SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 162084. June 28, 2005.]

APRIL MARTINEZ, FRITZ DANIEL MARTINEZ and
MARIA OLIVIA MARTINEZ, petitioners, vs.
RODOLFO G. MARTINEZ, respondent.
DECISION

had been admitted to probate. Rodolfo appealed

the order to the CA. 11

CALLEJO, SR., J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 59420 setting aside and reversing the
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 30, in Civil Case No. 00-96962
affirming, on appeal, the decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Manila in Civil
Case No. 164761 (CV) for ejectment.

In the meantime, the spouses Manolo and Lucila

Martinez wrote Rodolfo, demanding that he
vacate the property. Rodolfo ignored the letter
and refused to do so. This prompted the said
spouses to file a complaint for unlawful detainer
against Rodolfo in the MTC of Manila. They
alleged that they were the owners of the property
covered by TCT No. 237936, and that pursuant to
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1508, the matter
was referred to the barangay for conciliation and
settlement, but none was reached. They
appended the certification to file action executed
by the barangay chairman to the complaint.
IcaHCS

The Antecedents
The spouses Daniel P. Martinez, Sr. and Natividad
de Guzman-Martinez were the owners of a parcel
of land identified as Lot 18-B-2 covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 54334, as
well as the house constructed thereon. 2 On
March 6, 1993, Daniel, Sr. executed a Last Will
and Testament 3 directing the subdivision of the
property into three lots, namely, Lots 18-B-2-A,
18-B-2-B and 18-B-2-C. He then bequeathed the
three lots to each of his sons, namely, Rodolfo,
Manolo and Daniel, Jr.; Manolo was designated as
the administrator of the estate.
In May 1995, Daniel, Sr. suffered a stroke which
resulted in the paralysis of the right side of his
body. Natividad died on October 26, 1996. 4
Daniel, Sr. passed away on October 6, 1997. 5
On September 16, 1998, Rodolfo found a deed of
sale purportedly signed by his father on
September 15, 1996, where the latter appears to
have sold Lot 18-B-2 to Manolo and his wife
Lucila. 6 He also discovered that TCT No. 237936
was issued to the vendees based on the said
deed of sale. 7
Rodolfo filed a complaint 8 for annulment of deed
of sale and cancellation of TCT No. 237936
against his brother Manolo and his sister-in-law
Lucila before the RTC. He also filed a criminal
complaint for estafa through falsification of a
public document in the Office of the City
Prosecutor against Manolo, which was elevated to
the Department of Justice. 9
On motion of the defendants the RTC issued an
Order 10 on March 29, 1999, dismissing the
complaint for annulment of deed of sale on the
ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over
the action since there was no allegation in the
complaint that the last will of Daniel Martinez, Sr.
1|Family

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On October 4, 1999 Rodolfo filed a Petition with

the RTC of Manila for the probate of the last will of
the deceased Daniel Martinez, Sr. 12

In his Answer 13 to the complaint filed on October

11, 1999, Rodolfo alleged, inter alia, that the
complaint failed to state a condition precedent,
namely, that earnest efforts for an amicable
settlement of the matter between the parties had
been exerted, but that none was reached. He also
pointed out that the dispute had not been
referred to the barangay before the complaint
was filed.
On October 20, 1999, the spouses Martinez filed
an Amended Complaint in which they alleged that
earnest efforts toward a settlement had been
made, but that the same proved futile. Rodolfo
filed his opposition thereto, on the ground that
there was no motion for the admission of the
amended complaint. The trial court failed to act
on the matter.
The spouses Martinez alleged in their position
paper that earnest efforts toward a compromise
had been made and/or exerted by them, but that
the same proved futile. 14 No amicable
settlement was, likewise, reached by the parties
during the preliminary conference because of
irreconcilable differences. The MTC was, thus,
impelled to terminate the conference. 15
On February 21, 2000, the trial court rendered
judgment in favor of the spouses Martinez. The
fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
rendered in favor of plaintiff. The defendant,
including any person claiming right under him, is
ordered:

1) To vacate the subject premises;

