which read:
13. The bank is not a depositary of the contents of the safe and it has
neither the possession nor control of the same.
14. The bank has no interest whatsoever in said contents, except herein
expressly provided, and it assumes absolutely no liability in connection
therewith. 28
are void as they are contrary to law and public policy. We find Ourselves in agreement
with this proposition for indeed, said provisions are inconsistent with the respondent
Bank's responsibility as a depositary under Section 72(a) of the General Banking Act.
Both exempt the latter from any liability except as contemplated in condition 8 thereof
which limits its duty to exercise reasonable diligence only with respect to who shall be
admitted to any rented safe, to wit:
8. The Bank shall use due diligence that no unauthorized person shall be
admitted to any rented safe and beyond this, the Bank will not be
responsible for the contents of any safe rented from it. 29
Furthermore, condition 13 stands on a wrong premise and is contrary to the actual
practice of the Bank. It is not correct to assert that the Bank has neither the
possession nor control of the contents of the box since in fact, the safety deposit box
itself is located in its premises and is under its absolute control; moreover, the
respondent Bank keeps the guard key to the said box. As stated earlier, renters
cannot open their respective boxes unless the Bank cooperates by presenting and

Thus, we reach the same conclusion which the Court of Appeals arrived at, that is, that the
petition should be dismissed, but on grounds quite different from those relied upon by the Court
of Appeals. In the instant case, the respondent Bank's exoneration cannot, contrary to the
holding of the Court of Appeals, be based on or proceed from a characterization of the impugned
contract as a contract of lease, but rather on the fact that no competent proof was presented to
show that respondent Bank was aware of the agreement between the petitioner and the Pugaos
to the effect that the certificates of title were withdrawable from the safety deposit box only upon
both parties' joint signatures, and that no evidence was submitted to reveal that the loss of the
certificates of title was due to the fraud or negligence of the respondent Bank. This in turn flows
from this Court's determination that the contract involved was one of deposit. Since both the
petitioner and the Pugaos agreed that each should have one (1) renter's key, it was obvious that
either of them could ask the Bank for access to the safety deposit box and, with the use of such
key and the Bank's own guard key, could open the said box, without the other renter being
present.
Since, however, the petitioner cannot be blamed for the filing of the complaint and no bad faith
on its part had been established, the trial court erred in condemning the petitioner to pay the
respondent Bank attorney's fees. To this extent, the Decision (dispositive portion) of public
respondent Court of Appeals must be modified.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is partially GRANTED by deleting the award for
attorney's fees from the 4 July 1989 Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 15150. As modified, and subject to the pronouncement We made above on the nature of the
relationship between the parties in a contract of lease of safety deposit boxes, the dispositive
portion of the said Decision is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant Petition for Review is otherwise
DENIED for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

SO ORDERED. 4
The antecedent facts of the present controversy are summarized by the public respondent in its
challenged decision as follows:

G.R. No. 102970 May 13, 1993

LUZAN SIA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SECURITY BANK and TRUST COMPANY, respondents.
Asuncion Law Offices for petitioner.
Cauton, Banares, Carpio & Associates for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The Decision of public respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 26737, promulgated on
21 August 1991, 1reversing and setting aside the Decision, dated 19 February 1990, 2 of Branch
47 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in Civil Case No. 87-42601, entitled "LUZAN
SIA vs. SECURITY BANK and TRUST CO.," is challenged in this petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules Court.
Civil Case No. 87-42601 is an action for damages arising out of the destruction or loss of the
stamp collection of the plaintiff (petitioner herein) contained in Safety Deposit Box No. 54 which
had been rented from the defendant pursuant to a contract denominated as a Lease
Agreement. 3 Judgment therein was rendered in favor of the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendant, Security Bank & Trust Company,
ordering the defendant bank to pay the plaintiff the sum of
a) Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), Philippine Currency, as actual
damages;
b) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), Philippine Currency, as
moral damages; and
c) Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), Philippine Currency, as attorney's
fees and legal expenses.
The counterclaim set up by the defendant are hereby dismissed for lack of
merit.
No costs.

The plaintiff rented on March 22, 1985 the Safety Deposit Box No. 54 of the
defendant bank at its Binondo Branch located at the Fookien Times
Building, Soler St., Binondo, Manila wherein he placed his collection of
stamps. The said safety deposit box leased by the plaintiff was at the
bottom or at the lowest level of the safety deposit boxes of the defendant
bank at its aforesaid Binondo Branch.
During the floods that took place in 1985 and 1986, floodwater entered into
the defendant bank's premises, seeped into the safety deposit box leased
by the plaintiff and caused, according to the plaintiff, damage to his stamps
collection. The defendant bank rejected the plaintiff's claim for
compensation for his damaged stamps collection, so, the plaintiff instituted
an action for damages against the defendant bank.
The defendant bank denied liability for the damaged stamps collection of
the plaintiff on the basis of the "Rules and Regulations Governing the Lease
of Safe Deposit Boxes" (Exhs. "A-1", "1-A"), particularly paragraphs 9 and
13, which reads (sic):
"9. The liability of the Bank by reason of the lease, is limited to the exercise
of the diligence to prevent the opening of the safe by any person other than
the Renter, his authorized agent or legal representative;
xxx xxx xxx
"13. The Bank is not a depository of the contents of the safe and it has
neither the possession nor the control of the same. The Bank has no
interest whatsoever in said contents, except as herein provided, and it
assumes absolutely no liability in connection therewith."
The defendant bank also contended that its contract with the plaintiff over
safety deposit box No. 54 was one of lease and not of deposit and,
therefore, governed by the lease agreement (Exhs. "A", "L") which should
be the applicable law; that the destruction of the plaintiff's stamps collection
was due to a calamity beyond obligation on its part to notify the plaintiff
about the floodwaters that inundated its premises at Binondo branch which
allegedly seeped into the safety deposit box leased to the plaintiff.
The trial court then directed that an ocular inspection on (sic) the contents of
the safety deposit box be conducted, which was done on December 8, 1988
by its clerk of court in the presence of the parties and their counsels. A
report thereon was then submitted on December 12, 1988 (Records, p. 98A) and confirmed in open court by both parties thru counsel during the
hearing on the same date (Ibid., p. 102) stating:

"That the Safety Box Deposit No. 54 was opened by

both plaintiff Luzan Sia and the Acting Branch Manager
Jimmy B. Ynion in the presence of the undersigned,
plaintiff's and defendant's counsel. Said Safety Box
when opened contains two albums of different sizes
and thickness, length and width and a tin box with
printed word 'Tai Ping Shiang Roast Pork in pieces with
Chinese designs and character."
Condition of the above-stated Items

b) the contract entered into by the parties regarding Safe Deposit Box No. 54 was not a contract
of deposit wherein the bank became a depositary of the subject stamp collection; hence, as
contended by SBTC, the provisions of Book IV, Title XII of the Civil Code on deposits do not
apply;
c) The following provisions of the questioned lease agreement of the safety deposit box limiting
SBTC's liability:
9. The liability of the bank by reason of the lease, is limited to the exercise
of the diligence to prevent the opening of the Safe by any person other than
the Renter, his authorized agent or legal representative.

"Both albums are wet, moldy and badly damaged.

xxx xxx xxx
1. The first album measures 10 1/8 inches in length, 8 inches in width and
3/4 in thick. The leaves of the album are attached to every page and cannot
be lifted without destroying it, hence the stamps contained therein are no
longer visible.
2. The second album measure 12 1/2 inches in length, 9 3/4 in width 1 inch
thick. Some of its pages can still be lifted. The stamps therein can still be
distinguished but beyond restoration. Others have lost its original form.
3. The tin box is rusty inside. It contains an album with several pieces of
papers stuck up to the cover of the box. The condition of the album is the
second abovementioned album." 5
The SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, hereinafter referred to as SBTC, appealed the
trial court's decision to the public respondent Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as CAG.R. CV No. 26737.
In urging the public respondent to reverse the decision of the trial court, SBTC contended that
the latter erred in (a) holding that the lease agreement is a contract of adhesion; (b) finding that
the defendant had failed to exercise the required diligence expected of a bank in maintaining the
safety deposit box; (c) awarding to the plaintiff actual damages in the amount of P20,000.00,
moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 and attorney's fees and legal expenses in the
amount of P5,000.00; and (d) dismissing the counterclaim.
On 21 August 1991, the respondent promulgated its decision the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and
instead the appellee's complaint is hereby DISMISSED. The appellant
bank's counterclaim is likewise DISMISSED. No costs. 6
In reversing the trial court's decision and absolving SBTC from liability, the public respondent
found and ruled that:
a) the fine print in the "Lease Agreement " (Exhibits "A" and "1" ) constitutes the terms and
conditions of the contract of lease which the appellee (now petitioner) had voluntarily and
knowingly executed with SBTC;

13. The bank is not a depository of the contents of the Safe and it has
neither the possession nor the control of the same. The Bank has no
interest whatsoever in said contents, except as herein provided, and it
assumes absolutely no liability in connection therewith.
are valid since said stipulations are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy; and
d) there is no concrete evidence to show that SBTC failed to exercise the required diligence in
maintaining the safety deposit box; what was proven was that the floods of 1985 and 1986,
which were beyond the control of SBTC, caused the damage to the stamp collection; said floods
were fortuitous events which SBTC should not be held liable for since it was not shown to have
participated in the aggravation of the damage to the stamp collection; on the contrary, it offered
its services to secure the assistance of an expert in order to save most of the stamps, but the
appellee refused; appellee must then bear the lose under the principle of "res perit domino."
Unsuccessful in his bid to have the above decision reconsidered by the public
respondent, 7 petitioner filed the instant petition wherein he contends that:
I
IT WAS A GRAVE ERROR OR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE
PART OF THE RESPONDENT COURT WHEN IT RULED THAT
RESPONDENT SBTC DID NOT FAIL TO EXERCISE THE REQUIRED
DILIGENCE IN MAINTAINING THE SAFETY DEPOSIT BOX OF THE
PETITIONER CONSIDERING THAT SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE EXIST
(sic) PROVING THE CONTRARY.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN EXCULPATING
PRIVATE RESPONDENT FROM ANY LIABILITY WHATSOEVER BY
REASON OF THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPHS 9 AND 13 OF THE
AGREEMENT (EXHS. "A" AND "A-1").
III

THE RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING

THE AWARDS OF THE TRIAL COURT FOR ACTUAL AND MORAL
DAMAGES, INCLUDING ATTORNEY'S FEES AND LEGAL EXPENSES, IN
FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER. 8
We subsequently gave due course the petition and required both parties to submit their
respective memoranda, which they complied with. 9
Petitioner insists that the trial court correctly ruled that SBTC had failed "to exercise the required
diligence expected of a bank maintaining such safety deposit box . . . in the light of the
environmental circumstance of said safety deposit box after the floods of 1985 and 1986." He
argues that such a conclusion is supported by the evidence on record, to wit: SBTC was fully
cognizant of the exact location of the safety deposit box in question; it knew that the premises
were inundated by floodwaters in 1985 and 1986 and considering that the bank is guarded
twenty-four (24) hours a day , it is safe to conclude that it was also aware of the inundation of
the premises where the safety deposit box was located; despite such knowledge, however, it
never bothered to inform the petitioner of the flooding or take any appropriate measures to
insure the safety and good maintenance of the safety deposit box in question.
SBTC does not squarely dispute these facts; rather, it relies on the rule that findings of facts of
the Court of Appeals, when supported by substantial exidence, are not reviewable on appeal
by certiorari. 10
The foregoing rule is, of course, subject to certain exceptions such as when there exists a
disparity between the factual findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals and the trial
court. 11 Such a disparity obtains in the present case.
As We see it, SBTC's theory, which was upheld by the public respondent, is that the "Lease
Agreement " covering Safe Deposit Box No. 54 (Exhibit "A and "1") is just that a contract of
lease and not a contract of deposit, and that paragraphs 9 and 13 thereof, which expressly
limit the bank's liability as follows:
9. The liability of the bank by reason of the lease, is limited to the exercise
of the diligence to prevent the opening of the Safe by any person other than
the Renter, his autliorized agent or legal representative;
xxx xxx xxx
13. The bank is not a depository of the contents of the Safe and it has
neither the possession nor the control of the same. The Bank has no
interest whatsoever said contents, except as herein provided, and it
assumes absolutely no liability in connection therewith. 12
are valid and binding upon the parties. In the challenged decision, the public respondent further
avers that even without such a limitation of liability, SBTC should still be absolved from any
responsibility for the damage sustained by the petitioner as it appears that such damage was
occasioned by a fortuitous event and that the respondent bank was free from any participation in
the aggravation of the injury.

We cannot accept this theory and ratiocination. Consequently, this Court finds the petition to be
impressed with merit.
In the recent case CA Agro-Industrial Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 13 this Court
explicitly rejected the contention that a contract for the use of a safety deposit box is a contract
of lease governed by Title VII, Book IV of the Civil Code. Nor did We fully subscribe to the view
that it is a contract of deposit to be strictly governed by the Civil Code provision on deposit; 14 it
is, as We declared, a special kind of deposit. The prevailing rule in American jurisprudence
that the relation between a bank renting out safe deposit boxes and its customer with respect to
the contents of the box is that of a bailor and bailee, the bailment for hire and mutual benefit 15
has been adopted in this jurisdiction, thus:
In the context of our laws which authorize banking institutions to rent out
safety deposit boxes, it is clear that in this jurisdiction, the prevailing rule in
the United States has been adopted. Section 72 of the General Banking Act
[R.A. 337, as amended] pertinently provides:
"Sec. 72. In addition to the operations specifically authorized elsewhere in
this Act, banking institutions other than building and loan associations may
perform the following services:
(a) Receive in custody funds, documents, and valuable
objects, and rent safety deposit boxes for the
safequarding of such effects.
xxx xxx xxx
The banks shall perform the services permitted under subsections (a), (b)
and (c) of this section asdepositories or as agents. . . ."(emphasis supplied)
Note that the primary function is still found within the parameters of a
contract of deposit, i.e., the receiving in custody of funds, documents and
other valuable objects for safekeeping. The renting out of the safety deposit
boxes is not independent from, but related to or in conjunction with, this
principal function. A contract of deposit may be entered into orally or in
writing (Art. 1969, Civil Code] and, pursuant to Article 1306 of the Civil
Code, the parties thereto may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms
and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. The
depositary's responsibility for the safekeeping of the objects deposited in the
case at bar is governed by Title I, Book IV of the Civil Code. Accordingly, the
depositary would be liable if, in performing its obligation, it is found guilty of
fraud, negligence, delay or contravention of the tenor of the agreement [Art.
1170, id.]. In the absence of any stipulation prescribing the degree of
diligence required, that of a good father of a family is to be observed [Art.
1173, id.]. Hence, any stipulation exempting the depositary from any liability
arising from the loss of the thing deposited on account of fraud, negligence
or delay would be void for being contrary to law and public policy. In the
instant case, petitioner maintains that conditions 13 and l4 of the questioned
contract of lease of the safety deposit box, which read:

"13. The bank is a depositary of the contents of the safe and it has neither
the possession nor control of the same.
"14. The bank has no interest whatsoever in said contents, except as herein
expressly provided, and it assumes absolutely no liability in connection
therewith."
are void as they are contrary to law and public policy. We find Ourselves in
agreement with this proposition for indeed, said provisions are inconsistent
with the respondent Bank's responsibility as a depositary under Section 72
(a) of the General Banking Act. Both exempt the latter from any liability
except as contemplated in condition 8 thereof which limits its duty to
exercise reasonable diligence only with respect to who shall be admitted to
any rented safe, to wit:
"8. The Bank shall use due diligence that no
unauthorized person shall be admitted to any rented
safe and beyond this, the Bank will not be responsible
for the contents of any safe rented from it."
Furthermore condition 13 stands on a wrong premise and is contrary to the
actual practice of the Bank. It is not correct to assert that the Bank has
neither the possession nor control of the contents of the box since in fact,
the safety deposit box itself is located in its premises and is under its
absolute control; moreover, the respondent Bank keeps the guard key to the
said box. As stated earlier, renters cannot open their respective boxes
unless the Bank cooperates by presenting and using this guard key. Clearly
then, to the extent above stated, the foregoing conditions in the contract in
question are void and ineffective. It has been said:
"With respect to property deposited in a safe-deposit
box by a customer of a safe-deposit company, the
parties, since the relation is a contractual one, may by
special contract define their respective duties or provide
for increasing or limiting the liability of the deposit
company, provided such contract is not in violation of
law or public policy. It must clearly appear that there
actually was such a special contract, however, in order
to vary the ordinary obligations implied by law from the
relationship of the parties; liability of the deposit
company will not be enlarged or restricted by words of
doubtful meaning. The company, in renting safe-deposit
boxes, cannot exempt itself from liability for loss of the
contents by its own fraud or negligence or that, of its
agents or servants, and if a provision of the contract
may be construed as an attempt to do so, it will be held
ineffective for the purpose. Although it has been held
that the lessor of a safe-deposit box cannot limit its
liability for loss of the contents thereof through its own
negligence, the view has been taken that such a lessor
may limit its liability to some extent by agreement or
stipulation ."[10 AM JUR 2d., 466]. (citations omitted)
16

