Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
A. In General
1. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. MAXIMO A.
MACEREN CFI, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, JOSE BUENAVENTURA,
GODOFREDO REYES, BENJAMIN REYES, NAZARIO AQUINO
and CARLO DEL ROSARIO, G.R. No. L-32166, October 18,
1977
Parties:
Plaintiff-appellant: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Accused-appellees: HON. MAXIMO A. MACEREN CFI, Sta.
Cruz, Laguna, JOSE BUENAVENTURA, GODOFREDO REYES,
BENJAMIN REYES, NAZARIO AQUINO and CARLO DEL
ROSARIO
Ponente: AQUINO, J.
Facts:
On June 28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, upon the recommendation of the Fisheries Commission,
issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1, amending section 2
of Administrative Order No. 84, by restricting the ban against
electro fishing to fresh water fisheries. Thus, the phrase "in any
portion of the Philippine waters" found in section 2, was changed by
the amendatory order to read as follows: "in fresh water fisheries in
the Philippines, such as rivers, lakes, swamps, dams, irrigation
canals and other bodies of fresh water."
On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin
Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a
Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz,
Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 841. It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the
morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro fishing in the waters
of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz.
Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court quashed the
complaint. The prosecution appealed. The Court of First Instance of
Laguna affirmed the order of dismissal. The case is now before this
Court on appeal by the prosecution under Republic Act No. 5440.
The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize
because electric current is not an obnoxious or poisonous
Ponente: MORELAND, J.
Facts:
COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS is a foreign
corporation organized under the laws of Spain and engaged in
business in the Philippine Islands as a common carrier of
passengers and merchandise by water: On June 7, 1915, the Board
of Public Utility Commissioners issued and caused to be served an
order to show cause why they should not be required to present
detailed annual reports respecting its finances and operations
respecting the vessels owned and operated by it, in the form and
containing the matters indicated by the model attached to the
petition.
They are ordered to present annually on or before March first of
each year a detailed report of finances and operations of such
vessels as are operated by it as a common carrier within the
Philippine Islands, in the form and containing the matters indicated
in the model of annual report which accompanied the order to show
cause herein.
COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS denied the
authority of the board to require the report asked for on the ground
that the provision of Act No. 2307 relied on by said board as
authority for such requirement was, if construed as conferring such
power, invalid as constituting an unlawful attempt on the part of
the Legislature to delegate legislative power to the board. It is
cumbersome and unnecessarily prolix and that the preparation of
the same would entail an immense amount of clerical work."
Issue:
1. Whether or not it is constitutional to require COMPANIA GENERAL
DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS to pass a detailed report to the Board of
Public Utility Commissioners of the Philippine Islands.
2. Whether the power to require the detailed report is strictly
legislative, or administrative, or merely relates to the execution of
the law.
Ruling:
The section of Act No. 2307 under which the Board of Public Utility
Commissioners relies for its authority, so far as pertinent to the
case at hand, reads as follows:
Sec. 16. The Board shall have power, after hearing, upon
notice, by order in writing, to require every public utility as
herein defined: (e) To furnish annually a detailed report of
finances and operations, in such form and containing such
matters as the Board may from time to time by order
prescribe.
The statute which authorizes a Board of Public Utility
Commissioners to require detailed reports from public utilities,
leaving the nature of the report, the contents thereof, the general
lines which it shall follow, the principle upon which it shall proceed,
indeed, all other matters whatsoever, to the exclusive discretion of
the board, is not expressing its own will or the will of the State with
respect to the public utilities to which it refers.
Such a provision does not declare, or set out, or indicate what
information the State requires, what is valuable to it, what it needs
in order to impose correct and just taxation, supervision or control,
or the facts which the State must have in order to deal justly and
equitably with such public utilities and to require them to deal justly
and equitably with the State. The Legislature seems simply to have
authorized the Board of Public Utility Commissioners to require
what information the board wants. It would seem that the
Legislature, by the provision in question, delegated to the Board of
Public Utility Commissioners all of its powers over a given subjectmatter in a manner almost absolute, and without laying down a
rule or even making a suggestion by which that power is to be
directed, guided or applied.
