Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
However, on June 9, 2003, the NFA, through Assistant Regional Director Victoriano
Molina, chairman of respondent NFA-Regional Bids and Awards Committee (NFARBAC), notified petitioner to submit the required documents not later than June 19,
2003 in order to qualify for the bidding.
On June 26, 2003, the NFA-RBAC informed petitioner that its application to bid had
been rejected due to its failure to submit the required documents.
Aggrieved, petitioner sent a letter of protest to the NFA on July 10, 2003, contending
that until the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9184 can be
promulgated, no bidding should take place. Notwithstanding, respondents rejected
petitioners application.
Respondents defended their position, citing an instruction coming from then NFA
Administrator Arthur C. Yap which directed that in the absence of the said IRR and
due to the exigency of the service, respondents projects would be temporarily guided
by the provisions of E.O. No. 40, among others, provided the same are consistent
with R.A. No. 9184.
Unfazed, petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Prohibition and Preliminary
Injunction, with a prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
seeking, among others, to enjoin respondents from awarding the contract to another
security agency.
On August 8, 2003, the RTC issued a TRO against respondents. RTC granted the writ
of preliminary injunction in favor of petitioner and directed respondents to desist from
terminating petitioners services until further orders from the RTC. The RTC held that
the composition and the orders of the NFA-RBAC were void because the IRR of R.A.
No. 9184 has not yet been promulgated. The RTC also found that no observers from
the private sector were present in the bidding process as required by law.
RTC denied respondents motion for reconsideration
Thus, respondents sought recourse from the CA by way of certiorari under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, charging the RTC of grave abuse of
discretion in the issuance of the said orders.
CA granted the petition. It held that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it
issued the writ of preliminary injunction against respondents despite the utter lack of
basis and justification for its issuance. The CA highlighted that while IRR-A of R.A. No.
9184 took effect on October 8, 2003, and thus could not have been applied by the
RTC in its August 27, 2003 Order, its failure to consider the said IRR-A in resolving
respondents motion for reconsideration amounted to grave abuse of discretion. The
CA added that contrary to the trial courts ruling, there were three observers present
during the bidding process, as shown by the Minutes of the Meeting for public bidding
held on July 16, 2003. The CA further opined that petitioner did not appear to possess
a clear legal right to enjoin the awarding of the contract considering that petitioners
right to participate in the bidding was itself dubious as petitioner failed to submit the
necessary documents required by respondents.
Thunder filed an MR but the CA denied the same
Issue:
WON the CA erred in setting aside the RTC orders which granted injunctive relief to
petitioner
Held:
No.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to
judgment of final order, requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a
particular act or acts. It is a preservative remedy to ensure the protection of a partys
substantive rights or interests pending the final judgment in the principal action. A plea for
an injunctive writ lies upon the existence of a claimed emergency or extraordinary situation
which should be avoided for otherwise, the outcome of a litigation would be useless as far as
the party applying for the writ is concerned.
At times referred to as the Strong Arm of Equity, we have consistently ruled that there is no
power the exercise of which is more delicate and which calls for greater circumspection than
the issuance of an injunction. It should only be extended in cases of great injury where
courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages; in cases of
extreme urgency; where the right is very clear; where considerations of relative
inconvenience bear strongly in complainants favor; where there is a willful and unlawful
invasion of plaintiffs right against his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a
continuing one, and where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to reestablish and
maintain a preexisting continuing relation between the parties, recently and arbitrarily
interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new relation.
For the writ to issue, two requisites must be present, namely, the existence of the
right to be protected, and that the facts against which the injunction is to be
directed are violative of said right. It is necessary that one must show an
unquestionable right over the premises.
Thus, the following requisites must be proved before a writ of preliminary injunction,
be it mandatory or prohibitory, will issue:
1)
The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected,
that is a right in esse;
(2)
There is a material and substantial invasion of such right;
(3)
There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the
applicant; and
(4)
No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the
infliction of irreparable injury.