It must be noted that conditions No. 13 and No. 14 in the Contract of Lease of Safety Deposit
Box in CA Agro-Industrial Development Corp. are strikingly similar to condition No. 13 in the
instant case. On the other hand, both condition No. 8 in CA Agro-Industrial Development
Corp. and condition No. 9 in the present case limit the scope of the exercise of due diligence by
the banks involved to merely seeing to it that only the renter, his authorized agent or his legal
representative should open or have access to the safety deposit box. In short, in all other
situations, it would seem that SBTC is not bound to exercise diligence of any kind at all. Assayed
in the light of Our aforementioned pronouncements in CA Agro-lndustrial Development Corp., it
is not at all difficult to conclude that both conditions No. 9 and No. 13 of the "Lease Agreement"
covering the safety deposit box in question (Exhibits "A" and "1") must be stricken down for
being contrary to law and public policy as they are meant to exempt SBTC from any liability for
damage, loss or destruction of the contents of the safety deposit box which may arise from its
own or its agents' fraud, negligence or delay. Accordingly, SBTC cannot take refuge under the
said conditions.
Public respondent further postulates that SBTC cannot be held responsible for the destruction or
loss of the stamp collection because the flooding was a fortuitous event and there was no
showing of SBTC's participation in the aggravation of the loss or injury. It states:
Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides:
"Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or
when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the
nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk,
no person shall be responsible for those events which
could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were
inevitable.'
In its dissertation of the phrase "caso fortuito" the Enciclopedia Jurisdicada
Espaola 17 says: "In a legal sense and, consequently, also in relation to
contracts, a "caso fortuito" prevents (sic) 18 the following essential
characteristics: (1) the cause of the unforeseen ands unexpected
occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must
be independent of the human will; (2) it must be impossible to foresee the
event which constitutes the "caso fortuito," or if it can be foreseen, it must
be impossible to avoid; (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it
impossible for one debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (4)
the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the
injury resulting to the creditor." (cited in Servando vs. Phil., Steam
Navigation Co., supra). 19
Here, the unforeseen or unexpected inundating floods were independent of
the will of the appellant bank and the latter was not shown to have
participated in aggravating damage (sic) to the stamps collection of the
appellee. In fact, the appellant bank offered its services to secure the
assistance of an expert to save most of the then good stamps but the
appelle refused and let (sic) these recoverable stamps inside the safety
deposit box until they were ruined. 20
Both the law and authority cited are clear enough and require no further elucidation.
Unfortunately, however, the public respondent failed to consider that in the instant case, as
correctly held by the trial court, SBTC was guilty of negligence. The facts constituting negligence

are enumerated in the petition and have been summarized in this ponencia. SBTC's
negligence aggravated the injury or damage to the stamp collection. SBTC was aware of the
floods of 1985 and 1986; it also knew that the floodwaters inundated the room where Safe
Deposit Box No. 54 was located. In view thereof, it should have lost no time in notifying the
petitioner in order that the box could have been opened to retrieve the stamps, thus saving the
same from further deterioration and loss. In this respect, it failed to exercise the reasonable care
and prudence expected of a good father of a family, thereby becoming a party to the aggravation
of the injury or loss. Accordingly, the aforementioned fourth characteristic of a fortuitous event is
absent Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Those who in the performance of their obligation are guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor
thereof, are liable for damages,
thus comes to the succor of the petitioner. The destruction or loss of the stamp collection which
was, in the language of the trial court, the "product of 27 years of patience and
diligence" 21 caused the petitioner pecuniary loss; hence, he must be compensated therefor.
We cannot, however, place Our imprimatur on the trial court's award of moral damages. Since
the relationship between the petitioner and SBTC is based on a contract, either of them may be
held liable for moral damages for breach thereof only if said party had acted fraudulently or in
bad faith. 22 There is here no proof of fraud or bad faith on the part of SBTC.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Decision and
Resolution of the public respondent Court of Appeals of 21 August 1991 and 21 November 1991,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 26737, are hereby SET ASIDE and the Decision of 19 February
1990 of Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 87-42601 is hereby
REINSTATED in full, except as to the award of moral damages which is hereby set aside.
Costs against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. L-26948 and L-26949

October 8, 1927

SILVESTRA BARON, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
PABLO DAVID, defendant-appellant.
And
GUILLERMO BARON, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PABLO DAVID, defendant-appellant.
Jose Gutierrez David for plaintiff-appellant in case of No. 26948.
Gregorio Perfecto for defendant-appellant in both cases.
Francisco, Lualhati & Lopez and Jose Gutierrez David for plaintiff-appellant in case No. 26949.

STREET, J.:
These two actions were instituted in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Pampanga by
the respective plaintiffs, Silvestra Baron and Guillermo Baron, for the purpose of recovering from
the defendant, Pablo David, the value of palay alleged to have been sold by the plaintiffs to the
defendant in the year 1920. Owing to the fact that the defendant is the same in both cases and
that the two cases depend in part upon the same facts, the cases were heard together in the trial
court and determined in a single opinion. The same course will accordingly be followed here.
In the first case, i. e., that which Silvestra Baron is plaintiff, the court gave judgment for her to
recover of the defendant the sum of P5,238.51, with costs. From this judgment both the plaintiff
and the defendant appealed.
In the second case, i. e., that in which Guillermo Baron, is plaintiff, the court gave judgment for
him to recover of the defendant the sum of P5,734.60, with costs, from which judgment both the
plaintiff and the defendant also appealed. In the same case the defendant interposed a
counterclaim in which he asked credit for the sum of P2,800 which he had advanced to the
plaintiff Guillermo Baron on various occasions. This credit was admitted by the plaintiff and
allowed by the trial court. But the defendant also interposed a cross-action against Guillermo
Baron in which the defendant claimed compensation for damages alleged to have Ben suffered
by him by reason of the alleged malicious and false statements made by the plaintiff against the
defendant in suing out an attachment against the defendant's property soon after the institution
of the action. In the same cross-action the defendant also sought compensation for damages
incident to the shutting down of the defendant's rice mill for the period of one hundred seventy
days during which the above-mentioned attachment was in force. The trial judge disallowed
these claims for damages, and from this feature of the decision the defendant appealed. We are
therefore confronted with five distinct appeals in this record.
Prior to January 17, 1921, the defendant Pablo David has been engaged in running a rice mill in
the municipality of Magalang, in the Province of Pampanga, a mill which was well patronized by
the rice growers of the vicinity and almost constantly running. On the date stated a fire occurred
that destroyed the mill and its contents, and it was some time before the mill could be rebuilt and
put in operation again. Silvestra Baron, the plaintiff in the first of the actions before us, is an aunt
of the defendant; while Guillermo Baron, the plaintiff in the other action; is his uncle. In the
months of March, April, and May, 1920, Silvestra Baron placed a quantity of palay in the
defendant's mill; and this, in connection with some that she took over from Guillermo Baron,
amounted to 1,012 cavans and 24 kilos. During approximately the same period Guillermo Baron
placed other 1,865 cavans and 43 kilos of palay in the mill. No compensation has ever been
received by Silvestra Baron upon account of the palay delivered by Guillermo Baron, he has
received from the defendant advancements amounting to P2,800; but apart from this he has not
been compensated. Both the plaintiffs claim that the palay which was delivered by them to the
defendant was sold to the defendant; while the defendant, on the other hand, claims that the
palay was deposited subject to future withdrawal by the depositors or subject to some future
sale which was never effected. He therefore supposes himself to be relieved from all
responsibility by virtue of the fire of January 17, 1921, already mentioned.
The plaintiff further say that their palay was delivered to the defendant at his special request,
coupled with a promise on his part to pay for the same at the highest price per cavan at which
palay would sell during the year 1920; and they say that in August of that year the defendant
promised to pay them severally the price of P8.40 per cavan, which was about the top of the
market for the season, provided they would wait for payment until December. The trial judge
found that no such promise had been given; and the incredulity of the court upon this point
seems to us to be justified. A careful examination of the proof, however, leads us to the

conclusion that the plaintiffs did, some time in the early part of August, 1920, make demand
upon the defendant for a settlement, which he evaded or postponed leaving the exact amount
due to the plaintiffs undetermined.
It should be stated that the palay in question was place by the plaintiffs in the defendant's mill
with the understanding that the defendant was at liberty to convert it into rice and dispose of it at
his pleasure. The mill was actively running during the entire season, and as palay was daily
coming in from many customers and as rice was being constantly shipped by the defendant to
Manila, or other rice markets, it was impossible to keep the plaintiffs' palay segregated. In fact
the defendant admits that the plaintiffs' palay was mixed with that of others. In view of the nature
of the defendant's activities and the way in which the palay was handled in the defendant's mill,
it is quite certain that all of the plaintiffs' palay, which was put in before June 1, 1920, been milled
and disposed of long prior to the fire of January 17, 1921. Furthermore, the proof shows that
when the fire occurred there could not have been more than about 360 cavans of palay in the
mill, none of which by any reasonable probability could have been any part of the palay
delivered by the plaintiffs. Considering the fact that the defendant had thus milled and doubtless
sold the plaintiffs' palay prior to the date of the fire, it result that he is bound to account for its
value, and his liability was not extinguished by the occurence of the fire. In the briefs before us it
seems to have been assumed by the opposing attorneys that in order for the plaintiffs to recover,
it is necessary that they should be able to establish that the plaintiffs' palay was delivered in the
character of a sale, and that if, on the contrary, the defendant should prove that the delivery was
made in the character of deposit, the defendant should be absolved. But the case does not
depend precisely upon this explicit alternative; for even supposing that the palay may have been
delivered in the character of deposit, subject to future sale or withdrawal at plaintiffs' election,
nevertheless if it was understood that the defendant might mill the palay and he has in fact
appropriated it to his own use, he is of course bound to account for its value. Under article 1768
of the Civil Code, when the depository has permission to make use of the thing deposited, the
contract loses the character of mere deposit and becomes a loan or acommodatum; and of
course by appropriating the thing, the bailee becomes responsible for its value. In this
connection we wholly reject the defendant's pretense that the palay delivered by the plaintiffs or
any part of it was actually consumed in the fire of January, 1921. Nor is the liability of the
defendant in any wise affected by the circumstance that, by a custom prevailing among rice
millers in this country, persons placing palay with them without special agreement as to price are
at liberty to withdraw it later, proper allowance being made for storage and shrinkage, a thing
that is sometimes done, though rarely.
In view of what has been said it becomes necessary to discover the price which the defendant
should be required to pay for the plaintiffs' palay. Upon this point the trial judge fixed upon P6.15
per cavan; and although we are not exactly in agreement with him as to the propriety of the
method by which he arrived at this figure, we are nevertheless of the opinion that, all things
considered, the result is approximately correct. It appears that the price of palay during the
months of April, May, and June, 1920, had been excessively high in the Philippine Islands and
even prior to that period the Government of the Philippine Islands had been attempting to hold
the price in check by executive regulation. The highest point was touched in this season was
apparently about P8.50 per cavan, but the market began to sag in May or June and presently
entered upon a precipitate decline. As we have already stated, the plaintiffs made demand upon
the defendant for settlement in the early part of August; and, so far as we are able to judge from
the proof, the price of P6.15 per cavan, fixed by the trial court, is about the price at which the
defendant should be required to settle as of that date. It was the date of the demand of the
plaintiffs for settlement that determined the price to be paid by the defendant, and this is true
whether the palay was delivered in the character of sale with price undetermined or in the
character of deposit subject to use by the defendant. It results that the plaintiffs are respectively
entitle to recover the value of the palay which they had placed with the defendant during the
period referred to, with interest from the date of the filing of their several complaints.

As already stated, the trial court found that at the time of the fire there were about 360 cavans of
palay in the mill and that this palay was destroyed. His Honor assumed that this was part of the
palay delivered by the plaintiffs, and he held that the defendant should be credited with said
amount. His Honor therefore deducted from the claims of the plaintiffs their respective
proportionate shares of this amount of palay. We are unable to see the propriety of this feature
of the decision. There were many customers of the defendant's rice mill who had placed their
palay with the defendant under the same conditions as the plaintiffs, and nothing can be more
certain than that the palay which was burned did not belong to the plaintiffs. That palay without a
doubt had long been sold and marketed. The assignments of error of each of the plaintiffsappellants in which this feature of the decision is attacked are therefore well taken; and the
appealed judgments must be modified by eliminating the deductions which the trial court allowed
from the plaintiffs' claims.
The trial judge also allowed a deduction from the claim of the plaintiff Guillermo Baron of 167
cavans of palay, as indicated in Exhibit 12, 13, 14, and 16. This was also erroneous. These
exhibits relate to transactions that occurred nearly two years after the transactions with which we
are here concerned, and they were offered in evidence merely to show the character of
subsequent transactions between the parties, it appearing that at the time said exhibits came
into existence the defendant had reconstructed his mill and that business relations with
Guillermo Baron had been resumed. The transactions shown by these exhibits (which relate to
palay withdrawn by the plaintiff from the defendant's mill) were not made the subject of
controversy in either the complaint or the cross-complaint of the defendant in the second case.
They therefore should not have been taken into account as a credit in favor of the defendant.
Said credit must therefore be likewise of course be without prejudice to any proper adjustment of
the rights of the parties with respect to these subsequent transactions that they have heretofore
or may hereafter effect.
The preceding discussion disposes of all vital contentions relative to the liability of the defendant
upon the causes of action stated in the complaints. We proceed therefore now to consider the
question of the liability of the plaintiff Guillermo Baron upon the cross-complaint of Pablo David
in case R. G. No. 26949. In this cross-action the defendant seek, as the stated in the third
paragraph of this opinion, to recover damages for the wrongful suing out of an attachment by the
plaintiff and the levy of the same upon the defendant's rice mill. It appears that about two and
one-half months after said action was begun, the plaintiff, Guillermo Baron, asked for an
attachment to be issued against the property of the defendant; and to procure the issuance of
said writ the plaintiff made affidavit to the effect that the defendant was disposing, or attempting
the plaintiff. Upon this affidavit an attachment was issued as prayed, and on March 27, 1924, it
was levied upon the defendant's rice mill, and other property, real and personal. 1awph!l.net
Upon attaching the property the sheriff closed the mill and placed it in the care of a deputy.
Operations were not resumed until September 13, 1924, when the attachment was dissolved by
an order of the court and the defendant was permitted to resume control. At the time the
attachment was levied there were, in the bodega, more than 20,000 cavans of palay belonging
to persons who held receipts therefor; and in order to get this grain away from the sheriff,
twenty-four of the depositors found it necessary to submit third-party claims to the sheriff. When
these claims were put in the sheriff notified the plaintiff that a bond in the amount of P50,000
must be given, otherwise the grain would be released. The plaintiff, being unable or unwilling to
give this bond, the sheriff surrendered the palay to the claimants; but the attachment on the rice
mill was maintained until September 13, as above stated, covering a period of one hundred
seventy days during which the mill was idle. The ground upon which the attachment was based,
as set forth in the plaintiff's affidavit was that the defendant was disposing or attempting to
dispose of his property for the purpose of defrauding the plaintiff. That this allegation was false is
clearly apparent, and not a word of proof has been submitted in support of the assertion. On the

contrary, the defendant testified that at the time this attachment was secured he was solvent and
could have paid his indebtedness to the plaintiff if judgment had been rendered against him in
ordinary course. His financial conditions was of course well known to the plaintiff, who is his
uncle. The defendant also states that he had not conveyed away any of his property, nor had
intended to do so, for the purpose of defrauding the plaintiff. We have before us therefore a case
of a baseless attachment, recklessly sued out upon a false affidavit and levied upon the
defendant's property to his great and needless damage. That the act of the plaintiff in suing out
the writ was wholly unjustifiable is perhaps also indicated in the circumstance that the
attachment was finally dissolved upon the motion of the plaintiff himself.
The defendant testified that his mill was accustomed to clean from 400 to 450 cavans of palay
per day, producing 225 cavans of rice of 57 kilos each. The price charged for cleaning each
cavan rice was 30 centavos. The defendant also stated that the expense of running the mill per
day was from P18 to P25, and that the net profit per day on the mill was more than P40. As the
mill was not accustomed to run on Sundays and holiday, we estimate that the defendant lost the
profit that would have been earned on not less than one hundred forty work days. Figuring his
profits at P40 per day, which would appear to be a conservative estimate, the actual net loss
resulting from his failure to operate the mill during the time stated could not have been less than
P5,600. The reasonableness of these figures is also indicated in the fact that the twenty-four
customers who intervened with third-party claims took out of the camarin 20,000 cavans of
palay, practically all of which, in the ordinary course of events, would have been milled in this
plant by the defendant. And of course other grain would have found its way to this mill if it had
remained open during the one hundred forty days when it was closed.
But this is not all. When the attachment was dissolved and the mill again opened, the defendant
found that his customers had become scattered and could not be easily gotten back. So slow,
indeed, was his patronage in returning that during the remainder of the year 1924 the defendant
was able to mill scarcely more than the grain belonging to himself and his brothers; and even
after the next season opened many of his old customers did not return. Several of these
individuals, testifying as witnesses in this case, stated that, owing to the unpleasant experience
which they had in getting back their grain from the sheriff to the mill of the defendant, though
they had previously had much confidence in him.

used in course of a legal proceeding for the purpose of obtaining a legal remedy, and it is
therefore privileged. But though the affidavit is not actionable as a libelous publication, this fact
in no obstacle to the maintenance of an action to recover the damage resulting from the levy of
the attachment.
Before closing this opinion a word should be said upon the point raised in the first assignment of
error of Pablo David as defendant in case R. G. No. 26949. In this connection it appears that the
deposition of Guillermo Baron was presented in court as evidence and was admitted as an
exhibit, without being actually read to the court. It is supposed in the assignment of error now
under consideration that the deposition is not available as evidence to the plaintiff because it
was not actually read out in court. This connection is not well founded. It is true that in section
364 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is said that a deposition, once taken, may be read by either
party and will then be deemed the evidence of the party reading it. The use of the word "read" in
this section finds its explanation of course in the American practice of trying cases for the most
part before juries. When a case is thus tried the actual reading of the deposition is necessary in
order that the jurymen may become acquainted with its contents. But in courts of equity, and in
all courts where judges have the evidence before them for perusal at their pleasure, it is not
necessary that the deposition should be actually read when presented as evidence.
From what has been said it result that judgment of the court below must be modified with
respect to the amounts recoverable by the respective plaintiffs in the two actions R. G. Nos.
26948 and 26949 and must be reversed in respect to the disposition of the cross-complaint
interposed by the defendant in case R. G. No. 26949, with the following result: In case R. G. No.
26948 the plaintiff Silvestra Baron will recover of the Pablo David the sum of P6,227.24, with
interest from November 21, 1923, the date of the filing of her complaint, and with costs. In case
R. G. No. 26949 the plaintiff Guillermo Baron will recover of the defendant Pablo David the sum
of P8,669.75, with interest from January 9, 1924. In the same case the defendant Pablo David,
as plaintiff in the cross-complaint, will recover of Guillermo Baron the sum of P7,000, without
costs. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Johnson, Malcolm, Villamor, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