The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the
law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what shall be, and
conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be
done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.
The Supreme Court held that there was no delegation of legislative
power, it said:
The Congress may not delegate its purely legislative powers to a
commission, but, having laid down the general rules of action under
which a commission shall proceed, it may require of that
commission the application of such rules to particular situations
and the investigation of facts, with a view to making orders in a
particular matter within the rules laid down by the Congress.
In section 20 (of the Commerce Act), Congress has authorized the
commission to require annual reports. The act itself prescribes in
directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied
the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by
petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City
Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu
Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No.
4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial
boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted
person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a
city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only
provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is
unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides
equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion
to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of
power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of
the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing
probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.
Issue:
Parties:
Petitioner: Restituto Ynot
Respondents: INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE
STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE,
BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR,
BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY
Ponente: CRUZ, J.
Facts:
In 1980, President Ferdinand Marcos issued Executive Order No.
626-A prohibiting the transportation and slaughtering of carabaos.
Principles:
Police power: To justify the State in thus interposing its authority
in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require such interference; and second, that the means are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same
lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with
equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz.,
that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the
original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute
ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement,
providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported
from one province to another." The object of the prohibition
escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the
questioned measure is missing.
We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport
of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering
that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one
province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one
province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than
moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them
Ponente: CRUZ, J.
Facts:
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he
was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow
sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and
Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner
of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the
POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been filed
against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed
jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties
ruled in favor of the complainant. The award consisted of
P180,000.00 as death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses.
The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of
P192,000.00
by
the
Philippine
Overseas
Employment
Administration (POEA) for the death of her husband. The decision is
challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA
had no jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an
overseas worker.
The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint
was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System
and should have been filed against the State Fund Insurance. The
POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the
position papers of the parties ruled in favour of the complainant.
Issue:
Whether or not the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as
violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power.
Ruling:
No. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is an administrative regulation. The
model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant
number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power
of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring
the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard
guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That
standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in
creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration,
mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to
"fair and equitable employment practices."
Parties:
Petitioner: ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land
Transportation Commissioner
Respondents: HON. VICENTE G. ERICTA in his capacity as
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Br. XVIII, Quezon
City, and TEDDY C. GALO
Ponente: FERNANDO, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Romeo Edu, the Land Transportation Commissioner
issued Administrative Order No. 2, which took effect on April 17,
1990, which provides as follows:
No motor vehicles of whatever style, kind, make, class or
denomination shall be registered if not equipped with
reflectors. Such reflectors shall either be factory built-inreflector commercial glass reflectors, reflection tape or
luminous paint. The luminosity shall have an intensity to be
maintained visible and clean at all times such that if struck
by a beam of light shall be visible 100 meters away at
night. Then came a section on dimensions, placement and
color. As to dimensions the following is provided for: Glass
reflectors- not less than 3 inches in diameter or not less
than 3 inches square; Reflectorized tape- at least 3 inches
wide and 12 inches long. The painted or taped area may be
bigger at the discretion of the vehicle owner. Provision is
then made as to how such reflectors are to be placed,
installed, pasted or painted.
There is the further
requirement that in addition to such reflectors there shall be
installed, pasted or painted four reflectors on each side of
the motor vehicle parallel to those installed, pasted or
Facts:
In January of 1994, the New Tropical Medicine Foundation, with the
assistance of the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) released its final report of a study on the Philippine blood
banking system entitled Project to Evaluate the Safety of the
Philippine Blood Banking System. It was revealed that of the blood
units collected in 1992, 64.4% were supplied by commercial blood
banks, 14.5% by the PNRC, 13.7% by government hospital-based
blood banks, and 7.4% by private hospital-based blood banks;
showing that the Philippines heavily relied on commercial sources
of blood. It was further found, among other things, that blood sold
by persons to blood commercial banks are three times more likely
to have any of the four (4) tested infections or blood transfusion
transmissible diseases, namely, malaria, syphilis, Hepatitis B and
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome(AIDS) than those donated
to PNRC.