2) To pay plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 a month
starting July 17, 1999, the date of last demand
until he vacates the same;
3) To pay the sum of P10,000.00 as and for
attorney's fees; and
4) Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 16
The trial court declared that the spouses Martinez
had substantially complied with Article 151 of the
Family Code of the Philippines 17 based on the
allegations of the complaint and the appended
certification to file action issued by the barangay
captain.
Rodolfo, appealed the decision to the RTC. On
May 31, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment
affirming the appealed decision. He then filed a
petition for review of the decision with the CA,
alleging that:
1. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION
OF THE MTC WHICH FOUND WITHOUT MERIT THE
DEFENSE OF PETITIONER THAT THERE IS NO
ALLEGATION
IN
THE
COMPLAINT
THAT
PETITIONER
HAS
UNLAWFULLY
WITHHELD
POSSESSION
OF
THE
PROPERTY
FROM
RESPONDENTS A REQUIREMENT IN [AN]
UNLAWFUL DETAINER SUIT.
2. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION
OF THE MTC WHICH FOUND THAT PETITIONER'S
POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY IS BY MERE
TOLERANCE OF RESPONDENTS.
3. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION
OF THE MTC WHICH FOUND THAT THE
RESPONDENTS HAVE A CAUSE OF ACTION.
4. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION
OF THE MTC WHICH DID NOT RESOLVE THE SIXTH
ISSUE, TO WIT, "Whether or not this Court has
jurisdiction over this case considering that the
allegations in the complaint makes out a case of
accion publiciana."
5. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION
OF THE MTC WHICH HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER
THE CASE. DaTICc
6. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION
OF THE MTC WHICH FOUND THAT THE
2|Family

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MANDATORY REQUIREMENT
HAS BEEN COMPLIED WITH.

OF

CONCILIATION

7. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION

OF THE MTC WHICH FOUND THAT THERE WAS
SUBSTANTIAL
COMPLIANCE
WITH
THE
KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY LAW.
8. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION
OF THE MTC WHICH FOUND THAT THE PENDENCY
OF CIVIL CASE NO. 98-91147 AND SPECIAL
PROCEEDINGS NO. 99-95281, INVOLVING THE
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENTS AND INVOLVING
THE SAME PROPERTY DID NOT DIVEST THE MTC
OF AUTHORITY TO DECIDE THE CASE.
9. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION
OF THE MTC WHICH GRANTED THE RELIEF
PRAYED FOR BY THE RESPONDENTS.
10. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION
OF THE MTC. 18
On November 27, 2003, the CA rendered
judgment granting the petition and reversing the
decision of the RTC. The appellate court ruled that
the spouses Martinez had failed to comply with
Article 151 of the Family Code. The CA also held
that the defect in their complaint before the MTC
was not cured by the filing of an amended
complaint because the latter pleading was not
admitted by the trial court.
Upon
the
denial
of
their
motion
for
reconsideration of the said decision, the spouses
Martinez filed the present petition for review on
certiorari, in which they raise the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CERTIFICATION TO FILE
ACTION AND THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE
COMPLAINT THAT THE CASE PASSED [THROUGH]
THE BARANGAY BUT NO SETTLEMENT WAS
REACHED, ARE SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE TO
PROVE THAT, INDEED, EARNEST EFFORTS WERE,
IN FACT, MADE BUT THE SAME HAVE FAILED
PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THERE WAS NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE
REQUIREMENT PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE
151 OF THE FAMILY CODE, CONSIDERING THAT
ONE OF THE PARTIES TO A SUIT IN THIS CASE IS
NOT A MEMBER OF THE SAME FAMILY. 19

The petitioners alleged that they substantially

complied with Article 151 of the Family Code,
since they alleged the following in their original
complaint:
2. In compliance with P.D. 1508, otherwise known
as the "Katarungang Pambarangay," this case
passed (through the Barangay and no settlement
was forged between plaintiffs and defendant as a
result of which Certification to File Action was
issued by Barangay 97, Zone 8, District I, Tondo,
Manila. . . ." (Underscoring supplied) 20
Further, the petitioners averred, they alleged in
their position paper that they had exerted earnest
efforts towards a compromise which proved futile.
They also point out that the MTC resolved to
terminate the preliminary conference due to
irreconcilable difference between the parties.
Besides, even before they filed their original
complaint, animosity already existed between
them and the respondent due to the latter's filing
of civil and criminal cases against them; hence,
the objective of an amicable settlement could not
have been attained. Moreover, under Article 150
of the Family Code, petitioner Lucila Martinez had
no familial relations with the respondent, being a
mere sister-in-law. She was a stranger to the
respondent; hence, there was no need for the
petitioners 21 to comply with Article 151 of the
Family Code. EHTSCD
The petition is meritorious.
Article 151 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 151. No suit between members of the same
family shall prosper unless it should appear from
the verified complaint or petition that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made,
but that the same have failed. If it is shown that
no such efforts were, in fact, made, the case must
be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not
be the subject of compromise under the Civil
Code.
The phrase "members of the family" must be
construed in relation to Article 150 of the Family
Code, to wit:

Art. 150. Family relations include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;