As against the defendant's proof showing the facts above stated the plaintiff submitted no
evidence whatever. We are therefore constrained to hold that the defendant was damaged by
the attachment to the extent of P5,600, in profits lost by the closure of the mill, and to the extent
of P1,400 for injury to the good-will of his business, making a total of P7,000. For this amount
the defendant must recover judgment on his cross-complaint.
The trial court, in dismissing the defendant's cross-complaint for damages resulting from the
wrongful suing out of the attachment, suggested that the closure of the rice mill was a mere act
of the sheriff for which the plaintiff was not responsible and that the defendant might have been
permitted by the sheriff to continue running the mill if he had applied to the sheriff for permission
to operate it. This singular suggestion will not bear a moment's criticism. It was of course the
duty of the sheriff, in levying the attachment, to take the attached property into his possession,
and the closure of the mill was a natural, and even necessary, consequence of the attachment.
For the damage thus inflicted upon the defendant the plaintiff is undoubtedly responsible.
One feature of the cross-complaint consist in the claim of the defendant (cross-complaint) for the
sum of P20,000 as damages caused to the defendant by the false and alleged malicious
statements contained in the affidavit upon which the attachment was procured. The additional
sum of P5,000 is also claimed as exemplary damages. It is clear that with respect to these
damages the cross-action cannot be maintained, for the reason that the affidavit in question was

Separate Opinions

JOHNS, J., dissenting and concurring:

The plaintiff Silvestra Baron is the aunt of the defendant, and Guillermo Baron, the plaintiff in the
other action, is his uncle. There is no dispute as to the amount of palay which each delivered to
the mill of the defendant. Owing to the fact that they were relatives and that the plaintiffs reposed
special reposed special trust and confidence in the defendant, who was their nephew, they were
not as careful and prudent in their business dealings with him as they should have been.
Plaintiffs allege that their respective palay was delivered to the defendant at his mill with the

understanding and agreement between them that they should receive the highest market price
for the palay for that season, which was P8.50 per cavan. They further allege that about August
first they made another contract in and by which he promised and agreed to pay them P8.40 per
cavan for their palay, in consideration of which they agreed to extend the time for payment to the
first of December of that year. The amount of palay is not in dispute, and the defendant admits
that it was delivered to his mill, but he claims that he kept it on deposit and as bailee without hire
for the plaintiffs and at their own risk, and that the mill was burned down, and that at the time of
the fire, plaintiffs' palay was in the mill. The lower court found as a fact that there was no merit in
that defense, and that there was but little, if any, palay in the mill at the time of the fire and that in
truth and in fact that defense was based upon perjured testimony.
The two cases were tried separately in the court below, but all of the evidence in the case was
substituted and used in the other. Both plaintiffs testified to the making of the respective
contracts as alleged in their complaint; to wit, that they delivered the palay to the defendant with
the express understanding and agreement that he would pay them for the palay the highest
market price for the season, and to the making of the second contract about the first of August,
in which they had a settlement, and that the defendant then agreed to pay them P8.40 per
cavan, such payment to be made on December first. It appears that the highest market price for
palay for that season was P8.50 per cavan. The defendant denied the making of either one of
those contracts, and offered no other evidence on that question. That is to say, we have the
evidence of both Silvestra Baron and Guillermo Baron to the making of those contracts, which is
denied by the defendant only. Plaintiffs' evidence is also corroborated by the usual and
customary manner in which the growers sell their palay. That is to say, it is their custom to sell
the palay at or about the time it is delivered at the mill and as soon as it is made ready for
market in the form of rice. As stated the lower court found as a fact that the evidence of the
defendants as to plaintiffs' palay being in the mill at the time of the fire was not worthy of belief,
and that in legal effect it was a manufactured defense. Yet, strange as it may seem, both the
lower court and this court have found as a fact that upon the question of the alleged contracts,
the evidence for the defendant is true and entitled to more weight than the evidence of both
plaintiffs which is false.
It appears that the plaintiff Silvestra Baron is an old lady about 80 years of age and the aunt of
the defendant, and Guillermo Baron is the uncle. Under the theory of the lower court and of this
court, both of them at all the time during the high prices held their palay in defendant's mill at
their own risk, and that upon that point the evidence of the defendant, standing alone is entitled
to more weight and is more convincing than the combined evidence of the two plaintiffs. In the
very nature of things, if defendant's evidence upon that point is true, it stands to reason that,
following the custom of growers, the plaintiffs would have sold their palay during the period of
high prices, and would not have waited until it dropped from P8.50 per cavan to P6.15 per cavan
about the first of August. Upon that question, both the weight and the credibility of the evidence
is with the plaintiffs, and they should have judgment for the full amount of their palay on the
basis of P8.40 per cavan. For such reason, I vigorously dissent from the majority opinion.
I frankly concede that the attachment was wrongful, and that it should never have been levied. It
remained in force for a period of one hundred and seventy days at which time it was released on
motion of the plaintiffs. The defendant now claims, and the majority opinion has allowed him,
damages for that full period, exclusive of Sundays, at the rate, of P40 per day, found to be the
net profit for the operation of the rice mill. It further appears, and this court finds, that the
defendant was a responsible man, and that he had ample property out which to satisfy plaintiffs'
claim. Assuming that to be true, there was no valid reason why he could not had given a counter
bond and released the attachment. Upon the theory of the majority opinion, if the plaintiffs had
not released the attachment, they would still be liable to the defendant at the rate of P40 per day
up to the present time. When the mill was attached, if he was in a position to do so, it was the

duty of the defendant to give a counter bond and release the attachment and resume its
operation. The majority opinion also allowed the defendant P1,400 "for injury to the goodwill of
his business." The very fact that after a delay of about four years, both of the plaintiffs were
compelled to bring to their respective actions against the defendant to recover from him on a just
and meritorious claim, as found by this court and the lower court, and the further fact that after
such long delay, the defendant has sought to defeat the actions by a sham and manufactured
defense, as found by this and the lower court, would arouse the suspicion of any customers the
defendant ever had, and shake their confidence in his business honor and integrity, and destroy
any goodwill which he ever did have. Under such conditions, it would be strange that the
defendant would have any customers left. He is not entitled to any compensation for the loss of
goodwill, and P5,000 should be the very limit of the amount of his damages for the wrongful
attachment, and upon that point I vigorously dissent. In all other respects, I agree with the
majority opinion.
G.R. No. 93849 December 20, 1991
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DICK ONG y CHAN, LINO MORFE y GUTIERREZ, RICARDO VILLARAN and LUCILA
TALABIS, accused, DICK ONG y CHAN, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Leoncio T. Mercado for accused-appellant.

MEDIALDEA, J.:p
The accused, Dick Ong y Chan, Lino Morfe y Gutierrez, Ricardo Villaran and Lucila Talabis,
were charged with the crime of estafa in Criminal Case No. 44080 before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 35. The information filed in said case reads, as follows (pp. 8-9, Rollo):
That in (sic) or about and during the period comprised between December
6, 1978 and January 31, 1979, both dates inclusive, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and
helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud the Home Savings Bank in the following manner, to wit: the said
accused Dick Ong y Chan, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representations which he made to the management of the Home Savings
Bank, Aurea Annex Branch, located at 640 Rizal Avenue, Sta. Cruz, in said
City, to the effect that the following checks, to wit:

NAME OF
CHECK

NUMBER

PAYBLE
TO

Metropolita

82508

Cash

n Bank &
Trust Co

Equitable
Bank

27624961

-do-

1915855

do.

-do-

1915856

do.

do.

Phil. Bank
of Comm

T1907249

do.

-do-

T1907249

do.

China
Banking
Corp.

QCO86174A

do.

Pacific
Banking
Corp.

PCB 238056
S

do.

Producers
Bank of the
Phil.

C 987955

do.

or all in the total amount of P575,504.00, are good and covered with
sufficient funds in the banks, and by means of other similar deceits with the
conspiracy of his co-accused Lino Morfe y Gutierrez, Ricardo Villaran and
Lucila Talabis, in their capacities as officer-in-charge, branch accountant
and bank branch cashier, respectively, of said bank (Home Savings Bank),
induced and succeeded in inducing the management of the said bank to
accept said checks as deposits, all the said accused well knowing that his
(Dick Ong y Chan's) representations and manifestations are false and
untrue and were made solely for the purpose of defrauding the said bank,
and, in accordance with the conspiracy, his co-accused Lino Morfe y
Gutierrez, Ricardo Villara and Lucila Talabis, facilitated the opening of a
savings account in the name of accused Dick Ong y Chan and, thereafter,
approved said deposits; that on the strength of such deposits made and the
opening of an account, the said accused were able to withdraw the total
amount of P575,504.00, which once in their possession, with intent defraud,
they thereafter wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated,
misapplied and converted to their own personal use and benefit, to the
damage and prejudice of said Home Savings Bank in the said amount of
P575,504.00, Philippine Currency.
Contrary to law.
On October 15, 1979, the prosecution moved for the dismissal of the case, insofar as accused
Lino Morfe y Gutierrez is concerned, on the ground that after a reinvestigation, it was found that
the evidence against him is not sufficient to sustain the allegations contained in the information
(p. 54, Records). On October 31, 1979, the trial court granted the motion (p. 6 Records).

Equitable
Banking

27624963

do.

Phil. Bank
of Comm.

1915852

do.

Upon being arraigned, the remaining three (3) accused entered the plea of not guilty to the crime
charged. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision on January 11, 1990, the
dispositive portion of which reads, as follows (p. 26,Rollo):
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered: (1) pronouncing accused DICK ONG
y CHAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of ESTAFA defined
under No. 2 (d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act 4885, and penalized under the lst paragraph of the same Code
as amended by Presidential Decree No. 818, and sentencing said accused
to RECLUSION PERPETUA; (2) ACQUITTING accused Lucila Talabis and
Ricardo Villaran, their guilt of (sic) the felony charged against them not
having been established beyond reasonable doubt; (3) ordering accused
Dick Ong to pay the Home Saving Bank and Trust Company the sum of
P559,381.34 as partial reparation of the damage caused to said Bank; (4)
ordering forfeited in favor of the Home Savings Bank and Trust Company
the sum of P16,122.66 the positive balance remaining outstanding in
Savings Account No. 6-1981 of accused Dick Ong with, and in the

possession of, said Bank to complete the reparation of the damage caused
by Dick Ong to the Bank; (5) ordering accused Dick Ong to pay one-third
(1/3) of the costs; and (6) ordering two-thirds (2/3) of the costs charged de
oficio.

2. Equitable Bank

2762496
1

Cash

3. Phil. Bank of
Comm.

T1907265

Cash

4. Phil. Bank of
Comm.

T1907249

Cash

SO ORDERED.
On February 15, 1990, the accused-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration. On March 22,
1990, he filed a supplemental memorandum in support of the motion for reconsideration. On
April 3, 1990, said motion was denied for lack of merit (pp. 575-576, Records). Hence, the
present appeal by Dick Ong y Chan.
The facts of this case were summarized by the trial court, as follows (pp. 18-20, Rollo):
Accused Dick Ong was one of the depositors of the Home Savings Bank
and Trust Company in its Aurea Annex Branch at Rizal Avenue, Sta. Cruz,
Manila, hereafter, to be referred to as the Bank. He opened his savings
account on December 6, 1978, under the Bank's Saving Account No. 61981, with an initial deposit of P22.14 in cash and P10,000.00 in (a) check.

TOTAL

On the same date, December 6, 1978, without his check undergoing the
usual and reglamentary (sic) clearance, which normally takes about five
working days, Dick Ong was allowed to withdraw from his savings account
with the Bank the sum of P5,000.00. The corresponding withdrawal slip was
signed and approved by Lino Morfe, then the Branch Manager, and accused
Lucila Talabis, the Branch Cashier.

Afterwards but before these checks could be cleared and the Bank could
collect their amounts from the drawee banks, Lucila Talabis allowed and
approved the withdrawal of Dick Ong against the amounts of said checks.
(TSN, Mar. 18, 1981, pp. 47-48.)

That initial transaction was followed by other similar transactions where Dick
Ong, upon depositing checks in his savings account with the Bank, was
allowed to withdraw against those uncleared checks and uncollected
deposits. The withdrawals were authorized and approved by accused
Ricardo Villaran and Lucila Talabis, sometimes jointly, sometimes by aither
(aic) of them alone, and at other times by one of them together with another
official of the Bank. But all of those uncleared checks deposited by Dick Ong
prior to January 3, 1979 and against which he was allowed to withdraw were
subsequently honored and paid by the drawee banks. (TSN, Mar. 9, 1981,
pp. 101-104; TSN, Mar. 18, 1981, pp. 144 -146.)

On the following day, January 31, 1979, Dick Ong also issued and
deposited in his savings account with the Bank the following check;

On January 30, 1979, Dick Ong issued and deposited in his savings
account with the Bank the following checks:
Drawee Bank
Drawee Bank

1. Metropolitan
Bank & Trust Co.

Check
No.

82508

Check No.

Paye
e

QC08617
A

Cash

Payee

Cash

1. China
Banking
Corporation

P69,850.00

2. Pacific
Banking
Corporation

PCB23805
6S

3. Producers
Bank of the
Phil.

C987955

Cash

60,890.00

respective drawee banks for payment, they were all dishonored for lack or
insufficiency of funds. (TSN, Jan. 7, 1981, pp. 90-101; TSN, May 8, 1981,
pp. 74-75.)
The accused-appellant neither took the witness stand to testify in his behalf, nor presented any
witness to testify in his favor. Instead, he offered the following documents (p. 20, Rollo):

Cash

49,090.00

4. Equitable
Banking

27624963

Cash

14,965.00

5. Phil. Bank of
Communicatio
ns

1915852

Cash

63,9000.009

1. Exhibit 1 Ong. The letter dated June 27, 1980 of the Central Bank
Governor to all banks authorized to accept demand deposits, enjoining strict
compliance with Monetary Board Resolution No. 2202 dated December 21,
1979, prohibiting, as a matter of policy, drawing against uncollected deposits
effective July 1, 1980.
2. Exhibit 2 Ong. The Memorandum of the Central Bank Governor
dated July 9, 1980, to all banks for their guidance, that Monetary Board
Resolution No. 2202 dated December 21, 1979, prohibiting, as a matter of
policy, drawing against uncollected deposits effective July 1, 1980, covers
drawing against demand deposits as well as withdrawals from savings
deposits.
3. Exhibits 3 Ong. and 3-a. Clippings from the Bulletin Today issue
on July 25, 1980 regarding on (sic) ban on DAUD (drawn against
uncollected deposits) effective July 1, 1980, and the one-day loan which
replaced the DAUD arrangement.
4. Exhibit 4 Ong. The sworn statement of Lino Morfe before the
METROCOM taken on February 11, 1979.

6. Phil. Bank of
Communicatio
ns

1915855

Cash

59,860.00
5. Exhibit 5 Ong. The letter dated July 6, 1979, of Lino Morfe to the
Assistant Fiscal of Manila, transmitting his (Morfe's) affidavit.
6. Exhibits 5-a Ong to 5-a-3-Ong. Affidavit of Lino Morfe sworn on
June 28, 1979.

7. Phil. Bank of
Communicatio
ns

1915856

Cash

65,880.00
7. Exhibit 5-b Ong. The Bank's Memorandum dated January 31, 1979,
to all Branch Manager/Extension Office O.I.C. (sic) requiring them to furnish
the Head Office of the Bank every Monday and Thursday with a list of all
"drawn against" and "encashment" acommodations (sic) of P1,000.00 and
above granted by the Branch during the week.

TOTA
L

P384,435.00

Subsequently, but before said seven checks were cleared and the Bank had
collected their amounts, Lucila Talabis and then officer in charge of the Bank
Grace Silao allowed and approved the withdrawals of Dick Ong against the
amounts of these seven checks. (TSN, lbid., pp. 47-48.)
However, when the Bank presented those eleven checks issued and
deposited by Dick Ong on January 30, 1979 and January 3l, 1979 and
against which he made withdrawals against (sic) their amounts, to their

8. Exhibit 6 Ong. The sworn statement of accused Dick Ong.

On the other hand, accused Lucila Talabis admitted that she approved the withdrawals of the
accused-appellant against uncleared checks. However, she explained that her approval thereof
was in accordance with the instruction of then bank manager Lino Morfe; that this
accommodation given or extended to the accused-appellant had been going on even before she
started giving the same accommodation; that this was common practice in the bank; that she
approved those withdrawals together with one other bank official, namely, either the bank
manager, the bank accountant, the other bank cashier, or the bank assistant cashier; and that
they reported those withdrawals against, and the dishonor of, the subject checks always sending
copies of their reports to the head office.

Accused Ricardo Villaran testified on his behalf that the accused-appellant was able to withdraw
against his uncleared checks because of the accommodations extended to him by bank officials
Lino Morfe, co-accused Lucila Talabis, Grace Silao, Precy Salamat, and Cora Gascon; that this
practice of drawing against uncollected deposits was a common practice in branches of the
Bank; that on December 14, 1978, the accused-appellant withdrew the sum of P75,000.00
against his uncleared checks; that on December 21, 1978, the accused-appellant deposited
several checks in the total amount of P197,000.00 and withdrew on the same date the sum of
P120,000.00; that on January 23, 1979, the accused-appellant again deposited several checks
in the aggregate sum of P260,000.00 and withdrew also on the same date, the amount of
P28,000.00; and that he (Villaran) approved these three withdrawals of the accused-appellant
against his uncollected deposits.

or, in case of dishonor, to deposit within three (3) days from receipt notice of dishonor, the
amounts necessary to cover the check. The testimony of Felix Hocson, Senior Vice President
and Treasurer of the Bank, apart from being hearsay, does not prove that the accused-appellant
made an offer to pay the amounts covered by the subject checks. Even assuming arguendo that
accused-appellant made an offer to pay the amounts covered by the subject checks, said offer is
not sufficient to rebut the prima facie evidence of deceit. There is no showing that the accusedappellant deposited the amounts necessary to cover the subject checks within three (3) days
from receipt of notice from Bank and/or the payee or holder that said checks have been
dishonored. The damage suffered by the Bank consists in its inability to make use of the
P575,504.00 it had delivered to the accused-appellant.
We are convinced that the accused-appellant is innocent of the crime charged against him.