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994
was then enacted into law on April 2, 1994. The Act seeks to
provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary
blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the country. One
of the provisions of the said act was the phasing out of commercial
blood banks within 2 years from its effectivity.
Petitioners, comprising the majority of the Board of Directors of the
Philippine Association of Blood Banks assail the constitutionality of
RA 7719 on the ground among others that it violates the equal
protection clause for irrationally discriminating against free
standing blood banks in a manner which is not germane to the
purpose of the law.
Issue:
WON R.A. 7719 violates the petitioners right to equal protection of
the law.
Ruling:
No. Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring
others is prohibited but classification on a reasonable basis and not
made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted. The classification,
however, to be reasonable: a) must be based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences; b) must be germane to
the purpose of the law; c) must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and d) must apply equally to each member of the class.
Facts:
For the calendar year 1986, BPI Leasing Corporation, Inc. (BLC) paid
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) a total of
P1,139,041.49 representing 4% "contractors percentage tax" then
imposed by Section 205 of the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC), based on its gross rentals from equipment leasing for the
said year amounting to P27,783,725.42.
On November 10, 1986, the CIR issued RR 19-86. Section 6.2
thereof provided that finance and leasing companies registered
under Republic Act 5980 shall be subject to gross receipt tax of 5%3%-1% on actual income earned. This means that companies
registered under Republic Act 5980, such as BLC, are not liable for
"contractors percentage tax" under Section 205 but are, instead,
subject to "gross receipts tax" under Section 260 (now Section 122)
of the NIRC. Since BLC had earlier paid the aforementioned
"contractors percentage tax," it re-computed its tax liabilities
under the "gross receipts tax" and arrived at the amount of
P361,924.44. BLC filed a claim for a refund with the CIR for the
amount of P777,117.05, representing the difference between the
About a month after the enactment and two (2) days before the
effectivity of RA 7654, Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93
("RMC 37-93"), was issued by the BIR.
Under the foregoing, the test for imposition of the 55% ad valorem
tax on cigarettes is that the locally manufactured cigarettes bear a
foreign brand regardless of whether or not the right to use or title
to the foreign brand was sold or transferred by its owner to the
local manufacturer. The brand must be originally owned by a
foreign manufacturer or producer. If ownership of the cigarette
brand is, however, not definitely determinable, ". . . the listing of
brands manufactured in foreign countries appearing in the current
World Tobacco Directory shall govern. . . ."
In view of the foregoing, the aforesaid brands of cigarettes, viz:
"HOPE," "MORE" and "CHAMPION" being manufactured by Fortune
Tobacco Corporation are hereby considered locally manufactured
cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem
tax on cigarettes.
On 02 July 1993, at about 17:50 hours, BIR Deputy Commissioner
Victor A. Deoferio, Jr., sent via telefax a copy of RMC 37-93 to
Fortune Tobacco but it was addressed to no one in particular. On 15
July 1993, Fortune Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a certified
xerox copy of RMC 37-93.
In a letter, dated 19 July 1993, addressed to the appellate division
of the BIR, Fortune Tobacco requested for a review, reconsideration
and recall of RMC 37-93. The request was denied on 29 July 1993.
The following day, or on 30 July 1993, the CIR assessed Fortune
Tobacco for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00.
On 10 August 1994, the CTA upheld the position of Fortune Tobacco
and adjudged:
WHEREFORE,
Revenue
Memorandum
Circular
No.
37-93
reclassifying the brands of cigarettes, viz: "HOPE," "MORE" and
"CHAMPION" being manufactured by Fortune Tobacco Corporation
as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject
to the 55% ad valorem tax on cigarettes is found to be defective,
invalid and unenforceable, such that when R.A. No. 7654 took effect
on July 3, 1993, the brands in question were not CURRENTLY
CLASSIFIED AND TAXED at 55% pursuant to Section 1142(c)(1) of
the Tax Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7654 and were therefore still
classified as other locally manufactured cigarettes and taxed at
45% or 20% as the case may be.
