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The Obama administration is correct to be wary of Russian support for Assad, but Russia is
unlikely to have in mind direct military backing for the embattled president. For months, Russia
engaged in a diplomatic dance with Saudi Arabia to find common ground for addressing the
Syrian crisis. Emboldened by their military campaign in Yemen, the Saudis were not
enthusiastic about a new diplomatic effort that included the Syrian president. Russias strategy
is not to trigger a broader proxy conflict but to accelerate what Putin probably now sees as an
inevitable negotiated endgame; he sent a decisive signal to Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar
that any military efforts to change the Syrian regime will be futile. Russias Syria policy might
not be popular in many Arab capitals, but its willingness to defend allies is met with respect.
More broadly, Putin is responding, in his own way, to Obamas hope that Russia will continue
its constructive role in the Middle East by offering to serve as the necessary link between what
have been two competing coalitions fighting ISIS in the Levant: the U.S.-led coalition and the
Iranian-led coalition, neither of which can succeed without the other.
Putins Middle East gambit is also about taking advantage of the refugee crisis to further draw
attention away from Ukraine and to create the conditions under which Europe can lift or
weaken its sanctions on Russia. Russia knows that the migrant crisis [9] has been a challenge
to the EUs political coherence. In part, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom supported
sanctions against Russia in 2014 to show solidarity with the eastern European statesthe
governments that are now refusing to share the burden of accommodating refugees. In the
meantime, Putin has not had a difficult time convincing some of the southern European states,
especially Italy, that Russia should be treated more as a partner than a pariah. In the last
month, Moscow even showed flexibility in German-led negotiations that resulted in a new
cease-fire between Russia and Ukraine, and he has ensured that the cease-fire has largely
held.
So, Putin came to New York believing that he held a pretty strong hand (in fact, it is the only
reason he came at all [10]). After all, Obamas goals in Syria [11]defeating ISIS, finding a
negotiated political compromise, and ousting Assadseem less attainable than ever. Given
Washingtons reluctance to get further embroiled in Middle Eastern conflicts, Putin was hoping
that his actions would force the United States to focus on his priorities.
But Obamas distrust of Putin runs deep, and he was not about to accept the new Russian
narrative at face value. Yesterdays meeting was but the first inning of what promises to be a
long game. For possible constructive next steps, Putins meeting last week in Moscow with
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu might be instructive. Bibi returned home with
agreements on procedures for deconflicting the two countries forces in Syria and keeping
Russian weaponry out of Hezbollahs hands. The Russia-Israel agreements might be a model
for where U.S.-Russian interactions go next.
Beyond that, Obama faces a dilemma. The U.S.-led anti-ISIS campaign is going nowhere fast.
It is worth exploring whether Moscows military involvement in Syria might be leveraged to
weaken the extremist group. Obama should be open to working with Moscow on new
diplomatic proposals to end the Syrian war. But he would be right to make clear that the
United States will do so only if Moscow restricts its use of force to the anti-ISIS campaign. At
this point, both sides probably need to avoid dealing with the issue of Assad directly if a
constructive diplomatic path is to be found.
Copyright 2015 by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
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Source URL: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2015-09-30/headstrong
Links
[1] http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/30/opinion/thomas-friedman-syria-obama-and-putin.html?_r=0
[2] https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2015-09-29/putin-and-obama-go-head-head-0
[3] http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/30/politics/russia-syria-airstrikes-isis/
[4] https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/chechnya/2013-03-25/real-reason-putin-supports-assad
[5] https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2015-09-16/putins-damascus-steal
[6] https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2015-09-20/russias-desperate-measures
[7] https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2015-08-11/new-great-game
[8] https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2013-09-11/putin-scores-syria
[9] https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/central-europe/2015-09-27/self-interested-approach-migration-crises
[10] https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2013-09-15/playing-poker-putin
[11] https://www.foreignaffairs.com/regions/syria