In this appeal, the accused-appellant assigns the following errors committed by the trial court:
1) it concluded that the withdrawals against the amounts of the subject checks before clearance
and collection of the corresponding amounts thereof by the depository bank from the drawee
banks is deceit or fraud constituting estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised
Penal Code, in the total absence of evidence showing criminal intent to defraud the depository
bank; and not a case which is civil in nature governed solely by the Negotiable Instruments Law;
2) it stated that he issued and deposited the subject checks when he is not the issuer, maker,
nor drawer thereof but merely an indorser; hence, his liability, if any, is that of a general indorser
under the Negotiable Instruments Law;

Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885,
provides:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa) Any person who shall defraud another by any
of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
..., provided that in the four cases mentioned, the fraud
be committed by any of the following means:
xxx xxx xxx

3) it convicted him on mere presumption, without any evidence that he had prior knowledge of
the lack or insufficiency of funds in the drawee banks to cover the amounts of the subject
checks; and
4) it failed to consider that a general indorser under the Negotiable Instruments Law warrants
payment of the value of the checks indorsed by him; no damage could have been suffered by
the depository bank because he had offered payment thereof.
To support the aforementioned assignment of errors, the accused-appellant alleges that based
on the testimonies of co-accused Lucila Talabis and Ricardo Villaran, he did not employ any
deceit or fraud on the Bank because the practice of deposit and withdrawal against uncleared
checks and uncollected deposits was tolerated by it. As soon as he learned of the dishonor of
the subject checks, he offered to pay the amounts thereof (see pp. 48-49, tsn of Felix Hocson,
May 8, 1981) and put up as security his property. The subject checks were not in payment of an
obligation but were deposited in his savings account. He was merely a general indorser of the
subject checks and this being the case, his obligations as such, if any, should be governed by
Section 66 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. * The subject checks were issued or drawn by his
customers and paid to him. He could not have had any knowledge as to the sufficiency of their
funds in the drawee banks.
The Office of the Solicitor General disputes the allegations of the accused-appellant. According
to it, by reason of the accused-appellant's antecedent acts of issuing and depositing check and
withdrawing the amounts thereof before clearing by the drawee banks, which checks were later
honored and paid by drawee banks, he was able to gain the trust and confidence the Bank, such
that the practice, albeit contrary to sound banking policy, was tolerated by the Bank. After thus
having gained the trust and confidence of the Bank, the accused-appellant issued and deposited
the subject checks, the amounts of which he later withdrew, fully aware that he had no sufficient
funds to cover the amounts of said checks in the drawee banks. Contrary to the accusedappellant's allegation, the trial court found that he issued and deposited the subject checks in his
savings account. As drawer of the subject checks, the accused-appellant had the obligation to
maintain funds in his current account in the drawee banks sufficient to cover the amounts thereof

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or

fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) By post-dating a check, or issuing a check in
payment of an obligation when the offender had no
funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were
not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The
failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount
necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from
receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or
holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or
insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of
deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
The following are the elements of this kind of estafa: (1) postdating or issuance of a check in
payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of
funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee thereof (People v. Tugbang, et al;, G.R.
No. 76212, April 26, 1991; Sales v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-47817, August 29, 1988,
164 SCRA 717; People v. Sabio, Sr., etc., et al., G.R. No. L-45490, November 20, 1978, 86
SCRA 568). Based thereon, the trial court concluded that the guilt of the accused-appellant has
"been duly established by the required quantum of evidence adduced by the People against
(him)" (p. 22, Rollo). We shall confine Our discussion only on the first element because there is
no argument that the second and third elements are present in this case. For an orderly
discussion of this element, We will divide it into two (2) parts: first, "postdating or issuance of a
check," and second, "in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued."

Inasmuch as the first part of the first element of Article 315 paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal
Code is concerned with the act of "postdating or issuance of a check," the accused-appellant
raises the defense that he was neither the issuer nor drawer of the subject checks, but only an
indorser thereof. Thus, his liability, if any, should be governed by the provision of the Negotiable
Instruments Law, particularly Section 66 thereof, supra. Also, he could not have had any
knowledge as to the sufficiency of the drawers' funds in their respective banks. The Office of the
Solicitor General contend's that the trial court found as a fact that the accused-appellant issued
the subject checks.
The contention of the Office of the Solicitor General is accurate only in part. In the trial court's
disquisition on the liability of the accused-appellant, it said (p. 22, Rollo):
There is no question that on January 30, 1979, accused Dick Ong issued or
used and indorsed, and deposited in his Savings Account No. 6-1981 with
the Bank the four checks ... .
There is likewise no dispute that on the following date, January 31, 1979,
Dick Ong issued or used and indorsed,and deposited in his savings account
with the Bank seven checks ... . (emphasis supplied)
On this subject matter, Fernando Esguerra, Intemal Auditor of the Bank and a witness for the
prosecution, testified that (pp. 101-103, tsn, January 7, 1981):
Court
Q: You mentioned these checks, Mr. Witness. Did you
or anybody for that matter ever verify the actual
depositors of these checks whether it is Mr. Dick Ong
himself.?
A: Yes, Your Honor. Our Vice-President for Bank
Operations verified said checks and found out that one
of or rather, two of those checks are in the account of
Mr. Dick Ong but the other checks are not in his
account.

A: There is one check, Your Honor. It is a China

Banking Corporation check in the amount of
P69,850.00 (Witness referring to Exhibit "Z").
Q: Now, why do you say that the current checking
account or current account was opened by Mr. Dick
Ong himself.
A: Because he is the drawer of the check, Your Honor.
(emphasis supplied)
Thus, the fact established by the prosecution and adopted by the trial court is that the subject
checks were either issued or indorsed by the accused-appellant.
In the case of People v. Isleta, et al., 61 Phil. 332, which was recently reiterated in the case
of Zagado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76612, September 29, 1989, 178 SCRA 146, We
declared the accused-appellant, who only negotiated the check drawn by another, guilty of
estafa. This case of People v. Isleta, et al. was relied upon by the trial court in its order dated
April 3, 1990, which denied the accused-appellant's motion for reconsideration based on the
same defense. The trial court erred in doing so. It must have overlooked the ratio decidendi of
the aforementioned case. We held the accused-appellant therein guilty of estafa because he
"had guilty knowledge of the fact that (the drawer) had no funds in the bank when he negotiated
the (subject) check" (at p. 334). In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that the
accused-appellant had such knowledge with respect to the subject checks that he indorsed. In
applying Our decisions, it is not enough that courts take into account only the facts and the
dispositive portions thereof. It is imperative that the rationale of these decisions be read and
comprehended thoroughly.
It goes without saying that with respect to the subject checks wherein the accused-appellant was
the issuer/drawer, the first part of the first element of Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised
Penal Code is applicable. However, this statement will lose its significance in Our next
discussion.
Regarding the second part of the first element of Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised
Penal Code, the accused-appellant alleges that when he deposited the subject checks in his
savings account, it was clearly not in payment of an obligation to the Bank. The Office of the
Solicitor General misses this point of the accused-appenant.

Court
Q: In other words, there are checks where the depositor
himself was also Mr. Dick Ong?
A: Could I go over the checks, Your Honor.
Q: Is it indicated there?
A: Yes, Your Honor, it.is.
Q: All right, go over the checks.

This single argument of the accused-appellant spells tilting the scale to his advantage. In several
cases, We were categorical that bank deposits are in the nature of irregular deposits. They are
really loans because they earn interest. All kinds of bank deposits, whether fixed, savings, or
current are to be treated loans and are to be covered by the law on loans. Current and savings
deposits are loans to a bank because it can use the same (Serrano v. Central Bank of the
Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 30511, February 14, 1980, 96 SCRA 96; Gullas v. Philippine National
Bank, 62 Phil. 519; Central Bank of the Philippines v Morfe, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-38427, March
12, 1975, 63 SC 114; Guingona, Jr., et al. v. The City Fiscal of Manila, et al. G.R. No. 60033,
April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577).
The elements of estafa in general are: (1) that the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of
confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. Aside from the elements that We have
discussed earlier, in the crime of estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check, deceit and
damage are essential elements of the offense and have to be established with satisfactory proof
to warrant conviction (U.S v. Rivera, 23 Phil. 383; People, et al. v. Grospe, etc., et al., G.R No.

74053-54, January 20, 1988,157 SCRA 154; Buaya v. Polo etc., et al., G.R. No. 75079, January
26, 1989, 169 SCRA 471).

HORACIO DELA RAMA, ANTONIO B. RAMOS, FILOMENA RAMOS LEDESMA, RODOLFO

LEDESMA, VICTORIA RAMOS TANJUATCO, and TEOFILO TANJUATCO, respondents.

In this connection, the Office of the Solicitor General advances the view that by reason of the
accused-appellant's antecedent acts of issuing and depositing checks, and withdrawing the
amounts thereof before clearing by the drawee banks, which checks were later honored and
paid by the drawee banks, he was able to gain the trust and confidence of the Bank, such that
the practice, albeit contrary to sound banking policy, was tolerated by the Bank. After thus having
gained the trust and confidence of the Bank, he issued and deposited the subject checks, the
amounts of which he later withdrew, fully aware that he had no sufficient funds to cover the
amounts of said checks in the drawee banks.

Rene Diokno for petitioner.

This view is not supported by the facts of this case. Rather, the evidence for the prosecution
proved that the Bank on its own accorded him a drawn against uncollected deposit (DAUD)
privilege without need of any pretensions on his part (pp. 7-8,supra). Moreover, this privilege
was not only for the subject checks, but for other past transactions. Fernando Esguerra and
Felix Hocson even testified that in some instances prior to July 1, 1980, especially where the
depositor is an important client, the Bank relaxed its rule and internal policy against uncleared
checks and uncollected deposits, and allowed such depositor to withdraw against his uncleared
checks and uncollected deposits. Admittedly, the accused-appellant was one of the important
depositors of the Bank (pp. 24-25, Rollo). Granting, in gratia argumenti, that he had in fact acted
fraudulently, he could not have done so without the active cooperation of the Banks employees.
Therefore, since Lucila Talabis and Ricardo Villaran were declared innocent of the crimes
charged against them, the same should be said for the accused-appellant (see People v.
Jalandoni, G.R. No. 57555, May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA 588). True it is that the Bank suffered
damage in the amount of P575,504.00 but the accused-appellant's liability thereon is only civil.
One additional statement made by the trial court in its decision requires correction. It said that
"[t]he circumstances that the drawer of a check had insufficient or no funds in the drawee bank
to cover the amount of his check at the time of its issuance and he did not inform the payee or
holder of such fact, are sufficient to make him liable for estafa" (p. 23, Rollo). This statement is
no longer controlling. We have clarified in the case of People v. Sabio, Sr., etc., et al., supra, that
Republic Act No. 4885 has eliminated the requirement under the old provision for the drawer to
inform the payee that he had no funds in the bank or the funds deposited by him were not
sufficient to cover the amount of the check.
We, therefore, find that the guilt of the accused-appellant for the crime of estafa under Article
315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
However, We find him civilly liable to the bank in the amount of P575,504.00, less the balance
remaining in his savings account with it (p. 26, Rollo), with legal interest from the date of the
filing of this case until full payment.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision and order appealed from are hereby SET ASIDE. The accusedappellant is ACQUITTED of the crime charged against him but ordered to pay the
aforementioned amount. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

F.E. Evangelista & Glecerio T. Orsolino for respondent Central Bank of the Philippines.
Feliciano C. Tumale, Pacifico T. Torres and Antonio B. Periquet for respondent Overseas Bank
of Manila.
Josefina G. Salonga for all other respondents.

CONCEPCION, JR., J.:

Petition for mandamus and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, that seeks the establishment
of joint and solidary liability to the amount of Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos, with interest,
against respondent Central Bank of the Philippines and Overseas Bank of Manila and its
stockholders, on the alleged failure of the Overseas Bank of Manila to return the time deposits
made by petitioner and assigned to him, on the ground that respondent Central Bank failed in its
duty to exercise strict supervision over respondent Overseas Bank of Manila to protect
depositors and the general public. 1 Petitioner also prays that both respondent banks be ordered
to execute the proper and necessary documents to constitute all properties fisted in Annex "7" of
the Answer of respondent Central Bank of the Philippines in G.R. No. L-29352, entitled "Emerita
M. Ramos, et al vs. Central Bank of the Philippines," into a trust fund in favor of petitioner and all
other depositors of respondent Overseas Bank of Manila. It is also prayed that the respondents
be prohibited permanently from honoring, implementing, or doing any act predicated upon the
validity or efficacy of the deeds of mortgage, assignment. and/or conveyance or transfer of
whatever nature of the properties listed in Annex "7" of the Answer of respondent Central Bank
in G.R. No. 29352. 2
A sought for ex-parte preliminary injunction against both respondent banks was not given by this
Court.
Undisputed pertinent facts are:
On October 13, 1966 and December 12, 1966, petitioner made a time deposit, for one year with
6% interest, of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) with the respondent
Overseas Bank of Manila. 3 Concepcion Maneja also made a time deposit, for one year with 6-
% interest, on March 6, 1967, of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) with the same
respondent Overseas Bank of Manila. 4

G.R. No. L-30511 February 14, 1980

On August 31, 1968, Concepcion Maneja, married to Felixberto M. Serrano, assigned and
conveyed to petitioner Manuel M. Serrano, her time deposit of P200,000.00 with respondent
Overseas Bank of Manila. 5

MANUEL M. SERRANO, petitioner,

vs.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES; OVERSEAS BANK OF MANILA; EMERITO M.
RAMOS, SUSANA B. RAMOS, EMERITO B. RAMOS, JR., JOSEFA RAMOS DELA RAMA,

Notwithstanding series of demands for encashment of the aforementioned time deposits from
the respondent Overseas Bank of Manila, dating from December 6, 1967 up to March 4, 1968,

not a single one of the time deposit certificates was honored by respondent Overseas Bank of
Manila. 6
Respondent Central Bank admits that it is charged with the duty of administering the banking
system of the Republic and it exercises supervision over all doing business in the Philippines,
but denies the petitioner's allegation that the Central Bank has the duty to exercise a most rigid
and stringent supervision of banks, implying that respondent Central Bank has to watch every
move or activity of all banks, including respondent Overseas Bank of Manila. Respondent
Central Bank claims that as of March 12, 1965, the Overseas Bank of Manila, while operating,
was only on a limited degree of banking operations since the Monetary Board decided in its
Resolution No. 322, dated March 12, 1965, to prohibit the Overseas Bank of Manila from making
new loans and investments in view of its chronic reserve deficiencies against its deposit
liabilities. This limited operation of respondent Overseas Bank of Manila continued up to 1968. 7
Respondent Central Bank also denied that it is guarantor of the permanent solvency of any
banking institution as claimed by petitioner. It claims that neither the law nor sound banking
supervision requires respondent Central Bank to advertise or represent to the public any
remedial measures it may impose upon chronic delinquent banks as such action may inevitably
result to panic or bank "runs". In the years 1966-1967, there were no findings to declare the
respondent Overseas Bank of Manila as insolvent. 8
Respondent Central Bank likewise denied that a constructive trust was created in favor of
petitioner and his predecessor in interest Concepcion Maneja when their time deposits were
made in 1966 and 1967 with the respondent Overseas Bank of Manila as during that time the
latter was not an insolvent bank and its operation as a banking institution was being salvaged by
the respondent Central Bank. 9
Respondent Central Bank avers no knowledge of petitioner's claim that the properties given by
respondent Overseas Bank of Manila as additional collaterals to respondent Central Bank of the
Philippines for the former's overdrafts and emergency loans were acquired through the use of
depositors' money, including that of the petitioner and Concepcion Maneja. 10
In G.R. No. L-29362, entitled "Emerita M. Ramos, et al. vs. Central Bank of the Philippines," a
case was filed by the petitioner Ramos, wherein respondent Overseas Bank of Manila sought to
prevent respondent Central Bank from closing, declaring the former insolvent, and liquidating its
assets. Petitioner Manuel Serrano in this case, filed on September 6, 1968, a motion to
intervene in G.R. No. L-29352, on the ground that Serrano had a real and legal interest as
depositor of the Overseas Bank of Manila in the matter in litigation in that case. Respondent
Central Bank in G.R. No. L-29352 opposed petitioner Manuel Serrano's motion to intervene in
that case, on the ground that his claim as depositor of the Overseas Bank of Manila should
properly be ventilated in the Court of First Instance, and if this Court were to allow Serrano to
intervene as depositor in G.R. No. L-29352, thousands of other depositors would follow and thus
cause an avalanche of cases in this Court. In the resolution dated October 4, 1968, this Court
denied Serrano's, motion to intervene. The contents of said motion to intervene are substantially
the same as those of the present petition. 11
This Court rendered decision in G.R. No. L-29352 on October 4, 1971, which became final and
executory on March 3, 1972, favorable to the respondent Overseas Bank of Manila, with the
dispositive portion to wit:
WHEREFORE, the writs prayed for in the petition are hereby granted and
respondent Central Bank's resolution Nos. 1263, 1290 and 1333 (that

prohibit the Overseas Bank of Manila to participate in clearing, direct the

suspension of its operation, and ordering the liquidation of said bank) are
hereby annulled and set aside; and said respondent Central Bank of the
Philippines is directed to comply with its obligations under the Voting Trust
Agreement, and to desist from taking action in violation therefor. Costs
against respondent Central Bank of the Philippines. 12
Because of the above decision, petitioner in this case filed a motion for judgment in this case,
praying for a decision on the merits, adjudging respondent Central Bank jointly and severally
liable with respondent Overseas Bank of Manila to the petitioner for the P350,000 time deposit
made with the latter bank, with all interests due therein; and declaring all assets assigned or
mortgaged by the respondents Overseas Bank of Manila and the Ramos groups in favor of the
Central Bank as trust funds for the benefit of petitioner and other depositors. 13
By the very nature of the claims and causes of action against respondents, they in reality are
recovery of time deposits plus interest from respondent Overseas Bank of Manila, and recovery
of damages against respondent Central Bank for its alleged failure to strictly supervise the acts
of the other respondent Bank and protect the interests of its depositors by virtue of the
constructive trust created when respondent Central Bank required the other respondent to
increase its collaterals for its overdrafts said emergency loans, said collaterals allegedly
acquired through the use of depositors money. These claims shoud be ventilated in the Court of
First Instance of proper jurisdiction as We already pointed out when this Court denied
petitioner's motion to intervene in G.R. No. L-29352. Claims of these nature are not proper in
actions for mandamus and prohibition as there is no shown clear abuse of discretion by the
Central Bank in its exercise of supervision over the other respondent Overseas Bank of Manila,
and if there was, petitioner here is not the proper party to raise that question, but rather the
Overseas Bank of Manila, as it did in G.R. No. L-29352. Neither is there anything to prohibit in
this case, since the questioned acts of the respondent Central Bank (the acts of dissolving and
liquidating the Overseas Bank of Manila), which petitioner here intends to use as his basis for
claims of damages against respondent Central Bank, had been accomplished a long time ago.
Furthermore, both parties overlooked one fundamental principle in the nature of bank deposits
when the petitioner claimed that there should be created a constructive trust in his favor when
the respondent Overseas Bank of Manila increased its collaterals in favor of respondent Central
Bank for the former's overdrafts and emergency loans, since these collaterals were acquired by
the use of depositors' money.
Bank deposits are in the nature of irregular deposits. They are really loans because they earn
interest. All kinds of bank deposits, whether fixed, savings, or current are to be treated as loans
and are to be covered by the law on loans. 14 Current and savings deposit are loans to a bank
because it can use the same. The petitioner here in making time deposits that earn interests with
respondent Overseas Bank of Manila was in reality a creditor of the respondent Bank and not a
depositor. The respondent Bank was in turn a debtor of petitioner. Failure of he respondent Bank
to honor the time deposit is failure to pay s obligation as a debtor and not a breach of trust
arising from depositary's failure to return the subject matter of the deposit
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Antonio, Abad Santos, JJ., concur.