In the instant case, the subject matter of the laws authorizing the
President to regulate or forbid importation of used motor vehicles,
In sum, the Court finds that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is void
insofar as it is made applicable to the presently secured fenced-in
Issue:
Whether or not PHILRACOM had unconstitutionally delegated its
rule-making power to PRCI and MJCI in issuing the directive for
them to come up with club rules.
Ruling:
No. PETITION is DISMISSED. The court finds no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of Philracom in issuing the contested
guidelines and on the part MJCI and PRCI in complying with
Philracoms directive.
The validity of an administrative issuance, such as the assailed
guidelines, hinges on compliance with the following requisites:
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
2. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed
procedure;
3. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the
legislature;
4. It must be reasonable.
All the prescribed requisites are met as regards the questioned
issuances. Philracoms authority is drawn from P.D. No. 420. The
delegation made in the presidential decree is valid. Philracom did
not exceed its authority. And the issuances are fair and reasonable.
The rule is that what has been delegated cannot be delegated, or
as expressed in the Latin maxim: potestas delegate non delegare
potest. This rule is based upon the ethical principle that such
delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be
performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own
judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not
through the intervening mind of another. This rule however admits
of recognized exceptions such as the grant of rule-making power to
administrative agencies. They have been granted by Congress with
the authority to issue rules to regulate the implementation of a law
entrusted to them. Delegated rule-making has become a practical
necessity in modern governance due to the increasing complexity
and variety of public functions.
However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a
showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law
(a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b)
The contentions of the appellees are not tenable. R.A. 2056 merely
empowers the Secretary to remove unauthorized obstructions or
encroachments upon public streams, constructions that no private
person was anyway entitled to make, because the bed of navigable
streams is public property, and ownership thereof is not acquirable
by adverse possession. It is true that the exercise of the Secretary's
power under the Act necessarily involves the determination of
some questions of fact, such as the existence of the stream and its
previous navigable character; but these functions, whether judicial
or quasi-judicial, are merely incidental to the exercise of the power
granted by law to clear navigable streams of unauthorized
obstructions or encroachments, and authorities are clear that they
are, validly conferable upon executive officials provided the party
affected is given opportunity to be heard, as is expressly required
by Republic Act No. 2056, section 2.The mere fact that an officer is
required by law to inquire the existence of certain facts and to
apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct
shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private, rights do
not constitute an exercise of judicial powers. Accordingly, a statute
may give to non-judicial officers the power to declare the existence
of facts which call into operation its provisions, and similarly may
grant to commissioners and other subordinate officer, power to
ascertain and determine appropriate facts as a basis for procedure
in the enforcement of particular laws. It is noteworthy that Republic
Act 2605 authorizes removal of the unauthorized dikes either as
"public nuisances or as prohibited constructions" on public
navigable streams, and those of appellees clearly are in the latter
class. In fine, it is held that Republic Act No. 2056 does not
constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial power to the Secretary
of Public Works; that the findings of fact of the Secretary of Public
Works under Republic Act No. 2056should be respected in the
absence of illegality, error of law, fraud, or imposition, so long as
the said, findings are supported by substantial evidence submitted
Issue:
Petitioner is in effect questioning the constitutionality of Executive
Orders Nos. 546 and 196 on the ground that the same do not fix a
standard for the exercise of the power therein conferred.
Ruling:
The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no
doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication.
Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to
petitioner and to no other. Further, it is premised on a finding of
fact, although patently superficial, that there is merit in a reduction
of some of the rates charged- based on an initial evaluation of
petitioner's financial statements-without affording petitioner the
benefit of an explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of
the financial statements warranted a corresponding rate reduction.
