A STUDY OF

Vl'2 OPEKATIONS

jared

by:
Koai 2m Johnson
C ap fca in, Infantry

i4i/w~ li yo
Table of Contents

Contents
Sectionl

Papers accompanying

Page 1.

1.

the study.

(Title)

Section ll
r The study

Page U

- ..

Section III: General consideration

1.
Page 1.

Section IV: Night marches

Page 8,
Page

Section V: Night Attacks

Page 15.
15.

Section VI: Night attacks by mechanized

weapons

Page

23.

Section VIIV:II: Raids

Pare

Page 25.

25.

Section VIII: Night Defense

Page 27.

Section IX: Historical Samples -

Page 28.

Section Xr Conclusion

Page 30.

Bibliography

Page 3<U

MS.IORAITDUL!: For the Director, 2nd year claso, Command and General

Staff School, Fort Leave nworth, Kansas.

SUBJECT:

A study as to what extent night operations will become

necessary, considering improvements in modern arms and

the governing principles of nd^Jit operations.

1. Papers Accompanying. Bibliography for this study.

2.

The Study Presented.-- -Considering improvements

in modern arms, the

Air Corps, etc., to what extent will night operations

become necessary

and

what wi-11 be the governing- principles of night attacks, night marches,

etc.

3.

General considerations.

Army, 1923 states,

ness

Fieli Service Regulations,

"Resort must frequently be had to the cover of dark

in order to effect surprise

statenent

United States

and to inininiize losses."

covers entirely the reasons

, for

This single

military operations

fc- night,

namely to effect surprise and to minimize losses.

study of military history will reveal that

ni^ht

operations

are

as old as war itself and historical examples nay be found in the Bible
but a stu:' 1-1'" -'" of these examples will show that, the commanders
1

always initiated

these operations 'with

* v*<iw

to securing the same effects

In the pat nnd prior to th .Torlu V.'^i;, due to the comparative

short range of the .-niscle throwing vteapons carried in tho field and the
inferior means of obsor^ttx; nr.d reconnaissance,
made necessary

only in

c]jr,e

soon

proximity to, or on the battle field, how

of the past

ever the principles laid dovfo hy *:ho commander

value today if properly applied to
The modern- battle area

night operation

oon&Jtiohs

ar9

of eqml

existing in modern warfare.

is. of considerable" extent wheil a study is

made of the moans available to bhe presont day array for preventing

surprise and inflicting casualties.

The area of irrncdiate contact between two opposing forces is covered

with a mass of SHiall-armc> aut.oitftlie weapons and artilleiy, capable of

placing such distinctive fires along the front that the passage

of assault

troops through these fires can only be fcoconplished at an enormcus ex

penditure of men and munitions.

Modern artillery with its excellent means of observation and its

ability to accurately deliver its fire at long ranges greatly deepens

the zone in which, it is reasonable

to expect, severe casualties.

Interdiction and fires on troop movements

and concentrations

in reer

areas are normal missions of part of the heavier batteries and ranges
extending to sixteen thousand yards are now possible.

(9-1 to 32, 140 to

143, 173 to 179)

Aviation more than any other
of the cover of darkness

weapon"

will force troops to make use

in order to, carry out operations

desired bo'effect surprise and reduce casualties.

Itf s

in which it is
distant radius

of action,- its ability to observe and deliver destructive fire will cause

many operations,

which in the past have been carried out in safety in day

light, to be at night.

The ability of aviation to observe and attack at

night in single planes or small groups will necessitate

positive and negative measures
night operations.

.(10-Chap..

the taking of both

for protection against aircraft, even during

(10-Chap. IV, VII, VIII)

The modern armored or mechanized force consisting of tanks, armored

cars, self propelled artillery and other weapons, while having great

mobility anl an extended radius of action 5s so difficult to control and

lrVtied in visibility when prepared for combat that its employment at

nilt

will not constitute a serious menace to operations

taking place in

It has however possibilities for use in at

gainst enemy

rear areas.

positions end will be discussed

later in this paper.

it appears that night operations

From the above brief statements

play a

tiore

will

important part in future wars and in order to effect surprise,

the concentration and preparation

for battle will, for the most part,

be made under cover of darkness.