Code

Art

150

(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the

full or half-blood.
Article 151 of the Family Code must be construed
strictly, it being an exception to the general rule.
Hence, a sister-in-law or brother-in-law is not
included in the enumeration. 22
As pointed out by the Code Commission, it is
difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic
spectacle than a litigation between members of
the same family. It is necessary that every effort
should be made toward a compromise before a
litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in
the family and it is known that a lawsuit between
close relatives generates deeper bitterness than
between strangers. 23
Thus, a party's failure to comply with Article 151
of the Family Code before filing a complaint
against a family member would render such
complaint premature.
In this case, the decision of the CA that the
petitioners were mandated to comply with Article
151 of the Family Code and that they failed to do
so is erroneous.
First. Petitioner Lucila Martinez, the respondent's
sister-in-law, was one of the plaintiffs in the MTC.
The petitioner is not a member of the same
family as that of her deceased husband and the
respondent:
As regards plaintiffs failure to seek a compromise,
as an alleged obstacle to the present case, Art.
222 of our Civil Code provides:
"No suit shall be filed or maintained between
members of the same family unless it should
appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, but that the same have failed,
subject to the limitations in Article 2035."
It is noteworthy that the impediment arising from
this provision applies to suits "filed or maintained
between members of the same family." This
phrase, "members of the same family, should,
however, be construed in the light of Art. 217 of
the same Code, pursuant to which:
"Family relations shall include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;

(2) Between parents and children;

3|Family

(3) Among other ascendants and descendants;

and

cases

(2) Between parent and child;

(3)
Among
descendants;

other

ascendants

and

their

(4) Among brothers and sisters."

Mrs. Gayon is plaintiff's sister-in-law, whereas her
children are his nephews and/or nieces. Inasmuch
as none of them is included in the enumeration
contained in said Art. 217 which should be
construed strictly, it being an exception to the
general rule and Silvestre Gayon must
necessarily be excluded as party in the case at
bar, it follows that the same does not come within
the purview of Art. 222, and plaintiff's failure to
seek a compromise before filing the complaint
does not bar the same. 24
Second. The petitioners were able to comply with
the requirements of Article 151 of the Family
Code because they alleged in their complaint that
they had initiated a proceeding against the
respondent for unlawful detainer in the
Katarungang Pambarangay, in compliance with
P.D. No. 1508; and that, after due proceedings, no
amicable settlement was arrived at, resulting in
the barangay chairman's issuance of a certificate
to file action. 25 The Court rules, that such
allegation in the complaint, as well as the
certification to file action by the barangay
chairman, is sufficient compliance with Article
151 of the Family Code. It bears stressing that
under Section 412(a) of Republic Act No. 7160, no
complaint involving any matter within the
authority of the Lupon shall be instituted or filed
directly in court for adjudication unless there has
been a confrontation between the parties and no
settlement was reached. 26
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING the petition is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 59420 is REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila as affirmed on appeal by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 30, in Civil
Case No. 164761(CV) is REINSTATED. No costs.
AHcaDC
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Tinga and Chico-Nazario,
JJ., concur.
||| (Martinez v. Martinez, G.R. No. 162084, June
28, 2005)