Barredo (Chairman) J., concur in the judgment on the of the concurring opinion of Justice
Aquino.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:
The petitioner prayed that the Central Bank be ordered to pay his time deposits of P350,000,
plus interests, which he could not recover from the distressed Overseas Bank of Manila, and to
declare all the assets assigned or mortgaged by that bank and the Ramos group to the Central
Bank as trust properties for the benefit of the petitioner and other depositors.
The petitioner has no causes of action agianst the Central Bank to obtain those reliefs. They
cannot be granted in petitioner's instant original actions in this Court for mandamus and
prohibition. It is not the Central Bank's ministerial duty to pay petitioner's time deposits or to hold
the mortgaged properties in trust for the depositors of the Overseas Bank of Manila. The
petitioner has no cause of action for prohibition, a remedy usually available against any tribunal,
board, corporation or person exercising judicial or ministerial functions.
Since the Overseas Bank of Manila was found to be insolvent and the Superintendent of Banks
was ordered to take over its assets preparatory to its liquidation under section 29 of Republic Act
No. 265 (p. 197, Rollo, Manifestation of September 19, 1973), petitioner's remedy is to file his
claim in the liquidating proceeding (Central Bank vs. Morfe, L-38427, March 12, 1975, 63 SCRA
114; Hernandez vs. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., L-29791, January 10, 1978, 81 SCRA 75).
G.R. No. 106244 January 22, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, VICTOR AFRICA, LOURDES AFRICA, NATHALIE
AFRICA, JOSE ENRIQUE, AFRICA, PAUL DELFIN AFRICA, ROSARIO ARELLANO
RACQUEL DINGLASAN, VICTORIA N. LEGARDA, ANGELA N LOBREGAT, MANUEL V.
NIETO, BENITO NIETO, MA. RITA N. DE LOS REYES, EVELYN ROMERO, ROSARIO
SONGCO, CARMEN N. TUAZON and RAFAEL V. VALDEZ, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
GOVERNMENT calls upon us to issue a writ of certiorari declaring null and void the 26
November 1991 and 20 May 1992 Resolutions of respondent ,Sandiganbayan which granted
the Motion for Declaration of Non-Sequestration or Invalidity of Sequestration over the shares of
stock of private respondents Messrs. Victor Africa, et al., in Eastern Telecommunications
Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), and which Subsequently denied reconsideration thereof thereby lifting
the writ of Sequestration over the subject shares.
These facts are not disputed: On 22 July 1987 the Republic of the Philippines through the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and the Office of the Solicitor General
filed before respondent Sandiganbayan a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution and damages against Messrs. Jose L. Africa, Manuel H. Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E.

Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Roberto S. Benedicto, Juan Ponce Enrile
and Potenciano Ilusorio before the Sandiganbayan. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No.
0009, alleged that defendants illegally manipulated, under the guise of expanding the operations
of Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), the purchase of major
shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited, a London-based telecommunications company, in
ETPI which shareholdings defendants Roberto S. Benedicto, Jose L. Africa and Manuel H. Nieto
Jr., by themselves and through corporations organized by them, namely, Polygon Investors and
Managers, Inc., Aerocom Investors and Managers, Inc., and Universal Molasses Corporation,
beneficially held for themselves and for defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R.
Marcos. 2
Private respondents Victor Africa, Lourdes Africa, Nathalie Africa. Jose Enrique Africa, Paul
Delfin Africa, Rosario Arellano, Racquel Dinglasan, Victoria N. Legarda, Angela N. Lobregat,
Manuel V. Nieto, Ramon Nieto, Benito Nieto, Carlos Nieto, Ma. Rita N. Delos Reyes, Evelyn
Romero. Rosario Sangco, Carmen N. Tuazon and Rafael V. Valdez, who are registered
stockholders of ETPI, were not impleaded in Civil Case No. 0009. Nonetheless, they were
denied the dividends appertaining to their shares. Thus on at least two (2) different
occasions, i.e., on 8 November 1988 and 31 January 1991, they had to file motions for leave of
court to intervene in Civil Case No. 0009 to be able to receive their cash dividends, which
motions were both granted. 3 On 4 October 1991 they filed aMotion for Declaration of NonSequestration or Invalidity of Sequestration.
Private respondents anchor their Motion for Declaration of Non-Sequestration or Invalidity of
Sequestration on the absence of a valid sequestration over their shares of stock, and on the
automatic lifting of the writ of sequestration, granting that their shares were validly sequestered,
pursuant to the second and third paragraphs of Sec. 26, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution, which
provide
A sequestration or freeze order shall be issued only upon showing of
a prima facie case. The order and the list of the sequestered or frozen
properties shall forthwith be registered with the proper court. For orders
issued before the ratification of this Constitution, the corresponding judicial
action or proceeding shall be filed within six months from the issuance
thereof.
The sequestration or freeze order is deemed automatically lifted if no judicial
action or proceeding is commenced as herein provided.
In a Resolution dated 26 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan granted the Motion for
Declaration of Non-Sequestration or Invalidity of Sequestration filed by private respondents on
the ground that since no judicial proceeding was ever commenced against them within the
constitutionally-mandated six-month period, the writ of sequestration issued over their shares of
stock is deemed to have been automatically lifted. In a Resolution dated 20 May 1992, which
was promulgated 8 June 1992, the motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
The Government through the PCGG is now before us on certiorari claiming grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of respondent
Sandiganbayan in granting private respondents'Motion for Declaration of Non- Sequestration or
Invalidity of Sequestration. In the main, the Government submits that "although private
respondents have neither been formally impleaded as parties nor have duly been served with
summons in Civil Case No. 0009, there being a finding that the subject shares were being held

merely on behalf of the already impleaded defendants in Civil Case No. 0009, there is no doubt
that there is a judicial action involving private respondents." 4 We are not persuaded.
It is elementary that before a person can be deprived of his right or property he should first be
informed of the claim against him and the theory on which such claim is premised. He should be
given an opportunity to defend himself and protect his interest. Impleading him as a defendant in
a complaint is just too basic to be disregarded. For, how can he be expected to be informed of
such claim, defend himself against it, protect his interest and prepare for trial if he is not even
impleaded as a defendant in a case involving his right or property?
In the instant case, private respondents have in the past years been deprived of their dividends
which have now accrued and accumulated, without affording them an opportunity to protect and
defend their interests. Their shares of stock in ETPI have been challenged by the Government
without the latter instituting an action to recover the same, and only on the mere allegation in a
collateral proceeding, belatedly made, that they are also part of ill-gotten wealth. The
Government is thus seeking to recover the shares of stock of private respondents through an
action where the named defendants are different from private respondents herein.
The procedure is highly irregular and seriously flawed. If the Government is really interested in
claiming the shares of stock of private respondents the proper procedure is to implead them in a
complaint for the recovery of those shares. Unfortunately, it has allowed the period to lapse
without impleading them. If the defendants in Civil Case No. 0009, who have been particularly
identified as having manipulated the transfer of shares of stock in ETPI to their names allegedly
under unconscionable terms and conditions, were impleaded to be able to defend themselves
and their interests, with more reason should private respondents herein, who have not even
been shown to have participated in the illicit transactions, be impleaded and given a chance to
be heard. For, the sanctified principle that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law requires that at the outset a person should first be named and
included in a suit before his very existence is disregarded and his freedom and property taken
away from him. Actions must be brought against the persons who are to be bound by the
judgment obtained therein. 5
We are not unaware of the various PCGG sequestration cases decided by this Court on 23
January 1995 where it was held that "corporations or business enterprises alleged to be
repositories of 'ill-gotten' wealth (need not) be actually and formally impleaded in the actions for
the recovery thereof, in order to maintain in effect existing sequestration thereof." 6 But those
cases should be distinguished from the instant case. In those 21 cases the companies as well
as properties which former President and Mrs. Ferdinand Marcos, their relatives, friends and
business associates allegedly used as depositories or as instruments to illegally amass wealth,
or which supposedly constituted fruits of ill-gotten wealth, were sequestered. Complaints were
thereafter filed by the PCGG against individual persons believed to be the owners or holders of
the shares of stock of the aforesaid companies. The companies were not themselves impleaded
as defendants but merely enumerated in lists annexed to the complaints against the named
individuals.
The defendants therein banked on the omissions and sought the lifting of the orders of
sequestration on the ground that no proper judicial action had been filed within the time and in
the manner required by the Constitution against the corporations with which they were
associated. They argued that upon the expiration of the reglementary period the sequestration of
the corporations should be deemed automatically lifted. Under the facts especially attendant in
those cases we said it should not be so. There we held that the Constitution did not describe nor
specify the kind and character of the judicial action or proceeding to be instituted but only
required that the action or proceeding involved the matter of sequestration, freezing or

provisional takeover of specific properties, having for its object the demonstration by competent
evidence that the property sequestered, frozen or taken over was indeed "ill-gotten wealth" over
which the government had a legitimate claim for recovery and other reliefs. The supposed
omission was rationalized thus A. Error Immaterial to Requirement to File Actions or Proceedings within
Constitutional Time Limits
Such a procedural defect, however, conceding its existence for the nonce,
does not contradict or adversely affect the actuality that judicial actions or
proceedings had been brought within the time limits laid down by the
Constitution "for" them, i.e., with regard or in relation to, in connection with,
or involving or concerning the sequestration or seizure by the PCGG of the
assets or properties in question.
Other considerations bearing upon the matter should also be taken into
account.
B. Impleading Unnecessary in Cases for Recovery of Shares of Stock or
Bank Deposits
As regards actions in which the complaints seek recovery of defendants'
shares of stock in existing corporations (e.g., San Miguel Corporation,
Benguet Corporation, Meralco, etc.) because (they were) allegedly
purchased with misappropriated public funds, in breach of fiduciary duty, or
otherwise illicit or anomalous conditions, the impleading of said firms would
clearly appear to be unnecessary. If warranted by the evidence, judgments
may be handed down against the corresponding defendants divesting them
of ownership of their stock, the acquisition thereof being illegal and
consequently burdened with a constructive trust, and imposing on them the
obligation of surrendering them to the Government.
Quite the same thing may be said of illegally obtained funds deposited in
banks. The impleading of the banks would also appear unnecessary.
Indeed, there would exist no cause of action against them. Judgment may
properly be rendered on the basis of competent evidence, that said funds
are ill-gotten wealth over which the defendants have no right, and should
consequently be surrendered to their rightful owner, the Government. The
judgment would constitute sufficient warrant for the bank to make the
corresponding transfer of the funds.
C. Impleading Unnecessary Re Firms Which Are the Res of the Actions
And as to corporations organized with ill-gotten wealth, but are not guilty of
misappropriation, fraud or other illicit conduct in other words, the
companies themselves are the object or thing involved in the action, the res
thereof there is no need to implead them either. Indeed, their impleading
is not proper on the strength alone of having been formed with ill-gotten
funds, absent any other particular wrongdoing on their part. The judgment
may simply be directed against the shares of stock shown to have been
issued in consideration of ill-gotten wealth.

Such showing of having been formed with, or having received ill-gotten

funds, however strong or convincing, does not, without more, warrant
identifying the corporations in question with the persons who formed or
made use of them to give the color or appearance of lawful, innocent
acquisition to illegally amassed wealth at the least, not so as (to) place
on the Government the onus of impleading the former together with the
latter in actions to recover such wealth. Distinguished, in terms of juridical
personality and legal culpability from their erring members or stockholders,
said corporations are not themselves guilty of the sins of the latter, of the
embezzlement, asportation, etc., that gave rise to the Government's cause
of action for recovery; their creation or organization was merely the result of
their members' (or stockholders') manipulations and manuevers to conceal
the illegal origins of the assets or monies invested therein. In this light, they
are simply the res in the actions for the recovery of illegally acquired wealth,
and there is, in principle, no cause of action against them and no ground to
implead them as defendants in said actions.
The Government is, thus, not to be faulted for not making such corporations
defendants in the actions referred to. It is even conceivable that had this
been attempted, motions to dismiss would have lain to frustrate such
attempts. 7
Private respondents in the instant case, as already stated, are not even sued nor impleaded as
defendants in Civil Case No, 0009 before public respondent Sandiganbayan. Neither are they
mentioned in the complaint of the Government. Their names only surfaced when they were
forced to intervene in the case since all the cash dividends declared by the Board of Directors of
ETPI were being turned over to the PCGG including the cash dividends due them. Thus, each
time a cash dividend was declared they had to file a motion to intervene in Civil Case No. 0009
to be able to petition respondent court to order the PCGG to release to them their respective
dividends. Accordingly, private respondents had to file in Civil Case No. 0009 a Motion for
Declaration of Non-Sequestration or Invalidity of Sequestration, which respondent court granted.
Clearly, there is a material variance between the factual circumstances in the 21 sequestration
cases on one hand, and those in the instant case on the other. In the former, court actions were
instituted against natural persons suspected to be "dummies" whose shares of stock in different
corporations the Government has been trying to recover. In the case before us, no court action
has ever been instituted against private respondents. In the former, the corporations which were
supposedly used as depositaries or as intruments to illegally amass wealth, or which allegedly
constituted fruits of ill-gotten wealth, were named in lists annexed to the complaints filed against
the natural persons who were suspected of being dummies. In the latter case, there was not
even a mention of private respondents' names in the complaints filed by the Government. In the
former, the Government was actually after the shares of stock of the defendant-stockholders of
the corporations who supposedly misappropriated public funds or who entered into illicit or
anomalous transactions prejudicial to the government, not the corporations themselves. Thus it
was held that the omission to implead the corporations was not fatal. In the latter, it appears that
the Government is after the shares of stock in the name of private respondents. Consequently,
the failure to implead them is a serious procedural flaw. Indeed, the firms in the various PCGG
sequestration cases and private respondents in the present case stand on different grounds.
Thus, since only Jose L. Africa, Manuel H. Nieto F., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos,
Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr., Roberto S. Benedicto, Juan Ponce Enrile, and Potenciano Ilusorio
were impleaded as defendants in Civil Case No. 0009 While private respondents were not, only
the shares of stock registered in the names of defendants should be in issue. Those registered

in the names of others, e.g., those of private respondents, should be spared unless it can be
shown in a proper proceeding that they are likewise ill-gotten-wealth or fruits of ill-gotten wealth.
In this regard, if only to uphold the rule of law, the minimum requirement is to implead the
registered owners of those shares in a formal complaint to recover them.
In the same sequestration cases, we also ruled that for lack of proof, even of the specie prima
facie, the writ of sequestration should be lifted
This Court is not unmindful of the fact that its Resolution of July 26, 1991,
on the petitioner's motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 92755 (PCGG v.
Interco) appears to sustain the proposition that actual impleading in the
recovery action of a corporation under sequestration for being a repository
of illegally-acquired wealth, is necessary and requisite for such proposed or
pending seizure to come under the protective umbrella of the Constitution.
But Interco is to be differentiated from the cases now under review in that
the former, as already elsewhere herein made clear, there was a lack of
proof, even of the prima facie kind, that Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., owned any
stock in Interco, the evidence on record being in fact that said corporation
had been organized as a family corporation of the Luys.
So too, this Court's judgment in the so-called "PJI Case" (Republic of the
Philippines [PCGG] v. Sandiganbayan and Rosario Olivares) may not be
ragarded as on all fours with the cases under consideration. The PJI Case
involved the shares of stock in the name of eight (8) natural persons which
had never been sequestered at all.
What happened was that the PCGG simply arrogated unto itself the right to
vote those unsequestered shares on the bare claim that the eight (8)
registered owners thereof were "dummies" of Benjamin Romualdez, the real
owner of the shares; and all that the PCGG had done as predicate for that
act of appropriation of the stock, was to include all the shares of PJI in a list
(Annex A) appended to its complaint in Sandiganbayan Case No. 0035,
describing them as among the properties illegally acquired by Romualdez.
Unfortunately, as in Interco, the PCGG failed to substantiate by competent
evidence its theory of clandestine ownership of Romualdez; and since
moreover, there had been no sequestration of the alleged dummies' shares
of stock, it was undoubtedly correct for the Sandiganbayan to grant the
latter's motion for them to be recognized and declared as the true owners of
the stock in question, which judgment this Court absolutely pronounced to
be free from grave abuse of discretion. 8
The Solicitor General explained the Interco ruling in the instant petition, 9 as well as in eight
(8) 10 out of the twenty-one (21) petitions this Court resolved on 23 January 1995 thuswise
The reason for the correctness of the (Interco) exception is obviously the
doctrine of "piercing the veil of corporate fiction." Stated simply, this doctrine
states that in an action against a person, whether natural or a corporation,
that wholly owns or controls another corporation and uses this wholly owned
or controlled corporation to evade his or its obligation or liability . . . to hide
the ill-gotten wealth of any or all of the persons impleaded therein, a
judgment against any or all of the impleaded defendants may be enforced

against any or all of the said corporations even if these corporations have
not been formally impleaded as defendants in the case.
But even if we disregard the corporate fiction of ETPI, still private respondents cannot be
divested of their shares of stock unless in a proper forum they have been shown to have
committed some wrongdoing in acquiring them. A corporation is a collection of individuals and
the idea of its being a legal entity apart from its members is a mere fiction of law introduced for
convenience in conducting business. When this fiction is used to justify wrong, protect fraud, or
defend crime, the law will disregard the existence of the corporation as a distinct legal entity and
view the latter merely as an association of persons. Accordingly, the equitable owners of the
corporation shall be personally liable and the acts of the real parties will be dealt with as though
no corporation had been formed. In the instant case, only the named defendants in Civil Case
No. 0009 are being accused of wrongdoing in acquiring their shares of stock in ETPI. Thus only
their identified shares of stock in ETPI should be subject to the laims of the Government.
On the other hand, private respondents who were not charged nor impleaded as defendants are
innocent until found guilty by a court of competent jurisdiction. They should be spared until found
liable. Consequently, even if the corporate veil of ETPI is pierced, they can never be divested of
their shares of stock until shown to have engaged in illicit activities in acquiring those shares. At
the very least, they have to be impleaded in a complaint for recovery thereof. For, how can their
shares of stock be considered ill-gotten and consequently the writ of sequestration of the said
shares upheld when not a single case has been filed against private respondents for the
purpose? How can the supposed prima facie case determined by the PCGG to be existing be
substantiated? To deny them their right to such shares on the much belated allegation and
merely on the basis thereof that they fronted for former President and Mrs. Ferdinand Marcos
and their cronies would simply be to unduly perpetuate the assault on the rudimentary rules of
fair play.
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan 11 we said that "[w]e need only to recall at this juncture that, as in
'INTERCO,' evidence of the PCGG is nil to even come up with a prima facie case against
SIPALAY (and ALLIED). This similitude is the decisive factor that draws the instant case away
from the "Final Dispositions" made by this Court in the 1995 Republic v. Sandiganbayan case,
thus making INTERCO, as supported by the Aetna and Seno cases, the controlling
precedent." 12 In the case at hand, how can the PCGG establish its supposed prima facie finding
against private respondents when it has not even filed a case against them?
The Concurring Opinion with Qualifications of Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera in Bataan
Shipyard & Engineering Co., Inc. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government 13 cannot
escape our thoughts
I consider it imperative that sequestration measures be buttressed by
judicial proceedings the soonest possible in order to settle the matter of
ownership of sequestered shares and to determine whether or not they are
legally owned by the stockholders of record or are "ill-gotten wealth" subject
to forfeiture in favor of the State. Sequestration alone, being actually an
ancillary remedy to a principal action, should not be made the basis for the
exercise of acts of dominion for an indefinite period of time.
Sequestration is an extraordinary, harsh, and even severe remedy. It should
be confined to its lawful parameters and exercised, with due regard, in the
words of its enabling laws, to the requirements of fairness, due process, and
Justice.