No rationalization was offered nor were the attending
contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted respondents to
impose as much as a fifteen percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not
far-fetched to assume that petitioner could be in a better position
to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the viability of its business
requirements. The rates it charges result from an exhaustive and
detailed study it conducts of the multi-faceted intricacies attendant
to a public service undertaking of such nature and magnitude. We
are, therefore, inclined to lend greater credence to petitioner's
ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its rates would
adversely affect its operations and the quality of its service to the
public considering the maintenance requirements, the projects it
PHILIPPINE
INTERISLAND
SHIPPING
OF THE PHILIPPINES, CONFERENCE OF
SHIPOWNERS AND OPERATORS, UNITED
who would charge rates under E.O. No. 1088. The PPA instead
issued Memorandum Circular No. 43-86, fixing pilotage fees at
rates lower than those provided in E.O. No. 1088.
On February 26, 1988, the PPA issued Administrative Order No. 0288, entitled IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES ON OPEN PILOTAGE
SERVICE. The PPA announced in its order that it was leaving to the
contracting parties, i.e., the shipping lines and the pilots, the fixing
of mutually acceptable rates for pilotage services, thus abandoning
the rates fixed by it (PPA) under Memorandum Circular No. 43-86,
as well as those provided in E.O. No. 1088. The administrative order
provided:
Sec. 3. Terms/Conditions on Pilotage Service. The shipping line or
vessel's agent/representative and the harbor pilot/firm chosen by
the former shall agree between themselves, among others, on what
pilotage service shall be performed, the use of tugs and their rates,
taking into consideration the circumstances stated in Section 12 of
PPA AO No. 03-85, and such other conditions designed to ensure
the safe movement of the vessel in pilotage areas/grounds.
Issue:
Whether Executive Order No. 1088 is valid and petitioners are
bound to obey it.
Ruling:
Nor is there any doubt of the power of the then President to fix
rates. On February 3, 1986, when he issued E.O. No. 1088,
President Marcos was authorized under Amendment No. 6 of the
1973 Constitution to exercise legislative power, just as he was
under the original 1973 Constitution, when he issued P.D. No. 857
which created the PPA, endowing it with the power to regulate
pilotage service in Philippine ports. Although the power to fix rates
for pilotage had been delegated to the PPA, it became necessary to
rationalize the rates of charges fixed by it through the imposition of
uniform rates. That is what the President did in promulgating E.O.
No. 1088. As the President could delegate the ratemaking power to
the PPA, so could he exercise it in specific instances without
thereby withdrawing the power vested by P.D. No. 857, 20(a) in
the PPA "to impose, fix, prescribe, increase or decrease such rates,
charges or fees . . . for the services rendered by the Authority or by
any private organization within a Port District."
the prior approval of the DECS. Schools that wish to increase school
fees beyond the ceiling would be subject to the discretion of the
DECS;
(2) Any private school may increase its total school fees in excess
of the ceiling, provided that the total schools fees will not exceed
P1,000.00 for the school year in the elementary and secondary
levels, and P50.00 per academic unit on a semestral basis for the
collegiate level. 1
The DECS took note of the report of the Task Force and on the basis
of the same, the DECS, through the respondent Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports (hereinafter referred to as the
respondent Secretary), issued an Order authorizing, inter alia, the
15% to 20% increase in school fees as recommended by the Task
Force. The petitioner sought a reconsideration of the said Order,
apparently on the ground that the increases were too high. 2
Thereafter, the DECS issued Department Order No. 37 dated April
10, 1987 modifying its previous Order and reducing the increases
to a lower ceiling of 10% to 15%, accordingly. 3 Despite this
reduction, the petitioner still opposed the increases. On April 23,
1987, the petitioner, through counsel, sent a telegram to the
President of the Philippines urging the suspension of the
implementation of Department Order No. 37. 4 No response
appears to have been obtained from the Office of the President.
