Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
18
27
People v Casabuena..........................................................30
Baculi v Belen....................................................................31
SPS. CARPO v. AYALA LAND, INCORPORATED....................32
PEOPLE v. GO (SUPRA).......................................................33
Elena Duarte v. Miguel Duran............................................38
EDUARDO P. MANUEL v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES........40
FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA vs. VIRGILIO P. BALAGUER and INTERCONTINENTAL BROADCASTING CORPORATION CHANNEL-13
.......................................................................................... 41
Atienza v BOM...................................................................43
PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, vs. TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO
44
14 January 2015
J. Villarama Jr. | 3rd Division
Facts:
1. Nick Garbo6 (Nick) was married to Eduviges Garabato
(Eduviges). They had a daughter named Florence Garabato
(Florence) who in turn had a son, respondent Victorey
Antonio Garabato (Victorey).
2. During the subsistence of Nick and Eduviges marriage, Nick
cohabited with petitioner Betty Gepulle-Garbo (Betty).
3. 6/17/1977: Eduviges and Florence executed a Deed of Sale
(1st Deed of Sale). Eduviges sold to Florence a parcel of land
in Pasay city. Nick signed the deed of sale.
4. 5/12/1978: Eduviges died. Nick married Betty 3 months
after.
5. 10/26/1988: Florence registered the property in her name
and was issued a new TCT. She died on March 4, 992 while
Nick died on Feb. 28, 1996.
6. 1196: Victorey registered the same property in his name by
virtue of a Deed of Sale (2 nd Deed of Sale) executed by
Florence in his favor. A new TCT was issued in his name.
7. 8/2/2001: Betty filed a petition for cancellation of TCT
against sps Garabato on the following grounds:
o 1st Deed of Sale was invalid the signatures of Nick
and Eduviges being forged by Florence, and
o 2nd Deed of Sale was invalid (walang rason si
Bettyboop. Invalid lang)
8. Betty: Nick had previously sought the examination of his
alleged signature on the 1st Deed of Sale by the NBI.
Albacea, the NBI document examiner and a handwriting
expert, allegedly found that the questioned signature and
the standard signatures of Nick were not written by one and
the same person. Nick had filed a criminal complaint for
falsification against Florence though the case was dismissed
due to lack of probable cause. Also, on February 6, 1993,
Nick wrote a letter12 to respondent Victorey reminding him
that the subject property was his despite the transfer of
title. She prayed that Victoreys TCT be cancelled and the
property be registered in her name.
Here, both the RTC and CA found that Albacea did not explain the
manner of examination of the specimen signatures in reaching his
conclusion. Albacea did not point out distinguishing marks,
characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false
specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape notice or
detection by an untrained observer.
The courts are not bound by expert testimonies especially that
the examination was upon the initiative of Nick and Betty and they
had complete control on what documents and specimens to be
examined by the NBI.
Rule 130: S49 opinion of expert witness; s50 opinion of
ordinary witnesses
DEL A LL ANA V BIONG
Brion, J Dec 4, 2013
FACTS:
Petition for review on certiorari of a CA decision
On Mar 2000, Juan dela Llana was driving along North Ave,
QC. His sister, petitioner Dr. Leila dela Llana, was seated
at the front passenger seat while a certain Calimlim was at
the backseat
Juan stopped the car when the signal light turned red. A few
secs after the car halted, a dump truck containing gravel
and sand suddenly rammed the cars rear end, violently
pushing the car forward. Glass splinters flew, puncturing
petitioner.
Traffic investigation report stated that the truck driver, Joel
Primero was recklessly imprudent in driving the truck.
Primeros employer was respondent Rebecca Biong
Starting May 2000, petitioner began to feel mild to
moderate pain on the left side of her neck and shoulder.
Pain became more intense as days passed by. Her health
deteriorated to the extent that she could no longer move
her left arm. A rehab med specialist told petitioner that she
1 injury caused by the sudden jerking of the spine in the neck area.
2 she required Primero to submit a certification of good moral character as well as
barangay, police, and NBI clearances prior to his employment; only hired Primero
after he successfully passed the driving skills test conducted by a licensed drivermechanic
33 elements necessary to establish Rebeccas liability were present: (1) that the
employee was chosen by the employer, personally or through another; (2) that the
services were to be rendered in accordance with orders which the employer had the
authority to give at all times; and (3) that the illicit act of the employee was on the
occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to him.
Evidence Rule 130 sections 25-34 Page 4 of 53
However, she was not presented to testify in court and was not
even able to identify and affirm the contents of the medical
certificate. Court also pointed out that the medical certificate did
not explain the chain of causation in fact between Primeros
reckless driving and Pets whiplash injury.)
(3) her testimonial evidence.
SC: Pets opinion that Primeros negligence caused her
whiplash injury has no probative value. Pet was the lone
physician-witness during trial. [TOPICAL] Significantly, she
merely testified as an ordinary witness. Under the RoC,
there is a substantial difference between an ordinary
witness and an expert witness. The opinion of an ordinary
witness may be received in evidence regarding:
(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate
knowledge;
(b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity;
and
(c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is
sufficiently acquainted. Furthermore, the witness may also
testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or
appearance of a person.
On the other hand, the opinion of an expert witness may
be received in evidence on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience or training which he shown to
possess.