Also worth mentioning is the Dissent in those oft-repeated PCGG sequestration cases where in
strong and eloquent language it was said
While government efforts to recover illegally amassed wealth should have
the support from all its branches, eagerness and zeal should not be allowed
to run berserk, overriding in the process the very principles that it is sworn to
uphold. In our legal system, the ends do not justify the means. Wrongs are
never corrected by committing other wrongs, and as above-discussed, the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth does not and should never justify unreasonable
intrusions into constitutionally forbidden grounds. 14
As we held in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 15 sequestration, etc., in order to be valid must have
factual basis and must accord due process to the parties thereby affected that said remedies
are not meant to create a permanent situation as regards the property subject thereof, or divest
ownership or rights, that they are in fact merely provisional and temporary and subsist only until
ownership is finally judicially determined.
Thus, we add, sequestration if it is to adhere to constitutional due process cannot be
allowed to hang interminably and forever!
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I concur, for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Republic of the Philippines
v. Sandiganbayan, et al.. G.R. No. 96073, 23 January 1995, 240 SCRA 476.
It is my view that in all actions for recovery of so-called illegally acquired wealth during the
Marcos era, all persons, whether natural or juridical, who stand to lose in favor of the
government under a judgment in such actions should be impleaded as defendants to afford
them an opportunity to be heard and defend themselves in the action. Consequently, where
shares of stock in a corporation, registered in the name of a particular stockholder or
stockholders have been sequestered by the PCGG but no judicial action or proceeding has been
initiated by the government against the stockholder or stockholders of record, within the period
prescribed by Sec. 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution, then the sequestration of the subject
shares of stock is deemed automatically lifted by operation of the Constitution.

VITUG, J., dissenting:

The real point of controversy is whether or not respondent Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in declaring the orders/writ of sequestration issued by the PCGG over the ETPI

shares of private respondents to have been AUTOMATICALLY LIFTED due to PCGG's failure to
file the corresponding judicial action against them within the period prescribed by Section 26,
Article. XVIII, of the Constitution.
In the various PCGG sequestration cases, promulgated on 23 January 1995, 1 this Court has
responded in the affirmative to the crucial question of whether or not the inclusion in the
complaints filed by the PCGG before the Sandiganbayan of specific allegations of corporations
being "dummies" or under the control of the defendants named therein and used as instruments
for acquisition, or as being depositaries, of ill-gotten wealth, or the annexing to said complaints
of a list of said firms, but without actually so impleading them as defendants, would satisfy the
constitutional requirement. This Court has said that there is no particular description or
specification of the kind and character of the judicial action or proceeding contemplated, let
alone an explicit requirement of the impleading of the corporations sequestered, or of the
ostensible owners of property suspected to be ill-gotten. The only modifying or qualifying
requirement in the constitution is held to be that the action or proceeding should be filed with
regard or in relation to, in respect of, or in connection with, or concerning orders of
sequestration.
The majority view would stress that there is a material difference between the factual
circumstances, on the one hand, in the 21 sequestration cased 2 and, on the other hand, in the
case at bench. The majority points out that in the PCGG sequestration cases, judicial actions
have been initiated against individuals suspected to be "dummies" whose shares of stock in
various corporations the Goverment has sought to recover, while in the instant case, no such
judicial action is claimed to have been instituted against private respondents.
I, most regretfully, find myself unable to join my respected colleagues in giving too much
significance to the supposed factual variance. I fail to see why there should be one rule for
corporate entities and a contrary rule for the individual stockholder. There is here, in any case,
Civil Case No. 0009 of the Sandiganbayan in which herein private respondents have
intervened 3 and whose interventions have been allowed. Civil Case No. 0009, instituted by the
Republic, is for the reversion, reconveyance and accounting of all ill-gotten ETPI shares. ETPI is
included in the list (of firms owning ill-gotten shares) appended to the complaint in the civil case
in which corporation private respondents are said to be holding ETPI shares on behalf of the
named defendants in Civil Case No. 0009, namely Jose Africa, Manuel Nieto, Jr., Roberto
Benedicto, Ferdinand Marcos, et al. The intervention has resulted in bringing private
respondents into the court action and having thus submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the
court, they must now lay their claims before that court for adjudication and determination. 4 Most
importantly, the omission to initially implead private respondents in the complaint should be
treated as a technical, not a fatal, defect that is correctable under applicable adjective rules.
Thus, in its 23rd January 1995 decision in the PCGG sequestration cases, the Court has ruled.
Even in those cases where it might reasonably be argued that the failure of
the Goverment to implead the sequestered corporations as defendants is
indeed a procedural aberration, as where said firms were allegedly used,
and actively cooperated with the defendants, as instruments or conduits for
conversion of public funds or property or illicit or fraudulent obtention of
favored Government. contracts, etc., slight reflection would nevertheless
lead to the conclusion that the defect is not fatal, but one correctible under
applicable adjective rules e.g., Section 10, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court
[specifying the remedy of amendment during trial to authorize or to conform
to the evidence]; Section 1, Rule 20 [governing amendments before trial], in
relation to the rule respecting the omission of so-called necessary or
indispensable parties, set out in Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. it

is relevant in this context to advert to the old. familiar doctrines that the
omission to implead such parties "is a mere technical defect which can be
cured at any stage of the proceedings even after judgment"; and that,
particularly in the case of indispensable parties, since their presence and
participation is essential to the very life of the action, for without them no
judgment may be rendered, amendments of the complaint in order to
implead them should be freely allowed, even on appeal, in fact even after
rendition of judgment by this Court, where it appears that the complaint
otherwise indicates their identity and character as such indispensable
parties. 5
Verily, the PCGG should be given an opportunity to adduce its evidence to show, among other
things, that it has aprima facie determination for its sequestration order and that it can provide
sufficient factual basis for the continued sequestration of ETPI shares held by private
respondents. The Sandiganbayan may, in time, be called upon to adjudicate the claims of all
contending parties. While the above matters and, eventually, the issue of ownership over the
sequestered shares remain unresolved, the lifting of sequestration over the ETPI shares in the
names of private respondents would appear to be precipitate.
In PCGG vs. International Copra Export Corporation 6 it might be pointed out, this Court had first
remanded the case (G.R. No. 86989) to the Sandiganbayan for the reception of evidence but the
PCGG, despite the opportunity, failed to present any proof to justify a further sequestration of
therein respondent corporations. On the contrary, the respondents were there able to show that
International Copra Export Corporation was organized as early as 1961, that Interco
Manufacturing Corporation was established in 1976, and that the two corporations were and
remained to be family corporationsof the Luy family. 7
Given all the foregoing I am constrained to vote for setting aside the resolutions, dated 26
November 1991 and 08 June 1992, of respondent Sandiganbayan and directing the latter in Civil
Case No. 0009 to have the issue of whether or not private respondents are the legitimate
and bona fide owners of the sequestered shares of stocks, as well as all other incidental and
related questions such as whether or not there is prima facie factual basis for the sequestration
of private respondents' ETPI shares, properly adjudicated.
G.R. No. L-21005

December 20, 1924

In the matter of the involuntary insolvency of Umberto de Poli. THE AMERICAN FOREIGN
BANKING CORPORATION, claimant-appellee,
vs.
J. R. HERRIDGE, assignee of the insolvent estate of U. de Poli, BOWRING and CO., C. T.
BOWRING and CO., LTD., and T. R. YANGCO, creditors-appellants.
Crossfield and O'Brien for the appellant assignee.
J. A. Wolfson for the appellants Bowring and Co. and C. T. Bowring and Co., Ltd.
Camus and Delgado for the appellant Yangco.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellee.

OSTRAND, J.:

This is an appeal from the following decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the
Honorable George R. Harvey presiding:
On or about April 28, 1920, the debtor, U. de Poli, a licensed public warehouseman in
the City of Manila, issued warehouse receipt No. A-48, commonly known as a
"quedan," for 560 bales of tobacco, which tobacco was particularly described therein
as "Cagayan tabacco en rama" with specified marks thereon. Said U. de Poli certified
over his signature on the face of said quedan as follows: I certify that I am the sole
owner of the merchandise herein described." (Exhibit A of American Foreign Banking
Corporation.) This quedan was endorsed in bank by U. de Poli, who delivered it to the
American Foreign Banking Corporation as security upon his overdraft, then amounting
to about P40,000.
The claimant bank, by its motion of April 23, 1921, asked that the assignee be ordered
to deliver to said bank the 560 bales of leaf tobacco called for in said quedan upon
surrender of the original of the warehouse receipt.
In answer to said motion the assignee denied that the 560 bales of Cagayan tobacco
listed in said Exhibit A are now in his possession as assignee of said insolvent estate,
and denied that said Exhibit A constitutes a negotiable warehouse receipt under the
law, for the reason that it does not comply with the provisions of sections 2, 4 or 5 of
the Warehouse Receipt Act; and that, even assuming that said 560 bales of leaf
tobacco were now in his possession, he denies that the claimant bank is the owner
thereof, or has any lien thereon, or any rights therein, by virtue of said receipt, Exhibit
A; and by his amended answer alleges that said Exhibit A was not delivered by the
insolvent, U. de Poli, to the claimant for the purpose of transferring the ownership of
the property described therein to it, but only as collateral security for a preexisting
indebtedness by way of overdraft, for which purpose it is under the law invalid and
wholly ineffective as against the general creditors of the said insolvent estate.
Substantially the same answer was made by Wise & Co. as general creditors."
There has been no question raised about the authenticity of the quedan. U. de Poli
testified that he issued it to said bank as security for his said overdraft; that the
tobacco was in the bodega on Calle Acarraga when he gave the quedan to the bank;
that the tobacco had to be stripped and booked, and, for this reason there might have
been a slight difference between the quantity given in the quedan and the quantity at
present in existence in the warehouse; that he knows that the tobacco was in the
warehouse at the time he became insolvent, because he had given an order to fill an
order for stripped tobacco, and that the tobacco was taken from the pile which he had
given in guaranty to the American Foreign Banking Corporation; that Vicente Molina
was in charge of the warehouse, and that he (De Poli) acted upon the data furnished
to him by Mr. Molina.
The evidence shows that there were only 530 bales of this tobacco. The quedan
(Exhibit A) calls for "Cagayan tobacco," but it was stipulated in this case that the 530
bales of tobacco claimed by the American Foreign Banking Corporation are Isabela
tobacco. Mr. De Poli explained this discrepancy in discrepancy in description by
saying that he "had the description of grade only and made the quedan without giving
importance if it was Cagayan or Isabela tobacco; that he asked only for grade, and did
not ask whether it was Cagayan or Isabela tobacco, because he had to deliver the
security no matter whether it was Isabela or Cagayan tobacco. The objection and
motion of the opposition counsel that this explanation be stricken out are hereby
overruled.

The quedan in question was issued by J. Magpantay, who was "encargado" of all the
U. de Poli warehouse, but he did not have control of the warehouses, but he did not
have control of the warehouses, according to Mr. de Poli. Molina did not see the
quedan when it was issued, but said that he knew of the tobacco which Mr. De Poli
transferred to the claimant bank, because Mr. De Poli told him about it; that it was
tobacco from Isabela for the year 1919, was stored in the warehouse on Calle
Azcarraga, and that there was no other tobacco in the warehouse except the 1919
Isabela tobacco.
The evidence further shows that in December, 1920, Mr. Kaintzler, a sub accountant
of the claimant bank, went to the U. de Poli warehouse on Calle Azcarraga to have the
tobacco covered by this quedan, Exhibit A, pointed out to him; that the then assignee
(Mr. Bayne) and one of his accountants showed him (Kaintzler) the 530 bales of
tobacco with the tag A. F. B. C. on them, and these bales were pointed out to him by
Mr. Bayne as the tobacco which belonged to the American Foreign Banking
Corporation.
The quedan (Exhibit A) is in the same form as quedan No. A-155, which, in the case of
Felisa Roman vs. Asia Banking Corporation, was declared by the Supreme Court of
the Philippine Islands to be a negotiable warehouse receipt conveying title to the said
bank superior to that of the vendor's lien of Felisa Roman (R. G. No. 17825). 1
The evidence shows that said quedan (Exhibit A) was taken by the American Foreign
Banking Corporation for value, believing it to be a negotiable warehouse receipt, and
without reasonable cause to believe that the debtor U. de Poli (who was operating a
public warehouse at the time) was insolvent.
In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the Felisa Roman case, abovementioned, the only question raised by the attorneys for the consignee and for the
common creditors which will be considered by the court is that as to the sufficiency of
the description of the tobacco in said warehouse receipt. This lot of tobacco was the
only tobacco in the warehouse. The debtor said that it was the tobacco which he
transferred to the claimant bank. The tobacco was pointed out by the then assignee to
the claimants representative as the tobacco covered by said quedan, Exhibit A.
Hence, there does not appear to be any doubt about the identity of the tobacco.
The only question left for consideration is whether the use of the word "Cagayan"
instead of "Isabela" in describing the tobacco in the quedan rendered the quedan null
and void as a negotiable warehouse receipt for the tobacco intended to be covered by
it. The insolvent, U. de Poli, testified positively that this quedan referred to the tobacco
in the Azcarraga warehouse, and he explained the discrepancy in the description. The
then assignee (Mr. Bayne) was evidently convinced that this lot of tobacco belonged
to the claimant bank, because he pointed it out to one of the bank's employees, who
noted the tags thereon bearing the initials of the claimant bank.lawphi1.net
The court is of the opinion that the intention of the parties to the transaction must
prevail against such a technical objection as to the sufficiency of the description of the
tobacco. It might be different if there had been Cagayan tobacco in the warehouse at
the time of the issuance of the quedan, Exhibit A, or if there were any doubt whatever
as to the identity of the tobacco intended to be covered by the quedan. The assignee
stands in the shoes of the insolvent, and while it is his duty to protect the general
creditors, he is not in the position of a judgment creditor with an unsatisfied execution.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the court is of the opinion that the quedan,
Exhibit A, is a negotiable warehouse receipt which was duly issued and delivered by
the debtor U. de Poli to the American Foreign Banking Corporation, and that it
divested U. de Poli of his title to said tobacco and transferred the position and the title
thereof to the American Foreign Banking Corporation.
It is therefore ordered and adjudged that the consignee deliver the said five hundred
and thirty (530) bales of tobacco to the American Foreign banking Corporation, upon
payment by said bank of any liens or charges thereon, or, in the event of said tobacco
having been sold, the proceeds thereof, less the storage and insurance charges paid
after the declaration of insolvency; and thereafter due report will be made to this court
of such delivery to the claimant bank in order that the proceeds be deducted from the
balance to said claimant bank from the insolvent debtor.
We find no reversible error in the decision quoted and do not think it necessary to add anything
to the discussion therein contained.
The judgment appealed from is therefore affirmed, with the costs against the appellants. So
ordered.
G.R. No. L-11776

August 30, 1958

RAMON GONZALES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GO TIONG and LUZON SURETY CO., INC., defendants-appellants.
Rustico V. Nazareno for appellee.
David, Abel and Ysip for appellant Go Tiong.
Tolentino, Garcia and D. R. Cruz for appellant Luzon Surety Co., Inc.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Defendants Go Tiong and Luzon Surety Co. are appealing from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Judge Magno S. Gatmaitan presiding, the dispositive part of which reads as
follows:
In view whereof, judgment is rendered condemning defendant Go Tiong and Luzon
Surety Co., jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the sum of P4,920 with legal interest
from the date of the filing of the complaint until fully paid; judgment is also rendered
against Go Tiong to pay the sum of P3,680 unto plaintiff, also with legal interest from
the date of the filing of the complaint until fully paid. Go Tiong is also condemned to
pay the sum of P1,000 as attorney's fees, plus costs.
The appeal was first taken to the Court of Appeals, the latter indorsing the case to us later under
the provisions of Section 17 (6) of Republic Act No. 296, on the ground that the issues raised
were purely questions of law.
Go Tiong owned a rice mill and warehouse, located at Mabini, Urdaneta, Pangasinan. On
February 4, 1953, he obtained a license to engage in the business of a bonded warehouseman
(Exhibit N). To secure the performance of his obligations as such bonded warehouseman, the