Respondent was not a dealer of petitioner nor was there any business dealing or
transaction at all between [petitioner] and [respondent]
Respondent was already selling imported Castrol GTX products even prior to the
execution of the Variation to Marketing and Distribution Agreement dated 23 July
1998 between [petitioner] and Castrol Limited, a corporation established under the
laws of England
Petitioner failed to show that [respondents] duty free importation of said Castrol GTX
products which were sold at its Parkson Duty Free Shop was a sinister scheme
employed by [respondent] in order to by-pass [petitioner]
Petitioner did not allege in its Complaint nor prove who the supplier of [respondent]
was with respect to said Castrol GTX products sold in Parkson Duty Free Shop. There
is no showing that [respondent] sought Castrol Limited of England in order to procure
Castrol GTX products for retailing inside the duty free shop of [respondent] within the
Clark Special Economic Zone, with the intention of violating the purported exclusive
marketing and distributorship agreement between [petitioner] and Castrol Limited of
England.
There is no evidence that any party was duped and that [respondent], who is not a
privy to the marketing and distribution agreement between [petitioner] and Castrol
Limited of England, employed any sinister scheme or ploy at all.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: whether or not petitioner is entitled to injunction against third-persons on the basis of
its marketing and distribution agreements.
NO.
Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain
from doing a certain act. It may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and
as an incident in the main action.
The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of
preliminary injunction which cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an
independent action or proceeding. As a matter of course, in an action for injunction, the
auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, may issue.
Under the law, the main action for injunction seeks a judgment embodying a final injunction
which is distinct from, and should not be confused with, the provisional remedy of
preliminary injunction, the sole object of which is to preserve the status quo until the merits
Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership (Ortigas) through its Manager, Manuel
Lozano (old manager), leased to Wellington Syquiatco (Wellington) a unit in
Gondolla alley at Greenhills Shopping Center at a monthly rental of Php1,500.
Later on, Wellington sold his leasehold rights & obligations of the Gondolla unit to
respondent spouses (Kings spouses), and such sale was approved by Ortigas.
When Ortigas dismissed Lozano (old Manager), it found out that the letter-lease
agreements signed by the latter, allegedly without authority, includes a clause
providing 6. Electric and water bins shall be for our (i.e. Ortigas) account."
(sa letter sa lease agreements ky nkaingon sa par.6 nga ang Ortigas kuno bhala sa
pagbayad sa electric ug water bills)
Lim (new manager) met with the Kings, wanted to correct the inequities in the lease
agreements. The Kings did not sign the new lease agreement.
So when the electricity bills came, Ortigas tried to collect from Kings for the payment
of such bills. But, Kings protested through a letter by citing par 6 of their
agreement (katong ingn c Ortigas nga xa kuno bhala sa elec ug water).
Subsequent bills came but Kings, still, refused to pay the said bills. Ortigas then
disconnected the electricity supply to them. (Napuno na c Ortigas Haha)
As a consequence, Kings then filed a civil case against Ortigas for specific
performance & damages, with prayer for issuance of prelim manda injunction.
Ortigas filed an opposition to Kings application for injunction. It argued that if the
injunction would be granted, the plaintiffs would be unjustly enriched at his
expense. (Reason: 2k kapin iya mabayran sa AVERAGE kuryente consumption ni
Kings unya 1,500 ra ang iyang kita. Haha. Subsidize xa ug 800 dw per monthLugi
ang bata Haha)
RTC denied the application. Kings appealed to CA.
CA reversed the denial, and issued the writ upon filing of bond by Kings.
Issue: WON the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying plaintiffs' application
for a preliminary mandatory injunction.
Ruling: NO!
The writ of preliminary injunction, in general, cannot be sought as a matter of right, but
its grant or refusal rests in the sound discretion of the court under the
circumstances and the facts of the particular case. The writ is the "strong arm of
equity" and therefore should not be used to sanction inequity.
The government established the Light Rail Transit System (LRT) which route is from
Baclaran to Balintawak Monument and vice versa.
Thus, negotiations were made between the government and the owners of the
properties affected by the project.
Some of the properties are owned by Joy Mart Consolidated, including the lot where
the Presidente Hotel leased by Joy Mart was located.
Joy Mart consented to sell the properties and give up its leasehold rights over the
adjacent properties, PROVIDED that it would be given the FIRST OPTION to redevelop
the entire area denominated as the CONSOLIDATED BLOCK of the LRT Carriedo
Station encompassing Joy Marts properties.