In addition night combat v/ill have to

be resorted

to not only to secure

surprise and minimize losses

but to

thoroughly defeat an enemy in the shortest possible time and before re

serves can be rushed into fcha battle and by the modern, rapid means of
transportation.

For the same reasons

the defense must be as stubborn at

night as during the hours of daylight.

Night operations,

in general, may be classed under the two following

headings;

a) Movements made under protection of other covering troops, i.e.,

night marches,

b) Movements

concentration and reliefs of front line units.

and operations

carried out without the protection of

otter covering troops, i.e. attacks, approach marches, marches

in the presence

of the enemy and withdrawal.

In general, certain characteristics

(1-114) (2-199)

are common to all night operations

and exercise the greatest

influence on the success

or failure of operations

and exercise the greatest

influence on the success

or failure of the move

ment undertaken.
Darkness decreases

the effect of infantry rifle as automatic rifle

fire and therefore increases

the importance of the weapons of close com

bat and weapons fired from fixed mounts which can be laid in definite lines
of fire during hours of daylight.
The difficulty of movement and in maintaining control, contact and
the use of close formations with

communication beween units necessitates

decreased

intervals and distances.

Direction is hard to maintain and therefore it will be necessary

follow roads, trails or other well-defined direction lines and advance

to limited and easily recognized objectives.
3

to

ana panic
ruin3
nay
n~: ana

The morale of fcroopfl at zr. ;hl ia highly

1

it a coranand

rapidly spread thr

This increases

r;ost trivial Incident*

he moa
from the

tith o

\u25a0

In view of theoe characteristics,

necessary,

a)

requirements

ssf.tl night op*: it :.s and are

for aT

orJer tc secure

3ecrecy.-Ind

to inaure

(1-114 ) (

eurit;-.

fche service

mar
arc

>f tsive

s ;rpriso and for troops on the

secure

ons to

ve

Sv

effort must be made to keep secrot t':

tnd reduce

operations

follows
every

casualties

at night including all

preparations*

b)

Careful preparation* -ftie

icluding the t

possible

el;

;r.o*t

careful preparation

nd correct issuance of orders

reconnaissances

?,n&

are necessary,
and

all necessary

in order that the operation may proceed smoothly

and with little or no confusion.

c) Security. -Adequate security

tneasures

are necessary

avoid confusion or pinis in event of an -inexpeoted happening

ir order to
o** c. counter

v/ilh the enemy.

d) High morale and training.-Due to th^ sensitive moral*

at

of troops

ni-^ht, only those having a high morale and are well trained can be

expected to successfully

conclude a night operation,

(1-114) (2-199, 200,

202) (3-2) (4-3, 4)

4. Night Marches. Kight marches are made in order to effect secret
concentrations
and deployments

either before or during battle, to make approach marches

for attacks to be launched at day light, to v/ithdraw from

combat or any inarch which is desired to be concealed from the enemy and is
made within the radius of his observation and reconnaissance

agencies.

In

the tropics and during hot weather night marches may sometimes be resorted
to in order to escape

the effects of heat durin t the daylight hours*

(1-114) (2-201) (5-144,145)

They have the advantages

of maintaining the secrecy of the movement,

increasing the surprise effect and reducing losses.

The disadvantages

are: the difficulty of following unknown roads or routes across country,

the difficulty of control, the uncertainty of the time required for their

execution, the increased

fatigue of movement at night and the lowered morale

duo to the loss of sleep and the inability of the troops to observe
surroundings

their

(3-2,3) (4-4)

during dnrkness.

Under the most favorable conditions the };lans and preparations

end carried out to the last

a night inarch must be carefully considered

on the time available and the existing situation.

detail possible depending

The situation -permitting, a complete reconnaissance

tc 3elect

should he made

Routes should be selected that will avoid

the best routes.

or collision of columns in

the cross injr of column's" or the interference

the" dark. Full use should be made of good roads

as poor roads,

trails

marches will increase the difficulties of the rvarch*

and cross-country
If necessary

for

to move across -country, compass

directions should be

determined during daylight or the route clearly marked so that it can

be followed in darkness.

during daylight.

Guides should be made familiar with the route

should be made to place men at road inter

Preparations

sections and in towns in order to direct movement without delay.