Luzon Surety Co. executed Guaranty Bond No. 294 in the sum of P18,334 (Exhibit O),
conditioned particularly on the fulfillment by Go Tiong of his duty or obligation to deliver to the
depositors in his storage warehouse, the palay received by him for storage, at any time demand
is made, or to pay the market value thereof, in case he was unable to return the same. The bond
was executed on January 26, 1953. Go Tiong insured the warehouse and the palay deposited
therein with the Alliance Surety and Insurance Company.
But prior to the issuance of the license to Go Tiong to operate as bonded warehouseman, he
had on several occasions received palay for deposit from plaintiff Gonzales, totaling 368 sacks,
for which he issued receipts, Exhibits A, B, C, and D. After he was licensed as bonded
warehouseman, Go Tiong again received various deliveries of palay from plaintiff, totaling 492
sacks, for which he issued the corresponding receipts, all the grand total of 860 sacks, valued at
P8,600 at the rate of P10 per sack.
On or about March 15, 1953, plaintiff demanded from Go Tiong the value of his deposits in the
amount of P8,600, but he was told to return after two days, which he did, but Go Tiong again told
him to come back. A few days later, the warehouse burned to the ground. Before the fire, Go
Tiong had been accepting deliveries of palay from other depositors and at the time of the fire,
there were 5,847 sacks of palay in the warehouse, in excess of the 5,000 sacks authorized
under his license. The receipts issued by Go Tiong to the plaintiff were ordinary receipts, not the
"warehouse receipts" defined by the Warehouse Receipts Act (Act No. 2137).
After the burning of the warehouse, the depositors of palay, including plaintiff, filed their claims
with the Bureau of Commerce, and it would appear that with the proceeds of the insurance
policy, the Bureau of Commerce paid off some of the claim. Plaintiff's counsel later withdrew his
claim with the Bureau of Commerce, according to Go Tiong, because his claim was denied by
the Bureau, but according to the decision of the trial court, because nothing came from plaintiff's
efforts to have his claim paid. Thereafter, Gonzales filed the present action against Go Tiong and
the Luzon Surety for the sum of P8,600, the value of his palay, with legal interest, damages in
the sum of P5,000 and P1,500 as attorney's fees. Gonzales later renewed his claim with the
Bureau of Commerce (Exhibit S).
While the case was pending in court, Gonzales and Go Tiong entered into a contract of amicable
settlement to the effect that upon the settlement of all accounts due to him by Go Tiong, he,
Gonzales, would have all actions pending against Go Tiong dismissed. Inasmuch as Go Tiong
failed to settle the accounts, Gonzales prosecuted his court action..
For purposes of reference, we reproduce the assignment of errors of Go Tiong, as well as the
assignment of errors of the Luzon Surety, all reading thus:
I. The trial court erred in finding that plaintiff-appellee's claim is covered by the Bonded
Warehouse Law, Act 3893, as amended, and not by the Civil Code.
II. The trial court erred in not exempting defendant-appellant Go Tiong for the loss of
the palay deposited, pursuant to the provisions of the New Civil Code.".
xxx

xxx

xxx

I. The trial court erred in not declaring that the amicable settlement by and between
plaintiff-appellee and defendant Go Tiong constituted a material alteration of the surety
bond of appellant Luzon Surety which extinguished and discharged its liability.

II. The trial court erred in bolding that the receipts for the palay received by Go Tiong,
though not in the form of "quedans" or warehouse receipts are chargeable against the
surety bond filed under the provisions of the General Bonded Warehouse Act (Act No.
3893 as amended by Republic Act No. 247) as a result of a loss.
III. The trial court erred in not holding that the plaintiff had renounced and abandoned
his rights under the Bonded Warehouse Act by the withdrawal of his claim from the
Bureau of Commerce and the execution of the "amicable settlement".
IV. The trial court erred in not holding that the palay delivered to Go Tiong constitutes
gratuitous deposit which was extinguished upon the loss and destruction of the
subject matter.
V. The trial court erred in not declaring that the transaction between defendant Go
Tiong and plaintiff was more of a sale rather than a deposit.
VI. The trial court erred in declaring that the Luzon Surety Co., Inc., had not complied
with its undertaking despite the liquidation of all the claims by the Bureau of
Commerce.
VII. The lower court erred in adjudging the herein surety liable under the terms of the
Bond.
We shall discuss the assigned errors at the same time, considering the close relation between
them, although we do not propose to discuss and rule upon all of them. Both appellants urge
that plaintiff's claim is governed by the Civil Code and not by the Bonded Warehouse Act (Act
No. 3893, as amended by Republic Act No. 247), for the reason that, as already stated, what Go
Tiong issued to plaintiff were ordinary receipts, not the warehouse receipts contemplated by the
Warehouse Receipts Law, and because the deposits of palay of plaintiff were gratuitous.
Act No. 3893 as amended is a special law regulating the business of receiving commodities for
storage and defining the rights and obligations of a bonded warehouseman and those
transacting business with him. Consequently, any deposit made with him as a bonded
warehouseman must necessarily be governed by the provisions of Act No. 3893. The kind or
nature of the receipts issued by him for the deposits is not very material much less decisive.
Though it is desirable that receipts issued by a bonded warehouseman should conform to the
provisions of the Warehouse Receipts Law, said provisions in our opinion are not mandatory and
indispensable in the sense that if they fell short of the requirements of the Warehouse Receipts
Act, then the commodities delivered for storage become ordinary deposits and will not be
governed by the provisions of the Bonded Warehouse Act. Under Section 1 of the Warehouse
Receipts Act, one would gather the impression that the issuance of a warehouse receipt in the
form provided by it is merely permissive and directory and not obligatory:
SECTION 1. Persons who may issue receipts. Warehouse receipts may be issued
by any warehouseman.,
and the Bonded Warebouse Act as amended permits the warehouseman to issue any receipt,
thus:

. . . . "receipt" as any receipt issued by a warehouseman for commodity delivered to

him.
As the trial court well observed, as far as Go Tiong was concerned, the fact that the receipts
issued by him were not "quedans" is no valid ground for defense because he was the principal
obligor. Furthermore, as found by the trial court, Go Tiong had repeatedly promised plaintiff to
issue to him "quedans" and had assured him that he should not worry; and that Go Tiong was in
the habit of issuing ordinary receipts (not "quedans") to his depositors.
As to the contention that the deposits made by the plaintiff were free because he paid no fees
therefor, it would appear that Go Tiong induced plaintiff to deposit his palay in the warehouse
free of charge in order to promote his business and to attract other depositors, it being
understood that because of this accommodation, plaintiff would convince other palay owners to
deposit with Go Tiong.
Appellants contend that the burning of the warehouse was a fortuitous event and not due to any
fault of Go Tiong and that consequently, he should not be held liable, appellants supporting the
contention with the ruling in the case of La Sociedad Dalisay vs. De los Reyes, 55 Phil. 452,
reading as follows:
Inasmuch as the fire, according to the judgment appealed from, was neither
intentional nor due to the negligence of the appellant company or its officials; and it
appearing from the evidence that the then manager attempted to save the palay, the
appellant company should not be held responsible for damages resulting from said
fire. . . . .
The trial court correctly disposed of this same contention, thus:
The defense that the palay was destroyed by fire neither does the Court consider to
be good for while the contract was in the nature of a deposit and the loss of the thing
would exempt the obligor in a contract of deposit to return the goods, this exemption
from the responsibility for the damages must be conditioned in his proof that the loss
was by force majeure, and without his fault. The Court does not see from the evidence
that the proof is clear on the legal exemption. On the contrary, the fact that he
exceeded the limit of the authorized deposit must have increased the risk and would
militate against his defense of non-liability. For this reason, the Court does not follow
La Sociedad vs. De Los Santos, 55 Phil. 42 quoted by Go Tiong. (p. 3, Decision).
Considering the fact, as already stated, that prior to the burning of the warehouse, plaintiff
demanded the payment of the value of his palay from Go Tiong on two occasions but was put off
without any valid reason, under the circumstances, the better rule which we accept is the
following:
. . . . This rule proceeds upon the theory that the facts surrounding the care of the
property by a bailee are peculiarly within his knowledge and power to prove, and that
the enforcement of any other rule would impose great difficulties upon the bailors. ... It
is illogical and unreasonable to hold that the presumption of negligence in case of this
kind is rebutted by the bailee by simply proving that the property bailed was destroyed
by an ordinary fire which broke out on the bailee's own premises, without regard to the
care exercised by the latter to prevent the fire, or to save the property after the
commencement of the fire. All the authorities seem to agree that the rule that there

shall be a presumption of negligence in bailment cases like the present one, where
there is default in delivery or accounting, for the goods is just a necessary one. . . . (9
A.L.R. 566; see also Hanes vs. Shapiro, 84 S.E. 33; J. Russel Mfg. Co. vs. New
Haven, S.B. Co., 50 N.Y. 211; Beck vs. Wilkins-Ricks Co., 102 S.E. 313,
Fleishman vs. Southern R. Co., 56 S.E. 974).
Besides, as observed by the trial court, the defendant violated the terms of his license by
accepting for deposit palay in excess of the limit authorized by his license, which fact must have
increased the risk.
The Luzon Surety claims that the amicable settlement by and between Gonzales and Go Tiong
constituted a material alteration of its bond, thereby extinguishing and discharging its liability. It is
evident, however, that while there was an attempt to settle the case amicably, the settlement
was never consummated because Go Tiong failed to settle the accounts of Gonzales to the
latter's satisfaction. Consequently, said non-consummated compromise settlement does not
discharge the surety:
A compromise or settlement between the creditor or obligee and the principal, by
which the latter is discharged from liability, discharges the surety, . . . . But an
unconsummated . . . agreement to compromise, falling short of an effective
settlement, will not discharge the surety. (50 C. J. 185)
In relation to the failure of Go Tiong to issue the warehouse receipts contemplated by the
Warehouse Receipts Act, which failure, according to appellants, precluded plaintiff from suing on
the bond, reference may be made to Section 2 of Act No. 3893, defining receipt as any receipt
issued by a warehouseman for commodity delivered to him, showing that the law does not
require as indispensable that a warehouse receipt be issued. Furthermore, Section 7 of said law
provides that as long as the depositor is injured by a breach of any obligation of the
warehouseman, which obligation is secured by a bond, said depositor may sue on said bond. In
other words, the surety cannot avoid liability from the mere failure of the warehouseman to issue
the prescribed receipt. In the case of Andreson vs. Krueger, 212 N.W. 198, 199, it was held:
The surety company concedes that the bond which it gave contains the statutory
conditions. The statute . . . requires that the bond shall be conditioned upon the
faithful performance of the public local grain warehouseman of all the provisions of law
relating to the storage of grain by such warehouseman.
The surety company thereby made itself responsible for the performance by the
warehouseman of all the duties and obligations imposed upon him by the statute; and,
if he failed to perform any such duty to the loss or detriment of those who delivered
grain for storage, the surety company became liable therefor. Where the
warehouseman receives grain for storage and refuses to return or pay it, the fact that
he failed to issue the receipt, when the statute required him to issue on receiving it, is
not available to the surety as a defense against an action on the bond. The obligation
of the surety covers the duty of the warehouseman to issue the prescribed receipt, as
well as the other duties imposed upon him by the statute.
We deem it unnecessary to discuss and rule upon the other questions raised in the appeal.
In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with costs.

G.R. No. L-17825

June 26, 1922

In the matter of the Involuntary insolvency of U. DE POLI.

FELISA ROMAN, claimant-appellee,
vs.
ASIA BANKING CORPORATION, claimant-appellant.
Wolfson, Wolfson and Schwarzkopf and Gibbs, McDonough & Johnson for appellant.
Antonio V. Herrero for appellee.
OSTRAND, J.:
This is an appeal from an order entered by the Court of First Instance of Manila in civil No.
19240, the insolvency of Umberto de Poli, and declaring the lien claimed by the appellee Felisa
Roman upon a lot of leaf tobacco, consisting of 576 bales, and found in the possession of said
insolvent, superior to that claimed by the appellant, the Asia Banking Corporation.
The order appealed from is based upon the following stipulation of facts:
It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between Felisa Roman and Asia Banking
Corporation, and on their behalf by their undersigned attorneys, that their respective
rights, in relation to the 576 bultos of tobacco mentioned in the order of this court
dated April 25, 1921, be, and hereby are, submitted to the court for decision upon the
following:
I. Felisa Roman claims the 576 bultos of tobacco under and by virtue of the
instrument, a copy of which is hereto attached and made a part hereof and marked
Exhibit A.
II. That on November 25, 1920, said Felisa Roman notified the said Asia Banking
Corporation of her contention, a copy of which notification is hereto attached and
made a part hereof and marked Exhibit B.
III. That on November 29, 1920, said Asia Banking Corporation replied as per copy
hereto attached and marked Exhibit C.
IV. That at the time the above entitled insolvency proceedings were filed the
576 bultos of tobacco were in possession of U. de Poli and now are in possession of
the assignee.
V. That on November 18, 1920, U. de Poli, for value received, issued a quedan,
covering aforesaid 576bultos of tobacco, to the Asia Banking Corporation as per copy
of quedan attached and marked Exhibit D.
VI. That aforesaid 576 bultos of tobacco are part and parcel of the
2,777 bultos purchased by U. de Poli from Felisa Roman.
VII. The parties further stipulate and agree that any further evidence that either of the
parties desire to submit shall be taken into consideration together with this stipulation.

Manila, P. I., April 28, 1921.

(Sgd.) ANTONIO V. HERRERO
Attorney for Felisa Roman
(Sgd.) WOLFSON, WOLFSON & SCHWARZKOPF
Attorney for Asia Banking Corp.
Exhibit A referred to in the foregoing stipulation reads:
1. Que la primera parte es duea de unos dos mil quinientos a tres mil quintales de
tacabo de distintas clases, producidos en los municipios de San Isidro, Kabiaw y
Gapan adquiridos por compra con dinero perteneciente a sus bienes parafernales, de
los cuales es ella administradora.
2. Que ha convenido la venta de dichos dos mil quinientos a tres mil quintales de
tabaco mencionada con la Segunda Parte, cuya compraventa se regira por las
condiciones siguientes:
(a) La Primera Parte remitira a la Segunda debidamente enfardado el tabaco de que
ella es propietaria enbultos no menores de cincuenta kilos, siendo de cuenta de dicha
Primera Parte todos los gastos que origine dicha mercancja hasta la estacion de
ferrocarril de Tutuban, en cuyo lugar se hara cargo la Segunda y desde cuyo instante
seran de cuenta de esta los riesgos de la mercancia.
(b) El precio en que la Primera Parte vende a la Segunda el tabaco mencionada es el
de veintiseis pesos (P26), moneda filipina, por quintal, pagaderos en la forma que
despues se establece.
(c) La Segunda Parte sera la consignataria del tabaco en esta Ciudad de Manila
quien se hara cargo de el cuando reciba la factura de embarque y la guia de Rentas
Internas, trasladandolo a su bodega quedando en la misma en calidad de deposito
hasta la fecha en que dicha Segunda Parte pague el precio del mismo, siendo de
cuenta de dicha Segunda Parte el pago de almacenaje y seguro.
(d) LLegada la ultima expedicion del tabaco, se procedera a pesar el mismo con
intervencion de la Primera Parte o de un agente de ella, y conocido el numero total de
quintales remitidos, se hara liquidacion del precio a cuenta del cual se pagaran quince
mil pesos (P15,000), y el resto se dividira en cuatro pagares vencederos cada uno de
ellos treinta dias despues del anterior pago; esto es, el primer pagare vencera a los
treinta dias de la fecha en que se hayan pagado los quince mil pesos, el segundo a
igual tiempo del anterior pago, y asi sucesivamente; conviniendose que el capital
debido como precio del tabaco devengara un interes del diez por ciento anual.

Los plazos concedidos al comprador para el pago del precio quedan sujetos a la
condicion resolutoria de que si antes del vencimiento de cualquier plazo, el
comprador vendiese parte del tabaco en proporcion al importe de cualquiera de los
pagares que restasen por vencer, o caso de que vendiese, pues se conviene para
este caso que desde el momento en que la Segunda Parte venda el tabaco, el
deposito del mismo, como garantia del pago del precio, queda cancelado y
simultaneamente es exigible el importe de la parte por pagar.
Leido este documento por los otorgantes y encontrandolo conforme con lo por ellos
convenido, lo firman la Primera Parte en el lugar de su residencia, San Isidro de
Nueva Ecija, y la Segunda en esta Ciudad de Manila, en las fechas que
respectivamente al pie de este documento aparecen.
(Fdos.) FELISA ROMAN VDA. DE MORENO
U. DE POLI
Firmado en presencia de:
(Fdos.) ANTONIO V. HERRERO
T. BARRETTO
("Acknowledged before Notary")
Exhibit D is a warehouse receipt issued by the warehouse of U. de Poli for 576 bales of tobacco.
The first paragraph of the receipt reads as follows:
Quedan depositados en estos almacenes por orden del Sr. U. de Poli la cantidad de
quinientos setenta y seis fardos de tabaco en rama segun marcas detalladas al
margen, y con arreglo a las condiciones siguientes:
In the left margin of the face of the receipts, U. de Poli certifies that he is the sole owner of the
merchandise therein described. The receipt is endorced in blank "Umberto de Poli;" it is not
marked "non-negotiable" or "not negotiable."
Exhibit B and C referred to in the stipulation are not material to the issues and do not appear in
the printed record.
Though Exhibit A in its paragraph (c) states that the tobacco should remain in the warehouse of
U. de Poli as a deposit until the price was paid, it appears clearly from the language of the
exhibit as a whole that it evidences a contract of sale and the recitals in order of the Court of
First Instance, dated January 18, 1921, which form part of the printed record, show that De Poli
received from Felisa Roman, under this contract, 2,777 bales of tobacco of the total value of
P78,815.69, of which he paid P15,000 in cash and executed four notes of P15,953.92 each for
the balance. The sale having been thus consummated, the only lien upon the tobacco which
Felisa Roman can claim is a vendor's lien.
The order appealed from is based upon the theory that the tobacco was transferred to the Asia
Banking Corporation as security for a loan and that as the transfer neither fulfilled the
requirements of the Civil Code for a pledge nor constituted a chattel mortgage under Act No.
1508, the vendor's lien of Felisa Roman should be accorded preference over it.