While negotiations were ongoing, the LRTA (Special Committee on Land and Property
Acquisition of the Light Rail Transit Authority) contracted with Philippine General
Hospital Foundation (PGHF).
PGHF was granted the right, authority, and license to develop the areas adjacent to
the LRT stations and to manage and operate the concessions to be established in
Caloocan, Manila, and Pasay, with the right to sublease, assign, and transfer any of
its rights and interests therein.
After that, Joy Mart conveyed its properties to LTRA through a Deed of Absolute Sale.
The said deed contained the right of first option.
As partial compliance with the aforestated first option, the PGH Foundation subleased
to Joy Mart the LRT Carriedo station covering the consolidated block for the purpose
of constructing a multi-storey building of first class materials.
LTRA however only allowed Joy Mart to occupy an area of 1,141.20 square meters as
the rest of the areas within the consolidated block would be used by the LRT station
and as set-back area or open space for the benefit of the commuting public.
It reminded LTRA of its right to exercise the first option.
Joy Mart then constructed an 8 storey building
Then, LTRA entered into Commercial Stalls Concession Contract with the Phoenix
Omega Development and Management Corporation ("Phoenix" for brevity) awarding
to it all the areas and commercial spaces within the three LRT terminals and the
fifteen (15) on-line stations.
Joy Mart learned of this, and demanded its right but to no avail.
Joy Mart filed a complaint for specific performance of contract and damages for
breach of contract with injunction against the LRTA and Phoenix on August 21, 1987.
The injunction was to
command
LTRA
and
Phoenix
individually
and
collectively, their officers and employees, to cease and desist from the construction
being had in the property adjacent to the leased premises.
RTC issued the injunction.
Phoenix sought relief in CA by filing a Petition for certiorari and prohibition. (naglibog
ko kay isa sa gipangayo ni Phoenix kay ibalik daw ang case sa original na RTC na first
naka take og jurisdiction, pero wala naman gisulti sa facts kung asa jud diay nag
una).
While it was pending in CA, Phoneix and LRTA petitioned to dissolve the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, offering to post a counterbond.
They alleged that the writ of preliminary injunction was causing tremendous losses to
LRTA and Phoenix because they have been unable to use the commercial stalls in the
consolidated block while Joy Mart could be compensated for any loss it may suffer if
the injunction were lifted.
Joy Mart opposed the petition.
RTC dissolved the writ (based on Sec.6, Rule 58) TAKE NOTE: na elevate na
ang matter sa CA.
CA knowing the RTC decision dismissed the certiorari petition for being moot and
academic.
This time, c Joy Mart na pod ang niadto sa CA for a TRO/ PRELIM INJUNCTION
CA temporarily restrained Phoenix and LTRA from continuing its activities until further
orders from CA.
Despite such order, Phoenix still continued with its activities.
Joy Mart filed a motion to declare Phoenix in contempt.
CA dismissed both petitions by Joy Mart.
Hence, this appeal.
Issue: whether the trial court continued to have control of the writ of preliminary injunction
even after the same had been raised to the Court of Appeals for review.
Held: NO.
After the LRTA and Phoenix had elevated the writ of preliminary injunction to the Court of
Appeals for determination of the propriety of its issuance (CA-G.R. SP No. 12998), the trial
court (notwithstanding the absence of a temporary restraining order from the appellate
court) could not interfere with or preempt the action or decision of the Court of Appeals on
the writ of preliminary injunction whose annulment was sought therein by Phoenix and the
LRTA.
In petitioning the trial court to lift the writ of preliminary injunction which they themselves
had brought up to the Court of Appeals for review, Phoenix and the LRTA engaged in forumshopping. After the question of whether the writ of preliminary injunction should be annulled
or continued had been elevated to the Court of Appeals for determination, the trial court lost
jurisdiction or authority to act on the same matter. By seeking from the trial court an order
lifting the writ of preliminary injunction, Phoenix and LRTA sought to divest the Court of
PCIB V NAMAWU
On December 22, 1975 the National Mines & Allied Workers' Union obtained in NLRC a
judgment ordering the Philippine Iron Mines, Inc. to pay the union P4,298,307.77 as
severance pay, etc. The judgment became final and executory on January 6, 1976.