4|Family

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SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 125465. June 29, 1999.]
SPOUSES AUGUSTO HONTIVEROS and MARIA
HONTIVEROS, petitioners, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, Branch 25, Iloilo City and SPOUSES
GREGORIO HONTIVEROS and TEODORA AYSON,
respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.
Resurreccion S. Salvilla for private respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner spouses herein filed a complaint for
damages against herein private respondents. In
their complaint, petitioners alleged that being the
owners of a parcel of land they were deprived of
the income therefrom as a result of the filing of
the land registration case by the private
respondents and withheld in bad faith possession
of the land from petitioners. Private respondents,
however, denied the allegations and claimed that
possession of the property in question had
already
been
transferred
to
petitioners.
Petitioners moved for a judgment on the
pleadings
on
the
ground
that
private
respondents' answer did not tender an issue or
that it otherwise admitted the material
allegations of the complaint. The trial court
denied the motion. At the same time, the court
dismissed the case on the ground that the
complaint was not verified as required by Art. 151
of the Family Code and, therefore, it did not
believe that earnest efforts had been made to
arrive at a compromise. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal, but their
motion was denied. Hence this petition.
The Supreme Court ruled that the inclusion of
private respondent Teodora Ayson as defendant
and petitioner Maria Hontiveros as plaintiff took
the case out of the ambit of Art. 151 of the Family
Code. Under this provision, the phrase "members
of the same family" refers to husband and wife,
parents
and
children,
ascendants
and
descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether
full or half-blood. Private respondent Ayson, being
the spouse of respondent Hontiveros, and
petitioner Maria Hontiveros, being the spouse of
petitioner Augusto Hontiveros, are considered
strangers to the Hontiveros family, for purposes
of Art. 151. The absence of verification required
in Art. 151 do not affect the jurisdiction of the
court over the subject matter of the complaint.
The verification is merely a formal requirement
intended to secure an assurance that matters
which are alleged are true and correct. Hence,
this petition was granted and the case was
remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; APPEAL TO THE
SUPREME COURT; PETITION FOR REVIEW ON
CERTIORARI (UNDER RULE 45 OF THE RULES
OF COURT); PROPER MODE WHEN MATTERS
RAISED IS PURELY ON QUESTIONS OF LAW;
CASE AT BAR. The petition in this case was
filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As
explained in Atlas Consolidated Mining and
Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
(201 SCRA 51, 58-59 [1991]): Under Section 5,
subparagraph (2)(e), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution, the Supreme Court is vested with
the power to review, revise, reverse, modify, or
affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and
orders of lower courts in all cases in which only
an error or question of law is involved. A similar
provision is contained in Section 17, fourth
paragraph, subparagraph (4) of the Judiciary Act
of 1948, as amended by Republic Act No. 5440.
And, in such cases where only questions of law
are involved, Section 25 of the Interim Rules and
Guidelines implementing Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, in conjunction with Section 3 of Republic Act
No. 5440, provides that the appeal to the
Supreme Court shall be taken by petition for
certiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. The rule, therefore, is that
direct appeals to this Court from the trial court on
questions of law have to be through the filing of a
petition for review on certiorari. It has been held
that: . . . when a CFI (RTC) adjudicates a case in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the correct
mode of elevating the judgment to the Court of
Appeals is by ordinary appeal, or appeal by writ
of error, involving merely the filing of a notice of
appeal except only if the appeal is taken in
special proceedings and other cases wherein
multiple appeals are allowed under the law, in
which even the filing of a record on appeal is
additionally required. Of course, when the appeal
would involve purely questions of law or any of
the other cases (except criminal cases as stated
hereunder) specified in Section 5(2), Article X of
the Constitution, it should be taken to the
Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari
in accordance with Rules 42 and 45 of the Rules
of Court. By the way of implementation of the
aforestated provisions of law, this Court issued on
March 9, 1990 Circular No. 2-90, paragraph 2 of
which provides: 2. Appeals from Regional Courts
to the Supreme Court. Except in criminal cases
where the penalty imposed is life imprisonment
or reclusion perpetua, judgments of regional trial
courts may be appealed to the Supreme Court
only by petition for review on certiorari in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in
relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948,
5|Family

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as amended, this being the clear intendment of

the provision of the Interim Rules that (a)ppeals
to the Supreme Court shall be taken by petition
for certiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. Under the foregoing
consideration,
therefore,
the
inescapable
conclusion is that herein petitioner adopted the
correct mode of appeal in G.R. No. 88354 by filing
with this Court a petition to review on certiorari
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig in
Civil Case No. 25528 and raising therein purely
questions of law. In Meneses vs. Court of Appeals,
it was held: It must also be stressed that the trial
courts order of 5 June 1992 dismissing the
petitioner's complaint was, whether it was right
or wrong, a final order because it had put an end
to the particular matter resolved, or settled
definitely the matter therein disposed of and left
nothing more to be done by the trial court except
the execution of the order. It is a firmly settled
rule that the remedy against such order is the
remedy of appeal and not certiorari. That appeal
may be solely on questions of law, in which case
it may be taken only to this Court; or on
questions of fact and law, in which case the
appeal should be brought to the Court of Appeals.
Pursuant to Murillo vs. Consul, the appeal to this
Court should be by petition for review on
certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.
2. ID.; ID.; DISMISSAL OF CASE; COURTS
CANNOT DISMISS A CASE MOTU PROPRIO
WITHOUT
VIOLATING
THE
PLAINTIFF'S
RIGHT TO BE HEARD; EXCEPTIONS. There
are instances when the trial court may order the
dismissal of the case even without a motion to
that effect filed by any of the parties. In Baja vs.
Macandog, (158 SCRA 391, 396-397 [1986]) this
Court mentioned these cases, to wit: The court
cannot dismiss a case motu proprio without
violating the plaintiff's right to be heard, except in
the following instances; if the plaintiff fails to
appear at the time of the trial; if he fails to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length
of time; or if he fails to comply with the rules or
any order of the court; or if the court finds that it
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
suit.
3. ID.; ID.; JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS;
PROPER ONLY WHERE AN ANSWER FAILS TO
TENDER AN ISSUE OR OTHERWISE ADMITS
THE
MATERIAL
ALLEGATION
OF
THE
ADVERSE PARTY'S PLEADING; WHEN NOT
APPLICABLE; CASE AT BAR. Rule 19 of the
Rules of Court provides (Now Rule 34 of the 1997
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE): SECTION 1.
Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer

fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the

material allegation of the adverse party's
pleading, the court may, on motion of the party,
direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions
for annulment of marriage or for legal separation
the material facts alleged in the complaint shall
always be proved. Under the rules, if there is no
controverted matter in the case after the answer
is filed, the trial court has the discretion to grant
a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by a
party. Where there are actual issues raised in the
answer, such as one involving damages, which
require the presentation of evidence and
assessment thereof by the trial court, it is
improper for the judge to render judgment based
on the pleadings alone. In this case, aside from
the amount of damages, the following factual
issues have to be resolved, namely, (1) private
respondent Teodora Ayson's participation and/or
liability, if any, to petitioners and (2) the nature,
extent, and duration of private respondents'
possession of the subject property. The trial court,
therefore, correctly denied petitioners' motion for
judgment on the pleadings.
4. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; ART. 151;
REQUIREMENT THAT EARNEST EFFORTS
TOWARDS A COMPROMISE SHOULD HAVE
BEEN MADE BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE
FAMILY, CONSTRUED. The absence of the
verification required in Art. 151 does not affect
the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter of the complaint. A verification is merely a
formal requirement intended to secure an
appearance that matters which are alleged are
true and correct. If the court doubted the veracity
of the allegations regarding efforts made to settle
the case among members of the same family, it
could simply have ordered petitioners to verify
them. As this Court has already ruled, the court
may simply order the correction of unverified
pleadings or act on it and waive strict compliance
with the rules in order that the ends of justice
may be served. Otherwise, mere suspicion or
doubt on the part of the trial court as to the truth
of the allegation that earnest efforts had been
made toward a compromise but the parties'
efforts proved unsuccessful is not a ground for
the dismissal of an action. Only if it is later shown
that such efforts had not really been exerted
would the court be justified in dismissing the
action. Thus, Art. 151 provides: No suit between
members of the same family shall prosper unless
it should appear from the verified complaint or
petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, but that the same have failed.
It if is shown that no such efforts were in fact
made, the case must be dismissed. This rule shall
6|Family

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150

cases

not apply to cases which may not be the subject

of compromise under the Civil Code.

5. ID.; ID.; ART. 150; "MEMBERS OF THE

SAME FAMILY," DEFINED; APPLICATION IN
CASE AT BAR. The phrase 'members of the
same family' refers to the husband and wife,
parents
and
children,
ascendants
and
descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether
full or half-blood. (FAMILY CODE, Art. 150) As this
Court held in Guerrero vs. RTC, Ilocos Norte, Br.
XVI (229 SCRA 274, 278 [1994]): As early as two
decades ago, we already ruled in Gayon vs.
Gayon that the enumeration of "brothers and
sisters" as members of the same family does not
comprehend "sisters-in-law." In that case, then
Chief Justice Concepcion emphasized that
"sisters-in-law" (hence, also "brothers-in-law") are
not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as
members of the same family. Since Art. 150 of
the Family Code repeats essentially the same
enumeration of "members of the family," we find
no reason to alter existing jurisprudence on the
matter. Consequently, the court a quo erred in
ruling that petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-inlaw of private respondent Hernando, was required
to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise
before filing the present suit. Religious
relationship and relationship by affinity are not
given any legal effect in this jurisdiction.
Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who is
described in the complaint as the spouse of
respondent Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria
Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of
petitioner Augusto Hontiveros, are considered
strangers to the Hontiveros family, for purposes
of Art. 151. AaSIET
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
On December 3, 1990, petitioners, the spouses
Augusto and Maria Hontiveros, filed a complaint
for damages against private respondents
Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson before
the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 25,
where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 19504. In
said complaint, petitioners alleged that they are
the owners of a parcel of land, in the town of
Jamindan, Province of Capiz, as shown by OCT No.
0-2124, issued pursuant to the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, dated April 12,
1984, which modified the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Capiz, dated January 23, 1975, in
a land registration case 1 filed by private
respondent Gregorio Hontiveros; that petitioners
were deprived of income from the land as a result
of the filing of the land registration case; that

such income consisted of rental from tenants of

the land in the amount of P66,000.00 per year
from 1968 to 1987, and P595,000.00 per year
thereafter; and that private respondents filed the
land registration case and withheld possession of
the land from petitioners in bad faith. 2
In their answer, private respondents denied that
they were married and alleged that private
respondent Hontiveros was a widower while
private respondent Ayson was single. They denied
that they had deprived petitioners of possession
of and income from the land. On the contrary,
they alleged that possession of the property in
question had already been transferred to
petitioners on August 7, 1985, by virtue of a writ
of possession, dated July 18, 1985, issued by the
clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court of Capiz,
Mambusao, the return thereof having been
received by petitioners' counsel; that since then,
petitioners have been directly receiving rentals
from the tenants of the land; that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action since it did not
allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise
had been made, considering that petitioner
Augusto Hontiveros and private respondent
Gregorio Hontiveros are brothers; that the
decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in
Land Registration Case No. N-581-25 was null and
void since it was based upon a ground which was
not passed upon by the trial court; that
petitioners' claim for damages was barred by
prescription with respect to claims before 1984;
that there were no rentals due since private
respondent Hontiveros was a possessor in good
faith and for value; and that private respondent
Ayson had nothing to do with the case as she was
not married to private respondent Gregorio
Hontiveros and did not have any proprietary
interest in the subject property. Private
respondents prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint and for an order against petitioners to
pay damages to private respondents by way of
counterclaim, as well as reconveyance of the
subject land to private respondents. 3
On May 16, 1991, petitioners filed an Amended
Complaint to insert therein an allegation that
"earnest efforts towards a compromise have been
made between the parties but the same were
unsuccessful."
In due time, private respondents filed an Answer
to Amended Complaint with Counterclaim, in
which they denied, among other things, that
earnest efforts had been made to reach a
compromise but the parties were unsuccessful.
llcd
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On July 19, 1995, petitioners moved for a