Pets medical opinion cannot be given probative value for
the reason that she was not presented as an expert witness. As
an ordinary witness, she was not competent to testify on the
nature, and the cause and effects of whiplash injury.
Furthermore, Pet, during trial, nonetheless did not provide a
medical explanation on the nature as well as the cause and
effects of whiplash injury in her testimony.
4Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that "[w]hoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is a quasi-delict.
5Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in relation with the 5th paragraph of Article
2180, "an action predicated on an employees act or omission may be instituted
against the employer who is held liable for the negligent act or omission committed
by his employee.
That Civil Case No. 5215 was reinstated is a fact that cannot
be ignored.
1. W/N Alvarez should be disqualified as witness and
w/n Alvarezs testimony would be hearsay. No. RTC
committed GAD in disqualifying Alvarez
Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence provides:
SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications.Except as
provided in the next succeeding section, all persons
who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known
their perception to others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of
the case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwise
provided by law, shall not be a ground for
disqualification.
Specific rules of witness disqualification are provided under
Sections 21 to 246, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence.
Sections 19 and 207 of Rule 130 provide for specific
disqualifications.
As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely
perceive and make known her perception to others. SC
declared that she is qualified as a witness and cannot be
disqualified as a witness since she possesses none of
the disqualifications specified under the Rules. The
RTC rather confused the qualification of the witness with the
credibility and weight of her testimony.
The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert
depends not upon his mere statements of whether a writing
is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in
7 Section 19 disqualifies those who are mentally incapacitated and children whose
tender age or immaturity renders them incapable of being witnesses. Section 20
provides for disqualification based on conflicts of interest or on relationship. Section
21 provides for disqualification based on privileged communications.
Evidence Rule 130 sections 25-34 Page 6 of 53
followed his order, but his car hit the center island twice while
backing up. Cielo went out of the car and approached the
sprawled body of Rochelle; he and the petitioner brought
Rochelles body inside Mendez car. The three of them (the
petitioner, Cielo and Mendez) brought Rochelle to the UST
Hospital, where she died due to septicemia secondary to
traumatic injuries.
DEFENSE: The petitioner was driving along Gov. Forbes corner
G. Tuazon St. when his car ramped on an island at the foot of
the Nagtahan Flyover. He tried to move the car backwards, but
failed to do so. He alighted from his car and then saw that its 2
rear wheels had been elevated. He returned inside his car to
turn off its engine; he then noticed that many people were
approaching his car. He again alighted from his vehicle and
saw a person lying on the road. He looked at his left side and
saw a car that was "running fast like a wind" pass by. He
approached the person lying on the road, and noticed that she
was still breathing and moaning. Afterwards, he saw Mendez
car backing up; he carried the victim towards that car.
Thereafter, he, Mendez and Cielo brought the victim to the UST
Hospital.
Mendez, for his part, testified that as he was driving along Gov.
Forbes corner G. Tuazon St. on his way home, he saw a vehicle
that had ramped on an island divider. Suddenly, another
vehicle overtook his car from the right and cut his lane. He
slowed down his car when he saw a rug-like object fall from the
car that overtook him, and stopped when he realized that what
had fallen was a persons body. When he moved his car
backwards to help this person, many people approached his
car. He alighted from his car and inquired from them what had
happened. The people replied that someone was run over;
some of them pointed to him as the culprit. He denied having
run over the victim when they tried to hurt him. The petitioner
carried the victim and placed her inside Mendez car.
Thereafter, the two of them brought the victim to the UST
Hospital.
The petitioner and Mendez were charged with reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide before the RTC, Br. 39,
Manila. The RTC convicted the 2 accused of the crime charged.
It found that the petitioners car first hit the victim, causing her
to be thrown into the road on her back, and that Mendez car
ran over her as she was lying down.
The CA agreed with the factual findings of the RTC, and
affirmed its decision with the modification on the penalty.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the conviction of the accused should
be affirmed - YES
2. Whether or not the CA [ERRED IN UPHOLDING HIS]
CONVICTION [ON THE BASIS OF THE] INCREDIBLE
AND UNRELIABLE TESTIMONY OF VICTOR SORIANO NO
3. Whether or not the CA erred in disregarding the
witness of the accused - NO
HELD:
1. Reckless imprudence, generally defined by our penal law,
consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to
do an act from which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances
regarding persons, time and place. Imprudence connotes a
deficiency of action. It implies a failure in precaution or a
failure to take the necessary precaution once the danger or
peril becomes foreseen. Thus, in order for conviction to be
decreed for reckless imprudence, the material damage
suffered by the victim, the failure in precaution on the part
of the accused, and the direct link between material
damage and failure in precaution must be established
beyond reasonable doubt. All three were established in this
case in accordance with the required level of evidence in
criminal cases.
The petitioner failed to exercise precaution in
operating his vehicle.
The petitioner repeatedly admitted that as he drove his
vehicle on his way home from work, he did not notice the
island divider at the foot of the Nagtahan Flyover. As a
result, his car ramped on the island so that both its rear
wheels became "elevated" from the road and he could no
longer maneuver the vehicle.33 The petitioner even testified
that his car had to be towed. Later, during crossexamination, he admitted that all four wheels of his car, not
just the two rear wheels mentioned in his earlier testimony,
lost contact with the ground. The entire vehicle, therefore,
ended up on top of the island divider. He puts the blame for
the ramping and, essentially, his failure to notice the island
Facts:
1. Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or Lulu) was to the
spouses Felix Hernandez and Maria San Juan Hernandez.