If troops are to move into bivouac areas at the completion of the

march, these areas
Bivouac areas

should be reconnoitered and marked, if possible.

should be selected

so as to allow the ronr elements

column to be in them before daylight*

should be selected,

if concealment

of the

Areas such as woods and villages

for troops and trains is desired.

Assembly areas for troops advancing to a line of departure

should have

good lines if approach into the area and from it to the line of departure.
The area should provide concealment

and cover from hostile fire and should

be of sufficient distance

from the advance enemy elements

not discover the movement

into or out of the area.

so as they may

Every effort must be made to keep the inarch and the preparations

for it, secret.

It may be necessary

to give out false infomation as to

routes, destination and mission in order to mislead enemy agents.

maintaining of secrecy in the preparations

The

will be most difficult and

only those officers whom it necessary

to inform beforehand

correct information of the movement.

lawns and villages should be avoided

if possible but if passed

habitants

should have

through strict control of both troops and in

should be inforced.

Smoking and lights must be prohibited.

near the enemy noises must be reduced to a minimum, equipment must be

If

secured against rattling, wheel* oJ vohicl

r soft

1'in;: or

materials and lon

,VT:

i 90Om

Ith burlap
pi >

is vital, the

time ro

-se followed by

for the march

The orders must he explicit as to rentes, destination,

initial

head of column should reach same or columns clear.

ointa 8

Time and

.ibiteH

roh L such that warning orders

"

should be is

shouted orders

I'j of : iutain"
:or t)

detailed orders

\u25a0->

spacfl umst

be carefully calculated and due allovraace made for

the uncertainty of isoveaent at bight. (1-65) (2-201) (3-3) (4-4, 5) (5-144)

Due to the sensitive norale of troops and the liability of panic,
security for night marches

is of the utmost importance.

Even though the front flanks and rear are covered by friendly troops,

security detachnents

should be provided, as

..u1l enemy groups, although

5;

not capable of doing physical damage to a column, may at night, throw a

large force into confusion.

Security detachments

those used in daylight and due to decreased

march with reduced intervals and distances.

enough strength to
against

c^rry

out the necessary

surprise and provide the necessary

amy be smaller than

effectiveness

of aimed fire,

They should, however, have

reconnaissance,

provide security

connecting files. Supporting

weapons, as a rule, cannot assist the security detachment

at night and

need not be attached thereto unless the situation appears

to call for

combat at daylight by these detc.chi^nts.

na^ative measures should

At night, the same positive and

be taken to prevent observation and attack by

hostile aircraft as a,re taken during daylight hours.

nights troops on broad, white roads may be observed

On bright moonlight
from au altitude of

three thousand feet, on dark roads from an altitude of fifteen feet and
on a clear starlight night

rove

hostile aviation flying a few hundred feet

the ground may observe the movement.

the use of parachute

Once the column is detected,

flares may permit the avitctbr to closely estimate the

strength and composition of the force.

In addition, attack observation

operating at low altitudes may detect the column and cause considerable

damage, delay and confusion*

3ecurity against

eneny long range artillery

fire nay be effected by moving around areas normally interdicted,

iilitary

police or others should bo provided to direct troops around localities

the eneny habitually shells.

(1-65,114) (2-203) (5-145) (10-Chap IV, p. 4,

Chap VII pp 10, 11 )

,March

discipline must be strictly inforced In order to prevort

strn-.-lia* and to
rear of all units.

keep units well closed up.

Officers should march in the

Officers should be nade responsible

for the rate of

march and careful consideration mast be given to the condition of the

route, weather and degree of darkness.

Ample tine must bo given for troops

to reach their objective or bivouac areas.

Exact time should be prescribed

for the halts for resting and to continue the inarch,

numerous

connecting

files must be employed to maintain contact between the elements of the

column.

(1-65) (2-202) (5-146)

From the above the following principles for night marches may be
deduced:

a) Careful and complete plans and preparations

must be made and

kept secret.

b) Local security, both from ground and air forces is of primary

importance

c) Objectives

or bivouac areas

must be reached

ty all elements of

the column before daylight.

d) Strict march discipline must be maintained and careful considera

tion given to the rate of march.

c) Daylight should find the march completed, and the command secured

from fire, observation or attrack.