judgment on the pleadings on the ground that
private respondents' answer did not tender an
issue or that it otherwise admitted the material
allegations
of
the
complaint.
4
Private
respondents opposed the motion alleging that
they had denied petitioners' claims and thus
tendered certain issues of fact which could only
be resolved after trial. 5
On November 23, 1995, the trial court denied
petitioners' motion. At the same time, however, it
dismissed the case on the ground that the
complaint was not verified as required by Art. 151
of the Family Code and, therefore, it did not
believe that earnest efforts had been made to
arrive at a compromise. The order of the trial
court reads: 6
The Court, after an assessment of the diverging
views and arguments presented by both parties,
is of the opinion and so holds that judgment on
the pleadings is inappropriate not only for the
fact that the defendants in their answer,
particularly in its paragraph 3 to the amended
complaint, specifically denied the claim of
damages against them, but also because of the
ruling in De Cruz vs. Cruz, G.R. No. 27759, April
17, 1970 (32 SCRA 307), citing Rili vs. Chunaco,
98 Phil. 505, which ruled that the party claiming
damages must satisfactorily prove the amount
thereof and that though the rule is that failure to
specifically deny the allegations in the complaint
or counter-claim is deemed an admission of said
allegations, there is however an exception to it,
that is, that when the allegations refer to the
amount of damages, the allegations must still be
proved. This ruling is in accord with the provision
of Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
That while the plaintiffs in their amended
complaint allege that earnest efforts towards a
compromise with the defendants were made, the
fact is that their complaint was not verified as
provided in Article 151 of the Family Code.
Besides, it is not believed that there were indeed
earnest efforts made to patch up and/or reconcile
the two feuding brothers, Gregorio and Augusto,
both surnamed Hontiveros.
The submission of the plaintiffs that, assuming no
such earnest efforts were made, the same is not
necessary or jurisdictional in the light of the
ruling in Rufino Magbaleta, et al., petitioners, vs.
Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, et al., respondents, No.
L-44903, April 22, 1977, is, to the mind of this
Court, not applicable to the case at bar for the
fact is the rationale in that case is not present in
the instant case considering these salient points:

a) Teodora Ayson, the alleged wife of defendant

Gregorio Hontiveros and allegedly not a member
of the Hontiveros Family, is not shown to be really
the wife of Gregorio, a fact which Gregorio also
denied in their verified answer to the amended
complaint;
b) Teodora Ayson has not been shown to have
acquired any proprietary right or interest in the
land that was litigated by Gregorio and Augusto,
unlike in the cited case of Magbaleta where it was
shown that a stranger to the family acquired
certain right;
c) In the decision rendered by the appellate court
no mention was made at all of the name of
Teodora Ayson as part-awardee of Lot 37 that was
adjudged to Gregorio other than himself who was
therein described as a widower. Moreover,
Teodora was never mentioned in said decision,
nor in the amended complaint and in the
amended motion for judgment on the pleadings
that she ever took any part in the act or
transaction that gave rise to the damages
allegedly suffered by the plaintiffs for which they
now claim some compensation.
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing
premises, the Court orders, as it hereby orders,
the dismissal of this case with costs against the
plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the
order of dismissal, but their motion was denied. 7
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioners contend:
I. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT PALPABLY ERRED
IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND
THAT IT DOES NOT ALLEGE UNDER OATH THAT
EARNEST EFFORTS TOWARD A COMPROMISE
WERE MADE PRIOR TO THE FILING THEREOF AS
REQUIRED BY ARTICLE 151 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
LLjur
II. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT PALPABLY ERRED
IN NOT DENYING THE MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON
THE PLEADINGS AND ORDERING A TRIAL ON THE
MERITS.
Private respondents raise a preliminary question.
They argue that petitioners should have brought
this case on appeal to the Court of Appeals since
the order of the trial court judge was actually a
decision on the merits. On the other hand, even if
petition for certiorari were the proper remedy,
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they contend that the petition is defective