The latter died due to complications during childbirth. After
Maria's death, Felix left Lulu in the care of her maternal
uncle, Sotero C. San Juan.
2. Felix married Natividad Cruz. The union produced three
children, petitioners Cecilio C. Hernandez, Ma. Victoria C.
Hernandez-Sagun and Teresa C. Hernandez-Villa Abrille.
3. Lulu inherited valuable real properties from the San Juan
family (estimated at P50M).
4. Lulu went to live with her father and his new family. Due to
her "violent personality," Lulu stopped schooling when she
reached Grade 5.
5. Upon reaching the age of majority, Lulu was given full
control of her estate. Because Lulu did not even finish her
elementary education, Felix continued to exercise actual
administration of Lulus properties. Upon Felix's death,
petitioners took over the task of administering Lulu's
properties.
6. During the period of their informal administration, Felix and
petitioners undertook various "projects" involving Lulus real
properties.
7. Lulu sought the assistance of her maternal first cousin,
respondent Jovita San Juan-Santos, after learning that
petitioners had been dissipating her estate. She confided to
Jovita that she was made to live in the basement of
petitioners Montalban, Rizal home and was receiving a
measly daily allowance. Lulu was severely overweight,
unkempt and smelled of urine.
8. Respondent filed a petition for guardianship.
9. During the hearing, Lulu was presented and asked to testify
on her genealogy and experiences with the San Juan and
Hernandez families. Lulu identified and described her
parents, stepmother, half-siblings and maternal relatives.
She claimed inheriting tracts of land from the San Juan
family. However, these properties were dissipated by the
Hernandez family as they lived a "luxurious" lifestyle. When
asked to explain this allegation, Lulu said that her
stepmother and half-siblings rode in cars while she was
made to ride a tricycle.
10. Medical specialists testified to explain the results of Lulus
examinations:
a. afflicted with diabetes mellitus
RATIO:
CSC v. Belagan
19 October 2004
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
Facts:
1. Two separate complaints were filed by Magdalena Gapuz,
founder/directress of the "Mother and Child Learning
Center," and Ligaya Annawi, a public school teacher against
respondent Dr. Allyson Belagan, Superintendent of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS).
Magdalena charged respondent with sexual indignities and
harassment, while Ligaya accused him of sexual harassment
and various malfeasances.
2. Magdalena alleges that sometime in March 1994, she filed
an application with the DECS Office in Baguio City for a
permit to operate a pre-school. One of the requisites for the
issuance of the permit was the inspection of the school
premises by the DECS Division Office. In the course of the
inspection, while both were descending the stairs of the
second floor, respondent suddenly placed his arms around
her shoulders and kissed her cheek.
3. She then wrote a letter-complaint for sexual indignities and
harassment to former DECS Secretary Ricardo Gloria.
4. The CSC dismissed respondent.
5. Respondent seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration,
contending that he has never been charged of any offense
in his thirty-seven (37) years of service. By contrast,
Magdalena was charged with several offenses before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Baguio City, thus: 22 criminal
cases for light oral defamation, slight physical injuries, grave
threats, malicious mischief, light threats, grave oral
defamation, light oral defamation, and unjust vexation.
6. In addition, the following complaints against Magdalena
were filed with the Barangay Chairmen of Barangay Gabriela
Silang and Barangay Hillside, both in Baguio City: 23 cases
of grave threats, unjust vexation, rumor mongering, oral
defamation, harassment, habitual trouble maker, etc.
ISSUE/HELD:
1. WON complaining witness, Magdalena Gapuz, is credible.
YES.
xxx
PUNO, J.:
Facts
Issue/Holding/Ratio
WON Herminia Marquez testimony was credible? YES.
A:
Hindi naman po butas, kundi bukas na bintana.
Nakabukas iyong bintana namin.
Q:
So in your sinumpaang salaysay in the
statement that you said butas na bintana is not
correct?
A:
Mali ho kasi, hindi ko na napansin iyan, kasi ito
napansin ko, kinorect ko.
COURT: You show to the witness. There, butas na
bintana.
August 6, 2014
VS. MARISSA
REYES, J.:
Facts
Issue/Holding/Ratio
WON there was a lease agreement between the petitioner and
respondent regarding the residential building? YES, the petitioner
thus cannot claim ownership over the building.
WON the lease had already expired when Adoracion bought the
property from Tomas? The issue cannot be resolved in the
present case, but nothing supports that view.
The petitioner also insists that the lease between CCC and
the respondents already expired when Adoracion bought the
property from Tomas. The foregoing issue, however, cannot
be considered in the present action. There is also nothing on
record that will prove the petitioners claim that the lease
between CCC and the respondents already expired. The fact
that Adoracion subsequently bought the property did not
ipso facto terminate the lease. While the lease between CCC
and the respondents contained a 15-year period, to end in
1992, the petitioner failed to show that the subsequent
transferors/purchasers of the two parcels of land opted to
terminate the lease or instituted any action for its
termination.