5. Night Attacks.-

While a continuation of daylight attacks must be

carried out during hours o darkness

in order to maintain direct pressure

against an enerr/ and inflict a decisive defeat before an opponent and

reorganize

and recuperate

the attacks considered in this paper will be

only those which are launched under cover of darkness

securing its objective before daylight.

in order to decrease

w:'.th a miss? on of

These attacks may b& launched

the heavy losses incident to the capture of a

highly organized tactical locality, to secure points necessary:

for the

operatk-vi to follow at daylight, to drive in covering forces preparatory

to the main attack or similar missions.
Night attacks,

in

to having the advan

addj

common to all night operations

Losses

(1-115; (2-207, 208) (4-11)

to the assaulting

are

lisadvanti

by the follow"

characterized

troops are not so obvious

<\u25a0

morale effect ia lesaenod

They permit the attaok to be launched close to the eneray lines which

reduces

. memy'c fire.

[posed be

the time the troops

ith determination to uoc the bayonet: v/ill

The attack pushed for

often enable a stmll force to defer.t a much larger one.

The attack when properly conducted increases
and creates

the element of surprise

the utriost confusion in the enemy's lines.

of liability of panic, the difficulty

They have the disadvantages

of observation and of determining friend from eneny, they can only be

rae.de to limited objectives with a lock of close artillery support and
there is the increasing problem of determining the objective and position
and maintaining the direction of the attack.
Weather exercises

a decided influence

(3-2) (4-9, 10)

on night attacks.

Mights for

an attack should be selected which are clear in order to facilitate

control and the ground should be hard or the footing such that it will

not impede the movement.

lessens

Mnd coining from the direction of the enemy

the liability to discovery by sound.

These conditions may as a

whole not exist at the time tho attack is desired but due to the hazards
of night operations
tion.

\u25a0

the weather conditions must be given careful considera

(3-4)
Terrain which is open end facilitates ease and rapidity of
Darkness is depended

is more suitable for the attack.

and to decrease

casualties.

on for concealment

Broken and wooded country which would offer

better chances for a successful

disorganization

moverrjent

advance during dayli.rht may cause

and lack of control when passed

over at night.

Due to the difficulties of movement, control, maintenance

(3-4)
of

direction, coordination and the use of supporting artillery fire, night

attacks should be made to limited objectives that can be easily recognized
when reached.

It should be easy to approach and permit the troops to

assemble

close upon it before moving to the assault*

should not contain more bhan one defensive

defe re of fche objective without

of the infantry and its subsequent

objectives must le

If the attack i

.3

iveri each

position ana should be

artillery to fire in support

shallow enough to permit the support:*

forward displacement.

The objective

on a broad front definite

uni^. of' t c attacking

force.

(1-115)

(2-208) (3-6) (5-150, 151)

The preparations
tuke considerable

t operations

time and must be carried out in great datail.

Reconnaissances
to become

ck. like ell other

for a r.

should be made both before and after dark Ln order

thoroughly familiar with the terrain, under both conditions*

As

many unit leaders as time arid the situation permits should make a
re connai seance

leaders.

and this should if possible include platoon ai;d section

The routes to and from the assembly positions should be marked,

the line of departure

marked or easily recognized and compass bearings

taken and prominent objects marked, so as to insure proper direction being

taken in moving on the objective*

All ranks taking part in the atta k must wear a specific distinguishing
mark easily visible at night.

Warning orders must be issued in sufficient tine to enable all

elements of the attacking force to thoroughly complete its preparation.
The orders for the attack must be in detail and in addition to the

matter normally prescribed

in fisld orders, should cover the following:

Definite routes should be prescribed for each column to its assembly

position or the line of departure,

depending on the location at the time

the orders are received.

A specific distinguishing mark to be used by all assault troops.

The methods to be used in maintaining direction and of determining
location.
The objective to be secured by each column and the action to be
taken when the objective is reached.

Definite instructions as to the use of the reserve and to troops in

the flanks of the assault elements.

If practicable,

a time tnb.lo for

movement during the

each successive

ope rat s on*

De fif.ilo arraageme
Designated

rd to conmmnic&tior

1 1fc

'

rallying points for each unit in event *-he attack

(1-115) (2-21C, 211) (4-10)

unsuccessful.

The Advance to the attack i- usually made in lir.es of erull columnfl

writh decreased

intervals

tistances and covered to the front by

scouts and or. the flanks by strong combat patrols*

Deployments

ere not made until close to tht

generally junt before bhe assault

is

The troepe must he determined

assault with the bayonet.

/ posil

made*

to close with the enevcj &nd make the

Resorting to fire action

p.t

night with small

arms is not only ineffective bu1 will disclose the position of the attack!*
troops.

The use of an artillery preparation

\u25a0

is

vcrj

questionable.

While it

may raise the morale of the attacking force and lower that of the eneray,
if fired long enough to create sufficient neutralization the elenent of

surprise willbe lost.* It will be better for the artillery to rex&ain

normal until the assault is made and thereafter to support the attack by
fires in advance

of the troops on prearranged

targets and execute

countep

battery fire. Fires should be prepared to assist the troops in holding

the objective vrhen gained from the subsequent

counter-attacks.

Aviation can but assist the attack by executing its norzal battle

missions, illuminating the area by use of parachute

reconnaissance

flares -or marking the objective by dropping flares behind the objective

in prolongation of the direction of attack.

Care must be exercised

in

the use of flares as as not to prematurely discloce the attack or blind

the attacking troops.
Engineers

The reserve
fit not to

should be present to assist in the passage

of obstacles.

should be located well to the rear and on the flanks so

become involved in a retreat

and in order to cover a retreat

in case the attack is 'insuccescful

if necessary.

Tro&ps must be kept well in hand during the entire operation and
for prompt reforming when the objective

all impressed with the necessity

is reached.

They should then be disposed to meet counter-attacks.

10

pursuit

after a night attach

I'jnlz.

ihed out

shoul

-ver security gr

only roc It 5n disorganization

(1-114,

d da lay*

11)0)

(2-208, 209, 21C) (3-3, 9, IC, XI) (S-U2, 152, 164)

of night

Tho success

Dettiled plan* ond orde

eluding

ft

ret

reconnaissance,

the.

art of illcon- .
\u25a0

on the fol

attacks will therefore &

and co

ratl
o r< leader ah i] on

Nt excellently

rfcl

cVs to 1

015

w*ri

trail
\u25a0

troops

c^^able

carrying out during kin* of

'.dpi*- o r simplicity, pcrticulerly i

3trict conpliar.ce irith 1

regard to plans and foraation* for th r-ttack#

Sight attacks by riecha:.ized weapons. -Tiio tank used during

*hr and at present

in general

in our amy, due

use

visibility could rarely Ke used in night operations*

to its

fbrld

noise find United

Ir; addition,

the lnck

reens of comunication between tanks end the difficulty of connsnd greatly

when employed in groups.

reduced their effeetiveneeo

There is no reason to believe that these disadvantages

tho mechanized

willexist with

weapons of the future.

The use of mufflers with cut-outs or other silencers car be employed

to drown the noise of motors and the use of so c

or other

proof

necessary

ne&ns

form of periscope, bullet

will increase the visibility to the extent

?or night movement.

3ven shoulc the means of visibility fail

the tenk could still operete by a compass direction and a computation of

speed.
The use of radio telephones
enable the group commander

for communication between tanks should

to direct the operation of hie unit in c. nenner

similar to that uced by fleet commanders

The concealment
pf ct

precented

theiront.

during naval battles.

from air observation of tank tracks, has, in the

a difficult problem in effecting secret concentrations near

As a greet number of* the vehicles in the future will probably

nove on wheels until just prior to their entry into battle, this problem
will be greatly simplified.

11.

rh

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effective at

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report

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r-jvtf-te/.k w<^

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All er'::e:.
crr r
:-cr

re oxperi

.-

x,

'
;

or of

their

rove
froj^t 1:
Ith fror:

"'&:
due to RRti*t
t^a ..'orlc
Hovld "Tar
r&^ofj duri; o the
enti~tenk wo^o's
'.:, Increase
n-rl^r, of
increase in number,
an

more
of
ok

hay#
, hare

fut'irs may, aion-;

along or^rir.'zed
organized fr
the fut'ire

naoke screens

pone^

or during hours of derkr.ess

nd
of cand

&-,V~v

cf Umkfi

tfiiii

jonsida:
jonsidar^ble

to be

-..

4
Lth

! fsres in

yed mder
-inder carer
coTer of

iv order to decrease

the ir:r^< r

of casualties*
of
casualties.

The

operati
night op^rfitionfi
or. for ni&ht
reason

*'

casualties,
cafiualtiec, therefore^
therefore,

mechanized

!s to effect surprise
survri&e and
and

cre^

\u25a0

fcrc6 due to its sharfccteristic*

forc6
c.

ristics

exd rith
irith improved
eosmnd end the
the

insproved materiel, more effective meanss of cc-

adoption of
o^ group tactics will provide a powerful we
w
either
either by day or night*
7#77#7 #

for c.

(personal opinion)

-The necessity
Raids
Sftids#<-The
necesslt/

for securing information

infonaation particularly identificai
identifies tie

of
>f opposing troops along the frorz
front lines will cauee
ceuse

the execution

ezecut:

acy

re
i *\u25a0
rsids,

. lf?
Ie re
raids
ids may be carried out in daylight the

c for the &uc;es

success!

execution
aission #irith a ndnimiia
win jbub of
cee'ialtle:;, -..ill
execution of this nission^with
of casualties^
willbe
If
if carried out Lmder
under cover of d&rkness.
d&rknesE

increased
increased

'

T?:e
c
.
v&ry froi c few
way/ vary
The composition
of aa raiding
fcr-e
sition of
raid

en to a0 fore
ec

arr,6.
of
>f all arr

5 '\u25a0/"
0Vi
r

'"/o-'

to

'

. force*
force.
support Ing

Iti
It

** **

1
!

12

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I
r

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f

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t!

ere used iuriug !

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c loce
-

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.
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&n

r frequent

t&e

cc

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reGlstincfj
stance
of reel

be
id L^

Jii

*
"icr.

*"

to the lack of

'

roo 0

'

coidter--t1.
orta3 counter-^"

-er.

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jri^cv effctire#
e r frf c :
79 #
tsoct
frc:;l

je
c

ni^tt attack,

bayonet irili
fcha bayonet
th
will b*
c

The lowl
local ccur.ter-si^t'
counter-fltt ck hstB the advajrtfcgje of beizig

;
115er
15er with tthe
.e grc
rcu.

orr which th
the ftttac

shed;d

and alert sec^r:t

ec^r:t vvr groapg should easily dicar;
Bnergetic
r^etic patrollisg aad
the
.c approach of a ni^it
i c?.- .1
night attack aad ths*
'

plac
lacir;^ of previously arranged
'

front of

co'^te? preparcttioa
co^r-ter
jjriijzr''

ana
na protective firec
fireu i:
ia

'

sn#

fie
fie fire should bs witheld usfcil
ustil the
tar

foil
follows

2?

ene;-^ pre-er.tc

a distil]
di^tf.

Bt#
f practicable
If

provisions should

ade for illun^r^atinj

ill;r/*..-it:'r.. the ground

In fr
fc

or s

'

>

"

is

y;

+,r

for iefej 6.

--

_'

t-r>' *
i *
':. r?'-r,

"
.r v
. <-:r
of
6lr

.
2

"

feiizo
feixcc- is

'

-eo^;

"o

1 ,'

\u25a0

2pied
*

13

\u25a0<8

Vf

t '#

'"* *

'

en

, atr^aed

'

'

'

r*

I
retreat

fraj
:"/

;
i

rcr; ss~ie
I: rch
ade

'*-*

# "

. -

'\u25a0\u25a0'

/^

\u25a0

*>

"" '

'" 9

"

&de #
'

sso-Japfcfjes

IHcin

zee 1lent

ezaaple
exaaplc

the attae^ of t

of i-2

- ..'e.r,

of a

ptur of Maje y^fl bill Is

la
attach :r.
ss^it attach:
cf^it

syce.

Consltfslcm*

In addition

ni^ht

*.:.

r&r Is
in vfcicb
which aall

(3-124, 12S}
.
*or the
:; "or
necezz&ry

fc<s tiae recuire.

?<i^-r r.

H^ nriacipel jbfect of all

-^.;

w eaa

o-^r^'i:

Ec

irprise*
^'

- rtreae

*
> ii

>f c
adrs

14

" r;

c;^
(?pej

;slon
j-.t aperfttioa
si on o* if.I ,-r.t
o-'.'-i'rs
# i

f >.

s or. the ni'-

prinefplec of 5 /it attacks were correctly applied,

.

BS

firsj

- . "'-v V

->

53-^:

ana of both natural and artificial concealment,

be

> this destructive

I h will reduce

'tended upon

that oan always

.loss' is one

the clement of

fire. It may therefore be concluded that as

nd effect of fire power increase, the value and frequency of

ht

.vill have a corresponding

0]

increase

prise, the second object; oT night operations,

Secret marches

S movement.

and concentrations

order to obtain the full effect of surprise

:

is obtained by

and again concealment

event discovery by the enemy.

bo in orier

are necessary

vehicles and aviation

aintaining cecrecy, even in areas

9

antiaircraft defense,

enemy from discovering

from the front lines or

superiority in aviation and with

to keep an

daylight move ents of forces of any size.

observation and reconnaissance,

of motorized

the difficulties of

it is practically impossible

however, is a most powerful weapon

v;

Darkness,

b which to combat these agencies

of

therefore in the future, in order to

rise, night operations

obtai

sone distance

3ven with a marke

o? contact.

adequate

\u25a0reatly increase

must be

Powerful optical

its, the groat radius of action and rapidity of movement

reconnaissance

in

must be resorted

to more frequently than

in the past.

All night operations will require complete and detailed preparations

including plans, orders and reconnaissances.
as

These preparations,

the execution of the operation must be secured

enemy

as well

against discovery by the

Due to the sensitive

morale of troops at night adequate

security measures

must be taken to insure protection from both enemy ground and air forces.
The highest degree of leadership

commanders,

is necessary

on the part of all

from the highest to the lowest echelons

end, the study of night operations

of command.

should be stressed

To this

in all service scnools

organizations.

On^.

troops,

with high morale, well trained and confident in their

ability to operate

of ore, exercises
Piflii

"i

at night, can hope to be successful

during hours of darkness

rogrario of

all units

15

o;

in night operations,

should be included in the

the Regular Army and National Guard.

The use of the mechanized

possible

find practicable)

force in ni^hb operations

appears

to be

and further studios should be made and exercises

carried out in order to determine

the best methods of movement,

tion and attack for this force as

well as meana for defense

attacks*

16

concontra

against such

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Key:

(1-115, llfi) equals No. 1 texs (below) pages 115 and 116.

1. .Field 3ervic> ?eg ilations, United St4t9B Army, 1920.

Printing Office, Washington, 1924.
Z. British Field Service Regulations,
Majesty 131 3 Stationary Office, London,

Voluni' 11,

Covenant

Operations, 1924.

3. Tactical Principles and Decisions, Chapter XXI, Wight Operations.

General Sorvieo Schools, Fort Leaven//orb;t, Kansas , 1925.

EiS
The

4. Tii^ht Operations, (Pamphlet) The Infantry School, Do partment o

Military Art # 2923-1924.
5. Lectures on Land Warfare.
Ltd., London, 1922.

A ?ield Officer, William ?^bv?ers

and Sons^

6. Military Operations.
France and Belgium, 1914. August-October 1914.
Brigadier-Cieneral J. E. Edmunds. HacMillan and Co., Ltd.,- London, 1922.

7. Hostory of the War in South Africa, 1399-1902. Vol. I. Hajor-General

Sir Frederick Maurice, Hunt and Blackett, Ltd., London, 1906,
Official History, the Russo-Japanese
War. Vol. 11.
Imperial Defense,
Endland, 1312.
1912,
of the c ndttee
Defense. Endland,
ittee of Imperial
8.
q
\u0084

Presw,

7oi

Historical Section

and Technique of Field Artillery. The General Service Schools

Leavenworth, Kansas, 1927.

10. Tactics .id Technique of Air Corps. Chapters IV, VII and VIII.
The Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1929.

11. Tactical Principles and Decisions. Chapter XX. Raids.

Service Schools, Fort LeaVenv/orth, Kansas, 1925.

The General

\u25a0i

17