It is quite evident that the court below failed to take into consideration the provisions of section
49 of Act No. 2137 which reads:
Where a negotiable receipts has been issued for goods, no seller's lien or right of
stoppage in transitu shall defeat the rights of any purchaser for value in good faith to
whom such receipt has been negotiated, whether such negotiation be prior or
subsequent to the notification to the warehouseman who issued such receipt of the
seller's claim to a lien or right of stoppage in transitu. Nor shall the warehouseman be
obliged to deliver or justified in delivering the goods to an unpaid seller unless the
receipt is first surrendered for cancellation.
The term "purchaser" as used in the section quoted, includes mortgagee and pledgee. (See
section 58 (a) of the same Act.)
In view of the foregoing provisions, there can be no doubt whatever that if the warehouse receipt
in question is negotiable, the vendor's lien of Felisa Roman cannot prevail against the rights of
the Asia Banking Corporation as the indorse of the receipt. The only question of importance to
be determined in this case is, therefore, whether the receipt before us is negotiable.

A non-negotiable receipt shall have plainly placed upon its face by the warehouseman
issuing it 'non-negotiable,' or 'not negotiable.' In case of the warehouseman's failure
so to do, a holder of the receipt who purchased it for value supposing it to be
negotiable may, at his option, treat such receipt as imposing upon the warehouseman
the same liabilities he would have incurred had the receipt been negotiable.
This section shall not apply, however, to letters, memoranda, or written
acknowledgments of an informal character.
This section appears to give any warehouse receipt not marked "non-negotiable" or "not
negotiable" practically the same effect as a receipt which, by its terms, is negotiable provided the
holder of such unmarked receipt acquired it for value supposing it to be negotiable,
circumstances which admittedly exist in the present case.
We therefore hold that the warehouse receipts in controversy was negotiable and that the rights
of the endorsee thereof, the appellant, are superior to the vendor's lien of the appellee and
should be given preference over the latter.
The order appealed from is therefore reversed without costs. So ordered.

The matter is not entirely free from doubt. The receipt is not perfect: It recites that the
merchandise is deposited in the warehouse "por orden" instead of "a la orden" or "sujeto a la
orden" of the depositor and it contain no other direct statement showing whether the goods
received are to be delivered to the bearer, to a specified person, or to a specified person or his
order.
We think, however, that it must be considered a negotiable receipt. A warehouse receipt, like any
other document, must be interpreted according to its evident intent (Civil Code, arts. 1281 et
seq.) and it is quite obvious that the deposit evidenced by the receipt in this case was intended
to be made subject to the order of the depositor and therefore negotiable. That the words "por
orden" are used instead of "a la orden" is very evidently merely a clerical or grammatical error. If
any intelligent meaning is to be attacked to the phrase "Quedan depositados en estos
almacenes por orden del Sr. U. de Poli" it must be held to mean "Quedan depositados en estos
almacenes a la orden del Sr. U. de Poli." The phrase must be construed to mean that U. de Poli
was the person authorized to endorse and deliver the receipts; any other interpretation would
mean that no one had such power and the clause, as well as the entire receipts, would be
rendered nugatory.
Moreover, the endorsement in blank of the receipt in controversy together with its delivery by U.
de Poli to the appellant bank took place on the very of the issuance of the warehouse receipt,
thereby immediately demonstrating the intention of U. de Poli and of the appellant bank, by the
employment of the phrase "por orden del Sr. U. de Poli" to make the receipt negotiable and
subject to the very transfer which he then and there made by such endorsement in blank and
delivery of the receipt to the blank.
As hereinbefore stated, the receipt was not marked "non-negotiable." Under modern statutes the
negotiability of warehouse receipts has been enlarged, the statutes having the effect of making
such receipts negotiable unless marked "non-negotiable." (27 R. C. L., 967 and cases cited.)
Section 7 of the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, says:

TRANSLATION:
Exhibit A Referred to in the foregoing stipulation reads:

1st That first part owns about 2500 to three million pounds of tacabo of various kinds, produced
in the municipalities of San Isidro, Gapan Kabiaw and acquired by purchase with money
belonging to their separate property, which is her manager.

2nd That has agreed the sale of these two thousand five hundred to three thousand pounds of
snuff mentioned in Part II, whose sale is subject to the following conditions:

(A) The First Party shall send the second properly tied the snuff she owns in not less than fifty
kilos lumps, being aware of this Part all costs arising from such mercancja to the railway station
Tutuban in whose place the second charge will be made and from which point this will account
the risks of the goods.

(B) The price at which the Part II sold the snuff is mentioned twenty-six pesos (P26), Philippine
currency, per quintal, payable in the manner set out after.

(C) The second part will be the consignee of snuff in this City of Manila who charge upon receipt
of the bill of lading and the Internal Revenue guide, transferring it to his winery being the same
as the date of deposit to be made in that said second part pay the price of it, being aware of this
Part to pay storage and insurance.

(D) Check the last expedition of snuff, will proceed despite the intervention of the same Part or
agent thereof, and the total number of known quintals submitted, settlement price will be made
on account of which they will be paid fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000), and the remaining thirty
days after the previous payment will be divided into four vencederos promissory notes each; that
is, the first note will be due thirty days from the date on which they have paid fifteen thousand
pesos, the second time to equal the previous payment, and so on; on the understanding that
capital because as the price of snuff accrue an interest of ten percent per annum.

The time allowed to the buyer to pay the price are subject to the condition that if before the
expiration of any period, the buyer sells part of snuff in proportion to the amount of any of the
Notes that restasen expire, or if sells, as it should in this case that from the moment the band
Part snuff, deposit thereof, as security for the payment of the price, is canceled and
simultaneously is the amount required to pay part.

Read this article by grantors and finding it consistent with what for them agreed, they sign the
First Party to the place of residence, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, and the second in this City of
Manila, on the dates respectively at the foot of This document appear.

G.R. No. L-25748 March 10, 1975

CONSOLIDATED TERMINALS, INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ARTEX DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., defendant-appellee.
Pelaez, Jalandoni and Jamir for plaintiff-appellant.
Norberto J. Quisumbing and Humberto V. Quisumbing for defendant-appellee.

AQUINO, J.:+.wph!1
Consolidated Terminals, Inc. (CTI) appealed from the order of Judge Jesus Y. Perez of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, dismissing its amended complaint for damages against Artex
Development Co., Inc. (Artex for short). The dismissal was predicated on lack of cause of action.
The following ultimate facts, which were hypothetically admitted in the motion to dismiss, were
alleged in the amended complaint:

CTI was the operator of a customs bonded warehouse located at Port Area, Manila. It received
on deposit one hundred ninety-three (193) bales of high density compressed raw cotton valued
at P99,609.76. It was understood that CTI would keep the cotton in behalf of Luzon Brokerage
Corporation until the consignee thereof, Paramount Textile Mills, Inc., had opened the
corresponding letter of credit in favor of shipper, Adolph Hanslik Cotton of Corpus Christi, Texas.
Allegedly by virtue of a forged permit to deliver imported goods, purportedly issued by the
Bureau of Customs, Artex was able to obtain delivery of the bales of cotton on November 5 and
6, 1964 after paying CTI P15,000 as storage and handling charges. At the time the merchandise
was released to Artex, the letter of credit had not yet been opened and the customs duties and
taxes due on the shipment had not been paid. (That delivery permit, Annex A of the complaint,
was not included by CTI in its record on appeal).
CTI, in its original complaint, sought to recover possession of the cotton by means of a writ of
replevin. The writ could not be executed. CTI then filed an amended complaint by transforming
its original complaint into an action for the recovery from Artex of P99,609.76 as compensatory
damages, P10,000 as nominal and exemplary damages and P20,000 as attorney's fees.
It should be clarified that CTI in its affidavit for manual delivery of personal property (Annex B of
its complaint not included in its record on appeal) and in paragraph 7 of its original complaint
alleged that Artex acquired the cotton from Paramount Textile Mills, Inc., the consignee. Artex
alleged in its motion to dismiss that it was not shown in the delivery permit that Artex was the
entity that presented that document to the CTI. Artex further averred that it returned the cotton to
Paramount Textile Mills, Inc. when the contract of sale between them was rescinded because
the cotton did not conform to the stipulated specifications as to quality (14-15, Record on
Appeal). No copy of the rescissory agreement was attached to Artex's motion to dismiss.
In sustaining Artex's motion to dismiss, which CTI did not oppose in writing, Judge Perez
said:t.hqw
Since the plaintiff (CTI) is only a warehouseman and according to the
amended complaint, plaintiff was already paid the warehousing and
handling charges of the 193 bales of high density compressed raw cotton
mentioned in the complaint, the plaintiff can no longer recover for its
services as warehouseman.
The fact that the delivery of the goods was obtained by the defendant
without opening the corresponding letter of credit cannot be the basis of a
cause of action of the plaintiff because such failure of the defendant to open
the letter of credit gives rise to a cause of action in favor of the shipper of
the goods and not in favor of the plaintiff.
With respect to the allegation of the amended complaint that the goods
were taken by the defendant without paying the customs duties and other
revenues (sic) assessed thereon, this does not give rise to a cause of action
in favor of the plaintiff for the party aggrieved is the government.
Likewise, the alleged presentation of a forged permit to deliver imported
goods by the defendant did not give rise to a cause of action in favor of the
plaintiff but in favor of the Bureau of Customs and of the consignee. (18-19,
Record on Appeal).

Judge Perez was guided more by logic and common sense than by any specific rule of law or
jurisprudence.
CTI in this appeal contends that, as warehouseman, it was entitled to the possession (should be
repossession) of the bales of cotton; that Artex acted wrongfully in depriving CTI of the
possession of the merchandise because Artex presented a falsified delivery permit, and that
Artex should pay damages to CTI.
The only statutory rule cited by CTI is section 10 of the Warehouse Receipts Law which provides
that "where a warehouseman delivers the goods to one who is not in fact lawfully entitled to the
possession of them, the warehouseman shall be liable as for conversion to all having a right of
property or possession in the goods ...".
We hold that CTI's appeal has not merit. Its amended complaint does not clearly show that, as
warehouseman, it has a cause of action for damages against Artex. The real parties interested in
the bales of cotton were Luzon Brokerage Corporation as depositor, Paramount Textile Mills, Inc.
as consignee, Adolph Hanslik Cotton as shipper and the Commissioners of Customs and
Internal Revenue with respect to the duties and taxes. These parties have not sued CTI for
damages or for recovery of the bales of cotton or the corresponding taxes and duties.
The case might have been different if it was alleged in the amended complaint that the depositor,
consignee and shipper had required CTI to pay damages, or that the Commissioners of
Customs and Internal Revenue had held CTI liable for the duties and taxes. In such a case, CTI
might logically and sensibly go after Artex for having wrongfully obtained custody of the
merchandise.
But that eventuality has not arisen in this case. So, CTI's basic action to recover the value of the
merchandise seems to be untenable. It was not the owner of the cotton. How could it be entitled
to claim the value of the shipment?
In other words, on the basis of the allegations of the amended complaint, the lower court could
not render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer thereof. It could not render such valid
judgment because the amended complaint did not unequivocally allege what right of CTI was
violated by Artex, or, to use the familiar language of adjective law, what delict or wrong was
committed by Artex against CTI which would justify the latter in recovering the value of bales of
cotton even if it was not the owner thereof. (See Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. vs. Barrios, 79
Phil. 666; 1 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., pp. 259, 495).
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal is affirmed with costs against the plaintiff-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-23033

January 5, 1967

LUA KIAN, plaintiff and appellee,

vs.
MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY and MANILA PORT SERVICE, defendants and appellants.
D. F. Macaranas and S. V. Pampolina Jr. for defendants and appellants.
San Juan, Laig and Associates for plaintiff and appellee.

BENGZON, J. P., J.:

The present suit was filed by Lua Kian against the Manila Railroad Co. and Manila Port Service
for the recovery of the invoice value of imported evaporated "Carnation" milk alleged to have
been undelivered. The following stipulation of facts was made:
1. They admit each other's legal personality, and that during the time material to this
action, defendant Manila Port Service as a subsidiary of defendant Manila Railroad
Company operated the arrastre service at the Port of Manila under and pursuant to
the Management Contract entered into by and between the Bureau of Customs and
defendant Manila Port Service on February 29, 1956;
2. On December 31, 1959, plaintiff Lua Kian imported 2,000 cases of Carnation Milk
from the Carnation Company of San Francisco, California, and shipped on Board SS
"GOLDEN BEAR" per Bill of Lading No. 17;
3. Out of the aforesaid shipment of 2,000 cases of Carnation Milk per Bill of Lading
No. 17, only 1,829 cases marked `LUA KIAN 1458' were discharged from the vessel
SS `GOLDEN BEAR' and received by defendant Manila Port Service per pertinent
tally sheets issued by the said carrying vessel, on January 24, 1960;
4. Discharged from the same vessel on the same date unto the custody of defendant
Manila Port Service were 3,171 cases of Carnation Milk marked "CEBU UNITED
4860-PH-MANILA" consigned to Cebu United Enterprises, per Bill of Lading No. 18,
and on this shipment, Cebu United Enterprises has a pending claim for short-delivery
against defendant Manila Port Service;
5. Defendant Manila Port Service delivered to the plaintiff thru its broker, Ildefonso
Tionloc, Inc. 1,913 cases of Carnation Milk marked "LUA KIAN 1458" per pertinent
gate passes and broker's delivery receipts;
6. A provisional claim was filed by the consignee's broker for and in behalf of the
plaintiff on January 19, 1960, with defendant Manila Port Service;
7. The invoice value of the 87 cases of Carnation Milk claimed by the plaintiff to have
been short-delivered by defendant Manila Port Service is P1,183.11 while the invoice
value of the 87 cases of Carnation Milk claimed by the defendant Manila Port Service
to have been over-delivered by it to plaintiff is P1,130.65;
8. The 1,913 cases of Carnation mentioned in paragraph 5 hereof were taken by the
broker at Pier 13, Shed 3, sometime in February, 1960, where at the time, there were
stored therein, aside from the shipment involved herein, 1000 cases of Carnation Milk
bearing the same marks and also consigned to plaintiff Lua Kian but had been
discharged from SS `STEEL ADVOCATE' and covered by Bill of Lading No. 11;
9. Of the shipment of 1000 cases of Carnation Milk which also came from the
Carnation Company, San Francisco, California, U.S.A. and bearing the same marks
as the shipment herein but had been discharged from S/S "STEEL ADVOCATE" and
covered by Bill of Lading No. 11, Lua Kian as consignee thereof filed a claim for short-

delivery against defendant Manila Port Service, and said defendant Manila Port
Service paid Lua Kian plaintiff herein, P750.00 in settlement of its claim;
10. They reserve the right to submit documentary evidence;
11. They submit the matter of attorney's fees and costs to the sound discretion of the
Court.
On these facts and documentary evidence subsequently presented, the Court of First Instance
of Manila ruled that 1,829 cases marked Lua Kian (171 cases less than the 2,000 cases
indicated in the bill of lading and 3,171 cases marked "Cebu United" (171 cases over the 3,000
cases in the bill of lading were discharged to the Manila Port Service. Considering that Lua Kian
and Cebu United Enterprises were the only consignees of the shipment of 5,000 cases of
"Carnation" milk, it found that of the 3,171 cases marked "Cebu United", 171 should have been
delivered to Lua Kian. Inasmuch as the defendant Manila Port Service actually delivered 1,913
cases to plaintiff,1which is only 87 cases short of 2,000 cases as per bill of lading the former was
ordered to pay Lua Kian the sum of P1,183.11 representing such shortage of 87 cases, with
legal interest from the date of the suit, plus P500 as attorney's fees.
Defendants appealed to Us and contend that they should not be made to answer for the
undelivered cases of milk, insisting that Manila Port Service was bound to deliver only 1,829
cases to Lua Kian and that it had there before in fact over-delivered to the latter.
The bill of lading in favor of Cebu United Enterprises indicated that only 3,000 cases were due to
said consignee, although 3,171 cases were marked in its favor. Accordingly, the excess 171
cases marked "Cebu United" placed the defendant arrastre operator in a dilemma, for should it
deliver them to Lua Kian the goods could be claimed by the consignee Cebu United Enterprises
whose markings they bore, and should it deliver according to markings, to Cebu United
Enterprises, it might be sued by the consignee, Lua Kian whose bill of lading indicated that it
should receive 171 cases more. The dilemma itself, however, offered the solution. The legal
relationship between an arrastre operator and the consignee is akin to that of a depositor and

warehouseman.2 As custodian of the goods discharged from the vessel, it was defendant
arrastre operator's duty, like that of any ordinary depositary, to take good care of the goods and
to turn them over to the party entitled to their possession.3 Under this particular set of
circumstances, said defendant should have withheld delivery because of the discrepancy
between the bill of lading and the markings and conducted its own investigation, not unlike that
under Section 18 of the Warehouse Receipts Law, or called upon the parties, to interplead, such
as in a case under Section 17 of the same law, in order to determine the rightful owner of the
goods.
It is true that Section 12 of the Management Contract exempts the arrastre operator from
responsibility for misdelivery or non-delivery due to improper or insufficient marking. We cannot
however excuse the aforestated defendant from liability in this case before Us now because the
bill of lading showed that only 3,000 cases were consigned to Cebu United Enterprises. The fact
that the excess of 171 cases were marked for Cebu United Enterprises and that the
consignment to Lua Kian was 171 cases less than the 2,000 in the bill of lading, should have
been sufficient reason for the defendant Manila Port Service to withhold the goods pending
determination of their rightful ownership.
We therefore find the defendants liable, without prejudice to their taking whatever proper legal
steps they may consider worthwhile to recover the excess delivered to Cebu United Enterprises.
With respect to the attorney's fees awarded below, this Court notices that the same is about 50
per cent of the litigated amount of P1,183.11. We therefore deem it reasonable to decrease the
attorney's fees to P300.00.
Wherefore, with the aforesaid reservation, and with the modification that the attorney's fee is
reduced to P300.00, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants. So
ordered.