Bancom bought the property at an auction sale in 1979;
Union Bank, in 1984; Tomas, and later, Adoracion, acquired
the property in 1993. It cannot be denied that the
transferors/purchasers of the property all had knowledge of
the lease between CCC and the respondents; yet, not any of
the transferors/purchasers moved to terminate the lease.
July 24, 1995 - Meanwhile, Alejandro and the Bliss Dev't Corp.
(BDC) entered into a Contract to Sell over a dwelling unit (Unit
No. 10) in the Rural Bliss 1 Project located at Calumpang, Gen.
Santos City with an area of 36 sqm.
Reblandos defaulted in their loan obligation, prompting the PNB
to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage over TCT No. T-40839.
PNB bought the land as the lone bidder. Following the lapse of
the redemption period, PNB consolidated its ownership over the
subject parcels of land and was able to secure a new title over
the property.
The Reblandos filed a complaint before the RTC to declare the
nullity of the mortgage over Lot No. 10 allegedly constituted
on January 13, 1995 when PNB and the Reblandos executed
the Amendment to REM. According to them, they could not
have validly created a mortgage over Lot No. 10, not being the
owner when the mortgage was constituted (since it was still
public land). They only included Lot No. 10 in the mortgage
package, albeit it did not belong to them, because PNB
required them to post Lot No. 10 as additional collateral.
PNB's arguments: On January 28, 1992, the Reblandos, via a
contract of REM of even date, already conveyed by way of
mortgage Lot No. 10 covered by TD No. 59006, inclusive of the
Reblandos possessory and other rights. And together with the
lot covered by TCT No. T-40839, Lot No. 10 is listed as
mortgaged property. The Reblandos deliberately omitted to
attach the supplemental page in their basic complaint in an
attempt to mislead the court and conceal the simultaneous
constitution of the mortgage over Lot No. 10 and the titled lot.
Lot No. 10 was not an additional security, noting that the very
same lot was already an existing collateral. As an affirmative
defense, PNB raised the issue of estoppel.
RTC for the Reblandos. CA affirmed.
respondent Alejandro was the declared owner of Lot No. 10. His
ownership is reflected in TD No. 59006 issued in 1990 which was
prior to the constitution of the mortgage on Lot No. 10 in January
1992. The fact of being in actual possession of the property is
another indication of such ownership.
The records are bereft of evidence, other than respondents bare
and self-serving assertion, to support their contention about being
mere applicants in a social housing project at the time and that Lot
No. 10 was, indeed, government property. And as may be noted, TD
No. 59006 was issued in Alejandros name, two (2) years prior to
the constitution of the REM.
The Contract to Sell shows that it contemplates a different object.
The contract, to stress, is one for the sale of Unit No. 10 in the Rural
Bliss I Project, having an area of 36 sqm. Its Clause IV specifically
refers to the unit being sold as a dwelling unit" (read: house). The
Contract to Sell of Unit No. 10 presented by respondents has
nothing to do with this case, as it is not in any way related to the
mortgage contract. And as between the Contract to Sell and TD No.
59006, categorically stating that respondent Alejandro is the owner
of Lot No. 10 since the time of its issuance on September 12, 1990,
the latter ought to be the superior evidence as to who owns Lot No.
10.
Not only was the tax declaration in Alejandros name, but also,
respondents admittedly possessed the property mortgaged, their
residence being constructed on it--a prima facie proof of ownership
which respondents failed to rebut.
Whether or not the respondents were guilty of estoppel by deed.
(YES)
Rule 131, Section 2(a) of the Rules of Court, enunciating the
principle of estoppel, states, Whenever a party has, by his own
declaration, act or omission, intentionally and deliberately led
another to believe a particular thing to be true, and to act upon
such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such
declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it.
Respondents act of entering into the mortgage contract with
petitioner, benefiting through the receipt of the loaned amount,
defaulting in payment of the loan, letting the property be
foreclosed, failing to redeem the property within the redemption
period, and thereafter insisting that the mortgage is void, cannot
be countenanced. Respondents are estopped from contesting the
element. This may be shown, however, by the nature of the act, the
circumstances under which it was committed, the means employed
and the motive of the accused. The law provides that, in estafa,
prima facie evidence of deceit is established upon proof
that the drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount
necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from
receipt of the notice of dishonor for lack or insufficiency of
funds.
Conviction affirmed.
Racines tries to escape liability by saying that Atty. Manalad did not
explain the contents of the pleadings to him, because if Atty.
Manalad did, he would not have signed the same.
The Court is not convinced. It is presumed that a person intends
the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act and unless the
requirements for proper substitution were made, a lawyer enjoys
the presumption of authority given him by his client. Racines does
not deny that the signatures in the pleadings were his. He also does
not claim that he was prevented by Atty. Manalad from reading the
contents thereof. He only said that since he fully trusted Atty.
Manalad. Penalty: Reprimand
As to Atty. Manalad, the Court finds that a greater penalty is in
order. As a member of the bar, he should know better than to file
an unfounded administrative complaint. His claim that he filed the
charges against respondent at the instance of Racines cannot free
Ratio:
Issue #1:
Jurisdiction over the persons of both defendants was validly
acquired because personal service of summons, via tender to
petitioner Sandra Manuel, was made by Sheriff Joselito Sales.