On April 18, 1979 the NLRC, through a Labor Arbiter, granted the union's ex parte motion of
April 16, 1979 for the garnishment of the amount of P4,298,307.77 due from Atlas
Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation to the Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank and the Manila Banking Corporation, as part of the price for which the mining
machinery and equipment of the Philippine Iron Mines (acquired under foreclosure sale by
the two banks) was sold by the two banks to Atlas. (The total price was thirty million pesos.)
On that same date, April 18, Atlas complied with the writ of garnishment and delivered to
the sheriff a check for P4,298,307.77.
The order of garnishment and Atlas' compliance with it are assailed in this certiorari
proceeding on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the two banks were not parties in the
labor case and the funds garnished were not due to the judgment debtor, Philippine Iron
Mines.
After deliberating on these facts, the Court Resolved (1) to REQUIRE the respondents within
ten (10) days from notice to ANSWER the petition (not to file a motion to dismiss) and (2) to
ISSUE a WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION after the petitioners had filed a satisfactory bond
in the sum of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000). It should be specified in the writ that
Atlas is directed to stop payment on the said check, that respondent Union is enjoined from
cashing the check and, if the check has not yet been delivered to the union, then respondent
sheriff is directed to return the check to Atlas. If the check has been delivered to the Union,
the latter is enjoined from distributing the proceeds thereof to its members and to return the
check to Atlas. (Vol. 1, Record.) with the corresponding writ of preliminary injunction after
the required bond was filed on May 9, 1979, after petitioners filed their supplemental
petition of April 24, 1979 and Urgent Motion of April 30, 1979.
It appears, however, as stated in the answer of respondent Union dated October 10, 1979,
that "the check turned over by the Sheriff of the NLRC to herein respondent on April 20,
1979 was encashed on April 23, 1979 and the proceeds thereof were duly distributed to its
members/claimants on the same day (April 23, 1979) and everyday thereafter, until the
distribution was finished on May 5, 1979. In fact, on May 10, 1979, respondent union filed
with the Labor Arbiter a "Report of Compliance and Motion for Admission and Approval of
Schedule of Distribution" dated May 10, 1979, a copy of which is herewith attached and
made part hereof as Annex "18". A corresponding order approving the aforesaid distribution
was issued by Labor Arbiter Manuel B. Lorenzo on May 12, 1979, a copy of which is herewith
attached and made part hereof as Annex "19". Under the present circumstances, respondent
union can only invoke the following legal principle: 1wph1
The established principle is that when the events sought to be prevented by injunction or
prohibition have already happened, nothing more could be enjoined or prohibited because
Paras v ROURA
Facts:
Judge Roura Judge who handled the principal case Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines,
Inc. vs. Hon. Reynaldo V. Roura, etc. et al
Ricardo L. Paras who filed this Complaint in his capacity as General Manager of
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.
Oscar G. Tiglao - driver of the Philippine Rabbit
Rosanna Del Rosario Complainant of the main case.
Since the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied, Judge issued an Order
directing issuance of a Subsidiary Writ of Execution against the employer of
Oscar G. Tiglao, that is, the Philippine Rabbit. Upon receipt of this Order,
Philippine Rabbit filed a Notice of Appeal which was denied by the respondent
Judge.
By Letter dated 30 March 1987, Pulgar, reminded Deputy Sheriff that the
Temporary Restraining Order issued by CA had expired on 24 March 1987 and
requested to proceed with the sale of the bus. Acting on this request, Carreon
issued a Sheriff's Notice of Sale on 7 April 1987 setting the date of the public
auction sale of Bus on 14 April 1987.
On 13 April 1987, Phil Rabbit then filed with the CA an Urgent Motion seeking
the extension of the lifetime of the Temporary Restraining Order on the same
date and by filing with the respondent Judge an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to
Hold in Abeyance the scheduled sale of PRBL Inc. property."
On 14 April 1987, Judge Roura denied PRs Ex-Parte Motion for having become
moot and academic, the auction sale having taken place as scheduled and
Rosanna del Rosario, being the highest bidder, having already bought Bus No.