because the judge of the trial court has not been
impleaded as a respondent. 8
Private respondents' contention is without merit.
The petition in this case was filed pursuant to
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As explained in
Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development
Corporation v. Court of Appeals: 9
Under Section 5, subparagraph (2)(e), Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court is
vested with the power to review, revise, reverse,
modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the
law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases
in which only an error or question of law is
involved. A similar provision is contained in
Section 17, fourth paragraph, subparagraph (4) of
the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by
Republic Act No. 5440. And, in such cases where
only questions of law are involved, Section 25 of
the Interim Rules and Guidelines implementing
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in conjunction with
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 5440, provides that
the appeal to the Supreme Court shall be taken
by petition for certiorari which shall be governed
by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The rule, therefore, is that direct appeals to this

Court from the trial court on questions of law
have to be through the filing of a petition for
review on certiorari. It has been held that:
. . . when a CFI (RTC) adjudicates a case in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction, the correct
mode of elevating the judgment to the Court of
Appeals is by ordinary appeal, or appeal by writ
of error, involving merely the filing of a notice of
appeal except only if the appeal is taken in
special proceedings and other cases wherein
multiple appeals are allowed under the law, in
which even the filing of a record on appeal is
additionally required. Of course, when the appeal
would involve purely questions of law or any of
the other cases (except criminal cases as stated
hereunder) specified in Section 5(2), Article X of
the Constitution, it should be taken to the
Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari
in accordance with Rules 42 and 45 of the Rules
of Court.
By way of implementation of the aforestated
provisions of law, this Court issued on March 9,
1990 Circular No. 2-90, paragraph 2 of which
provides:

2. Appeals from Regional Courts to the Supreme

Court. Except in criminal cases where the
penalty imposed is life imprisonment or reclusion
perpetua, judgments of regional trial courts may
be appealed to the Supreme Court only by
petition for review on certiorari in accordance
with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended, this being the clear intendment of the
provision of the Interim Rules that (a)ppeals to
the Supreme Court shall be taken by petition for
certiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
Under the foregoing considerations, therefore,
the inescapable conclusion is that herein
petitioner adopted the correct mode of appeal in
G.R. No. 88354 by filing with this Court a petition
to review on certiorari the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig in Civil Case No.
25528 and raising therein purely questions of law.
In Meneses v. Court of Appeals, it was held: 10
It must also be stressed that the trial court's
order of 5 June 1992 dismissing the petitioner's
complaint was, whether it was right or wrong, a
final order because it had put an end to the
particular matter resolved, or settled definitely
the matter therein disposed of and left nothing
more to be done by the trial court except the
execution of the order. It is a firmly settled rule
that the remedy against such order is the remedy
of appeal and not certiorari. That appeal may be
solely on questions of law, in which case it may
be taken only to this Court; or on questions of
fact and law, in which case the appeal should be
brought to the Court of Appeals. Pursuant to
Murillo v. Consul, the appeal to this Court should
be by petition for review on certiorari in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
LLjur
As private respondents themselves admit, the
order of November 23, 1995 is a final order from
which an appeal can be taken. It is final in the
sense that it disposes of the pending action
before the court and puts an end to the litigation
so that nothing more was left for the trial court to
do. 11 Furthermore, as the questions raised are
questions of law, petition for review on certiorari
is the proper mode of appeal. These questions
are: (1) whether after denying petitioners' motion
for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court
could dismiss their complaint motu proprio for
failure to comply with Art. 151 of the Family Code
which provides that no suit between members of
the same family shall prosper unless it appears
from the complaint, which must be verified, that
9|Family

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earnest efforts towards a compromise have been

made but the same have failed; and (2) whether
Art. 151 applies to this case. These questions do
not require an examination of the probative value
of evidence presented and the truth or falsehood
of facts asserted which questions of fact would
entail. 12
On the other hand, petitioners contend that the
trial court erred in dismissing the complaint when
no motion to that effect was made by any of the
parties. They point out that, in opposing the
motion for judgment on the pleadings, private
respondent did not seek the dismissal of the case
but only the denial of petitioners' motion. Indeed,
what private respondents asked was that trial be
held on the merits.
Of course, there are instances when the trial
court may order the dismissal of the case even
without a motion to that effect filed by any of the
parties. In Baja v. Macandog, 13 this Court
mentioned these cases, to wit:
The court cannot dismiss a case motu proprio
without violating the plaintiff's right to be heard,
except in the following instances: if the plaintiff
fails to appear at the time of the trial; if he fails to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length
of time; or if he fails to comply with the rules or
any order of the court; or if the court finds that it
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
suit.
However, none of these exceptions appears in
this case.
Moreover, the trial court itself found that
"judgment on the pleadings is inappropriate not
only for the fact that [private respondents] in
their answer . . . specifically denied the claim of
damages against them, but also because of the
[rule] . . . that the party claiming damages must
satisfactorily prove the amount thereof . . . ."
Necessarily, a trial must be held. prcd
Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides: 14
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where
an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegation of the adverse
party's pleading, the court may, on motion of the
party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in
actions for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.
Under the rules, if there is no controverted matter
in the case after the answer is filed, the trial court