The sheriffs return on summons indicated that Sheriff Joselito
Sales endeavored to personally hand the summons and a copy
of the complaint to the Spouses Manuel on two (2) separate
occasions.
The Spouses Manuel did not deny the occurrence of the events
narrated in the sheriffs return but claimed that no valid service
of summons was made. The Spouses Manuel cannot capitalize
on the supposed variance of address. Personal service of
summons has nothing to do with the location where summons is
served. A defendants address is inconsequential.
Topical: the Spouses Manuels self-serving assertion must
crumble in the face of the clear declarations in the sheriffs
return. The acts of Sheriff Joselito Sales and the events relating
to the attempt to personally hand the summons and a copy of
the complaint to the Spouses Manuel, as detailed in the sheriffs
return, enjoy the presumption of regularity. Moreover, Sheriff
Joselito Sales must be presumed to have taken ordinary care
and diligence in carrying out his duty to make service upon the
proper person(s) and not upon an impostor.
A sheriffs return, if complete on its face, must be accorded the
presumption of regularity and, hence, taken to be an accurate
and exhaustive recital of the circumstances relating to the steps
undertaken by a sheriff. In this case, the Spouses Manuel have
In this case, the Court of Appeals noted that the Spouses Manuels
motion to lift order of default was not made under oath. We add
that this motion was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit
specifying the facts which would show that their non-filing of an
answer within fifteen (15) days from March 16, 2010 was due to
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.
Failing both in making their motion under oath and in attaching an
affidavit of merits, the Spouses Manuels motion to lift order of
default must be deemed pro-forma. It is not even worthy of
consideration
Evidence Rule 130 sections 25-34 Page 25 of 53
TARAPEN V PEOPLE
raised his head, Tarapen hit the formers head again with the
shovel. Accused then ran away.
(2008)
Petitioner: PETER TARAPEN y CHONGOY
Respondent: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Ponente: J. Chico-Nazario
Concept: Rule 131 Section 3
Tarapen was charged before the RTC of Baguio City with Frustrated
Homicide for attacking and assaulting James Lacbao Pangoden. The
day after, the victim died from the injuries he sustained. Thus, the
information was amended charging him with Homicide.
sitting position, accused was able to get hold of the shovel and
swing it, hitting James who was approaching him and about to
strike with a clenched fist. Tarapen stood up and tried to leave.
When James followed him, the accused hit him again with the
shovel. Tarapen saw James boarding a taxi, before reporting
the matter to his supervisor at the office.
The trial court convicted Tarapen of the crime of homicide. This was
affirmed with modification in the CA. Hence, this petition for review
filed before the SC.
Issue:
1. WON the Court should give credence to testimony of
prosecution witnesses YES
2. WON the accused acted in self-defense and should be acquitted
- NO
Ratio:
Tarapen:
The
prosecution
witnesses
deliberately
suppressed material evidence favorable to Tarapen. It may
be safely presumed that such evidence, having been
willfully suppressed, would be adverse if produced.
Evidence Rule 130 sections 25-34 Page 27 of 53
o
SC: The defense failed to specify which evidence was
suppressed. It simply made a general statement that
the prosecution witnesses allegedly did not tell the
truth and thus deliberately suppressed material
evidence favorable to the petitioner.
Tarapen: Molly and Silmana Linglingens version that the victim was
hit from behind, on the right side of the head is not tenable,
considering that it is not corroborated by medical findings. Molly
and Silmana Linglingens claim was negated by the findings of Dr.
Mensalvas that James suffered injuries on the "left fronto parietal
and left fronto temporo parietal" areas of his head. The findings
mean that James was facing Tarapen when hit by the shovel.
2.
Tarapen: The trial court judge was not able to observe the
demeanor of the prosecution witnesses, because they were looking
at the court interpreter when they were testifying.
3.
SC: The trial court judge was emphatic in saying that he had
the chance to see the face of the witness while she testified.
4.
5.
Ratio:
UNIWIDE SALES REALTY AND RESOURCES CORP V TITANIKEDA CONSTRUCTION AND DEVT CORP
(2006)
Ponente: J. Tinga
Concept: Rule 131 Section 3
Facts:
1. 3 construction contracts was entered into by Titan and Uniwide
whereby Titan undertook to construct Uniwides Warehouse Club
and Administration Building (Project 1), to construct an
additional floor and renovate Uniwides warehouse (Project 2)
and, to construct the Uniwide Sales Department Store Building
(Project 3).
2. Titan filed an action against Uniwide with the RTC, for the nonpayment of certain claims billed by Titan after completion of 3
projects covered by the said agreements. Upon Uniwides
motion to dismiss/suspend proceedings the case was
suspended for it to undergo arbitration. Titans complaint was
thus re-filed with the Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission (CIAC).
3. An Arbitral Tribunal was created in accordance with the CIAC
Rules. After conducting a preliminary conference, it issued a
Terms of Reference (TOR) which was signed by the parties. The
tribunal then promulgated a Decision, holding Uniwide liable for
the unpaid balance for Projects 2 and 3 (since Uniwide already
Uniwide: Titan was not entitled to be paid this amount because the
additional works were without any written authorization. None of
the contracts contain stipulations on additional works, Uniwides
liability for additional works, and prior approval as a requirement
before Titan could perform additional works. Nonetheless, Uniwide
cites Article 1724 of the New Civil Code 10 as basis for its claim that
it is not liable to pay for additional works it did not authorize or
agree upon in writing.
