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Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 21, Number 4, October

1983, pp. 467-478 (Article)
3XEOLVKHGE\-RKQV+RSNLQV8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV
DOI: 10.1353/hph.1983.0090

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Plato and Aristotle

on the N a t u r e o f W o m e n
NICHOLAS

D. S M I T H

h N ThE Republic, P l a t o a r g u e s t h a t w o m e n (at least t h o s e i n t h e u p p e r classes ~)

m u s t b e a s s i g n e d social roles i n t h e i d e a l state e q u a l (or a p p r o x i m a t & ) to t h o s e
o f m e n . O n l y o n e g e n e r a t i o n l a t e r A r i s t o t l e , i n his Politics, r e t u r n s w o m e n to
t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l roles i n t h e h o m e , s u b s e r v i n g m e n . Plato's p o s i t i o n i n t h e
Republic is b a s e d u p o n his view t h a t " w o m e n a n d m e n h a v e t h e s a m e n a t u r e i n
r e s p e c t to t h e g u a r d i a n s h i p o f t h e state, save i n s o f a r as t h e o n e is w e a k e r a n d
t h e o t h e r is s t r o n g e r ''~ (456A). N a t u r e p r o v i d e s n o s u c h e q u a l i t y in A r i s t o t l e ;
i n t h e Politics h e flatly d e c l a r e s , "as r e g a r d s t h e sexes, t h e m a l e is by n a t u r e
s u p e r i o r a n d t h e f e m a l e i n f e r i o r , t h e m a l e r u l e r a n d t h e f e m a l e s u b j e c t ''4
(1254b13-14).
O t h e r d i a l o g u e s o f his m i d d l e p e r i o d s u p p o r t t h e view t h a t P l a t o was a
s e x u a l e g a l i t a r i a n : 5 t h e Meno, f o r e x a m p l e , assigns t h e s a m e v i r t u e s to
i am indebted to David Keyt, Charles M. Reed, Carol White, Julie Murphy, George Lucas,
and the editors of this journal for their criticisms of various drafts of this paper, and to Gregory
Vlasms for first arousing my interest in this topic and for making numerous suggestions that
have helped clarify my thinking about it. I am also indebted to the National Endowment for the
Humanities and the Center for Programs in the Humanities at Virginia Polytechnic Institute
and State University for their help in funding this research.
' Plato says nothing about the women of the artisan class in this regard, though he may
view his prescriptions as having full generality.
On the specifics of this qualification, more below.
:~ This and all other translations of the Republic are by P. Shorey.
4 This and all other translations of the Politicsare by H. Rackham.
5 I use the term "sexual egalitarian" with some trepidation, given the various ways in
which Plato qualifies his relevant prescriptions. Similarly, terms like "feminist" and "male chauvinist," so frequently employed by scholars in this discussion, are arguably anachronistic oversimplifications, at best, given the cultural and temporal gaps between our culture and that of
classical Athens. Finally, I shall not refer to Plato's "emancipation" of women at all, since that
appears to be inaccurate as well as anachronistic: there's little freedom given to anyone in Plato's
state, and his making women roughly equal to men merely allows them to share the same quite
high degree of non-freedom in their civic roles.
[467]

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women as to men (73 A ff.), and Aristophanes' speech in the Symposium

provides women with a genetic and biological status equal to that of men
(lo9A ft.), a status never disputed as such elsewhere in the dialogue. Aristotle, on the other hand, plainly distinguishes manly from womanly virtues
(Pol. 126oa2o ft.), and sees biology as demonstrating that the generation of
the female is no better than that of a "mutilated male" (D.G.A. 737a28), a
reproductive failure the same in kind, though of a lesser degree, as those
that result in (other) monstrosities (D.G.A. 767b6-9 ff.). Because of such
differences in their views, Plato has lately been celebrated by some as, for
example, "one o f the few notable exceptions" in our long history o f sexism, ~
whereas Aristotle has been angrily dismissed as "a dangerous chauvinist. ''7
Too little attention, however, has been paid to what is common to Plato's
and Aristotle's views. Both apply the same principle as their warrant for
what turn out to be wholly incompatible policies: both proclaim that justice
will only be served where social roles are assigned in strict accordance with
nature. Hence, the root of Plato's and Aristotle's divergent social prescriptions concerning women is to be found in their conceptions of female nature; for if nature were to provide a difference between male and female
that is relevant to the assignment of social roles, both would be committed to
discriminating on the basis o f sex. Plato does not find such a difference;
Aristotle does.
In the following discussion, I shall clarify this disagreement by reviewing
the relevant differences between Plato's and Aristotle's views of h u m a n nature. First, I shall consider the warrant Plato finds in nature for his prescriptions on women in the Republic; then I shall show how attempts by other
scholars, to explain the motive source of Plato's view as lying elsewhere, fail.
T u r n i n g next to Aristotle, I shall argue that though biology has an important effect on his conception of female nature, the connection between biology and the specific ground he claims as justification for his view of women
in the Politics has never sufficiently been explored. I shall conclude in each
case that the biological views o f Plato and Aristotle are not the essential ones
in this debate. Rather, I shall show that the crucial difference between the
two, upon which all of the other differences are f o u n d e d , lies in their different theories of the soul.
I