has the discretion to grant a motion for judgment

on the pleadings filed by a party. 15 Where there
are actual issues raised in the answer, such as
one involving damages, which require the
presentation of evidence and assessment thereof
by the trial court, it is improper for the judge to
render judgment based on the pleadings alone.
16 In this case, aside from the amount of
damages, the following factual issues have to be
resolved, namely, (1) private respondent Teodora
Ayson's participation and/or liability, if any, to
petitioners and (2) the nature, extent, and
duration of private respondents' possession of the
subject property. The trial court, therefore,
correctly denied petitioners' motion for judgment
on the pleadings.
However, the trial court erred in dismissing
petitioners' complaint on the ground that,
although it alleged that earnest efforts had been
made toward the settlement of the case but they
proved futile, the complaint was not verified for
which reason the trial court could not believe the
veracity of the allegation. cdtai
The absence of the verification required in Art.
151 does not affect the jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter of the complaint. The
verification is merely a formal requirement
intended to secure an assurance that matters
which are alleged are true and correct. If the
court doubted the veracity of the allegations
regarding efforts made to settle the case among
members of the same family, it could simply have
ordered petitioners to verify them. As this Court
has already ruled, the court may simply order the
correction of unverified pleadings or act on it and
waive strict compliance with the rules in order
that the ends of justice may be served. 17
Otherwise, mere suspicion or doubt on the part of
the trial court as to the truth of the allegation
that earnest efforts had been made toward a
compromise but the parties' efforts proved
unsuccessful is not a ground for the dismissal of
an action. Only if it is later shown that such
efforts had not really been exerted would the
court be justified in dismissing the action. Thus,
Art. 151 provides:
No suit between members of the same family
shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made, but that
the same have failed. It if is shown that no such
efforts were in fact made, the case must be
dismissed. cdll
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not
be the subject of compromise under the Civil
Code.
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Moreover, as petitioners contend, Art. 151 of the

Family Code does not apply in this case since the
suit is not exclusively among family members.
Citing several cases 18 decided by this Court,
petitioners claim that whenever a stranger is a
party in a case involving family members, the
requisite
showing
of
earnest
efforts
to
compromise is no longer mandatory. They argue
that since private respondent Ayson is admittedly
a stranger to the Hontiveros family, the case is
not covered by the requirements of Art. 151 of
the Family Code.
We agree with petitioners. The inclusion of
private respondent Ayson as defendant and
petitioner Maria Hontiveros as plaintiff takes the
case out of the ambit of Art. 151 of the Family
Code. Under this provision, the phrase "members
of the same family" refers to the husband and
wife, parents and children, ascendants and
descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether
full or half-blood. 19 As this Court held in
Guerrero v. RTC, Ilocos Norte, Br. XVI: 20
As early as two decades ago, we already ruled in
Gayon v. Gayon that the enumeration of
"brothers and sisters" as members of the same
family does not comprehend "sisters-in-law." In
that case, then Chief Justice Conception
emphasized that "sisters-in-law" (hence, also
"brothers-in-law") are not listed under Art. 217 of
the New Civil Code as members of the same
family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code repeats
essentially the same enumeration of "members of
the family," we find no reason to alter existing
jurisprudence on the matter. Consequently, the
court a quo erred in ruling that petitioner
Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of private
respondent Hernando, was required to exert
earnest efforts towards a compromise before
filing the present suit. dctai

Religious relationship and relationship by affinity

are not given any legal effect in this jurisdiction.
21 Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who
is described in the complaint as the spouse of
respondent Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria
Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of
petitioner Augusto Hontiveros, are considered
strangers to the Hontiveros family, for purposes
of Art. 151. llcd
Petitioners finally question the constitutionality of
Art. 151 of the Family Code on the grounds that it
in effect amends the Rules of Court. This,
according to them, cannot be done since the
Constitution reserves in favor of the Supreme

Court the power to promulgate rules of pleadings

and procedure. Considering the conclusion we
have reached in this case, however, it is
unnecessary for present purposes to pass upon
this question. Courts do not pass upon
constitutional questions unless they are the very
lis mota of the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the
Order, dated November 23, 1995 of the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 25 is SET ASIDE

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and the case is remanded to the trial court for

further proceedings not inconsistent with this
decision. dctai
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo,
concur.

Puno,

Quisumbing

and

Buena,

JJ.,

||| (Spouses Hontiveros v. RTC, Br. 25, Iloilo City,

G.R. No. 125465, June 29, 1999)