10 Art. 1724. The contractor who undertakes to build a structure or any other work
for a stipulated price, in conformity with plans and specifications agreed upon with
the landowner, can neither withdraw from the contract nor demand an increase in the
price on account of the higher cost of labor or materials, save when there has been a
change in the plans and specifications, provided:(1)
Such change has been
authorized by the proprietor in writing; and
(2)
The additional price to be paid to the contractor has been determined in
writing by both parties.
Uniwide, as the owner who did pay the contractor for such
additional works even if they had not been authorized in
writing, has to establish its own right to reimbursement not
under Art. 1724, but under a different provision of law.
Uniwides burden of establishing its legal right to
reimbursement becomes even more crucial in the light of
the general presumption in Section 3(f), Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court that money paid by one to another was due
to the latter.
It is alleged by Uniwide that Titan failed to submit any asbuilt plans for Project 2, such plans allegedly serving as a
condition precedent for payment. SC said the submission of
these plans were not necessary.
Uniwide claims that Titan had substantially overcharged
Uniwide for Project 2. The SC upheld the findings of the
CIAC and held Uniwide liable for the amount agreed upon in
the parties agreement. Claims of connivance or fraudulent
conspiracy between Titan and Uniwides representatives
which allegedly grossly exaggerated the price may properly
be dismissed for not being supported by evidence.
Furthermore, Uniwide alleged that the works performed
were structurally defective, as evidenced by the structural
damage on four columns as observed on ocular inspection
by the CIAC and confirmed by Titans project manager. Court
agreed with the CIAC that there was no structural defect.
o Uniwide had the burden of proving that there was
defective construction in Project 2 but it failed to
discharge this burden. The concrete slab placed by
Titan was not attached to the old columns where
cracks were discovered. The CIAC held that the posttensioning of the new concrete slab could not have
caused any of the defects manifested by the old
columns. What was being passed off as a defective
construction, was in fact an old column. The SC is
bound by this finding of fact.
PEOPLE V CASABUENA
BRION, J., 2014:
Facts:
1. Rosalinda Casabuena was charged with violation of RA 9165
for the illegal sale of shabu, and sentenced to life.
2. She was caught in a buy buys operation with a certain
Armando Joaquin acting as the poser buyer.
3. Prosecutions version:
a. A certain Armando was a walk-in informant who told
police officer Balolong that Casabuena was selling
shabu. They set up an entrapment team, with
Armando as the poseur-buyer. Armando went inside
Casabuenas house, tried to buy the drugs, then
went out to make the pre-arranged signal. Balolong
and the other cops went inside, forced Casabuenas
hand, and took the money. Note that Balolong did not
see the transaction between Armando and
Casabueno and that Armando was a walk-in
informant.
4. Defense story:
a. Casabuena was taking a bath when she heard a male
voice looking for her. Someone kicked the bathroom
door open, the cops came in, asked where the money
was (which confused her, since shes allegedly
innocent), then brought her to the precinct.
Casabuena alleges that the cops did not sign any
confiscation receipt and that she was innocent.
5. RTC: guilty.
6. CA: guilty.
Issue: Is she guilty? No. Acquitted.
Ratio:
The PDIC discovered the loans in Timmys and Asia Textile were
released in managers checks to Zeta International and Philippine
Recyclers, said checks thereafter deposited to the account of
respondent Jose Go. The PDIC filed two counts for estafa against Go
and two others in the Office of the City Prosecutor. The respondents
filed a demurrer to the evidence, which the RTC granted, and which
is now the subject of appeal, after being upheld by the CA.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not the prosecution sufficiently proved
estafa YES, the prosecution successfully proved that the elements
of estafa were present.
ROSAROSO V. SORIA
GR No. 194846 / 19 Jun 2013 / J. Mendoza
FACTS
Properties in dispute (parcels of land in Daan Bantayan,
Cebu City) were acquired by Luis and Honorata, who had nine
children.
TOPICAL:
1. As to the 2nd element of estafa (misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by the offender, or
denial on his part of such receipt) the evidence establishes
Evidence Rule 130 sections 25-34 Page 37 of 53
following children:
Respondents' version
Lucila and Laila
Petitioners were estopped from questioning the second sale
the title with the Register of Deeds and the first sale was not
registered.
Lourdes
The first sale had no consideration. Her and Luis' signature
that the first sale was void because they failed to prove that
they tendered consideration (a point later reversed by the
SC).
CA relied on testimony of Lourdes that petitioners did not
ISSUE
1 W/N the first sale to petitioners was void for lack of
consideration. NO
2 W/N Meridian was a buyer in good faith. NO.
3 W/N the second sale was void. YES (no subject matter)
Cast of Characters:
Siain Enterprises (debtor) engaged in wholesale trading
Yuyek Manufacturing (another company owned by Cua Le Leng)
Cua Le Leng President and Majority Shareholder of both
companies
Wilfredo Lim common law husband of Cua Le Leng
Facts:
(1) Prior to 1995, Siain Enterprises and Cupertino Realty and
their respective Presidents have had transactions with each
other, wherein Cupertino constituted checks, debit memos,
and the pledges of the jewelries, condominium units and
trucks in favor of Siain, Yuyek, Cua Le Leng, and Wilfredo
Evidence Rule 130 sections 25-34 Page 39 of 53
ITC:
(1) Recipients of the proceeds were Siain and Yuyek (both
companies owned and run by Cua Leleng), Cua Leleng
herself, and her common law husband Alberto Lim.