239 for the amount of P250,000.00.
CA then gave a Resolution on 8 May 1987 granting the PRs application for a
preliminary injunction, the affectivity of which was conditioned upon
Philippine Rabbit's filing a bond covering the award of damages by the trial
Hence this admin case was filed by Paras, under the theory that the phrase
"until further order from [the Court of Appeals)" had the effect of restraining
respondents from implementing the Subsidiary Writ indefinitely until the
restraining order is lifted by the issuing court.
Issue:
W/N Judge Roura, Deputy Sheriff Carreon and Atty. Pulgar are administratively liable
for implementing the Subsidiary Writ of Execution notwithstanding the presence of
the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the CA.
Held:
No. This administrative complaint has no legal basis.
Section 8 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, set out a general rule
concerning the duration of effectivity of restraining orders issued by "all inferior
courts which is the 20 day period.
In Celso Defalobos v. Hon. Gregorio U. Aquilizan, etc., et al., 1 SC reiterated
that, it is well-settled that the life span of a temporary restraining order
automatically expires on the 20th day by the sheer force of law and no judicial
declaration to that effect is necessary. The extension by the respondent judge of the
restraining order was already void therefore, as correctly contended by the SolicitorGeneral, there was no effective restraining order which the petitioner could have
disobeyed hence contempt had no basis.
In Delbros Hotel Corporation v. The Intermediate Appellate Court, etc., et
al.,G.R. No. 72566, the Supreme Court held that the above quoted Section 8 of the
Interim Rules and Guidelines is applicable to temporary restraining orders issued by
the Court of Appeal. This is emphasized in the preamble of the Interim Rules which
states that the same shall apply to all inferior courts according to the Constitution."
The term "inferior courts" as used therein refers to all courts except the Supreme
Court, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals.
It follows, therefore, that respondent Judge Roura did not violate any legally
effective act or order of the Court of Appeals when he dismissed Philippine Rabbit's
ex parte Motion to Hold in Abeyance the scheduled sale of PRBL Inc. property.
Similarly, the Temporary Restraining Order of 3 March 1987 of the Court of Appeals
had already lapsed when Deputy Sheriff Carreon implemented anew on 14 April
1987 the Subsidiary Writ of Execution and Atty. Pulgar's act of requesting in writing
the Deputy Sheriff to proceed with the Notice of Sale upon expiration of the twentyday period, was strictly in accordance with law. There was no legal impediment to
Rivera v. Florendo
FACTS:
preliminary mandatory injunction is the exception rather than the rule, but
according to the Code Commission, in its report on page 98, "the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction is called for by the fact that there are at
present prolonged litigation between owner and usurper and the former is
deprived of his possession even when he has an immediate right thereto." In
the instant case, the right of the petitioners is clear and unmistakable on the
law and the facts and there exists an urgent and paramount necessity for the
issuing of the writ in order to prevent extreme or rather serious damage
which ensues from withholding it.)
Riveras counsels filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that
respondent Judge has no jurisdiction to entertain the case, while through Atty.
Bueno, they filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order granting the
issuance of a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction. Judge Florendo denied
both but increased the amount of the bond from P30,000.00 to P120,000.00
to sufficiently protect the interests of herein petitioners.
On August 14, 1981 petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Restraining Order
and Other Provisional Injunctive Reliefs
In the same resolution of August 17, 1981, after deliberating on the petition
and supplemental to the petition, the Court Resolved: (a) to require the
respondents to comment thereon (not to file a motion to dismiss within ten
(10) days from notice and (b) upon petitioners' filing of an injunction
bond in the amount of P30,000.00 to issue a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction enjoining respondents from enforcing the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction dated June 23, 1981 issued in Civil
Case No. 132673. (Rollo, p. 160). Said bond was filed on August 20, 1981
(Rollo, p. 161) and accordingly, a writ of preliminary injunction was
issued by this Court on August 21, 1981 (SC issued a PI to enjoin the
enforcement of the PMI issued by lower court)
Subsequently, petitioners filed a manifestation and urgent motion on August
28, 1981 praying that private respondent Lourdes Jureidini and her counsel
Atty. Arthur Canlas be declared in contempt of court for the former's alleged
defiant refusal: (a) to acknowledge receipt of the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction of August 21, 1981 and (b) to comply with the said writ issued by
this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge erred in issuing the writ of
mandatory preliminary injunction in this case
RULING: YES
Petitioners insist that what was issued was a provisional receivership, while private
respondents maintain that the trial court issued a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction. Be that as it may, it appears obvious that from the abovementioned
rulings of this Court, petitioners' contention that respondent Judge in the issuance
thereof committed acts of grave abuse of discretion, is well taken.