Plato thinks that social roles ought to be assigned according to each individual's nature. The explicit method of determining social roles in the Republic,
~i William Jacobs, "Plato on Emancipation and the Traditional Family, Apeiron 12 0978),
p. 29.
7 Peter Tumuhy, "Aristotle, Feminism and Natural Law Theory," The N e w Scholasticism 55
(,981), p. 45 I.

THE NATURE OF WOMEN

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o f w h i c h we a r e f r e q u e n t l y r e m i n d e d , c o n c e r n s i n s u r i n g t h a t e a c h p e r s o n in
t h e state be g i v e n t h a t o n e a n d o n l y o n e j o b to w h i c h his o r h e r n a t u r e is best
suited (e.g. at 433 D, w h e r e w o m e n a r e i n c l u d e d u n d e r this g e n e r a l f o r m u l a ,
as well as at 4 4 9 C - 4 5 7 C, w h e r e s o m e o f t h e details o f their e q u a l roles with
m e n a r e given). I n d e e d , it is this p r i n c i p l e t h a t Plato identifies as the s o u r c e
o f j u s t i c e in t h e state ( 4 3 9 B - 4 3 4 C, especially 433A).
B u t the a p p l i c a t i o n o f this p r i n c i p l e to w o m e n in s u c h a way as to g a i n
t h e o u t c o m e t h a t t h e y m u s t a c q u i r e a p p r o x i m a t e l y e q u a l status to m e n is
h a r d l y w h a t we w o u l d e x p e c t f r o m a n a n c i e n t A t h e n i a n . T h o u g h in t h e
h i g h l y e m o t i o n a l r h e t o r i c o f m u c h o f t h e r e c e n t literature, the i n f e r i o r
status o f w o m e n to t h a t o f m e n in A t h e n s has s o m e t i m e s b e e n o v e r s t a t e d , 8
still n o s u c h sexual e g a l i t a r i a n i s m as we find in Plato is to be f o u n d in
e i t h e r the practices o r the l i t e r a t u r e o f his day, e x c e p t in t h e t o p s y - t u r v y
w o r l d o f A r i s t o p h a n i c c o m e d y , 9 w h e r e its a p p e a r a n c e is m o r e likely to
reflect a c u l t u r a l bias a g a i n s t it t h a n in its favor. Plato h i m s e l f r e c o g n i z e s
t h e e x t r e m e n o v e l t y o f his view by labelling it o n e o f his " t h r e e waves o f
paradox"(457C).
M o r e o v e r , it is also t r u e t h a t Plato is given to f r e q u e n t slurs a g a i n s t
w o m e n a n d w h a t he d i s p a r a g i n g l y calls " w o m a n i s h " b e h a v i o r (e.g. at 469D).
T h i s , t o g e t h e r with the c u l t u r a l i m p r o b a b i l i t y o f his e g a l i t a r i a n a r g u m e n t s ,
has b e e n t a k e n as decisive e v i d e n c e t h a t Plato's position is n o t to be t a k e n
seriously o r has a p u r e l y r h e t o r i c a l c h a r a c t e r . ' " Allan B l o o m , f o r e x a m p l e ,
dismisses all o f B o o k V as a k i n d o f c o m e d y , a n d c o n c l u d e s t h a t "it is h i g h l y
i m p r o b a b l e t h a t a n y w o m a n w o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d f o r m e m b e r s h i p in t h e
h i g h e r classes. ' ' ' ' Similarly, A r l e n e S a x o n h o u s e says t h a t she " c a n n o t a c c e p t
the view t h a t S o c r a t e s wishes to e m a n c i p a t e the A t h e n i a n w o m a n . '''~ I n s t e a d ,
she u r g e s t h a t B o o k V shows n o t a n a t t e m p t to p r e s c r i b e a c c o r d i n g to nature, b u t r a t h e r t h e r e v e r s e : " . . . it shows a n a t t e m p t to d e s t r o y t h e n a t u r a l
Cf. John Gould, "Law, Custom and Myth: Aspects of the Social Position of Women,"
Journal of Hellenic Studies loo (x98o), pp. 38 ff., for a balanced assessment and replies to many
of the more excessive claims,
Cf. Aristophanes' Lysistrata, and especially his Ecclesiazousae, for examples. It is sometimes
claimed that Euripides and even Sophocles show an untraditional degree of sympathy for
women's unequal position in Athens, but I see little support in this for Zeller's surprising claim
that there was a "movement for the emancipation of women in the last third of the 5th
century..." (Cf. Eduard Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, trans. L. R. Palmer
(New York, 1957), p. lo7. )
~o Cf. Allan Bloom, The Republic of Plato (New York, 1968); Arlene W. Saxonhouse, "The
Philosopher and the Female in the Political Thought of Plato," Political Theory 4 (1976), pp- 195
ft.; Sarah Pomeroy, "Feminism in Book V of Plato's Republic," Apeiron 8 0974), PP. 33 ft., for
examples. The same view is at least suggested by Dorothea Wender, "Plato: Mysogynist, Paedophile, and Feminist," Arethusa 6 (1973), pp. 75 ft.
" Bloom, Republic of Plato, p. 383 .
'~ Saxonhouse, "Philosopher and the Female," p. 196.

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o r phusis . . . . T h a t Socrates must so p e r v e r t the natural in o r d e r to create

the best political system must raise d o u b t s a b o u t its value. '''3
O f course, as followers o f the i n t e r p r e t i v e m e t h o d s o f Leo Strauss, B l o o m
and S a x o n h o u s e have special motives for so a b a n d o n i n g Plato's a r g u m e n t s ,
a n d so it would be pointless to a t t e m p t to r e f u t e their views by an appeal to
the text they are methodologically c o m m i t t e d to disbelieve. But for those o f
us without such preconceptions, it must be n o t e d that Plato does i n d e e d
o f f e r a r g u m e n t s for his prescriptions, and that these are by and large g o o d
ones. I n d e e d , they are r o u g h l y the same as we now o f f e r in favor o f feminism: Plato says that the only natural d i f f e r e n c e s between male a n d female
are physical strength (456A) a n d that the w o m a n bears children, whereas the
m a n only begets t h e m ( 4 5 4 D - E ) . Like Plato, we are disinclined to believe
that these differences are relevant to the capacity for political office or civic
responsibility. Since Plato's a r g u m e n t s are generally s o u n d ones o n this
point, and since, as I shall subsequently show, they do in fact accord with his
view o f n a t u r e as it applies to the assignment o f social roles, it seems a p p r o priate not to suppose that he is s o m e h o w less than entirely sincere.
But d o n ' t the sexist slurs u n d e r m i n e the a r g u m e n t s ? No; at most they
show that Plato is not the p e r f e c t master o f his own message, but this should
not surprise us. W h e r e such slurs are a part o f one's everyday e n v i r o n m e n t
a n d in the c o m m o n parlance o f the day, even the most principled feminist
might well lapse into t h e m thoughtlessly. This is c o m m o n e n o u g h in o u r
own day, and Plato's culture was a great deal less sensitized to such issues
than o u r own. For that matter, even if we s u p p o s e d that such slurs are
self-conscious o n Plato's part, they would not show that he was insincere in
his advocacy o f sexual egalitarianism. For o n e thing, he might well think ill
o f the c o n t e m p o r a r y A t h e n i a n woman, b r e d and raised as she was in ways
that c o n d e m n e d h e r to the traits Plato deplores. Any n u m b e r o f c o n t e m p o rary feminists find traditionally " f e m i n i n e " habits and characteristics d e g r a d ing. It would be all too easy to r e f e r to these in ways that looked to an
e n l i g h t e n e d a u d i e n c e like b r o a d slanders to all womankind. But even if Plato
were a c o m m i t t e d misogynist in general, he could still consistently advocate
equality at least insofar as that involves the e n d o r s e m e n t o f equal o p p o r t u nity and status in political and social processes. I do not have to like o r
respect s o m e o n e to think that she deserves rights equal to mine. ,4 I n d e e d , it
is p r o f o u n d l y to be h o p e d that all o f us are p r e p a r e d to set aside o u r private
tastes for the moral, social, and political values that must t r a n s c e n d them. O f
Plato least o f all should we e x p e c t otherwise.
'~ Ibid., p. 211.
,4 This point is explored in some detail in Wender's essay.

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M o r e m o d e r a t e views have also b e e n o f f e r e d for the a p p a r e n t tension in

Plato's position. Susan Moiler Okin, f o r e x a m p l e , believes that Plato was
f o r c e d ( s o m e w h a t to his chagrin) to r e g a r d w o m e n as equals by his abolition
o f the private h o u s e h o l d , which thus swept away their traditional social
roles. '5 But the abolition o f the p r i v a t e family no m o r e entails equal rights
for w o m e n t h a n does the abolition o f private p r o p e r t y entail equal rights f o r
what h a d b e e n m a t e r i a l possessions. Plato could as easily (and p e r h a p s m o r e
plausibly, by c o n t e m p o r a r y A t h e n i a n standards) have assigned w o m e n to
m a l e g u a r d i a n s in m u c h the s a m e way in which the latter were assigned
m a t e r i a l goods, p r o v i d i n g the w o m e n roles only as b r e e d i n g p a r t n e r s a n d
n u r s e - m a i d s , without g r a n t i n g t h e m political powers. '6
O t h e r s a r g u e that Plato's position is really an i n h e r i t a n c e f r o m Socrates, Iv
w h o resisted the traditional i'elativizing o f virtues a c c o r d i n g to sex, age, or
class (Meno 73 A ft.). But t h o u g h Socrates m a y well d e s e r v e s o m e credit as an
influence, the e v i d e n c e cited shows no m o r e t h a n a first step t o w a r d s the
Platonic view; n o t h i n g Socratic e v e n a p p r o a c h e s the specificity a n d substance
o f B o o k V o f the Republic. I n fact, the a r g u m e n t in the M e n o cited as evid e n c e f o r the Socratic anticipation o f Plato's view is d e s i g n e d to attack the
relation o f a virtue to social f u n c t i o n o r status, a relation that at least a p p e a r s
to be a f e a t u r e o f the associations o f classes a n d virtues in the Republic.
Plato's view o f w o m e n in the Republic thus c a n n o t be d e r i v e d f r o m the
generality o f h u m a n virtue that is established in the Meno; r a t h e r it is that
w o m e n can s h a r e the virtues particularly (and at least s o m e w h a t exclusively)
e m b o d i e d in the u p p e r classes o f the ideal state. I n a n y case, the non-relativity o f virtue is not a sufficient r e a s o n for m a k i n g the social roles o f m e n a n d
w o m e n identical; in the s a m e M e n o passage, we learn that virtue is indifferent to slave a n d free, a n d y o u n g a n d old, yet this plainly p r o v i d e s no motive
for m a k i n g slaves the social equals o f f r e e m e n , or youths the social equals o f
m a t u r e adults. Plato's f e m i n i s m r e q u i r e s a n o t h e r source. '~
W h a t m i g h t this source be? I f Plato is to be consistent, he m u s t s u p p o s e
that w o m e n m e r i t equal c o n s i d e r a t i o n for e n t r a n c e into the g u a r d i a n classes
,5 Susan Moiler Okin, "Philosopher Queens and Private Wives: Plato on Women and the
Family," Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 0977), PP. 345 ff.; see also Marcel Pierart, Platon et la Cite
Grecque (Brussels, 197,t).
,6 This point is made against Okin and Pierart by a number of scholars. Cf., for examples,
Nicholas D. Smith, "The Logic of Plato's Feminism," Journal of Social Philosophy 11 (198o), pp. 5
ft.; Gregory Vlastos, "The Status of Persons in Platonic Justice: Women," Interpretations of Plato:
A Swarthmore Symposium (Supplement Mnemosyne 5o), 1977; and Jacobs "Plato."
,7 Cf. A. E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work (Cleveland and New York: 1956), p. 278;
Vlastos, "Status of Persons"; and Wender, "Plato," for examples.
'8 Cf. Smith, "Plato's Feminism," (pp. 8-9) for a fuller dispute of" the importance of the
Socratic precedents.

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because he thinks s o m e small p e r c e n t a g e o f t h e m to be suited by n a t u r e to

the relevant tasks. ',~ W h a t " n a t u r e " is this?
It m u s t be plain f r o m the outset that w h a t e v e r qualities are involved they
are not essentially physical in c h a r a c t e r , h l d e e d , physical characteristics
force Plato to m a k e the few clear e x c e p t i o n s he m a k e s to his egalitarian
principles. For e x a m p l e , o n e role o f the auxiliaries is to d e f e n d the state in
war, a n d Plato recognizes the n e e d f o r m a s c u l i n e s t r e n g t h in ancient warfare, e m p l o y i n g the w o m e n in lighter duties (457A) o r as reserves (471D).
Similarly, t h o u g h w e t - n u r s e s will be used as m u c h as possible, g u a r d i a n
m o t h e r s will n u r s e c h i l d r e n w h e n they a r e lactating ( 4 6 o C - D ) . Plainly m e n
c a n n o t p e r f o r m such tasks t h o u g h they will h a v e an equal s h a r e in t a k i n g
care o f the c h i l d r e n o t h e r w i s e (46oB).
O f the tasks assigned to the g u a r d i a n s , however, these a r e the e x c e p t i o n s
that r e q u i r e a d e g r e e o f sexual discrimination. In his overall view o f m a l e
a n d f e m a l e n a t u r e in B o o k V, Plato finds no d i f f e r e n c e significant to t h e i r
playing equal roles in g u a r d i n g the state. Plato's r e a s o n for this is explicit,
a n d has b e e n o v e r l o o k e d by those w h o assign too g r e a t a weight to tile
p u r e l y physical (and especially p r o c r e a t i v e ) f\mctions o f the g u a r d i a n s : '~''
We did not then posit likeness and difference in nature in any and every sense, but
were paying heed solely to the kind of diversity and homogeneity that was pertinent
to the pursuits themselves. We meant, for example, that a man and a woman who
have a physician's mind (psuche) have the same nature. (454C-D)
H o w m i g h t it be t h a t b o t h males a n d females can have the s a m e sorts o f
A n u m b e r o f dialogues show Plato's c o m m i t m e n t to a t h e o r y o f
m e t e m p s y c h o s i s , p r e s u m a b l y i n h e r i t e d tu
the P y t h a g o r e a n s with w h o m
he h a d contact. T h i s t h e o r y p e r m i t s p e r s o n s to have n u m e r o u s lives (or
e m b o d i m e n t s ) in m a n y forms. I n this life, I a m a m a n ; in the next, I m i g h t
be either an animal, a d i f f e r e n t sort o f m a n , or m o s t significantly, a w o m a n
(cf. Rep. 6 2 o A - D ; also P/u/. 8 I E - 8 2 B ) . Epeios, fi)r e x a m p l e , selects the life
o f a c r a f t s w o m a n f o r his n e x t e m b o d i m e n t (Rep. 62oB). T h e r e v e r s e can be
t r u e as well: Atalanta chooses the life o f an athlete (Rep. 62oB). Souls, o n
such a t h e o r y o f r e i n c a r n a t i o n , a r e thus f u n d a m e n t a l l y sexless. H e n c e , the
n a t u r e o f a w o m a n , in the sense r e q u i r e d by Plato cited above, is no d i f f e r e n t f r o m that of" a m a n : b o t h are sexless souls e m b o d i e d . This, I claim, is
why Plato finds no difficulty in saying that j u s t as a m a n can have the n a t u r e
of" a physician, so can a w o m a n ; j u s t as a m a n can be nmsical, so can a

psuche?

'~' Not necessarily a smaller percentage of them than of men, however: only a small
percentage of either sex will qualify.
~" It is disturbing to see the nature of women in Saxonhouse and Bloom so completely tied
to childbearing.

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w o m a n (Rep. 455E). Most importantly, just as a m a n can be warlike, so can a

w o m a n ; just as a m a n can be a lover o f wisdom, so can a w o m a n (Rep. 456A;
cf. Diotima in the Symposium 2 o l D ft., a w o m a n who gives Socrates instruction in the p h i l o s o p h y o f love). Hence, m a k i n g some w o m e n warriors o r
rulers accords with nature, and failing to do so is against n a t u r e (Rep. 456C).
A n d the r e a s o n it is u n n a t u r a l to discriminate on the basis o f sex in such
cases is that the n a t u r e involved (the soul) is sexless. ~'
O n e objection to the above analysis may be anticipated: in the Timaeus
Plato plainly states that w o m e n are reincarnations o f m e n who lived evil lives
(42B, 9oE), a n d that the male state is not only the first h u m a n state, but the
best, a n d the o n e to which the best natures r e t u r n (42D). O n e m i g h t a r g u e
on these g r o u n d s that w o m e n are not the natural equals o f men, even in the
psychic sense r e q u i r e d by the Republic, a n d hence the t h e o r y o f m e t e m p s y chosis c a n n o t be a source o f Plato's egalitarianism in the Republic.
T h e r e is a m p l e reason to resist this application o f the Timaeus to an
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the Republic, however, despite the fact that in the Timaeus
(x 8 C - D ) Plato explicitly recalls the relevant prescriptions o f the Republic. As
others have a r g u e d quite compellingly, ~ Plato seems to have c h a n g e d his
mind a b o u t a n u m b e r o f things c o n c e r n i n g h u m a n genesis a n d m e t e m p s y chosis by the time he wrote the Timaeus (and the Laws, which a p p e a r s to
share the c o m m i t m e n t s o f the Timaeus account; cf. Laws 9 o 3 D - 9 o 4 C ) . For
one thing, one's next life in the Myth o f Er is a m a t t e r o f choice, t h o u g h it is
usually m a d e a c c o r d i n g to the habits acquired in one's f o r m e r life (62oA).
A n d t h o u g h the effect o f this is that a kind o f poetic justice is achieved, it
seems unlikely that the sort o f justice Plato has in mind here could be
c o n s t r u e d in even a p p r o x i m a t e l y similar ways as that implied in the Timaeus.
It is most implausible, for example, to see A g a m e m n o n ' s c h a n g e into an
eagle in the Republic as an instance o f a m a n ' s b e c o m i n g a bird in the sense
r e q u i r e d by the Timaeus; A g a m e m n o n is surely not rightly characterized as
"harmless, but e m p t y - h e a d e d " (Tim. 91D). I n d e e d , the o n e case o f a m a n
b e c o m i n g a w o m a n is Epeios, the awe-inspiring b o x e r whose description in
the lliad ( 2 3 . 6 6 4 - 6 6 9 ; cf. also Odysse~ 8.493) hardly distinguishes him as
unjust a n d cowardly, as the Timaeus would require for such a c h a n g e o f sex

~' I am indebted to David Keyt for suggesting the relevance of Plato's theory of metempsychosis in this regard. It should be noted that on this view the soul is not necessarily a member of
any particular species, either. Another example of this lack of specification can be found in the
account in the Phaedrus (esp. 249B). The Phaedrus neither supports nor conflicts with the view
that souls are not sexed, however, as the issue is never addressed either explicitly or implicitly
there.
~ Cf. Anne Dickason, "Anatomy and Destiny: The Role of Biology in Plato's View of
Women," The PhilosophicalForum 5 (x973-4), PP. 45 ft., for example.

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(9oE). ~3 T h e s a m e c a n b e said f o r t h e o t h e r m i d d l e p e r i o d d i a l o g u e s : s u r e l y
t h e a p p r o v a l P l a t o shows i n t h e Phaedo f o r b e c o m i n g a bee, wasp, o r a n t i n
t h e n e x t life, f o r e x a m p l e , c a n n o t b e s q u a r e d with t h e v e r y n e g a t i v e a p p r a i sal o f insects i n t h e Timaeus (92A).
T h i s e v i d e n c e a l o n e s h o u l d r e s t r a i n u s f r o m e m p l o y i n g t h e Timaeus i n
i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e view P l a t o e x p r e s s e s i n t h e Republic. B u t p e r h a p s e v e n m o r e
i m p o r t a n t is t h e fact t h a t t h e i n f e r i o r s t a t u s o f w o m e n i n t h e h i e r a r c h y o r
r e i n c a r n a t i o n s we f i n d i n t h e Timaeus a c c o u n t c a n n o t be f o u n d i n t h e Repub-

lic, o r f o r t h a t m a t t e r , i n a n y d i a l o g u e f r o m t h e m i d d l e p e r i o d . I t s e e m s ,
t h e r e f o r e , m o s t u n l i k e l y t h a t Plato saw m e t e m p s y c h o s i s i n r e l e v a n t l y s i m i l a r
ways i n t h e m i d d l e a n d late p e r i o d s . H e n c e , t h e s e l a t e r a c c o u n t s d o n o t
u n d e r c u t t h e view I h a v e p r e s e n t e d o f Plato's m o t i v e s f o r t h e f e m i n i s m we
f i n d i n B o o k V o f t h e Republic24---one is a s s i g n e d o n e ' s role i n t h e state
a c c o r d i n g to n a t u r e , o n e ' s n a t u r e i n this case is o n e ' s soul, a n d o n e ' s soul is
sexless? 5
II
I h a v e a r g u e d t h a t Plato's c o n c e p t i o n o f h u m a n n a t u r e is w h a t m o t i v a t e s t h e
e q u a l i t y o f B o o k V o f t h e Republic, a n d t h a t this c o n c e p t i o n is p r i m a r i l y
p s y c h o l o g i c a l i n c h a r a c t e r . A r i s t o t l e s h a r e s two f e a t u r e s o f Plato's a p p r o a c h :
like Plato, A r i s t o t l e believes t h a t social roles m u s t b e a s s i g n e d a c c o r d i n g to
e a c h i n d i v i d u a l ' s n a t u r e , a n d like Plato, A r i s t o t l e f i n d s the r e l e v a n t n a t u r a l
f e a t u r e s o f h u m a n s to b e p s y c h o l o g i c a l . T h u s , w h e n A r i s t o t l e seeks, in t h e

Politics, to e s t a b l i s h f i t t i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s in t h e polis to m e n , w o m e n , slaves,

~-~ Gregory Vlastos suggested to me that the example of Epeios does show a degree of
misogyny on Plato's part, as a "fitting" reincarnation for the sort of devious mind that could
invent the Trojan Horse (cf. Odyssey 8.493). Whether or not this is what Plato had in mind, it is
still not the cowardice and injustice required by the Timaeus.
'~4 Indeed, if anything the Timaeus and Laws can be seen as further evidence in favor of the
view I have proposed; for along with the downgrading of female nature in the metempsychosis
accounts of these later dialogues, one finds a considerable backsliding on the issue of sexual
egalitarianism in the Laws, as well. Women in the Laws do not enjoy the same high degree of
equality with men as they did in the Republic, though they are still arguably closer to that goal
than anything they would achieve in Aristotle's state.
'~5 The above account should not be taken as presuming the view that the accounts of
metempsychosis Plato offers in the middle period are consistent in every other detail. Such is
hardly the case, and the fact that it is not constitutes an interesting puzzle concerning Plato's
real view of the nature of the afterlife during this period. The effect of this lack of coherence
on the interpreter should thus be that extreme caution must be used whenever one seeks to use
evidence from this material from any other dialogue than the one under interpretation. Nonetheless, in all the varieties of these accounts, no suggestion of sexual inegalitarianism of the
relevant sort appears until the Timaeus, though this is perhaps only because the issue does not
arise one way or another in the accounts of the Phaedo and Phaedrus. The principle of caution
just introduced, however, supports the argument of this paper without qualification.

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and children, he appeals in each case to the features of the soul o f each that
he finds both relevant a n d distinguishing (e.g. at Pol. 126oa12--14).
Given such initial presuppositions, one might expect Plato and Aristotle
to reach similar conclusions, and in most cases they do. Both have similar
views concerning slaves, barbarians, children and artisans, a m o n g others.
But with r e g a r d to w o m e n their values are wholly incompatible. Unlike
Plato, Aristotle finds w o m e n fit only to be subjects o f male rule (Pol.
1254b13-14).
As we might expect, Aristotle's only explicit rationale for this is psychological. W o m e n , according to Aristotle, have the deliberative part of the
soul (to bouletikon), but in contrast to m e n it is not sovereign (akuron Pol.
126oa13). But w o m e n are not like natural slaves either, who wholly lack the
deliberate part (Pol. 126oa12), or children who have it only in an i m m a t u r e
way (Pol. 126oa13--14). Since w o m e n have the deliberative part, they are
ruled by m e n in a "constitutional" fashion, that is, as citizens rule other
citizens, or equals rule equals (Pol. 1 2 5 9 a 4 o - b l ). But since women's deliberative part is not sovereign, this rule is p e r m a n e n t , unlike other examples
of constitutional rule (Pol. 1259b4 - 1o).
W. W. F o r t e n b a u g h ~6 conjectures that the lack of sovereignty in women's
deliberative part is the p r o d u c t of its susceptibility to being overruled by the
emotional part of the soul (to orektikon). Since n a t u r e makes d i f f e r e n t things
for different purposes (Pol. 1954bl-3), and women are psychologically different f r o m men, they have functions different from those of men, contrary
to Plato's view in the Republic. A n d since virtue is relative to function for
Aristotle (Pol. 126oa14-17), a woman's virtue is d i f f e r e n t from a man's,
contrary to Plato's view in the Meno.
W h e n Aristotle says that in w o m e n the deliberative part is without sovereignty, the adjective expressing this is "akuron," which has decidedly political
connotations. For a law or sentence to be akuron is for it to be cancelled,
annulled, or set aside. O f persons, to be akuron is to lack rights or powers.
Aristotle frequently uses the adjective opposite to this (kurios) in Book III of
the Politics to refer to the s u p r e m e power of the state. For example, in
democratic states the people are kurios, while in oligarchic ones only a few
are (Pol. 1278b1~--13). So to employ Aristotle's metaphor, a woman's deliberative part is either annulled, cancelled, or set aside, or it is lacking in rights
or powers. F o r t e n b a u g h views the relevant issue to be intra-personal in
nature, rather t h a n inter-personal. ~7 T h a t is, it is not just that women's
~6 W . W . F o r t e n b a u g h , "Aristotle o n Slaves a n d W o m e n , " Articles on Aristotle 2, J. B a r n e s et
al., eds. ( L o n d o n : 1978), p. a38 ff.
~7 Ibid., p. ]38 .

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deliberations are set aside by society or by men but that they are set aside or
cancelled by the emotional or alogical part of their souls. In short, women
are too susceptible to being overcome by their emotions and thus require the
steadier rule of men. Fortenbaugh offers a number of cases from other
Greek works as paradigms for this, especially Medea in Euripides' play. '~s
Fortenbaugh's conjecture is plausible enough, I think, but there may be
more to be said for the inter-personal effects o f nature, so construed, than
Fortenbaugh allows. For Aristotle, human beings are the union of body
and soul, where the soul is the form of the body (De An. 412a16--21). That
a given h u m a n has a female body, therefore, is of vital import, especially
with regard to the procreative function: women not only carry the fetus
and give birth, they also suckle the young child. All o f these roles are
reserved for women by nature. And since nature makes nothing for more
than one special function, the extra-household functions of politics would
presumably be reserved for men, whose role in procreation is of relatively
brief duration. On this view, women require the deliberative part for their
roles in the rearing of children and the maintenance of the household; but
that part of the soul is akuron for the practice of politics, for to make
women participate in such activities goes against nature, which reserves one
function for each thing. As a woman's function in the household is clearly
given by nature, for Aristotle, to add to this function others outside the
household is to make her like a Delphic knife, that is, one thing with many
functions, which is contrary to nature (Pol. 1252bt-3). Hence, that a
woman's deliberative part is akuron undoubtedly has important civic ramifications quite apart from those psychological ones Fortenbaugh proposes,
though the two are entirely consistent.
Fortenbaugh and others ~9 suggest that the reason Aristotle believes this is
that he views women as in some sense biologically deficient. According to
Fortenbaugh, the proper understanding of Aristotle's view is to be found in
the common link between female and deficient offspring both in Politics
1335at 2 - t 5, as well as a n u m b e r of biological works, especially Generation of
Animals, where the lack o f heat affects semen (766a18-~2) in such a way as
to produce female or deficient offspring (767b23; cf. also 737a27-28). T h u s
women are deficient not only in bodily strength, but in the powers o f deliberation, both (as Fortenbaugh would have it) as those powers apply to the
mastery of their own emotions, and (the addition I have suggested) as they
apply to political activities.
'~ Ibid.
'~'~ Cf. for example, Wender "Plato." It is odd that Fortenbaugh so vigorously attacks
Wender's article, though their conjectures are quite similar on this point. O f course, W e n d e r is
critical of Aristotle, whereas Fortenbaugh is inclined to d e f e n d him, at least on logical grounds.

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F o r t e n b a u g h is less t h a n explicit as to how precisely the biological deficiency explains the psychological deficiency Aristotle sees in w o m e n , t h o u g h
plainly t h e r e is a c o n n e c t i o n to be made. T h i s is easy e n o u g h to imagine,
however, if we see what is c o m m o n to the biology and the psychology. In
r e p r o d u c t i o n , o n Aristotle's account, the f o r m o f the child comes f r o m the
father's semen, and the m a t t e r f r o m the m o t h e r ' s catamenia. In the biological
c o n c e p t i o n o f a female, the f o r m takes an i m p e r f e c t hold on the matter, and
thus fails to achieve conversion in sex as the female m a t t e r is given h u m a n
form. But since the soul is the f o r m o f the body, a n d the g e n e r a t i o n o f a
female is o n e o f f o r m incompletely m a s t e r i n g material, the psychological
deficiency Aristotle finds in females could be e x p l a i n e d in terms o f the soul's
i m p e r f e c t mastery o f the body. This, then, we might well assume?" is why
the highest, or deliberative, part o f the soul lacks sovereignty in w o m e n .
T h e h u m a n is, for Aristotle, a combination o f soul and body. Both the
souls and bodies o f w o m e n d i f f e r in n a t u r e f r o m those o f men, the soul
lacking sovereignty in its deliberative part, and the body having a d i f f e r e n t
role in the activities a n d relationships in the h o u s e h o l d , such as r e p r o d u c t i o n
and child-rearing. H a v i n g d i f f e r e n t natures, w o m e n should serve in different social capacities t h a n men, as n a t u r e makes d i f f e r e n t things for d i f f e r e n t
functions. Unlike Plato, Aristotle does not believe the soul to be essentially
sexless; the souls o f w o m e n a n d m e n are as d i f f e r e n t by n a t u r e as their
bodies are. Also unlike Plato, t h e r e f o r e , Aristotle does not restrict the natural d i f f e r e n c e s a n d inferiorities o f w o m e n to merely physical capacities,
such as strength. As their bodies are too weak for some purposes, so their
souls are too weak for others, each weakness an effect o f the same basic
causes, which o c c u r in the r e p r o d u c t i v e process. H e n c e , what is an u n n a t u r a l
d o m i n a t i o n in P l a t o - - t h a t o f m e n over w o m e n - - b e c o m e s a natural one in
Aristotle.
IIl

I have a r g u e d that the principal d i f f e r e n c e between Plato's a n d Aristotle's

views c o n c e r n i n g w o m e n is to be f o u n d in their d i f f e r e n t theories o f the
soul. B o t h a g r e e that social roles should be assigned a c c o r d i n g to nature. But
Plato sees no i m p o r t a n t natural differences in the natures o f males a n d
females because their natures are essentially sexless souls i n c a r n a t e d t e m p o rarily in sexed bodies. In sharp contrast, Aristotle makes the soul the f o r m
o f the body, and o f f e r s a biological account o f h u m a n r e p r o d u c t i o n that
:~" This is, like Fortenbaugh's interpretation, largely speculative. Aristotle never makes the
explicit link for which I have argued here, but it is plain that a link of this sort is presumed by
his view.

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renders female psychology naturally and importantly different from that of

males. These differences, I claim, provide the naturalistic warrants for
Plato's celebrated "feminism" and Aristotle's notorious "male chauvinism."
And though conceptions of nature and the natural are not value-neutral for
the Greeks, unless our purposes are more polemical than philosophical, we
should recognize that the main controversy between Plato and Aristotle on
this issue is not primarily a moral one; for their different prescriptions are
derived wholly from more fundamental differences in metaphysical and
natural philosophies.

Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University