(2) These entities are related because:
a. Siain and Yuyek have [a] common set of
[incorporators], stockholders and board of directors;
b. They have the same internal bookkeeper and
accountant in the person of Rosemarie Ragodon;
c. They have the same office address at 306 Jose Rizal
St., Mandaluyong City;
d. They have the same majority stockholder and
president in the person of Cua Le Leng; and
e. Relation to Siain Transport, Cua Le Leng had the
unlimited authority by and on herself, without
authority from the Board of Directors, to use the
funds of Siain Trucking to pay the obligation incurred
by the [petitioner] corporation.
f. As common law husband, it appears that Alberto Lim
received the checks and debit memos on behalf of
his wife or her alter ego corporations.
(3) The same principle applies to respondent CUPERTINO and its
President who are also mere alter egos of each other. So
any amounts issued by the President were on behalf of the
corporation and vice versa.
ELENA DUARTE V. MIGUEL DURAN
Side Issue: Siain also argued that parol evidence rule is not
applicable to the Amended Real Estate Mortgage (most likely
because it was partially executed already) such that it should be
(2011)
Facts:
(1) Feb 14, 2002. Duran offered to sell a laptop computer to
Duarte through Dy for the amount of P15,000.
(2) Duran left the laptop with Duarte for a trial period of 2 days
while the latter was deciding whether or not she would but
it.
(3) 2 days later she allegedly agreed to buy it on installments.
a. Duarte paid Duran P5,000 down payment
b. Promised to pay P3,000 on Feb 18, 2002, and the
balance of P7,000 to be paid on March 15, 2002.
(4) Feb 18, 2002 Duarte paid Dy the P3,000 installment and
Dy signed the handwritten receipt as proof of payment.
(5) Dy returned on March 15, 2002 but Duarte ONLY paid P2,000
claiming that the laptop was worth P10,000
(6) Duran thru counsel sent a demand letter for the balance
(7) Duarte CLAIMS
a. That she did not issue the handwritten receipt for
P3,000
b. That she did not receive a demand letter
c. That there was NO contract of sale since it was
really a LOAN to Dy in the amount of P8000
(P5000 + P3000) with the laptop as collateral
coupled with an option to buy. However, since
Duarte refused to buy the laptop, the loan is now due
and demandable.
(8) ACTION: Collection of Sum of Money. Duran v. Duarte.
MTC: In favor of Duran. Gave credence to testimonies of Duran
and Dy that there was a contract of sale. Actual damages P7K, Atty
Fees P5K, Expesnes P3K.
ISSUES:
Substantive: (1) WON there was contract of sale (Yes) (2) WON
entitled to attorneys fees and litigation expenses. (Yes) |
Procedural: WON petition for review filed on time (Yes)
Duarte Argues
(1) No Contract of Sale
a. Duran failed to present a WRITTEN CONTRACT
b. Under the Statute of Frauds, to be enforceable must
be in writing
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/sep2011/gr_1
73038_2011.html - fnt43
(2) Receipt was not an actionable document, thus no need to
deny under oath its genuineness and due execution.
(3) Denial of receipt of demand letter shifts burden of proof to
Duarte to prove that she received it.
(4) Atty Fees and Expenses were excessive since they comprise
70% of the principal amount claimed by Duran.
(5) Petition for Review with the CA on June 1, 2004 was beyond
the reglementary period. Copy of the RTC Decision on March
25, 2004, filed an MR April 12, 2004 since April 9 and 10
were holidays and April 11, 2004 was a Sunday, and
received a copy of the RTC Order denying his MR on May 27,
2004. Thus, he only had one day left from May 27, 2004
within which to file a Petition for Review with the CA.
Duran Argues
(2) Denial of the receipt of the demand letter dated July 29,
2002 cannot overcome the presumption that the said letter
was received in the regular course of mail.
(3) Statute of Frauds does not apply in the instant case.
(4) Award of attorneys fees and litigation expenses are not
excessive and that the factual and legal bases of the award
were stated in the body of MTCC Decision.
(5) Fresh Period Rule gives him additional 15 days from receipt
of RTC order.
SC: Upheld CA decision in favor of Duran.
RE contract of sale
(1) Elements: A contract of sale is perfected the moment the
parties agree upon the object of the sale, the price, and the
terms of payment, regardless of form.
(2) Statute of Frauds does not apply in the present case the
contract of sale had been partially executed and possession
already transferred to Duarte and the partial payments
made by her.
(3) Preponderance of evidence that there was an oral
contract of sale,
a. Durans own affidavit,
b. Affidavit of his witness Dy
c. Receipt dated February 18, 2002
d. Demand letter dated July 29, 2002.
(4) No other evidence submitted by Duarte except for bare
denials.
(5) Alleged loan was a mere afterthought since it appears that
from the time she allegedly decided not to buy the laptop up
to the time the instant case was filed against her, she did
not exert any effort to recover from respondent the payment
of the alleged loan.