Whether or not the TC had jurisdiction over the subject matter: YES
(before ni xas amendment transferring jurisdiction to the rtc haaaa)
It has already been settled that an intracorporate controversy would call for the
jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission. (Hello! Sauna pa man ni na
law) On the other hand, an intra-corporate controversy has been defined as "one
which arises between a stockholder and the corporate. There is no distinction,
qualification, nor any exemption whatsoever."
As confirmed by this Court, "shares of stock may be transferred by delivery to the
transferee of the certificate properly indorsed. 'Title may be vested in the transferee
by delivery of the certificate with a written assignment or indorsement thereof '
There should be compliance with the mode of transfer prescribed by law.
There is merit in the findings of the lower court that the present
controversy is not an intracorporate controversy; private respondents are
not yet stockholders; they are only seeking to be registered as
stockholders because of an alleged sale of shares of stock to them.
A restraining order was issued against Carbungco by the CA on March 11, 1987
On April 9, 1987, respondent Court issued another restraining order "in view of the
special circumstances under which this case is being heard. . .
Issue:
WON CA may issue another temporary restraining order of indefinite duration after
the first had automatically expired on the twentieth (20th) day of its issuance without
private respondents having taken steps to obtain a preliminary injunction.
Held:
No.
Sec. 5 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court as amended by BP Blg. 224, which reads:
Sec. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; issuance of restraining order. No
preliminary injunction shall be granted without notice to the defendant. If it shall appear
from the facts shown by a affidavits or by the verified complaint that great or irreparable
injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the judge to
whom the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue a restraining order to
be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from date of its issuance. Within the said
20-day period, the judge must cause an order to be served on the defendant requiring him
to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted, and
determine within the same period whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted,
and shall accordingly issue the corresponding order. In the event that the application for
preliminary injunction is denied, the restraining order is deemed automatically vacated.
is also applicable to the Court of Appeals.
Carbungco v. CA
G.R. No. 78265
January 22, 1990
Facts:
Issue:
WON CA may issue another temporary restraining order of indefinite duration
after the first had automatically expired on the twentieth (20th) day of its
issuance without private respondents having taken steps to obtain a
preliminary injunction.
Held:
No.
Sec. 5 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court as amended by BP Blg. 224, which
reads:
Sec. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; issuance of restraining
order. No preliminary injunction shall be granted without notice to the defendant.
If it shall appear from the facts shown by a affidavits or by the verified complaint
that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can
be heard on notice, the judge to whom the application for preliminary injunction was
made, may issue a restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20)
days from date of its issuance. Within the said 20-day period, the judge must cause
an order to be served on the defendant requiring him to show cause, at a specified
FACTS:
On 1 August 1984, RMC Garments, Inc. (RMC) leased from Peter Pan Corporation (Peter
Pan) its properties (Leased Premises) located on Ortigas, Metro Manila where RMC, a
garments manufacturing company, installed machinery on the Leased Premises and brought
in furniture, office equipment and supplies.
Two years thereafter, Rosario Textile Mills Corp. (Rosario Textile) advised RMC in a letter
that it had acquired the Leased Premises, including the chattels found inside, from GBC
Corporation (GBC) through a Deed of Assignment of Rights and Interests and demanded
RMC to vacate the Leased Premises within 10 days. Rosario Textile proceeded to exercise its
right of self-help. Representatives of Rosario Textile entered the Leased Premises; cut off
RMCs power supply and communication lines; barricaded the road leading to the Leased
Premises, padlocked the entrances and posted guards to prevent entry and Rosario Textile
removed the machinery, equipment, garments and other chattels found inside the Leased
Premises.