Thus, on May 20, 1987, the petitioner, allegedly on the basis of the
public interest, went to this Court and filed the instant Petition for
prohibition, seeking that judgment be rendered declaring the
questioned Department Order unconstitutional. The thrust of the
Petition is that the said Department Order was issued without any
legal basis. The petitioner also maintains that the questioned
Department Order was issued in violation of the due process clause
of the Constitution in as much as the petitioner was not given due
notice and hearing before the said Department Order was issued.
Issue:
Whether or not the fixing of school fees through department order
by DECS is a valid delegation of legislative power.
Ruling:
After a careful examination of the entire record of the case, We find
the instant Petition devoid of merit.
SEC. 57.
Educations and powers of the Ministry. The Ministry
shall:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(3)
Promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the
administration, supervision and regulation of the educational
system in accordance with declared policy.
xxx
xxx
xxx 9
Section 70 of the same Act grants the DECS the power to issue
rules which are likewise necessary to discharge its functions and
duties under the law, to wit:
SEC. 70.
Rule-making Authority. The Minister of Education
and Culture, charged with the administration and enforcement of
this Act, shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and
regulations.
In the absence of a statute stating otherwise, this power includes
the power to prescribe school fees. No other government agency
has been vested with the authority to fix school fees and as such,
the power should be considered lodged with the DECS if it is to
properly and effectively discharge its functions and duties under
the law.
We find the remaining argument of the petitioner untenable. The
petitioner invokes the due process clause of the Constitution
against the alleged arbitrariness of the assailed Department Order.
The petitioner maintains that the due process clause requires that
prior notice and hearing are indispensable for the Department
Order to be validly issued.
We disagree.
The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may
be either a legislative or an adjudicative function. If it were a
legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the
affected parties is not a requirement of due process. As regards
rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its
quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the
validity of such rates. When the rules and/or rates laid down by an
Parties:
Petitioner-appellant: VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC.
Ponente: BARRERA, J.
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its
promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory
authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in
agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom. On
the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best
merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the
law means.
Section 8 (f) of Republic Act No. 1161 which, before its amendment,
reads as follows:
The case was then raised to the SC, with each party arguing in the
following manner: CFI rules that the circulars retroactive effect on
past due loans impairs the obligation of contracts and deprives
Tayug Rural of property without due process of law. Central Bank
reasons that Tayug Rural, despite the loans, should have known
that rules and regulations authorize the Central Bank to impose
additional reasonable penalties.
Issue:
Whether or not The Central Bank can validly impose the 10%
penalty via Memorandum Circular No. DLC-8.
Ruling:
No. A reading of the circular and pertinent provisions, including that
of R.A No. 720, shows that nowhere therein is the authority given to
the Monetary Board to mete out additional penalties to the rural
banks on past due accounts with the Central Bank. As said by the
CFI, while the Monetary Board possesses broad supervisory powers,
nonetheless, the retroactive imposition of administrative penalties
cannot be taken as a measure supervisory in character.
Administrative rules have the force and effect of law. There are,
however, limitations in the rule-making power of administrative
agencies. All that is required of administrative rules and regulations
is to implement given legislation by not contradicting it and
conform to the standards prescribed by law. Rules and regulations
cannot go beyond the basic law. Since compliance therewith can be
enforced by a penal sanction, an administrative agency cannot
implement a penalty not provided in the law authorizing it, much
less one that is applied retroactively.
The new clause imposing an additional penalty was not part of the
promissory notes when Tayug Rural took out its loans. The law
cannot be given retroactive effect. More to the point, the Monetary
Board revoked the additional penalty later in 1970, which clearly
shows an admission that it had no power to impose the same. The
Central bank hoped to rectify the defect by revising the DLC Form
later. However, Tayug Rural must pay the additional 10% in case of
suit, since in the promissory notes, 10% should be paid in
attorneys fees and costs of suit and collection.
The decision of the trial court was affirmed with modification that
Appellee Rural Bank is ordered to pay a sum equivalent to 10% of
the outstanding balance of its past overdue accounts, but not in
any case less than P500.00 as attorney's fees and costs of suit and
collection.
Principle Involved: Rule-making Power of Administrative Agencies
3. PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF
THE PHILIPPINES vs. HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T.
DUQUE III; HEALTH UNDER SECRETARIES DR. ETHELYN P.
NIETO, DR. MARGARITA M. GALON, ATTY. ALEXANDER A.
PADILLA, & DR. JADE F. DEL MUNDO; and ASSISTANT
SECRETARIES DR. MARIO C. VILLAVERDE, DR. DAVID J.
LOZADA, AND DR. NEMESIO T. GAKO, G.R. No. 173034,
October 9, 2007
Parties:
Petitioner:
PHARMACEUTICAL
AND
HEALTH
CARE
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondents: HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE
III; HEALTH UNDER SECRETARIES DR. ETHELYN P. NIETO, DR.
MARGARITA M. GALON, ATTY. ALEXANDER A. PADILLA, & DR.
JADE F. DEL MUNDO; and ASSISTANT SECRETARIES DR.
MARIO C. VILLAVERDE, DR. DAVID J. LOZADA, AND DR.
NEMESIO T. GAKO
Ponente: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Facts:
Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries,
and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Health (DOH). For
purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a corespondent since respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their
capacity as officials of said executive agency.
Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President
Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative
powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution.
One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law
seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of
Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the
World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the
WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding
should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be
ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for
breastmilk substitutes. In 1990, the Philippines ratified the
International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of
The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are not treaties as they have not
been concurred in by at least two-thirds of all members of the
Senate as required under Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
However, the ICMBS which was adopted by the WHA in 1981 had
been transformed into domestic law through local legislation, the
Milk Code. Consequently, it is the Milk Code that has the force and
effect of law in this jurisdiction and not the ICMBS per se.
The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, but
it is well to emphasize at this point that the Code did not adopt the
provision in the ICMBS absolutely prohibiting advertising or other
forms of promotion to the general public of products within the
scope of the ICMBS. Instead, the Milk Code expressly provides that
advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials may be
allowed if such materials are duly authorized and approved by the
Inter-Agency Committee (IAC).
Apparently, the WHA Resolution adopting the ICMBS and
subsequent WHA Resolutions urging member states to implement
the ICMBS are merely recommendatory and legally non-binding.
Thus, unlike what has been done with the ICMBS whereby the
legislature enacted most of the provisions into law which is the Milk
Code, the subsequent WHA Resolutions, 30 specifically providing
for exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months, continued
breastfeeding up to 24 months, and absolutely prohibiting
advertisements and promotions of breastmilk substitutes, have not
been adopted as a domestic law.
As previously discussed, for an international rule to be considered
as customary law, it must be established that such rule is being
followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply
with such rules (opinio juris). Respondents have not presented any
evidence to prove that the WHA Resolutions, although signed by
most of the member states, were in fact enforced or practiced by at
least a majority of the member states; neither have respondents
proven that any compliance by member states with said WHA
Resolutions was obligatory in nature.
Respondents failed to establish that the provisions of pertinent
WHA Resolutions are customary international law that may be
deemed part of the law of the land.
Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions
of the WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the
WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the
from
is
affirmed
without
THE
Ponente: MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
Facts:
ABS-CBN is engaged in the business of telecasting local as well as
foreign films acquired from foreign corporations not engaged in
trade or business within the Philippines. The applicable law for the
income tax of non-resident corporations is section 24 (b) of the
National Internal Revenue Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
2343 dated June 20, 1959, which provides:
(b) Tax on foreign corporations.(1) Non-resident corporations.
There shall be levied, collected, and paid for each taxable year, in
lieu of the tax imposed by the preceding paragraph, upon the
amount received by every foreign corporation not engaged in trade
or business within the Philippines, from an sources within the
Philippines, as interest, dividends, rents, salaries, wages,
premiums, annuities, compensations, remunerations, emoluments,
or other fixed or determinable annual or periodical gains, profits,
and income, a tax equal to thirty per centum of such amount.
On April 12, 1961, in implementation of said provision, the CIR
issued General Circular No. V-3349. Pursuant to the foregoing, ABSCBN dutifully withheld and turned over to the BIR the amount of
30% of one-half of the film rentals paid by it to foreign corporations
not engaged in trade or business within the Philippines. The last
year that ABS-CBN withheld taxes pursuant to the foregoing
Circular was in 1968.
The facts set forth in the information and proved on the trial does
not constitute a violation of Cat 1760 as alleged in the information
but it constitute a violation in Art 581 of the Penal Code sentencing
him to pay a fine of seventy pesetas or 14 pesos.
G. Penal Regulations
Parties:
Petitioner: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
Respondent: AUGUSTO A. SANTOS
1. THE UNITED STATES vs. ADRIANO PANLILIO, G.R. No. L9876, December 8, 1914
Parties:
Petitioner: THE UNITED STATES
Respondent: ADRIANO PANLILIO
Ponente: VILLA-REAL, J.
Facts:
Facts:
The servants of Panlilio took the carabao out of the corral to the
adjacent area land for the purpose of working them.
Ponente: MORELAND, J.
D.A. Filed a case against Panlilio for violation of Sec 6 of Act 1760
and later amended to Sec 3,4 and 5 Act 1760. Taking his Carabao
while under quarantine.
Issue:
1. Whether or not accused violate sec. 3,4 and 5 of Act 1760.
2. Whether or not Act 1760 is a penal regulation.
Ruling:
Panlilio did not violate Sectiones 3,4 and 5 because:
- no importation of animals was made;
- no proof that the animals is suffering from Renderpest
- it was only taken out of the corral to the adjoining land, not on
highways, nor moved from one municipality to another.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Sec. of Agri & Commerce exercise an excess of
regulatory power as vested by Sec. 4 Act 4003.
2. Whether or not Sec. Of Agri & Commerce can exercise legislative
power in issuing an Admin Order 2.
3. Whether or not Sec. 28 of Admin Order 2 is null and void.
Ruling:
Act 4003 does not contain any conditional clause quoted in sec 28
AO 2 such clause supplies a defect if the law. In Sec 4 Act 4003 he
shall issue from time to time instructions, orders, rules and
In spite of the permit to transport and the said four certificates, the
carabaos, while passing at Basud, Camarines Norte, were
confiscated by the town's police station commander, and by
provincial veterinarian. The confiscation was basis on the
aforementioned Executive Order No. 626-A which prohibits the
transportation and slaughtering of carabaos. The confiscated
carabaos or carabeef were distributed to twenty-five farmers of
Basud, and to a farmer from the Vinzons municipal nursery.
Issue: Whether or not E.O. No. 626-A, providing for the confiscation
and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from one
province to another, dated October 25, 1980 is enforceable before
publication in the Official Gazette on June 14, 1982.
Ruling: We hold that the said executive order should not be
enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already
noted, it is a penal regulation published more than two months
later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became
effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the
Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Principles involved:
The word "laws" in article 2 of the NCC (article 1 of the old
Civil Code) includes circulars and regulations which
prescribe penalties.
Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all Presidential
EOs having general applicability should be published in the
Official Gazette. It provides that every order or document
which shall prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to have
general applicability and legal effect. Indeed, the practice
has always been to publish executive orders in the Gazette.
Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code provides
that even bureau "regulations and orders shall become
H. Effectivity of Rules
1. LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY
AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI) vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA,
in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President,
HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive
Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ,
ETC., ET AL., G.R. No. L-63915, December 29, 1986
Parties:
Petitioners:
LORENZO
M.
TAADA,
ABRAHAM
F.
SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
(MABINI)
Respondents: HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as
Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his
capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL.
Ponente: CRUZ, J.
Facts: Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in
demanding the disclosure of a number of Presidential Decrees
which they claimed had not been published as required by Law. The
government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule,
it was not so when it was otherwise provided, as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective
immediately upon approval. The court decided on April 24, 1985 in