RE receipt
(1) NOT an actionable document
(2) However, it corroborates the testimonies of Duran and his
witness Dy that there was an oral contract of sale between
the parties.
RE demand letter
Evidence Rule 130 sections 25-34 Page 43 of 53
that his first marriage was invalid for he has not heard from
Rubylus for 20 years due to imprisonment for Estafa.
SECOND DIVISION
TC: bigamy affirmed. That the absence of his wife for 20 years even
if true did not exculpate him from bigamy.
G.R. No. 165842
EDUARDO P. MANUEL V PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
November 29, 2005
Eduardo was charged with bigamy for being married to Rubylus and
contracting a second marriage with Tina Gandalera Manuel whom
he met in Dagupan
Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while
Eduardo was 39.
Eduardo went to Baguio City her hometown to visit her. Eduardo
proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was
single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet
Tinas parents, and was assured by them that their son was still
single. They were happy during the first 3 years, but then in
January 2001, Eduardo left. In August 2001, Tina secured from the
NSO a certificate saying that Eduardo had already been married.
Eduardo meanwhile alleged that Tina was a GRO, that he informed
her of his previous marriage, that she cheated as proof of a love
bite, and that he stated that he was single because he believed
CA: affirmed TC but ruled that there should have been a judicial
declaration of presumptive death.
ISSUES
I
WON the wife could be presumed dead under Article
390? amended
With the effectivity of the Family Code, the period of seven years
under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code was
reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse present
may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must institute
summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death
of the absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the
reappearance of the absentee spouse.
This provision is intended to protect the present spouse from
a criminal prosecution for bigamy under Art. 349 of the
Revised Penal Code because with the judicial declaration
that the missing spouses presumptively dead, the good faith
of the present spouse in contracting a second marriage is
already established
What evidence must be adduced? A decision of a competent
court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as
required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation
to Article 41 of the Family Code
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Assailed is the August 10, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 81657 which reversed the October 29, 2003
Decision and February 2, 2004 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 89 finding petitioner Francisco N. Villanueva
entitled to damages. Also assailed is the October 16, 2007
Resolution2 denying the motion for reconsideration.
Francisco N. Villanueva, then Assistant Manager for Operations of
Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation-Channel 13 (IBC-13) was
dismissed from employment on the ground of loss of confidence for
selling forged certificates of performance. He filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal before the NLRC
Pending the labor case, irregularities in IBC-13 were published in
Manila Times,Phil Star and Manila Bulletin
Virgilio P. Balaguer, then President of IBC-13, was quoted to have
said that he uncovered various anomalies in IBC-13 about an
operations executive selling forged certificates of performance who
was dismissed
In the Manila Times, on July 18, 1992:3
Anomalies at IBC-13 uncovered
INSIDER pilferage, malversation, overpricing and other
irregularities have cost government-owned Intercontinental
Broadcasting Corporation (IBC) 13 more than P108 million in losses
for the period 1986-1989.
Gil P. Balaguer, IBC president, uncovered the anomalies after a long
and painstaking investigation when he took over the company in
1990.
The investigation uncovered irregularities ranging from selling
forged certificates of performance (CPs) to non-remittance of sales
collections, illegal and unauthorized airing of movie trailer
advertisements (MTAs), illegal leasing of electricity and machines
to "friendly clients," millions worth of undocumented transactions
IBC has had four presidents since 1986 after the EDSA revolution.
Balaguer is the fifth president.
A special investigative committee helped Balaguer uncover the
anomalies in IBC. It led to the dismissal of an operations executive
who sold forged certificates of performance, a former supervisor
who pocketed IBCs sales collections, and station managers who
did not remit payments on radio advertisements.
Other anomalies committed against the government station
include the loose issuance of technical facilities orders (TFOs)
which practically leased the networks broadcast facilities to a
"friendly client" for free.
Balaguer, sources said, succeeded in staying as president because
of his technical expertise in media and communications and his
"managerial will" to cleanse the ranks of the firm. (Emphasis
supplied)
In the Philippine Star, on July 18, 1992:4
The labor arbiter then found the dismissal illegal and so did the
NLRC. However the commission found that IBC did it in good faith.
The parties entered into a compromise agreement with IBC
proposing a scheme of paying the monetary claims arising from the
labor case.
ISSUES:
1.
Facts
NOT HEARSAY
o
o
Tecla:
o 1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno [sister
Eustaqio] , Climaco Avenido and Tecla herself
o 2) Documentary evidence such as the following:
of
Peregrina
o Testified that Tecla was once a common law wife of
Eustaquio.
o Documentary evidence
1) 1979 Marriage Contract
2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March
1985 declaring himself as single when he
contracted marriage with the petitioner although
he had a common law relation with one Tecla
Hoybia with whom he had 4 children
3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April
2002, addressed to the Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of Alegria, Surigao del Norte;
4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by
Colita P. Umipig, in her capacity as the Civil
Registrar of Alegria, Surigao del Norte.
RTC dismissed the case for failure of Tecla to present the
marriage certificate
CA ruled in favor of Tecla. Marriage to Ate P was bigamous.
o RTC erred when it disregarded
(1) the testimonies of
[Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who
testified that she personally witnessed the
wedding celebration of her older brother
EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla];